Chapter I: On the Duties of Laymen

939. Up to this point the matter has concerned the offices which are incumbent upon all in general; but since there are various states of life, to which diverse offices correspond, it is necessary to add a few things concerning these. Now there are three states of life to which the others are referred: the state of laymen, the state of clerics, and the state of religious; for among Christians, some remain in the world, and, although they care for their own salvation, are devoted to secular affairs; others, adorned with clerical dignity and performing the priestly office, officially attend to the salvation of souls, although they dwell amid the dangers of the world; finally others, snatching themselves away from worldly cares, bind themselves by the three vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity to embracing a more perfect life, whether they are content with the lay condition, or receive the priesthood.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 183; Antoine, Theol. Moralis, De obligationibus specialibus certorum statuum et officiorum (Migne, Theol. Curs., XVI, 1131-1276); Conferences d'Angers, sur les Etats, 3 vol., Paris, 1829-1830; Valentin, Examen raisonne sur les devoirs et les peches des diverses professions, Lyon, 1844; Berardi, Praxis, Tr. VII, De statibus particularibus; Ballerini P., Tr. IX, De praeceptis particularibus.

940. We shall not treat here of the religious state, since Canonists are accustomed to discuss it. Concerning the lay and clerical state we shall especially set forth those things which flow from natural and divine right, more briefly touching upon offices which are declared more fully in the Praelectiones Juris Canonici.

On The Offices Of Laymen

From domestic society:

• Of parents and children.
• Of masters and servants.

From civil society:

• Of superiors and subjects.
• Of those exercising a special office.

On The Offices Of Clerics

• Of all clerics in general.
• Especially of those who are constituted in sacred orders.
• More especially of those who have received the priesthood.

The special offices which are incumbent upon laymen arise especially from a twofold source, from domestic society and from civil society.

941. State of the question. Domestic society, which is older than other societies, arises from nature itself. For since the human race cannot naturally be propagated except by the union of man and woman, by that very fact there arises conjugal society, concerning which we spoke in Tr. on Matrimony; but afterward, when children have been procreated, parental society now arises, which flourishes between parents and children; to this there is often added masterly society, which flows from relations between master and servants. Wherefore we shall speak of the mutual offices 1. of parents and children; 2. of masters and servants.

942. According to St. Thomas,¹ parents "are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle"; for just as God creates men, so parents procreate their children; just as He preserves creatures in being, and directs them to their end and governs them by his providence, so parents protect their offspring by assiduous cares, and by counsels, examples, and also by wise providence rule them and direct them to the end. From this it follows that the right and office of educating their own children is incumbent upon parents, and besides that children are held to render the due honor to parents.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 122, art. 5.

943. State of the question. Socialists, adhering to the footsteps of J. J. Rousseau,² contend that children belong to the Republic rather than to parents, and therefore that the office of feeding and educating them is incumbent upon the State: for parents, they say, often imbued with many prejudices, inculcate the same in their offspring, and thus dissensions arise among citizens, because not all have received the same discipline; wherefore, for placing national unity in safety, it is necessary that children be snatched away from parents, so that each and all may be instructed in the same way in public schools; then there will be no distinction between rich and poor, noble and ignoble, Catholics and non-Catholics; all, imbued with the same principles, will defend liberty of thinking, social equality, and perfect solidarity; no preeminence will be acknowledged except that which is owed to each one's talent and merit.³ - Anarchists, who altogether reject the authority of the State, nevertheless do not wish children, procreated from a free union, to be educated by parents, but by those who love them more, and adopt them as children, and freely consent to furnish them food and education.¹ - Not a few of those who defend the rights of women beyond what is fair (feministes) are more or less imbued with the same errors; for since they contend that women have, by equal right with men, the faculty of managing public affairs, they wish them to be immune from domestic cares and the education of children, so that they may give themselves to civil offices.²

¹ Taparelli, Essai de Droit naturel, n. 1555-1575; Meyer, Instit. juris naturalis, t. II, n. 107-111; 660-678; A. Jansen, De facultate docendi, 1885; Castelein, Droit naturel, Paris, 1903, p. 625-640; R. Lavollee, L'Etat, le Pere et l'Enfant, Paris, Plon, 1904.

² For he holds that the family is indeed older than any other society, but that children do not remain joined to parents except as long as they need them for protecting their life: "The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of the family: and even so, children remain bound to the father only as long as they need him in order to preserve themselves; as soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved." (Contrat social, l. I, ch. 5.) But afterward (ch. 6-8) he declares that, by force of the social pact, all authority is in the Prince's possession.

³ Thus G. Renard, Le Regime socialiste, Paris, 1898, p. 89-100, where among other things he writes: "The child, a moral person in potency, or, to speak still better, in the way of development, must no longer, as formerly, be considered the property of his parents. The power of the father or of the mother is justified, like every authority exercised over human beings, only on condition of being a creator of liberty, and not of oppression... If the parents remain absolute masters of his education, I fear over his mind a pressure all the more powerful because the pupil is naturally predisposed to undergo the affectionate suggestion of those who are nearest to him. Beware then hereditary prejudices, which are the very negation of scientific progress... Teaching being gratuitous and the maintenance of children being put at the charge of the community, one will no longer see, as in our mercantile society, this unreasonable anomaly: public instruction reserved to those who can pay for it... education will address itself equally to all intelligences which will be capable of profiting from it."

¹ Thus J. Grave, La Societe future, ch. 23, where he says: "The child is not a property, a product, which can belong more to those who have procreated him, as some wish, than to society, as the others contend." Whose therefore will children be? "To those who love the child most... Instead of being a charge for those who will adopt him, the child will no longer be anything but a pretty little creature to love and caress." - This system C. Turgeon sets forth and refutes, Le Feminisme francais, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 405-420.

² In Turgeon, op. cit., t. II, 417-420.

944. Thesis: The right and office of educating their own offspring belongs primarily to parents, and only secondarily to the State, namely when parents are lacking. - For if it is certainly and publicly established that certain parents do not furnish the education necessary to their children, and there are no others who act in place of the parents, it pertains to the State, insofar as it is the provider of the public good, to provide for this education.³

³ We do not here treat of the rights of the Church, whose office it is to hand on moral and religious education to all those who have arisen from Catholic parents, or who through baptism have entered the Church, as was declared in Tr. on the Church. As to human sciences, spiritual authority has the right of teaching them, by at least the same right as private citizens or private associations. - Cf. F. Cavagnis, Instit. juris publici, l. IV, n. 1-145.

(A) It is proved by reason. For the right and office of educating offspring naturally belongs to those who have begotten the same: "It is a most holy law of nature that the father of a family should protect, with sustenance and every cultivation, those whom he himself has procreated."⁴ For children, as long as they have not attained the use of reason, are altogether unable to protect their own life; likewise, when reason now first dawns, they can obtain the truth in the intellectual, moral, and religious order only with the greatest difficulty by their own powers, without any external aid, and therefore they need some authority which directs them in the right path of truth. Now nature itself manifestly shows that the work of education is primarily to be performed by the parents themselves.

⁴ Leo XIII, Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

"For the son," says St. Thomas,¹ "naturally is something of the father; and at first indeed he is not distinguished from the parents according to the body, as long as he is contained in the mother's womb; but afterward, after he comes forth from the womb, before he has the use of free will, he is contained under the care of the parents, as under a certain spiritual womb." In reality nature gave breasts to the mother, but not to the State, for nursing children; to each parent, but not to the City or to strange nurses, it gave a maternal or paternal heart for pursuing their own offspring with tender and at the same time generous love; to parents, but not to strangers, at least from things commonly occurring, it gave an inclination that they gladly hand over not only their own things, but even themselves and their own life, for the welfare of their offspring. Wherefore long and universal experience establishes that children educated at home, fed with maternal milk, and carefully guarded by the vigilant care of parents, much more easily escape the dangers of diseases and death, and progress much more than those who are nourished by strangers.²

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 10, art. 12.

² For many of those who are handed over to strange nurses die: "Already in 1889, at the congress of hygiene and demography, Dr. Fleury attested that at Lyon the mortality of nurslings rose to 49 percent." (C. Raff, Natalite, Paris, 1901, p. 364.)

945. The same must be said concerning intellectual and moral education; no one, as the mother, can look into the mind of her offspring, no one can detect and correct their depraved inclinations, or direct the powers of the will to good: for led by maternal instinct, she naturally performs all these things, and besides by native inclination the child is inclined to follow the sweet direction of the mother. Afterward, when the boy is now growing up, he needs a virile education, for furnishing which no one is more suitable than the father: for, because of the special and generous love with which he pursues his children, he tempers with gentleness the authority necessary for restraining the depraved habits to which they incline, and helps them by opportune counsels to avoid dangerous occasions;³ by words and examples he draws them to the practice of virtues; indeed he himself is induced to lead a more honorable and more perfect life, led by this reason, that unless he gives a good example, he will scarcely be able to exhort his boys to honesty. - Hence experience establishes that children educated at home, other things being equal, generally progress much more in studies and in the practice of virtues than those who are instructed by strangers.¹

³ To the point it is read in the Expose des motifs du Code civil, where the matter concerns paternal authority: "The child is born weak, besieged by needs and diseases; nature gives him his father and mother to defend and protect him. When the time of puberty arrives, the passions awaken at the same time as intelligence and imagination... It is then that the child needs a counsel, a friend, who may defend his nascent reason against the seductions of every kind which surround him."

¹ On the office of each parent in education, cf. Turgeon, II, 341-362.

946. Socialists indeed object that children have rights which parents are not permitted to oppress. - It is certainly wonderful that these men complain of the tyranny of parents, while they themselves wish tyrannically to inculcate their opinions in the young; do they not thus contradict themselves? - We by no means deny the rights of children, since Christ himself and the Church have diligently vindicated these against the unspeakable errors of the pagans, as was proved elsewhere, on True Religion, n. 155; but since the child himself cannot protect these rights, it pertains to parents, rather than to strangers or to the State, to preserve them whole and intact; for those who begot and nourished children are joined more intimately with them, and are more apt to instruct them than any others. For the family is historically and logically prior to the State, nor is it consonant with right reason that civil power at its own judgment penetrate even to the interiors of homes, and disturb domestic peace; paternal power ought neither to be extinguished nor absorbed by the republic, but rather confirmed by it.² And certainly, if prejudices are in parents, is it not to be feared that the State, imbued with worse prejudices, may wish to inculcate them in the young, and thus oppress the liberty of children equally and of parents by intolerable tyranny? - And, since besides the opinions and theories of the State are diverse according to the diverse ministers who manage public affairs, will children also be held to change their ideas at the will of various officials? Where, I ask, is liberty? - Nor should it be said that the young are to be educated in such a way that they are instructed neither by the State nor by parents in religious or ethical disciplines, until, mature in age and reason, they are able freely to choose among various religions or diverse systems of ethics; - for this is nothing other than to promote indifferentism in matters altogether necessary for the right ordering of life, and to deprive the young of the means by which they need to restrain depraved inclinations.¹

² Leo XIII declared this excellently, Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "Therefore to wish that civil power at its own judgment penetrate even to the interiors of homes is a great and pernicious error... Paternal power is of such a kind that it can neither be extinguished, nor absorbed by the republic, because it has the same and common principle with the life itself of men. Children are something of the father, and as it were a certain amplification of the paternal person; and if we wish to speak properly, they do not of themselves, but through the domestic community in which they were generated, enter and participate in civil society." Cf. Brunetiere, Le Droit de l'Enfant, in the periodical Reforme sociale, Feb. 1, 1903, p. 202-221.

¹ G. Bonjean, Enfants revoltes et parents coupables, Paris, 1895; A. Fouillee, Les Jeunes Criminels, l'Ecole et la presse, in the periodical Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 15, 1897, p. 417-449; H. Joly, L'Enfance coupable, Paris, 1904, among others, have described into what excesses the young frequently fall who are educated without religion and moral discipline.

947. They insist, saying that by paternal education those dissensions are preserved and strengthened which draw one region and city, as it were, into two or more factions, and invincibly stand in the way of national unity. - I turn the argument back: are there not factions and dissensions in the State itself, and indeed among the socialists themselves? Do not anarchists, collectivists, and moderate socialists try to draw the minds of the young to their systems? - Therefore this difficulty rests on a false concept of unity: for it is impossible, especially in our days, where unbridled liberty of thinking, speaking, and writing flourishes, that all citizens of one City think and will the same thing concerning religious, philosophical, or political matters. Therefore those who vindicate national unity in this sense, that they wish all citizens to have the same principles concerning all these matters, not only promote intolerable tyranny, but dream of a thing altogether impossible. No unity can flourish among rational and free citizens other than that which arises from mutual tolerance and fraternal charity;² for all citizens ought to tend toward the common good of the fatherland, and devise nothing which turns to its detriment; but concerning the better reason for pursuing this end, discussion ought to be free, according to that saying: in necessary things unity, in doubtful things liberty, in all things charity. This is clearly evident by the example of nations which are eminent among cultivated nations, such as Great Britain and America: there certainly flourishes a singular love of fatherland, precisely because the greatest liberty flourishes for parents in educating children; and certainly the fatherland is loved the more, the more securely and efficaciously the liberty of domestic life is protected.

