Chapter II: On Oaths and Vows

Two secondary acts of religion are enumerated: oath, by which God is called as witness of truth, and vow, or a promise made to God. They are called secondary, not because they are less perfect than the acts described above, but because they are not so necessary for the exercise of religion.

We shall speak: 1. of its nature; 2. of its honesty; 3. of the obligation which it induces; 4. of adjuration, which is akin to oath.

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 89-90; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. V; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, lib. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 133-193; Bouquillon, n. 503-725; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 532-601; Muller, § 58-62; Lehmkuhl, n. 405-427; Noldin, n. 243-260; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, 4th Conference, p. 123; Codex, c. 1316 sq.

943. 1. Notion. An oath, which is also called a sacrament, is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of those things which are said or promised. When men wish to confirm the truth of the things which they say, they are accustomed to bring in witnesses for confirming the matter. But sometimes the matter of which there is question cannot be fully proved by human testimony, because it is hidden or future: then not rarely, especially if there is question of a momentous matter, God Himself is invoked as witness so that, when it pleases Him, whether in this or in the other life, He may confirm the hidden truth.

Therefore two things are required for an oath: (a) invocation of the divine name, either express or tacit, namely through external signs sufficiently expressing this invocation, such as the touching of the cross or of the Gospel, or the extension of the hand toward a crucifix. The word I swear does not of itself suffice for an oath, unless from the context or other adjuncts it is clear that God is truly invoked. Likewise, to swear by creatures or saints does not suffice, unless, from the adjuncts, the creatures have a special relation to God, so that their invocation is deservedly held as the invocation of the divine name.

(b) Besides, the calling upon God as witness of the truth declared is required, and therefore the intention of obliging oneself to speaking the truth; for the end of this invocation is the confirmation of the truth which is asserted. Psychologically the matter is declared thus: when the one swearing, who is supposed to fear God, confirms by oath the things which he says, he is judged sincerely to declare the truth: for he invokes God as witness, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, and is accustomed strictly to chastise the perjured, if not in the present life, at least in the other life. But, as is clear, the force of this confirmation arises from faith in God the rewarder, and therefore the oaths of atheists lack it.

944. Applications. (a) Among oaths these or similar expressions cannot be enumerated: by my faith, by the faith of a man, by the faith of a priest, by my honor, because then only the conscience, honor, veracity of man is called upon; otherwise if it were said: by the Christian faith. (b) To say: it is as true as it is true that God exists, or as true as the Gospel, is not of itself an oath, since God is not invoked as witness; nor generally is it heretical blasphemy, since the speaker does not will to equate the certainty of his own assertion to the truth of the Gospel; but, if it is brought forth for the sake of confirming a lie, it is not excused from simple blasphemy, since injury is inflicted upon God. (c) These formulas: may I die, may the devil snatch me, if this is not true, are not properly oaths, unless, from the adjuncts, there is the intention of calling upon God, but imprecations; otherwise, if it were said: may God destroy me if I lie: for then there is an execratory oath, by which God is invoked as the avenger of perjury. (d) Uncivil words, which the common people improperly call oaths (pardi, parbleu, sacristi, sacredii, etc.), although etymologically certain ones import blasphemy, are generally neither blasphemies nor oaths, the intention of the speakers being considered; but, according to common estimation, they are nothing other than meaningless words brought forth by an angry person; yet a Christian man will carefully try to avoid them.

945. 2. Divisions. (a) By reason of the object about which it is concerned, an oath is assertory, if God is invoked as witness of a past or present thing, for example, I swear that I saw Paul standing there, I swear that I am a cleric; or promissory, if He is invoked as witness of a future thing, for example, God is witness to me that I will give you one hundred coins: it is called promissory, because it is generally applied to confirming a promise.

(b) By reason of form, it is called invocatory, or contestatory, when God is simply invoked as witness; imprecatory, or execratory, when He is invoked not only as witness, but as avenger of perjury, namely when the one swearing imprecates evils upon himself or his own, if he asserts a false thing or does not keep what he promises, for example, may God destroy me, if I do not speak the truth. - The formula: so may God help me and these holy Gospels, approaches an imprecatory oath, and the sense is: if I speak the truth, may God help me; if a false thing, may God deprive me of His help.

(c) By reason of the mode in which it is uttered, it is simple, if it is made without any apparatus; solemn, if with special ceremonies, for example, by touching the Gospel, raising the hand, before a crucifix, with candles lit, etc.

Moreover these diverse oaths are of the same moral species, since all agree in the invocation of the divine name, and differ only accidentally.

946. Certain heretics contended that oath is prohibited under the new law, among whom were the Waldenses and certain Protestants, such as the Quakers, relying on these words of the Lord: "Again you have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not forswear thyself... But I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech be: yea, yea; no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil."² Nevertheless not only Catholics, but most Protestants, hold that an oath is licit, certain conditions being posited.

² Matt. 5:33-37.

947. 1. Thesis: An oath, clothed with the due conditions, is honest and laudable.

(A) That oath was in use under the old Law and approved by God Himself is clear from many texts:³ "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and shalt swear by His name." In the new law likewise oath is often exhibited as something honest, used by the apostles; thus Paul writes:⁴ "For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the Gospel of His Son, that without ceasing I make a commemoration of you... But I call God to witness... For God is my witness, how I long after you all in the bowels of Jesus Christ." Wherefore, unless a contradiction is admitted between the words of Christ and the words of Paul, it must be said that the passage cited above is to be understood of the prohibition of swearing without cause, without necessity; for in common circumstances it is not necessary to confirm by oath the truth of the things which are said; for Christians ought to be so sincere that, even without any oath, their words are believed confidently.

³ Deut. 6:13; cf. Josh. 9:15; Judg. 21:5; Ps. 14:4 and 62:18, etc.

⁴ Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23; Phil. 1:8.

(B) The practice of the Church has approved this interpretation; for in judgments, whether ecclesiastical or secular, oath is frequently used, either so that witnesses may be induced by religion to manifest the truth completely, or to strengthen an argument otherwise incomplete. And deservedly; for, provided God is invoked as witness of the truth brought forth not frequently, but only in a matter of great moment, no irreverence is committed against Him, but on the contrary His supreme veracity is acknowledged, and His justice, which strictly pursues and chastises perjury. Wherefore in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is read:⁵ "For men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy."

⁵ Heb. 6:16.

948. 2. Conditions, moreover, are required for the liceity of an oath. Three are deduced from this text of Jeremiah,⁶ namely truth, judgment, and justice: "And thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice."

⁶ Jer. 4:2.

(A) Truth, that is, conformity of words with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes a lie in asserting or promising, and fiction, or an oath uttered without the mind of swearing or obliging oneself.

(a) He who by oath confirms that which he knows to be false commits the mortal sin of perjury, because he commits grave irreverence against God, bringing Him in as witness of falsity. Nor does lightness of matter excuse here; for, even in light or joking matter, it is gravely repugnant to invoke God as witness of falsity. Therefore this proposition 24 was deservedly reproved by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He wills or can damn a man."⁷

⁷ Apud Denzinger, n. 1041; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) It is not licit to swear with only probable knowledge of the matter, but moral certainty is required, namely that against which no prudent doubt fights; one swearing with prudent doubt concerning the truth sins mortally, because he inflicts grave irreverence upon God, by invoking Him as witness of something about which he doubts.

949. (c) Nor is it licit to swear with a mental restriction whose sense cannot be detected; indeed not even with a mental restriction whose sense can be detected, except from a most grave cause: for the former restriction is a lie; the latter is a distorted mode of speaking, which, when an oath accedes to it, can be used only in a case of true necessity, namely when there is no other means of protecting oneself or others against unjust aggression or a most grave evil.⁸ - Therefore these propositions were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI:

⁸ For understanding this, see what we wrote concerning lying, De Justitia, n. 408-417. - If the theory of equivocations and restrictions is rejected, and with moderns it is admitted that false speech is licit in a case of necessity, it must be said that false speech cannot be confirmed by oath, unless when there is no other means of averting a most grave harm, for example the death of an innocent person.

26. "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he in reality does not lie, nor is he perjured."⁹

⁹ Here there is question, from the context, of a purely mental restriction, whose sense cannot be detected by a prudent man.

