On Sins and Vices

Division: 1. The concept of sin in general. 2. Concerning mortal sin. 3. Concerning venial sin. 4. Concerning the distinction of sins.

We shall set forth: 1. the biblical notion of sin; 2. the theological notion; 3. the causes which induce to sin.

429. Etymological notion.¹ Sin is designated by various names among the sacred authors.

¹ Schleusner, Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus, Leipzig, 1821; Grimm, Lexicon graeco-lat. in libr. N. Test., Leipzig, 1903; Trench, Synonyms of the N. Testament, 9th ed., London, 1880, rendered in French by C. de Faye, Synonymes du N. Testament, Paris, 1869.

In Hebrew: hatta't, that is, aberration from the mark or end, because the sinner recedes from his end; awon, that is, iniquity, depravity; pesha, or rebellion, defection; sarah, secession, because the sinner withdraws from the law.

But in Greek it is called: ἁμαρτία, that is, aberration from the mark;¹ or ἁμάρτημα, which has the same sound, with this distinction, however, that the former word signifies sin whether habitual or actual, while the latter always designates a sinful act; ἀνομία or παρανομία, that is, violation and contempt of the law² (in the Vulgate it is rendered iniquity); παράβασις, or transgression of the law;³ παρακοή, that is, the will not to hear the voice of God, disobedience;⁴ παράπτωμα, that is, fall, because by sin we slip and lie prostrate;⁵ ἀγνόημα, ἄγνοια, or ignorance, because every sin imports a certain error, although not altogether excusable;⁶ ἥττημα, that is, diminution, defeat, because sinners, overcome by temptations, experience defeat;⁷ πλημμέλεια, or that which is beyond measure and harmony, inharmonious.⁸

¹ Rom. 5:12; 7:7, etc.

² 1 John 3:4; 2 Pet. 2:16.

³ Gal. 3:19; 1 Tim. 2:14, etc.

⁴ Rom. 5:19; Heb. 2:2.

⁵ Mark 11:25-26.

⁶ Heb. 9:7; Acts 17:30.

⁷ Rom. 11:12.

⁸ Lev. 5:15; Num. 18:9, etc.

430. 2. Historical notion. Sin is exhibited in a general way by the sacred authors as something negative, or as something contrary to justice and rectitude, yet in a diverse way.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) In Genesis, sin is exhibited as disobedience, or the transgression of a divine precept,⁹ which not only is reproved by God, but is strictly punished;¹⁰ hence Cain, after killing his brother, suffers remorse of conscience and the divine curse;¹¹ and, when iniquities were multiplied upon the earth, men are punished by the flood,¹² because especially "every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times."

⁹ Gen. 2:16; 3:11.

¹⁰ Gen. 3:14-19.

¹¹ Gen. 4:9-16.

¹² Gen. 6:5-7 and 11-13.

(b) After the election of the Israelite people and the promulgation of the Mosaic law, positive precepts are multiplied, and therefore various species of sins against various laws; but, since God is the special legislator and king of Israel, transgressions of the law assume a special malice of rebellion. Among graver sins, idolatry is principal, by which false gods are preferred to the one and perfect Deity: wherefore whoever indulges idolatry is severely chastised.¹³ Among lesser sins are numbered legal impurities, which, although they by no means suppose internal fault, had to be expiated by various ablutions and sacrifices.¹⁴ - Lighter offenses were destroyed by expiatory sacrifices;¹⁵ but graver ones were punished by the penalty of death.¹⁶ In order that the people might be more efficaciously turned away from sinning, abundant blessings are promised to those keeping the law, and dreadful evils, especially temporal ones, are denounced against those violating the same.¹ Yet the fulfillment of the law is also urgently commended on account of gratitude and love toward God.² - Another motive for fleeing sin is taken from the fact that one person's offense affects the whole nation because of the law of solidarity;³ in truth God sometimes punishes the sins of fathers even in sons, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me."⁴

¹³ Exod. 32:30-35.

¹⁴ Lev. 11-15.

¹⁵ Lev. 4-6.

¹⁶ Lev. 18:29; 20:6-21, etc.

¹ Deut. 7:11-26; 10:12-22; 11:13-28.

² "Love therefore the Lord thy God and observe his precepts." (Deut. 11:1; cf. 8:2-20.)

³ Josh. 20:20.

⁴ Exod. 20:5.

431. (C) From the time of the Prophets, sin is exhibited more vividly as an offense against God and neighbor, and true repentance of heart is more urgently preached as a means for satisfying for offenses. For sin is contempt of God as benefactor and father, and therefore impiety: "I have nourished and exalted sons; but they have despised me";⁵ infidelity toward God, who is as it were the spouse of the chosen nation: "But thou hast fornicated with many lovers."⁶ It is also often denounced as injustice against neighbor, because it oppresses the poor: "Who crush the heads of the poor upon the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the humble."⁷

⁵ Isa. 1:2; cf. Jer. 2:4-37.

⁶ Jer. 3:1.

⁷ Amos 2:7.

Moreover sinners, by leaving God, the fountain of living water, inflict upon themselves the greatest evil: "But they who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."⁸ Hence sin is truly a certain kind of foolishness, concerning which the impious will grieve bitterly.⁹ - Therefore, in order to obtain mercy, nothing remains except to do penance; nor is it sufficient to offer victims or to rend garments, but it is necessary to offer to God a contrite and humbled heart: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts and not your garments... A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."¹⁰

⁸ Tob. 12:10; cf. Jer. 2:13.

⁹ Wis. 5:2-13.

¹⁰ Joel 2:12-13; Ps. 50:19.

432. (B) In the New Testament. (a) Christ from the beginning is exhibited as the lamb who takes away the sins of the world, and therefore He speaks more concerning the destruction of sin than concerning its nature.

Nevertheless He supposes sin to be a transgression of the law, an offense against God and neighbor, a disordering of the will, by which one's own glory is preferred to the glory of God.¹¹ From another side, by teaching and inculcating a more perfect law, by that very fact He indirectly declares the nature and extension of sin: thus, in the sermon on the mount, He reproves as sinful many acts which were presented as honorable by the doctors of the law and the scribes, for example, anger, hatred of enemies, boasting, pride, etc. In a special manner He denounces hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and sin against the Holy Spirit.¹ From another side He takes away merely legal sins from the midst, and openly declares that sins go out from the heart:² "For from the heart go forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies: these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man."

¹¹ John 12:43.

¹ Matt. 23:5-32; Matt. 18:6; Luke 17:1-2; Matt. 12:31-32; Mark 16:16.

² Matt. 15:19-20.

(b) According to St. Paul, sin is a certain servitude, from which we are freed by grace: "But being freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice";³ it is also the cause of death: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death";⁴ it is deservedly called disobedience and prevarication,⁵ and therefore is punished with a terrible judgment, because the sinner tramples underfoot the Son of God and grieves the Holy Spirit.⁶

³ Rom. 6:18.

⁴ Rom. 5:12.

⁵ Heb. 2:2.

⁶ Heb. 10:26-31; Eph. 4:30.

(c) According to St. John, we all indeed sin, but we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, who is the propitiation for our sins;⁷ but sin is iniquity and the work of the devil; everyone who is born of God does not commit sin⁸ (namely, as long as he remains a son of God, by imitating divine morals). Among sins, two especially are to be fled: those which are opposed to charity, and those which are against Christ, especially the denial of His divinity.⁹ With regard to gravity, sin is twofold, one which is not unto death, but another which is unto death,¹⁰ that is, to which the will adheres so obstinately that there is scarcely hope of obtaining pardon.

⁷ 1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-2.

⁸ 1 John 3:4-10.

⁹ 1 John 3:15; 5:10-12.

¹⁰ Ibid., 16-17.

433. 1. Definition of sin. It is commonly defined as a free transgression of the law, according to that saying of Augustine: "Sin is some deed, or word, or desire against the eternal law. But the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."¹² - Hence a twofold element is found in sin: a voluntary act,¹³ whether of deed or of mouth or of heart, which Augustine does not mention in his definition, but supposes; and a defect of rectitude, or privation of due order toward the ultimate end, and therefore lack of conformity with divine reason, which is the ultimate rule of morals, and with the dictate of conscience, which manifests the same to us. - This indeed is true even of the transgression of human law: for this is not truly law except insofar as it is consonant with divine reason; and therefore the transgressor of human law indirectly violates divine law.

¹¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-72; Suarez, De Peccatis, disp. I-IV; Salmant., Tr. XX, De principiis moralitatis, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, lib. II, n. 1-10; Billuart, De peccatis, diss. I, art. 2-4; L. Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900.

¹² St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. XXXII, c. 27; Migne, P.L. XLII, 418. - Concerning the eternal law, we spoke above, n. 210.

¹³ Wherefore for formal, or subjective, sin there is required advertence of the intellect and consent of the will, concerning which above, n. 78-84.

434. Corollaries. (A) From this it follows that there is not per se a merely philosophical sin, that is, one opposed to right reason without nevertheless being an offense against God. (a) For the following proposition 2 was condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690, as scandalous, rash, and erroneous: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."¹ - And deservedly; for of itself he who apprehends some action as morally evil, by that very fact at least implicitly perceives it as prohibited by the supreme legislator, and therefore logically and interpretatively as an offense against God.² (b) Yet from this it cannot be inferred that the opinion of Lugo and of certain other theologians was reproved, who assert that a merely philosophical sin can hypothetically be given, namely in those who inculpably are ignorant of God;³ for these do not offend God even implicitly, since they by no means know His existence. - But the proposition was condemned because it did not distinguish between vincible and invincible ignorance of God, and from another side supposed this ignorance to be common enough.

¹ Denzing., n. 1157; Viva, on this proposition, where he observes that that proposition, ascribed to a certain professor of Dijon (Musnier), had not been defended by him so absolutely; Mangenot, Dictionn. de theol., t. I, p. 749; A. Vermeele, La morale de Kant et la theorie du peche philosophique, apud Annales de Philos. caret., Sept. 1894, p. 543-565.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7, ad 3.

³ Lugo, De Incarnat., disp. V, sect. 5; Viva, cited place, n. 22.

435. (B) From this can also be gathered the difference between evil, sin, and fault; for evil indeed is any deformity, whether moral or physical, consisting in the privation of due perfection; but sin is a morally evil act, whether voluntary or involuntary (material, or objective, sin); finally, fault is a morally evil and voluntary act. Yet sin and fault are often taken promiscuously.

(C) It must likewise be noted that, in St. Paul and in ancient authors, by the name sin is also designated that which induces to sin, for example, concupiscence,¹ or that which follows from sin, for example, the stain impressed on the soul by sin; indeed, by extension, the penalty of sin, or sacrifice for sin, or the object of sin.² Wherefore, from the context the genuine sense must be defined.

¹ "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." (Trent, sess. V, can. 5, apud Denzing., n. 674.)

² Lev. 20:20; 2 Cor. 5:21; Deut. 9:21.

436. 2. Divisions of sin. Sin is divided in many ways, because it can be considered under a manifold respect: -

(a) By reason of the principle from which it arises, sin is original or actual: the former is not committed by the proper consent of each one, but is transfused from Adam into his descendants, from a certain moral connection between these and him, as we declared in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 189-193. But the latter, concerning which alone we treat here, is committed by the proper will of each one.

(b) By reason of the mode in which it is completed, sin of commission consists in a positive act against some forbidding precept, such as homicide; while sin of omission consists in omitting an action prescribed by law, as is the omission of fasting: sin of this kind requires a positive act of the will, by which someone wills to omit the thing commanded, or at least wills something else incompatible with the thing commanded,³ as was declared above, n. 84.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5.

437. (c) By reason of malice, sins of ignorance are distinguished, which proceed from ignorance, although culpable (above, n. 90-97); sins of infirmity, which arise from the impulse of passion, although not without free consent (above, n. 102-106); sins of malice, which especially draw their origin from an evil and perverse will, without being excused by ignorance or the vehement impulse of passion: these, other things being equal, are graver.

(d) By reason of the powers by which they are committed, sins are of heart, of mouth, and of deed, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or by words externally brought forth, or by external action; suppose if someone first conceives anger in the heart against a neighbor, then expresses it by harsh words, and finally strikes the enemy with blows and wounds. But what malice the external act adds to the internal act of the same kind, we have already explained, n. 162-166.

(e) By reason of gravity, sin is called mortal, from a certain analogy with physical death, when it brings spiritual death upon the soul, by depriving it of sanctifying grace,¹ which is supernatural life; but venial, if it does not deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and therefore in some way deserves pardon, even when it has not been remitted.

¹ In the state of mere nature, grave sin would not deprive the soul of grace, but of that rectitude and beauty which arises from the ordering of the faculties to God, the ultimate end.

438. From this it follows that the word "sin" is not univocal, but analogous, insofar as it does not have altogether the same sense when it is predicated of certain kinds of sins. For, other divisions being passed over, actual mortal sin, venial sin, and original sin so differ among themselves that they can be reduced to the same genus only analogically; since mortal sin not yet remitted turns us altogether away from the ultimate end, while venial sin indeed retards us from the attainment of the end, but does not turn us away;² from another side original sin is not voluntary by one's proper will, while actual sin supposes one's proper fault.

² "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1.)

Wherefore, original sin being set aside, concerning which something has been said elsewhere, we shall speak separately of mortal and venial sin, since their nature and effects differ as much as heaven from earth.

439. That God is not the author of sin, whatever the Manicheans and not a few Protestants said to the contrary, we have already proved in the Treatise on the One God, n. 94-99; which from another side is established from Trent:¹ "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as He works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is His proper work no less than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Therefore the efficient cause of sin is the free will of man itself, which, from infirmity or malice, and often from both at the same time, deviates from the right path of virtue, and prefers its own advantage to the will of God. But the will is drawn to sin by various motives or causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The prior and principal intrinsic cause is our corrupted nature, or concupiscence, which, with Trent as witness, is from sin and inclines to sin; but the extrinsic causes are the world and the devil; concerning these three we must speak separately. Afterward concerning temptation, which is nothing other than an incitement to sin arising from this threefold cause.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, apud Denzing., n. 698.