² Cf. Ch. Dupuy, in the speech held to the Senate Nov. 5, 1903, in Questions actuelles, t. 71, p. 168-192; E. Faguet, Le Liberalisme, Paris, 1903, p. 128-169, where he lucidly shows how much they contradict themselves who, under the pretext of unity, strive to extinguish liberty of teaching.

948. (B) The same is established by history. For Nations which assigned the office of educating boys to the Republic alone soon fell into despotic tyranny; thus the Spartans, ignorant of human dignity, who had committed the education of children to the State, instituted not men nor free citizens, but soldiers. Thus also the leaders of the French Revolution, Danton and Robespierre, who assigned to the fatherland alone the right of educating children, oppressed their fellow citizens with bronze tyranny and cruel persecution. Hence those who favor Caesarism, as Napoleon I, State Socialists, in one word, all haters and oppressors of liberty, vindicate for themselves the exclusive right or monopoly of teaching.¹ - On the contrary, however, the Christian religion, which liberated peoples from tyranny, has always asserted and defended the rights of parents to educating their own offspring; likewise everywhere and at every time it has favored those institutes and Universities which, independently from the State, hand on various disciplines. Wherefore even in our days truly cultivated nations, which pursue not only the shadow and name of liberty, but the thing itself, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the Federated States of America, gladly acknowledge and protect the rights of parents to instructing their own offspring in various disciplines, and at the same time confer the greatest liberty on independent schools and Universities.¹ Unless therefore we wish to say farewell to the liberty of private persons and families, we ought unceasingly to vindicate, by all legitimate means, especially by rightly ordered associations of fathers of families, the rights of parents as to the education of offspring.

¹ This indeed is admitted by a man otherwise most hostile to the doctrines of the Church, Clemenceau, in the speech held to the Senators Nov. 17, 1903: "The State, I know it: it has a long history, all of murder and blood. All the crimes which have been accomplished in the world, massacres, wars, breaches of sworn faith, pyres, torments, tortures, everything has been justified by the interest of the State, by reason of State... I understand well: you dream of the ideal State. Thus Plato, thus Aristotle, thus Thomas More, thus other dreamers. You dream of the ideal State. This State, in books, you make it as beautiful as it can please you; but here we are weak men, changing, grappling with reality... If you could succeed, you would put into the hands of universal suffrage, into the hands of the changing majorities which succeed one another in Assemblies, the most formidable instrument of reaction which has yet been seen in the world, for the responsibility would be ungraspable, scattered in the anonymous crowd." (In Questions actuelles, t. 71, Dec. 12, 1903, pp. 197, 198, 199; ibidem p. 177-183, read what Lamarzelle spoke excellently concerning liberty of teaching.)

¹ Thus J. Stuart Mill (Principles of Political Economy, New York, 1882, t. II, p. 576-577) writes that no right belongs to the State of teaching exclusively, or even of conferring special privileges on those who frequent the State's schools; and that it is intolerable tyranny to wish to subject all schools to its rule: "to possess such a control, and actually exert it, is to be despotic." - R. Lavollee sketches the history of this question and the laws of diverse Nations, op. cit., p. 3-202.

949. Corollary. A twofold office belongs to civil authority concerning the instruction of children, namely to take care that independent schools not favor the corruption of morals, and to found schools necessary for the right instruction of citizens.

(A) The reason for the former is that it pertains to the State to promote the public good, and therefore to prohibit those things which manifestly stand in the way of this good. Now, if there were any school which notoriously corrupted the minds of the young by doctrines evidently contrary to natural right, or weakened good morals, civil authority would deservedly restrain those abuses, since the right and office is incumbent upon it of warding off dangers which can overturn the foundations of the republic. - Yet we said notoriously, because public authority ought not to be too solicitous about hidden things, lest perhaps, while it tries to restrain abuses, it take away all liberty altogether.

(B) The same reason of the public good often urges civil authority to institute schools and colleges. For although it pertains primarily to parents to educate their own offspring, nevertheless many can fulfill this office neither through themselves nor through private teachers; wherefore it pertains to the City to remedy this insufficiency by the foundation of public schools, to which parents can send their offspring: for the right instruction of the young greatly profits the public good.

But the Republic cannot institute a monopoly of education, namely by commanding that parents send their children to public schools, with the faculty excluded of educating them privately through teachers well seen by themselves: for this would be a usurpation of domestic right and an open violation of liberty of conscience.

Indeed that system, now flourishing among not a few nations, by force of which public schools alone are sustained from the common treasury, harms the equality and liberty of citizens; for then the school tax is paid by all, although many receive no advantage from it.¹ Much fairer is the system prevailing in Great Britain and other regions, by force of which public and private schools are equally sustained, provided that they attain a certain degree of progress: for thus the liberty of families remains intact, burdens are equally distributed, and noble emulation prevails among the diverse schools.

¹ Faguet sets this forth thus, op. cit., p. 134: "It is as if from Paris to Bordeaux there were two railways, one by Chartres, the other by Orleans, operated by two different companies, and I had the right to go to Bordeaux by Orleans, but on condition of paying my place to the Company of Orleans and also to the Company of Chartres."

950. Since parents act in God's place with respect to their offspring, they are held to pursue them with a special love, and to impart to them bodily and spiritual education, and also by a certain providence to direct them to the end.

² St. Chrysostom, De liberorum educatione, in Migne, P. G., t. LXIII, col. 763-772; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, lib. VII, cap. 7; Mayol, Summa doctrinae moralis circa decem Decalogi praecepta, in Migne, Curs. Theol., t. XIV, p. 503-532; Jaugey, De virtutibus cardinalibus, Paris, 1876, p. 464-475; Berardi, Praxis, Tract. VII, n. 1-32; Rosset, De sacram. Matrimonii, t. V, n. 3520-3572; A. de Margerie, De la Famille, Paris, 1869, t. I, p. 226 sq.; P. Janet, La Famille, 15th ed., Paris, 1894, p. 107-236; A. de Gasparin, La Famille, Paris, 1866, t. I, p. 143-297; M. d'Hulst, Lent of 1894, 4th Conference.

1. On The Love Of Parents Toward Children.

951. Love of this sort is called piety, because it bears before itself something sacred and religious; it helps to set forth its foundation and endowments.

(A) The motives on account of which parents ought to love their offspring are natural and supernatural.

(a) Natural indeed; for if anyone loves the work of his hands, if even beasts themselves by a certain natural instinct love and protect their young,³ even with danger to their own life.

³ St. Augustine lucidly sets forth this argument, Sermon 349 (alias, de Tempore 52), in Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1530: "Beasts also love their children: asps love their children, tigresses love their children, lions love their children. For there is no beast which does not gently murmur to its children. For when it terrifies men, it cherishes its little ones. A lion roars in the woods, so that no one may pass: he enters the cave, where he has his children, he lays aside every rage of ferocity. Outside he places it, when he himself does not enter. Therefore he who does not love his children is worse even than a lion."

how much more ought parents to pursue with tender and devoted affection the offspring whom they have begotten from their own substance, and who are as it were a certain amplification of the paternal person? - This appears even more manifestly if one considers that the children whom they procreated are endowed with reason and free will, bear in themselves the image of God and at the same time of the parents, enjoy immortality, are destined to God as to their ultimate end, and that they are citizens of the earthly fatherland, whose good and honor they can promote, if they have been rightly educated; for who, attending to these things, would not sincerely and devotedly love the sweet offspring who can procure the glory of God, the exaltation of the fatherland, and the happiness of the family?

952. (b) To these are added supernatural motives; for these are citizens not only of the earthly, but also of the heavenly fatherland: they are destined to the supernatural end, namely the clear vision of God and perfect possession; wherefore they are given the divine life, and all the graces necessary for increasing it; redeemed by Christ, and cleansed by his precious blood, they bear the image of Christ impressed in their hearts, and ought to imitate his virtues. Now parents are as it were God's cooperators in the sanctification of children, as they were in procreation; and therefore they ought to love their offspring with a special and supernatural love, so that by paternal solicitude they may form in them the spirit and virtues of Christ, and supernaturally beget those whom they have carnally begotten, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹ "My little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in you."

¹ Galat., IV, 19.

953. (B) The endowments of this love. The love of parents toward children ought to be:

(a) True and internal, insofar as they sincerely will their good, not only as to the body, but also and chiefly as to the soul, not only for the present, but also for the future. - Wherefore they sin gravely of themselves who deliberately pursue them unjustly with hatred, or seriously and from the soul curse them or imprecate evils upon them, or provoke them to anger with names gravely injurious; to the point St. Paul says: "And you, fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, but educate them in the discipline and correction of the Lord."¹ - Yet parents are often excused from grave sin who, moved by anger, act thus without perfect deliberation. Nor do they commit any sin, but act rightly, who, on account of a just cause, severely rebuke children, and moderately chastise them.

¹ Ephes., VI, 4.

(b) Rightly ordered, that is, resting on and ruled by a rational and also supernatural motive, so that it is neither excessive, nor irrationally favors one rather than another. - Hence they should not love children with a quasi-idolatrous love, by indulging everything to them, on account of sluggishness or cruel benignity, by by no means correcting their vices, etc. Likewise they should love all offspring equally, insofar as it can be done; and if there is some distinction, let them take care that it not be made without a reasonable cause; not rarely incautious parents are deceived by external qualities or flattering caresses, and they pursue with a more tender affection those who are worthy of less love; and from this arise not a few envies, quarrels, contentions, and other things of this sort, as is clear from the history of Joseph.²

² "But his brothers, seeing that he was loved by his father more than all the sons, hated him, nor could they speak anything peaceably to him." (Gen. XXXVII, 4.) - Hence St. Ambrose writes (de Joseph, in Migne, P. L., XIV, 643): "To love children is sweet, and to love more intensely is very sweet; but frequently paternal love itself, unless it holds moderation, harms children; if either by excessive indulgence it weakens the beloved, or by the preference of one turns the rest away from the affection of brotherhood... Let equal grace join children whom equal nature has joined."

(c) Generous and operative, insofar as parents not only will well to children, but do good, by averting from them every evil, whether corporal or spiritual, insofar as it can be done, and by furnishing that which can conduce to their good and salvation; this indeed is especially performed through the best education.

2. On The Education Of Children.³

³ Dupanloup, De l'Education, 7th ed., Paris, 1866, t. II, l. 2, p. 138; Guibert, L'Educateur apotre, Paris, 1894, p. 66-84.

954. Education is the progressive and harmonious evolution of faculties, by which children are gradually and orderly transformed into perfect men. For children have received from God various faculties, which, although generically the same in all, are nevertheless imbued with special inclinations, whether good or bad; now good education is placed in this, that it eradicates evil inclinations, restrains untamed passions and directs them to good, but strengthens, cultivates, and orders good qualities to human and at the same time Christian perfection. - This evolution, however, can only be slow and progressive, because it is impeded by many obstacles, and besides man naturally can obtain perfection only gradually. It ought to be harmonious, or rightly ordered, insofar as all faculties, whether bodily, spiritual, or religious, must be cultivated in such a way that the whole man is formed, that is, a sound mind in a sound body; if therefore one kind of faculties is evolved before the others, this nevertheless ought to be done proportionately, so that bodily exercise does not harm the progress of the mind, nor excessive intellectual cultivation stand in the way of bodily health. - We shall speak of education both bodily and spiritual, and also of the schools to which parents ought to send their children.

955. (A) On bodily education. This already begins in the maternal womb, and does not come to an end except at mature age.

(a) As soon as it is established that a child has been conceived, everything which, under grave obligation, could harm the life of the little child ought to be avoided. Wherefore the mother ought to abstain from those dances, violent movements and actions, and other things of this sort which induce more violent concussions of the body;¹ and also from immoderate excitements, anxieties, or from excesses in drink; for all these things can induce abortion. Men and others who inhumanely treat, exasperate, or strike a pregnant woman also sin, since from this the life of the fetus is endangered.

¹ To the point Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis, 1896, p. 156, n. 1: "It is also to be most carefully guarded that they (pregnant women) not be carried in a carriage through badly paved streets or rough roads. The very trips on the railway, by continual concussions, not rarely furnish the occasion of abortion, wherefore longer journeys on the railway are not to be undertaken without necessity. To this also pertains the use of machines for sewing (machines a coudre, sewing machines) which are moved by the feet."

(b) After the birth of the offspring, parents are held diligently to watch so that whatever would induce danger of death be warded away from it. Wherefore the Ritual admonishes parents not to have a little child with them in bed, because of the danger of suffocation.

956. (c) The mother ought to nourish children with her own milk, as often as this can be done;² for many inconveniences arise from the contrary practice as to the mother herself, who is exposed to a longer-lasting fever, - as to the children, for whose nourishing maternal milk is more apt,¹ - and as to the nurses themselves, who are generally compelled to abandon their husbands and their own offspring, with danger of incontinence and neglect of the offices of domestic life. Yet mothers are excused from this office who, because of lack of milk, infirmity, or another reasonable cause, prudently cannot nurse their own offspring.