27. "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for the health of the body, honor, preserving family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

28. "He who, by means of custom or gift, has been promoted to a magistracy or public office, will be able with mental restriction to take the oath which, by command of the king, is customarily exacted from similar persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one exacting it: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."¹⁰

¹⁰ As Viva testifies (on this proposition), thus is condemned the practice of those who use equivocation whenever, by command of legitimate authority, they swear that they were not promoted because of recommendations or gifts.

950. (d) He who promises something by oath without the intention of swearing or obliging himself, and therefore simulates an oath, commits a grave sin from its genus; for although he does not emit an oath, he uses the name of God in vain, and deceives others. Wherefore if this is done before a judge, or in contracts, the sin is grave. But in other matters of slight moment, the sin is probably light, according to many theologians, because it is nothing other than the vain use of the name of God. But all fictions of this kind, as unworthy of an honorable man and easily drawing one to perjury, are altogether to be avoided. - But he who with the mind of swearing promises something, yet without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, since he brings God in as guarantor of a false promise.

951. (B) Justice, in an assertory oath, requires that the one swearing have the right of asserting what he says, and, in a promissory oath, that the thing promised be honest.

(a) Thus, in an assertory oath, he sins who manifests another's hidden crime without cause, or boasts of a sin committed: for he does not have the right of saying these things, nor, a fortiori, of confirming them by oath. Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the intention of the agent and on the gravity of the things which are said.

(b) In a promissory oath, he certainly sins mortally who swears that he will commit some grave thing: for he inflicts a grave injury upon God by making Him witness and, as it were, guarantor of this iniquity. But if the act which is promised under the faith of an oath is only venially evil, the malice against religion is probably only venial, although, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 146) and others, it is more probably mortal, on account of the injury inflicted upon God. Whatever the case, oaths of this kind are carefully to be avoided, not only because of the reverence due to God, but because they savor of foolishness: for who of sound mind can invoke God as witness of the promise of a thing less honest?

952. (C) Judgment, or discretion, requires two things, namely, that there be a just cause for swearing, and besides that the oath be furnished with that reverence, internal and external, which the divine majesty requires.

(a) Therefore they sin who frequently swear, without sufficient reason, that is, without necessity or great utility: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls... A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity, and a scourge shall not depart from his house. And if he make it void, his sin shall be upon him; and if he dissemble, he offendeth doubly; and if he swear in vain, he shall not be justified."¹ Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the frequency of the acts and on the intention of the agent; to swear once or twice without sufficient cause does not exceed venial sin, unless contempt of the divine majesty is present.

¹ Ecclus. 23:9-14.

(b) They also sin who utter oaths jokingly or in a manner little becoming. This happens by no means rarely when they are taken too frequently.² - Civil authority can indeed, from a just cause, exact an oath to be taken upon a book of Scripture; but it ought to permit Catholics to swear upon Catholic Bibles.³

² In the United States of America oaths are perhaps required too often in the matter of tributes and taxes; whence it happens that perjuries are easily committed in this matter. By a very excellent counsel all Christians ought to join their forces, so that they might obtain a change of the civil laws in this matter.

³ To the point, S. Cong. de Prop. Fide, Sept. 8, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1664): "It has been reported that, in several regions of India, Catholics have been accustomed, if an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the government... Therefore let all Apostolic Vicars, in whose missions use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed, diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful take an oath upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath."

953. Here there is question only of a promissory oath; for an assertory oath produces no obligation for the future, since it consists in the mere affirmation of some thing. - Every promise induces an obligation of justice or fidelity, according to the principles set forth in the Treatise on Justice, n. 677; when an oath accedes to this, it produces a new obligation of religion: of which we must now speak.

954. 1. The existence and gravity of this obligation: A promissory oath, concerning an honest thing, induces an obligation of religion, grave from its genus, for the one swearing. For the one swearing invokes God not only as witness of the promise, but also as guarantor of its execution; and therefore, from reverence toward God, he is bound to execute what was promised. - Nevertheless, he who utters the formula of an oath without the intention of swearing, whether from inadvertence or from deliberation, does not contract an obligation: say the same of him who does not have the intention of obliging himself; for in both cases one of the elements necessary either for an oath or for contracting an obligation is lacking.⁴

⁴ But what obligation is incumbent on him who emitted a promissory oath in favor of a third party can be inferred from what was said in the Treatise on Justice, n. 621.

(a) Moreover, the gravity of the obligation depends on the gravity of the thing promised; for since the one swearing is judged to have had a sincere will of fulfilling what was promised, he sins only insofar as he does not put the same into execution; but if the thing promised is of slight moment, its non-execution cannot be grave; for an oath does not change the nature of the act, but only adds to it an obligation of religion.

(b) The obligation of a personal oath belongs to the one swearing, and therefore does not pass to heirs, while the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise itself can be real and can pass to heirs (De Justitia, n. 679).

955. (c) An oath concerning an impossible, illicit, or plainly useless thing induces no obligation. For no one is held to the impossible; besides, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity, or even of a vain thing, which in no way turns to the honor of God. If the thing afterward becomes licit or useful, an oath which was null from the beginning does not revive: for that which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not made firm by the passage of time.⁵

⁵ Rule of law 18 in the Sext.

(d) From the Code, can. 1317, "an oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior." Nevertheless, from can. 1318, "a promissory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added. If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act consequently obtains no firmness."

956. 2. Concerning the extension and interpretation of this obligation.⁶ (A) The general principle is that the obligation of an oath does not extend more widely than the promise itself to which it accedes; for an oath is something accessory to the promise itself, which it confirms; but it is fitting that the accessory follow the nature of the principal.⁷ - Except if the one swearing intended the matter otherwise; for the extension of the obligation, like its existence, depends chiefly on the intention of the one swearing.

⁶ In the Treatise on Justice, n. 662-664, there is weighed what sort of obligation an oath adds to a contract.

⁷ Rule of law 42 in the Sext.

(B) Moreover, two particular rules are to be noted: (a) The obligation ought not be extended beyond the sense of the words strictly accepted. For hateful things are to be restricted; but an obligation which arises from an oath is judged hateful, as restricting liberty. Besides, an oath depends on the intention of the one swearing; but he is not judged to will to oblige himself beyond the expressed and strict sense of the words.

(b) A promissory oath is to be interpreted according to the conditions and restrictions which are understood from the nature of the matter, or from the principles of law, or from the common sense of prudent men. Moreover, the chief restrictions of this kind are the following: - if I am able, physically and morally; - without prejudice to the right of superiors, who from a just cause can invalidate the obligation or dispense in it; - if the matter has not been notably changed: for if it is notably changed, the intention of the one swearing did not extend to it; - if the other has kept faith: for in vain does someone ask that faith be kept toward himself by him toward whom he himself refuses to keep the faith pledged;⁸ - unless the other cedes his right: for since a promissory oath is made in favor of another, and this other can renounce his right, it is in some way subjected to his will; - unless there is a grave reason for changing the proposal: for if execution cannot take place without a grave danger of death, infamy, etc., not foreseen before, the one swearing is not judged to have willed to oblige himself.

⁸ Rule of law 75 in the Sext.

957. Corollaries. (a) An oath of observing the statutes of some college, congregation, office, etc., ought to be understood of statutes already issued, not of those to be issued, - of those which then are in force, not of those which have fallen into desuetude or are not observed by the greater part of the community, - and indeed in that manner in which the statutes oblige, that is, under grave sin, under light sin, or only to a penalty, according to the statutes themselves: for an oath does not change the nature of the obligation, but only adds to it the bond of religion.

(b) An oath of observing a secret does not oblige when the obligation of the secret itself ceases (De Justitia, n. 421-425).

(c) An oath of fidelity and obedience to some Prince or Government, or of observing a Constitution, does not oblige except according to the common sense of honorable men; accordingly it does not oblige one to embrace in mind all things which are contained in the Constitution, but only to undertake nothing illegitimately against the same.⁹

⁹ Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 660-714, discusses learnedly the various political oaths.