440. St. James explains that this is a cause of sin thus:² "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begets death." Therefore concupiscence is not sin in itself, but the principal internal cause of sin, or incitement to sinning; if the will freely consents to it, then a sinful act arises. - But St. John teaches that concupiscence is threefold:³ "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." (a) Now concupiscence of the flesh is a certain inordinate propensity toward carnal pleasures, especially toward intemperance and lust. (b) Concupiscence of the eyes, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas,¹ designates inordinate curiosity for knowing, through the eyes of the body or of the mind, all things which please, even dangerous things; or an inordinate propensity toward riches, resources, magnificent houses, and other things of this kind, by whose sight men are delighted, and whose possession they covet. (c) The pride of life is the inordinate desire of honors, dignities, and similar things which render life conspicuous and procure vainglory. Therefore the principal internal propensities which incline to sin are: intemperance and lust, curiosity and covetousness, and also ambition. - But the root of all these is inordinate love of self: "That someone inordinately desires some temporal good proceeds from this, that he inordinately loves himself";² for he does not desire riches, pleasures, and honors except in order to enjoy them and to please himself. - Moreover all passions, concerning which above, n. 99-107, can allure us to sin: concerning the principal ones it will be treated where we discuss the capital vices.

² Jas. 1:14-15.

³ 1 John 2:16. Cf. Bossuet, Traite de la Concupiscence. - A certain concupiscence is natural to man; this, besides, received an increase from original sin, as was proved in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 171, 198.

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., l. X, c. 35, P.L. XXXII, 802; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 5.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4.

441. There are especially two external causes soliciting to sin: the world and the devil.

(A) The world, concerning which the question is, is not the complex of men who live in the world, but that depraved spirit which flourishes among many men; this is often exhibited in Scripture, especially apud St. John, as an occasion of sin. Thus Christ anathematizes the world because of the scandals which it offers,³ nor does He pray for the world,⁴ but for the disciples, not indeed that God take them out of the world, but that He preserve them from the evil which is in the world;⁵ He predicts that the disciples will suffer persecution from the world, but inspires confidence in them, because He Himself has conquered the world.⁶ The reason for fleeing the world is because the world "is wholly set in the evil one,⁷... since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life."¹ Or, in other words, the world in these places is held as the tinder of threefold concupiscence.

³ Matt. 18:7.

⁴ John 17:9.

⁵ John 17:5.

⁶ John 16:33.

⁷ 1 John 5:19.

¹ 1 John 2:16.

In truth it often induces us to sinning: (a) by deceiving the incautious with fallacies which are directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ; for while the Master calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek and humble, the peacemakers, and those who mourn and suffer persecution for justice, - the world on the contrary pronounces these unhappy and foolish, and places the highest good in riches, pleasures, and honors; (b) by allurements it draws us, by placing before the eyes all those things which please the senses or favor ambition, so that it may deter us from the right path, and by promising any delights to those who wish to serve it; (c) by depraved examples it draws those weak in soul, and terrifies the timid with threats, lest they fulfill their office.²

² Cf. Marion, De la solidarite morale, Paris, 1883, p. 163-231.

Yet it must be noted that those who are strong in soul, and trust in God, not with difficulty despise the vanities of the world and reject its solicitations: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world... And this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith."³

³ John 16:33; 1 John 5:4.

442. (B) The devil likewise not rarely incites man to sin: he tempted our first parents,⁴ did not hesitate to attack Christ Himself,⁵ and incited Judas the traitor to hand over the Lord;⁶ but in a general way, the Apostles warn us to beware of diabolical temptation: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour... For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavenly places."⁷

⁴ Gen. 3:1-16.

⁵ Matt. 4:3-10.

⁶ John 13:2, 27.

⁷ 1 Pet. 5:8-9; Eph. 6:12.

This, according to common doctrine, he accomplishes in these various modes: (a) by acting upon the external and internal senses, namely by proposing to the eyes, imagination, and memory sensible objects or phantasms, from which passions are moved; (b) also by stirring up passions, namely by cooperating with natural causes which are able to excite the sensible appetite. Yet commonly it is said that he cannot act directly on the intellect and will, which, as being spiritual faculties, are subject to no other external agent except God: "Whence the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be concerned with phantasy and the sensitive appetite; by moving each of these, he can induce to sin."¹ - But here it can be observed that many temptations are attributed to the devil which in truth arise from concupiscence itself.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. - Yet some think that the demon can also act directly on the intellect.

443. When the aforesaid causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, actually incite us to sinning, temptation arises: concerning which it will be helpful to establish these things: -

² Cf. Bourdaloue, Careme, Sunday of the first week.

(A) Concerning the rules to be followed with regard to temptation. (a) To feel temptation is not sin, but to consent to it is. This Trent openly teaches indeed concerning concupiscence:³ "But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or tinder, remains in the baptized: since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent; indeed he who shall have contended lawfully will be crowned." - This surely is established from the things which were said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where it was proved that for merit or demerit a free act, and therefore the consent of the will, is required.

³ Trent, sess. V, can. 5.

Therefore the whole difficulty is in this: that the distinction between feeling and consenting be clearly established. To understand this better, three things can be distinguished in temptation: evil suggestion, delectation, and consent. The suggestion itself, or evil thought or imagination, however depraved and long-lasting, is not sin, since in it the will has no part. But often from this suggestion, especially if it perseveres for a long time, some natural and as it were necessary delectation arises in the sensitive appetite, and sometimes a commotion of the senses: up to this point, however, there is no sin, because, as is supposed, this motion of the sensitive appetite is indeliberate and involuntary. When the intellect now perceives the depraved suggestion and its malice, and also the delectation arising from it in the sensitive appetite, the will cannot conduct itself passively; if it immediately rejects the pleasure, there is no sin; but, if it freely consents to it, there will be sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter, and the consent more or less full.⁴

⁴ St. Francis de Sales declares this lucidly, Introduction a la vie devote, Part II, ch. 18 and Part IV, ch. 3-6, where he illustrates the matter by various comparisons and examples.

444. (b) It is not licit rashly to expose oneself to temptation, without sufficient reason. For temptation imports a certain danger of sinning more or less grave or proximate; but it is not licit to go to meet the danger of sinning without sufficient reason: for he who foresees and intends to incur the danger of sinning, by that very fact wills the sin very probably joined with the temptation.¹

¹ Concerning the danger which arises from the occasion of sin, it is said in the moral Treatise on Penance, n. 451-469.

It was said "without sufficient reason"; for if a grave reason is present, it is licit to expose oneself to temptation, provided that there is well-founded hope of overcoming it; for here the principle concerning an indirectly willed effect, n. 175-182, can be applied. For the action placed is supposed to be honorable in itself, although it is foreseen that temptation will arise from it; from another side the good effect compensates for the evil, by hypothesis; therefore it is licit to place this action. Thus a physician, confessor, and other men of similar condition, who in the exercise of their office experience certain temptations, even grave ones, can nevertheless persevere in their state, provided they apply means for overcoming temptations; for the exercise of an office of this kind is honorable in itself; and from another side the evil effect which sometimes follows from it, that is, grave temptation, is compensated by the good effect which results from the same exercise both to the agent himself and to society.

The sin committed by him who rashly exposes himself to temptation is of the same nature and species as the sin whose danger he undergoes. - But to judge concerning its gravity, one must weigh whether the agent clearly and certainly foresees the danger of sinning, or only confusedly and probably (above n. 80, 179).

445. (B) Concerning the manner of overcoming temptations. In order that temptations may be more efficaciously conquered, these means especially are to be employed: (a) vigilance, to guard against many temptations, according to that saying of St. Peter:² "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour." For even if all temptations cannot be guarded against, nevertheless by vigilance their number is diminished and their force weakened. The reason why we ought to watch is because our will, although good and ready, remains weak and infirm, and therefore ought always to be prepared for repelling spiritual enemies.

² 1 Pet. 5:8.

To furnish this, occasions of sinning which are not necessary must be diligently avoided, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 458-469. Besides, our faculties must be turned toward the good, by which they may more easily decline from evil; thus, if we wish to avoid depraved thoughts, it is not enough to repel them when they have preoccupied the mind: but vain and useless wanderings of the soul, from which dangerous phantasms often arise, must be expelled insofar as can be done, not only negatively, but also positively, by turning the soul toward good and useful things. Passions likewise, which often induce us into temptation, must be directed toward the honorable and religious good, as we noted above, n. 107.

446. (b) To vigilance must be joined prayer, by which we are able to obtain the actual grace of God at the opportune time. For, as was proved in the Treatise on Grace, n. 39-45 and 57-60, fallen man cannot, without the grace of God, overcome all grave temptations; and therefore by urgent, frequent, and humble prayer, he ought to ask divine aid, by which, sustained, he may be able to overcome the attacks of the world and the devil and also the movements of his own concupiscence: "Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation."¹

¹ Matt. 26:41.

Nor is it sufficient to pray at the very time of temptation, but it is expedient before and after temptations often to have recourse to God, according to the warning of Christ, who inserted these words into the prayer which He taught the Apostles: "And lead us not into temptation." This prayer indeed becomes much more efficacious when joined to meditation; for then, reconsidering the mysteries of faith and the principles of morals, we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and the occasions of sin more vigilantly. The reconsideration of God living everywhere and in the intimate heart will likewise help greatly: for who would rashly wish to offend God present? "Walk before me and be perfect."²

² Gen. 17:1.

447. (c) But when temptation presses, one must immediately and strenuously resist: "Resist him, strong in faith."³ For in the beginning, when the enemy is still weak, victory is easier, while it becomes much more difficult if he has already fixed his foot in our camp.⁴ Wherefore, if he has appeared from afar, let us defend the citadel of our soul by diverting the soul toward some honorable thing: for nothing is more useful for avoiding the conflicts of rushing temptations than to occupy the mind in good thoughts or assiduous labors; for then the attack of the enemy, having been frustrated, vanishes. - But this must be furnished strenuously: for if we fluctuate hesitatingly, or resist only weakly, the enemy becomes more daring, and attacks us more bitterly. - Whence those who conduct themselves passively toward temptation, by applying no means to overcome it, expose themselves to the danger of sinning, and therefore sin more or less gravely according to the gravity and proximity of the danger. Yet it is licit to contemn temptation, by diverting the soul to other things, from what has just been said, since this is the best means of conquering it.

³ 1 Pet. 5:9.

⁴ What Ovid said about love (Remedia amoris, 91-92) is valid concerning all passions:

"Resist beginnings: medicine is prepared too late,
when evils have grown strong by long delays."

448. (C) Concerning the usefulness of temptations. In truth temptation is not without usefulness. (a) For virtue is perfected in temptations; just as soldiers become stronger by fighting strenuously, so Christians, by fighting manfully against the enemies of salvation, are strengthened in virtue; namely thus, mindful of their own frailty, they begin to think humbly of themselves, and to place their whole confidence in God; they also understand better how necessary it is to mortify the senses and passions, lest perhaps, allured by enticements, they fall into sin; by resisting temptations strongly on account of God, by that very fact they begin to love God more fervently. (b) They have the opportunity of satisfying for past sins: if once they indulged base delectation, now by contemning pleasure they undergo a penalty which contributes not a little to destroying the sins of past life. (c) From this our merits are increased: other things being equal, the more difficult the work to be performed is, the greater is the merit; therefore when storms of temptations arise and it is more arduous to row back to the harbor of salvation, by that very fact merits are increased. Surely a stone would be ungrateful if, sculpted by art, it complained of the sculptor who carved a beautiful figure in it; so also we would be ungrateful if we lamented because God, by various temptations, engraves upon our soul a more perfect image of Christ.¹ Merits being increased, the reward is likewise increased, and for each victory won we shall obtain new degrees of glory, to remain forever.

¹ The Church indeed sings this on the day of Dedication:

"By the blows of the saving chisel,
and by very much pounding,
polished by the hammer of the craftsman,
stones build this mass,
and joined by fitting bonds
are placed in the summit."

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. concerning its effects; 3. concerning the conditions required for mortal sin.

It has already been said that mortal sin, by the force of its very name, brings spiritual death upon the soul; but, in order that its nature and its difference from venial sin may be more deeply declared, we shall successively set forth what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what theologians have taught concerning this matter.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-73; Suarez, De peccatis, disp. I-III; Gonet, Clypeus Theol. thomisticae, Lyons, 1681, De vitiis et peccatis, disp. I-IV; Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati, Rome, 1900, th. I-III; Manning, Sin and its consequences, rendered into French by Maillet, Le Peche et ses consequences, Avignon, 1894, ch. I-II.

449. (A) That there are grave sins which bring death upon the soul and are the cause of damnation is evidently gathered from Scripture. (a) Thus Christ, in the sermon on the mount, reproving sins against neighbor, says: "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment; and he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say: Thou fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire."² Now words of this kind: shall be liable to the judgment, to the council, signify, from a certain analogy with the penalties inflicted by the tribunals of the Jews, that those who gravely offend their brothers, not only in deed, but in heart or word, are to be punished with a grave penalty; but gehenna designates eternal damnation. This indeed He declares more clearly, by prophetically describing the last judgment:³ "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat"...

² Matt. 5:22; cf. Maldonat on this place. - The mind of Christ is that not only homicide is grave sin, but also anger internally conceived, when it leads to homicide, or to very contumelious words. From this, however, it is not licit to infer that every motion of anger is grave.

³ Matt. 25:41-42.

(b) The Apostle lucidly sets forth the same doctrine, both with regard to the sin of our first parents and with regard to actual sins: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death... That as sin reigned unto death, so also grace might reign through justice unto eternal life."¹ Hence those who sin gravely are excluded from the kingdom of heaven:² "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." (c) According to John, mortal sin is privation of light for the mind, and privation of life for the soul: "For everyone who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved... He who says that he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness even until now... He who does not love remains in death."³ The reason is because sin separates us from Christ who is truth and life.

¹ Rom. 5:12, 21. The question concerns each death, corporal and spiritual.

² 1 Cor. 6:9-10; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

³ John 3:20; 1 John 2:9; 3:14.

450. (B) Among sins, some are graver than others. Thus God, apud Jeremiah,⁴ complains of the Jews thus: "They have hardened their neck, and have done worse than their fathers." Christ Himself, addressing Pilate, says: "Therefore he who delivered me to thee has the greater sin."⁵ This indeed is especially clear from the fact that certain sins are called irremissible, while others can be remitted: "Therefore I say to you: every sin and blasphemy shall be remitted to men; but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be remitted."⁶ The context having been inspected, the question here concerns the sin of the Pharisees who attributed the miracles of Christ to the devil, and thus deliberately and pertinaciously denied His divine mission; but this sin is said not to be remitted, because it is altogether difficult for those who pertinaciously abuse grace to repent sincerely. In the same way the words of John can be understood, who distinguishes between sin unto death and sin not unto death.⁷

⁴ Jer. 7:26.

⁵ John 19:11.

⁶ Matt. 12:31; cf. Mark 3:29-30.

⁷ 1 John 5:16.