² Concerning the gravity of this obligation, scarcely anything certain can be established; of itself it is held as light by most theologians; but when many evils, and very grave ones, are foreseen to arise from the use of a strange nurse, of itself a grave sin is committed if this is done without legitimate cause. On this Capellmann wrote excellently, op. cit., p. 47-53; cf. R. Bazin, Donnatienne; Brieux, Les Remplacantes.

¹ Hence, with experience as witness, among infants who are nourished by art, mortality is far greater than among those who are fed with maternal milk.

But when little children are handed over to nurses, care should be taken that these be healthy in mind and body, and provide for the health and also the morals of the child: for maternal solicitude is no less necessary in this case than where the mothers themselves feed their children.

(d) Parents are held under grave obligation of itself to furnish to offspring food and other things necessary for honestly sustaining life, according to their condition, until these can feed themselves; for it pertains to them to protect the life of those whom they have procreated, and this obligation from its nature is grave.

Therefore parents sin who, without grave necessity, expose offspring in public ways, with danger of death, or at the door of an orphanage, so that they may free themselves from the burden of feeding it, when besides they can easily provide for its education. Yet, if the matter concerns illegitimate offspring, prudence can demand that it be commended to an orphanage; in which case, however, honor and equity demand that the rich repay the expenses for nourishing the offspring. But whether justice requires this is disputed among theologians; certain ones probably deny it, because hospitals of this sort have been instituted not only for assisting the poor, but also the rich who otherwise would incur the mark of infamy;² whence if any parents have not paid these expenses, they are to be earnestly exhorted, but not compelled to restitution.

² St. Alphons., lib. III, on the Decalogue, n. 656; Ball. P., n. 824.

957. (e) Finally, in a general way parents ought to take care that children, by bodily exercise and labor proportioned to age, orderly evolve and increase their physical powers; for since the body is the instrument of the soul, and the health of the body favors not a little the evolution of intellectual life, it is very expedient that legitimate means be used for multiplying physical powers.³ This is also true of girls: for if they are educated delicately and are weaker in body, they easily suffer in their nerves and by an irritable character exasperate others.⁴

³ Demolins described how, in Great Britain, attention is given to the physical education of boys, A quoi tient la superiorite des Anglo-Saxons? Paris, s. d., p. 52-86; every excess indeed in this matter must be avoided, but in France parents and teachers often do not care enough about bodily education.

⁴ To the point Bentzon, Causeries de Morale, p. 236: "It is a duty to be well. Without doubt each of us inherits a more or less robust temperament; but, such as it is, we ought by wise hygiene to maintain it in the best possible equilibrium. And why? Because the soul is bound to the body; how many nervous people, by losing all command over their will, become insupportable to themselves and to others! How many young girls are sullen, capricious, disagreeable, because they overwork, digest badly, lead a life too over-excited, abuse dance and worldly pleasures..."

958. (B) On spiritual education. The care of parents is not confined to the health of the body, but ought especially to be occupied in rightly instructing the souls of children. For this it is necessary that they cautiously and diligently look into their inclinations and psychological dispositions: for not all ought to be instructed in the same way and by the same method, but each according to his own powers and the special character with which he is endowed.¹ Yet we shall hand on certain more general things: namely education ought to be virile, practical, and Christian.

¹ Courtade and d'Hulst, De l'action individuelle dans l'education chretienne, Paris, 1870; E. Picard, Comment traiter l'enfant a l'ecole, in Science sociale, t. XXXVI, August 1903, p. 97-129.

959. (a) First, education ought to be virile, insofar as it ought to tend to forming men gradually. For there are parents and teachers who think that nothing else is to be desired in the young except perfect docility of soul and blind obedience of will, by which they immediately and without complaint embrace the opinions expressed by superiors and obey their commands. Men endowed with reason and liberty are not formed thus. But by words and examples, persuasion and gentle suggestion, and also paternal correction, let the young be taught how they may cultivate their faculties, and gradually may be able by themselves to think, will, and act, not indeed independently from God and the rule of morals, but independently from vain human fear and from prejudices by no means consonant with reason.

Wherefore, as soon as the exercise of reason dawns, let it be set forth to them why and how they ought to flee evil and do good; let them be deterred especially from vices common to their age, such as lies, small thefts, contentions, and quarrels; let them be induced to perfect sincerity and honesty, justice and charity, modesty and chastity.² But let them be taught to perform all these things not only from fear or custom, but from the inward persuasion of the soul, by which they understand that they are held to this both from the will of God and from the dictate of conscience. Likewise let them increase the powers of the will by assiduous efforts,¹ so that they may more easily overcome the untamed passions which arise within, and the allurements of the world which from without entice them to vices.

² Fonssagrives excellently sets forth how the young are to be strengthened in chastity, Conseils aux parents et aux maitres sur l'education de la purete, 2nd ed., 1902. - For preserving chastity, it must diligently be cared for that boys and girls not sleep together in the same room, and especially in the same bed, at least after the seventh year.

¹ J. Payot, L'Education de la volonte, 18th ed., Paris, 1894; Ribot, Les maladies de la volonte, Paris, 18th ed.; A. Martin, L'Education du caractere, Paris, 1889.

960. (b) Education ought also to be practical, that is, truly preparing boys or girls for that kind of life for which they are destined, according to the character and condition of each. Many parents today, especially in France, think only of teaching letters, and send their offspring to colleges and universities, so that they may be able to lead a quiet life in the exercise of the liberal arts or in managing public affairs; from this it happens that many exercise no office, because there are many more candidates than offices to be distributed. Now the liberal arts must be cultivated by some, but not by all; otherwise industry, commerce, agriculture, and other arts necessary for life would soon grow languid and perish. Moreover many are found less suitable for the liberal arts, while on the contrary they would wish to give themselves to agriculture, industry, or commerce, if they were rightly instructed in these. Therefore let parents and teachers diligently look into the character and inclinations of their children or pupils, and not exercise any longer in literature those who intend to devote themselves to industry. Therefore it is greatly to be desired that schools which they call professional be multiplied among Catholics, in which all those who wish to embrace an industrial office, independent from the State, may be rightly formed.²

² Demolins, op. cit., p. 87-112; the same author, in another work (L'Education nouvelle, Paris, s. d.), describes how the young can be practically prepared for industrial life.

961. (c) Education should especially be Christian, by which namely adolescents are formed who embrace religion and adhere to it, not only when they are placed under the guardianship of parents or teachers, but also when they now act by their own movement and lead life far from the family. For this it is required that they believe from an inward and reasonable persuasion of the soul, and not be ashamed to manifest faith by works; for today, since the Catholic faith is attacked everywhere, it is necessary that Catholic youth be ready to fight manfully for the faith, as soldiers of Christ.

Wherefore parents are held under grave obligation, either through themselves or through others, to hand on to their children Catholic doctrine concerning all those things which are necessary to be known for attaining salvation and living as Christians; to form the same to the practice of those virtues without which they cannot be saved. For since children of this sort are destined to a supernatural end, those who procreated them by that very fact took upon themselves the burden, insofar as it can be done, of furnishing them the means necessary for obtaining this end. - The Roman Catechism inculcates this obligation in these words:¹ "The proper offices and duties of parents are that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals, and give them the best precepts of living, so that, instructed and prepared for religion, they may venerate God holily and inviolate."

¹ Catech. Rom., On the fourth precept of the Decalogue, n. 13.

The same is handed down in the Code, c. 1113.

962. 1. Hence parents ought to take care that children be baptized as soon as possible (On Baptism, n. 48), and receive the grace of regeneration, by which they are made children of God, citizens of the Church and of the kingdom of heaven; - that from the tenderest years they learn the principal mysteries of faith, invoke the name of God,² love Christ the mediator, and pursue his Mother with a pious affection; - that they become accustomed to morning and evening prayers, the sacrifice of the Mass and divine offices, and also catechisms; - that they avoid depraved companions and dangerous readings, and especially that they not be corrupted by impious or dishonest servants.

² Let mothers take care that children, first attaining the years of discretion, turn themselves to God; to the point St. Thomas, 1. 2., q. 89, a. 6, ad 3: "For the first thing that occurs to a man having discretion is that he think concerning himself, to whom he should order other things as to an end. For the end is prior in intention. And therefore this is the time for which he is obliged by the affirmative precept of God, by which the Lord says: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you (Zach., 1, 3)."

2. But they themselves ought to furnish a good example to their offspring, by speaking cautiously before them, especially about things pertaining to religion or chastity, lest at an inopportune time they learn what they ought still to be ignorant of; - likewise by acting cautiously, lest perhaps they furnish scandal to little ones:³ for these easily desire to imitate all things which they see; - by showing them examples of all virtues: for since the first age, like soft wax, receives impressions more distinctly and elegantly, it is certainly of great importance that only specimens of virtue be shown before boys, especially by those who enjoy the greatest authority among them.

³ Hence even the pagan poet Juvenal writes (Satire 14): "The greatest reverence is owed to the boy; if you prepare anything shameful, do not despise the years of the boy: but let your infant son stand in your way when you are about to sin."

3. Parents are also held to correct delinquent children, yet moderately, prudently, and benignly, so that it clearly appears that this is done for the sake of amendment, but not of indignation and anger. - For parents act in God's place in the rule of the house, and ought to imitate him who disposes all things sweetly and strongly, and chastises men only wisely, for instructing them and deterring them from vice. Therefore let them speak or determine nothing too bitter against children; but, as the Roman Catechism admonishes,¹ "if any fault has been committed, since chastisement and rebuke are necessary, let them not loosely remit anything to children through indulgence: for often children are depraved by the excessive softness and facility of parents; wherefore let the example of Heli, the high priest, deter them from relaxed indulgence, who, since he had been too indulgent toward his children, was afflicted with the greatest punishment."

¹ Catech. Rom., loc. cit., n. 14.

963. (C) On Catholic schools. Finally parents, when they cannot provide at home for the perfect education of children, are held to send them to Catholic schools; for from the Code, c. 1374, "Catholic children should not frequent non-Catholic, neutral, mixed schools, namely those which are open also to non-Catholics"; lest they be exposed to the danger of losing faith or morals.²

² Dupanloup discusses excellently the endowments of teachers and the manner of educating the young, De l'Education, and Lettres sur l'Education des Filles, Paris, 1879; cf. Guibert, op. cit.

To set forth the matter more fully, it must be known that non-Catholic schools are of two kinds: neutral, which in the education of boys prescind from any positive religion, but teach nothing heretical or impious; positively evil, in which atheism, heresy, or indifferentism is more or less defended.

(a) Now it is not permitted to parents to send children to positively evil schools, in which the proximate danger of perversion cannot be removed: for here the matter concerns the eternal salvation of souls, which must be preferred to all goods; nor is it permitted to expose oneself to the proximate danger of sinning, as is established from the things said where treating the proximate occasion, On Penance, n. 458-469. Hence, if such public schools exist, let fathers of families not omit to denounce them, as contrary to the common good, and let them use all legitimate means to abolish them thoroughly. - But if, with attention to all the circumstances, the danger can certainly morally be removed, let these things from the Code, c. 1374, be attended to before the eyes: "But it belongs to the Ordinary alone to decree, according to the norm of the instructions of the Apostolic See, in what circumstances of things and with what cautions employed, so that the danger of perversion may be avoided, it can be tolerated that those schools be attended." This also applies to neutral schools.

964. Schools which are called neutral are also very dangerous; for by the very fact that they exclude every religion, they prepare the way for religious indifferentism, especially as regards boys of tender age; at least in their estimation the dignity and authority of religion is much diminished if it seems relegated within domestic walls; besides, in these schools purity of morals is not rarely exposed to great dangers; finally it can scarcely happen that religion is altogether prescinded from, especially in historical and moral matters, and often, under the pretext of neutrality, Catholic dogmas are attacked or mocked.¹

¹ Leo XIII vividly described these dangers, Encyclical Nobilissima Gallorum gens, Feb. 8, 1884; cf. Instruction of the S. C. de Prop. Fide, Nov. 24, 1875, to the Bishops of the Federated States of America, in Collectanea, n. 481; Third Council of Baltimore, n. 194-213; Letter of the S. C. de Prop. Fide, in Acta S. Sedis, t. XXVIII, p. 381. - In France, the Bishops set forth how dangerous State schools are, in the letter of Sept. 14, 1909; cf. Goyau, L'ecole d'aujourd'hui, Paris, 1899; J. Bricout, Ce qu'on enseigne aux enfants dans nos ecoles publiques, Paris, 1910. In certain schools the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the very foundations of morality are denied or called into doubt!

Wherefore Catholic schools are to be erected wherever this can be done, all the more because, where such have been instituted, public schools are compelled to reverence the Catholic religion more, lest perhaps parents send their offspring from these to Catholic schools.

