On Laws

206. Human acts cannot tend toward the ultimate end unless they are conformable to the norm of morality, which, from what was said above, n. 25, is twofold, namely God, the supreme good and ultimate end, and the rational nature of man. The former is now to be treated. God is the ultimate norm of morality; for He infallibly sees what is good and how human actions can be ordered to the ultimate end; moreover, by force of His supreme dominion, He commands whatever He judges necessary for the attainment of our end. But this ordination is manifested to us through laws, by which the divine mind and will are signified. Now, among laws, some are divine, because they emanate directly and immediately from the divine will, but others are human, because they emanate directly from human authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil. Nevertheless even human laws, when they are just, proceed mediately from God, since God Himself has handed over to legitimate superiors the power of making laws: "For there is no power except from God."¹ - From this it follows that human acts ought to be conformable to laws, that they may lead us to the ultimate end. - Therefore we shall speak:

¹ Rom., XIII, 1.

I. Concerning the concept of law in general;

II. Concerning divine law;

III. Concerning human ecclesiastical law;

IV. Concerning human civil law.

207. 1. Law is defined by St. Thomas as "a certain ordination of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 90-93; Suarez, De Legibus, lib. I and lib. II, c. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XI, De Legibus, c. 1; Billuart, De Legibus, diss. I-II; Bouquillon, n. 53-64; Haine, t. I, De Legibus, q. 1-4; Ball. P., I, n. 236-239; Bautain, Philosophie des Lois, Paris, 1860, ch. I-II; Didiot, n. 588-607; Farges, op. cit., p. 252-265.

It is said: (a) ordination, or norm or rule, by force of which the acts of subjects are ordered to the due end; (b) of reason, because it pertains to reason to know the end and the means proportioned for attaining this end; yet the will accedes to reason, for commanding what reason has judged equitable; from this it is clear that a norm which is not just cannot truly be called a law, because it is not an ordination of reason. (c) For the common good, and consequently not for evil: for then it would not be an ordination nor law, but tyrannical oppression; for the common good, not however for the particular good of some private person or of some members of society: otherwise it would be a precept, not a law. This good can indeed be spiritual, or temporal, or both, and it tends at least mediately and implicitly to the ultimate end. (d) By him who has care of the community: for not just anyone can command such an ordination authentically, but only he who presides over the community, that is, God Himself, and those to whom God has entrusted the power of ruling society. (e) Promulgated, or authentically published and imposed by the Prince, or in his name and authority; for in order that a rule can be useful, it must be applied to the subject; but it cannot be applied unless it is known, and knowledge occurs through promulgation.

2. This definition is deservedly held as masterly. Yet in it the obligation which law imposes is not explicitly declared, because the holy Doctor had already established earlier (a. 1) that law is a rule which obliges to acting. Therefore the definition can easily be completed with these words: "and obliging subjects to doing or omitting something." And thus law is distinguished from counsel.

208. According to St. Thomas,² law imposes obligation in a fourfold way, namely by commanding, forbidding, permitting, punishing: for it commands certain acts of virtues; prohibits evil acts; permits those which are indifferent, and from this permission there follows the obligation of not impeding others from performing those acts; punishes transgressors of the law, and therefore imposes on judges the obligation of inflicting punishment, and on subjects the obligation of undergoing punishment; sometimes it also irritates an act, rendering it invalid, in order more efficaciously to prohibit the same.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 92, a. 2.

209. A particular precept differs from law: (a) by reason of the subject upon whom the obligation is imposed: for a precept is imposed on one or more private persons, on account of a particular good; law on the whole society or community, and indeed for the common good. (b) By reason of the author: for making a law public authority and jurisdiction over some community are required; for a precept private authority suffices, for example the authority of parents over children, of a husband over a wife, of a master over servants. (c) By reason of duration: a precept, since it is enjoined for the good of private persons, perishes with the death of those upon whom it has been imposed, and therefore is not of itself perpetual; while law, which is made for the good of society, by its nature is born to endure; it can indeed be abrogated, but of itself it does not perish by the death of the legislator or of the first subjects: it endures as long as it has not been explicitly or implicitly revoked. Therefore if the legislator restricts the effect of the law to a determinate time, it is not properly a law, but a precept. (d) By reason of place: since law is given to a community, it directly affects the territory, and consequently does not oblige subjects who are legitimately outside the territory; but a precept, since it is directed to subjects, directly affects them and obliges them, even if they go out from the limits of the Prince's territory: it is something personal, and adheres to persons wherever they go.

It must be noted, however, that sometimes, among authors, the names law, precept, or statute are taken indiscriminately, so that the sense can be determined only from the context and various adjuncts.

210. 1. Eternal law, according to St. Thomas,¹ is "the reason of divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." Namely, God from eternity decreed to create creatures from nothing, and to order and direct them, according to His infinite wisdom, to the end. But He willed to direct them according to the proper nature of each: inanimate things, through the powers and properties impressed upon them; sentient things, through the instincts and tendencies placed in them; intellectual things, through the illumination of the intellect, and the motion by which He directs the will without harming its liberty. Now that ordination of all things to the ultimate end, insofar as it is considered as existing from eternity in the divine mind, is called the eternal law. Its existence is logically inferred from the dogmas of creation and providence.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 93, a. 1. - Eternal law, concerning which the pagans spoke only obscurely, is described by the Scriptures especially under the name of the wisdom or word of God: Job, XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov., VIII-IX; Wisd., VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII. Cf. Corluy, La sagesse dans l'Anc. Testament, Congrès scient. catholique, 1888, t. I, p. 61-91.

It can indeed be called law in a broad sense, insofar as it is an ordination of reason, for the common good, willed by him who has care of the community; but it is not law in the strict sense set forth above; for from eternity the community upon which that ordination is imposed is lacking, and likewise promulgation is lacking.¹ From this head the eternal law already differs from the other laws: for it is not properly law, but the fountain of all laws.

¹ For that cannot be called a true promulgation which, according to Billuart, is made through the eternal Word and the book of life written from eternity; for this, unless we are mistaken, is a metaphorical manner of speaking.

211. 2. Laws properly so called are derived from the eternal law, insofar as they manifest to us this ordination which from the beginning exists in the divine mind. This is indeed clear as regards divine laws, which signify to us the will of God. But human laws are derived from the eternal law by a threefold reason: (a) as from an exemplary cause, because laws, that they may be just, ought to be conformable to the eternal law; (b) as from an efficient cause, insofar as every legislative power comes forth from God; (c) as from a directing cause, in the sense that divine reason, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, directs legislators so that they may see what laws are to be established and when, according to the diversity of persons, times, places, and circumstances. Wherefore divine Wisdom deservedly says: "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things; by me princes command, and the powerful decree justice."²

² Prov., VIII, 15-16.

212. Divine law is twofold: natural, which is founded in the very nature of things, is necessarily enacted by God, and is promulgated in human conscience; positive, which is freely enacted by God and is promulgated in various external modes. Each must be discussed separately.

Here we hand down only the more general matters, since the various precepts of the natural law must be explained in the course of the work. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the concept and existence of the natural law; 2. concerning its object and character; 3. concerning its promulgation and knowledge.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94; Suarez, De Legibus, lib. II, c. 5-17; Gonet, Clypeus Theol. thomisticae, tr. VI, disp. 3; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2-4; Muller, t. I, § 30-35; Meyer, t. I, n. 242-286; Bouquillon, n. 65-81; Noldin, n. 91-95; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 3-6, p. 46-129; Didiot, op. cit., n. 736-760.

213. (A) Notion. (a) Natural law, according to St. Thomas,² "is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature." For God from eternity knows and ordains whatever is consonant with the nature of each being, and that ordination, from what was said above, n. 210, is called the eternal law. But in time He created rational creatures, and manifested this eternal law to them. Now natural law is nothing other than the manifestation or promulgation of the eternal law in the conscience of the rational creature. Therefore it can be defined: the divine ordination of the rational creature to the ultimate end, founded in nature itself, and perceived by the natural light.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2.

It is called natural for a twofold reason: namely because it embraces only precepts which are founded in the very nature of things, and moreover because it is known by the natural light. Thus it is distinguished from the positive law of God, which concerns things necessary for attaining the ultimate end, not of themselves, but from the will of God, and becomes known only by revelation.

Therefore natural law commands all those things which by their nature are honorable and necessary for the ultimate end; but it prohibits all those things which by their nature are evil. Hence it is thus described by Augustine:¹ "The eternal law is the divine reason or the will of God, commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed."

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. XXII, c. 27, P. L., XLII, 418.

214. (b) Consequently natural law is not the free will of God alone, as the Nominalists used to say: for actions are not good or evil because they are commanded or prohibited by God, but rather are commanded or prohibited because divine reason, which cannot be deceived, sees that they are good or evil (above, n. 22).

Nor is it the dictate of practical human reason, or the categorical imperative of the autonomous will; for human reason is not the rule obliging, but only exhibiting and manifesting obligation (above, n. 26); and the human will is not autonomous, but essentially depends upon God.

215. All those who acknowledge the existence and providence of God admit that some natural law exists in the sense explained above; but atheists, positivists, and evolutionists reject it, whose systems we have already explained, n. 34-42. - Traditionalists indeed admit the existence of the natural law, but they assert that, in the present state of fallen man, it becomes known to us only by the supernatural light of faith or tradition.

Thesis: A moral law must be acknowledged which deservedly is called natural, because it is inserted into nature by God, and can be known by the natural light of reason, at least as to its primary principles. - It is of faith that the natural law exists, since the ordinary magisterium of the Church clearly teaches this; it is certain that this law can be known naturally.

216. (A) It is proved by authority. St. Paul, after he had reproved the Jews who, notwithstanding the positive law of God, had sinned gravely, writes concerning the Gentiles, who had not received revelation: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law [the Mosaic law], do naturally those things which are of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves: who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another, in the day when God shall judge the hidden things of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ."¹ Now (a) there it is declared that the Gentiles, who lacked the Mosaic law, nevertheless observed certain precepts of the natural law, because, namely, this kind of law was written in their hearts, and conscience, reproving evil and approving good, urged its observance; and this law was not merely human, but divine, since according to it God will judge the Gentiles. (b) Moreover, the Apostle in no way teaches that this law was known by tradition, but by natural reason, since it is written in the heart and is confirmed by the testimony of conscience.

¹ Rom., II, 14-16. - That this text is to be understood of pagans we proved in De Gratia, n. 35, note 10.

217. The Fathers confirmed this doctrine of Paul; thus Tertullian says:² "Therefore do you seek the law of God? You have that common one in the public place of the world, in the natural tablets, to which also the Apostle is wont to appeal... when, in saying to the Romans that the nations by nature do those things which are of the law, he suggests both natural law and legal nature." - The same Fathers likewise teach that this law is inscribed in hearts by the finger of God, innate, inserted, implanted, and therefore known naturally by human understanding; thus St. Ambrose:³ "Therefore that law is not written, but is born within; nor is it received by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a certain flowing fountain of nature." Nor otherwise Chrysostom:⁴ "From the beginning, forming man, God placed the natural law within him. And what, finally, is the natural law? He impressed conscience upon us, and willed the knowledge of good things and of contrary things to have been implanted by nature." - Leo XIII briefly sums this up: "Such is the chief of all, the natural law, which is written and engraved in the souls of individual men, because it is human reason itself commanding right action and forbidding sin."⁵

² Tertullian, De corona, VI, apud Migne, P. L., II, 83.

³ St. Ambrose, Epist. 73, n. 3, Migne, P. L., XVI, 1251.

⁴ St. Chrysostom, homil. XII, de statuis, Migne, P. G., XLIX, 131.

⁵ Encycl. Praestantissimum, 20 Jun. 1888.

218. (B) The same is established psychologically and historically. (a) By the intimate testimony of conscience we know that certain actions are good of themselves, and others depraved (above, n. 22), - that the latter are to be avoided, but the former to be done, at least those which are apprehended as necessary and as commanded by supreme authority, - so that he who obeys this command obtains peace of soul, while he who transgresses the same is disturbed by the goads of conscience. Now all these things suppose that some natural law exists, promulgated in each one's conscience, which we are bound to obey, and indeed a universal and absolute law: for this authoritatively commands the fulfillment of certain duties for all and unconditionally, independently of any civil law.¹

¹ J. Simon, Le Devoir, 3e p., ch. 1, p. 233-262.

(b) The intimate experience of each person is confirmed in no small degree by the unanimous consent of peoples, who, although they think differently concerning some moral precepts, nevertheless agree in admitting a moral distinction between good and evil; - they hold that there is some law which arises not from kings, nor from the decrees of the people or senate, but from nature itself or from the divine power; - that violators of it are vexed by anxieties, even when they can avoid human punishments; - and that from it other laws draw their force, so that they ought to be conformable to it.

219. Thus, among the Greeks, Sophocles commends the natural law in this way:² "Would that fortune be present to me for attaining the holy integrity of all words and works, concerning which sublime laws have been set forth, born in the heavenly ether, of which Olympus alone is father, and the mortal race did not beget them, nor indeed will oblivion ever lull them to sleep: in these there is a great God, and He does not wither with age." Among the Latins, let Cicero be heard:³ "I see that this was the judgment of the wisest men, that law was neither devised by the talents of men, nor is it some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which rules the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding... But it arose together with the divine mind. Wherefore true and chief law, apt for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove." Among the Chinese likewise a universal rule of morals is admitted, which rules heaven and earth, and is read as inscribed in the heart of all.⁴ Similar things are found among various nations, even barbarous ones.⁵

² Sophocles, Oedip., v. 863-871; cf. Antigon., v. 446-460. Similar things may be seen apud Plato, Respub., l. IV, p. 427, ed. Stephan.

³ Cicero, De Legibus, II, 4. Cf. Pro Milone, IV, 10; Philipp., XI, c. 12, n. 28; likewise the fragment preserved apud Lactantius should be read, Instit. VI, 8, Migne, P. L., VI, 660-661.

⁴ "The rule of moral conduct of man is the law of all intelligences; it illumines the universe in the highest heavens, as in the deepest abysses. The rule of moral conduct of the wise man has its principle in the heart of all men, whence it rises to its highest manifestation, to enlighten heaven and earth with its brilliant rays." (Apud J. L. De Lanessan, La Morale des Philosophes Chinois, Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 44-45.)

⁵ Cf. Quatrefages, L'unité de l'espèce humaine; L'espèce humaine, Paris, Alcan; Carbonnelle, L'aveuglement scientifique, in period. Revue des Quest. scientif., VII, 193.

220. (C) Reason supports this. For once the creation of man is posited, natural law already becomes necessary. For God, the most wise creator and orderer of all things, must direct all beings to the end for which they were destined by Him. But no directive principle is suitable for beings endowed with liberty except a moral rule. Beings which lack liberty tend to their end by a certain necessary instinct divinely impressed; but man, since he is free, tends to his end only freely; and therefore he must not be led by a blind and necessary impulse, but by a moral rule which shows him the way to be followed, without taking away his free will. But this rule, common to all, can be nothing other than a certain participation or manifestation of the eternal law, or, in other words, the natural law.

Once the existence of the natural law has been proved, it is useful to describe its object and character.

221. In a general way the natural law embraces those things which are so fitting or repugnant to rational nature that they ought to be commanded or prohibited by the Author of nature.

(A) Now, with respect to the logical nexus by which they are connected with one another, the precepts of the natural law are of three kinds: -

(a) Some indeed are most universal, so that the rest flow from them; such are these and similar ones: good is to be pursued and evil avoided; the supreme good is to be loved; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; live conformably to right reason.

222. Among philosophers and theologians it is asked what is the supreme principle from which the rest flow logically. St. Thomas asserts that it is this: good is to be done and evil avoided.¹ According to others: Live conformably to human nature, considered according to all its essential relations.² Berti proposes this, according to the mind of St. Augustine: Love God as the end and the rest on account of Him.³ Others prefer this formula: Exhibit also by free actions the image of God, absolutely holy, impressed upon you by way of rational nature.⁴ Meyer proposes this: Preserve the right order of rational nature as divinely holy.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

² Thus not a few Scholastics.

³ Berti, Theolog. discipl., lib. XX, c. 4, prop. 3.

⁴ Carl Aeger, Moralphilosophie, 1873, S. c. 63 ff.

¹ Meyer, op. cit., n. 284.

Of these, the formula of St. Thomas is the simplest and most clearly intelligible; the last, although not so clearly intelligible, seems more complete and scientific; the Augustinian one is in itself most perfect, but in the order of knowledge it is not first, nor explicitly known to all. In any case all agree substantially as to the sense.

223. (b) In the second place come those precepts which are deduced from universal principles by an immediate and easy discourse; for example, honor your father and mother, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, and the rest contained in the Decalogue, if one excepts the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which is a positive law.

(c) In the third place proceed those precepts which are deduced from the first principles remotely and only by diligent study and more difficult discourse; for example, an injury inflicted on someone, in a well-ordered society, is not to be avenged by one's own authority. Since precepts of this kind are not easily known by all, they are often proposed more clearly and certainly by positive law.

