Case 5. A Debt Probably Paid

Caius confessed to Titius, a new confessor, that he had paid a debt of five pounds sterling with doubtful money. Titius remembered that a similar case gives theologians occasion for dispute, but, since he did not retain the certain solution in his memory, he asked Caius to return to him the following week. Meanwhile, he proposed the question for solution to two fellow priests. The first replied that a certain obligation cannot be fulfilled by an uncertain payment, and therefore the whole debt must be paid again. The other, however, replied that, since payment was probably made, nothing remained to be done. Titius, therefore, still doubtful about the answer to be given to Caius, asks:

1. In what does the principal difference between probabilism and equiprobabilism consist?

2. Is it lawful to use probabilism where there is question of probable injury to another?

3. How can probabilism be called a universal rule for forming conscience when it cannot be applied to many cases?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What is the chief difference between probabilism and equiprobabilism? In spite of theoretical differences on the question of the chief formula employed to form a conscience in case of uncertain and conflicting opinions about the lawfulness of an action, in practice there is virtual agreement between moderate probabilists and equiprobabilists on the main point. This is seen in the doctrine and practical solutions which are common to both schools. However, there is a difference of some importance between them on a subsidiary rule. When it is solidly probable that a law has ceased to bind, either because it is probably abrogated or because it has probably been complied with, probabilists deny that any obligation remains in such circumstances. On the other hand equiprobabilists affirm that the obligation remains until it has been complied with for certain, or at least until it is certainly more probable that it has been complied with. They admit that St. Alphonsus followed other probabilists in this question in the earlier editions of his “Moral Theology,” but they assert that he afterward changed his opinion. The chief reason alleged for their doctrine by equiprobabilists is the principle of possession — in doubt the condition of him who is in possession is the stronger. Therefore, they conclude, when it is not practically certain that the law has been complied with, inasmuch as it is in possession, the obligation still remains. Probabilists deny that the law can be said to be in possession when there is a solidly probable opinion that it has been complied with or has ceased to exist. In order that the principle of possession may be applied the possession must be a certain fact, and it is not a certain fact if it has probably ceased. Furthermore, the principle is applicable in its proper sense to a case of negative doubt, and when there is a probable opinion against the obligation, it is not a case of merely negative doubt.

2. See the answer to this question, p. 54.

3. See the answer to this question, p. 55.

4. The case. Caius confesses to Titius his confessor that he has paid a debt of five pounds with money which was probably false. In doing this he committed a sin against justice, and he should repent of it. As there was a probability that the money paid was false, it was not worth five pounds, and so Caius did not pay his debt in full. But now, on the other hand, it is probable that the debt has been paid; has Caius any further obligation of making restitution? The creditor has not any certain right to further payment; he has by hypothesis probably received payment in full, and thus no certain obligation rests on Caius of making further restitution. He committed sin in exposing himself to the probable danger of injuring his neighbor, but as it is not certain that any injury was in fact inflicted on his neighbor, Caius is not now bound to make restitution.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book iii, p. 562.