But where there are no Catholic schools suitable for conveniently educating the young, parents are permitted to commit their offspring to public schools, provided that cautions are employed by which the danger of perversion is made remote from proximate.²

² Thus the Holy See already declared that it can be tolerated that Catholic young persons frequent the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and at the same time defined what cautions are necessary for removing the dangers thence arising (Holy Office, March 26, 1895).

But the cautions to be employed so that the danger of perversion may be warded off are these: to hand on Christian instruction and education outside school rightly and diligently, especially concerning those truths which are usually attacked in schools; to watch solicitously lest children suffer some detriment in faith or morals from lessons heard, from depraved books, or from association with depraved companions.¹

¹ Thus the Holy Office, in Collectanea, n. 481. - Hence the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 199, established that "all Catholic parents are held to send their offspring to parochial schools, unless either at home or in other Catholic schools they sufficiently and evidently consult the Christian education of their children, or, on account of a sufficient cause, approved by the Bishop, and with opportune cautions and remedies, it is permitted to them to send them to other schools."

3. On The Providence Of Parents Toward Children.

965. When parents have given work to the education of children, it remains that, by a certain paternal providence, they help them toward choosing a state and rightly ordering life.

(A) First of all they are held to help them so that they may be able to embrace a state suitable to their condition and character; for it is not fitting that even the rich and noble remain idle, but an obligation is incumbent upon each person of devoting himself to some labor, so that he can bring some utility to himself, to the family, and to society. They will furnish this indeed:

(a) By taking care that boys and girls (for these also ought to do something useful) learn art or letters, - and acquire those endowments of body and soul by which, even if they were deprived of an inheritance, they would be able to obtain for themselves an honorable support.

(b) By furnishing to the same counsel concerning choosing a state of life, according to their condition: for parents, who have greater experience, can help incautious young persons much in this matter; nevertheless they cannot bring force upon their children, who have the right of choosing a decent state for themselves, after they have sought the counsel of parents.

966. (c) By bringing help to them, so that they may be able to attain the state which they have chosen; therefore, if parents are richer, it is altogether fitting that they moderately endow their children, so that these may more easily be able to devote themselves to some industry or art and support themselves and their family, when they have married. But whether this is owed from justice, by natural right alone, is not so certainly established, provided that otherwise the children are able to provide for themselves. - Whatever may be the case, in many regions the custom has prevailed that daughters be endowed, so that they may more easily marry according to their condition; and, where custom flourishes, parents who without reasonable cause would not wish to furnish this would sin against charity - gravely or lightly according to the circumstances - because by their fault a daughter would often remain unmarried or would enter only an unequal marriage.

It is likewise fitting that parents lay up treasure for children, and leave to them a part of the inheritance, so that the honor and security of families may be more safely provided for; but, natural right alone being inspected, that is not prescribed from justice;¹ wherefore, in certain nations, civil law leaves full liberty to fathers, as we declared above, on the Virtue of Justice, n. 716. But where civil law has defined something concerning this matter, what is to be done in conscience we handed down in the same place, n. 725.

¹ To prove that this is an office of justice, many allege the words of the Apostle: "For children ought not to lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children" (II Cor., XII, 14); but, the context having been inspected, it is clear that St. Paul there in no way treats of an office of justice incumbent upon parents, but only refers to those things which are fitting, and which in his time were commonly done.

967. (B) After children have chosen a state of life and have married, paternal care is indeed diminished, but not altogether extinguished; for children, even after marriage has been celebrated, are closer to parents than strangers; wherefore the order of charity demands that, if they are placed in bodily or spiritual necessity, parents assist them more than strangers.

(a) If therefore children by fortuitous chance, from physical infirmity or misfortune, indeed from their own fault, have been made needy, and do not have the necessities for the support of themselves and of their children, and neither wives nor their own children can furnish them food, paternal charity demands that parents, insofar as they can, provide for the necessities of children: for if they are held to aid the poor, a fortiori those who are joined to them by the closer bond of consanguinity. - Yet they ought by no means to supply them with wealth and luxury, but only those things which are required for honorable support.

968. (b) Thus likewise if children need spiritual correction or opportune counsel, the right and office of furnishing spiritual alms by paternal affection is incumbent upon parents rather than upon strangers, because of the closer conjunction which they retain with them.

In one word, the special bonds of charity by which parents are bound to children are indeed relaxed at mature age, but are not entirely dissolved. Yet in these matters very great attention must be paid to the morals and customs which have prevailed in such or such a region, indeed even in the same region among various kinds of families; for the bonds by which parents and children are joined are closer or looser among diverse Nations, and also at various times or among diverse families: in this matter, custom is the best interpreter of laws.

969. Since parents act in God's place with regard to children, they have the right to be loved and honored by them, first on account of God, whom they represent; hence the honor rendered to parents is attributed to God rather than to men. Wherefore to them, as to God, yet in a lesser degree, love, reverence, and obedience are owed: love indeed, because they participate in God's infinite goodness in a finite way; reverence, because divine excellence specially shines forth in them; obedience, since they are made participants of divine authority; concerning these we must speak separately.²

¹ Mayol, op. cit., p. 478-504; Jaugey, p. 448-464; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 815-822; A. de Margerie, t. II, p. 138-171; P. Janet, op. cit., p. 143-236; M. d'Hulst, op. cit., 5th Conf.

² And thus we shall set forth the fourth precept of the Decalogue: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the land which the Lord thy God will give thee" (Exod., xx, 12). For, as the Catech. Rom., l. c., n. 4, rightly observes, to honor is to think honorably concerning someone, and to consider all his things of very great worth. The other things are joined to this honor, namely love and obedience; for he who loves does not always venerate; he who fears does not always love; but he who honors someone from the soul loves and reveres him.

1. On The Love Owed To Parents.

970. Principle: Children are held to love parents not only from the common law of charity, but from the special precept of piety.

It is proved. For besides motives common to all, there are certain special ones on account of which parents ought to be loved; for by procreating children, they bestowed life upon them, and with it all the goods which flow from it;³ by nourishing and protecting them they preserved that same life, often subtracting very many things from themselves so that they might provide for them; by education they cultivated and increased their faculties; in one word, whatever children have, after God, they owe to progenitors, and on that account they are held to exhibit special love and gratitude to them. In reality if God must be loved because he is good in himself and benign to us, ought not parents likewise to be loved, who, participants in divine goodness, have imitated his benignity toward their offspring?

³ "In thy whole heart honor thy father, and do not forget the groans of thy mother: remember that unless through them thou wouldst not have been born; and repay them as they also did to thee" (Eccli., VII, 29-30).

Wherefore in the Sacred Scriptures God promises all the best things to those who honor and love parents: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth";¹ this longevity indeed was highly valued among the Jews. And again: "He who honors his father will rejoice in children, and in the day of his prayer he will be heard... In work and speech, and in all patience honor thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from him, and his blessing may remain in the end."² Nor otherwise St. Paul: "Honor thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with a promise, that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth."³

¹ Exod., XX, 13.

² Eccli., III, 7, 9-10.

³ Ephes., VI, 2-3; see other texts in the work La Famille suivant l'Ecriture Sainte, Paris, 1881, p. 233-268.

971. It is declared. This love indeed ought to be internal and external at the same time, and consists in two things: to will well and to do good.

(A) To will well, that is, to pursue them with a pious, tender, and devoted affection, so that one is ready in soul to suffer and do all things for them. - Wherefore children gravely sin against piety who deliberately and seriously wish death upon their parents, or grave damage of soul or body, or rejoice concerning notable damage inflicted on them; likewise those who truly despise them, mock them, affect them with insults and words gravely injurious, or, without a just cause, gravely and deliberately sadden them. - It must be noted that hatred toward parents is more easily a grave sin than toward strangers.

972. (B) To do good, or to show parents signs of benevolence: (a) by a friendly and cheerful face, sweet speech, prompt service, and all those means by which tender and devoted love is manifested. Wherefore those who scarcely show a sign of friendship, but speak harshly or act imperiously, sin more or less, and often gravely.

(b) By assisting them in bodily or spiritual necessity. Thus, when parents labor under infirmity or old age, or suffer from adverse cases, children ought to visit and console them and bring help to them; if they are placed in poverty, not only extreme but grave, they are held to furnish the same food and other necessities of life.

So great is this obligation that, when parents are placed in extreme or grave necessity, a son cannot enter religion, even if he has emitted a vow of entering religion, but ought to remain in the world so that he may assist them, provided that there is no other who can or wishes to furnish this; for the natural law concerning the care of parents precedes an obligation undertaken by one's own will.¹ - But when he has already been professed in religion, he can and is held to go out from the convent for a time, even with the Prelate unwilling, if the parents are in extreme and evident necessity, which cannot otherwise be assisted, on account of the same reason;² but if the religion itself provides necessary things for needy parents (which is altogether fitting as often as this can be done), the religious ought to remain within the cloister. - But if the necessity is only grave, it is disputed; according to the more probable opinion, he is held, with obedience to his Prelate preserved, to use means by which his parents may be assisted.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 101, a. 4. - Thus also civil law in most regions; so in France: "Children owe support to their father and mother or other ascendants who are in need... Support is granted only in proportion to the need of the one who claims it, and to the fortune of the one who owes it... If the person who ought to furnish support shows that he cannot pay the support pension, the tribunal can, with knowledge of the cause, order that he receive in his dwelling, feed, and maintain the one to whom he owes support" (Cod. civ., art. 205, 208, 210).

² St. Thom., l. c., ad 4, seems to teach the contrary; but there he does not speak of extreme necessity; for elsewhere he writes (Quodlibet 3, q. 6, art. 11): "He ought, as far as he can, with the obedience of the order preserved, to strive that by himself or by another his parents be assisted, if they shall have been placed in necessity." Besides, the Superior would not reasonably be unwilling who denied permission of going out from religion to him who otherwise would not be able to succor the extreme necessity of parents. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 67; Jaugey, op. cit., n. 551; Ball. P., n. 148.

973. Likewise they are to be assisted in spiritual necessities, namely by taking care that they obtain all spiritual helps which they need, but especially that to those lying in extremity there be administered the sacraments and other helps useful for dying well. Likewise they ought not to impede them from restoring another's goods before death, or repairing damage inflicted on neighbors, or making a testament for donating something to pious works. - After their death, according to their faculties, let them take care that they receive decent obsequies and that the sacrifice of the Mass be offered for them several times: for piety extends even to the dead.

2. On The Reverence Owed To Parents.

974. (A) Principle: Children are held to show to parents special signs of reverence and honor, according to the custom of the fatherland and of their condition. - It is said special, because greater reverence, other things being equal, is owed to parents than to strangers.

This is certainly openly established from all the places of Scripture related above, in which the matter directly concerns the honor owed to parents. - This is also proved by reason: for honor is owed to those to whom excellence belongs, and indeed the greater the higher their dignity; but parents participate in the excellence of God in a particular way, insofar as they were cooperators of God in the procreation and education of children; they are therefore visible and living images of the invisible God, and their excellence is as it were a certain emanation and participation of divine excellence; therefore to these, insofar as they act in God's place, children ought to show special honor and reverence.

975. (B) They ought indeed to furnish this by heart, word, and work: (a) By heart indeed, by thinking honorably concerning them, acknowledging them as superiors, and conceiving a good estimation of their excellence. Therefore children sin who despise them, disdain them, or are ashamed of them, not wishing to acknowledge them as their parents; this sometimes happens when children are raised to a higher state, while parents live in poverty, but it is deservedly judged unworthy of an honorable man.

(b) Also by word, by speaking with them modestly and reverently, without any sign of contempt, and by saying nothing concerning them which can harm the good estimation which they enjoy among others. - Therefore children sin, and indeed mortally of itself, who deliberately affect parents with contemptuous, mocking, or abusive words, or in a grave matter detract from them, or provoke them to anger without cause; a fortiori those who curse them: "He who shall have cursed his father or his mother shall die by death";¹ "he who curses his father and mother, his lamp shall be extinguished in the midst of darkness."²

¹ Exod., XXI, 17.

² Prov., XX, 20.

(c) Finally by work, by greeting and honoring them according to the custom of the fatherland, and by showing other signs which denote the internal sense of reverence, e.g., by opportunely seeking and following their counsels, especially in matters of great moment, insofar as it can be done. - Therefore those sin gravely who deliberately strike parents, even lightly, or lift a hand for striking, although they do not in reality strike, or injuriously treat them. On the contrary, they ought to bear, conceal, and excuse with all patience, without anger and indignation, their defects, and also rustic, uncivil, or difficult manners: since they also once patiently bore the defects and rough manners of children.

The Wise Man draws all these things together thus:¹ "In work and speech, and in all patience honor thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from him, and his blessing may remain in the end. The blessing of the father strengthens the houses of children: but the curse of the mother uproots the foundations. Do not glory in the dishonor of thy father: for his confusion is not glory to thee... Son, receive the old age of thy father, and do not sadden him in his life; and if he fails in sense, give pardon, and do not despise him in thy strength."