(d) An obligation induced by oath ceases: by the cessation of the end, - by condonation made by him in whose favor the oath was uttered, - by invalidation, or dispensation, or commutation, according to the principles set forth below, n. 990 sq.

958. 1. Notion and species. (A) Adjuration, which is akin to oath, is called the interposition of the divine name or of a sacred thing, by which someone is induced to do or omit something. Accordingly it differs from an oath, because God is not invoked as witness or guarantor, for confirming truth, but as a motive for obtaining something more efficaciously.

(B) It is deprecatory when it is made through prayers, for example: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God..."¹; thus also God Himself is sometimes prayed by way of adjuration, for example, through the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation, through Thy Passion, etc. - It is preceptive, or imperative, when it is made by command or mandate; for example, when the high priest said to Christ:² "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ." - God can be adjured only deprecatorily, because no one can command Him; the devil only imperatively, because he is not capable of deprecation; man both imperatively and deprecatorily, because he is capable both of command and of deprecation.

¹ Rom. 12:1.

² Matt. 26:63.

Adjuration is called solemn when it is made in the name of the Church, by ministers specially deputed, as in exorcisms; but private if it is employed in a private name.

959. 2. Principles. (A) Adjuration does not induce an obligation of religion in the person adjured: for it is not used for this, but for exciting in him fear or love of the divine name, by which he may be moved more easily and efficaciously to perform what is asked. If a subject is already bound to obey a superior, he ought indeed to comply with him, not by force of the adjuration, but by force of the precept joined with the adjuration.

960. (B) But on the part of the one adjuring, certain conditions are required so that he may act licitly; for on his part, adjuration is an act of religion, which ought to be adorned with the same qualities as an oath: (a) truth, insofar as the one adjuring ought to set forth only a true cause: from this head a fictitious poor man sins who, by God or by the Virgin, asks alms without cause; (b) justice, insofar as only a licit thing can be asked; (c) judgment, that is, for a reasonable motive, but not from vanity alone, or curiosity. The defect of these conditions is grave or light sin, according as the matter is grave or light. Thus a fictitious poor man who squeezes out a great sum of money, or who asks for a gravely illicit thing, sins mortally; but venially, if he solicits a modest alms, or induces to a light sin.

961. 1. The second precept forbids that the name of God be taken in vain:³ "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." And deservedly; for the name of God is holy, and ought to be pronounced only with due reverence. The same must be said, due proportion being observed, of the vain assumption of the names of saints, since irreverence toward the saints or sacred things ultimately redounds upon God.

³ Exod. 20:7.

This vain appellation of the divine name arises especially from a twofold cause: from anger, and from lightness or custom.

(A) From anger, when from commotion of mind one says, for example: the name of God, a thousand names of God! For the most part that usurpation does not exceed venial sin, because it proceeds from sudden and little deliberated commotion; nevertheless it could be mortal, on account of deliberate contempt of God, or scandal.

962. (B) From lightness, or custom, when without cause the name of God is frequently used in conversation, for example: My God! Great God! Good Jesus! Sweet mother of God! This frequent appellation is indeed reproved by Scripture:⁴ "Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth"; and in reality it bears before it some irreverence toward God and the saints. But it does not exceed venial fault, since in it there appears only a light disorder; indeed, it often is free from all fault, on account of inadvertence.

⁴ Ecclus. 23:10; cf. above, n. 952.

963. 2. But by no means is frequent invocation of the divine name from an internal sense of reverence and from devotion of heart prohibited; rather, it is commended. Thus in the Scriptures the prophets more often say: The Lord liveth; thus also today pious Christians greet one another with these words: Praised be Jesus Christ!

Wherefore it is permitted to conclude with the Catechism of the Council of Trent:⁵ "Then we venerate and worship the divine name when, by reason of office and religion, we celebrate the divine praises, and give Him singular thanks for all things, both prosperous and adverse... Therefore, when we are tortured by pains of soul and body, when we are tormented by miseries and afflictions, let us at once turn all the zeal and powers of our soul to praising God, saying that saying of Job:⁶ Blessed be the name of the Lord!"

⁵ Catechism, second precept of the Decalogue, n. 4.

⁶ Job 1:21.

964. Through an oath God is assumed as witness of the things which are asserted or promised; through a vow a promise is made to God Himself; for just as we promise something to men, so likewise also to God. Moreover, a promise made to the Lord is counted among the acts of religion, because it tends to furnish service to Him. We shall speak: 1. of the nature of a vow; 2. of its honesty and obligation; 3. of the cessation of this obligation.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88; Suarez, op. cit., tr. VI, l. 1-6; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 194-262; Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 302-502; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 602-710; Noldin, n. 209-242; Berardi, Praxis, t. I, n. 489-562; M. d'Hulst, Careme, 1893, 4th Conf., p. 131-145; Codex, c. 1307-15.

In order that the nature of a vow may be better understood, it is fitting to declare its notion and species.

A vow is commonly defined as a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Hence two things especially are desired for a vow: a true promise made to God, and apt matter. When these have been rightly set forth, it will easily be understood what conditions are required for its validity.

965. 1. A true promise made to God. (A) The promise of which there is question here is a sincere will of obliging oneself to do or omit something; accordingly it differs from a mere proposal, or intention of doing something, which is elicited without the will of assuming a true obligation. The faithful sometimes doubt whether they have emitted a proposal or a vow; for solving this doubt, attention must be paid not only to the words which they used, but also and especially to their intention. For not rarely the word "I promise before God" signifies nothing other than a proposal; indeed "I vow" does not necessarily import a vow; but if there is the intention of obliging oneself under penalty of sin, there is a vow, whatever words were employed.⁸ If, all things considered, the matter remains truly doubtful, in practice there is not a strict obligation of fulfilling the vow, because its existence is not established.

⁸ The will of fulfilling the thing promised is not essentially required for the existence and obligation of a vow, but it is required that the vow be honest and an act of religion; for he who intends to contract an obligation, but not to fulfill it, by no means honors God, but offends Him, and therefore commits a sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter itself.

966. (B) A promise of this kind ought to be true, or deliberate: for no one imposes upon himself any moral obligation unless he sincerely wills this; but for this there is required a deliberate volition, namely that which is necessary for a truly human act (above, n. 78-84). Indeed, since a vow is an act grave in itself, a greater deliberation is required for its validity than for other common acts; and the graver the obligations which it imposes, the greater deliberation it requires. Nevertheless, in order that a vow be valid, lengthy and mature deliberation is not necessary, but only that which, according to the common estimation of prudent men, is proportioned to the gravity of the obligation to be undertaken. But when mature deliberation is lacking, the obligation contracted is less strict, and is more easily dispensed or commuted.

Therefore invalid are vows emitted by children not yet perfectly masters of themselves, - by the half-drunk or half-asleep, - by those who are wholly ignorant of the obligations which vows induce, or conceive them only imperfectly and confusedly: for in these and similar adjuncts, there is not found a deliberation proportioned to the gravity of the obligation.

967. (a) But an attentive consideration of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but only of those which morally pertain to its substance. Thus he who emits religious vows, understanding sufficiently clearly what they substantially import, vows validly, even if he has not maturely considered all the burdens which naturally follow from them.

(b) Nor for a vow is there required an actual and explicit will of undertaking the obligation, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, provided it be true. A virtual will suffices, namely one which truly was had and still perseveres, although not actually elicited; thus an adolescent who freely resolves to receive the subdiaconate and, by force of this proposal, receives ordination, truly emits the vow of chastity, which he knows to be annexed to this order, even if at the time of ordination he does not actually think about it; the same must be said of him who emits religious profession. - An implicit will likewise suffices, namely one which is included in the general volition of undertaking all the obligations annexed to such a promise; thus he who wills to profess the religious state, by that very fact implicitly vows poverty, chastity, and obedience annexed to this profession, when he has sufficiently understood that all these things are included in the religious state.

968. (c) From this it also follows that all those impediments which harm the liberty of human acts obstruct the validity of a vow: if liberty is thoroughly destroyed, the vow is by that very fact invalid; if it is diminished, yet so that the one vowing enjoys liberty proportioned to the gravity of the obligation, the vow is indeed valid, but dispensation in it is easier.