451. (C) From all these things it can be gathered that the malice of mortal sin consists especially in this, that it turns us away from God. Jeremiah had already explained this by comparison, saying:¹ "For my people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters." The same is established from many texts alleged above, where sin is called the transgression of the divine law, an offense against God, hatred of God, the loss of divine friendship and divine filiation, privation of light and grace, the cause of damnation and of eternal separation from God; for by these and other words of this kind it is signified that man - who through grace is the adoptive son of God, a participant in the divine nature, a son of light, and therefore is united to God by a manifold bond - by mortal sin becomes a son of the devil, a participant in his works, and walks in darkness, and therefore is truly turned away from God. Wherefore the last sentence of the judge against impenitent sinners is situated in declaring that this departure will be eternal: "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."²

¹ Jer. 2:13.

² This is the very sentence which Bossuet, in the sermon De la gloire de Dieu dans la conversion des pecheurs, magnificently explains, as is his custom: "Hell, if we understand it, is sin itself; hell is to be far from God." (Ed. Lebarq, t. II, p. 75.)

452. (D) But that certain sins are not mortal, or are not the cause of eternal damnation, is gathered very probably from a few texts of Scripture. (a) For Christ declares that there is lesser and greater iniquity:³ "He who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." Besides, the Apostles confess that all Christians offend in many things: "In many things we all offend⁴... If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us";⁵ nevertheless from the context it is supposed that those sins are not mortal, nor do they take away charity; thus, for example, a little afterward it is added: "But he who keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected; and in this we know that we are in Him."⁶ Therefore certain sins are given so small that they by no means destroy charity and spiritual life.

³ Luke 16:10.

⁴ Jas. 3:2.

⁵ 1 John 1:8.

⁶ 1 John 2:5.

(b) The same is indirectly deduced from the celebrated and difficult text of St. Paul,⁷ as it is understood by many Fathers: "According to the grace of God, which was given to me, as a wise architect I laid the foundation... But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire, and the fire shall prove what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains which he built upon it, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work shall burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." For there the discourse concerns certain doctors who, after Paul, had preached the Gospel to the Corinthians; if they had handed down doctrine not solid, but little useful, relying more on the persuasive words of human wisdom than on the power of Christ, the vanity of their labor will appear on the day of judgment: they indeed will not suffer eternal penalty, because they announced the faith, but, on account of their empty work, they will pay some penalty. From this it is deduced that they sinned, but not mortally.

⁷ 1 Cor. 3:10-15.

Yet we confess that these arguments are not apodictic, unless the authority of Tradition is added.

453. (A) In the first three centuries, the distinction between mortal and venial sins is not explicitly instituted, but between the greatest and the small, between those which had to be expiated by public penance and those which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. Nor from the beginning was it clearly and distinctly defined which sins in species were to be held as grave, but only gradually, according to the progress of Christian conscience: since not a few acts which did not seem gravely sinful to those recently converted from paganism were afterward held graver by those who, through Christian education, had formed for themselves a more delicate conscience, as will be clear from what must be said.

¹ Vacandard, Le traitement des peccata leviora, apud Rev. du Clerge francais, 15 August 1901; id., La Penitence publique, 1903 (collection Bloud), p. 25-44; Batiffol, Etudes d'hist. et de theol. positive, Paris, 1902, pp. 81, 144, 128 and passim.

454. (a) Already in the second century three sins were considered as most grave, indeed by some as irremissible by the power of the keys, namely apostasy, moechia or adultery, and homicide.² From this certain persons inferred that these three alone are mortal sins. But undeservedly; for Tertullian, who declares these irremissible, enumerates other sins which are grave and must be chastised by public penance: "But there are also those contrary to these (minute offenses), as graver and destructive, which do not obtain pardon: homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial, blasphemy, certainly also moechia and fornication, and whatever other violation of the temple of God."¹

² Cf. Tertullian, De Pudicitia, c. 5 and 12, P.L., t. II, 987-989, 1001-1005; cf. A. d'Ales, La theologie de Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 272-276; J. Turmel, Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 210-213.

¹ Tertullian, ibid., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

455. (b) From another side there are lesser, or small, sins, which are daily committed and can be remitted through penance. For the same Tertullian says:² "For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly, and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to put forth the hand, or easily to curse, or to swear rashly, or to destroy the fidelity of a pact, or to lie from shame or necessity? In businesses, in offices, in gain, in food, in sight, in hearing, how many things tempt us, so that if there were no pardon of these, salvation would belong to no one! Therefore there will be pardon for these through Christ, the entreator of the Father." - St. Cyprian testifies that penance was necessary for these lesser offenses:³ "When in lesser sins sinners do penance for a just time, and, according to the order of discipline, come to exomologesis, and through the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy receive the right of communion..." Therefore these lesser offenses are not merely venial according to the present manner of speaking.

² De pudicit., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

³ St. Cyprian, epist. 9, P.L., IV, 251.

456. (B) From the fourth century, the distinction is already explicitly made between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, concerning which it suffices to do penance privately.

(a) Thus St. Ambrose:⁴ "Because as there is one baptism, so also one penance, which nevertheless is done publicly; for we ought to repent of daily sin: but this latter is for light offenses, the former for graver ones."

⁴ St. Ambrose, De Paenitent., cap. 10, P.L., XVI, 520.

457. (b) Augustine declares this more fully. Besides original sin, which is destroyed through baptism, he distinguishes two kinds of sins: grave sins or crimes, which are remitted only by long and public penance, namely those which the Apostle describes in the epistle to the Corinthians and to the Galatians; and light sins, which all commit and which are destroyed by prayer: "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain monstrous deeds: thence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for destroying these."⁵ - The reason for the difference between light and grave sins is taken from this, that the former do not destroy the foundation of faith and charity, while the latter overturn the foundation of charity: "These things therefore (light sins), because when carnally loved by affection they are not lost without sorrow, for this reason those who have them in such a way that they have in the foundation faith which works through charity, and do not by any reason or cupidity prefer them to this, when they suffer loss in the loss of them, arrive at salvation through a certain fire of sorrow... But he who, for the sake of either keeping or acquiring them, commits homicide, adultery, fornication, idolatry, and any similar things, will not be saved through fire because of the foundation, but, the foundation having been lost, will be tormented by eternal fire."¹

⁵ De Symbolo, to Catechumens, c. 7, P.L., XL, 636; cf. Enchiridion, c. 68-71, P.L., XL, 264-266; sermon 351, P.L., XXXIX, 1535-1549.

¹ De fide et operibus, cap. 16, P.L., XL, 216.

458. (c) With regard to the Eastern Church, the same is established from the canonical epistles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil. The former, being asked concerning the kind of penance which had to be imposed on those who had sinned on the occasion of the incursion of the Goths, sets forth how one should act with those who had eaten idolothytes, or had committed fornication, robbery, theft, invasion of others' homes, or had unjustly detained captives, or had been cooperators with barbarians.² The latter weaves a longer catalogue of offenses which are subject to canonical penance: there are numbered the killing of an animated or unanimated fetus, digamy and trigamy, fornications of deacons and of canonesses who had vowed virginity, and other grave sins against chastity, homicides, beatings, idolatry, violent motions of anger, usury, perjuries; indeed, it is equitable that involuntary killing, or killing done in war, be punished by some penance.³ Elsewhere he complains that many make little of sins which nevertheless are declared as mortal by Paul:⁴ "Assuredly a most evil custom has deceived us; assuredly a perverse tradition of men exists for us as the cause of great evils, which namely, while certain sins have been avoided, has indifferently admitted others, and while it pretends to be vehemently indignant at some, as at homicide and adultery, and at others of the same kind, it judges some to be worthy not even of simple rebuke, such as anger, or reviling, or drunkenness, or avarice, and whatever things are similar to these, against all of which also elsewhere Paul, speaking in Christ, brought forth the same sentence, when he said: Those who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore mortal sins were recognized, besides idolatry, moechia, and homicide. But elsewhere they teach that certain sins are very light, into which all fall.

² Canonical epistle, P.G., X, 1019-1047.

³ Canonical epistle, P.G., XXXII, 663-684; cf. Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements, Migne, Theol. Curs., XX, 692-721, where these and other canonical epistles of St. Basil are rendered into French.

⁴ De Judicio Dei, P.G., XXXI, 670.

459. (C) Around the sixth century, it is already more explicitly declared which sins are grave and which light.

Thus Caesarius of Arles, in a sermon to the people, says:⁵ "And although the Apostle has mentioned many capital sins, nevertheless, lest we seem to cause despair, we briefly say which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false testimony, theft, robbery, pride, envy, avarice; and anger, if it is held for a long time; and drunkenness, if it is assiduous, is computed in their number." These sins indeed must be expiated by long penance; otherwise they will be punished by eternal flame. Among minute sins he chiefly numbers these: "As often as someone either in food or in drink takes more than is necessary... as often as he speaks more than is fitting, or is silent more than is expedient; as often as he exasperates a poor man asking importunately. As often as, although healthy in body, while others fast, he wishes to dine; or, given over to sleep, rises later to church... As often as he visits the sick later. If he has neglected to call back the discordant to concord. If he has exasperated a neighbor, or wife, or son, or servant more than is fitting; if he has flattered more than is expedient... If he has not given food to the hungry poor; or has prepared for himself banquets too delicate or too costly... For these and things similar to these undoubtedly pertain to minute sins, which, as I have already said, can scarcely be enumerated, and from which not only the Christian people, but no one of the saints could ever have been, or will be, immune. Although we do not believe the soul to be killed by these sins, nevertheless by filling it as it were with certain pustules, and as with a dreadful scab, they make it deformed." Afterward he adds that these minute sins are redeemed by good works, especially fraternal charity and alms. - Elsewhere among minute sins he numbers not a few which today would be held as mortal: "Let us think, from the time when we began to be wise, what for oaths, what for perjuries, what for curses, what for detractions, what for idle words, what for hatred, what for anger, what for envy, what for evil concupiscence, what for gluttony, what for sleepiness, what for filthy thoughts, what for concupiscence of the eyes, what for voluptuous delectation of the ears..."¹ - Therefore it is clear that the difference between mortal and venial sins, from the first centuries, was first indirectly and confusedly, then explicitly and clearly recognized; but that the rules by which they are distinguished from each other were not clearly defined; and therefore some offenses, which today by a rightly cultivated conscience are held as grave, at that time were regarded as light. - This evolution will be better understood by him who attentively runs through the penitential books; for there he will find an examination of conscience which, as the centuries pass, becomes more and more prolix.²

⁵ Appendix to Serm. St. Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 1946-1947.

¹ Sermon 257, apud Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 2220.

² You will find some of these penitential books apud Morinus, Comment. histor. de disciplina in administrat. Paenitent., Appendices; Chardon, op. cit., p. 712-725.

460. (A) Notion. In mortal sin two things can be considered: the voluntary act by which someone transgresses the law, and the defect of rectitude which is found in such an act. Under this last respect, according to St. Thomas¹ and other theologians commonly, mortal sin is defined as a turning away from God the ultimate end, through a voluntary and inordinate turning toward creatures.² Consequently mortal sin is opposed to divine goodness and wisdom, to the eternal law, and also to the rational nature of man, from what was said above, n. 25. For the most part man does not primarily and explicitly will to turn himself away from God, but, when a useful or delectable created good has been proposed to him, he sometimes chooses the disorder inhering in sin, and therefore the turning away from God, rather than to be deprived of the delectation: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."³ Hence, for grave sin, it is not necessary directly to intend a turning away from the ultimate end, but it suffices to will it indirectly and logically, by desiring a created good which is known to be contrary to the ultimate end. - In truth man does not desire evil insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it lies hidden under the appearance of good. This indeed is valid even concerning hatred of God: thus the worst sinners do not hate God except insofar as they apprehend Him as opposed to their own good.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

² Among Protestants, others more orthodox, as Bovon, define sin as the free transgression of the law, by which egoism is preferred to love of God; others, tending toward rationalism and determinism, as Schleiermacher and Rothe, hold sin to be as it were a necessary stage of human evolution, in which flesh lusts against spirit and turns the same away from God. Cf. Lichtenberger, Encyclop. des sciences religieuses, t. X, at the word Peche; Bovon, Dogmatique chretienne, Lausanne and Paris, 1895, t. I, p. 311-397, and Morale chret., 1897, t. I, p. 257-316.

³ John 12:43.

Wisdom graphically describes these psychological dispositions of sinners:⁴ "For they have said, thinking not rightly within themselves: short and tedious is the time of our life, and there is no refreshment in the end of man, and no one has been known to return from hell... Come therefore and let us enjoy the good things that are, and let us use the creature quickly as in youth... Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let there be no meadow through which our luxury does not pass... Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow... These things they thought and erred: for their malice blinded them."

⁴ Wis. 2:1-21; the whole chapter should be read.

461. Corollaries. (a) From this the difference between mortal sin and venial sin appears: for the latter does not turn man away from God the ultimate end, but only retards him from Him, as will be explained below.

St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ "For there is a twofold disorder: one through the removal of the principle of order, another in which, even with the principle of order preserved, disorder occurs concerning those things which are after the principle; just as in the body of an animal sometimes indeed the disorder of complexion proceeds even to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, with the principle of life preserved, there is a certain disorder in the humors, and then it is illness. But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end... whence when the soul is disordered by sin even to turning away from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then it is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then it is venial sin."

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

462. (b) From this also the controversy, long agitated among theologians, whether the formal constitutive element of a sin of commission consists in something positive or in something negative, can be reconciled.² A twofold element can be distinguished in sin: the voluntary act and its disorder. Now sin of commission, considered on the part of the act, consists in something positive by which someone tends toward a good at least apparent; but the disorder of the same act essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude, since the will, by inordinately desiring a created good, turns itself away from God.

² All indeed confess that sin of omission is something negative. But according to Suarez (De peccatis, disp. I, sect. I, n. 4), sin essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude; according to the Wurzburg theologians (De pecc., n. 13), it consists in the positive tendency of the act toward the prohibited object. Billuart, diss. I, art. 2, sets forth the reasons alleged on each side.

Wherefore God indeed concurs toward the positive act, by moving the will to acting; but neither directly nor indirectly is He the cause of the disorder, which proceeds wholly from the depravity of the human will. "Whence this defect is not reduced to God as to a cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping is reduced to the curved shin as to a cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in limping is caused."³ - Nor let it be said that God indirectly cooperates with sin from the fact that He does not prevent it; for most wisely He willed man to be free, and He offers him the helps necessary for avoiding sin; but it is altogether fitting that, after He has sufficiently instructed men toward the good, He allow them to act by their own motion, and by their own efforts to acquire merits and to attain eternal life, with the help of grace which He denies to no one well disposed. For from what was said, n. 185, it is licit to cooperate materially with sin, provided there is a proportionately grave reason.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79, art. 2.

463. (B) Concerning the malice of mortal sin.¹ The malice, or disorder, of this sin is manifold, if it is considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinner himself.