¹ Eccli., III, 9-14; read the whole chapter.

3. On The Obedience Owed To Parents.

976. Principle: Children ought to obey parents in all honest and licit things pertaining to paternal care, as long as they remain under their power. - Love and reverence are owed for the whole time of life, but obedience strictly binds children only as long as they live under paternal authority; therefore when they have now been emancipated, or have attained majority, or have married, they are now made their own right. Yet if they live under the paternal roof, they are held to furnish a certain obedience to the father, as head of the family.

(A) It is proved. (a) For Scripture often inculcates this: "Hear, my son, the discipline of thy father, and do not abandon the law of thy mother...² Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is just...³ Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is pleasing in the Lord."⁴ (b) And deservedly; for, if in a general way inferiors ought to obey superiors, a fortiori children ought to obey parents: for these, as God's cooperators in the procreation and education of children, participate in his authority in a special way, and therefore have the right of prescribing to children in all things which regard their instruction and discipline; for since the duty and office of educating and instructing offspring is incumbent upon them, by that very fact children are held to obey parents justly prescribing, as God himself, in whose place they act.

² Prov., I, 8.

³ Ephes., VI, 1.

⁴ Colos., III, 20.

977. (B) It is declared. Yet they are not held to obey in all things without any distinction, but only: (a) in licit and honest things; for if parents should prescribe something evil or less honest, e.g., to exercise vengeance, to pursue enemies with hatred, to provoke them to duels, or to steal and inflict damage on others, or to go to dangerous occasions of sin, etc., it would be necessary to resist them, because then they by no means act in God's place: "It is necessary to obey God rather than men."¹

¹ Acts, V, 29.

(b) In all things pertaining to paternal care; since the authority of parents is neither absolute nor universal, but is contained within certain limits, and is restricted to those things which regard the education of offspring and the government of the family. Thus children certainly ought to furnish obedience in those things which regard eternal salvation and good morals, e.g., when parents prescribe attendance at divine offices on feast days, - or forbid that suspect houses and dangerous gatherings be frequented, or prohibit immoderate games, certain associations full of dangers, entrance into taverns given to intemperance, and other things of this sort which can corrupt morals. In all these things, which are now forbidden or prescribed by divine law, there is probably not committed a double sin, one against the special virtue which is offended and another against the obedience owed to parents, unless the violation proceeds from contempt of parents; but the malice of the sin is increased from the irreverence committed against parents, and the young are to be exhorted to declare this circumstance, so that the confessor may be able to hand on opportune counsels concerning this matter. - Likewise children are held to obey in those things which pertain to the administration of the house and family, e.g., as to domestic things not to be alienated or destroyed.

So that a sin against obedience owed to parents may be grave, it is required that parents seriously and strictly prescribe, - that the matter of the precept be grave, with attention to all things, - and that disobedience be fully voluntary. Wherefore not rarely, from the defect of one of these conditions, the sin is judged light, especially when it is committed not from contempt or obstinacy, but from a certain frailty or inborn sense of independence.

978. (c) But children are not held to obey parents in the choice of the state of life, although generally it is greatly expedient to seek their counsel. The reason is that vocation to a particular state is an act of divine providence which transcends the authority of parents; besides, since the happiness of the young depends very greatly on such an election, it belongs to them to choose and embrace this state, according to the sweet inclination which they experience and the admonitions of a spiritual director. Yet it is useful to seek the counsel of progenitors, especially if the matter concerns the lay state, since in these matters they have greater experience than adolescents.

Wherefore children can enter religion or receive sacred orders, while parents dissent, provided they enter this plan not lightly, but after mature deliberation. What power they have in order to matrimony we have already set forth on Matrimony, p. 217-221.

979. Note for practice. Often the young of each sex accuse sins against obedience or reverence owed to parents only in a confused and vague way; and since it is of great importance in our days to strengthen paternal authority, the confessor, with the best counsel, will prudently and diligently ask concerning this matter, so that, the nature of the sin having been detected, he may vividly manifest its malice to the penitents, and sweetly and at the same time strongly exhort the young to honor parents as living images of God, and to obey them as the Lord. - Children who have offended parents ought of themselves to ask pardon; but, if it is foreseen that the matter will be very difficult, this is not to be urged, lest perhaps those who bear this with difficulty be again exposed to the danger of sinning by omitting this petition for pardon; besides they can repair the wounded honor in another way, namely by gentle speech, or by the manifestation of sincere love; for this being posited, parents easily condone this obligation.

980. Often domestic society is completed by herile society, inasmuch, namely, as male and female servants hire out their services to the head of a family, and for a certain price oblige themselves faithfully to fulfill certain duties in the house. This indeed arises from a twofold need and necessity: on the one hand, the members of the family cannot perform all the works which are required for domestic affairs; but on the other hand, there are certain persons who, on account of want or misfortune, can obtain the necessities of life by themselves only with difficulty: wherefore they desire to hire out their services, so that they may procure food for themselves or for others joined to them; thence arose service, or the contract by which certain outsiders, by hiring out their services, become of the master's family, and therefore are called domestics.

¹ Mayol, Summa moralis, col. 544-549, ed. Migne; Valentin, Examen sur les Commandements, Lyon, 1869, t. I, p. 202-216; Ball. P., n. 833-839; D'Hulst, Careme, 1894, 6th Conf.; L. M. Salmon, Domestic service, New York, 1897.

Servants are distinguished from workers, who hire out their services for a short time, but are not received into the master's family; for craftsmen have their own home and often a family, nor are they subject to employers except during those hours of the day for which they are hired, while servants ought to furnish obedience to masters for the whole time of service, and inhabit the house of the masters.

Historically it is certain that the condition of domestics has not always been the same; in antiquity many were bound to servitude; when afterward they were made free, for a long time the bonds between them and the masters were much closer than they are in our days; likewise today, the contract of service is not entered into in the same way in different regions; indeed, in the same region, it is understood in one way in the countryside and in another in cities. Wherefore all these things must be carefully attended to in defining the mutual obligations of masters and servants: their extension and obligatory force depend greatly on the customs of times and places. - Likewise, when texts of Scripture, the Fathers, and Theologians are brought forward, one must carefully distinguish between general principles, which are adapted to all places and times, and special rules which are applied only to certain conditions of places and times.

I. On The Duties Of Masters.

981. Masters obtain their authority from God, who, by granting unequal gifts to men, willed that in human society some should be superior to others, and constituted a certain hierarchical order; in which sense it can be said: "For there is no power except from God."¹ Yet this authority is not absolute, but ought to be exercised moderately, prudently, and in a Christian manner: for servants, although inferior to masters in state and condition, are equal to them insofar as they are children of the same heavenly Father, redeemed by the same Savior, participants in the same sacraments, and destined for the same end; therefore Christian charity and modesty should temper authority.

¹ Rom., XIII, 1.

These things being posited, the duties of masters arise both from justice and from charity: from justice, when they flow explicitly or implicitly from the very contract of service freely entered into; from charity, which ought to be greater toward domestics than toward strangers.

982. 1. Justice demands that all legitimate conditions included in the contract be equally observed: - (A) A just wage ought to be paid at the appointed time, or according to the custom of the region confirmed by laws or custom; for masters have obliged themselves to this by the very contract. (a) As to the determination of the just price, the rules concerning the wages of workers handed down above are to be followed (On Justice, n. 819-826).

Hence those are guilty of injustice who, abusing the want or simplicity of servants, extort their consent to a wage below that which by common judgment is judged equitable. And indeed masters who assign very small wages to servants are less easily excused than employers who have many workers; for the latter sometimes, by reason of unbridled competition, are compelled to diminish stipends, lest otherwise they tend toward ruin; but the former, who have few servants, generally can pay a full wage without being conquered by the law of competition.¹

¹ Certain masters diminish the stipends of servants so that they may give more abundant alms, as they say; yet is it not better to give alms to the domestics themselves, as being nearer, under the form of a greater wage?

(b) Likewise those sin who do not pay the promised remuneration at the appointed time, but defer it for a long time;² the gravity of the injustice depends on the gravity of the damage thus inflicted: it is greater, for example, when servants need this stipend in order to sustain their own.

² For the words of Scripture look here: "Behold the hire of the laborers who have reaped your fields, which has been kept back by you, cries out, and the cry of them has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth" (James, V, 4).

983. Corollaries. (a) If a servant, hired for a year, is sick for a short time, for example, for a week, generally by the custom of places the whole wage is owed: and indeed deservedly, since sickness of this sort can be foreseen among things commonly occurring. But if he is sick for a notable time, strictly the whole wage is not owed, since remuneration, if justice alone is attended to, ought to be proportioned to the work furnished: therefore if the whole is paid, it will be a work of mercy.

(b) If a servant departs spontaneously, without a legitimate cause, before the time fixed, for example, before the month has elapsed, strictly speaking he loses the right to the wage corresponding to the time of service, because he himself broke the contract, and perhaps inflicted damage on the master thereby; nevertheless, if in reality the latter has suffered no damage, for example, because he can immediately find another servant, equity counsels that some compensation be given for the work furnished. - But if the servant is unjustly dismissed before the fixed time, or because of the fault of the master, who, for example, treats him harshly or provokes him to sin, he has a strict right to obtain compensation for all damages unjustly inflicted on him under this head.

984. (B) Masters cannot demand more works than those concerning which agreement was made in the contract; and if they ask anything more, they are held to increase the stipend. For since such a wage was determined by mutual consent for such a work, if the work is increased, the stipend ought to be increased. Yet often nothing certain has been defined, and the matter must be left to the judgment and moral estimation of prudent persons, according to the various customs of places.

985. 2. Duties of charity. Masters ought to love servants the more because these are nearer to them. Wherefore: - (A) They ought to treat them kindly: "If thou hast a faithful servant, let him be to thee as thy soul; treat him as a brother";¹ and therefore to address them most humanely, to preside over and command them without arrogance, to provide them sufficient food, and not to burden them with excessive labors. - Therefore they sin if they afflict them without cause by harsh and abusive words, and a fortiori by blows.

¹ Eccli., XXXIII, 31; cf. Ephes., VI, 9; Epistle to Philemon. - To the point Turgeon, op. cit., t. I, p. 363: "Appealing to masters and above all to mistresses, we beg them to penetrate themselves better with this Christian and human idea, that their domestics are their equals before God and before nature, beings who think as they do, who suffer as they do, and whom the progress of instruction and equality renders more and more sensitive to injustice, harshness, and humiliation. Let us have the courage to say to ourselves that they need more patience and resignation to serve us than we need to bear with them."

If servants labor under some infirmity or disease, masters ought to watch over them so that diligent care may be provided for them; indeed they are not strictly held to pay expenses for a doctor and medicines, unless this has been brought into the agreement; but often Christian charity will counsel this.

986. (B) They ought also prudently to procure the spiritual good of servants: by granting time for fulfilling religious duties,² namely, for hearing Mass, receiving the sacraments, learning Christian doctrine, etc.; - and therefore by not compelling them, outside necessity, to servile works on feast days or to eat flesh at a forbidden time; - by watching over good morals, especially where there are younger servants of different sex;¹ - by prudently and gently, but firmly, correcting them when by blasphemies, filthy speech, impious conversations, or illicit familiarities they scandalize other domestics; - by chiefly taking care that they themselves do not induce servants to sin by bad example, incautious speech, or solicitation; and that sons of the family do not draw younger maids, by importunate attentions, to acts contrary to modesty and chastity.

² "Respect the conscience of the servant: no imposed religion: hypocrisy does not honor God; no impeded religion: it is an odious tyranny to deny to one who serves his fellow man the liberty of serving his God." (M. D'Hulst, op. cit., p. 182.)

¹ "Be vigilant: the servant forms part of the family; he must not dishonor it by his vices; you have charge of souls with respect to all who live at your hearth." (M. D'Hulst, ibid.) Wherefore the praised author laments, p. 450, that at Paris and in great cities male and female servants are promiscuously relegated, far from the rooms of the masters, to the upper part of the building, where younger persons are often exposed to proximate occasions of sinning.

II. On The Duties Of Servants.

987. 1. Duties of justice. (A) By force of the contract itself, they are held to furnish their services wholly and faithfully, just as it has been freely and equitably agreed, with that common diligence which is required by law or custom; - and therefore to inflict no damage on the master or on his goods, whether deliberately or from culpable negligence (On Justice, n. 793-794). - Therefore those sin who waste in idleness a notable part of the time owed to service, or divert it to their own or another's utility. - Moreover they ought to furnish obedience in all those things which pertain to service and good morals,² and those sin who obstinately resist the legitimate commands of masters.

² Here belong the words of the Apostle, with the due distinction nevertheless preserved between slaves and servants: "Servants, obey your masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ; not serving to the eye, as pleasing men, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart." (Ephes., VI, 5-6; cf. I Pet., II, 18-19.)