1. Thus he who emitted a vow from error is not held to fulfill it, if the error is truly the cause of the vow, so that, the truth having been known, he would not have vowed the thing; for example, one who promises chastity, in no way knowing of what matter there is question, - one who vows a pilgrimage to a sanctuary which he thinks to be distant one hundred miles, while in reality it is distant one thousand, - one who vows a Mass for the health of his father, whom he falsely heard to be ill. - On the contrary, an error of less moment about the circumstances of the matter, knowledge of which would not have impeded the vow, does not render it invalid.

When there is question of religious vows, it is commonly held that they are not invalidated except by error concerning their substance: for since there is question of a complex of obligations, it suffices that their substance be sufficiently understood.

If an invalid vow is renewed because it was believed valid, by this it does not become firmer, because it was renewed only from error.

2. A vow emitted from grave fear unjustly inflicted for extorting the vow is not valid,⁹ because it lacks due liberty, and besides God cannot accept a promise of this kind, lest He seem to approve the very injury brought upon the one vowing. But it is otherwise if it is from light fear,¹⁰ or from fear justly inflicted, or not for extorting consent. Thus a vow emitted from fear of shipwreck or of another danger is valid: for then it is not made unwillingly, but from the soul, for obtaining the grace of safety.

⁹ This can be inferred from cap. 1 Perlatum, lib. I, tit. 40, and also from Trent, sess. XXV, c. 19.

¹⁰ Thus always in public vows; but in private vows, if it were established in fact that fear, even light fear, was the true and sole cause of vowing, the vow more probably would not be valid in the forum of conscience.

969. (C) A promise made to God: for a vow properly so called is an act of religion by which we furnish service to God and acknowledge His supreme dominion, and so it pertains to the worship of latria. Nevertheless, sometimes vows are said to be pronounced to the saints, that is, to God in honor of the saints, just as altars are dedicated to the saints, that is, to God in their honor: for the honor rendered to them redounds upon God Himself. - But if someone should directly intend to promise something to the saints themselves, it would not properly be a vow, but a religious promise, pertaining to the worship of dulia.

970. 2. Apt matter, that is, honest, concerning a better good, and possible.

(A) Honest, or morally good; for since a vow is emitted for furnishing service to God, nothing can be promised except a thing pleasing and acceptable to Him. Therefore a vow concerning a thing altogether indifferent is void, unless from the end or circumstances it becomes good: thus the one vowing sins venially, as taking the name of God in vain; and, a fortiori, a vow concerning a morally evil thing is void: thus the one vowing sins gravely in itself, unless he is excused by ignorance or inconsideration (as often happens), because he supposes that an evil thing can please God: which in itself brings a grave injury upon Him.

Here it is asked whether a vow of a good thing is valid, but from an end of the one vowing which is in some way evil. (a) It is indeed not valid, if the depraved intention is the motive and total cause of the vow, because then the act becomes totally evil (above, n. 150); for example, if someone vows alms that he may successfully commit injustice: for such an end renders the vow evil and impious. (b) But it is valid if the depraved intention is only the impulsive and partial cause of the vow, because then the whole act is not vitiated; for example, if someone vows alms both that he may please God and that he may be praised by men: for notwithstanding a vain intention of this sort, the action remains good in part and can be offered to God. - The same must be said concerning an evil condition added to a vow, for example, if someone promises a rich alms, on condition that he come out unharmed from a duel; for although the duel is evil, to preserve life unharmed is good, and the vow is not concerned with the evil thing, namely the duel, but with safety, which is certainly good.

971. (B) Concerning a better good, that is, concerning a work which is more perfect than its opposite, all the circumstances being considered; for since a vow is made for pleasing God, one cannot promise Him a good which impedes a greater good: for if a lesser good is promised, by that very fact the one vowing obliges himself to omit the greater: which surely cannot please God. Moreover, a better good must be estimated not only in itself and absolutely, but also in relation to the one vowing and all the adjuncts.

Thus a vow of marrying is not valid in itself, because it is opposed to a better good, namely virginity. But in special adjuncts matrimony can be the matter of a vow, for example, if someone, under the hope of matrimony, has corrupted some virgin, or if such a matrimony is very useful to the republic. Likewise a vow of not vowing is not valid in itself, because it concerns a lesser good; but a vow of not vowing except with the permission of a confessor is valid, since it is an act of prudence.

An action already prescribed can be the matter of a vow, because a thing prescribed is good; besides, from what is to be said, to do something from vow is better than to perform the same thing without vow. Nevertheless, that which already falls under a precept should not be vowed without reason, lest bonds be multiplied rashly in this way.

972. (C) Concerning a possible good, not only physically, but morally: because no one can oblige himself to the impossible.

Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones, is not valid, since this is impossible without a special privilege of God, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 63; but a vow of avoiding all fully deliberate venial sins is valid, because persons firmly rooted in virtue can fulfill this, with the help of grace; but such a vow cannot be permitted to others, since it is above their strength. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is also valid, but is by no means to be counseled to the frail, lest perhaps by violating it they commit a double sin.

Since the matter of a vow ought to be in the power of the one vowing, we cannot properly vow the deed of another, or something to be performed by another; thus a mother cannot vow that her son will enter religion. If in reality such a vow has been emitted, it ought to be explained thus: that the mind of the one vowing was to oblige herself to take care, insofar as she can, that the other perform it; but his liberty remains intact. Vows made by cities, monasteries, or colleges do not bind posterity, unless the obligation arises from elsewhere, for example from a statute, law, or custom having the force of law.

973. If the matter of a vow is partly possible and partly impossible, before all else the intention of the one vowing must be explored: if he promised both indivisibly, or in the manner of one thing, he is held to nothing when either part is impossible; otherwise, if he promised two things divisibly, or independently from one another, because the useful is not vitiated by the useless. If the intention of the one vowing is not established, it ought to be presumed from the matter itself of the vow: when this is divisible, the possible part must be fulfilled; thus he who vowed ten fasts, and can fulfill only two, is held to these two. If the matter is indivisible, or if the impossible part is altogether principal in relation to the other, no obligation subsists; thus he who vowed a Roman pilgrimage, and can travel only half the way, is held to nothing; but if he promised to make the journey on foot (which he cannot do), yet can easily go to Rome by railroad, he should indeed do this, since the Roman pilgrimage itself is principal, and the mode of going is accessory.

974. 1. By reason of the object about which it is concerned, a vow is: (a) personal, if the thing promised is some action to be placed or omitted, such as the recitation of some prayer, a pilgrimage, etc.; (b) real, when the thing promised is directly some thing external to the one vowing and estimable by price, such as alms, the donation of a chalice, etc.; (c) mixed, if the object of the vow is at the same time an action and a thing, for example, a vow of going to Loreto, and there offering a chalice.

2. By reason of duration, it is called temporary or perpetual according as it is promised to be observed for a certain time or throughout one's whole life.

975. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is made, it is called absolute or conditioned, according as it is made simply, without any restriction, or with some condition added: an example of this is had if someone vows a rich alms on condition that he receive such an inheritance. - If the condition added is joined by way of a penalty to be inflicted, the vow is penal, as if someone promises alms, on condition that he shall have relapsed into such a sin.

976. 4. By reason of form and effects, a vow is public when it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private; - solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple (Codex, c. 1308). - As to the fact, the Church regards two genera of vows as solemn: the vow of chastity emitted in sacred orders, and religious vows emitted in those orders which have been approved by the Church as solemn.

977. Hence arises the question, long debated among canonists and theologians, whence the solemnity of vows comes, or in what a solemn vow differs from a simple one. All today indeed confess that this distinction arises only from the authority of the Church, since neither Christ nor the Apostles established anything concerning this matter. This, moreover, Boniface VIII declared in the single chapter De Voto, in the Sext: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow has been found by the constitution of the Church alone"... Nevertheless it is further asked whether this solemnity is situated in the will alone of the Church, or in some special effect which, by the Church so establishing, has been annexed to a solemn vow.