¹ Besides the theologians, cf. Manning, op. cit., ch. I; Bourdaloue, Sermons sur les Mysteres, 1st sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ; id., Exhortations, Sur le jugement du peuple contre J.-C.; id., Careme, Wednesday of the 5th Week, concerning the state of sin and the state of grace; Gratry, Medit. inedites, Paris, Tequi, 1878, 7th Meditation, Sin.

On the part of God, mortal sin is (a) disobedience and rebellion against God, the supreme legislator: for the sinner deliberately, although created by God and wholly depending on Him, prefers his own will to the will of God, although he knows very well that He is supreme Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and that He prescribes nothing except what is consonant with reason and wisdom. Thus he becomes guilty of rebellion: for since by a manifold title he is justly subject to the dominion of God, nevertheless equivalently² he says, "I will not serve," and rejects the authority of God. (b) It is deservedly called injustice or iniquity; for God, as being the infinite good and the font of all beatitude, and also the supreme Lord, has a strict right that He be our ultimate end; and therefore the sinner, turning himself away from God the ultimate end, violates that right, and, insofar as he can, deprives Him of that external glory which he ought to render to the most perfect Being; thus he commits true injustice. (c) It imports a certain irreligiosity: for to God, because of His supreme excellence and majesty, supreme worship and honor is due; but the sinner denies this honor, indeed in some sense dishonors and contemns the Lord, preferring the vilest creature to the Creator, according to that saying:¹ "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns which cannot hold waters." But this contempt has the character of contumely, because sin is committed in the sight of the omnipresent God: "Against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee."² (d) It is foul ingratitude: for God is a distinguished benefactor: whatever of being, whatever of good we have, proceeds from Him; natural and supernatural gifts He has generously bestowed upon us; He has sanctified and redeemed our souls; but we use His benefits to offend Him, and indeed at the very time when He bestows His gifts upon us!

² It is said equivalently, or logically, by way of conclusion, not explicitly; for most often the sinner does not expressly intend this rebellion; hence sacred orators should abstain in this matter from excessive amplifications.

¹ Jer. 2:13. Hence Paul says (Rom. 2:23-24): "By transgression of the law thou dishonorest God: for the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles."

² Ps. 50:6.

464. On the part of Christ, (a) sin was the cause why Christ had to undergo such bitter pains and tortures, and a most shameful and most cruel death; therefore he who, knowing these things, nevertheless sins, by that very fact logically and indirectly becomes an accomplice of those who crucified the Lord, and, as far as lies in him, renews His agony, tortures, humiliations, crucifixion, and death, and therefore in some sense becomes guilty of deicide: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God."³ (b) But because through baptism he entered into a covenant with Christ, and breaks it through sin, by that very fact he is deservedly held as a covenant-breaker, just as the Jewish people when it broke the faith given many times. (c) Since he has likewise been made a living temple of God and marked by a sacramental character, the sinner commits a certain sacrilege, dedicating the temple of God to profane uses and rashly violating his own soul consecrated to Christ. Wherefore the sins of a Christian are graver than the sins of unbelievers, and the sins of a priest graver than the sins of Christians.⁴ - Yet for the most part sinners are not conscious of the whole malice which of itself is in mortal sin; and therefore sacred orators, when they speak concerning this matter, ought to have this before their eyes.

³ Heb. 6:6; here the question indeed concerns apostasy from the faith, but by analogy it can be extended to all mortal sins. Wherefore Christ could address sinners, as He addressed the Jews themselves, thus: "What more ought I to have done for thee and have not done? I indeed planted thee, my most beautiful vineyard: and thou hast become very bitter to me: for with vinegar thou hast given me to drink in my thirst and with a lance thou hast pierced the side of thy Savior." Let the whole reproaches be read, in the Mass of Friday of great week.

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10.

465. On the part of man, sin is the highest evil, namely: (a) spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; (b) deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of the supernatural beauty with which it shone, and of the many supernatural gifts and habits which adorned it; (c) ignominious servitude, since the sinner is constituted a slave of the devil, and renders himself subject to his attacks. Therefore the Prophet deservedly says:¹ "Know and see, that it is evil and bitter for thee to have left the Lord thy God."

¹ Jer. 2:19.

466. (C) Controversy concerning the infinity of sin. According to all, mortal sin, insofar as it is the evil of man, is not infinite, because the goods of which it deprives him are finite. Likewise the malice of sin, or the disorder of the sinful act considered in the will of the sinner itself, is something finite, since the human will is incapable of infinite malice.² But the question concerns the offense, or the injury inflicted by sin; and from this head, all concede that sin is at least extrinsically and objectively infinite, because namely it dishonors God, who is truly infinite. But it is controverted whether the offense inflicted upon God is simply and intrinsically infinite in the genus of morals, or only extrinsically and in a qualified way.

² Some theologians indeed say that the malice of sin is in some way infinite, but they confuse this malice with the offense inflicted upon God.

(a) Many Thomists affirm that mortal sin, under the notion of offense, is of simply infinite gravity in the genus of morals.³ For the gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted, according to that saying: injury is in the injured person; and in truth the same injury inflicted upon a soldier is less grave than if it is inflicted upon a general. But the person offended through mortal sin, namely God, is of simply infinite dignity. - It is confirmed from this, that mortal sin deserves an infinite penalty in duration.

³ Thus especially Gonet, Clypeus theol. thomisticae, concerning Sins, diss. IX, art. 6; the Salmanticenses, De Incarnat., disp. I.

(b) Yet not a few theologians hold, with Scotus and Suarez,⁴ that the gravity of sin, even under the notion of offense, is infinite only in a qualified way. For there are mortal sins graver than others; but if they were simply infinite, all would be equal, since there is not given an infinite greater than an infinite. - Besides, the divine majesty and excellence, although infinite, is known only in a finite way; but the malice of the act, even under the notion of offense, is measured according to the dignity of the person not considered in itself, but insofar as it is known by the agent.

⁴ Suarez, De peccatis, disp. II, sect. 3; Pesch, n. 477-482.

Conclusion. We gladly admit what St. Thomas says:¹ "Sin committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty: for the greater is he against whom one offends, the graver the offense is." But we do not think that a certain infinity signifies infinity simply; rather, we assent to those who say that the gravity of offense morally taken is to be measured not only from the dignity of the person offended, but also according to the agent's cognition, which is finite.

¹ St. Thomas, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

467. (D) Concerning the inequality of mortal sins.² That not all mortal sins are equal we have already learned from Scripture, n. 450. Reason shows the same: for although sin consists essentially in turning away from God, the ultimate end, nevertheless there are degrees in it. For this is not a mere negation of conversion to God, but also a positive opposition against the end, in which there can be many degrees, whether on the part of the will, or on the part of the object and circumstances.

² Horace elegantly refutes the theory of the Stoics, who taught that all sins are equal, Satir., I, 3, 96:

"Those to whom it has pleased that sins are nearly equal, labor
when it has come to truth: sense and morals resist,
and utility itself, almost the mother of the just and fair."

(a) On the part of the will; for since sin is an act of the will, it will be greater or lesser according as the volition is more or less perfect: but this, even when it suffices for grave sin, can be more or less intense by reason of deliberation, effort, and duration. Thus, other things being equal, the sin is graver which was preceded by more attentive deliberation, and which was committed with vehement affection, without external solicitation, for a long time.

(b) On the part of the object and circumstances; for since sins are diverse according to the diversity of objects, those which are immediately committed against God are graver, such as voluntary apostasy from the faith, blasphemy; among those which are perpetrated against man, those which are against his life are graver than those which are against his goods, for example, homicide is worse than theft.¹ Circumstances likewise can increase malice; thus parricide is graver than homicide, and theft of sacred things than simple theft. This will be declared more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; cf. Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 1223-1232.

Mortal sin produces a twofold effect, namely: 1. a habitual turning away from God, or guilt of fault; 2. guilt of penalty, or the obligation to penalty.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86-87; Suarez, disp. VII-VIII; Gonet, disp. VIII; Billuart, diss. VII; Pesch, n. 495-515; Billot, th. 4-6.

468. (A) After the sinful act has passed, man remains habitually turned away from God, until he is freed from sin through penance: but he cannot be exempted from this unless through an act of the will he retracts the evil act placed by himself, and obtains pardon from God.³ But that state of turning away from God is called habitual sin, or the state of sin; it is not indeed a vicious habit properly so called, for this supposes repeated acts of the same species; but it is a certain inordinate disposition, by force of which the will, which ought to tend toward God, remains turned away from the ultimate end, and therefore is less apt for resisting temptations and for acting well.

³ St. Thomas declares this thus, I-II, q. 86, a. 2: "Although the act of sin ceases, by which man withdrew from the light of reason or of the divine law, nevertheless man does not immediately return to that in which he had been; but some motion of the will contrary to the first motion is required; just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, when the motion ceases he does not immediately become near to him, but he must approach by returning through a contrary motion."

This disposition is called guilt of fault, because the sinner, as long as he has not retracted nor repaired the injury inflicted upon God, remains guilty of that offense; therefore he ought to do penance as soon as possible, if he wishes to recover grace.

469. (B) For man constituted in the supernatural order, the state of sin includes also the privation of habitual grace and charity; for in the present order, man is not ordered to his supernatural end except through habitual grace, as was said above, n. 8; therefore he is not turned away from the same end except by privation of habitual grace and charity.

(C) But this privation of grace is nothing other than the stain of sin, which the Scriptures often commemorate; for sins are called stain, filth, uncleanness, defilements; from which God washes us with clean water, and Christ washes us in His blood.¹ But this stain is not something positive or a depraved quality, but only the privation of sanctifying grace. St. Thomas declares this by comparison:² just as a stain in corporeal things consists in this, that a shining body loses its brightness from contact with another body, so in spiritual things the soul is metaphorically said to be stained when it loses its brightness by clinging to created things through inordinate love.³

¹ Josh. 22:17; Isa. 4:4; Ezek. 36:25; Zech. 13:1; 1 Cor. 6:11; Eph. 5:27.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 1.

³ In the natural order, the state of sin would consist in the privation of the rectitude by which man is naturally ordered to God.

470. Besides the stain left in the soul, sin induces an obligation to undergo some penalty; this indeed is twofold: one which accompanies the fault itself, as remorse of conscience; the other, which is inflicted as a remedy of salvation by God or by man.

(A) Concerning remorse of conscience. The sinner, seeing that he has been turned away from God, and deprived of many goods, because of vile and transitory delights, returns into himself, and, hearing the voice of conscience, at least as long as he is not obstinate in evil, understands that he has erred and done evil.

Wisdom vividly describes this remorse of conscience:⁴ "Seeing, they shall be troubled with horrible fear..., saying within themselves, doing penance, and groaning for anguish of spirit... Therefore we have erred from the way of truth... We have been wearied in the way of iniquity and perdition; and we have walked difficult ways, but the way of the Lord we have not known. What has pride profited us, or what has the boasting of riches brought us? All those things have passed like a shadow... but in our wickedness we have been consumed." Too happy are sinners if, vexed by anxieties and remorse of conscience, they return penitent to the heavenly Father, crying out as the prodigal himself did: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee."¹

⁴ Wis. 5:2-13. - Hugo graphically depicts the remorse which Cain experienced after perpetrating fratricide in La Conscience, in the work La Legende des siecles, Paris, t. I, p. 35-37.

¹ Luke 15:18.

471. (B) Concerning the various penalties inflicted by God or man. A wise legislator adds sanctions to his laws, by which subjects may be more efficaciously deterred from evil and impelled toward good. (a) Now mortal sin induces guilt of eternal penalty; this indeed is twofold: the penalty of loss, or privation of the beatific vision, which corresponds to the turning away from God, and the penalty of sense, which corresponds to the turning toward creatures:² "And these shall go into eternal punishment."³ Yet this penalty is not inflicted except upon the impenitent, namely those who obstinately die in their sin. And surely he who voluntarily remains turned away from God is deservedly deprived of the vision of God and of the ultimate end; likewise he who inordinately adhered to creatures even to the end justly feels harm from them.⁴

² Concerning each it was said in the Treatise on God the Rewarder, n. 23-30.

³ Matt. 25:46.

⁴ In the natural order, the penalty of sin would be the privation of that beatitude which consists in a fuller, although natural, knowledge and love of God.

(b) Besides, sometimes God, even in this life, inflicts medicinal penalties upon sinners, namely various calamities, and also anxieties of soul, illnesses, and other temporal evils, so that, returning to the heart, they may grieve for sins and satisfy for them by salutary penance. But concerning these penalties nothing certain and infallible can be predicated: for Providence sometimes permits the evil to be afflicted by no special calamities in the present life, nor does He always measure the quantity of temporal penalty according to the gravity of sins. Hence the Psalmist says:⁵ "But my feet were almost moved... because I was zealous over the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners... Behold these are sinners, and abounding in the world, they have obtained riches." For God indeed is patient, because eternal. - Whence penalties inflicted upon sinners ought to be regarded, at least for the most part, as benefits: just as physicians give bitter potions to the sick for restoring health, so God chastises those whom He wills to amend.

⁵ Ps. 72:2-12.

From these things it is clear how diligently mortal sin is to be avoided, which offends God, defiles the soul, and renders the sinner subject to so many evils. Would that of any Christian it could be said what is narrated concerning Chrysostom:⁶ "That man is superior to fear and threats, and is lifted up even against death itself. One thing alone he fears, namely sin, and lest through it he offend God even a little."

⁶ Symeon Metaphr., Vita S. Chrys., Migne, P.G., CXIV, 1138.

The nature and effects of mortal sin having been described, it remains to inquire what conditions are required in order that sin be mortal. Now three must concur together: grave matter, full advertence, and full consent.

472. 1. Grave matter: but this can be such by reason of the object or circumstances, from what was said above, n. 144-146 and 158-161. - But what matter is grave can be defined both by authority and by reason.

(A) By authority. (a) We have already said that from Scripture it can be discerned that certain sins are mortal, namely those which are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal damnation, execrable, abominable, etc. (b) The same can be gathered from the decrees of Councils, Pontiffs, or Congregations, or from the common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, or from the common sense of the faithful. In this matter it must be noted that there has been some progress, so that the catalogue of sins today is longer than in the first times of the Church; this indeed happened not so much from an authentic declaration of the Pontiffs, who have very rarely pronounced concerning the gravity of sin, as from the common sense of doctors or of the faithful, and from the progressive education of Christian conscience.