(B) Those who are hired by office to guard some thing, such as guardians of houses, administrators of household property, etc., are held by justice to prevent any damage from being inflicted on those things of which they have the guardianship or management; and if, from their culpable negligence, damage has been inflicted, they are held to its reparation, as unjust cooperators. But if they have been hired for common labor, they are indeed held by charity to prevent damages, but probably not by strict justice, according to modern customs. (On Justice, n. 512-515; in the same place, nn. 439, 457, see what we said concerning thefts of servants and hidden compensation.)

(C) It is not licit to desert service before the fixed time except for a grave cause, and, insofar as it can be done, with the master opportunely warned: this is clear from the very nature of the contract.

988. 2. Duties of charity. (A) They ought to furnish interior and exterior reverence to masters, insofar as they are divinely set over them in those things which pertain to the government of the family; for the words of the Apostle to slaves can in some way be accommodated to servants: "Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them account their masters worthy of all honor."¹ - Therefore they sin if they despise masters, mock them, offend them with abusive words, or bear themselves insolently toward them.

¹ I Tim., VI, 1. - "As the master ought to see in his servant a brother, his equal before nature and before redemption, so the man who serves his fellow man ought to respect in him this element of divinity which resides in his person and consecrates his authority." (M. D'Hulst, l. c., p. 189.)

(B) In a special way they ought to take care that they do not harm the master or his family by detraction or by the manifestation of secrets which they know from the office entrusted to them: from the fact that they are made in some way participants in domestic life, they ought to be more cautious when they converse with strangers about domestic matters.

It is indeed greatly to be desired that relations between servants and masters be more intimate, as in reality they still exist in some families; but if they cannot generally be restored, let the difficulties of service at least be tempered by mutual reverence and charity. - Priests, however, should not neglect the spiritual care of servants, but with paternal solicitude should take pains that by opportune counsels and pious confraternities they keep them from evil and direct them to the perfection of virtue.²

² How solicitously H. de Tourville, a man otherwise very meritorious concerning social matters, performed this, P. Bureau has set forth, L'Oeuvre de H. de Tourville, in Science Sociale, t. XXXV, 1903, p. 470-471.

989. Preliminary remarks concerning the origin and nature of this society.³ To domestic society, already instituted from the beginning, civil society was soon superadded. First indeed there appear patriarchal families, enlarged through several generations, and at the same time aided by outside persons who are joined to the family either as servants furnishing their services, or as associates seeking protection: all these dwell together under the rule of the elder father of the family. A little later other families, weaker for defending themselves against external dangers, attacks of beasts or men, flowed together in constructing towns, and instituted a certain confederation under the rule of a more powerful leader; and thus tribes arose, or associations of several families. Afterward certain tribes joined themselves to others, either for the sake of security, so that they might repel external enemies more efficaciously, or from a certain necessity, because the weaker, conquered by the more powerful, passed under their rule; and thus nations were gradually formed.

³ M. D'Hulst, Careme of 1895, 1st Conf.; Meyer, op. cit., t. II, n. 266 seq.; Castelein, Droit naturel, p. 737-767.

990. We note only a few things concerning the various forms of civil government. A threefold form was already distinguished by Aristotle: monarchic, when supreme power resides in one man; aristocratic, when authority belongs to some college of the best men; democratic, if authority remains with the whole people organically united. Today, however, among cultivated nations, especially two forms of government prevail: - monarchy, tempered by other elements, aristocratic and democratic; a republic, or representative democracy, in which the people administer public affairs not directly by themselves (which is impossible), but through deputies elected by themselves.

But whatever the form of government may be, some supreme authority is necessary as the public guardian and patron of social order, whether for protecting peace and security against external enemies, or for protecting the rights of citizens against unjust aggressors dwelling in the state itself; and as the provident promoter of institutions which can serve the common good. - Individual citizens, however, especially those who exercise some office, ought, under the rule of the supreme authority, to labor for the good of the republic. - These things being posited, we shall treat: 1. of the duties of superiors and inferiors in general; 2. of certain offices in particular.

991. Superiors, or princes, are here called not only those who possess supreme power in civil society, such as a King, Emperor, or President of the Republic, but also those who have a part in the Government, as ministers, or also deputies and senators, in regions where supreme power is divided among several. - But subjects are called those who are subject to civil authority.

But love and worship of the fatherland ought to be common to all, not indeed in the sense that foreign peoples are despised or held in hatred, but in the sense that the region where one was born and educated, in which one's fathers are buried, and which has received its mission from God, is specially loved. And indeed this love ought to be generous, so that we are prepared to act rightly, to suffer patiently, and to die for the common good of the fatherland.¹

¹ Card. Gibbons, Patriotism and Politics, in the periodical North Amer. Review, April 1892, p. 385-400.

I. On The Duties Of Superiors, Or Princes.²

² St. Thom., De regimine principum, Opusc. XVI, among the works published at Parma, t. XVI, p. 225-291; Bellarmine, De officio principis christiani; cf. Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Noldin, n. 304-306.

992. Legitimate superiors, whoever they are and in whatever manner they have been elected, act in the place of God, since every power proceeds from God; therefore they do not enjoy unlimited authority, but ought to exercise rule in dependence on the natural and divine law. Their functions and duties, and also the scope of their power, are defined by the Constitution and civil laws of the various Peoples; here we can briefly touch only the more general matters.

993. 1. Superiors are held, by force of their office, primarily to intend and procure the common good, and only secondarily the particular good, whether their own or that of those who are nearer to them. For since society was instituted to promote the common good, those who preside over society were chosen for this, that they might provide for this common good; wherefore they sin against the duty of their state if, administering care of the republic remissly and negligently, they strive to serve the advantage of the few. Hence: -

(A) First, they ought to know in what the common good consists, whether material or spiritual, and by what means it can and ought to be promoted, not only in itself, but also with all circumstances of times, things, and persons attended to; otherwise they will act imprudently, and will inflict many damages on the republic and on private persons. Wherefore they ought diligently to devote themselves to political, economic, and social science; and if they wish to be of more profit to the fatherland, they will try to know in some measure not only the morals and laws of their own people, but also of foreign nations: for, once a comparison has been made between the laws of diverse peoples, it can be better understood how paternal customs may be amended.

(B) The exercise of rule ought to be just, not tyrannical, "but as it were paternal, because God's most just power over men is also joined with paternal goodness."¹ Wherefore respect of persons must be avoided, by force of which favor is shown to one class of citizens rather than to another, or to some private persons rather than to others, without reasonable cause. This is especially to be observed in the distribution of offices and burdens; when injustice is admitted in this matter has already been explained, On Justice, n. 467-468. But, even with justice uninjured, administrators of the republic sin who knowingly and willingly keep the worthier from offices and call the less worthy; for thus they do not provide for the public good, but for their own or for that of a few friends, with detriment to others.

¹ Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei.

994. 2. They are held to protect and promote the good morals of citizens, not only by laws and judicial power, but also by examples. For all concede that good morals contribute much even to the temporal utility of the republic. Wherefore, when abuses have already begun to prevail, for example, public drunkenness because of the multitude of taverns, the corruption of the young through obscene books or obscene pictures or exhibitions, it is necessary that the supreme authority strive to restrain them either by just laws, or by more efficacious observance of the laws. - From this it follows that those who preside are held by a stricter obligation to provide good example, since subjects tend to imitate superiors, according to that saying: By the king's example the whole world is fashioned.

995. 3. They ought to defend and protect private associations which contribute to the good of citizens, but to restrain those which are evidently opposed to good morals; for the former furnish aid to the republic, but the latter greatly harm it. This was more fully explained where we treated of the right of association, On Justice, n. 183-194. But concerning relations between the civil power and the Church we have disputed elsewhere, On The True Church, n. 227-250.

996. 4. As to deputies specifically, and all those who enjoy the right of suffrage in Assemblies, these things especially are to be noted: -

(A) Only those can seek and accept this office who can exercise it prudently and usefully; otherwise, they expose themselves to the danger of inflicting grave damage on the republic. - But if suitable persons have been elected, they cannot refuse the office without a grave cause: for the public good demands that wise and upright persons should not decline an office and burden useful to the fatherland.

(B) They are held to fulfill their office faithfully and vigorously, caring for the common rather than the private good. Wherefore they ought to acquire the economic and social science necessary for the exercise of their office, not only speculative but also practical, by studying theories and facts together, and especially those questions which are foreseen as to be treated in the Legislative Assembly.

(C) They ought to be present at sessions, as often as they are not impeded by a grave cause; indeed, when they cannot be present, let them take care that, as often as a question of great moment is to be decided, they be immediately summoned by telephone or telegraph, lest perhaps an unjust or inopportune law be enacted while they are absent. - But they ought to cast their vote according to the dictate of conscience, and, if the matter is doubtful, let them have recourse to those who can provide wise counsel. - If by their vote they concur in an unjust law, they sin and sometimes are held to restitution, according to the principles explained above, On Justice, n. 503-505.

II. On The Duties Of Subjects.¹

¹ Meyer, t. II, n. 497-537; Noldin, n. 307-319; Vermeersch, De Justitia, n. 83-131; Ami du Clerge, Le peche electoral, t. XXV, 1903, p. 979, and t. XXVI, 1904, p. 2.

997. 1. In regions in which deputies and senators are elected, who by their votes concur in administering public affairs, the primary duty of those who have the right of electing is prudently and vigorously to labor for procuring the election of a suitable candidate.

For the matter at issue, especially in our days, is of the greatest moment: for, in Legislative Assemblies, questions are often debated not only commercial and industrial, but also moral and religious, on whose solution depends the good not only temporal but also spiritual of many citizens, indeed of the whole People. But the solution of questions of this sort depends chiefly on elections: if prudent and honest men are chosen, endowed with courage of soul, a Catholic spirit, and, insofar as it can be done, eloquence, religion and the fatherland will flourish together; but if foolish, evil, irreligious men are elected, a way is prepared not only for temporal ruin, but also for corruption of morals and innumerable errors against faith. Wherefore upon all electors there lies a grave duty not only of abstaining from selling their vote, but also of concurring vigorously in the election of a suitable candidate; from which they cannot be excused except on account of a proportionately grave cause. Hence: -

998. (A) Light causes by no means excuse from this duty, insofar as they are loss of time, hunting or honest recreation, or the mockery of malevolent fellow-citizens: for all these things are something light in relation to the public utility. Nor generally does the probable uselessness of casting votes excuse, because, for example, there is scarcely any hope of electing a good candidate; for, even in this case, it is greatly expedient to show by deeds that good citizens do not at all despair, but are prepared to use all licit means until good deputies can at last be elected. - That one may be dispensed from such a duty, an altogether grave cause is required, such as would be the loss of an office necessary for honest support. - Nevertheless, if it is morally certain that one's vote will profit nothing, or that society will suffer no detriment from the election, whichever candidate is elected, because, for example, both are equally good or evil, a lesser cause suffices so that one can abstain from the election. Nonetheless, even in these cases, it is generally expedient to cast a vote for some upright citizen, so that good example may thus be provided; and this indeed more urgently presses those who possess greater authority and can draw others by their example to giving votes.

999. (B) If the choice is given only between two unworthy candidates, of whom nevertheless one is worse than the other, for example, between a socialist and another imbued with liberal errors, a vote can be cast for the less unworthy, and generally it is expedient; for between two evils it is licit to choose the lesser; but, to forestall the scandal of the little ones, it should be declared publicly that this is done only to impede the evils that would follow from the election of the worse one; besides, good citizens who cast their vote for the less unworthy should warn him that they concur in his election only so that he may vigorously oppose the evil principles advocated by the other candidate and repel unjust laws: for thus he will try to act more cautiously.

(C) That upright citizens may more efficaciously concur in administering public affairs honestly and prosperously, it is necessary that they establish permanent associations among themselves, and hold public meetings, by which electors may be instructed concerning their duties, concerning the importance of questions which will be proposed for decision in Assemblies, concerning the necessity of choosing the best deputies; and this ought to be declared not only speculatively but practically, by setting forth facts, how the deputies of such a province cast their vote for such or such a law, what consequences arose from it, etc., so that electors may be able prudently and freely to choose the worthier among the various candidates.

1000. 2. But in all regions, subjects ought to furnish reverence, obedience, and fidelity to legitimate superiors: -

(A) Reverence indeed, insofar as superiors act in the place of God; and therefore, whatever gifts they shine with or vices they labor under, they have the right of receiving due honor, on account of the authority committed to them, and the excellence which flows from this authority: "Render therefore to all what is due: tribute to whom tribute is due... honor to whom honor."¹ - Therefore those sin who deny due signs of honor to the civil power without just cause, and show it contempt and irreverence. Today indeed the public acts of ministers and officials are deservedly scrutinized and subjected to strict examination, so that abuses which they could favor may thus be forestalled; yet this ought to be done honestly, by avoiding whatever smacks of falsehood and calumny.

¹ Rom., XIII, 7. - How the ancient Christians furnished reverence and obedience to emperors, even persecutors, Guignebert describes, Tertullien, p. 21-128; Adhemar d'Ales, La theologie de Tertullien, p. 397 sq.