(a) According to St. Thomas¹ and many others, the solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual consecration, by force of which the person or thing designated by the vow is thoroughly withdrawn from human uses and, of itself irrevocably, is dedicated to God, so that it cannot be converted to profane uses without sacrilege. (b) According to others,² however, the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow is merely external, and consists in this, that the Church dissolves solemn vows far more difficultly than simple ones. - Nevertheless we hold the former opinion, rightly understood, as the more probable; for, although the solemnity of vows depends on the Church, it produces some effects permanent in themselves which do not proceed from a simple vow: thus acts contrary to solemn vows are rendered not only illicit, but also invalid; for example, a marriage contracted by him who has emitted a solemn vow of chastity is invalid. This can be declared thus: just as, in civil matters, those contracts are called solemn in the making of which public authority intervenes, which confers upon them a special firmness on account of the public good; so likewise, in our matter, the public authority of the Church intercedes, so that it may concede a special indissolubility to solemn vows, which it publicly recognizes as such. Moreover this indissolubility proceeds from this, that publicly, and from the very authority of the Church accepting and confirming the vows emitted, persons vowing are consecrated to God in a special and indissoluble manner, as regards those acts which they promised to do or omit.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 7 and 9; Lehmkuhl, n. 500.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 603; Noldin, n. 210.

Moreover, since this indissolubility arises from the authority of the Church, it is not so firm that dispensation cannot be made in it from a most grave cause.

978. 1. Errors. Many Protestants, from the fact that they reject the distinction between precepts and counsels, contend that vows concerning things not prescribed, from the motive of worshiping God, are not only illicit, but impious, since they suppose that there are certain supererogatory works which are by no means owed to God. Nevertheless, they concede that the same vows are licit if they are made from another motive, for example, for the sake of avoiding sin, or of freeing oneself from the bonds of the world. - Today, however, not a few rationalists and politicians reprove all vows, especially religious and perpetual vows, as harmful to liberty and to society: for since man is essentially mutable and progressive, no one can abdicate his liberty, especially in perpetuity; besides, religious, by vowing poverty, obedience, and chastity, become not only useless to society, but even harmful: for they produce nothing, and by their example draw others to idleness under the pretext of contemplation. - Hence we shall premise a few things concerning the honesty and excellence of vows.

¹ St. Thomas vindicated the excellence of religious vows in two opuscule works: Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem; Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu (Works, ed. Vives, t. XXIX).

979. 2. Thesis: Vows prudently emitted, from the motive of worshiping God, are honest and laudable.

(A) That vows made in honor of God are acceptable to Him and are commended by Him is clear from many texts of Scripture: the Patriarchs emit vows, and on account of this are blessed by Him;² in the Mosaic law, prescriptions are established concerning the fulfillment of vows: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it: and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin. If thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin."³ Although vows do not fall under precept, as is clear from the words just cited, nevertheless elsewhere they are commended:⁴ "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God." - Under the new law, the Apostles are presented as paying vows;⁵ and many Fathers understood of the vow of chastity the words of Paul concerning younger widows, who have made void their first faith.⁶

² Gen. 28:20.

³ Deut. 23:21-22.

⁴ Ps. 75:12.

⁵ Acts 18:18; 21:23.

⁶ 1 Tim. 5:12.

980. (B) Wherefore, already in the first centuries of the Church, vows were in use, especially the vow of chastity, and afterward the three vows of religious. Thus Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome wrote entire treatises on virginity, insofar as it is confirmed by vow. Let Augustine be heard addressing the spouses Armentarius and Paulina, who by mutual consent had emitted a vow of chastity: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to recede from the vow), but I deter thee from great iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this kind. For then thou wouldst have been lesser, not worse; but now so much the more miserable, which may God avert, if thou shalt break the same to God, as thou art happier if thou shalt pay it. Nor therefore should it repent thee to have vowed; rather rejoice that now that is not licit for thee which would have been licit to thy loss... Happy is the necessity which compels to better things."⁷ - Wherefore the Church approved the vows of religious, condemned their impugners,⁸ and, against Protestants, in a general manner defined the honesty of vows thus:⁹ "If anyone shall say that men are to be so recalled to the remembrance of baptism received that they understand all vows which are made after baptism to be void by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as if by them both the faith which they professed and baptism itself were detracted from, let him be anathema."

⁷ St. Augustine, Epist. 127, Migne, P.L., XXXIII, 487. - Cf. St. Jerome to Eustochium on the custody of virginity, P.L., t. XXII, 394-425.

⁸ In Denzinger, n. 497-499.

⁹ Trent, sess. VII, De Baptismo, can. 9; Denzinger, n. 746.

981. (C) Reason itself shows that vows, prudently emitted, turn to the glory of God and to the utility of those vowing. (a) To the glory of God; for man, offering and promising to God a thing pleasing and better to Him, studies to please Him and acknowledges His supreme dominion; but because he cannot fulfill the vow except by renouncing his own will and pleasure, at the same time he offers an internal sacrifice and spiritual hosts by which God is worshiped most greatly. - Even conditioned vows, by which something is promised if God grants such a grace, glorify Him, although less perfectly than absolute vows; for thus it is acknowledged that God provides for human affairs, and that one must flee to Him so that opportune helps may be obtained in temporal or spiritual matters. - Nevertheless that mercenary disposition of soul by which something is never vowed to God or to the saints except for obtaining some temporal advantage should by no means be commended; they act much more perfectly who vow something to God absolutely, confidently awaiting from Him whatever it shall please Him to repay at the opportune time.

(b) To the utility of those vowing; for since human nature is weak and inconstant, it greatly benefits, in certain adjuncts, to furnish it strength and firmness by binding oneself to more perfect things through a vow: for thus the will is strengthened and confirmed in good; since an honorable man is, as it were, compelled by a sense of honor to execute promises seriously made; and, if there is question of promises made to God, he is induced gently and strongly by the virtue of religion to fulfill them. Wherefore he will employ every fortitude to overcome difficulties and execute the thing, and thus his powers for doing good will be doubled. Besides, God Himself, in whose honor the vow was emitted, will not disdain to assist the one vowing by His powerful virtue, and from this head his strength will be increased not a little.

982. The adversaries indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows, since thus the moral power of choosing between contraries is taken away. - The argument is retorted; for the same can be said of all human promises and contracts; for by these the power of choosing is restricted, since the contracting parties impose true obligations upon themselves, whether for a time or in perpetuity. - Therefore the adversaries falsely suppose that liberty is diminished or destroyed by a moral obligation; on the contrary, we are the freer the more faithfully and perfectly we fulfill our duties. For although we have the power of choosing between good and evil, we do not lose this by choosing good, which perfects our nature, but use it well. Is not liberty, on the contrary, diminished when, serving passions and pleasures, contrary to the dictate of right reason, we desire evil? Therefore they are freer who, their passions having been subdued, fulfill their duties more frequently and perfectly. But those who not rashly but prudently, not quickly but after mature deliberation, spontaneously oblige themselves to doing something better, far from binding their liberty with new bonds, become freer: for they bid farewell to pleasures, that they may serve right reason and God Himself more faithfully. - Thus certainly do they judge who, after a long life spent in the practice of virtue, are no longer drawn to evil by the vehement impulse of the passions.¹⁰

¹⁰ M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, p. 134-136, eloquently declares this as follows: "The vow an enemy of liberty? But do you not perceive the equivocation? Liberty, that is, the right to do: yes, this liberty, which after all is only a benefit, is restricted by the vow. What was permitted is so no longer. But since when is it a moral diminishment to renounce a benefit? Is not everything great in the world of souls made of this stuff? Do you wish to see whom the vow profits? Look at whom it saddens. It saddens egoism, the need to enjoy, to seize goods. Ah! if egoism is not satisfied, so much the better; it is that virtue triumphs... The power of choosing one's acts, that is free will; and such is the moral signification of the word liberty. Well then, this power, where is it exercised, where is it affirmed more? Speak; I appeal to your consciences. Is it in enjoyment permitted, or in enjoyment sacrificed? Ah! in enjoyment permitted, I am not very sure of being free. Perhaps I grant it to myself because it is permitted; then it is a good act; but perhaps I yield to its attractions because it is enjoyment, and then I am no longer free, I am dragged along. If on the contrary I react; if, by going back up the current of my covetous desires, I pass even beyond the line of duty; if I venture, bold and proud, into the regions of perfection; if I do more; if, modest as much as strong, I distrust, in my fervor of today, my weakness of tomorrow, and if, in order to cut it short, like that Spanish conqueror, I burn behind me the ships of return and bind myself by a voluntary bond to heroic actions which it was permitted to me to omit; oh! then, say if it pleases you, that I am no longer free. I shall answer you, for my part, that one is free in the measure in which one does a work of will, and that I have willed more strongly than you, since I have willed more difficult things. And, if returning to the charge, you speak to me of my chains, I shall tell you that I bear them because I chose them, and that I am proud of them, while perhaps you bear some which you did not choose and of which you are ashamed."