224. (B) With respect to necessity, the precepts of the natural law are some primary and others secondary: the former are so necessary for the particular or social good that, without them, the moral order is impossible; thus blasphemy, the unjust killing of an innocent man, false testimony, etc., are opposed to primary natural right. - But secondary precepts are those which are very useful for the particular or social good, but not necessary, so that the moral order can subsist without them, although less perfectly; thus polygamy and divorce are opposed to secondary natural right.

225. (C) By reason of the object about which they are concerned, natural precepts regard: (a) God, who is to be worshiped and loved; (b) our neighbor, to whom reverence, justice, and charity are owed; (c) ourselves, insofar as we ought to subject the sensitive faculties to reason, and reason to God.

226. The natural law is universal, immutable, and non-dispensable; the reason is because it flows not from the positive will of God, but from the very nature of things. This, however, needs declaration.

(A) The natural law is universal, insofar as it binds all those who enjoy the use of reason; for, on the one hand, it is promulgated in the conscience of each rational being, and on the other it is enacted for every rational creature.

It is asked, however, whether it also reaches infants and the insane. The controversy had concerning this matter can be reconciled in this way: the natural law of itself affects them, insofar as they are radically and potentially rational; but it does not oblige them morally, under penalty of sin:¹ for only those are capable of moral obligation and imputability who enjoy the use of reason.

¹ Adults, however, using reason, sin when they impel them to act against the natural law.

227. (B) The natural law is immutable, in the sense that it cannot be changed in itself, although it admits some changes in its application.

(a) Indeed, it cannot be changed in itself: for it is founded in the very nature of the rational being, considered in its relations with the ultimate end; but the nature of things and their relations to the ultimate end always remain the same. - Yet in order rightly to understand immutability of this kind, we must consider the natural law not in some abstract and insufficiently determined principle, but with all the adjuncts which constitute morality. Thus homicide is prohibited by natural right, and nevertheless there are many cases in which it is licit to kill others. But to one attending even a little, it is clear that not every homicide is prohibited, but only unjust killing, or the killing of an innocent man by private authority, without necessity; consequently, when an unjust aggressor is killed, or a criminal is condemned to death, the natural law is not changed, since it in no way prohibits the legitimate defense of oneself or of society: the circumstances, the adjuncts, are changed; the law itself remains the same.

This is true also of secondary precepts; take, for example, polygamy, which is opposed to secondary natural right, and yet flourished among some Patriarchs; the law itself suffered no change in itself; for at every time it was contrary to the secondary ends of marriage, especially to the peace of families; but, since it did not hinder the primary end of marriage, namely the procreation and education of offspring, it could be permitted or tolerated, with means employed by which abuses would be prevented.¹

¹ Some older scholastics wrote that the natural law can be changed as to the more remote conclusions; they bring the example of a deposit, which by natural right ought to be returned, and nevertheless sometimes cannot be returned, because, for example, it is foreseen that the owner will use the deposited sword to kill an enemy. - But in a case of this kind there is no change of the natural law; for the law does not establish that a deposit is to be returned in every case, but forbids it to be returned at that time when the owner is going to abuse his own thing.

(b) But in its application it suffers some changes, when secondary precepts are in question. Thus God tolerated, under certain conditions, polygamy and divorce; for in those things which are not absolutely necessary, but only very useful, it can happen that, circumstances having changed, the application of the law, even if very useful, is not urged; for example, among the Jews divorce was tolerated, in order to avoid worse abuses, namely adultery or the killing of a spouse; but divorce of itself remained contrary to the perfect equality of the contract, to the best education of offspring, to the peace of families, etc.

228. (C) The natural law is not properly dispensable; and indeed, if God Himself does not change the natural law, no one on earth, not even the vicar of Christ himself, can dispense in this law.² The Church, however, can declare and interpret it, and that infallibly; for she received from Christ the power of teaching, and consequently of explaining and interpreting divine laws, by defining whether in these or those adjuncts they truly oblige. Thus the indissolubility of marriage pertains to secondary natural right; but the Church, by long-standing practice, has implicitly declared that this indissolubility does not belong to a marriage simply ratified.

² Likewise some older theologians said that some dispensation can be admitted in secondary natural law; they bring the example of the permission given to the Hebrews to carry off the goods of the Egyptians; but from this nothing can be inferred as to the thesis set forth: for since God is the supreme lord of all goods, He could transfer the ownership of certain goods from the Egyptians to the Hebrews, on account of the reason of the public good, or by way of compensation for the labors furnished.

229. The natural law certainly obliges all rational creatures as soon as it has been sufficiently promulgated in their conscience: for it is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will, which all must obey.

(A) Now, on God's part, for sufficient promulgation two things are required and suffice: (a) that the most universal principles of the law can easily be known by him who enjoys the use of reason; (b) that from these, through natural means, internal and external, individual and social, those practical conclusions can be deduced which are necessary for the right institution of life. It is in no way required that all men be able to acquire these notions for themselves with equal facility, or know individual conclusions without admixture of error; for this would contradict the natural inequality and infirmity of men. Therefore it suffices that those who enjoy lesser ability can learn from those who are endowed with a more powerful mind the truths necessary for living rightly.

As to the fact, man is indeed physically capable, by his own powers, of knowing the natural law; but, as the Vatican says,¹ "it is to be attributed to divine revelation that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason, in the present condition also of the human race, can be known by all expeditiously, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of error." - If man had remained in the state of pure nature, God would have furnished men, by a special natural concurrence, the means for knowing the natural law more expeditiously.

¹ Vatican, sess. III, cap. 2, de Revelatione; we explained this decree in Tr. de Vera Relig., n. 50.

230. (B) But on man's part, certain things are necessary for attaining knowledge of natural right: (a) positive means, namely one's own study of the truth, recourse to wiser men in more difficult matters, prayer to God, who is the Father of lights; for right reason suggests all these things; (b) negative means, or the removal of impediments, the chief of which are levity of mind and want of reflection, prejudices, depraved customs which cloud the mind, and evil counsels received from others.

If, notwithstanding those means seriously employed, knowledge of some natural precept could not be acquired morally, the ignorance is invincible; otherwise it is called vincible, according to what was explained above, n. 91-92.

231. From this it can be understood what sort of ignorance can be admitted concerning the precepts of natural right.

(A) The first and most universal principles of the natural law cannot be invincibly unknown by an adult who is fully in possession of reason. For these principles stand to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason: both are per se known; thus no one in possession of himself can be ignorant that good is to be done and evil avoided.

232. (B) Particular precepts, which are deduced immediately and clearly from the first principles, cannot be invincibly unknown for a long time by one who uses suitably developed reason. Such are: honor your father, do not kill an innocent man, do not steal, etc. For these, since they flow from known principles by an obvious and easy inference, cannot be unknown for long by one whose reason has been sufficiently cultivated. It can indeed happen that, by prejudices imbued from infancy, by depraved persuasions and examples, and also by evil habits, the mind is clouded for some time; but, when someone in good faith pursues the truth, and thinks seriously about the rule of morals, at least a doubt arises concerning the liceity of acts contrary to these natural precepts; but doubt produces the obligation of inquiring further about the truth, and God does not deny the help of illumination to those who inquire. But if the search for truth is omitted, the ignorance is not without fault: and the gravity of this is judged from what was said, n. 95-97.

233. (C) Remote conclusions of the natural law can be invincibly unknown even by one who uses suitably developed reason. For conclusions of this kind can be known only after diligent study has been premised, and with great difficulty; wherefore they are not rarely unknown by those who cannot diligently devote themselves to the study of truth, whether because of weakness of mind, or because of lack of time, or the necessity of attending to other matters. Moreover, in the more remote conclusions of the natural law, there is often some obscurity and uncertainty: for the more we recede from first principles, the more frequent is the danger of erring or at least of doubting. Hence among theologians themselves it is often disputed whether this or that precept pertains to natural right; thus, for example, Scotus taught that the precepts of the second table are not of natural right,¹ while most others hold otherwise; it is disputed whether there is a natural obligation of referring all acts to God, whether every lie is evil per se, etc.; what wonder, therefore, if the unlearned are ignorant of many other things?

¹ Scotus, in III Sentent., dist. 37.

In fact confessors, who have frequented the sacred tribunal, know very well that certain penitents labor under the greatest ignorance concerning the more remote conclusions of the natural law, for example concerning the malice of internal acts,² or even of an officious lie, of perjury for preserving life,³ of certain acts against chastity,⁴ etc. - Therefore penitents are to be questioned prudently, treated benignly when they are in ignorance, - and instructed discreetly.

² Cf. Lacroix, lib. I, n. 135; St. Alphonsus, De conscientia, n. 9.

³ Sanchez, De praeceptis Decal., lib. I, c. 16, n. 33.

⁴ St. Thomas, Quaest. disp., de malo, q. 3, a. 8, thinks it can happen that someone invincibly does not know the prohibition of fornication. Cf. Ball. P., I, n. 48.

234. Since perfect knowledge of the natural law, without admixture of error, is very difficult for the human race, some clear and positive declaration of this law through revelation becomes useful. Indeed, granted that man was elevated to the supernatural state, it is necessary that he be directed to the supernatural end through positive divine law: for means ought to be proportioned to the end. - In fact God, through revelation made to men, promulgated certain precepts of natural right, and also precepts imposed by His positive will. In that revelation a threefold stage is usually distinguished: the primeval law, manifested to the first parents and patriarchs, and therefore destined for the whole human race; the old law, or Mosaic law, manifested through Moses to the Israelite people; the new law, or Christian law, promulgated by the Incarnate Word, or Christ, for the whole human race. - Nothing special occurs here to be said concerning the primeval law, since very few things are known concerning it; wherefore the old and the new law must be briefly discussed.

235. It is not our purpose to examine the historical questions concerning the Mosaic law which today are agitated with great heat not only among rationalists, but even among Catholics: for this pertains to the history of revelation.¹ Yet it is fitting to outline a few things: 1. concerning the character and end of this law; 2. concerning its object; 3. concerning its obligation and abrogation, so that the perfection of the new law may be better understood.

¹ Concerning this matter, cf. Vigouroux, Les Livres Saints et la Critique rationaliste, 3rd ed., 1891, t. III, p. 3-226; Hummelauer, Comment. in Exodum, 1891, p. 16-25; in Deut., 1901, p. 23-110; Pelt, Histoire de l'Anc. Testament, 4th ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, ch. XXVII, p. 295-331; Prat, S. J., Le Code du Sinaï, sa genèse et son évolution, Paris, Bloud, 1904; Lagrange, O. P., La Méthode historique, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 147-182.

236. Since the natural law, impressed upon minds, and the primeval law given to the first parents and patriarchs, had gradually been obscured, whether because of sin, or because of the long stay of the Israelites in Egypt, it was opportune that the chief precepts of each should again be solemnly promulgated and completed by others, by which the chosen people would be more efficaciously removed from idolatry and corruption of morals. For this reason, in the third month after Israel's departure from the land of Egypt, on Mount Sinai, the ten precepts of the Decalogue were promulgated,² which contain the sum of the moral precepts of the ancient law; for the rest, not expressed in the Decalogue, are either presupposed, as the precept of faith and love,³ or follow from others, as the prohibition of lying,⁴ which is inferred from the eighth precept, - and the prohibition of unjust hatred,⁵ which is deduced from the fifth. - Yet to these moral precepts were added ceremonial and judicial precepts, which were accommodated to the special condition of the Hebrews, and were ordered to the more perfect observation of the moral precepts.

² Exod., XIX-XX; cf. Hummelauer, in hunc loc.

³ Deut., VI, 5; Levit., XIX, 18.

⁴ Exod., XXIII, 1.

⁵ Levit., XIX, 17-18.

237. (A) That law is truly divine, insofar as it proceeds from God through revelation or inspiration. For this is declared many times not only in the Old Testament (loc. cit.), but also in the New; thus St. Stephen, the interpreter of Jewish tradition, says:¹ "You received the law in the disposition of angels"; and Paul declares that the law was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator;² for the ministry of angels denotes the intervention of God.

¹ Acts, VII, 53.

² Galat., III, 19.

From this, however, it is in no way permitted to infer that the Hebrew legislator borrowed nothing from the primeval law, from the customs of the patriarchs, or from foreign laws: for God, by inspiring the sacred authors, can move them to use all those things which they already know naturally. Thus, for example, abstinence from things strangled and from blood, and circumcision, had already been prescribed before Moses;³ likewise divorce, polygamy, slavery, and the law of retaliation had been in use, and the Mosaic law limited all these things rather than established them; moreover, certain moral or ritual precepts are almost the same as those which flourished among the Chaldeans and Egyptians.⁴

³ Gen., IX, 4-6; Gen., XVII, 10-14.

⁴ Cf. Prat, op. cit., p. 16-20; Lagrange, op. cit., p. 156-182, where he sets up a comparison between the Mosaic law and the code of Hammourabi recently discovered by V. Scheil, O. P.

But how much the Mosaic law excels foreign laws is clear to one who attends a little: (a) for it clearly and explicitly inculcates monotheism, and strictly prohibits the worship of idols, which flourished among other peoples: "I am the Lord your God... You shall not have strange gods before me. You shall not make for yourself a graven thing..."⁵ (b) Moreover slavery, although tolerated, is much milder than among neighboring nations.⁶ (c) The sum of the law is the love of God and of neighbor: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole strength;⁷... You shall love your friend as yourself."⁸ (d) Not only external sins are prohibited, but also internal ones:⁹ "You shall not covet your neighbor's house; nor shall you desire his wife." (e) Nor is only negative holiness commanded, but also positive holiness, which consists in a certain imitation of divine holiness: "Be holy, because I am holy, the Lord your God."¹⁰

⁵ Exod., XX, 2-4.

⁶ Exod., XXI, 1-11.

⁷ Deut., VI, 5.

⁸ Levit., XIX, 18.

⁹ Exod., XX, 17.

¹⁰ Levit., XIX, 2.

238. (B) To urge the observance of the precepts, the Mosaic law chiefly, although not exclusively, uses temporal promises and threats. St. Thomas explains the reason for this:¹ just as in speculative matters means are proposed to the hearer according to his condition, so in moral matters men must be led to the observance of laws by means proportioned to their character, namely by punishments and rewards. Now the Israelites, since they were stiff-necked and especially inclined toward temporal things, were more easily led by the hand to execute the commandments through temporal promises and threats. Wherefore God, accommodating Himself to them, leads them to divine worship by the promise of temporal things, which are symbols of eternal goods: "Whence it was fitting for the old law that through temporal things which were in the affection of imperfect men, it should lead men by the hand to God."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 99, a. 6.

239. (C) The Mosaic law, although divine, received various additions at various times:² for God did not cease to accommodate His laws to the condition of the Jews; hence He sent Prophets, who not only recalled the people to the observance of the law, but also authentically interpreted and completed the law.³ Likewise He inspired other writers, who in the sapiential books and in the psalms explained the ancient precepts of ethics and handed down new and more perfect ones. The historical books also, besides the examples of virtue which they report, contain not a few precepts or counsels which are especially useful for the spiritual life. Hence, in order to know the old law accurately, it is not enough to read the Mosaic books, but it is necessary to run attentively through the other sacred writers.

² In the Mosaic books a threefold series of laws can already be distinguished: (a) the Code or volume of the covenant (Exod., XX-XXIII); (b) the priestly Code (Exod., XXV-XXX and XXXV-XL; Levit. in its entirety; Num., I-IX, XV, XVII-XIX, XXVIII-XXX, XXXIV-XXXV); (c) Deuteronomy, which either contracts or more fully explains each code.

³ You will find certain examples apud Prat, op. cit., p. 48-67.

240. (D) But the end of the law is Christ;⁴ for, as St. Peter says,⁵ "all the prophets, from Samuel and afterward, who have spoken, announced these days" (messianic days). The law itself was our pedagogue in Christ, that is, leading us to Christ; for its various precepts, not only moral, but also ceremonial, especially those which regard sacrifices and sacraments, were divinely ordered to preparing the way of the Messiah; for by the observation of the law they disposed the Jews to understand and receive more easily the more perfect law of Christ. This indeed is true also of many historical facts, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹ "All these things happened to them in figures"; for many things tended to this, that they might draw minds away from temporal things, and dispose them to awaiting the spiritual kingdom of the Messiah. Therefore the law cannot be rightly understood unless it is kept before the mind that this is a preparation for the evangelical law.

⁴ Rom., X, 4.

⁵ Acts, III, 24-25. We proved this elsewhere, De Vera Relig., n. 229-265.

¹ 1 Cor., X, 11; cf. Fillon, La Ste Bible, t. I, Introduction, p. 2-10.

In the old law are contained moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. -

241. (A) Moral precepts, which are briefly summed up in the Decalogue. For there the chief duties toward God and neighbor are handed down.