473. (B) By reason: for this, since it is a certain participation in divine reason, judges concerning the morality of human acts, and therefore concerning the gravity of sins. The general principle is that that sin is to be held as mortal which imports a grave disorder with regard to God, society, oneself, or neighbor. Thus mortal of themselves are:

(a) Sins which inflict grave injury upon God or His divine attributes, such as infidelity, apostasy, despair, hatred of God, blasphemy, irreligion. (b) Sins which induce grave harm to the human race or to society, for example, fornication, rebellion against legitimate authority, all those things which foster discords among the various orders of citizens. (c) Sins which are so opposed to charity or justice toward oneself or neighbor that they bring notable detriment; thus, for example, suicide, homicide, theft of some moment, hatred of neighbor, detractions and calumnies which greatly injure reputation, etc.

Certain sins are called grave from their whole genus, when namely they admit no smallness of matter, for example, apostasy, hatred of God, blasphemy; these are always mortal of themselves, nor can they become light except by defect of full deliberation or full consent. But others are grave from their genus, insofar as of themselves they have it that they can be grave, yet in such a way that they are venial not only from defect of full deliberation or consent, but also from smallness of matter; for example, theft, detraction, etc.

474. 2. Full advertence, namely that which a man fully master of himself is accustomed to apply to a business of great moment; for when the matter concerns the loss of eternal salvation, or turning away from the ultimate end, semiplene advertence does not suffice, such as exists in one half-asleep or in him who is distracted by another matter. Therefore it is required that the action be clearly apprehended or clearly suspected as illicit, and indeed gravely so: for if this appears only confusedly and obscurely, it cannot be said that the sinner wills, explicitly or implicitly, to turn himself away from God.¹ Yet it is not necessary that someone again and again, for a long time, maturely and reflexively consider the matter as prohibited by God under grave penalty; but it suffices to perceive the act clearly and directly, even for a brief time, as gravely illicit.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, Peche precis et peche vague, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-1030.

Hence they lack full advertence, and therefore do not sin gravely: (a) the half-asleep, the half-drunk, or all those who are not truly masters of themselves; (b) those who, occupied and distracted by another matter, give only slight attention to the action which they perform; (c) those who, by vehement passion, or agitation of the nerves, or another physical disease or pathological state (above, n. 128-135), are so disturbed that they attend to the matter only imperfectly; (d) those who immediately or a little after the fact, weighing its malice more attentively, judge that they would not have acted so if they had seriously thought beforehand; and a fortiori if they scarcely remember what they did.

475. 3. Full consent, that is, that which follows full advertence, and at the same time is offered with that liberty which a matter of great moment requires. For this liberty it is not necessary that the agent be immune from passion or fear, but it suffices that, notwithstanding vehement passion or fear, he is able to deliberate and choose maturely: thus he is not excused from grave sin who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith, or, in order to preserve a public office, deliberately, although reluctantly, commits injustice.

But in doubt whether someone has fully consented, these can be held as signs of imperfect consent: (a) he who habitually abhors mortal sin, and therefore is of a fearful conscience, so that he is prepared rather to die than to sin gravely, is to be presumed not to have fully consented. (b) He who experienced some desire of doing evil, and abstained from external sin, while an easy occasion of sinning externally presented itself, is generally to be judged not to have offered full consent. (c) The same can be said of him who, as soon as he fully adverted to the temptation, repelled it; or is anguished or saddened concerning depraved thoughts or desires which invade his mind, even if they have remained for a long time.

476. Corollaries. (A) Therefore it can happen that an action objectively gravely sinful is not mortal sin:

(a) From defect of full advertence or full consent from the things said above; (b) from invincibly erroneous conscience, when namely someone in good faith thinks that the action is only lightly evil; (c) from an excusing cause, when the matter concerns some law, from whose fulfillment sufficient reason can excuse; for example, grave inconvenience excuses altogether from hearing Mass on a feast day, and an inconvenience not so grave can excuse from mortal sin, if not from venial.

477. (B) On the contrary, a sin light from its genus can become grave:

(a) From erroneous conscience, when the agent holds a venial sin as grave, for example, a minute theft; (b) from a gravely evil end, if someone, for example, steals a thing of slight price for committing homicide: for the means which is ordered to a gravely evil end participates in the grave malice of the end itself; for the same reason, he sins mortally who adheres to a thing prohibited only under light sin, yet in such a way that he is prepared rather to offend God gravely than to bid farewell to the thing; (c) by reason of scandal, when it is morally certain that grave scandal will arise from a sin otherwise venial, for example, if a priest acts so lightly that he offers grave scandal to laymen; (d) by reason of danger, if someone, by sinning venially (for example, by idle conversation), foresees that he is going to fall into grave temptation; (e) by reason of contempt, when someone violates the law in light matter, but with the intention of manifesting contempt toward the law or the legislator: which nevertheless occurs very rarely; (f) by reason of matter coalescing, when matters, small of themselves, are so ordered to making some one moral whole that they effect a notable transgression of the same precept; thus sometimes minute thefts coalesce into one and constitute mortal sin, as is declared in the Treatise on Justice, n. 440-444.

478. (C) Since it is very difficult in practice to define whether some sin is mortal, all circumstances having been attended to, and especially the psychological dispositions of the agent, let the confessor not be prone to judging easily that such or such an action is gravely evil, unless this is sufficiently evident.¹ Often he will prudently recognize that the matter is doubtful, and leave it to divine judgment; but he will be solicitous about exciting contrition in the heart of the penitent, and will urgently exhort him to strive to abstain from every deliberate sin.

¹ Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1029.

We shall briefly declare its nature and effects.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88-89, and Quaest. disp., de Malo, q. 7; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 5-8; Gonet, disp. IX; St. Alphonsus, nn. 11, 51, 64; Ball. P., n. 670-680; Pesch, n. 516-556; Billot, th. 8-10; Manning, ch. 3; Pratique progressive de la confession, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 115-132.

479. Already from Scripture and the Fathers (n. 452 sq.) we know that there are lesser, or venial, sins, which do not bring death upon the soul. The same can be gathered from Trent declaring that mortal sins are to be set forth in confession, but that venial sins can be omitted without fault, because they can be expiated by many other remedies.³ Wherefore this proposition 20 of Baius was condemned by Pius V: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment."⁴

³ Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5.

⁴ Denzing., n. 900.

480. 1. Notion. Venial, according to the force of the word, signifies that which can obtain pardon, and from this head all sins can be called venial, because remissible. But venial sin, insofar as it is distinguished from mortal, is so called because it does not take away sanctifying grace, and therefore from its own nature is worthy of pardon. It in fact obtains pardon when due retraction has been made and temporal penalty paid.

But with regard to the thing, venial sin is a morally evil act by which, nevertheless, habitual conversion to God is not taken away.

481. 2. Difference between venial and mortal. St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ (a) Since sin is a certain sickness of the soul, it is called mortal when it induces an irreparable defect, or takes away the principle of life. But the principle of spiritual life is order to the ultimate end, and therefore mortal sin, which is a turning away from the ultimate end, is of itself irreparable, and cannot be repaired except by divine power. But sins which have disorder concerning those things which are toward the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable, and are called venial.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1.

(b) In another way he explains the matter:² one sinning mortally is truly turned away from God, and therefore recedes from the way which leads to the ultimate end; but one sinning venially is not turned away from God, but is similar to him who delays too much on the road, and therefore is retarded in the attainment of the ultimate end.

² St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, q. I, a. 3, ad 5.

(c) Hence one sinning venially, although he displeases God, does not cease to love Him. For when something is prohibited only under light sin, it can happen without the agent being turned away from the ultimate end, and without losing divine friendship. Therefore his disposition is this: I know indeed that this thing displeases God, but not so that He denies His friendship to those who elicit it; therefore I enjoy this thing, but I would prefer to lack its advantage than to lose charity. - Something similar also happens in human matters: sometimes a friend does those things which displease a friend, but would by no means wish to furnish anything which would dissolve the covenant of friendship.

In truth just as a man turned away from God by mortal sin can nevertheless do some good works, so likewise man, while he habitually remains turned toward God through grace, can elicit acts venially evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to an ultimate end.

(d) Venial sin must be diligently distinguished from imperfections which, although they are not against the law, do not reach that degree which the pursuit of perfection imports.

3. In what sense venial is said to be beyond the law. Venial sin is said by St. Thomas³ and by certain other theologians to be beyond the eternal law, insofar as it is beyond the ultimate end which the eternal law primarily regards, and because it does not destroy charity, which is the fullness of the law. But from this it is not licit to infer that venial sin is only beyond, but not against, the law. Every sin, even light sin, is a transgression of the law; but venial sin is not against the ultimate end, nor therefore, strictly speaking, against the eternal law, by which all beings are ordered to the ultimate end.

³ St. Thomas, Q. disp., de Malo, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

482. 4. Conditions required for venial sin. Venial sin can be committed in two ways: (a) when the matter itself is light: then sin remains venial, even if there is perfect knowledge and full consent; (b) when the matter is grave, but full knowledge or full consent is lacking (above, n. 474-475). - But when light matter is had can be gathered from the things said above, n. 472-473, and will be explained more fully in the whole course of this work.

483. In order that an equitable judgment may be made concerning the malice and effects of venial sin, one must diligently distinguish between those things which are committed from mere frailty, without mature deliberation or full consent; - and those which are done deliberately, from some affection, especially if they are committed frequently and from habit: for these bring much greater detriment to the soul. But because not a few orators and ascetics have not kept these distinctions before the mind, they have amplified the malice and effects of venial sin more than was fair.

1. First indeed it is helpful to set forth what venial fault does not produce in the soul. (a) It neither extinguishes nor diminishes sanctifying grace. For since it is not a turning away from God, it does not destroy divine friendship: indeed, habitual grace in itself it does not diminish: for this, since it is nothing other than the supernatural state of conversion to God, could not be diminished except by acts contrary to the ultimate end or to charity; but from what has been said, venial sin is by no means opposed to the ultimate end or to charity. - Nor from this are the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with habitual grace, diminished, nor merits already acquired.

(b) Hence it does not properly induce a stain into the soul; for the stain of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace; moreover venial sin by no means takes this away or diminishes it. Yet in a less proper sense it is sometimes said to cause a stain, and is compared to dust and filth which defile the face of man. St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ in the soul there is a twofold brightness, one indeed habitual, from sanctifying grace, the other actual from acts of virtues; now venial sin indeed impedes the splendor which arises from acts of virtues, but not habitual brightness, because it does not exclude nor diminish the habit of charity.

¹ St. Thomas, q. 89, a. 1.

484. 2. Nevertheless venial sin, frequently and deliberately committed from affection, produces pernicious effects.

(A) It diminishes the fervor of charity; for fervor consists in promptness for doing all things devoutly and generously on account of God; now he who frequently, deliberately, and from affection sins venially is by no means prepared for doing all things on account of God, but in many things deliberately chooses to please himself more than God. Gradually therefore he leaves behind arduous things, and pursues only the easier things: in prayer, he does not greatly care to expel wanderings of soul; in fulfilling the duties of his state, he conducts himself negligently; in virtues he does not strive to progress; works of charity languish, and voluntary mortifications grow torpid; in one word, gradually and without sensing it, tepidity is induced, or the state in which the powers of the soul grow languid.

485. (B) It gradually disposes toward mortal sin, not indeed of itself, since it differs altogether from mortal sin, but through a certain consequence, as St. Thomas says:¹ (a) For, as the disposition of clinging to created things grows from habit and affection, the desire of sinning can so increase that the will, even in matters of greater moment, clings to the creature against the will of God; thus, for example, he who first consents lightly to anger, by repeated acts deliberately committed, easily admits grave motions of anger; likewise he who often indulges curiosity and sensuality, by reading books rather dangerous and by fostering imaginations approaching pleasure, soon, overcome by desire, sins gravely. - The reason for this is that one sinning venially, as the Angelic Doctor says, "from the fact that he becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end, by choosing that which is mortal sin from its genus." In truth, with Christ as witness,² "he who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." (b) Besides, he who frequently and from affection sins venially, by that very fact abuses actual grace, deliberately resisting the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; for this reason he is deprived of more abundant helps, and, when grave temptation arises, he is found weaker for overcoming it.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 3.

² Luke 16:10.

486. (C) Venial sin also induces guilt of fault and guilt of penalty: (a) guilt of fault, because, although it does not dissolve divine friendship, nevertheless it displeases God and saddens Him: for one sinning venially prefers his own will to the divine good pleasure, and therefore is truly guilty of fault; if this happens frequently, the guilt is increased daily, and the charity of God toward us grows cold, as does ours toward God: "But I have against thee that thou hast left thy first charity. Remember therefore from where thou hast fallen, and do penance, and do the first works. But if not, I come to thee, and I will move thy candlestick out of its place, unless thou do penance."¹ (b) Guilt of penalty, insofar as one sinning venially, although he does not deserve the eternal penalty of loss, nevertheless ought to undergo some temporal penalty proportioned to the offense, whether in the present time or in purgatory. But what penalty is due to venial sin cannot be defined, but must be left to divine judgment.²

¹ Apoc. 2:4-5. Here the question concerns Timothy, bishop of Ephesus; cf. Fouard, Saint Jean, 3rd ed., Paris, 1905, p. 125.

² Therefore one must beware of those orators and ascetics who heap up examples taken from the Old Testament to prove that the penalty of death was not rarely inflicted upon those sinning venially. The examples alleged refer to public facts, which are severely chastised on account of the public good: therefore they are undeservedly extended to other cases.

Therefore with St. Francis de Sales it is licit to conclude that affection for venial sins must be extirpated:³ "Never can we be wholly pure and clean from venial sins, at least so that we live and remain long in this purity; but we can have no voluntary propensity toward venial sins... These affections are directly contrary to devotion, as affection toward mortal sin is contrary to charity; for they weaken the powers of the spirit, and render them languid, impede divine consolations, open the door to temptations, and, although they do not kill the soul, nevertheless they greatly weaken it and render it sick."⁴

³ St. Francis de Sales, Introd. a la vie devote, p. I, ch. 22.

⁴ Here it is licit to observe that not all venial sins can indeed be avoided according to Trent (sess. VI, cap. 11), but, according to common doctrine, all fully deliberate venial sins can be avoided. Hence a vow concerning avoiding all venial sins is invalid, but not one concerning avoiding all deliberate venial sins.

Since, from Trent, we are held in confession to accuse mortal sins according to species and number, and the confessor ought to instruct and help penitents in this burden, it is necessary to hand down certain rules concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins in general; to these we shall add opportune principles concerning internal sins.

⁵ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72; Billuart, diss. II; St. Alphonsus, n. 12-50; Lehmk., n. 240-256; Ball. P., n. 514-669; Noldin, n. 275-285.