983. 3. Corollary. A good work done from vow, other things being equal, is more meritorious than the same work without vow. St. Thomas demonstrates this by a threefold argument: (a) to vow is an act of latria, or of religion, which is the chief among the moral virtues; but since an act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, the works of inferior virtues, such as fasting, abstinence, continence, are rendered better and more meritorious when they are done from vow, because thus they are commanded by the virtue of religion, which excels the other moral virtues. (b) He who vows something and does it subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, and therefore subjects himself more perfectly; just as he gives more who hands over to a neighbor the tree with the fruits than he who hands over the fruits only. (c) Through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good, from what was said above, n. 982; but to do something from a will confirmed in good pertains to the perfection of virtue, which from its nature is stable, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates sin.

Nevertheless I said other things being equal; for, since charity is the most perfect of all the virtues, he who acts from charity accomplishes more perfect works than he who acts from vow, or from the virtue of religion. Moreover, he who, not from vow, but from repeated acts, accomplishes the same things as one vowing, sometimes acquires greater merit from the greater effort which he must renew more frequently.

984. 1. Principle: By a vow there is induced in conscience an obligation of performing that which was promised; moreover, the gravity of this obligation depends both on the intention of the one vowing and on the gravity of the matter.

(A) From Scripture it is clear that vows must be diligently fulfilled under penalty of sin: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God requireth it, and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin"¹... "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him... and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."² In truth, if promises made to men must be kept from the virtue of fidelity, a fortiori those things which are made to God must be fulfilled, and indeed from the virtue of religion; for fidelity toward God, as pertaining to divine worship, is deservedly adorned with the name of religion. It is indeed true that a promise does not strictly oblige unless it has been accepted; but, from the texts cited above, it is clearly established that vows, clothed with the due conditions, are accepted by God, and that their fulfillment is urged; wherefore there can be no doubt concerning the obligation which they induce.

¹ Deut. 23:21.

² Eccles. 5:3-4.

985. (B) The gravity of this obligation depends chiefly on the very intention of the one vowing: for since a vow is, as it were, a private law which he imposes upon himself, he can oblige himself under grave sin or under light sin, according as he wills. It also depends on the gravity of the matter itself. Nevertheless, even when there is question of matter grave in itself, a vow can be emitted under light sin only. Yet those vows are excepted whose gravity the Church herself has defined, namely the vow of chastity emitted by sacred ministers, and the vows of religious: for then legitimate authority, on account of the public good, manifestly declares that vows of this kind cannot be made except under penalty of grave sin. - Besides, matter light in itself cannot be vowed under grave sin, because the intention of incurring a grave obligation in light matter is not reasonable, and therefore is not approved by God (De Legibus, n. 274).

Hence, in order that a vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: that the matter be grave, and that the one vowing have the intention of obliging himself under mortal sin. - Moreover, matter is judged grave which, if it were prescribed by the Church, would oblige under grave sin, such as assistance at Mass, fasting, Communion, etc.; this indeed must be determined from the estimation of prudent men. - When several light matters have been promised by the same vow, they coalesce or do not coalesce into grave matter according as, from the intention of the one vowing, they were promised as one thing or as singular things; when this intention is lacking, the matter must be judged from the estimation of prudent men.

986. 2. Corollaries. (A) A vow directly obliges only the one vowing; for since the obligation of a vow arises from a promise freely made, he alone is bound by this obligation who freely undertook it. Hence:

(a) Children are not held to fulfill the personal vows of their parents, unless afterward they have made these vows their own. Subjects are not held to execute vows made by the superior of the community, by force of the vow itself, unless they have consented to the same, but by force of religious obedience, if the superior legitimately commands this. Likewise posterity is not compelled to observe the vows of ancestors by force of the vow; but, if the community itself, through its legitimate presidents, has emitted some vow, the subjects ought to execute the acts promised by reason of precept, or of custom having the force of law: for presidents can, on account of the common good, prescribe some work which even posterity must fulfill; but because the work is enjoined from the motive of religion, it must indirectly be performed by the subjects from the same motive.

(b) When there is question of a real vow, heirs are held to execute, not from religion, but from justice, those things which had been promised by deceased predecessors, yet not beyond the forces of the inheritance. For a real vow, for example, the promise of some alms, is as it were a burden annexed to the inheritance itself; but the inheritance passes to heirs with its burdens. Therefore these are held to pay the burdens, first indeed debts of justice, but afterward debts of religion, arising from vow, which precede pious legacies.

(c) Moreover a personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself, since his own action was promised; if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, he is not held to perform it through another. - The contrary must be said of a real vow: for since a thing was promised, the one vowing can give it either by himself or through another.

987. (B) A vow must be fulfilled in the manner in which it was made. Accordingly:

(a) If it is conditioned, it does not oblige unless the condition has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is not licit fraudulently to impede the execution of the condition; and therefore he sins against the vow who by deceit, force, threats, or other unjust means impedes this execution. But he who prevents the added condition from being verified only by prayers, persuasion, or licit ways, does not strictly sin, and is freed from his vow, since in reality the condition was not fulfilled. Likewise, if the condition is fulfilled not properly but only equivalently, the vow probably does not oblige; for example, he who vowed entrance into religion if his widowed mother entered second nuptials is not strictly held to enter if she has died, even if the reason for the condition added was the support of the mother.

(b) If it is disjunctive, for example, if I recover, I shall fast for three days or give twenty coins to the poor, the option belongs to the one vowing; but he must execute one or the other. If, before the election has been made, one part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, probably he is held to nothing, because the faculty of choosing does not remain; but a pious and honorable man will nevertheless execute the other part. But once the election has been made, the chosen part is to be performed, even if the other part becomes impossible; but if the chosen part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, he is held to nothing.

988. (C) As to time, a vow must be fulfilled at the prefixed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if a future impediment is foreseen; and notable delay, without just cause, in a grave matter, is of itself a grave sin.

But what constitutes notable delay depends on many circumstances: on the nature of the vow, the age of the one vowing, the danger of forgetfulness or of inability to execute the vow in the future. All these things can be judged only from the estimation of prudent men. Thus he who vowed to enter religion at once, and without cause defers for three or four years, of itself sins gravely, because he withdraws a notable part of the service promised; but if there is question of a pious pilgrimage, a long delay does not seem grave, unless from this there is probable danger of future inability to execute the pilgrimage. - If the vow has not been fulfilled at the prefixed time, its obligation ceases if the time was added for ending the obligation, but by no means if it was added for urging the same: prudent men will judge concerning this, according to the true or presumed intention of the one vowing and the other circumstances. - If no time was prefixed, the vow must be fulfilled as soon as morally possible: for it is as a debt, which must be paid as soon as possible.

989. (D) When there is question of the interpretation of a vow, these things especially are to be attended to: (a) First, a vow must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the one vowing, as is established from what has already been said.

Thus he who vowed that he would give annually, for ten years, one hundred coins to Titius, so that he might help him in supporting his family, is held to perform this even after Titius has died, if his primary intention was the support of the family; but not if the primary intention was the relief of the father from anxiety in supporting the family.

(b) When the intention of the one vowing is not established, the vow must be interpreted according to the nature of the vow, the common usage of the place, or the general custom of the Church.

Thus he who vowed to recite the rosary can recite it alternately with a companion; he who vowed a fast can use lacticinia where this custom is in force; if you vowed a fast for a month, you are not held on Sunday, since, from the practice of the Church, fasting does not take place on that day.