St. Thomas declares this as follows:² To God, as the principle of the community, three things are owed: fidelity, reverence, service. Fidelity consists in this, that He alone be adored; hence the first precept: "You shall not have strange gods." Reverence demands that nothing injurious be committed against Him; whence the second precept is as follows: "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain." Service is owed in recompense for benefits received from the Lord: and to this pertains the third precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath, in memory of the benefit of creation. - But toward neighbor, the duties to be fulfilled are special or general: special with regard to parents, to whom children ought to show honor, according to the fourth precept. General duties consist in this, that harm be inflicted on no one by deed, mouth, or heart. By deed let no injury be committed against the person himself: You shall not kill, according to the fifth precept; nor against the person joined in marriage: You shall not commit adultery, as the sixth precept bears; nor in external goods: You shall not steal, as the seventh precept declares. Harm of the mouth is prohibited by the eighth precept: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. But harm of the heart is prohibited by the ninth and tenth precepts: You shall not desire the wife... You shall not covet your neighbor's house.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 5.

Yet these precepts presuppose another one handed down elsewhere, namely the love of God and of neighbor, as we explained above, n. 236.

242. (B) Ceremonial precepts, which determined the peculiar mode by which God was to be worshiped at that time, and at the same time prefigured the mysteries and sacraments of Christ. From this it can be understood why precepts of this kind were so numerous:³ (a) to promote the worship of God;

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 3.

for since the Jews were prone to idolatry and the neighboring nations worshiped idols in manifold ways, it was necessary likewise to institute many and solemn ceremonial precepts, by which the chosen people might be more efficaciously deterred from the worship of idols; if the worship offered to the true God had been too simple, the Israelites would easily have been led away to the more solemn worship of the gods; and indeed, when Christian rites, much simpler than Jewish rites, succeeded them, not a few Hebrews converted to the faith grieved greatly over the abrogation of the ancient rites, as is evident from the Epistle to the Hebrews. (b) Moreover, the ceremonial precepts prefigured Christ who was to come, as the Decree for the Jacobites declares:¹ "All the sacred rites, sacrifices, sacraments, and ceremonies of the Old Testament pre-signified Him [Christ] as one day to come." But the mysteries of Christ, on account of their perfection and multiplicity, could be prefigured only by many rites: for the individual Mosaic rites, as imperfect, signified only one or another aspect of the mysteries of Christ; thus, in order to represent the one sacrifice of the New Law, there were many and diverse old sacrifices, each of which in its own way prefigured the immolation of Christ.²

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 602.

² Concerning the reason and sense of the ceremonies of the old law, cf. Bähr, Symbolik des mosaischen cultus, Heidelberg, 1874, t. I; Broglie, Confér. sur l'idée de Dieu dans l'Ancien Testament, Paris, 1892, 6th Conf., p. 197-223; Lesêtre, apud Vigouroux, Dict. de la Bible, t. II, 437-441.

243. (C) Judicial precepts, or civil or political ones, which ordered the Israelites toward one another, under the rule of God, the supreme king. For God was held not only as spiritual Lord, but also as temporal king of the Jewish people. Wherefore He determined their political and social state by judicial laws, and ordered it especially to a twofold end: (a) that the Israelites, by living according to justice and equity, might be prepared step by step for the messianic kingdom, which is a kingdom of justice and equity; (b) that by the social rule of the chosen people the constitution of the Church of Christ might in some way be prefigured.³ - According to St. Thomas,⁴ judicial precepts are divided into four species: (a) those which regard the institution of princes and magistrates, their offices, and the reverence to be shown to them; (b) those which pertain to fellow-citizens in their mutual relations, for example purchases, sales, judgments, punishments, etc.; (c) those which regard foreigners, for example wars against enemies, the manner of acting toward pilgrims and strangers; (d) those which refer to domestic life, namely wives, children, servants.⁵

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 104, a. 1-2.

⁴ Ibid., a. 4.

⁵ Pelt hands down a brief synopsis of these civil laws, op. cit., t. II, p. 40-59.

244. (A) Concerning obligation. (a) The old law, insofar as it promulgates moral precepts of natural right, obliges all men who have attained knowledge of these, not because it is the Mosaic law, but because it is the natural law impressed upon hearts; and therefore the precepts of the Decalogue, if you except the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which does not pertain to the natural law, bound the Gentiles per se and also bind them today, and likewise Christians themselves; for, according to the common and true opinion, these precepts, with the third excepted, are nothing other than an exposition of the natural law. Wherefore Trent strikes with anathema those who hold that "the ten precepts pertain in no way to Christians."¹

¹ Trent, sess. VI, can. 19.

(b) But the ceremonial and judicial precepts obliged only the Jews, and the proselytes of justice,² who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish nation: for these were positive precepts, which had been enacted not for the Gentiles, but for the chosen people alone. Just as today clerics and religious are held by certain laws which in no way bind laymen, so the Israelites were bound to observe certain special commandments to which other peoples were not bound.³ But because legal observances were of no little profit for attaining holiness and salvation more securely, certain Gentiles, who converted themselves to the true God, freely took up the obligation of observing the Mosaic laws.

² Proselytes of justice were Gentiles converted to the faith, who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish people; proselytes of the gate, although truly converted, were not circumcised, but only had to fulfill the precepts which were called Noachic (Gen., IX, 4).

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 98, a. 5.

245. (B) Concerning the abrogation of the old law. From what has already been said, the moral precepts were in no way abrogated by the new law. But the ceremonial and judicial precepts were abrogated through Christ, as is evident from the Council of Jerusalem, which, against the Pharisees, declared that circumcision and the other Mosaic prescriptions were no longer in force,⁴ - and from the Epistle to the Galatians, where the Apostle severely reproves the converts who had wished to bind themselves to this law. - And deservedly; for, since they had been instituted to prefigure and prepare the advent of Christ, once Christ had come, they could no longer persist.

⁴ Acts, XV, 5-29.

Yet, during the life of Christ, the law was in force together with the Gospel, and He Himself willed to fulfill the law, because the mystery of Redemption had to be consummated only through the passion and death of the Savior. Christ having died, the legal observances were dead in law, because our redemption was then completed; yet in fact they were abrogated only at that time when the Gospel had been promulgated.

God, who in many portions and in many ways had formerly spoken to the fathers in the prophets, in the fullness of time spoke in the Son, who instituted the new law, preached it by words and examples, and sealed it by His blood. We shall explain concerning this law: 1. its character and end; 2. its object; 3. its perfection and duration.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 106-108; Suarez, lib. X; Bellarmine, Controversiae, De justificatione, lib. IV; Muller, § 42-46; Bouquillon, n. 85-103; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 7, p. 142-152; Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, New York, 1899, pp. 17-26, 65-75, 92-149.

246. (A) The Christian law is deservedly said to have been promulgated not through Angels, but through Christ Himself, written not on tablets of stone, but in the hearts of the faithful. For the Prophets had already announced this: "I will give my law in their inward parts, and I will write it in their heart."² And St. Paul sees the fulfillment of this prophecy in the new dispensation; for, addressing the faithful, he says:³ "You are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink, but with the spirit of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart."

² Jerem., XXXI, 33; this prophecy is declared to have been fulfilled through the new law, Hebr., VIII, 10, X, 16. - There note that the new law is not presented as something imposed from without, but as an internal rule, which the Christian, under the influence of grace, makes his own.

³ 2 Cor., III, 3.

This metaphor signifies that the new law has been put into the mind through the abundance of faith, which proposes to us the rules of acting more explicitly and clearly, - and has been inscribed upon the heart through the abundance of love, which sweetly inclines us to do those things which are commanded.⁴ Indeed, to the old law there had been joined a certain grace of illumination and love, but much less abundant: for since the price of redemption had not yet been paid, it was not fitting that such copious grace be granted to the Jews; but, once the price was paid by the death of Christ, much more copious grace was poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit.

⁴ Thus it is distinguished from the natural law, which indeed is said to be engraved on the heart, but naturally, while the new law is said to be inscribed by the supernatural light of faith.

Paul indeed inculcates this many times, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: for there he shows that justification is not from the Mosaic law and from the works of the law, but from faith which works through charity; for often the law of itself excites concupiscence and is the occasion of sin, not because it is evil, but because, on account of our infirmity, we act against its prescriptions: "For the law works wrath; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression.¹... What then shall we say? Is the law sin? God forbid. But I did not know sin except through the law."² Grace alone can help us to fulfill the law; this indeed was given to the Hebrews, but sparingly, while it is granted abundantly to Christians: "For the law [the new law] of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death."³

¹ Rom., IV, 15.

² Rom., VII, 7; cf. VII, 11-25.

³ Rom., VIII, 2.

247. (B) The new law is wholly spiritual; (a) for its sanction does not consist in temporal threats or promises, but in spiritual and eternal ones: "And fear not those who kill the body, and cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell."⁴ - Wherefore it calls blessed those who are poor in spirit, who mourn, who suffer persecution for justice, because their reward is great in heaven.⁵ On the other hand, it denounces riches and honors as impediments which retard us from the kingdom of heaven: "Woe to you that are rich, for you have your consolation. Woe to you that are filled, for you shall hunger⁶... For what does it profit a man if he gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his own soul?"⁷

⁴ Matt., X, 28.

⁵ Matt., V, 3-12.

⁶ Luke, VI, 24-25.

⁷ Matt., XVI, 26.

(b) The kingdom which Christ preaches is not a temporal kingdom, such as had been conceived by many Jews, but a spiritual kingdom, for entering which there are required faith in the Gospel, love of God and neighbor, imitation of Christ, and denial of self, as will be more fully explained in the Treatise on the Virtues.

(c) The worship which He promotes, although it ought to be manifested externally, ought especially to be internal: "But the hour comes, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."¹ Hence the ancient sacrifices, which consisted chiefly in external immolation, have been abolished, and there succeeds to them the sacrifice of Christ Himself, who immolates not only His body, but His soul by most perfect obedience: "Therefore coming into the world he says: Sacrifice and oblation you did not will, but a body you have fitted to me; holocausts for sin did not please you. Then I said: Behold I come; in the head of the book it is written of me that I should do your will, O God."² Wherefore He wills His disciples to offer to God spiritual victims, namely good works done for the sake of God, and not from ostentation: "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father who is in heaven."³

¹ John, IV, 23.

² Hebr., X, 5-7.

³ Matt., VI, 1.

248. (C) The end of the evangelical law is to promote the glory of God and of Christ, - and indeed in the most perfect mode, namely by attaining true and internal sanctification, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, adopted sons of God, and His heirs, and co-heirs with Christ, - by which consequently we merit eternal beatitude, or the clear vision of God and perfect love. Christ proposed this end to Himself: "I have glorified you on the earth; I have finished the work which you gave me to do. And now glorify me, you, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was."⁴ His disciples ought to set the same end before themselves: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ⁵... Do all things for the glory of God."⁶ To glorify God, they ought to imitate His holiness, insofar as it can be done:⁷ "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." When we have accomplished this according to our powers, we await glory as the crown of justice;⁸ but this is our glory, that we may see God face to face: then we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is.⁹

⁴ John, XVII, 5.

⁵ 1 Peter, IV, 11.

⁶ 1 Cor., X, 31.

⁷ Matt., V, 48.

⁸ 2 Tim., IV, 7.

⁹ 1 John, III, 2.

249. The evangelical law embraces not only precepts, which it is necessary to observe in order that we may attain eternal life, but also counsels, by fulfilling which we attain greater perfection on earth and a more copious reward in heaven.

(A) The foundation of the whole of Christian ethics is situated in this, that God is manifested not only as Creator and Lord, but as Father, who, from His infinite goodness, adopted us as sons, - and redeemed us from the slavery of sin through His only-begotten Son, who washed us from our sins in His blood, - whose infinite merits are applied to each of us through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba [Father]¹... For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life²... The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us."³

¹ Rom., VIII, 15.

² John, III, 16.

³ Rom., V, 5.

Hence the whole law is summed up in two precepts: we ought to love God as Father, and men as brothers and co-heirs: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."⁴ Each commandment was already contained in the old law; but in the new law it is declared much more perfectly; formerly God was held and feared especially as Lord, now He is loved as Father; formerly the Jews loved their friends and fellow-citizens, but cared little for strangers, and not rarely hated enemies; today there is no distinction of Jew and Greek, but all are to be held as brothers in Christ, and we are commanded to love enemies: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you."⁵ Wherefore Christ could deservedly say that the commandment of fraternal charity was new, not indeed in itself, but as to the perfect mode in which it must be understood and fulfilled: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another, as I have loved you."¹

⁴ Matt., XXII, 37-40.

⁵ Matt., V, 44.

¹ John, XIII, 34.

From this twofold precept flow all duties toward God and toward neighbor.

250. (B) But because, in the state of fallen nature, we cannot love God and neighbor as we ought, Christ by words and by His own examples preached self-denial as a necessary means for attaining this end: "If anyone wills to come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."² We deny ourselves through mortification of the senses, chastity, temperance, obedience, humility; we take up the cross through patience in adversities, and faithful fulfillment of the duties proper to our state, as will be explained more fully in the course of the work. - But that denial, which is the more arduous the more it must be renewed continually, becomes easier by the examples of Christ, who went before us bearing His cross, so that we also might be able to carry our cross, according to that saying:³ "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps." For thus patience is, as it were, deified, and greatly increases our merits: "If yet we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him."⁴ How much strength of soul and how much consolation this doctrine brings, the rationalists themselves are compelled to acknowledge.⁵

² Matt., XVI, 24.

³ 1 Peter, II, 21.

⁴ Rom., VIII, 17.

⁵ Thus, among others, P. Janet, Histoire de la Philosophie morale, Paris, 1860, t. I, p. 211: "The Passion, which is the supreme mystery in Christianity, sufficiently indicates that the life of man is nothing but a passion, that is, a sorrow. While all antiquity made the good consist in not suffering, and invited man, either by virtue or by pleasure, to flee sorrow, the Gospel presents sorrow as a good. Sorrow is in some way deified, since God Himself willed to suffer, to groan, to die." - Nor otherwise G. Seailles, Les affirmations de la Conscience moderne, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 51: "Christianity deifies suffering: Jesus, Son of God and God Himself, descended upon the earth; He took with our body all our infirmities; from the point of view of this world, He was one conquered, He was despised, insulted, struck; He willed to suffer, to die; He carried His Cross, He attached Himself to that wood of sorrow, He groaned, He shed tears... The Christian, he who looks at things with the eyes of faith and not with the eyes of flesh, no longer knows one disinherited, one conquered by life. Suffering is a good; it has its price in itself. God gathers up the most unknown, the most obscure, the most humble miseries, to make of them beatitude and glory."

251. (C) The duties of domestic and social life flow both from the love of God and neighbor and from self-denial. Thus children ought to honor parents and obey them, because they hold the place of God.¹ Servants and domestics ought to show honor and obedience to masters, as to Christ;² but masters ought to hold their servants as brothers in Christ.³ - Subjects are bound to obey legitimate superiors, as God Himself: "For there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God."⁴ Superiors, on the other hand, ought to exercise only a paternal rule, and to imitate God, whose power over men is joined with paternal goodness.

¹ Ephes., VI, 1; Coloss., III, 20.

² Ephes., VI, 5-6; 1 Peter, II, 18-19.

³ Ephes., VI, 9; Coloss., IV, 1; Ep. to Philemon.

⁴ Rom., XIII, 1-2.

252. (D) Those things which regard worship are concerned with the sacraments and the sacrifice of the Mass; but these derive their virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ, and therefore tend to this, that they may more perfectly dispose us to receiving the supernatural life of grace, which itself is as it were a foretaste of eternal life. For this reason the ceremonial matters of the new law are fewer in number, easier in act, and far greater in usefulness than the rites of the ancient law, as befits the state of sons, which is proper to the Christian people.⁵

⁵ St. Augustine, Cont. Faustum, lib. XIX, c. 13, Migne, P. L., XLII, 355.

253. (E) To these precepts, however, evangelical counsels have been added, by which we are able to tend more securely to the perfection of the Christian life. Precepts are given concerning those things which are necessary for attaining the end,⁶ and therefore imply a true moral obligation; - but counsels are given concerning those things which lead us to the end more expeditiously and perfectly, and therefore do not oblige per se.

⁶ This is easily understood concerning precepts under grave obligation: for the violation of them turns us away from the ultimate end. As to precepts under light obligation, the violation of them retards us from the kingdom of heaven, as long as it is not fully remitted.

Christ indeed did not hand down this distinction explicitly, but implicitly, when He addressed the rich young man thus: "But if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments... If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me."¹ Paul confirms this concerning virginity, saying: "But concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel... He who gives his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not give her does better."² Yet we do not deny that it is often difficult to define from Scripture what ought to be referred to precepts and what to counsels; for the most part this can be determined only from the traditional sense of the Church.

¹ Matt., XIX, 17-21.

² 1 Cor., VII, 25-40.