487. 1. State of the question. (A) Speculatively, theologians do not agree concerning the principle from which the specific distinction of sins is to be repeated. (a) St. Thomas repeats it from the formally diverse objects of sins;⁶ namely, sins differ in species when they are concerned with objects formally diverse in the being of morals; for primary morality is drawn from the object formally taken, as was said above, n. 114. (b) But Scotus repeats it from the diverse virtues to which sins are opposed;¹ for since sin is a privation, it takes its species from the form to which it is opposed, or from virtue. (c) According to Vasquez,² sins differ specifically insofar as they are opposed to morally diverse precepts; for since sin is a transgression of the law, or of a precept, it obtains its species from the precept which is violated.

⁶ St. Thomas, cited place, a. 1.

¹ Scotus, in 2 Sentent., dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

² Disput. in I-II S. Thom., disp. 98, c. 2.

488. (B) Practically, however, these three norms can be composed together; for it is true that sins are diverse in species according to the diverse precepts which are violated; but the precepts themselves are generally diverse because they regard diverse virtues; but virtues are not diverse except because they are concerned with specifically distinct objects. Whence it can be said that sins proximately receive their specific distinction from the precepts, or from the virtues to which they are opposed, but remotely from the moral objects concerning which they are concerned.

489. (C) It must likewise be noted that many faithful, ignorant of theological distinctions, bear judgment concerning the various species of sins according to the moral estimation of prudent persons, but that this is diverse according to places, times, moral education, etc. Whence, in practice, confessors ought to look into, insofar as they can, the subjective dispositions of penitents, and judge concerning the malice of sins according to the knowledge and advertence which was in the penitents, and indeed at the very time when they were sinning. Therefore if some apprehended only confusedly the diverse malices contained in their actions, and recognized only one sin in an act which, strictly speaking, had a threefold malice specifically distinct, they are not to be troubled to accuse distinctly what they had perceived obscurely; for they sinned according to the degree of knowledge proper to them: nothing is willed unless foreknown.

490. 2. Practical rules. (A) Sins which are opposed to diverse virtues must be held as specifically diverse; thus infidelity, despair, hatred of God are sins diverse in species, because they are opposed to the three theological virtues; likewise superstition, which is opposed to religion, is specifically distinguished from homicide, which is against justice. - Therefore, if one and the same act harms several virtues specifically diverse, it contains several malices specifically diverse; thus a priest perpetrating adultery with a married blood-relative commits four sins specifically diverse: against chastity, as is clear; against religion, because he is bound by the vow of chastity; against justice, he violates the right of the husband; and against piety, because he sins with a blood-relative.

(B) Sins opposed to the same virtue in a contrary mode are specifically diverse, for example, despair and presumption, which are opposed to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary mode, the former namely by defect, the latter by excess.

(C) Sins likewise diverse in species are those opposed to the same virtue, but in a morally diverse mode, or to diverse functions of the same virtue; thus detraction, theft, homicide differ in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue of justice, because in a morally diverse mode they violate the rights of neighbor, namely the right to reputation, the right to external goods, the right to life: for these rights, according to the moral estimation of all, are altogether diverse.

491. N.B. When one and the same act is prohibited by various laws, it has only one malice, if precepts of this kind were enacted from the same motive: thus is theft, which is prohibited by natural, divine, canonical, and civil law, because of the same motive. But if the precepts were enacted from a diverse motive, one and the same act contains in itself several malices specifically diverse; thus he who breaks a fast to which he was held both from a vow and from a precept of the Church commits a twofold sin.

492. Sins specifically diverse by that very fact are numerically distinct. But the question is when sins are numerically distinct in the same species. Nothing concerning this matter has been defined by the Church; and therefore the question must be resolved from the moral estimation of prudent persons, with attention also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent. The things which are more commonly taught can be recalled to two principles; concerning a third principle there is much dispute.

493. 1. First principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are evil acts of the will really distinct. It is said acts of the will, because sin is primarily in the will; really distinct, because if evil acts are at the same time gathered together to effect something morally one, there is only one sin, as will be declared below, n. 494. But if the evil acts of the will are truly and really distinct, each one of them has its own malice and is truly a sin. Thus he who by several acts steals from distinct persons commits as many thefts as he elicits diverse acts; he who by three acts harms the reputation of three persons commits a threefold sin of detraction.

494. 2. Second principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are acts morally interrupted. For as often as acts are morally interrupted, each is complete, and therefore constitutes a sin.

But acts are morally interrupted in a twofold way: (a) by retraction, whether explicit, or even implicit, namely when the will deliberately ceases from the act without the purpose of returning to it, or is turned toward something incompatible with it; (b) by mere cessation, even involuntary, from the act (for example, through sleep, or through another occupation), so long that, in the judgment of prudent persons, the subsequent act does not morally coalesce with the former.

But in order that the matter may be better understood, it is helpful to apply the principles to various kinds of acts, namely to acts merely internal, to internal acts to be consummated externally, and to external acts.

Applications. (A) Acts merely internal, which are consummated in the will itself, such as acts of complacency or morose delectation in depraved thoughts, are multiplied as often as, after retraction or long cessation, they are renewed.

Thus he who voluntarily consents to evil delectation arising from a depraved thought, afterward devotes himself to study for a long time, and then voluntarily returns to the evil delectation, commits two sins; say the same of him who, seeing an enemy, inwardly curses him, afterward plays for a notable time, and again thinking about the enemy, curses him terribly. But if someone perseveres for an hour in morose delectation, from the same impulse of passion, although for a brief time he thinks about another matter, he commits only one sin, because a brief interruption does not prevent the act from being judged morally one. Yet he who for a whole day turns over the same depraved imaginations, and anew consents to them after a notable interruption, commits several sins, since the sinful acts are interrupted by various occupations. In this case, it is difficult to recount the number of sins accurately; but it suffices that the penitent say that for one or another day he frequently gave consent to these imaginations occurring to him: for from this a prudent confessor, with account taken of all the circumstances, will be able to judge about how many sins were committed, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 157.

495. (B) Internal acts elicited with the intention of consummating them externally, namely purposes or desires of doing some evil, for example, stealing, killing, are multiplied as often as after revocation, or very long cessation, they are renewed. For moral interruption a longer interval is required for desires than for complacencies in thoughts; for desires, by that very fact that they tend into an external act, are judged to endure virtually until the work is externally completed, unless nevertheless a very long delay is placed between the purpose and its execution.

But what interval is to be held as notable can be determined only from the judgment of prudent persons, according to the diversity of acts. Thus the purpose of reading a depraved book which is at hand is judged to be interrupted by an interval of several hours or at least one day, while the purpose of stealing or taking vengeance can persist through several days or weeks, namely if the opportune time is awaited for carrying out the purpose: for then all the internal acts form something morally one, because they are referred to the same act to be executed externally. But it must be said otherwise if, when the occasion presented itself, the agent did not wish to use it, because, by voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose, the first volition was morally interrupted.

496. (C) External acts are multiplied as often as they are repeated, provided they are complete and independent from each other; but they are not multiplied if, as incomplete acts or means, they are ordered to completing one principal act. Whence these acts are not morally interrupted by cessation alone, although long, but only by explicit or implicit retraction.

(a) Therefore he commits several sins who communicates sacrilegiously ten times, even within a brief time, - who omits prescribed fasting through several days, - who successively strikes an enemy several times, without the intention of killing him, - or steals a thousand coins from the same rich man on several occasions, without the prior intention of stealing this whole sum; for these are complete and independent acts.

(b) But he perpetrates one sin who, wishing to kill an enemy, conceives an act of vengeance, thinks about the means for executing it, buys and prepares weapons, takes the road, renews the perverse will of killing several times, wounds the enemy, and finally kills him; - who, wishing to steal a thousand coins from the same person, renews this intention hundreds of times, and at various intervals takes away now more, now less, until he has completed the sum; for all these acts are directed to the same end and constitute one homicide or theft. - The same must be said of him who, from the same impulse of anger, spews out several blasphemies, or afflicts the same person with several contumelies, because these acts are morally united by the same movement of passion.

497. 3. Controversy concerning the distinction of sins from the diversity of objects. When by one and the same act objects numerically distinct are reached, the question arises whether several sins are committed or only one.

(A) According to St. Alphonsus (n. 45) and many others, there are as many sins as there are distinct objects, even if they are apprehended by one act. The reason is because the malice of sin is drawn from the object formally taken, and therefore is multiplied according to diverse objects truly distinct.

Therefore he commits several sins who knowingly and willingly kills several men by one blow, - by one act wishes evil to several or detracts from various persons, - by one purpose wishes to omit prescribed fasting through several days, - by one action steals from several, unless the goods belong to the same community, etc.

498. (B) Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, and others¹ contend that a single act which is referred to several distinct objects, provided they are not specifically diverse, and are apprehended by the mind after the manner of one, constitutes only one sin.

¹ Suarez, in 3 p. St. Thomas, disp. XXII, sect. 5, n. 34; Lugo, De paenitent., disp. XVI, n. 104 seq.; Laymann, l. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 2; Noldin, n. 284, 285.

Thus he who by a single explosion wounds and kills several men, whom he apprehends only confusedly after the manner of one multitude, commits one sin; otherwise, if he distinctly apprehends each and wills to kill them. He who in one speech detracts from a family or community, whose members he perceives after the manner of one, perpetrates one sin; otherwise, if he wishes to harm the individual members or some of them distinctly. He who hates ten men by one act commits one sin, because under the confused concept of plurality he reaches them. He who by one desire covets three women sins once; but if he covets three under a diverse notion, an unmarried woman, a married woman, a nun, he perpetrates three sins specifically distinct.

In our judgment, it can be said that in this case there is one sin, but bearing before itself a special malice, which must be declared in confession. Certainly there is a difference, morally speaking, between the killing of one and the killing of several; whence if someone, by one explosion, knowingly and willingly killed and wounded several, it is not sufficient in confession to say: I perpetrated homicide once; but it is necessary to add: by one blow I killed several and wounded others; otherwise the confessor would plainly be deceived. Likewise if someone scandalized several, he ought to confess this, nor is it enough to say: I offered scandal once. When the number was apprehended only confusedly, it can likewise be accused confusedly, even if afterward the number of those who were wounded or scandalized were accurately known.

499. State of the question. Since difficulties often arise concerning merely internal sins, it is expedient to speak specially about these. But there are three internal sins: morose delectation, desire, and joy. (a) Morose delectation is referred to an evil work exhibited by the imagination as present. Namely, when the imagination depicts something evil, for example, theft, homicide, a base act, and the will deliberately is delighted in it, without nevertheless the desire being conceived of executing it, evil delectation is had; and this is called morose, because the will stands still in it, or lingers, although perhaps for only one instant. For it is not required for sin that complacency persevere for a long time, but it suffices that consent be voluntarily offered; whence morose delectation signifies the same as voluntary.

(b) Desire looks to a future thing: when someone depicts to himself an evil delectation as future, and deliberately wills to enjoy it, a depraved desire is had.

(c) But joy is free complacency concerning an evil work as past, and is had when someone represents to himself a past evil act, and at the same time deliberately takes complacency in it. Here also belongs sadness concerning a good performed, or concerning an evil not performed, as if someone says: I grieve that at that time, when the occasion presented itself, I did not strike the enemy.

Concerning delectation and joy the same principles hold, with this difference, however, that joy, as concerning a more concrete past thing, more easily puts on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the imagination.

500. 1. Concerning morose delectation and joy. (A) Delectation or joy can be concerning the thing itself thought of, or concerning the knowledge of this thing; thus a physician, hearing that someone has been wounded, can rejoice concerning the wound itself inflicted, because, for example, the wounded person is an enemy, or can rejoice from the fact that he knows such a one to have been wounded, so that he may be able to assist him. To rejoice concerning an evil thing insofar as it is evil is deservedly judged a sin; to rejoice concerning the knowledge of this evil is not of itself sin, indeed it can be good, if this is done from an honorable end. Thus he who studies the medical art ought to learn those things which pertain to generation; if he is delighted intellectually concerning the knowledge acquired, so that he may be able to exercise his art, he in no way sins; but if he deliberately thinks about these matters in order to perceive venereal pleasure from them, he is guilty of sin.

501. (B) Morose, or voluntary, delectation, or joy concerning an evil thing, is a sin of the same species and gravity as the evil work represented by the imagination.

For morose delectation or joy receives its morality from the object formally taken, just as any other human act (above, n. 144). Therefore if the thing about which one deliberately thinks is evil, the delectation arising from it is sin; if the delectation concerning theft is concerned with light theft, the sin is venial; but mortal if the question concerns theft of grave moment.

It must likewise be noted that evil delectation assumes the malice of the object as it is depicted in the imagination; thus delectation concerning theft of a sacred thing puts on a twofold malice, provided the circumstance of the sacred thing is apprehended by the agent. But if the imagination, and therefore the will, does not apprehend these circumstances, probably the special malice arising from these circumstances is not contracted; thus he who is delighted concerning the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred, but because it is precious, probably incurs only the malice of theft, but not of sacrilege.

502. (C) It is illicit to be delighted or to rejoice concerning an evil thing on account of the good effect which followed from it; nevertheless it is licit, speaking of itself, to be delighted concerning the good effect which followed from an evil thing, provided the evil thing itself is sincerely disapproved.

The reason for the former is because it is not licit to approve evil, even on account of a good end, as we explained, n. 151. Whence these propositions 13 and 15, which directly regard joy concerning a past evil and indirectly delectation concerning a present evil, were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death... not indeed from displeasure with the person, but because of some temporal profit. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance thence."¹

¹ Denzing., n. 1030, 1032; Viva, on this proposition.

The reason for the latter is because delectation is not borne toward the evil object, which is disapproved, but toward the good effect. - Yet it is said speaking of itself, because in practice he who is voluntarily delighted concerning the good effect is not rarely exposed to the danger of consenting to the evil object itself; hence let him not neglect sincerely to disapprove that object.

503. (D) To be delighted or rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the ingenious mode by which it is completed, or concerning the charming mode by which it is narrated, is of itself free from fault, although not rarely dangerous. For the will in this case is borne toward something good or indifferent, but not toward the evil object; but since the passage from the mode to the thing is easy, especially in the matter of chastity, such delectation is not without danger.

Thus to be delighted concerning the artful mode by which someone completes a theft, concerning the ridiculous mode by which women quarrel among themselves, concerning paintings made with the greatest art, although immodest, concerning a charming narration of things less modest, of itself is not sin, but easily leads to sin.

504. 2. Concerning depraved desires. Desire is called efficacious, or a purpose, when someone absolutely intends to execute an evil thing; but inefficacious, if only conditionally, for example, if I could, if it were licit.

(A) The absolute desire of an evil thing or action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. For the malice of an act, and its gravity and species, is drawn from the object toward which it tends. Whence Christ said:² "He who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Therefore desire includes all the malices which are found in the object itself, provided they are at least implicitly apprehended; but they are more easily apprehended in the case of desire than in the case of simple delectation; for he who wishes for some thing generally is borne toward it such as it is, - while he who is delighted concerning a thing thought of not rarely abstracts from certain of its qualities.