(c) If, all things having been weighed, doubt remains concerning the sense of the vow, it is licit to follow the more benign part; for in hateful matters, to which the bond of a vow is referred, the more benign part is to be followed.

Therefore he who promised alms, without determining the quantity, satisfies the vow, provided the sum disbursed is not ridiculous, all things considered; he who vowed a chalice, without a determined quality of matter, is not held to offer a gold one, but can offer a silver one.

Moreover, as to all doubts which arise concerning the existence or extension of a vow, the principles handed down in the Treatise on Conscience, where the various systems of probabilism are treated, must be kept in mind; nor is the fulfillment of a truly doubtful vow to be urged.

The obligation of a vow can cease in four ways: 1. by its own nature, from a change of matter or cessation of the end; 2. by invalidation, or annulment or suspension by him who has power; 3. by dispensation; 4. by commutation by a legitimate superior.

990. A vow, like a law, can cease from the nature of the thing itself, namely from a notable change of matter or circumstances, or from the cessation of the principal end.

1. From a notable change of matter or circumstances, namely if the thing promised becomes illicit, useless, or impeding a greater good: for the thing ceases to be apt matter of a vow.

Thus a pastor who vowed a pilgrimage on such a day, if then he must assist the gravely sick; or one who promised to come to the aid of some necessity which has already come to an end; or who vowed a fast on such a day, which would impede a very useful work of charity. The same must be said when circumstances are so notably changed that, if the one vowing had foreseen the change, he would not have emitted the vow: for then he did not intend to oblige himself for such circumstances. Thus he who vowed to give a rich alms, and afterward became poor, is not held to bestow it; he who had promised to relieve a poor man is not held to give him money when he notices that this man uses the same to make himself drunk. On the contrary, however, a vow of chastity is valid, even if vehement temptations afterward arise: for these could have been foreseen from things commonly occurring.

991. 2. From the cessation of the principal end; for since a vow is ordered to obtaining some end, when the principal end for which it is intended ceases, by that very fact the reason of the obligation ceases. Therefore he who vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of a friend is not held to execute the vow after the friend has died. But when the secondary, or impulsive, end ceases, the vow does not by that very fact cease, if the principal end endures; he who vowed to educate a pious young man for the clerical state, and chose Titius on account of a pleasing voice, is not freed from the vow if the voice becomes less pleasing, because this end is altogether secondary.

992. 1. Notion. The invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him who has dominative power¹ over the will of the one vowing, or over the matter of the vow. Therefore a twofold invalidation is customarily distinguished: (a) direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by him who has power over the will of the one vowing: this dissolves the obligation in perpetuity, so that it never revives. This can be declared thus: he who is subject to the power of another cannot emit an absolute vow, but only a conditioned one, namely with the tacit condition added: unless the superior contradicts; wherefore, if in reality the superior has contradicted, by that very fact the vow does not oblige, because the annexed condition was not fulfilled. (b) Indirect, or less properly so called, is the suspension of a vow made by him who has power not directly over the very will of the one vowing, but over the thing promised: this does not thoroughly remove the obligation of the vow, but only suspends it, namely as long as the matter remains subject to the will of the superior; therefore the obligation revives as soon as this matter is withdrawn from his power.

¹ Dominative power, which belongs to private masters as regards subjects, differs from the power of jurisdiction: for the latter arises from a public office, while the former arises from a private office. Dominative power sometimes flows from the law of nature, as paternal authority; sometimes also from ecclesiastical law, as the authority of religious superiors over subjects.

993. 2. Who are able to invalidate vows? (A) Directly, those can do this who have dominative power over the will of others:

(a) A father can directly invalidate all vows emitted by children before puberty, and probably those of non-emancipated minors (Codex, 88, 89). This power indeed rests on natural law, by force of which children depend on the father as long as they are immature in judgment, but it was determined by ecclesiastical law alone within these precise limits. This faculty extends to all vows emitted before puberty, even reserved vows and vows made in favor of a third party; indeed even to vows confirmed after puberty, unless these are made firm by a new vow altogether independent from the former. The same privilege belongs to all those in whom paternal power is present by law, namely to a tutor, and, this lacking, to the paternal grandfather; indeed probably, according to some, to the mother, if, the father or tutor being present and not contradicting, she exercises this authority.

(b) It is controverted whether a husband can directly invalidate all the vows of his wife emitted after marriage. Those who affirm with St. Thomas² argue from the fact that the man is the head of the woman, and therefore has power over her will. Yet many deny this, because the subjection of the wife, arising from marriage, does not extend beyond matrimonial duties; therefore the husband can invalidate only indirectly those vows which are opposed to his rights. We embrace this opinion as the more probable.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3. - Num. 30:7-9 is also alleged for confirming this opinion; but this text pertains to the ceremonial Mosaic law, which has been abrogated.

(c) A regular Superior can directly invalidate all private vows of subjects emitted after profession: for by the vow of obedience they have subjected their will to the superior in all licit things. Nevertheless, the vow of passing to a stricter religion is excepted; this, from ecclesiastical law,³ no one can invalidate, since it is always free to each one to tend to better things. - The vows of novices can be invalidated only indirectly, since they have not yet vowed obedience.

³ Decretals, l. III, tit. 21, c. 18.

This same power belongs to superioresses of nuns as regards the vows of their subjects. - The Sovereign Pontiff, insofar as he is the supreme prelate of all religious, can invalidate their vows; Bishops enjoy the same authority only as regards religious who depend on the Ordinary.

994. (B) From the Code, all superiors who have power over the matter of a vow can suspend the vows of subjects which wound their rights. The reason is that, even by natural law, promises which wound the rights of another cannot be made. Wherefore:

(a) A husband can invalidate all vows of his wife, even those emitted before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, for example, a vow of continence, of a long pilgrimage, etc.; the wife enjoys the same right, and therefore can invalidate a vow of living for a long time far from the conjugal home.

(b) A father can invalidate the vows of children, even of those who have reached puberty, which are opposed to his rights or the rights of the family, for example, a vow of a distant pilgrimage.

(c) Masters, or lords, can invalidate the vows of servants which render them unfit to furnish the services owed, such as vows of fasting daily or of spending a long time in churches.

(d) Regular prelates can invalidate the vows of novices which are incompatible with the observance of the rule; the same must be said of all superiors of colleges as regards the vows of pupils which bring an impediment to due obedience.

(e) The Sovereign Pontiff and Bishops can a fortiori invalidate the vows of subjects incompatible with their just prescriptions.

995. Note. For the validity of invalidation, in these or similar cases, no reason is required, because the superior who invalidates a vow subject to himself uses his own right. But for the licit exercise of this right, a just cause is required; for one who without reason invalidated the vows of subjects would irrationally impede their spiritual good. Thus from the Code, can. 1312: "... he can render his vows invalid validly and, from a just cause, also licitly."

From the Code, c. 1315, vows emitted before religious profession are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion.

996. 1. Notion and required conditions. Vows, even firm in themselves, sometimes it is expedient to remove by dispensation, which is defined as the relaxation of an obligation induced by vow, made in the name of God by him who has the power of jurisdiction.

(A) From this the distinction between invalidation and dispensation is clear: (a) for the latter is made in the name of God, while invalidation is made in the proper name of the one invalidating; (b) the latter requires the power of jurisdiction, while the former supposes only dominative power: for since, by force of the vow, a man has contracted an obligation before God, this cannot be dissolved except by him who has divinely received the power of jurisdiction, by force of which he can dissolve spiritual bonds in the name of God Himself; (c) hence a just cause is required for a valid dispensation, which is not necessary for invalidation; (d) invalidation can be made even when the one vowing is unwilling, while dispensation supposes the consent of the one vowing, who imposed the obligation upon himself.

997. (B) That the power of dispensing in vows belongs to the Church is clear: (a) from the general concession of dissolving all spiritual bonds which can obstruct the salvation of souls: "And whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven";⁴ for sometimes it happens, on account of human frailty, that vows even maturely emitted can be observed only with difficulty, with the greatest danger to souls; therefore it is of the greatest interest that they be able to be relaxed, so that those vowing may provide for their salvation more easily. Wherefore Christ conferred upon the Church the power of dispensing in vows, in the name of God Himself, who alone can condone an obligation contracted toward Himself. (b) From the long-standing and universal practice of the Church, which very often, for just causes, is accustomed to dispense in vows.