254. Among the counsels, three are principal, which usually are specially called evangelical, namely poverty and virginity, concerning which there is question in the texts cited above, and also perfect obedience, which is nothing other than the abdication of one's own will, and is commended many times in Scripture. - St. Thomas declares why these three are of the greatest importance:³ The goods of this world consist in three things: in riches, which pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes; in delights of the flesh, which pertain to the concupiscence of the flesh; and in honors, which regard the pride of life. But these three things are totally abandoned through the aforesaid counsels: for riches are abdicated through poverty, delights of the flesh through perpetual chastity, pride of life through the service of obedience. - And thus he who strives to observe these and other counsels renounces the goods of the world more perfectly, and loves God more fully from the whole heart. Yet the practice of the counsels is not fitting for all, because perfection belongs to few.⁴

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 4.

⁴ On the counsels see J. Schwane, De operibus supererogatoriis et consiliis evangelicis in genere, Monasterii, 1868.

255. (A) From all these things it is manifest that the new law is much more perfect than the old:⁵ (a) by reason of the object, which embraces more moral precepts, and those more luminously explained and better reduced to unity, - but fewer ceremonial precepts, and those conducing more closely to true holiness; (b) by reason of the more abundant grace which accompanies it; (c) by reason of universality, since it was enacted not for one people, but for all, according to that saying:⁶ "Going therefore, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; (d) by reason of perpetuity, since it will endure until the consummation of the age, according to that which remains to be explained.

⁵ Bourdaloue eloquently discusses the perfection of the Christian law, Sermon pour le 6e Dim. après l'Epiphanie, sur la sainteté et la force de la loi chrétienne.

⁶ Matt., XXVIII, 19.

256. (B) The Prophets had already announced that the ancient law, in its ceremonial part, was to be abrogated: "Behold the days shall come, says the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not according to the covenant which I made with their fathers."¹ Not so concerning the new law, which is called the new and eternal testament, to last until the consummation of the age.² In fact, after Christ's advent in the flesh, nothing else is to be expected except His same advent in the clouds of heaven to judge the living and the dead.³

¹ Jerem., XXXI, 31-32; cf. Malach., I, 10-11.

² Hebr., XIII, 20; cf. Canon of the Mass; Matt., XXVIII, 20.

³ Matt., XXV, 31-46; XXVI, 64.

Although the new law is perfect, and embraces all essentials, nothing prevents it from being accommodated to various places and times, under the authority of the Church, to whom Christ handed over the power of making laws which help the faithful to observe the divine precepts more safely.

257. In the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-100 and n. 199-216), it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws, and that this authority does not indeed reside in the body of the faithful or of simple priests, but with the supreme Pastors, primarily indeed with the Supreme Pontiff, and secondarily with Bishops. In fact, already from the Council of Jerusalem, the Church has not ceased to establish laws, by recalling to memory those things which had already been commanded by divine law, by determining more explicitly those things which divine law had left indeterminate, and by imposing certain things which until then had been free, for promoting the more perfect fulfillment of the evangelical law. Wherefore here certain principles must be handed down concerning ecclesiastical law considered in general; but particular laws are explained in the course of this work, and especially in the Praelectiones juris canonici.

⁴ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. IV-VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 48-69; Bouquillon, n. 108-213. - Besides theologians, see the Canonists, especially Reiffenstuel, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, in book I of the Decretals, tit. II, De Constitutionibus, tit. III, De Rescriptis, tit. IV, De Consuetudine. - Concerning ecclesiastical law the manuscripts were of the greatest use which S. Many, professor of canon law in the Catholic University of Paris, kindly handed over to me, and which he will make public at an opportune time.

Division:

• Concerning the author
• Concerning the object
• Concerning the promulgation
• Concerning the obligation of ecclesiastical law
• Concerning interpretation
• Concerning cessation
• Concerning custom

258. From what was said in the Treatise on the Church (loc. cit.), by divine right, the Supreme Pontiff can make laws for the whole Church, but Bishops for the part of the territory assigned to them by the Roman Pontiff,¹ and indeed by ordinary power. Moreover the Pope, who is endowed with supreme legislative power, sometimes grants part of his power to others, either by simple delegation, or by deputation to some office, to which ordinary jurisdiction is annexed.

¹ Whether the jurisdiction of Bishops proceeds immediately from God, or immediately from the Supreme Pontiff and mediately from God, is disputed, from what was said in the Treatise on the Church, n. 208.

259. 1. The Roman Pontiff can establish laws for the universal Church, and for any part of it; and indeed either alone, insofar as he is the vicar of Christ, - or with the sacred Council approving, in which case the Bishops are legislators together with him.² And indeed, although he is able by his own authority to make laws, sometimes it is expedient that a Council, whether provincial or ecumenical, be convoked, for knowing better what abuses have crept into various parts of the Church, and by what means he may be able to remedy them; moreover, those things which have been decreed by common counsel are more efficaciously put into execution with concordant mind. - An Ecumenical Council enjoys the same universal authority as the Pontiff himself (On the Church, n. 211-216).

² De Ecclesia, n. 199-216.

260. 2. A Bishop can make laws for his own diocese, either in synod (that is, with the pastors of his diocese and others to be called by law convoked), or outside synod, - yet under the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, who can set certain limits to their power, and can invalidate their laws if he judges them to be contrary to the common good.

Patriarchs, Primates, Metropolitans can indeed make laws for their own diocese; but not for the whole province over which they preside, except in a provincial or plenary Council, namely with the suffragan Bishops concurring, who possess true lawmaking power. In the western Church, before the decrees of a plenary or provincial council are promulgated, they must be reviewed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council, or of Propaganda Fide (where missions are in question), so that they can be amended, if there is need;¹ nevertheless that review in common form² does not give greater force to these decrees, but only shows that nothing stands in the way of their promulgation.

¹ Sixtus V, Const. Immensa, 22 Jan. 1588; cf. Benedict XIV, De synodo, l. XIII, c. 3, n. 3; Pius X, Bull Sapienti consilio, 29 Jun. 1908.

² Decrees are confirmed in solemn form when the Pontiff makes them his own and promulgates them in his own name; this is not customarily done today.

261. By common ecclesiastical right, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic can make laws for their territory (c. 294, § 1), Abbots and Prelates nullius (c. 323), major Superiors and, according to the norm of the Constitutions, Chapters in exempt clerical religions (cc. 198, § 1, 501, § 1). - By particular ecclesiastical right, legates, nuncios, and others can make laws according to the tenor of their faculties.

Abbesses or superioresses, and rectors of lower communities, namely parishes, monasteries, sodalities, universities, etc., do not enjoy legislative power.

262. 1. The general principle is that the Church can make laws concerning all those things which regard the worship of God and the sanctification of man: "Whatever therefore in human affairs is in any way sacred, whatever pertains to the salvation of souls or the worship of God, whether it is such by its own nature, or again is understood to be such because of the cause to which it is referred, all that is in the power and judgment of the Church."³ For the power of any society is measured by its end; but the end of the Church is the attainment of eternal life through the worship of God and the sanctification of its members. - From this it follows that nothing dishonorable, nothing contrary to natural or divine right, can be prescribed.

³ Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885.

263. 2. Ecclesiastical law cannot command what is too arduous and difficult. For since it is enacted for the good of the community, it ought to be proportioned to the fragility of human nature; otherwise it would not promote the public good, but rather would be a very frequent occasion of sins. Concerning this, however, three things must be noted: (a) it is not repugnant that an arduous law be imposed upon some society or state which not all, but few, freely choose, as is, for example, the law of celibacy or poverty annexed to the clerical or religious state; (b) when the reason of the public good requires it, the Church can command even heroic acts, for example the administration of the sacraments in time of contagious disease; (c) judgment concerning the difficulty of the law belongs to the legislators themselves, not to the subjects: otherwise laws would be done away with.

264. 3. But it is asked whether the Church can command internal acts. Here there is question not of the penitential forum, where the confessor, as minister of Christ, judges concerning internal things, and can enjoin merely internal works by way of satisfaction; but of the external forum, to which legislative power pertains.

(A) According to all, the Church can prescribe internal acts which are necessarily joined with external acts; for law directs only truly human acts, and therefore can be concerned with the internal dispositions necessary for a human act; thus, by commanding an oath, confession, communion, or the hearing of Mass, by that very fact it commands the internal acts necessarily joined with those external acts, namely the mind of swearing, attrition, the state of grace, attention.

(B) According to the common opinion, which we embrace, the Church cannot prescribe merely internal acts.¹ For (a) the judicial and coercive power of the Church cannot be exercised concerning internal acts, as Innocent III openly declared: "If their excess [of simoniacs] were manifest to the Church, which does not judge hidden things, they would have to be struck with canonical penalty";² and elsewhere he adds: "It has been given to us to judge only concerning manifest things."¹ But legislative power cannot proceed without judicial and coercive power: for it is required that the legislator be able to urge the observance of his laws by judgment and penalties; otherwise, his power would be contemned.

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 100, a. 9; Suarez, De Legibus, l. IV, c. 12; Schmalzgrueber, in tit. de Const., n. 21; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 100. Bouquillon, n. 114, with certain others, defends the contrary.

² Cap. Sicut, 33, de Simonia (lib. V, tit. 3).

¹ Cap. Tua nos, 34, de Simonia (lib. V, tit. 3).

(b) Just as the power of the internal forum directly and immediately regards the internal sanctification of individuals, so the power of the external forum directly regards the external governance of the Church, and therefore reaches internal acts only indirectly, namely those which are necessarily joined with external acts.

265. 4. It is asked moreover whether ecclesiastical law can reach past acts. (A) Per se it generally does not extend to them; for since law is primarily a rule, it cannot reach past acts which can no longer be ruled. Hence in canon law it is expressly said:² "Since it is certain that laws and constitutions give form to future affairs, they are not to be drawn to past facts, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things." From this was born the axiom: "The law does not have eyes backward."

² Cap. Quoniam, 13, de Constit. (lib. I, t. 2).

(B) Sometimes, however, the law reaches past acts, not indeed as to the force of commanding or forbidding, as has already been said, but as to other effects: -

(a) As to a penal effect; namely, it cannot reach an act previously prohibited in no way, but it can punish an act which was already previously prohibited, although without sanction or without determinate sanction.

(b) As to an irritant effect; if an act, previously posited, is irrevocable by natural or divine right (for example, a matrimonial contract between Christians), a subsequent law cannot reach it; but if from some part, although valid, it is infirm or capable of being made void (for example, a contract entered into from fear), the law can irritate it, for a grave cause, provided that it expressly makes provision for this.

(c) A law establishing inabilities, incapacities, and irregularities, which are not properly penalties, can reach past acts for a most grave cause: for since here there is question not of a penalty, but of a condition for obtaining some office, the matter depends upon the will of the legislator.

It must be noted, however, that the things which we have said regard law properly so called, or law constitutive of new right; for if there is question of a law declarative of ancient right, it much more easily reaches past acts, although the agent ought to be excused from fault and from penalty, on account of ignorance and uncertainty of the newly declared right.

266. I. Necessity and mode. Law does not obtain the force of obliging unless it has been intimated, or promulgated, to the subjects. For promulgation is the act by which the legislator authentically intimates his law to the community, or makes it known, with the will of obliging clearly manifested; and this he can accomplish either by himself or through another. The necessity of this promulgation is acknowledged in Canon Law:¹ "This alone suffices, that he be held to the observance of it [the law], who has known that it has been solemnly issued or publicly promulgated." And deservedly, for law cannot direct or bind the will unless it is first known.

¹ Decretal., l. I, tit. 5, De postulat., c. 1, Ad haec.

From the nature of the thing, that promulgation is required and suffices by which the law, considering all the adjuncts of times, places, and persons, can morally and in a human manner reach the knowledge of the subjects; once this is posited, the mode of promulgating the law is left to the judgment of the legislator.

267. II. Specifically concerning Pontifical laws. 1. The mode of promulgating laws used by the Pontiffs was not always the same.² (a) During the first twelve centuries, they promulgated their constitutions by sending them into the provinces, through clerics of most approved fidelity, either to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or patriarchs, who would take care that the same were transmitted to the bishops. (b) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, they began to promulgate authentic collections of canon law, sending them with a Bull to the more celebrated academies; thus Innocent III, in the year 1210, promulgated the collection of his decretals by letters directed to the University of Bologna. (c) In the course of the same century, they ordered certain Bulls to be promulgated by affixing them in the place of their residence, especially at Rome, with this clause, that such promulgation would suffice for the law to obtain its whole force: thus Martin IV, in the year 1281, issued a Bull against Michael Palaeologus.³

² Zaccaria, De varia Ecclesiae, praesertim Latinae, in promulg. sacrar. constitut. disciplina; Bouix, De princ. juris can., Parisiis, 2nd ed., 1852, p. 248 sq.

³ Bull. Rom., ed. Cocquelines, t. III, P. 2, p. 30.

268. 2. But afterward they promulgated their decrees in various ways: (a) Constitutions or Apostolic Letters, when they contained a law for the whole world, were promulgated by affixing them at Rome, in one or more of these places: at the doors of the Lateran church, of the basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican, of the Apostolic Chancery, - or in the area of Campo de' Fiori. (b) They promulgated Encyclicals by sending them, according to the ancient custom, to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or apostolic nuncios. (c) Indeed, it had almost come into custom that the acts of the Holy See and its decrees, when published by legitimate authority in the secretarial Office by which they had been issued, were held by that very fact to have been promulgated.

3. But Pius X decreed¹ that an official Commentary should be published (Acta Apostolicae Sedis), in which he willed that pontifical constitutions, laws, decrees, and other decisions both of the Roman Pontiffs and of the sacred Congregations and Offices be inserted, and thus promulgated, whenever there is need of promulgation, and no provision has otherwise been made by the Holy See.

¹ Const. Promulgandi, 29 Sept. 1908, A. A. S., I, p. 5.

Therefore the opinion of those who formerly thought that promulgation in provinces and dioceses was required for the force of pontifical laws is to be rejected; for this is in no way required from the very nature of the thing, and moreover the legislator has several times declared that the promulgation which is made at Rome suffices.

269. But today, according to the Code, can. 9, "laws are promulgated by the Apostolic See through publication in the official commentary of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless in particular cases another mode of promulgating has been prescribed; and they exercise their force only after three months have been completed from the day which is affixed to the number of the Acta, unless from the nature of the thing they bind at once, or in the law itself a shorter or longer vacancy has been specially and expressly established."

Thus an end is imposed upon the controversy formerly agitated concerning the time at which a law begins to oblige. Some said that it obliges at once, namely on the day after promulgation;² but others gradually, namely from the time at which each person has known it;³ and others, finally, only after two months from the day of promulgation.

² D'Annibale, Summula, t. I, n. 202, note 21, 23.

³ Suarez, lib. III, c. 17, n. 6, and lib. IV, c. 15, n. 9 sq.

270. III. Concerning the promulgation of episcopal laws. According to the recent Code, can. 335, § 2, the matter is left to the reasonable judgment of the bishop. Thus they are sufficiently promulgated if they are publicly read in the cathedral church, or signified by the voice of a herald in the square of the city, - or, having been written, are affixed in a public place designated for this, for example at the doors of the cathedral church, - or are committed to type in the diocesan sheet. - Indeed, if the law regards only the clergy, it needs no other publication except that which is made in the synod itself, at which the principal part of the clergy is present.⁴

⁴ Benedict XIV, De synodo, lib. XIII, c. 4, n. 1.

An episcopal law obliges at once once it has been promulgated, unless otherwise declared; for common law establishes no delay for the obligation of particular laws.

271. In order that ecclesiastical law may oblige, it in no way needs the acceptance of the community or of secular authority.

1. It does not need the acceptance of the community; for ecclesiastical power does not come from the community, but from Christ Himself, as was proved in the Treatise on the Church. Hence the force of pontifical laws per se does not depend upon the acceptance of the bishops, since they are bound to obey the Roman Pontiff even in those things which regard the discipline and government of the Church; nor does the force of episcopal laws depend of itself upon the acceptance of priests, since they ought to obey their bishops.

Yet if some bishop understands that some pontifical constitution, concerning some head of discipline, can induce some harmful effect in his diocese, he not only can, but even ought, to represent his reasons to the Roman Pontiff.¹ "Nor," says Benedict XIV (loc. cit.), "have the Roman Pontiffs ever refused to lend an ear to the reasons of inferiors; and, as often as they recognized these to be sufficiently valid, they in no way refused to exempt some provinces or dioceses from the law of their general constitutions, as to that kind of discipline of which we are now treating." - Now, during the whole time of supplication, the obligation of the law is more probably suspended;² but when the Apostolic See has pronounced judgment, one must stand wholly by this.

¹ Thus Benedict XIV, op. cit., lib. IX, c. 8, n. 3.

² Reiffenstuel, in tit. De Constitut., n. 145.

272. 2. It does not need the acceptance of the civil authority, or the royal placet. Sometimes princes have opposed the promulgation of ecclesiastical laws in their kingdom, or prohibited pontifical bulls from entering the kingdom without the royal placet.³ This abuse, reproved many times by the Supreme Pontiffs, Vatican thus condemned:⁴ "Wherefore we condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who make the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that those things which are established by the Apostolic See or by its authority for the government of the Church have no force and value unless they are confirmed by the placet of the secular power." In fact the Church is a complete society, independent from the State (De Ecclesia, n. 109-110), and in spiritual matters she is endowed with supreme authority.