² Matt. 5:28.

505. (B) Conditional desire of itself is not sin, if the condition truly removes the malice; otherwise, it is sin.

To understand this, one must distinguish between those things which are extrinsically evil and those which are intrinsically evil.

(a) In those things which are extrinsically evil, the condition added "if it were licit" removes sin, because it removes the malice of the object; for example, I would eat meat today, if it were not prohibited by the Church; I would marry, if I were not bound by a vow of chastity. - Yet often desires of this kind are not only idle, but dangerous, because the passage from conditional desire to absolute desire is easy.

(b) In all things intrinsically and absolutely evil, the condition added does not remove sin, because malice cannot be separated from these acts; therefore they sin who say: I would wish to blaspheme, steal, act basely, perjure myself, if it were licit.

(c) A fortiori a condition which does not regard liceity does not excuse from sin, for example, I would commit theft if it could be done secretly; I would blaspheme if hell did not exist.

506. Yet it must be noted that sometimes an inefficacious desire of an evil thing is not sin, or at least is not grave, because it is not deliberate, but only the manifestation of a certain natural propensity by which the sensitive appetite is borne into evil, without the will offering consent to it, at least full consent. Thus some who are prone to vengeance, anger, or pleasure, say that they would gladly wish to indulge these vices, unless there were hell; but, because they believe there is hell, they restrain these desires. - Whatever the case may be, thoughts and desires, even conditional ones, concerning evil things must be expelled as soon and as strenuously as possible, lest perhaps the will, allured by these vain and dangerous phantasms, soon offer consent.

507. Material sin is an involuntary transgression of the law, and therefore not imputable to the agent unto fault.

¹ Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI (1899) 1105-1109; 1169-1175; t. XXII (1900) 49-55; 111-117.

1. Now that many sins of this kind are committed can be inferred from the things said either in this Treatise or in the preceding Treatises. Besides, not a few sins which are objectively grave become venial because of the psychological dispositions of the agents.

The principal causes taking away or diminishing the objective malice of sin are (A) on the part of the intellect: (a) ignorance of the law, or of its force of obliging, or at least of the gravity of the precept: for there are so many laws which are altogether unknown by the faithful, or whose force, or extent, or gravity more or less escapes their mind, especially in those places where many hear sacred sermons only rarely, or where sacred orators set forth Christian ethics only in a vague and confused manner, without logical connection! (b) Defect of advertence or deliberation: how many think little before they act, and therefore do not foresee the evils going to follow from their actions? Others, distracted in mind, and wholly clinging to earthly things, advert little to the grave malice of certain acts, or easily omit offices which are of themselves grave, for example, hearing Mass on certain feast days, or fasting, etc. (above, n. 89-98).

(B) On the part of the will: (a) vehement impulses of passions, and propensities which can scarcely be resisted, vicious habits whether innate or acquired, certain pathological states which greatly lessen the powers of the will (above, n. 99-135); (b) external causes, violence, fear unjustly struck in (above, n. 105 and 112), enticements of the world (441), and other things of this kind.

508. 2. These things being posited, for judging concerning the number, specific malice, and gravity of sins which are accused in the sacred tribunal, the confessor ought to keep before the mind not only the rules handed down above (n. 472-498), but also diligently to attend to the psychological dispositions of each penitent. But he will know these better if he receives penitents kindly, even and especially those who are burdened by many and grave sins; if he addresses and questions them with words full of charity and mercy.

(A) With regard to the past, he will easily admit all causes which excuse sinners either wholly or in part. He sits as judge before the tribunal, and therefore ought to bring an equitable judgment, insofar as human infirmity allows; but, if the matter is doubtful, it is helpful to lean toward the more benign part, since penitents are more efficaciously deterred from sin by an excess of benignity than by an excess of severity.

509. (B) But with regard to the future: (a) let the confessor not neglect to instruct those who have sinned through ignorance, without nevertheless omitting the rules of prudence. For material sin, even if it is not imputed unto fault, is a true disorder, as we warned above, n. 356, often offers scandal, harms the good morals of society, and sometimes induces the danger of formally sinning. Wherefore the confessor will try to extirpate it, insofar as can be done, by instructing penitents gradually and prudently; which indeed he ought to furnish, even if he foresees that they will commit certain formal sins from this, provided that their future amendment can seriously be expected. Yet it is not expedient to set forth at the same time all duties unknown to them, but only successively, as opportunity presents itself, and with attention given also to their powers and dispositions. - In private conversations, and also in public sermons, but especially in the sacred tribunal, they can likewise and ought to be instructed.

(b) But if some, because of infirmity of the will and grave temptations, have gradually formed for themselves a lax conscience, let them be taught how they can become strong in the Lord, by setting forth those things which we have handed down concerning the education of will and conscience, n. 136, 422, and also concerning the remedies of lax conscience, n. 358. By these and other similar means many material sins will be guarded against, and the good of penitents and of the whole Christian society will be promoted.

510. 1. Often men are inclined to sins through vicious habits, whether innate or acquired. (a) For there are present in man propensions to evil, which flow from his nature: for since he is composed of soul and body, he tends not only toward spiritual good, but also toward sensible good, sometimes against the order of reason, at least in the present state of fallen nature, as was said in De Deo Creante, n. 171 and 198. Moreover, even when he pursues spiritual good, not rarely he inordinately seeks his own excellence, against the divine will, because naturally his reason wishes to be autonomous. - Sometimes also these propensions are confirmed and increased by heredity, above, n. 116-119. (b) The same grow much by education and by repeated acts, as was said above, n. 108 and 123.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2-3; Quaest. disp., De Malo, q. 8-15; Natalis Alexander, De peccatis (Migne, Theol. Curs., XI, 707-1168); Pruner, Theol. Mor., trans. Belet, Paris, 1880, t. I, p. 336-352; Ball. P., n. 697-744; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, 2nd ed., Paris, 1827; Noldin, n. 301-312; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions, Paris, 1860; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, Paris, Alcan, 1902.

Now these propensions solicit us toward sin, and therefore are, as it were, sources and heads from which many sins arise; hence they are called capital sins, not indeed in the sense that the acts proceeding from them are always gravely sinful, but because propensions of this kind are, as it were, heads of many delicts. Yet they would better be called capital vices, because they are generally considered not as sinful acts, but as inclinations to sinning.

511. 2. Seven sins or capital vices are commonly enumerated, after St. Gregory and St. Thomas.

(A) The former, describing the vices, teaches that their root is pride, from which seven principal ones are brought forth, which themselves also are divided into many others:¹

¹ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXI, c. 45, P. L., LXXVI, 620-622.

"For the root of all evil is pride, concerning which, Scripture bearing witness, it is said: the beginning of every sin is pride.² But its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, are brought forth from this virulent root, namely vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, lust." - But each vice has its own army: "For from vainglory arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and presumptions of novelties. From envy are born hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, and affliction in his prosperity." And thus to each capital vice he assigns certain less principal vices. - Afterward he describes their genesis and their connection among themselves in this way: "For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which, when it has corrupted the oppressed mind, at once begets envy, because, namely, while it seeks the power of a vain name, it pines away lest any other be able to obtain it. Envy also generates anger, because the more the soul is wounded by the inward wound of spite, the more also the gentleness of tranquillity is lost; and because it is touched as though it were a suffering member, therefore the hand of an opposed action is felt as though pressed more heavily. From anger also sadness arises, because the troubled mind, in proportion as it shakes itself inordinately, by so acting confounds itself... Sadness also is drawn down to avarice, because while the confounded heart has lost within itself the good of joy, it seeks outside what may console it; and the more it has no joy to which it may inwardly recur, the more it desires to obtain exterior goods. But after these remain two carnal vices, that is, gluttony of the belly and lust."

² Eccli. 10:15.

512. (B) St. Thomas refined the theory of St. Gregory.¹ He calls those sins capital which are not only principles of others, but also directive and in a certain way leading them. But seven capital vices are fittingly numbered. For the will inordinately pursues good or flees evil. (a) Insofar as it inordinately seeks a good of the soul, namely excellence of praise or honor, it is called vainglory;² by inordinately pursuing a good of the body, it is called gluttony or lust; by seeking external goods, against the order of reason, it is named avarice. (b) It also inordinately flees certain evils: sometimes it is saddened at another's good, insofar as this impedes one's own excellence, and this is envy; if it is saddened at the same with a violent appetite for vengeance, anger blazes up; when it flees labor joined to spiritual good, there arises acedia, or sloth.³

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3-4.

² The Holy Doctor reckons vainglory among the capital sins; but declares pride to be the beginning of every sin, and therefore the source of the capital sins, while avarice is the root of all evils on the part of execution (q. 84, a. 2).

³ Concerning other divisions of the capital sins, which Cassian and St. John Climacus set forth, see Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 1689-1690.

But these capital vices take their proximate origin from the threefold concupiscence, and remotely from inordinate love of oneself. Hence by some there is said to be one principle of the vices, namely inordinate love of oneself, - a threefold tinder, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, - and a sevenfold head, namely the seven capital vices.

513. This division indeed is not adequate, nor opposed in its members, but nevertheless it embraces the principal depraved propensions, to which the others are easily reduced. Therefore we follow it, treating first of pride, and also of envy and anger, which flow more directly from pride; afterward of gluttony and drunkenness, which pursue the sensible goods of the body; then of avarice, which seeks external goods; finally of sloth, which shudders at the difficulty of labor. Of lust in particular there will be discourse in the Treatise on Chastity.

514. 1. Pride is described. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. To love oneself, to have a good estimation of oneself according to justice and truth, and therefore to seek one's own excellence in a way consonant with reason, is indeed not sin.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162 and 132; De Malo, q. 8-9; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 728-818; Bossuet, Tr. de la Concupiscence, c. 10-23; id., Sermon sur l'Ambition; Bourdaloue, Careme, Serm. pour le mercredi de la 2e sem.; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 23-57; Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 191-240; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, p. 167, and others alleged at n. 120; also Formation a l'Humilite, Paris, 1902, p. 33-55; Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 113-124, p. 113-123 and 133-148.

But especially in four ways do we seek this excellence inordinately: (a) when someone thinks that he has from himself what he has from God, or at least acts as though he thought this; now, with the Apostle as witness, whatever is in us in the natural or supernatural order proceeds from God, and is to be attributed primarily to God:² "For what do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?" (b) When someone thinks that he has received these goods from God, but only from his own merits; which indeed is likewise false; for we receive many things which we in no way merit, and merits themselves, although truly ours, are to be attributed more to God than to us, since we have being, faculties, the faculty of meriting, and divine help, necessary for meriting, only from the Lord. Wherefore Paul wrote concerning supernatural gifts:³ "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone should glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works which God has prepared, that we may walk in them." The same can be said of natural goods, which greatly exceed our merits. (c) When someone boasts that he has what he does not have, or at least a greater good than he has; for not rarely, from an inordinate desire of vainglory or from self-deception, we amplify our endowments beyond measure. This John indeed reproves:¹ "Because you say that I am rich, and made wealthy, and have need of nothing; and you do not know that you are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." (d) When someone, conscious of his own excellence, thence despises others, and wishes to be singularly seen and esteemed; thus the Pharisee, giving thanks to God that he was not a sinner like other men, despised the publican; but Christ rebuked this manner of acting in this way:² "Everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled, and he who humbles himself shall be exalted."

² 1 Cor. 4:7. - If the proud man truly believed that he had all these things from himself, he would be a heretic; yet generally he does not think this, but practically bears himself as though these gifts were not from God.

³ Eph. 2:8-10.

¹ Apoc. 3:17.

² Luke 18:14.

515. 2. The daughters of pride are enumerated. Pride, in a general way, is called the mother of all vices; this indeed is true, if it is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it is love of oneself; but if it is understood in the strict sense explained above, certain vices proceed more immediately from it, and are called its daughters in a special sense, namely ambition, presumption, vainglory.

(A) Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of undue honor, or of honor greater than is due, - or of due honor, but by undue mode or means. - The scribes and Pharisees labored under this vice, concerning whom Christ said:³ "But they love the first places at suppers, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and greetings in the marketplace, and to be called by men rabbi." The Lord willed to be subject to this temptation, when the devil took him onto a high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their glory, saying: "All these things I will give you, if, falling down, you will adore me."⁴ - Nor today are there lacking those who serve the devil and the world, that they may be able to obtain honors and dignities; in the priestly order itself, there are some, with St. Gregory as witness,⁵ who "desire to be seen as teachers, long to surpass the rest, and, with Truth bearing witness, seek the first greetings in the marketplace, the first places at suppers, the first chairs in assemblies." These indeed the Master rebukes with these words:⁶ "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them, and those who are greater exercise power over them; it shall not be so among you: but whoever will wish to become greater among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will wish to be first among you, shall be your servant; just as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many."

³ Matt. 23:6-7.

⁴ Matt. 4:9.

⁵ St. Gregory, Pastoral., p. I, c. 1, P. L., LXXVII, 14.

⁶ Matt. 20:24-28.

(B) Presumption, which undertakes works exceeding one's powers. Thus not a few seek dignities and offices for the exercise of which they are unskilled, with great detriment to themselves and others; others, presuming too much on their own powers, imprudently cast themselves into dangers, and there frequently sin.

516. (C) Vainglory, which is the inordinate appetite of manifesting one's own excellence, and of capturing the esteem and praises of men.¹ For there are many who care more for the esteem of their neighbor than for the very practice of virtues: they wish to please, and therefore display to others, with vain ostentation, true or imagined endowments, of body or soul, natural or supernatural.

¹ Pride therefore is distinguished from vainglory in that the latter seeks fame or the esteem of others, while pride takes complacency in its own excellence. Yet these two are often found united in the same man: nevertheless in some pride prevails, in others vanity. Cf. Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, ch. 14.

There are those who glory in the nobility of their stock or in the favor of great men; others because they are splendidly dressed, or sit upon a noble horse; but who does not see how great this folly is: for if there is any glory in this matter, it is to be attributed to ancestors, great men, the tailor, or the horse. "Others," says St. Francis de Sales,² "for one ounce of knowledge wish to be honored and cultivated by all, as though all ought to consult them as an oracle, always learn from them, and have them as masters: hence not undeservedly they are called pedagogues. Others boast of themselves and set themselves forth for sale, while they consider their beauty, and think that on account of it they are cultivated and loved by all. All these things are very vain, foolish, impertinent; and the glory which is borrowed from such empty things is called vain, foolish, and frivolous." But those who wish to be praised for good works Christ thus reproves:³ "Take heed that you do not do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father, who is in heaven."