⁴ Matt. 16:19.

998. (C) But because one dispensing acts not in his own name, but in the name of God, a just cause is required for dispensing validly, and indeed a cause graver according as the vow is more excellent. The sufficiency of this cause must be left to the prudent judgment of superiors; and the faithful, who in good faith have set forth the whole matter, ought not be disquieted concerning this. - The general causes which can move superiors to grant a dispensation legitimately are the honor of God, the utility of the Church, and the necessity of the one vowing.

Among particular causes, certain ones stand on the part of the vow, and others on the part of its execution. (a) On the part of the vow, namely if someone vowed indiscreetly, from anger, sadness, before puberty, without deliberation; or under compulsion, from fear even light fear, deceit, etc. (b) On the part of the execution, if this becomes too arduous, or impedes a greater private or public good, or becomes an occasion of spiritual or temporal evil; for example, if, the frailty of the one vowing being considered, it is an occasion of frequent violation.

If the vow was made for the utility of a third party, dispensation can be made as long as the promise has not been accepted, because this does not produce an obligation toward neighbor; but, if it has already been accepted, generally dispensation cannot be made without the consent of the third party, because otherwise his rights would be violated. Nevertheless, if the promise was made principally in honor of God, and only secondarily in favor of the third party, it can be dispensed by the Sovereign Pontiff, because the accessory follows the principal.

999. 2. Concerning those who are able to dispense. All and only those are able to dispense in vows who have jurisdiction in the external forum: for such dispensation pertains to the government of the Church.

(a) The Sovereign Pontiff can dispense in all vows for the universal Church: for supreme and universal jurisdiction belongs to him. He grants this power to the Major Penitentiary for the whole Christian world, and to Apostolic Legates in the provinces to which they are sent; and this power, although by commission of the Pontiff, is judged to be ordinary, and not merely delegated, since it has been handed over to them by reason of office and by ordinary law.

(b) Ordinaries and all having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are able to dispense in all vows of their subjects, except those which are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff; and therefore also capitular vicars when the see is vacant. - Vicars general enjoy this power from the Code (c. 1313) by force of their office; but pastors do not, because they do not enjoy jurisdiction in the external forum, except by delegation.

(c) Superiors of exempt orders can dispense in the non-reserved vows of their subjects (Codex, c. 514).

(d) By special privilege, regular confessors can commute the non-reserved vows of the faithful by dispensing; indeed, according to many, they can also dispense simply, from the privilege granted by Julius II to the Canons Regular of St. Saviour, and by Leo X to the Camaldolese hermits, which, by force of the communication of privileges, passed to other regulars. - Secular confessors sometimes obtain the same privilege by delegation. - In both cases, this privilege can be exercised even outside confession, unless the contrary is declared in the concession.

1000. 3. Concerning vows reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff. The Sovereign Pontiff has reserved to himself certain vows, in which he alone can dispense; these are:

(a) Solemn vows of religion; indeed, from recent law,¹ simple religious vows which precede solemn profession, and those which are emitted in congregations approved by the Holy See, whether perpetual or temporary.

¹ S. Cong. Bishops and Regulars, June 12, 1858.

(b) The vow of entering a religion of solemn vows.

(c) The vow of perpetual and perfect chastity, even emitted by laypersons.

The vows of a Roman pilgrimage, to the thresholds of the Apostles; of a Jerusalem pilgrimage, to the sepulcher of the Lord; of a Compostelan pilgrimage to the relics of St. James, are no longer reserved.

1001. Yet these vows are not reserved except in the strict sense set forth above; - and indeed when they are perfect, that is, obliging under grave sin; - fully free and emitted after the completed eighteenth year of age; - absolute, but not conditioned or disjunctive; - and certain, but not doubtfully emitted or doubtfully reserved. The reason is that, since reservation is hateful, it is to be interpreted strictly.

Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not sinning against chastity, of conjugal chastity, of temporary chastity, of virginity (as distinguished from a vow of perfect chastity), of receiving sacred orders, of entering a congregation in which only simple vows are emitted, ought by no means to be held reserved. - Likewise even reserved vows are reserved only as regards substance, but not as regards circumstances; thus he who vowed to enter a stricter religion can be dispensed by the Bishop so that he may enter a milder one.

Besides, when necessity urges, namely when grave spiritual or temporal harm is imminent and, on the other hand, the Sovereign Pontiff cannot be approached at once, Bishops can dispense in reserved vows. - When, by force of an apostolic concession, a reserved vow has been commuted into other works, these works indeed have the nature and obligation of a vow, but not of a reserved vow.

1002. 1. Notion. The commutation of a vow is the substitution of another work in place of that which had been promised, with the same obligation. Therefore in commutation the obligation of the vow is not relaxed, as in invalidation or dispensation, but, the bond of the vow remaining, the obligation contracted is transferred to another matter.

This commutation can be made in three ways: into a better work, into an equal work, into a less good work.

1003. 2. Conditions. For commutation two things are required: legitimate power and a just cause.

(A) Now (a) commutation into something better can be made even by the proper authority of the one vowing, unless a prescription of the Church or the good of a third party stands in the way; for what is better, that is, what contributes more, all things diligently considered, to the glory of God or the utility of the one vowing, includes in itself the less perfect, and without doubt is accepted by God.² But by the statute of the Church, reserved vows must be excepted, which cannot be commuted except into religious vows, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion. Likewise a vow in favor of a third party, accepted by him, cannot be commuted without his consent.

² Thus religious vows include the others in themselves, and therefore vows emitted in the world are extinguished by religious profession, or rather are commuted into it.

(b) Commutation into an equal work, according to the Code (can. 1314), does not require the intervention of a superior, but can be made by one's proper authority.

Thus an end is imposed on the controversy previously debated among theologians; and therefore we omit what we had written concerning this controversy.

Thus, for example, the daily recitation of the Rosary can be commuted into hearing Mass three or four times in the week; the fast of one day into one confession; the vow of a pilgrimage of one day into one fast, by applying the expenses of the pilgrimage to a pious work.

(c) Commutation into a lesser work, since it involves a true dispensation, cannot be made without the intervention of a superior. All those enjoy this faculty who have the power of dispensing, whether ordinary or delegated. - Those who have obtained only the power of commuting can use it for commuting vows into a morally equivalent work, or even into a work a little less good, but not into a notably lesser work.

1004. (B) As regards cause, a vow can be changed into something better without cause; into something equal, with a light cause, such as the greater devotion or utility of the one vowing; into something lesser, from a grave cause, which is required not only for liceity, but also for validity: this cause nevertheless can be less than that required for dispensation.

Moreover, once commutation has been made, it is licit to return to the first work, - even when this had been made into a better work, at least more probably: for commutation is a favor which no one is held to use. - Nevertheless, in practice inconstancy should carefully be avoided, which is found by no means rarely in pious women, and harms their progress not a little.

If the work into which the vow has been changed becomes impossible: (a) it is necessary to return to the first, if the commutation was made by one's own authority, because the obligation is not judged extinguished except by an equal or better work; (b) if the commutation was made by the authority of a superior, it is not necessary to return to the first work, because the prior obligation has been dissolved by the superior.

1005. Confessors ought not be too inclined in suggesting or permitting vows, especially where there is question of the vow of perpetual chastity. For experience establishes that certain young women, at a time when sensible devotion is fervent, easily vow chastity, and afterward, when temptations arise and an opportunity of marrying is offered, seek marriage and bid farewell to their vows, not without great danger to the soul. Therefore those are not to be heard who at once wish to vow perpetual chastity; but, after mature investigation, let a vow of chastity be permitted the first time for three or six months, afterward for a whole year, then for two years. Very rarely is the vow of perpetual chastity to be counseled to those remaining in the world, unless they are already of advanced age and have furnished examples of firmness.

Likewise, let confessors not easily commute vows without cause, but let them exhort penitents to fulfill their vows, and to serve God with fortitude of soul and unconquered constancy: for thus they will make more progress than by easily changing their proposals.