1001. (B) Obedience, insofar, namely, as they ought to obey just laws, and also the equitable sentences of judges: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God... Therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience."² - In reality no society can subsist for a long time without the faithful observance of laws; for if each one acts as he pleases, and laws are despised, soon the weaker will be oppressed by the more powerful, and dissensions and fights will succeed peace and concord. - How far the obligation of obeying laws extends has been explained in the Treatise on Laws, n. 341-348; concerning the law of taxes in particular it has been said, On Justice, n. 591-598.

² Rom., XIII, 1-5.

But when a law seems unjust or less opportune, it is not only licit, but expedient, to use licit means for abrogating or reforming it, by writing to deputies so that they may propose this change, if they wish to be elected again.

1002. (C) Let them also furnish fidelity, insofar as it is not licit to stir up rebellion or to kill those who preside, as we have explained, On Justice, n. 362-363; for since today supreme authority is in the hands of a Legislative Assembly, whose members are elected by the votes of citizens, the votes of citizens have greater force for protecting liberty and justice than arms of any kind.

Lest we transgress the limits of a brief Compendium, we shall speak only: of judges, advocates, plaintiff, defendant, and witnesses, and also physicians: for the good of the fatherland and of private persons depends very greatly on the manner in which these fulfill their office.

I. On Judges.¹

¹ Lessius, lib. II, c. 29; Lugo, De Justitia, disp. XXXVII; Conf. d'Angers, t. II, 3rd Conf.; Valentin, Examen sur les devoirs des professions, t. I, p. 1-60; Ball. P., n. 537-593; Noldin, n. 708-717.

1003. A judge is a public person, constituted by legitimate authority to speak and define right. For it is not sufficient that laws be enacted and promulgated, but it is required that they be carefully and faithfully observed. But the observance of laws is especially promoted by judicial power: when suits arise between private persons, or when delicts or crimes are perpetrated, it belongs to judges to settle the matter disputed between the parties, or to punish delinquents: in the former case, the cause is called civil, in the latter, criminal.

Here the matter concerns only secular judges; for ecclesiastical judges are discussed at length in the Lectures on Canon Law. - Today, however, among most nations, in criminal causes, judges of two kinds are employed: jurors, who judge concerning the fact itself, namely whether and in what degree the accused is truly guilty; judges properly so called, who decree a penalty proportioned to the crime. We shall speak: 1. of judges properly so called; 2. of jurors.

1. On Judges Properly So Called.

1004. Besides jurisdiction, which is necessary for the validity of the sentence, and concerning which one treats in both Laws where there is question of the competence of the forum, three obligations chiefly are incumbent upon a judge: -

(A) He ought to possess competent knowledge, so that he may render an equitable judgment: otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of inflicting damage on those who place themselves before his tribunal. Therefore he ought diligently to study the laws in force in his region and also jurisprudence; the higher and more difficult the office entrusted to him is, the more eminent ought the knowledge to be with which he is furnished.

Hence, if some judge is destitute of competent knowledge, he cannot be absolved unless he resigns the office, or learns juridical science and meanwhile abstains from exercising the office, if it can be done, or at least takes the counsel of a more learned person, if he is wholly unable to abstain.

Likewise he ought to use at least common diligence for knowing the particular cause concerning which he will render judgment, and for hearing the arguments which are brought forward for and against by the advocates; otherwise he can be deceived about the facts set forth.

If the judge culpably inflicts damage on one party, whether on account of lack of skill or on account of negligence of which he is conscious, he is held to repair the damage which the injured party has suffered: for he was the efficacious and unjust cause of this damage. - But if he does this inculpably, from some inadvertence, he ought to warn the injured party, so that this one may provide for himself through appeal or in some other way.

1005. (B) He ought to exhibit perfect integrity in all things, so that he yields neither to love nor to hatred, neither to pleas nor to threats, but follows only the dictate of conscience; for the matter here is not of grace or favor, but of strict justice, for which perfect incorruptibility is altogether required.

Hence all laws deservedly prohibit a judge from accepting money or gifts for weighing a matter and rendering sentence; otherwise he would be exposed to the danger of acting unjustly: for gifts once accepted more or less allure one to pronounce sentence in favor of the giver. Indeed it is not fitting to accept gifts from litigants as gifts offered from mere liberality; for the judge already receives a stipend for faithfully fulfilling his office, and therefore has no right to obtain anything else; besides, an honorable man rejects all gifts of this sort, even small ones, lest perhaps his integrity come under suspicion. - Nor ought he to accept money voluntarily offered to him so that he may expedite one cause before another; by force of his office, he is held to expedite all causes quickly, and ought not to favor one before another.¹

¹ Some say that small gifts can be accepted, because they are not thought to have the force of alluring one to an unjust sentence; thus Noldin, n. 710. Others contend that money can be accepted for expediting the matter more diligently, if extraordinary labor is required for this (id., n. 711), or for expediting one cause before another, when several enjoy equal right (Laymann, l. III, tr. IV, c. 4, n. 9). But we think that all these things must be rejected as dangerous, and unworthy of an honorable man. Nevertheless, after the fact, if in reality no damage has been unjustly inflicted on anyone, there is no strict obligation of restoring.

1006. (C) The judge ought to proceed according to the laws as to the order and form of the judgment, and render sentence according to things alleged and proved. For he is not the maker of the law, but its interpreter; nor does he act according to the private knowledge which he has, but according to public knowledge, which he has acquired as judge, and therefore according to things proved. This is the general principle, which nevertheless admits certain exceptions, and therefore must be explained a little more fully.

(a) When someone is known by private knowledge as guilty, but juridically has not been convicted, he ought to be absolved: for it is better for the public good that one guilty person be absolved than that the judicial order be disturbed, with the danger of sometimes condemning an innocent person.

1007. (b) But if the judge knows by private knowledge that someone is certainly innocent, who nevertheless has been juridically proved guilty, there is much dispute among theologians: some say, with St. Thomas,¹ that he ought indeed, because of this knowledge, to examine the witnesses more diligently, so that he may find an occasion of freeing the innocent man, and, if he cannot, to leave him to be judged by a superior; but if he cannot do even this, it remains that he render sentence according to the allegations, which he ought to follow in judging rather than what he himself knows as a private person. - But others limit this opinion to the case in which the penalty to be imposed is monetary or some privation of office: for then the public authority wills to deprive him of some temporal goods, on account of the common good which requires that in these matters the judicial order be preserved. But if there is question of capital punishment or prison, the judge cannot condemn an innocent person, because society does not have the right of depriving an innocent person of life or liberty, since this is intrinsically evil.² - Finally others assert that in no case is it licit to condemn him who is certainly known as innocent, although from private knowledge.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 64, a. 6, ad 3; q. 67, a. 3.

² Lugo, De Justitia, disp. XXXVII, n. 42-47; St. Alphons., n. 208.

Today, however, because of changed circumstances, the matter can be arranged thus: in criminal causes, jurors render sentence concerning the fact itself; but these, by civil law, ought to affirm only that of which they are inwardly persuaded, nor are they held to render the reason of the sentence which they give; wherefore they ought never to condemn an innocent person, in whatever way they know him to be innocent. - But when jurors have pronounced someone guilty, nothing more remains for judges than to declare the penalty which belongs to this crime;¹ therefore they cannot absolve him; perhaps they could omit some legal form, so that a place may be given to a new examination of the cause and to a new opportunity of discovering the truth.

¹ In many regions, however, as in France, judges today have a certain power of proportioning the penalty to the delict: therefore if they are persuaded that the accused is innocent, they ought to inflict the minimum penalty.

1008. (c) But if the arguments brought on both sides leave the matter doubtful, these things seem to be established: in criminal causes, in which a penalty is to be imposed, the accused is to be favored, and therefore he is to be absolved, unless the crime is morally certain: for crimes are not presumed, but ought to be proved.

In civil causes, if one party is in legitimate possession of the thing, he can retain it: for in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but if neither possesses, the thing ought to be adjudicated to him whom the greater probability favors: for when rights are opposed to rights, the judge ought to prefer those which have greater evidence for themselves;² - if the probability on each side is equal, an amicable settlement is to be counseled or even imposed.

² Hence as scandalous and pernicious in practice the following proposition was reproved by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable." (Denzinger, n. 1019; as to a fuller explanation, cf. Viva, on this proposition.)

1009. (D) If the civil law is manifestly unjust, a distinction must be made: (a) if it is opposed only to ecclesiastical law, for example, to the immunity of clerics, the judge should ask from ecclesiastical superiors the faculty of judging such a cause; and this indeed is generally easily granted, lest an upright judge be compelled to resign his office; (b) but if it is directly opposed to the natural or divine law, it is not licit to render sentence according to the unjust law, but the judge ought either to abstain from judging the matter, or to resign the office: for to impose upon someone, by a judicial sentence, something which is directly and manifestly contrary to the natural or divine law must be called intrinsically evil.³

³ But it does not seem intrinsically evil to impose a light penalty on an innocent person, according to an unjust law, if otherwise the judge would be compelled to lay down his office: for then the innocent person is deservedly thought to consent to this penalty, for the public good, namely lest honest judges be compelled to desert their office. (Noldin, n. 714.) - What specifically is to be done as to the law of divorce, we have explained, On Matrimony, n. 116.

1010. Corollaries. (A) If a judge has issued an unjust sentence, whether by condemning an innocent person, or by inflicting a penalty greater than just, he is held to repair the damage inflicted in the better way in which it can be done. (a) If he did it culpably, he ought to revoke the sentence, while he can; even with great inconvenience to himself; otherwise, he ought to warn the innocent person to appeal to a higher tribunal, and to repair the damages inflicted under this head. (b) If inculpably, from inadvertence, he is held to revoke the sentence, if it can be done without great inconvenience, or to suggest an appeal: but he is not strictly held to repair at his own expense damage inculpably inflicted, from what has been said in the Treatise on Justice, n. 474 sq. - But if there is question of a fine, which ought to have been imposed, but in fact was not imposed, the judge is not held to restitution, although he sinned against legal justice, because the right to the fine arises not from commutative justice but from legal justice.

1011. (B) A judicial sentence that is certainly just produces an obligation in conscience: for it is an authentic declaration of the law, which has the force of a particular precept as to the litigants themselves. - On the other hand, if it is certainly unjust, it has no force in conscience, as is clear; but, if there is place for appeal, it is expedient to use this privilege rather than openly to resist judicial authority or to use hidden compensation. - If it is doubtfully just, an appeal can indeed be made to a higher judge, but meanwhile the sentence has force even in conscience: for in doubt the presumption stands for the superior.

2. On Jurors.

1012. Juror judges (jures, jury) are so called because by oath they promise to perform their office duly. But it properly belongs to them to judge concerning the culpability not only material but also formal of the fact which is subjected to their examination, with all circumstances of persons, facts, etc., attended to, according to the inward persuasion which they have acquired from all these; nor are they ever held to render a reason for their judgment.

Since jurors are chosen from among all upright citizens, and juridical knowledge is not required of them, but only uprightness, they can accept that office, even if they are wholly ignorant of jurisprudence, provided they have a mind free from disordered affections and prejudices, and are prepared diligently to attend to all things which will be set forth in the judicial action. The reason is that they ought to pronounce only concerning facts and their culpability, not concerning juridical questions.

1013. When the matter is criminal, jurors cannot affirm culpability unless it is morally certain to them; otherwise they would incur the danger of condemning an innocent person. But they can acquire this certitude especially from the judicial acts, yet without being prohibited from using private knowledge: for civil law permits them to judge according to their conscience, and therefore according to knowledge which they have obtained in any legitimate way whatsoever. - Hence if by private knowledge they know certainly that the accused is innocent, even if from allegations and proofs he seems to be guilty, they ought to absolve him. But if he appears innocent from the acts of the judgment, and otherwise he is known certainly to be culpable, the matter is disputed; it seems more equitable that he is to be absolved,¹ both because odious things are to be restricted, and because otherwise the danger is present lest an innocent person suffer irreparable damage: for it is better, generally at least, that a few guilty persons be freed than that one innocent person be unjustly condemned.

¹ Thus Lehmk., n. 807; Ball. P., n. 592; Noldin, n. 717; Berardi, Praxis, Tr. VII, n. 108, holds the contrary.

II. On The Duties Of Advocates.²

² Lessius, lib. II, c. 31; Lugo, disp. XLI; Conferences d'Angers, t. II, Conf. 4-5; Valentin, op. cit., p. 113-170; Ball. P., n. 596-609.

1014. An advocate, or pleader, is said to be one who undertakes to defend the cause of litigants in judgment; this he furnishes by opportune counsels, and especially by pleading the cause before the judge either orally or in writings, according as the custom is in various regions. - Hence he ought to possess competent knowledge, as we have said concerning the judge; otherwise, he exposes himself to the danger of doing harm, and is held to repair damage actually inflicted, according to the things explained above, n. 1005. Moreover, however, duties are incumbent upon him: 1. as to the cause to be defended; 2. as to fidelity owed to the client; 3. as to the stipend to be demanded.