³ The royal placet, among others, was advocated by Van Essen, De promulg. legis et de placito regio; whom these refuted: Zaccaria, Antifebronius vindicatus, t. IV, diss. 12; Bouix, op. cit., p. 11, sect. 2, c. 4; Tarquini, diss. de placito regio; Cavagnis, Instit. juris publici, ed. 3a, t. II, lib. III, n. 2-23.

⁴ Vatican, sess. IV, c. 3 (Denzing., n. 1675).

Yet sometimes the Church, for the good of peace and to avoid greater evils, tolerates that the royal placet be obtained by bishops; sometimes also, in concordats, some use of the placet is conceded.

273. Ecclesiastical law, duly promulgated, has the force of obliging in conscience, as is clear from the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-67), where it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws. Hence those who despise the pastors are said to despise Christ Himself;² and filial obedience is to be shown to spiritual rulers.³

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 96; Suarez, lib. IV, c. 17-20; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 3-7; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 140-152; Bouquillon, n. 133-163; Noldin, n. 118-127 and 136-148.

² Luke, X, 16.

³ Hebr., XIII, 17.

But if there is question of a doubtful law, according to the Code, can. 15, "laws, even irritant and inhabilitating laws, do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact, the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense."

We shall speak: 1. concerning the gravity; 2. concerning the extension; 3. concerning the subject of this obligation; 4. concerning the manner of fulfilling it.

The gravity of this obligation depends both on the matter of the law and on the will of the legislator.

274. 1. It depends on the gravity of the matter, insofar as the legislator cannot impose under grave obligation except grave matter. For it is not consonant with reason that matter, light under every respect, be commanded under penalty of mortal sin; otherwise sins would be multiplied, and the law would turn to the detriment, rather than to the good, of subjects.

But for judging concerning the gravity of the matter, attention must be given not only to the nature of the thing, but also to the end and other adjuncts. (a) When the end to be attained is of great importance and morally necessary, and moreover the action commanded greatly conduces to obtaining this end, the matter is judged grave; thus the public service of God, the dignity of worship, the holiness of the clergy, etc., are certainly something of great importance, and moreover the observance of feasts, abstinence, fasting, observance of celibacy, and recitation of the breviary greatly conduce to pursuing those ends; therefore all these things can be commanded under grave obligation. (b) When the intended end is not of great importance, or when the action does not greatly conduce to the end, otherwise of great importance, the matter is judged light; thus a law commanding that the various parts of the breviary be recited at certain times of the day, although ordered to the glorification of God and the sanctification of priests, does not conduce greatly to obtaining that end, since God is glorified and priests are sanctified even if the breviary is recited at other times of the same day; therefore this matter is light.

275. 2. It depends also on the will of the legislator: for he, sometimes at least, can command under light obligation a thing grave of itself, for example fasting; for, even when there is question of an end of great importance and of a means very useful for attaining such an end, the legislator can foresee that a precept imposed under grave obligation will be the occasion of manifold spiritual ruin, and therefore prescribe the thing only under light obligation.

But for discerning what the intention of the legislator was, these things especially are to be weighed: (a) the very words of the law, which imply grave obligation when it is said: we command severely, strictly, in virtue of obedience, under threat of divine judgment, etc.; (b) the penalties inflicted or to be inflicted upon transgressors; for a grave penalty, such as excommunication, suspension, interdict, etc., implies grave obligation; (c) the interpretation of doctors and the sense of pious faithful.

276. Corollary. Since law is obligatory, by that very fact the means truly necessary for observing the law are obligatory: for he who sincerely wills to attain the end, logically and consequently wills the means necessary to the end.

Hence (a) subjects ought to apply ordinary diligence to knowing the law: for the law cannot be observed unless it is known.

(b) Likewise they ought to furnish those things which are proximately necessary for the observation of the law; thus he who is bound to recite the divine office ought to obtain and keep a breviary; he who is bound by the law of fasting ought to buy fasting foods at a suitable time.

(c) Moreover they ought to remove or forestall impediments which render observance of the law impossible, provided that this can be done without grave inconvenience; thus he who knows that he cannot fast when he hunts ought to abstain from hunting on a fast day.

There are certain laws which, from their special character, induce a special obligation; thus especially laws including a presumption, or founded on a presumption, and irritant laws.

A twofold presumption is distinguished: presumption of fact and presumption of danger.

277. (A) A law including a presumption of fact is one which, supposing that some fact always exists in certain adjuncts (because in similar adjuncts it is truly accustomed to exist), establishes rights and obligations for a case of this kind. Thus if someone has been born and educated among Catholics, he is presumed by law to have been baptized: therefore the law by which he is subjected to all the statutes of the Church, although his baptism is not certainly established, is a law including a presumption of fact.

A presumption of fact can be simply of law, or of law and by law: the former is one which is simply expressed or supposed in law, and against which any proof is admitted; thus in the case brought above; - the latter is one which is held by law as so firm that it is considered as truth, and against it not any proof is admitted, but only proof either indirect, or direct but wholly manifest: thus "a res judicata is held true and just by a presumption of law and by law, and cannot be impugned directly," as the Code, c. 1904, decrees; thus also from c. 1972, "a marriage which, while both spouses were living, was not accused, after the death of either or both spouses, is presumed to have been valid in such a way that no proof is admitted against this presumption, unless the question arises incidentally."

(a) In the external forum, a law founded on a presumption of law simply obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is proved: and for demonstrating this, any proof suffices. - If there is question of a presumption of law and by law, it likewise obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is demonstrated; but regularly direct demonstration is not admitted, unless it is wholly manifest. But indirect proof is admitted; for example, a res judicata can be impugned indirectly if the falsity of the documents on which the sentence exclusively rests is proved. - Indeed direct proof is permitted, if it is wholly evident, as judicial confession, a public document, witnesses of extraordinary authority: for the axiom is universally received: presumption yields to truth.

278. (b) In the internal forum, a law founded on a presumption of fact does not oblige in conscience, if the fact truly does not exist: for, in the forum of conscience, presumption always yields to truth. Thus if two spouses contracted marriage invalidly, because of a diriment impediment which cannot be proved in the external forum, they cannot engage in marital intercourse, even if the validity of the marriage is confirmed by the sentence of the judge.¹ - Yet if a law of this kind can be observed without sin, it often ought to be observed in order to avoid scandal.

¹ Decretal., cap. Inquisitioni, 44, de Sentent. excommunicationis.

279. (B) A law founded on a presumption of danger is one which forbids or commands something, to forestall a danger which is frequently found connected with some action or omission; thus the law which prohibits the reading of depraved books, or forbids mixed marriages; for in these cases the danger of perversion regarding faith or morals is frequently present. Now a law of this kind always obliges, even if in a particular case the danger is not present. For law does not cease unless the end of the law has ceased adequately, that is, totally and as to all, morally speaking: since it is directed to the whole community. But in our case, even if danger does not exist for such an individual, nevertheless it perseveres for the community. Therefore the law retains its force. - Moreover according to the Code,² "laws enacted to forestall a general danger urge, even if in a particular case the danger is not present." Otherwise many will rashly judge that no danger threatens them.

² Code, can. 21.

280. (A) Notion and species. (a) An irritant law is called one which establishes that some act or contract, on account of some defect, is by that very fact invalid or rescindable; and thus it is distinguished from a prohibiting law, which of itself indeed makes an act illicit, but not invalid. - A law closely related to an irritant law is an inhabilitating law, which decrees that such a person is incapable for this or that act; whence irritation directly regards the act, and inability directly regards the person; but in practice and morally speaking, both produce the same effects.

(b) From the very notion handed down, a law can irritate in two ways: by the law itself, when the act is rendered null from the beginning, even before the sentence of the judge; - by the sentence of the judge, when the act is valid until it is rescinded by the judge: wherefore, before the sentence of the judge, it is indeed rescindable, but not invalid. - From another head, irritation is called penal, when it is enacted on account of some delict; non-penal, when, on account of the public good, it irritates acts lacking a certain condition.

281. (B) Effects of an irritant law in the external forum. (a) If the act is only rescindable, it is deservedly held as valid until it is rescinded by the judge; for to this pertains what is said in canon law:¹ "Since many things are tolerated through patience, which, if they had been brought into judgment, with justice requiring it, ought not to be tolerated." (b) If the act is null by the law itself, it is held as invalid from the beginning, and the sentence of the judge, if it supervenes, does not properly irritate it, but declares that it was invalid from the beginning.

¹ Decretal., cap. Cum jamdudum, 18, de Praebendis (lib. III, tit. 5).

282. (C) Effects of an irritant law in the internal forum. When there is question of a rescindable act, there is no difficulty: for it is valid in the forum of conscience until it is rescinded. But very grave difficulties and controversies are present when there is question of an act null by the law itself. We explain those things which seem to us more probable: -

(a) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which have being and receive force from canon law alone (as, for example, religious profession), they must be held as invalid, even in the internal forum, before any declaratory sentence of a judge; since they do not have being and force from natural law, but only from canon law, - and moreover canon law in the case irritates them, they have no existence or force.

(b) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which receive being and force from natural law, the difficulty increases: 1) if the canonical legislator clearly manifests his will of irritating the act even in the internal forum, this must be wholly stood by: for he is endowed with the power of doing this; 2) if there is question of a matrimonial contract, the same must be said; the reason is because if that contract is once admitted as valid, thereafter it can be rescinded by no human power, even ecclesiastical, on account of the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond established by divine right; 3) but if there is question of other acts or contracts (for example, alienation of ecclesiastical goods), and nothing else is lacking for their validity except a certain solemnity prescribed by canon law, certain canonists of great name probably hold that the contract can be held as valid in the forum of conscience, until it is declared null by a judge; for it seems too hard that someone ought to despoil himself of a good justly acquired (considered according to natural right), before the declaratory sentence of a judge, on account of the defect of some solemnity; whence, in this case, it can be said that the act is not valid canonically, but retains its natural force until the contrary is authentically declared.

Laws do not oblige except subjects; but for defining who are subject to ecclesiastical law, we shall set forth 1. the general principle; 2. conclusions to be deduced therefrom concerning certain laws or certain persons.

¹ Suarez, lib. III, c. 31-35 and lib. IV, c. 19; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 8; Bouquillon, n. 151-163.

283. 1. General principle: All and only baptized persons, habitually in possession of reason, are subject to ecclesiastical laws.²

² "Those who have not received baptism are not held by merely ecclesiastical laws, nor baptized persons who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law." (Code, c. 12).

(A) All baptized persons, as Trent openly defined:³ "If anyone shall say that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church, which are either written or handed down, so that they are not held to observe them, unless they shall have wished to submit themselves to them of their own accord, let him be anathema." - For by receiving baptism, they become members of Christ and citizens of the Church (De Baptismo, n. 27).

³ Trent, sess. VII, de Baptismo, can. 8, apud Denzing., n. 745.

Heretics and schismatics also are bound per se by these laws. For if there is question of those who freely and culpably separated from the Church, they cannot by unjust rebellion exempt themselves from the obedience owed to legitimate superiors; in fact in the Corpus juris many laws are found concerning heretics, schismatics, and apostates, and it has several times been declared that they are held by impediments diriment of marriage. - But if the question is concerning those who are born in heresy, and remain in it in good faith, some have thought that the Church, for her benignity, does not wish to bind them by at least certain laws; but, as to the fact, the Church has never declared that they are immune from these laws. Therefore it can only be said that those who are in good faith are excused from every formal and culpable transgression of ecclesiastical laws, because they are wholly ignorant of them.

284. (B) Only baptized persons; for those who have not yet been regenerated by baptism are outside the Church. Now the Apostle teaches that the Church does not judge those who are outside;¹ the Pontiffs acknowledge that pagans are not bound by canonical constitutions;² and Trent declares that the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered into her through the gate of baptism.³ Consequently infidels, Jews, and others not baptized are in no way held by ecclesiastical laws.

¹ 1 Cor., V, 12-13.

² Decretal., lib. IV, tit. 19, cap. Gaudemus, 8, De divortiis.

³ Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 2, apud Denzing., n. 775.

285. (C) Habitually in possession of reason, that is, those who have attained the use of reason and at least habitually retain it, such as not only those who actually enjoy reason, but also the insane who have lucid intervals, the drunk, and the delirious; but not infants and the perpetually insane. - For ecclesiastical law tends to this, that it direct the actions of subjects to a spiritual end; but the actions of those who enjoy reason neither actually nor habitually cannot be directed to the end; on the contrary, the actions of those who habitually enjoy reason can be directed, even if actually they lack the use of it. - Therefore it is licit (although it is not fitting) to furnish meat to infants and the insane on a forbidden day.

286. Yet certain exceptions are given: (a) laws granting rights, or irritating some act, can affect even those who do not habitually have the use of reason, - because they are not directive laws; (b) the impubescent are not subject to penal laws of the Church, unless the contrary is expressed in law: for, on account of defect of more mature judgment, they are worthy of mercy; (c) but the faithful are subject to the other laws suited to their age; hence they are not held by the precept of fasting unless they have reached the twenty-first year; but those who have completed the seventh year ought to hear Mass and abstain from meat, and those who have attained the use of reason ought to communicate at Easter time.

⁴ Who are adults, impubescent persons, infants, the Code, c. 8, thus declares: "§ 1. A person who has completed the twenty-first year of age is an adult; below this age, a minor. § 2. A minor, if male, is judged pubescent from the completed fourteenth year, if female, from the completed twelfth year. § 3. An impubescent before the full seventh year is called an infant or child or little one and is judged not in possession of himself; but when the seventh year has been completed, he is presumed to have the use of reason. To an infant are assimilated all who are habitually destitute of reason."

287. (D) It is asked whether the legislator himself is bound to obey his laws? (a) The legislator properly and directly is not held by his laws, at least more probably; for no one can command himself and exercise jurisdiction over himself. But he is held indirectly and consequently, insofar as he ought to observe the law established for the good of the whole community, in order to furnish subjects good example, and lest they be scandalized. But the gravity of this obligation depends on the gravity of the scandal caused by violation of the law.

(b) But those who compose a college endowed with legislative power are subject to the laws enacted by the college or council; thus bishops and the metropolitan ought to obey the laws which they themselves enacted in a provincial Council; for, taken singly, they cannot enact these laws, and therefore the provincial council is truly above the individual bishops, not excepting the metropolitan, and can impose precepts upon them. - But the Roman Pontiff, who, while he presides over an ecumenical council, remains above the council, is not directly obliged by the disciplinary laws of the Council.

288. State of the question. General laws, enacted by the Roman Pontiff or by ecumenical Councils, indeed oblige all the baptized, as we have said; but particular laws enacted by bishops and provincial councils are presumed territorial; therefore the question arises who are held by these laws. Now in relation to territory, there are distinguished inhabitants, newcomers, pilgrims, travelers, vagi, and exempt persons.¹

¹ Code, c. 91: "A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a pilgrim, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus if he has domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere."

(a) Inhabitants of some place are called those who have their domicile there. Now from the Code, c. 92, § 1, "Domicile is acquired by residence in some parish or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, vicariate apostolic, prefecture apostolic; which residence is either joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from it, or has been protracted to a completed decade." It is lost as soon as these two things concur at the same time: actual departure from the place, and the intention of not returning.

(b) Newcomers are those who have a quasi-domicile somewhere. Now quasi-domicile is acquired "by residence as above, which is either joined with the intention of remaining there at least for the greater part of a year, if nothing calls one away from it, or is in fact protracted to the greater part of a year."² But it is lost if these two things concur at the same time: actual departure and the intention of not returning.

² According to the Canonists, six months are judged to be the greater part of a year.

(c) Pilgrims are called those who reside in some place for a short time, while retaining their domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere.

(d) Vagi are those who nowhere have a domicile or quasi-domicile, either because the intention of remaining in a certain place is lacking to them, or because, having left their domicile, they are seeking where they may establish a seat.

(e) Finally, exempt persons are those who, by a fiction of law, are placed outside the territory of any diocese, are exempted from the jurisdiction of bishops, and are immediately subject to the Roman Pontiff.

289. (A) Concerning inhabitants and newcomers. Inhabitants and newcomers are bound by the laws of the territory when they actually live in it. The matter was formerly doubtful concerning newcomers; but today, from the practice of the Holy See, it has become certain: for those who have quasi-domicile in some place are subject to the pastor of this place, and therefore to the bishop of the diocese.

290. (B) Concerning pilgrims. Pilgrims, according to the Code, c. 14, "are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory as long as they are absent from it,¹ unless either the transgression of them harms in their own territory, or the laws are personal; nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts; but they are held by general laws, even if these are not in force in their own territory, but not at all if they do not oblige in the place in which they are staying." Whence: -

¹ This holds even when they leave their own diocese in fraud of the law, that is, with the very purpose of evading the law; for in so acting they use their own right, namely the right of departing from the place where a special law is in force. Yet the two cases set forth in the Treatise on Penance, n. 353, and on Marriage, n. 410, are excepted.

(a) Pilgrims are not held by common laws which are in force in their own diocese - from which they are absent - but are not in force in the place where they are sojourning. For, by entering another diocese, they enjoy the privileges of the place in which they are staying; thus those who, during Lent, are sojourning in the United States of America, enjoy the privilege granted there of eating meat on all days, except Wednesday and Friday, even if that privilege is not had in their own diocese.

(b) But pilgrims are held by common laws which are in force in the place where they are staying, even if they do not oblige in their own diocese. Thus French and Americans, staying at Rome during Holy Week, ought to fast according to the Roman or strict manner, even if in their own regions the common law has been mitigated by custom or indult; for the common law is in force where they live, and moreover they cannot enjoy the local privilege of the diocese from which they are absent, from what has already been said.

(c) Pilgrims are certainly held to observe certain special laws of the places where they are staying, namely those which regard the validity of contracts, - or have been enacted for the common security of the place and public order, - or specially regard pilgrims.¹ - As to other laws, today, from the Code, pilgrims are not strictly held to observe them, outside the case of scandal; for laws oblige only subjects; but pilgrims, who have neither domicile nor quasi-domicile in the place where they are sojourning, are not truly subjects of that diocese. Thus those who pass through a place where a special fast has been prescribed are not held to fast. Indeed, if a special law is in force in the diocese of the pilgrim and in the place where he is living, he is not strictly held to observe it: not by reason of the precept of his own diocese, because he is outside it, nor by reason of the precept of the diocese in which he is living, because he is not a subject of the legislator. - But, from a certain equity and decency, it is altogether expedient that he observe it.

¹ Thus pilgrims are held by the reservations of places (A. A. S., 1 Dec. 1920).

291. (C) Concerning vagi, it was formerly controverted; not a few said that they are held to the laws of the place in which they are staying; but others held that they probably are not held except to the universal laws of the Church, and to those local laws which bind pilgrims. But today, from the Code, c. 14, "vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which are in force in the place in which they are staying."

292. (D) Exempt persons per se are not held by the laws of the diocese within whose boundaries they have their houses: for they are called exempt for this reason, that they are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of bishops. - It is said per se, because they can be held per accidens, as often as this is necessary to avoid scandal or to procure the public good; or if they have received pastoral care: for then they are held by certain laws, not as Regulars, but as pastors.²

² Cf. Leo XIII, Constit. Romanos Pontifices; C. Plen. Baltimorense III, n. 85-99.

293. 1. General principle: Law must be fulfilled in the mode determined by the legislator, whether explicitly or implicitly; for that mode, like the act itself, falls under the precept. Hence it must be fulfilled: -

(a) In a human mode, that is, with advertence and liberty.

(b) In an honorable mode, so that the act is not substantially vitiated under that respect under which it is commanded; thus one does not satisfy the obligation of annual confession through a sacrilegious confession, but he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who is duly present at the sacred rite, even if because of vain glory. Nor is it required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the prescribed act by its nature supposes that state.

(c) At the time prefixed, and if no time has been assigned, as soon as morally possible. If the time has elapsed, and at the same time it was determined for urging the obligation, this obligation does not cease (for example, the law of annual confession); but if it was determined for defining the obligation, the obligation is extinguished (for example, the law of fasting affixed to such a day).

294. 2. Concerning a prohibiting law. This commands nothing other than the negation of the act, without any intention of fulfilling the law. Wherefore he does not transgress the law of fasting who, sleeping the whole day, does not eat, nor the law of abstinence who on a forbidden day abstains from meat because he lacks it.

295. 3. Concerning a commanding law: (a) There is required at least the implicit will of placing the prescribed work; otherwise the law is not fulfilled in a human mode. But there is not required the intention of satisfying the precept, nor a fortiori of attaining the end intended by the legislator; for the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - Yet it is better to propose this intention to oneself, so that the merit of obedience may be had.

Thus he who, for the sake of devotion, hears Mass, not knowing that it is a feast day, satisfies the precept, because he implicitly wills the prescribed work; but he who, sleeping or coerced, assists at the sacred rite, does not satisfy the precept. He fulfills the law of fasting who observes the form of the fast, even if he eats sumptuously and does not intend mortification of the body.

(b) He who cannot fulfill the whole law is held to nothing if the thing commanded is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but if it is divisible, he is held to the part which he can fulfill; thus he who cannot recite the entire office, but only vespers and compline, is held to that.

(c) It is licit by the same act to satisfy several precepts, unless it is established that the legislator's mind was otherwise; and this is known from the circumstances and the judgment of prudent men. - Thus he who receives viaticum at Easter time satisfies the twofold precept of communicating at Easter time and in danger of death. But if alms are prescribed for the jubilee, and another alms is owed from a vow, one does not suffice for fulfilling both obligations.

(d) It is licit at the same time to satisfy several precepts, provided that the various works commanded do not exclude one another, or unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was otherwise. Thus someone can hear a prescribed Mass and at the same time recite the hours.

296. Written law, however clearly expressed, often needs interpretation, whether because of the weakness of human understanding, or because of the change of circumstances and customs.

Interpretation is nothing other than an explanation of the will of the legislator. (a) By reason of the author, it can be authentic, if it is given by the superior himself; - judicial, when it is made by a judge sitting for a tribunal; - usual, if it proceeds from the community through observance; doctrinal, whenever it is proposed by private doctors. (b) By reason of its character, it is called declarative, or comprehensive, if it elucidates obscure things and adds or takes away nothing from the law; - suppletive, when it adds what is lacking in the words of the law, especially with attention to the reason of the law, and therefore either extends the law to a case not comprehended in it, or restricts it, by excluding a case contained in the law.

297. 1. The authentic interpreter is the legislator himself, or his successor, and "he to whom the power of interpreting has been granted by the same." Authentic interpretation, exhibited by way of law, has the same force as the law itself; and if it only declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and has retroactive force; if it narrows or extends the law or explains a doubtful one, it is not drawn back and must be promulgated. (Code, can. 17).

Now the Supreme Pontiff can interpret general laws not only through himself, but also through the Congregations, to which he delegates his authority.¹ Yet it must be noted that the Sacred Congregations do not proceed in one manner in explaining laws: (a) for sometimes, by a solemn and general decree, approved by the special authority of the Pontiff, they settle a controversy, and therefore in this case their decrees have the force of law;² (b) sometimes they explain the sense of the law, by authority granted to them by the Holy See, and with approval in common form: then also merely declarative interpretation obtains the force of law;³ (c) but often they respond to proposed doubts for a particular case, without issuing a general decree; decisions of this kind indeed hand down a prudent and very probable norm of acting for similar cases, but not, according to the Code, c. 17, an authentic interpretation to be held: "But one given by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter does not have the force of law, and binds only the persons and affects the things for which it was given."

¹ For interpreting the canons of the Code authentically, a special Commission was instituted by the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XV by the Motu proprio of 15 September 1918.

² Thus the decree of 7 Apr. 1879, declaring that civil marriage, where the law of clandestinity was promulgated, does not produce the impediment of public honesty (De Matrim., n. 363). Then the Pontiff makes the decree his own, and promulgates it by his own authority.

³ Thus the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in moral and disciplinary matters, when they are not extensive, which are promulgated in this way: The report having been made, the Most Holy One approved and confirmed.

298. 2. In order that decrees of the Sacred Congregations may have the force of obliging, they must be authentic, that is, with the conditions and formalities prescribed by the Pontiff having been observed; and moreover they must be certainly established, whether through insertion in an authentic collection, or from the relation of trustworthy writers. - If the interpretation is merely comprehensive, it does not need new promulgation. But when it is extensive or restrictive, it more probably needs new promulgation, because it is deservedly judged a new law.

299. 1. Judicial interpretation is made through ecclesiastical judges, who apply the law to a particular fact. From this it follows that that interpretation has obligatory force as to the parties who subjected the matter to the judges, unless they have appealed to a superior judge at an opportune time; but as to others, it has only doctrinal authority, yet greater than that which is given by private doctors. - Therefore judgments issued by the Sacred Tribunals, even for a particular case, help greatly for rightly understanding the law itself; yet they can be adduced only cautiously and prudently, because not rarely the sentence depends on special circumstances which are found in such a case, but not in another.

300. 2. Usual interpretation is that which is had from the general observance of the community. For since laws are ordered to the good of the community, account must be taken of the commonly received sense; thence was born the axiom: custom is the best interpreter of law.

But custom can contribute in three ways to understanding the law: (a) antecedent custom discloses the mind of the legislator, because he is judged to have accommodated himself to the customs of the community; (b) concomitant custom furnishes the same, because, by exhibiting the common sense of subjects at the time when the law was enacted, it greatly helps for understanding the words used by the superior; (c) subsequent custom can determine the extension of the law; for since, from what is to be said, it can introduce a new obligation and abolish an old one, a fortiori it can define the extension of the obligation: in this last case it can be truly authentic, namely when it enjoys all the qualities required for establishing law.

This is made by private doctors, canonists and moralists; it is indeed very useful, provided that they seek to explain the sense of the law, and not to pervert it. Hence certain rules are handed down, by which they may be helped in a matter of such importance, both as to laws in general and as to certain laws in particular.

301. (A) The words of the law are to be taken in their proper sense, unless from the adjuncts it is manifestly established that the legislator thought otherwise.

(a) The reason for the former is because the legislator ought to have used words apt for manifesting his will to the community. Whence, from the Code, c. 18: "Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in text and context; and if this remains doubtful and obscure, one must have recourse to the parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator."

(b) The reason for the latter is because, since law is an ordination of reason, nothing unjust, absurd, or useless ought to be imputed to the legislator; therefore if the proper sense contained something of this kind, one would have to depart from the letter, in order better to attain the mind of the superior. - Wherefore rule 88 of law, in the Sixth, is as follows: "It is certain that he acts against the law who, embracing the words of the law, strives against the will of the law."

302. (B) General words are to be understood generally; for example, if it is said all, no one, nothing, the whole, etc., nothing ought to be excepted from the law, unless from the context, parallel places, or other adjuncts, the contrary mind of the legislator is established. For canon law made its own this axiom of civil law: Where the law does not distinguish, neither shall we distinguish.¹

¹ Decretal., cap. Quia circa, 22, de privilegiis (lib. V, tit. 33): "Since he excepted nothing and could have excepted."

303. (C) Law is contained in the dispositive part, but not in the reason assigned. For the motives which the legislator adduces are not the law itself, and, although they often help for understanding his mind, nevertheless sometimes they lack a solid foundation; while the dispositive part manifests the will of the legislator.

Thus, when the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) restricts the impediment of consanguinity to the fourth degree, it hands down this reason, which certainly lacks foundation: "Because there are four humors in the body, which consist from the four elements."¹ - Whence the intrinsic end of the law must be inferred not only from the reason assigned, but from the monuments of history, or from other adjuncts; and that saying is to be applied only cautiously: the reason of the law is the soul of the law.

¹ Decretal., cap. Non debet, 8, de Consanguinitate (lib. IV, tit. 14).

304. (A) It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors enlarged.² To understand this rule, these things must be noted: (a) From the Code, c. 19, "laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation." (b) Favors, or favorable things, are understood as graces granted to someone, provided that they are not against common right or against the acquired right of a third party.

² Rule 15 of law, in the Sixth.

Having posited these things, an odious law is restricted, that is, it extends no more widely than the words themselves; thus, if an interdict is brought against the people, the clergy is not subject to the same.³ - If the law is favorable, it is enlarged, or is understood in the whole amplitude which the property of the words permits; thus, in favorable matters, the word people embraces the clergy, the word sons embraces bishops, etc.

³ Decretal., cap. Si sententia, 16, de sentent. excomm. in the Sixth.

Yet there are exceptions, concerning which in the course of the work.

305. (B) In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed.⁴ By obscure things here are understood laws or statutes whose sense, whether in whole or as to part, is so obscure that neither from the text of the law, nor from the context or subject matter, or from custom or other adjuncts, does the true mind of the legislator appear. In this case, it is licit to follow the minimum, that is, to embrace the sense which burdens subjects less. For laws are more inclined to freeing than to obliging, and interpretation is to be made against him who could have spoken clearly.

⁴ Rule 30 of law in the Sixth.

306. (C) A special law derogates from a general law, even one enacted afterward,⁵ that is, when two dispositions are contrary to one another, that which is special prevails, and thus derogates from the general law, but only in that in which it is contrary to the general law.

⁵ Rule 34 of law in the Sixth signifies the same: "The genus is derogated from by the species."

Now a special law is one which establishes something concerning a thing contained under some genus; thus a law concerning testaments for pious causes is special relative to a law concerning testaments in general; a law concerning donations between spouses is held as special relative to a law concerning donations in general, and this is special relative to a law concerning gratuitous contracts.

307. Epikeia (epieikeia, equity) obtains place when it is judged that some particular case, although certainly comprehended in the general words of the law, is nevertheless exempt from the obligation of the law on account of special circumstances.

The legitimacy of epikeia, admitted by Roman law, is thus explained by St. Thomas:¹ "Because human acts, concerning which laws are given, consist in singular contingents, which can be varied in infinite ways, it was not possible for any rule of law to be instituted which would fail in no case; but legislators attend to that which happens in the greater number of cases, enacting the law according to this; yet to observe this law in some cases is against the equality of justice, and against the common good which the law intends... Therefore in these and similar cases it is evil to follow the law posited; but it is good, the words of the law being put aside, to follow that which the reason of justice and the common utility demand."

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 120, a. 1.

308. Yet rules must be observed in epikeia: (a) if someone, on account of special adjuncts, certainly or probably judges that the legislator did not will to comprehend such a case in the law, and moreover cannot easily approach the superior, he can with safe conscience omit the law; but, since no one ought to be judge in his own cause, this judgment is not to be left to the agent himself, but, insofar as it can be done, to a prudent and learned man.

(b) If, when there is only a probable judgment, he can easily approach the superior, he is generally held to have recourse to him; for it is disordered for a subject to put aside the words of the law, on account of some doubt, where the will of the legislator can be certainly established. - I said generally; for it is not necessary to have recourse to the legislator if the special case of which there is question has already been solved in this way by doctors and ecclesiastical judges.

The obligation of law can cease in two ways: 1. by the cessation of the obligation itself, while the law itself nevertheless remains; 2. by the cessation of the law.

309. Sometimes a law, even if it remains in itself, ceases to oblige certain subjects, on account of a special reason. Now there are three principal causes exempting from the obligation of law: ignorance, concerning which we have already spoken (above, n. 89-97), moral impotence, and dispensation, concerning which we must discuss separately.

310. Impotence is nothing other than the incapacity of the subject for fulfilling the law; it is called absolute when the work prescribed by the law can in no way be effected, because, for example, powers, instruments, or the required conditions are lacking; moral impotence is present when the work cannot be accomplished except with extraordinary labor, or with the imminent danger of grave evil or deprivation of a notable good. - It is involuntary when it exists without the free consent of the agent; voluntary, when it has been freely contracted.

(A) Involuntary impotence generally exempts from the obligation of law, not only absolute impotence, but also moral impotence. For from what was said, n. 263, the legislator cannot command something too burdensome; otherwise he would command unto destruction, not unto edification; therefore, if in a particular case observance of the law becomes too difficult, or impossible, the legislator does not intend to urge it.

Sometimes that impossibility arises from the concurrence of a superior law; then the natural law is to be preferred to the positive law, divine law to human law, ecclesiastical law to civil law, negative law to affirmative law, at least commonly. - But sometimes it proceeds from grave inconvenience, and in the course of the work it will be explained how great a difficulty excuses from the law; for this depends on the character of the law itself and many other adjuncts.

It was said that moral impotence generally excuses; for it can happen that the law is of such importance that it must be observed, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever.

311. (B) Even impotence voluntarily contracted generally exempts from the obligation of the law, provided that it is not contracted directly so that the law cannot be fulfilled, and moreover that there is a proportionately grave reason. For here recurs the principle explained above concerning an indirectly willed effect (n. 170-182).

Thus someone can make a journey, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on a feast day, provided that he has a sufficient reason for traveling; but it is not licit on a fast day to go hunting, for the sole cause of recreation, with foresight that in this way impotence for fasting is induced. - But for judging what reason suffices, these things must be kept before the mind: the graver the law is, and the rarer the return of its obligation, and the more proximately it urges, the greater the reason required; likewise a much graver cause is required if someone frequently or continually renders himself impotent for fulfilling the law than if he does so once or rarely.

312. (A) Notion. (a) Dispensation in general is prudent administration; but since it pertains to prudent administration to use moderation, and to remit certain things from benignity, the word dispensation signifies a certain lenity and condescension in the application of laws. - It is usually defined as the relaxation of law made by the superior in some particular case in which the law would otherwise oblige. Therefore it differs from epikeia, which judges that some case is not comprehended in the law; and from abrogation or derogation of law, by which a law is taken away in whole or in part for the whole community.