1015. 1. Concerning the justice of the cause which is undertaken. The general principle is that an advocate can undertake only just causes, and defend them only by just means; otherwise damage is inflicted on the other party. But to declare the matter more fully, certain distinctions are necessary: -

(A) In a civil matter, an advocate cannot undertake a cause which he knows certainly to be unjust; for if he conquers, he unjustly cooperates in the damage which is inflicted on the adverse party; if he is conquered, he inflicts damage on his client, who incurs useless expenses. Wherefore, if in the course of the judicial process he certainly knows the cause which he undertook in good faith at the beginning to be unjust, he ought to abandon it, and warn the client concerning this matter. - But if the cause is doubtful from the beginning, the advocate can undertake it, with the client warned, since tribunals have been instituted for settling controversies, and otherwise a cause which seemed doubtful in the beginning can become certainly just in the course of the process.

So long as the cause remains doubtful, the advocate can counsel an amicable settlement; but if it appears certainly unjust, nothing remains except that it be abandoned.

(B) In a criminal cause: (a) he can licitly defend the accused, even if it is certain that he is guilty; indeed, among cultivated Peoples, the custom has prevailed that an advocate be assigned to any accused person whatever, so that judicial forms may be observed more securely, and the accused may escape every injustice or excessive severity. Therefore the advocate can help the accused by all legitimate means which are available to him, but by no means by deceit, fraud, or lies. - (b) But it is not licit to protect the role of the accuser when the accused is certainly or very probably innocent; for thus the advocate would unjustly cooperate in the unjust condemnation of an innocent person.

(C) In each kind of causes, it is not licit to use unjust means, namely lies, frauds, false witnesses or false documents, because fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one. - Hence if an authentic document has been lost, it is not licit to substitute a fraudulent transcript for it: for this is a lie deservedly forbidden by laws, lest otherwise a way be opened to all frauds, with great public detriment.

When an advocate has unjustly inflicted damage on a client or on the adverse party, he is held to repair it, according to the principles explained above, On Justice, n. 466 sq.

(D) What he can do in a cause of divorce, we have explained in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 115.

1016. 2. Concerning fidelity toward the client. By force of his office, an advocate is held to plead diligently and faithfully the cause which he has undertaken, namely:

(A) Seriously to examine the cause, with that diligence, namely, which the gravity of the matter demands; and afterward sincerely to warn the client concerning the justice or injustice of the cause, and also concerning the probability of conquering or succumbing, so that this client, duly instructed, may be able to avoid useless expenses; if he culpably omits this, he is held to repair the damages that follow from it.

(B) He ought to expedite and defend the cause undertaken with that diligence which prudent men are accustomed to employ in a similar business. Wherefore, if, while the office of considering the matter attentively, reading documents, or approaching judges is incumbent upon him, he indulges in vain conversations or games, or devotes work to other matters, he is held to repair the evils befalling his client or adversary from this negligence or delay.

He also sins gravely who deliberately treats a cause badly, so that he may favor the other party, or deserts a suit begun, so that he may patronize the adverse party: this is deservedly prohibited by civil law, on account of the danger of abusing secrets entrusted by the former client.

1017. 3. Concerning the fees which can be demanded. (a) He can demand a stipend for the cause which he pleaded, provided that he does not exceed the limits of the just price; but the just price is determined by law, agreement, or custom, according to the judgment of prudent persons, with attention to the business, the skill of the advocate, and the labor spent in the cause. If, after the price has been agreed upon, the client, because of a just cause, desists from litigating, for example, because the injustice of the suit has been detected, the whole price is not owed, but only compensation for the labor spent, according to the estimation of prudent persons.

(b) When there is question of the poor, who are placed in extreme necessity, he is held by charity to plead the cause gratis, even with grave inconvenience; if they are placed only in grave necessity, he is held to this with only slight inconvenience. This is certain from what has been said where we treated of charity, since this is one of the ways of providing alms.

III. On The Plaintiff, The Accused, And Witnesses.¹

¹ St. Alphons., l. V, n. 234-290; Lehmk., t. I, n. 811-821; Ballerini-Palm., t. IV, n. 612-638.

1017¹. 1. On the plaintiff and accuser. (A) Plaintiff is said to be one who in a civil cause calls another into judgment. He is held: (a) to seek just things; (b) to proceed according to the paths of law; (c) to bring proofs. If he seeks unjust things or draws an innocent person into judgment without reason, he sins against justice, and is held to reparation of the damage inflicted.

(B) The accuser is the one who in a criminal cause brings the crime before the judge and undertakes the burden of proving. - In modern law, judicial accusation made by private persons is commonly not admitted (which ought to be made by the royal or republican procurator), but only denunciation, by which the delict is brought before the judge or procurator, without the denouncer undertaking the burden of proving.

They are held to denounce delicts or crimes: (a) from justice, those who by force of their office or of a special agreement are constituted for this, such as public officials, guardians of fields or forests, etc.; these, if they neglect their office, are held to restitution according to the principles explained above, n. 512-515; (b) from charity, when there is question of a crime being committed, from which grave damage threatens an innocent person which otherwise cannot be averted, - or of a crime even past which cannot be kept silent without grave common damage, - or of a crime which positive laws prescribe to be denounced for a legitimate cause.

That denunciation may be licit, the crime ought to be certain or at least very probable; in this latter case it ought not to be manifested as certain.

1017². 2. On the accused. The accused is said to be one who is drawn into judgment and against whom action is taken.

(A) In a civil cause, an accused who knows that the plaintiff's cause is certainly just: (a) ought not to begin a suit, but to satisfy the just petitions of the plaintiff; if the matter is doubtful, he can defend his probable right; (b) indeed, even if he has been absolved in judgment, he is not excused from the obligation of paying the debt; for the injured party, even when he does not appeal from the sentence issued, is not thought to have renounced his right in the internal forum; (c) if he obtained the sentence by unjust means, he is held besides to compensate the expenses of the suit; but not so if, because of a defect of proofs, sentence was issued in his favor.

(B) In a criminal cause: (a) the accused, by modern law, is not held to confess the crime committed by himself, but can declare himself innocent (in English, plead not guilty), because, from the circumstances, such a declaration signifies that he has not been judicially convicted of this crime; (b) he has the right of defending himself by manifesting even the hidden delicts of witnesses, if this is necessary for weakening the force of their testimony, because he is not held to preserve their reputation with grave inconvenience to himself; but it is not licit calumniously to impose a false crime on them, nor a fortiori to kill false witnesses or an unjust judge: for evils are not to be done so that good things may come; (c) he is not held to concur actively in his punishment, and therefore, even when justly captured, he can flee, or escape from prison, indeed probably break prison, in order to preserve life or liberty; and therefore he may deceive and frighten guards and officers, but not use force against them or corrupt them so that they fail in their office; yet if an innocent man by money given induces guards not to obstruct his flight, he does not sin, because then he does not entice them to an evil act. - When it is licit for the accused to flee, others who otherwise are not his official guards can furnish counsel and aid to him.

1017³. 3. On witnesses. Witnesses are said to be those who are legitimately called into judgment to bear testimony concerning a litigious matter.

(A) On the obligation of appearing. (a) No one is held spontaneously to offer himself for testifying, unless this is necessary for averting grave damage to the republic or to some innocent person; if there is question of the public good, we ought to testify even with our own grave inconvenience; if of private good, we are not obliged with grave inconvenience.

(b) He who has been cited by legitimate authority is held to appear, and indeed under grave obligation, unless the matter is of slight moment or the testimony is not necessary: for obedience owed to civil authority demands this.

(B) On the obligation of testifying. To a judge legitimately interrogating, with the order of law preserved, a witness is held under grave obligation to answer according to truth and conscience, unless a legitimate cause excuses him. (a) False testimony is of itself a grave sin against truthfulness, against religion, if an oath has first been emitted, as usually happens, and against justice, if damage has thereby been inflicted on the neighbor (above, n. 402).

But there is a distinction between him who says what is false and him who asserts that he knows nothing: the former positively cooperates in injustice, and therefore is held to restitution (above, n. 403); the latter is only a negative cooperator, and therefore is not held to restitution unless from justice the office of denouncing the accused is incumbent upon him (above, n. 512-516).

(b) A legitimate cause excusing from rendering testimony is a founded fear of public or private evil that is very notable; then the witness indeed cannot properly lie, but can say that he does not know, since, from the circumstances, this signifies that he cannot morally, without grave inconvenience, reveal the matter.

Thus the confessor ought to answer, who knows the matter only from sacramental confession, or from a natural or entrusted secret: in the former case the sacramental seal can never be violated; in the latter, the secret cannot be revealed unless the common good or a very great private good demands it, according to the principles explained above, n. 421-425. - Likewise they are excused from giving testimony: one who has unjustly, by force or fraud, arrived at knowledge of the matter, for example, by opening another's letters; one who knows that the accused did not sin, although he materially committed the delict; one who from testimony prudently fears that the greatest damage threatens him or his own, unless nevertheless the damage that would follow from testimony denied would be much greater; one who knows the fact only from witnesses little worthy of trust: for then he is judged not to know.

IV. On The Duties Of Physicians.¹

¹ Conferences d'Angers, t. III, 3rd Conf., p. 76-149; Valentin, t. I, p. 293-348; Surbled, op. cit., t. III, p. 155-245; Ch. Coppens, Moral and Medicine, New York, rendered into French under the care of J. Forbes, Morale et Medecine, Paris, 1901, 3rd Conf.

Physicians and surgeons exercise a noble and arduous office, since the bodily life of men is entrusted to them, and otherwise, by fulfilling the office in a Christian manner, they can contribute not a little even to spiritual life.

1018. 1. They ought to possess competent knowledge and at least ordinary skill; otherwise they are exposed to the danger of inflicting irreparable damage on the sick or wounded, and under this head can be obliged to restitution. But because today medical science progresses, those who wish to fulfill their office faithfully should not cease to devote themselves to study. Likewise in very difficult cases, when they doubt their own skill, let them not hesitate to call in another physician more skilled, if the sick person or his family consents to this.

1019. 2. They ought to exercise their office diligently and faithfully, namely: (A) When, after a stipend has been accepted or promised, they have obliged themselves to care for some sick person, at whatever hour of day or night they ought to hasten as soon as morally possible, unless they certainly know that no damage will follow to the sick person from delay; for the gravity of the matter demands this, namely human life committed to their care. - Likewise when they have been hired by a Municipality or some community by an agreed stipend, they cannot desert their office at the time of a contagious disease. If there has been no agreement, they are not strictly held from justice to remain in the city where the plague flourishes, and from charity rarely, since there are others who may care for the sick; but an honorable physician in this case will not desert his office except from the gravest cause.

1020. (B) He is held to employ safer remedies, whenever they are at hand. Wherefore it is not licit, secure means having been left aside, to try uncertain ones; when the former are lacking, less certain remedies can be employed, provided they are harmless; finally, if the safety of the sick person is despaired of, and there is present only a doubtful remedy which can more probably restore health but also probably hasten death, it is licit to use it, since it is permitted to choose the lesser evil; but if the safety of the sick person is not despaired of, a doubtful remedy, which can probably profit and harm, is not to be employed, lest death be hastened, but the matter should be committed to nature, which not rarely relieves itself. - Hence it is by no means licit to explore a new remedy with probable danger of life, even with the consent of the sick person: for he is not master of his life. Wherefore honest and prudent physicians first explore new remedies of this sort in animals, and do not apply them to men except when there is moral certainty concerning both their efficacy and their harmlessness.

Concerning surgical operations, the use of hypnotism, and also procurement of abortion or craniotomy, we have spoken elsewhere.¹

¹ On Justice, nn. 309, 313; On God The Creator, n. 113-115; On The Virtue Of Religion, n. 914-916; Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 68 sq.; ibid. n. 63-67 it is declared when and how aborted fetuses can be baptized either by physicians, or by others according to the counsel of physicians.

1021. 3. They are held not to multiply expenses without cause, whether through useless visits, or superfluous remedies, or especially by attempting useless and dangerous surgical operations for the sake of gain (which indeed happens not rarely in our days). - Let them not demand a stipend greater than the ordinary one, according to the estimation of prudent persons, with attention to the circumstances of places and persons. - But from charity they ought to care for the poor placed in necessity gratis, according to the principles handed down above concerning the advocate.

1022. 4. When the sick person is placed in proximate danger of death, the physician is held from charity to warn him by himself or through another, so that he may be able to receive the sacraments at an opportune time, before he loses the use of reason, and at the same time arrange his temporal affairs; likewise he ought to warn the family, so that provision may be made more securely for the spiritual and temporal good of the dying person. This obligation indeed is of itself grave, since the matter is of the greatest moment. When physicians prudently and opportunely fulfill this office, they perform a very great work of charity, and deserve very well of the family and of religion.¹

¹ Formerly by canon law physicians were commanded not to undertake care of a sick person lying dangerously ill unless by warning him concerning making confession; and if within three days he had not confessed, they were prohibited from visiting him. This law indeed today has fallen into desuetude almost everywhere.