(b) St. Thomas thus declares the reason why it is sometimes expedient to grant a dispensation:¹ it happens sometimes that some precept, which is for the advantage of the multitude, is not suitable to this person or in this case, because through this something better would be impeded, or even some evil would be induced: therefore it is expedient that in this particular case the law be relaxed; but because it would be dangerous to commit this to the judgment of anyone whatever, except because of evident and sudden danger, it is fitting that he who has the power of ruling the multitude have the power of dispensing in human law, which rests on his authority.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4.

313. (B) Concerning the author of dispensation. He who has the authority of making law can dispense by ordinary power, - but he who is deputed to this by the legislator himself can dispense by delegated power.

(a) By ordinary or native right, both the legislator and his superior as to this, that is, as to dispensation, can dispense. Concerning the legislator himself and his successor there is no difficulty, since the law, in its whole extent, depends on their will. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws, even those enacted by an ecumenical council; but a bishop can dispense in the statutes of his own diocese, even those enacted in synod.

The same must be said concerning the superior as to this; for he, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, has the whole power of inferiors; thus the Pope can dispense in episcopal laws. But a metropolitan cannot dispense in the laws of a suffragan bishop, because he is not his superior as to all things, nor as to this, namely as to the granting of dispensations.

314. (b) By delegated, or borrowed, right, an inferior can sometimes dispense in the law of a superior, namely whenever he has received this power from the superior; by quasi-ordinary right, when this power is permanently annexed to some office; by merely delegated right, when it has been transiently granted by the superior.

Thus Ordinaries, by power delegated from common law, dispense in irregularities arising from occult delict, except the one which arises from voluntary homicide and except others brought to the contentious forum;¹ likewise they dispense in abstinence and fasting with particular persons, indeed sometimes with the whole community;² they dispense in certain impediments of marriage, in a case of urgent necessity.³

¹ Code, c. 990, § 1.

² Code, c. 1245.

³ What bishops can do as to impediments of marriage we explained in the Treatise on Marriage, n. 1046 sq.

Thus also pastors, who by proper right cannot grant any dispensation, by delegated common law, in particular cases, dispense in fasting and abstinence and also in servile works prohibited on a feast day; thus also confessors.⁴

⁴ Code, cc. 1044-1045.

The Roman Congregations likewise have received the power of dispensing in pontifical laws, according to predefined limits.

315. (C) Concerning the subject of dispensation. Since dispensation is an act of jurisdiction, only subjects can be dispensed by a superior. As to the Supreme Pontiff, there is no difficulty: for all the baptized are his subjects.

But as to bishops, and others whose jurisdiction is exercised within the limits of some territory, these things are to be noted: (a) they can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers who, by reason of domicile or quasi-domicile, are subject to them; indeed with vagi, who, since they are subject to the laws of the place in which they are staying, are judged subjects as to the means necessary or useful for salvation, and therefore as to dispensation in the common laws of the Church; more probably also with pilgrims, who in a case of necessity cannot have recourse to their own bishop, and this indeed from the presumed consent of the bishop proper to the pilgrims: for otherwise pilgrims would be deprived of a means very useful for salvation.

(b) Since dispensation is an act of voluntary jurisdiction, and this can be exercised outside the territory, a bishop, pastor, or delegates can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers, even those dwelling outside the territory, provided nevertheless that these remain subjects, that is, retain domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the one dispensing.

(c) He who possesses the faculty of dispensing can dispense with himself, unless something else is established from the nature of things or from law, as is clear from the Code, c. 201, § 3: for voluntary jurisdiction, such as the power of dispensing, of itself does not require a distinction of persons, and moreover no law requires it in the present matter. - Hence he who has ordinary or delegated general power of dispensing in laws, or in vows and oaths, can use this with regard to himself.¹

¹ Suarez, liber VI, caput 12, n. 8-12; Sanchez, de Matrimonio, liber VIII, disp. 3; Schmalzgr., in titulo de Constit., n. 65; St. Alphonsus, liber I, n. 183; liber III, n. 249, 256.

316. (D) Concerning the conditions required for dispensation. For validity, there are required:

(a) In the one granting, a just and reasonable cause, if he dispenses in the law of a Superior; but none if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior; in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation can be granted validly.²

² Code, c. 84: "§ 1. Let there be no dispensation from an ecclesiastical law without a just and reasonable cause, with account taken of the gravity of the law from which dispensation is made; otherwise a dispensation given by an inferior is illicit and invalid. - § 2. A dispensation in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause is licitly sought, and can be licitly and validly granted."

(b) In the petitioner, there is required the allegation of a thing necessarily to be declared, unless the rescript has been granted motu proprio (Code, c. 45); the truth of at least one final or motive cause at the time when the rescript was given or at the time of execution; and recourse to the competent Superior, especially when a dispensation has already been denied (cf. cc. 43-44).

317. For the liceity of dispensation, there is required a cause at least probably sufficient, under light obligation if the legislator dispenses, under grave obligation in a grave matter if a delegate dispenses.

As to other things, cf. in the Code the titles concerning rescripts and concerning dispensations.

The law itself can cease especially in a threefold way: 1. through abrogation and derogation; 2. through cessation of the end; 3. through contrary custom; we treat here of the first two, since there must be discussion of custom in the following paragraph.

318. 1. Concerning abrogation and derogation. Abrogation is the total abolition of a law made by the legislator himself; derogation is the partial abolition of a law.

(A) Since the existence of a law depends on the will of the legislator, he himself, or his successor or superior, can take it away totally or partially.

But for this to be done licitly, a reasonable cause is required, namely nothing other than the good of the community itself. And this, according to St. Thomas,¹ can happen in two ways: (a) indeed it is consonant with human reason that it pass from the imperfect to the perfect; wherefore the first institutors of laws, not being able to consider and foresee all things, established certain imperfect things and things deficient in many respects, which they themselves or their successors wisely changed; (b) moreover what, in ancient times, was useful to society can, circumstances having changed, become useless or harmful.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 1.

(B) But change can be made in two ways: (a) by expressly revoking the old law; therefore in practice, as soon as the will of the legislator to abrogate the law is certainly known, subjects are no longer held to observe it;² (b) by enacting a new law contrary to the pre-existing law: then the later law "obrogates the former, if it expressly says this, or is directly contrary to it, or orders the whole matter of the former law anew from the beginning." (Code, c. 22).

² Suarez, l. VI, c. 27, n. 14-18.

319. 2. Concerning cessation of the end. Since law is an ordination of reason, if the reason which moved the superior to enact the law totally ceases, by that very fact the law itself ceases. But, to avoid the dangers which easily occur from private judgment in a matter of this kind, certain conditions are required:

(a) That the end of the law cease totally: for if one of the motives subsists, the law does not become useless, and therefore does not cease; thus if a bishop has commanded prayers for attaining peace with enemies and the cessation of internal sedition, the law does not cease when peace has been obtained, if sedition still rages; (b) that the end cease adequately, that is, for all the articles of the law: for if it ceases only for one or another, the obligation of those articles is indeed taken away, but not of the others which remain useful, lest, namely, the useful be vitiated by the useless;¹ (c) that it cease generally and permanently, that is, for the whole community and for a very long time: for if it ceases for one or another private person, there is no place for abrogation, but for dispensation or epikeia; if for a short time, suspension of the law suffices.

¹ Rule of law 37, in the Sixth.

Thus far concerning written law; but since law is sometimes introduced or taken away through custom, we must treat of this, which is often called unwritten law.

² Reiffenstuel, Pirhing, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, and other canonists in tit. de Consuetudine; Suarez, lib. VII; Billuart, diss. V, art. 2; St. Alphonsus, n. 107-109; Ball. P., n. 257-286; Bouquillon, n. 209-213; Noldin, n. 175-180; Kreutzwald, De canonica juris consuetudinarii praescriptione, Friburgi Brisg., 1873.

320. 1. Notion. Custom, or rather customary right, is right induced by the customs of the community, with some consent of the superior.

It is explained: (a) In democratic government, where the people enjoy lawmaking power, the consent of a superior is not required for custom, or rather, since the people itself is the superior, its consent is contained implicitly in the customs themselves. But, in the Church of Christ, in which the people does not enjoy legislative power, custom has the force of law uniquely from the consent of the competent Superior (Code, c. 25). - (b) Yet customary right, although ultimately it obtains its force from the will of the superior, is not originally induced by him, but by the community itself, which frequently and universally manifests its mind by such or such a mode of acting.

Custom is distinguished from prescription: for this is the mode by which private citizens or private communities acquire some right, or free themselves from some obligation; while custom is law induced for the whole society.³

³ We treat of prescription in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 243-263.

321. 2. Division. (a) By reason of extension, custom is general or particular, according as it has been received in the whole Church or in some part of the Church.

(b) By reason of relation to law, one is according to law, when by use it confirms or interprets an existing law; another is beside law, which induces a new obligation; another is against law, which derogates from written law in whole or in part.

322. 3. Reason of customary right. (a) That a new law can be induced by custom is easily understood. For laws attain their end, namely the public good, more efficaciously the more they are accommodated to the customs of the community: for then they are observed more easily and sweetly; but nothing is certainly more accommodated to these customs than a custom induced by the community itself and strengthened through a long time; therefore it was altogether fitting that the legislator should confirm by his authority customs apt for promoting the good of society. Thus certain impediments were introduced, such as disparity of cult, and also certain fasts. - The same can be said concerning a custom which interprets law.

(b) A custom which abrogates an existing law must likewise be said to be consonant with reason. For, that a law may promote the good of society, it ought not to be too arduous nor inaccessible to human infirmity; now if a law is opposed to a long-standing custom, which moreover we suppose to be reasonable, from this it is deservedly inferred that that law is too arduous and therefore to be abolished. - And this indeed appears more evident for the Church than for any other society: for the Church is perpetual and universal; but a law which is accommodated to one age, or to some region, often, with the passing of ages or with changed adjuncts, loses its usefulness, indeed sometimes has several inconveniences, especially in such or such a region. Therefore it was altogether fitting that antiquated laws could be abolished by contrary custom.

They arise from a fivefold source: on the part of the legislator, - of the community, - of the matter, - of the acts by which it is induced, and of time.

323. 1. On the part of the legislator consent is required, as is clear from what has already been said, n. 320. - (a) Yet consent which is called personal, by which namely the legislator, knowing some individual custom existing somewhere, assents to it either expressly or tacitly, namely when he does not protest though he easily can, is not strictly required, but plainly suffices. (b) Consequently legal consent suffices, which is given by way of general law, namely when the legislator, in the law itself, declares that any customs whatever will be valid, provided that they are clothed with the designated conditions; for thus he clearly expresses his consent, although in a general mode. Now that the matter is thus in canon law is clear from the celebrated declaration of Gregory IX: "For although the authority of long-standing custom is not worthless, nevertheless it is not going to prevail to such a degree that it ought to generate prejudice even to positive right, unless it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed."¹

¹ Decretal., c. Cum tanto, 11, De consuetud., lib. I, tit. 4.

324. 2. On the part of the community, two things are necessary: (a) that custom be induced by a community upon which law can be imposed; for if it is not capable of receiving law, neither is it capable of inducing law. Now the communities which, from canon law, enjoy that capacity are: the universal Church, a province, diocese, city, town, and more probably a parish, - and also a religious order, a religious community, a chapter, seminary, and confraternity: for upon all these a law can be imposed by the Pontiff or bishop; - but a family or a private man cannot induce a custom.

(b) That the greater part of the community elicit acts inductive of custom; indeed the lesser part does not suffice, since this cannot command the greater; nor is universality required, since even in a legislative assembly universality of votes is not necessary; therefore the greater part suffices, which morally represents the community.

325. 3. On the part of the matter, or object, it is required that it be reasonable, at least negatively; and therefore that it not be contrary to natural or divine right of the new law, since, from what was said above, n. 227 and 256, each is immutable; nor expressly or equivalently reprobated by canon law itself; nor furnish an occasion of sin or be pernicious to society. But the judgment concerning the reasonableness of custom pertains to prudent men, doctors, confessors, honorable men, - or to a judge, if the matter is brought to the external forum. - But it is not required that it begin without sin; not rarely the first who prescribe against the law sin; but custom, even begun in bad faith, is valid, provided that it is negatively reasonable in the sense explained.

326. 4. On the part of the acts by which custom is induced. These ought to be: (a) free, that is, proceeding neither from ignorance or error, nor from force or fear, but from free will with previous knowledge; otherwise, they are not truly human acts, and therefore cannot induce or take away an obligation; (b) frequent and continuous, or uninterrupted: for if they occur very rarely, or are interrupted either on the part of the people, or on the part of the Prince punishing transgressors, they can no longer be said to constitute the customs of the community, which suppose a certain frequency and continuity; (c) with at least interpretative intention of inducing right or derogating from right: for acts morally do not operate beyond the intention of the agent; and therefore those who act from mere devotion (for example, in daily hearing of Mass) do not impose a new obligation on themselves, nor do they prescribe against the law, if from want of consideration they do not observe its prescriptions. - A custom prevails prescriptively, even if the law against which prescription is made is not explicitly known, provided that there is had an interpretative intention of abolishing the law; thus a diocese which prescribes against the law of fasting in general, and does not observe a new fast unknown to it, has sufficiently the intention of abolishing that fast.

327. 5. On the part of time. According to the Code, can. 27, 28, custom against the law is not valid unless it has been "legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years; but against an ecclesiastical law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs, only reasonable centenary or immemorial custom can prescribe. A custom which is expressly reprobated in law is not reasonable. A custom beside the law, which has knowingly been observed by the community with the mind of obliging itself, induces law, if likewise it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years."

328. Corollary. From this it can be inferred how certain clauses, added to pontifical laws for reprobating customs, can be understood.

(a) A universal law indeed takes away a universal custom contrary to itself, but per se does not take away particular customs which the legislator can be ignorant of.

(b) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever" indeed takes away every ordinary custom, but not an immemorial one, namely that of whose beginning no memory exists.

(c) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever, even immemorial" indeed takes away all previous universal customs, but does not prevent a new custom contrary to the law from being formed.

(d) The clause "any custom in the future being excluded" renders impossible an ordinary custom contrary to the new law, but in no way renders impossible a contrary centenary or immemorial custom, as is clear from the Code, c. 27, § 1. Hence against disciplinary Tridentine laws, centenary or immemorial custom is admitted.

See the rest concerning custom and ecclesiastical law apud the Canonists.

329. Ecclesiastical legislation, which formerly was contained in the Corpus juris canonici¹ and in many other documents of the subsequent age, today is found in the Code of Canon Law, arranged by order of Pontiff Pius X, and promulgated by the authority of Pope Benedict XV, which had the force of obliging in its entirety from the day of Pentecost 1918, the 19th day of May.

¹ The best critical edition of the Corpus juris canonici was published by Richter, which afterward Friedberg polished and furnished with notes, Leipzig, 1879-1881: there you will find learned Prolegomena concerning the character and authority of the parts of which the Corpus juris consists. - The Corpus juris canonici consisted of six parts: 1. the Decretum of Gratian; 2. the Decretals of Gregory IX; 3. the Sixth of Decretals of Boniface VIII; 4. the Clementines of Clement V; 5. the Extravagants of John XXII; 6. the Common Extravagants.

(A) The scope of the Code was "to gather into one, arranged in a clear order, all the laws of the Church published up to these times; removing from it those which had already been abrogated or had become obsolete; adapting others, where there was need, more suitably to our present customs; and also establishing others anew, whenever it seemed necessary or expedient."

(a) It regards the Latin Church alone, and does not oblige the Oriental Church, unless there is question of those things which, from the very nature of the thing, also affect the Oriental Church (Can. 1).

(b) For the most part it decrees nothing concerning rites and ceremonies; wherefore all liturgical laws retain their force, unless some one of them is expressly corrected in the Code (c. 2).

(c) By the Code there are in no way abrogated conventions entered into by the Apostolic See with various Nations, nor privileges and indults granted to persons, whether physical or moral, unless they are expressly revoked by the canons of the Code.

(B) As to laws previously enacted, the Code decrees these things (c. 6):

"1. Any laws whatever, whether universal or particular, opposed to the prescriptions of this Code, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws something else is expressly provided;

2. Canons which refer the old right in its entirety are to be judged from the authority of the old right, and therefore from the interpretations received among approved authors;

3. Canons which agree only in part with the old right, insofar as they agree, are to be judged from the ancient right; insofar as they differ, they are to be judged from their own meaning;

4. In doubt whether some prescription of the canons differs from the old right, one must not depart from the old right;

5. As to penalties of which no mention is made in the Code, whether they are spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindictive, latae or ferendae sententiae, let them be held as abrogated;

6. If any of the other disciplinary laws which have flourished up to now is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Code, it must be said to have lost all force, unless it is found in approved liturgical books, or the law is of divine right, whether positive or natural."

(C) Division of the Code. At the very threshold three things are found: (a) the Preface in which Cardinal Gasparri learnedly sets forth the history of collections of Canon Law, and clearly declares the reason and method of the Code; (b) the Constitution of Benedict XV promulgating the Code and decreeing that it has the force of law for the universal Church; (c) the Profession of Catholic faith to be emitted in certain circumstances.

The Code itself embraces 2414 canons distributed in five books.

In the first book are proposed the General Norms.

Book II treats of persons, namely clerics, religious, laymen.

Book III treats of things, namely concerning the sacraments in general and in particular; concerning sacred places and times, concerning divine worship, concerning the ecclesiastical magisterium, concerning benefices and other non-collegial institutes, concerning the temporal goods of the Church.

Book IV treats of processes, namely concerning trials, concerning causes of beatification and canonization, concerning the manner of proceeding in certain business or penal sanctions.

Book V treats of delicts and penalties.

There follow the Code eight documents, among which especially should be noted the Constitution of Pius X, Vacante Sede Apostolica, 25 Dec. 1904, where all those things are prescribed which are to be done while the Apostolic See is vacant.

332. Just as ecclesiastical society can make laws for the spiritual good of the faithful, so likewise civil authority can establish laws for directly promoting the temporal happiness of citizens, and mediately their spiritual good; for even temporal happiness itself is reduced to a higher end, namely the practice of virtues, which ultimately conducts to eternal beatitude. Therefore civil law itself, provided that it is an ordination of reason, is truly a norm of human acts, since it ultimately tends to perfecting citizens and leading them to their end.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. III, V, VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 50-60; Bouquillon, n. 214-252; Van Gestel, De Justitia et lege civili, Groningae, 1896; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 11-12, 16-17; Waffelaert, Etude de Théol. Morale sur l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles, Tournai, 1884.

Here, from what was said in Philosophy, we presuppose that man is by nature a social being, and therefore that civil society is from nature, or, in other words, from God the author of nature, and does not arise from a mere social pact. But in every society there ought to be some authority which presides over the commonwealth; and this authority, in whatever way it is designated, whether by the vote of the nobles or of the people, or by received right of birth, proceeds from God, according to that saying of the Apostle:² "For there is no power except from God; but those things which are, are ordained by God... For he is God's minister to you for good." In fact, as Leo XIII argues, society can neither exist nor be understood in which there is not some superior who moderates wills and impels them rightly to the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there be those who command the multitude. By force of this authority, those who preside over society, whether Princes or legislative Assemblies, can, as ministers of God, establish laws which oblige in conscience. Wherefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the conditions required for civil law; 2. concerning its moral obligation.

² Rom., XIII, 1, 4. Cf. Leo XIII, Encyc. Diuturnum, 29 Jun. 1881, and Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885.

In order that civil law may be just, and therefore have the force of obliging, certain conditions are required on the part of the author, promulgation, and object.

333. 1. The faculty of making laws, as to temporal matters, resides in legitimate superiors, who are different according to the different constitution of society. Under a regime of absolute monarchy, this authority is exercised by the king, or supreme prince. Where aristocracy, or the power of the nobles, prevails, laws are established by the Assembly of nobles. Under a democratic regime, power resides in the assembly elected by the community. In most modern societies, laws are proposed by ministers of the State, or members of the legislative Assembly, and, after public discussion before the same Assembly, are accepted by vote and sanctioned by the supreme power.

Therefore it is necessary that all those upon whom the care of establishing laws lies act equitably and honorably, and intend the public good, not that of a few. Therefore they sin gravely who accept money for casting a vote for a law which is foreseen to be harmful to the public good.

334. 2. A usurper, who obtains public power, of himself indeed does not have the right of making laws; but as soon as he enjoys quiet possession of the government, with the people at least tacitly acquiescing, it is necessary, on account of the public good, to obey his precepts and laws, otherwise just, until his authority is shaken off by legitimate means. Leo XIII clearly taught this: "But that in matters not unjust those who preside are to be obeyed, for the sake of preserving order, in which the foundation of public safety is found, no one doubts: yet it does not follow that, by obeying, whatever is unjust either in the Constitution or in the administration of the state is approved."¹

¹ Leo XIII, Epist. 22 Oct. 1880, to the Archbishop of Paris.

335. 1. Civil law must be promulgated and made public right, but the mode of doing each is diverse among various nations. In many modern States, promulgation is made by an act of the supreme authority, which holds the law as ratified, and commands that it be published, generally in the official journal, and committed to execution. For the most part it does not begin to oblige until one or another day, or several days, after promulgation.¹

¹ Thus, in France, from the decree of 5 Nov. 1870 still in force, "a new law is executable in each arrondissement one full day after the number of the Journal officiel which contains it has arrived at the chief town of that arrondissement" (Planiol, Tr. élém. de Droit Civil, Paris, 1901, t. I, n. 170). - In Belgium: "Laws, after their promulgation, are inserted into the Moniteur, the French text and Flemish text facing one another. They are obligatory in the whole kingdom on the tenth day after their publication, unless the law has fixed another delay" (De Le Court, Codes Belges, Complément, p. 300). - In Italy: "The law does not become obligatory on the very day of its publication, but on the fifteenth day afterward (that is, the dies a quo excluded, and the dies ad quem included), unless something else has been provided in the law itself" (E. Gianturco, Istituzioni di Diritto civile, Firenze, 1901, p. 13). - As to the United States of America, general laws issued by Congress oblige at once once they have been promulgated, unless otherwise established in the law itself; thus apud A. Carlier, La République américaine, Paris, Guillaumin, 1890, t. 3, p. 257; cf. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, New York, 1896, t. I, ch. 16 and 40.

336. 2. For the force of civil law the acceptance of the people is not per se necessary; for, even under a democratic regime, legislative power can be exercised without recourse to the people: for once the delegation of authority has been legitimately made, the legislative Assembly or other superiors are restricted in the exercise of their power only by a superior authority. But, in certain regions,² provision has been made that certain laws of greater importance would not oblige except after the acceptance of the people: then indeed they must be referred to the people. And this often favors good government, provided that citizens have care for the public good, and freely give their votes: for thus laws are better accommodated to the customs of the people and are observed more willingly.³

² Thus in Switzerland, and in certain American States, concerning which see Bryce, op. cit., ch. 39.

³ Hence, even in the Middle Ages, many kings, especially Charlemagne, did not hesitate to seek the consent and acceptance of the people as to new laws, as G. Kurth reports, Les origines de la civilisation moderne, Paris, 1903, t. II, ch. 13, p. 225-229.

337. 1. Civil law in a general way can regulate all those things which regard the temporal good of citizens, and consequently: (a) goods of fortune, namely their legitimate acquisition and transmission, whatever favors agriculture, industry, commerce, or the various human arts; (b) goods of the body, by taking care that by apt means the number of citizens be preserved and increased, that nothing be done contrary to public health, that orphanages, hospitals, and other charitable institutes be erected for assisting those who are in necessity; (c) goods of the intellect, by providing for the right instruction of youth in letters, sciences, and human arts, which contribute greatly to the good of private persons and of society; (d) goods of the will, by promoting moral virtues, restraining and punishing vices; (e) goods properly social, namely the very constitution of society, the form of government, the administration of public affairs, relations between the various orders of citizens, and also the defense of the rights of the whole community against the unjust aggression of foreign nations.

338. 2. In matters which are merely temporal, the State can establish laws independently from the Church, but not independently from God.

Hence, (a) it can sanction the natural law by positive prescriptions, for example by compelling parents to nourish minor children, and children to provide sustenance to parents; (b) it can more specifically determine prescriptions of the natural law which are too vague and general, for example by establishing conditions for the validity of contracts, for the succession of children in the goods of parents; (c) it can complete the natural law by additions, by prescribing certain things which of themselves are indifferent, but, by reason of circumstances, can promote the common good, for example in relation to roads or streets, to fishing or hunting, etc. - But in no way can it enact statutes against the natural law; for since law is an ordination of reason, human law has so much of the power of law insofar as it is consonant with right reason: "but if in something it disagrees from the natural law, it will no longer be law, but a corruption of law."¹

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2.

339. 3. But in those things which are mixed, that is, which are referred to a spiritual and temporal end at the same time, the State cannot make laws while prescinding from ecclesiastical society, but concerning these it can make agreement with the Church, as often happens in Concordats. For since each power can prescribe something concerning these matters, conflict will easily arise unless the matter is defined equitably and peacefully by common counsel. Thus, for example, in scholastic legislation, provision must be made for sciences and arts in such a way that nothing is attempted against faith or good morals; in the matrimonial contract, concerning civil effects, concerning the mutual rights and duties of spouses, concerning the legitimacy of children, things must be established in such a way that no detriment is brought to the unity and sanctity of the matrimonial bond.¹

¹ We discuss these things more explicitly in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 6-11, and in the dogmatic part of the Treatise on Marriage, n. 32-39.

340. 4. In merely spiritual matters, the State can establish nothing by its own authority; but indirectly and ministerially it can, and, with the due conditions posited, must help the Church in defending the true religion, as we explained in the Treatise on the Church, n. 233-238.

341. State of the question. 1. Civil law obliges only subjects; but subjects can be either citizens or foreigners dwelling in the territory. Citizens, who dwell in their own territory, per se are subjected to all laws suited to their condition;² if they live outside their homeland, they remain subject to certain laws, especially those which regard personal status and personal duties, but not all, specifically those which are held as territorial. - Foreigners, when they dwell in the territory of some society, are subject to some laws, chiefly those which regard public order and tranquility, or goods possessed there. - As to particular matters, the various Codes must be consulted.

² For certain citizens can be immune from some laws. - The immunity of clerics is treated in canon law.

2. But here we especially inquire concerning the moral obligation of civil law, whether 1. a law commanding and prohibiting, 2. an irritant law, 3. a merely penal law, obliges in conscience.

342. Thesis. A just civil law, commanding or prohibiting something, truly obliges in conscience, and indeed per se under grave obligation.

(A) For the Scriptures declare this many times: (a) Since every power is from God, "he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; and those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience";¹ from which it follows that civil laws at least sometimes oblige in conscience, and indeed under penalty of damnation. (b) The reason assigned shows the same: for princes and other superiors in the civil order are to be obeyed because they are ministers of God, sent by Him, and therefore in some way participate in His authority: "For he is God's minister to you for good... For he is God's minister, an avenger unto wrath against him who does evil";² - "Be subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good."³ Consequently, just as God can oblige in conscience, and indeed under grave obligation, so likewise can those who hold His place on earth.

¹ Rom., XIII, 1-5.

² Rom., XIII, 4.

³ 1 Peter, II, 13-14.

(B) The reason is taken from the very concept of civil law handed down above, n. 332. For since civil law, although immediately ordered to the temporal good, is mediately and ultimately referred to the eternal good, namely to the practice of virtues which lead to God, it can truly be said that by the observation of civil law citizens are directed to the ultimate end, and by violation of it are turned away from the ultimate end; but aversion from the ultimate end is sin, and indeed grave sin.

343. Yet it was said: per se it obliges under grave obligation. For, that sin be grave, two things are required: gravity of matter, which must be judged not only from the thing commanded itself, but from the intended end (above, n. 274-275); and the intention of the legislator, which is discerned from various adjuncts, but especially from the sense of the people and the interpretation of prudent men. But here it must be noted that from a grave penalty the gravity of the transgression is not always inferred; for sometimes a grave penalty is inflicted for a light delict (for example, in the case of hunting and fishing), by which citizens may be more efficaciously deterred from violation of the law. - Nor are those to be heard who contend that modern legislators do not intend to impose a moral obligation upon citizens, because they themselves reject the existence of God and every foundation of morality; for, even if some of these defend those wicked errors, nevertheless they will to promote the observance of their laws in the best way they can, and therefore implicitly to bind subjects by a moral bond, since this is the most efficacious means.

344. Corollary. Generally laws of this kind oblige in conscience before the sentence of the judge, even in the matter of justice. For understanding this, it must be known that in this matter laws can be made in two ways: laws determinative of property, and laws irritating certain acts translative of property. Here we treat of the former; of the latter below, n. 345.

Laws determinative of property are those which more explicitly and distinctly define the rights of citizens as to ownership. For the right of nature not rarely remains obscure and indeterminate in this matter; and therefore it pertains to the civil power to declare the natural law more accurately concerning this matter, so that disputes and lawsuits may be forestalled; thus as to things found or lost, as to the prescription of goods, as to the rights of writers over the offspring of their own mind, etc., civil authority has accurately defined the more or less uncertain right of nature. Now laws of this kind oblige in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge, according to the common opinion. The arguments adduced in the thesis prove this; for here there is question of a temporal matter, insufficiently determined by the right of nature, concerning which therefore the State, as minister of God, can make laws immediately obliging in conscience.

345. To civil authority belongs the power of irritating certain acts of subjects, which otherwise by the right of nature are valid. Theologians commonly admit this against a few; and deservedly. For supreme and independent authority, such as civil society is, can establish, in its own forum, whatever is required for promoting the public good; but the public good sometimes demands that certain acts and contracts, although valid by the right of nature, be held as null; such are, for example, certain contracts entered into by minors, or from fear, or without legal forms. - Moreover sometimes the public good requires that those contracts be held invalid not only in the external forum and after the sentence of the judge, but also in the forum of conscience and before the declaratory sentence: for otherwise lawsuits would be multiplied, and the poor, who cannot pay the expenses of lawsuits, would easily be oppressed by the more powerful. Therefore civil law can, for grave reasons, irritate certain acts in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge.

Yet, since we are dealing with odious matter, a law wholly irritating is not easily presumed, but must be certainly proved; therefore if it can reasonably be understood of mere prohibition, the more benign interpretation is to be followed; likewise, if in a particular case it is doubted whether the legislator willed to irritate some act before the intervention of the judge, and moreover the public good does not evidently require the rescission of the act, the sentence of the judge can be awaited.¹

¹ We explain this more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 617-619.

The reason for the distinction between this case and the other (n. 344) is because a law determinative of property is favorable matter, while a law irritating an act valid of itself is something odious.

346. 1. All concede that by civil law penalties can be decreed against delinquents; for otherwise laws would be violated by many with impunity; wherefore those who are not inclined to good by persuasion must be turned away from evil by penalties. - Yet penalty supposes fault, and ought to be proportioned to it: otherwise it would not be equitable. - Yet, in the external forum, fault which is called juridical is admitted, namely omission of that diligence which is required by law, whatever may be the case concerning internal guilt. Whence it can happen that someone is held guilty juridically, even if before God he is innocent, because of inadvertence: in which case civil law, imposing the burden of repairing damage, does not oblige except after the sentence of the judge.² - Moreover a penal law indeed obliges ministers of justice to prosecute the guilty, and judges to inflict penalties on those who have been juridically proved guilty; but it does not oblige the guilty themselves to undergo the penalty before the sentence of the judge: for this would be too odious.

² We declare the matter in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 474-476.

347. 2. But here it is asked whether there are merely penal laws, that is, laws which obligate disjunctively either to placing or omitting the act, or to undergoing the penalty inflicted upon violators of the law. It is commonly answered affirmatively; for, when there is question of things useful to the common good, but not necessary, some coercion is very expedient, and moreover it seems less opportune to command or prohibit the thing under penalty of sin; wherefore the legislator sometimes sanctions his law by a fine or another penalty, without nevertheless intending that violators incur some guilt of fault; thus many think that the law which prohibits hunting without a special license (permis de chasse) is merely penal. - Yet the general principle is that civil laws are not merely penal, but generally oblige in conscience, unless the contrary is proved. Whence, in particular cases, for judging whether a law is merely penal or not, attention must be given to the will of the legislator, insofar as it can be discerned from his declaration, from the nature of the law and penalty, and from other adjuncts. - We treat specifically of the law of taxes in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 590-598.

348. Corollary. From what has been said it follows that those err who think little of equitable civil laws, and, without grave reason, violate them: for thus they contradict Christ, who said:¹ "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God"; they contradict the Apostles, who command obedience to superiors even difficult ones; they contradict the earliest Fathers and Christians, who did not hesitate to submit themselves to the just laws of the empire. And indeed Catholics ought to furnish example in all things, even in the observance of civil laws.

¹ Matt., XXII, 21.

But if some civil law is unjust (which is not presumed, but must be proved by valid arguments), it does not oblige in conscience, because it is not an ordination of reason, and therefore is not law. Indeed, in a democratic society, in which citizens in some way participate in legislative power, the duty lies upon honorable men of striving with all their powers to procure the abrogation of an unjust law. For this those associations of citizens are especially useful which, taking care for public matters, carefully see to it that those who favor unjust laws are not elected to the legislative Assembly.

"Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord."² All indeed desire beatitude, but very many do not know how one comes to it. The Psalmist shows them the way: the undefiled or perfect, and therefore blessed, are those who faithfully keep the law of the Lord: for by fulfilling the law, whether inscribed in hearts, or divinely revealed, or promulgated by legitimate authority, they tend with unoffending foot toward God Himself, the fountain of perfection and beatitude.

² Ps. 118 (Hebr. 119), 1; the entire psalm embraces praises of the divine law; cf. St. Augustine, Commentary on this psalm.