² Introd. a la Vie devote, III p., c. 4; cf. c. 5-7.

³ Matt. 6:1; cf. 2-9.

Among the daughters of vainglory, of which seven are enumerated,⁴ three are eminent: (a) boasting, by which one's own excellence is manifested inordinately by words; (b) ostentation, by which the esteem of men is sought through deeds or other external signs; (c) hypocrisy, which seeks glory through simulated virtues or endowments.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

517. 3. The malice of pride. This malice can be considered in itself and in its consequences. (A) Concerning the gravity of this sin considered in itself. (a) When pride is complete, namely when someone so seeks to excel others that he wishes to be subject neither to God nor to legitimate superiors, it is a mortal sin from its kind, and indeed most grave: for then he turns himself away from God, not on account of ignorance or infirmity, or on account of the desire of any other good whatever, but because he does not wish to be subjected to God and his supreme dominion.¹ - Yet this kind of pride occurs very rarely.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 5-6.

(b) Incomplete pride, by which someone, while preserving due subjection to God and superiors, makes more of himself and wishes to be esteemed more by others than is fitting, does not exceed venial sin, because it does not import a grave disorder. But by accident it can become a grave sin, if it inflicts grave injury upon one's neighbor, or induces to other grave sins, for example, if from wounded pride there is stirred up grave anger, or an appetite for vengeance.

518. (B) Concerning the depraved consequences of pride. (a) The Fathers note that pride was the beginning of every sin, that through it the angels were cast from heaven, and men expelled from paradise; they add that there is no evil which can be compared with pride, on account of the depraved effects which it produces: "It makes a man an insulting demon, blasphemous, perjured, it causes murders to be desired. The proud man always lives in griefs and troubles, is always angry, is always sad."² For indeed, with Gregory as witness, it is the root of all vices:³ "Other vices attack only those virtues by which they themselves are destroyed... but pride, which we have called the root of vices, by no means content with the extinction of one virtue, rises up against all the members of the soul, and, like a general and pestiferous disease, corrupts the whole body, so that whatever is done while it invades, even if it is shown to be a virtue, does not thereby serve God, but only vainglory."

² St. Chrysostom, in ep. II ad Thessal., cap. I, homil. I, n. 2, P. G. 471.

³ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXIV, c. 33, n. 48, P. L., LXXVI, 744.

(b) They observe moreover that pride is the greatest evil from the fact that, with Scripture as witness, God resists the proud:⁴ "Scripture says: God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble. See, brother, what kind of evil that is which has God as its adversary. On account of this in the Gospel both the arrogant Pharisee is rejected, and the humble publican is heard." In reality God, who has bestowed his goods on us so profusely, does not wish to give his glory to another,⁵ and therefore resists the proud who keep for themselves the glory which belongs to God alone; he afflicts them with privation of grace and other penalties: "The day of the Lord is upon everyone proud and high, and upon everyone arrogant: and he shall be humbled."⁶

⁴ St. Jerome, ep. 12 ad Anton., n. 26, P. L., XXII, 346.

⁵ Isa. 42:8.

⁶ Isa. 2:12.

519. 4. Remedies against pride. Since among men, even simple and rustic men, there are many who indulge pride,¹ it is useful to say a few things about the means of tearing it out. (A) For restraining the movements of pride, intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself is certainly of much profit; for he who recalls past sins, and attentively considers his own infirmities or moral defects, and at the same time recognizes that the endowments with which he shines forth are from God,² cannot reasonably lift himself above others. This is indeed the more efficacious the more benignly we at the same time consider the virtues and endowments of others, covering their vices with the veil of charity. For since we are prone to amplifying our own virtues and disguising our vices, it is necessary that, prejudices of this kind being set aside, we attend to those things which others rightly do or say: then we will often discover others to be better than ourselves.

¹ Bossuet, Tr. de la Concup., ch. 16-18.

² "Yet let it be far from a Christian man to trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord; whose goodness toward all men is so great, that he wishes those things to be their merits which are his own gifts." (Trent, sess. VI, c. 16.)

520. (B) The vanity of those things in which we are accustomed to glory is likewise to be carefully considered. On this matter Chrysostom should be heard:³ "Are you strong and proud? For this you ought rather to have been cast down... For even the lion is more courageous than you, and the boar stronger... and robbers and diggers of graves and gladiators and your servants, perhaps also those who are among them the duller, surpass you in strength and powers... But are you beautiful and fair? This is the boasting of crows; you are not more beautiful than the peacock... But do you abound in riches? Whence? In what things do you abound? In gold, silver, precious little stones? This also is the boasting of robbers." And thus he runs through the various goods in which men boast, and shows how foolish it is to glory in them. Moreover, man is mortal; and in the sepulcher who discerns the servant from the master, the poor man from the rich, the conquered from the king, the beautiful from the deformed?

³ St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Philip., c. 2, hom. 7, n. 5, P. G., LXII, 235.

Therefore those who are desirous of human glory should lift the mind higher, and seek eternal glory. Those who seek their own excellence should pursue it not in perishable endowments, but in virtue, which is perennial and truly excels, according to what the Apostle wisely wrote:⁴ "But he who glories, let him glory in the Lord... Gladly therefore I will glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me."

⁴ 2 Cor. 10:17; 12:9.

521. (C) But above all it is helpful to contemplate the humility of Christ, who, "though he was in the form of God, did not think equality with God a thing to be grasped; but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man; he humbled himself, made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."¹ And indeed, when he was an infant, he lay in a manger; he was in the house of a carpenter and of a poor mother, subject to both.² At the beginning of his public life, he receives from John the baptism of penance, is tempted by the devil, does not resist those rising up against him, nor did he exercise against his enemies the divine power with which he was endowed. In the Passion, he gave himself over to unjust aggressors as though they were more powerful than he, stood before priests unjustly accusing him, was led to the governor, and, although he could have refuted the false witnesses, he bore the calumnies in silence; he was spat upon by servants, scourged, ignominiously crowned with a crown of thorns, and unjustly handed over to a most disgraceful death. Deservedly therefore he draws us to humility: "Learn from me, because I am meek and humble of heart";³ deservedly St. Jerome adds:⁴ "Have nothing more excellent than humility, and nothing more lovable. For this is the chief preserver, and as it were a certain guardian, of all virtues; nor is there anything which makes us so pleasing both to men and to God, as if, great in the merit of life, we are lowest in humility."

¹ Phil. 2:6-8. The Apostle uses this argument to urge the necessity of humility: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation." (2:12.)

² Concerning this Bossuet exclaims, Elevat. sur les Mysteres, 20e Sem., 8: "O God, I am seized once again. Pride, come and burst at this spectacle: Jesus, son of a carpenter, himself a carpenter, known by this occupation, without there being mention of any other employment, or of any other action!" - Cf. 24e Sem., 1, where he treats of the humility of John the Baptist.

³ Matt. 11:29. - Concerning humility we will speak below, n. 1079.

⁴ St. Jerome, ep. ad Celant., 148, n. 20, P. L., XXII, 1213.

522. 1. Notion of envy. Envy, which is called also livor, zeal, jealousy, arises from pride: for when someone inordinately seeks his own excellence, he easily is saddened at another's good insofar as it is conceived as diminishing his own excellence, and consequently as our evil. For envy is sadness at another's good insofar as we conceive our excellence to be diminished thereby.

⁵ St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore, P. L., IV, 637-652; St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 46 (alias 31), P. L., LXXV, 727-730; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, and De Malo, q. 10; Natal. Alexander, op. cit., 1027-1061; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 331-340; Descuret, t. II, p. 241-274.

Therefore if someone grieves at another's good because he thinks the other unworthy of a good of this kind, it is not envy, but indignation. - Likewise, if we are saddened at another's elevation because some evil threatens us from it, it is not the effect of envy, but of fear. - To grieve at a neighbor's good because we lack this and wish by honest means to obtain the same or something similar is not envy, but emulation: yet one must beware lest he wish to despoil his neighbor of it.

Generally envy is wont to be found among equals or nearly equals: for when the matter concerns those who greatly excel, there is less fear lest their glory diminish our excellence. - Not rarely, even in perfect men, the seed and first movements of this vice are to be found. It generally arises from those goods which are esteemed honorable, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc.

523. 2. The daughters of envy. Five are numbered, namely whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, affliction in his prosperity, hatred.

For since the envious man grieves at the good of his neighbor, he soon desires that this man be deprived of it. Hence he tries to diminish it or utterly destroy it, for example, by speaking ill of his neighbor, whether secretly through whispering, or more openly through detraction; if he obtains the intended end, he exults in the adversities of the other; otherwise he is afflicted in his prosperity; furthermore all these things, when they endure for a long time, generate hatred.¹

¹ Concerning whispering and detraction, the matter is treated more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 374-396; concerning the others, it is said where Charity is treated.

524. 3. The malice of envy. (A) Envy properly so called is a sin mortal from its kind, because it is directly opposed to charity, which obliges of itself under grave obligation; for it belongs to the nature of friendship that we wish goods to our neighbor, just as to ourselves; but the envious man, on the contrary, wishes evil to his neighbor, since he is saddened at the good which the other possesses.

But, in order that envy be a grave sin, two things are required: (a) that the good of the neighbor to which it is referred be, all things carefully weighed, of grave moment; whence the greater a good of this kind is, the graver the sin is. Hence St. Thomas says:² "There is nevertheless envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envying fraternal grace, according as someone grieves at the very increase of God's grace." Akin to this is the envy of those who are saddened at the spiritual good accomplished by other preachers, confessors, pastors. (b) That the envious man deliberately and seriously wish the neighbor to lack this good; from this head, many movements of envy do not exceed venial sin, because they are imperfectly deliberate, or do not obtain the full consent of the will.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2.

525. (B) Envy is also a grave sin whenever it induces us to inflict grave harm upon our neighbor; for the malice of some act is to be measured not only from its nature, but also from its effects.

Now, with St. Cyprian as witness,¹ many evils have arisen from this vice: "It is the root of all evils, the fountain of calamities, the seedbed of delicts, the matter of faults. From it hatred rises, from it animosity proceeds. Zeal inflames avarice, while someone cannot be content with his own, seeing another richer. Zeal stirs up ambition, while someone sees another higher in honors. With zeal blinding our senses, and bringing the hidden places of the mind under its dominion, the fear of God is despised, the teaching of Christ is neglected, the day of judgment is not foreseen... Hence the bond of the Lord's peace is broken, hence fraternal charity is violated, hence truth is adulterated, unity is split, there is a leap into heresies and schisms, while priests are disparaged, while bishops are envied, while someone either complains that he himself was not rather ordained, or disdains to bear another set over him." Rarely indeed do all these things arise from envy at the same time, but often fraternal charity is wounded, - union, today so necessary among Catholics, is broken, - obedience to legitimate superiors is either disparaged or at least rendered only with difficulty: and these are more than enough!

¹ St. Cyprian, op. cit., P. L., IV, 642.

526. 4. Remedies against envy. (A) One must frequently keep before the mind that spiritual society which prevails among the faithful; for all are sons of the same heavenly Father, all brothers in Christ, citizens of the same Church, called to the same eternal inheritance; we make up one body, of which Christ is the head.² Wherefore each ought to regard the goods of another as his own, and therefore to rejoice in the neighbor's endowments, good works, and progress, as though he himself enjoyed all these: for what profits one member of the body profits the others also. Thus Paul felt when, although certain men were preaching not from charity, but on account of envy and contention, that they might stir up pressure for his chains, nevertheless he sincerely wrote:³ "For what then? So long as in every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ is preached; and in this I rejoice, yes and I will rejoice." - And indeed, while the envious waste away in jealousy, are troubled and inflamed in mind, and carry an enclosed wound in the breast on account of another's happiness; on the contrary, those who regard the goods of others as their own enjoy peace and joy.

² "And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member glories, all the members rejoice together. But you are the body of Christ and members of member." (1 Cor. 12:26-27). Let the whole chapter be read.

³ Phil. 1:18.

527. (B) Those who know that they are liable to movements of envy should turn that vice into noble emulation.¹ First indeed let them not value perishable things, such as wealth, honors, bodily strength and elegance, or even knowledge and eloquence, so highly as piety and virtues: for why do we envy our neighbor over fragile and perishable things? But with regard to the virtues of others, let us strive to imitate them by manly effort: "Let us consider one another unto the provocation of charity and of good works."² Augustine explains this excellently:³ "Why do you envy the just man, O unjust man? Because you wish to seem just? Quickly do what is better, and more easily you will be what you wish to seem. Be just: thus you will love him whom you envied; because what you grieve that he is, you also will be, and you will love yourself in him, and him in yourself. For if you envied a rich man, it would not be in your power to be rich; if you envied some honorable noble senator, it would not be in your power that you also be noble and distinguished; if you envied a beautiful man, you would never make yourself beautiful... if you envy the just man, the matter is in the will; be what you grieve that the other is."

¹ Concerning this Thomas excellently discusses, Educ. des sentiments, p. 203-222.

² Heb. 10:24.

³ Enarrat. in Ps. 139, P. L., XXXVII, 1807-1808.

(C) To tear out envy entirely, it will be opportune to consider the evils which arise from envy (n. 525); and also to eradicate the root from which it arises, namely pride; for, as Augustine says,⁴ "the devil fell by pride, and, because envy is the companion of pride, it cannot happen that the proud man does not envy."

⁴ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 58, P. L., XXXVI, 709.

528. 1. Notion of anger. Anger can be considered under a twofold respect: insofar as it is a passion (above, n. 100), or a vehement movement of the irascible appetite toward repelling a present evil; and insofar as it is an appetite for vengeance. Not rarely these two are joined together and include something immoderate or inordinate. Then anger is defined as an immoderate movement of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance. Therefore it consists of a twofold element: (a) an immoderate movement of the irascible appetite, with commotion of the body, transgressing the just limits prescribed by reason; (b) an inordinate appetite for vengeance, insofar as someone takes or seeks unjust or immoderate revenge from him by whom he has really been injured, or thinks himself to have been injured.

⁵ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 45, P. L., 723-727; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, and De Malo, q. 12; N. Alex., op. cit., p. 1112-1148; Descuret, t. II, p. 1-57; Thomas, op. cit., ch. 9, p. 94-103.

Hence anger is not a sin unless it bears before itself something inordinate, either as to the mode of being angry, namely when the movement of anger grows immoderately hot either inwardly or outwardly; or as to the object, when, namely, someone seeks vengeance against the order of reason, for example, desiring that he be punished who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved, or with the order of law not preserved, or on account of an end which is not legitimate, for example, from hatred, not from love of justice or a desire of amendment.

Wherefore just indignation, or zeal by which someone, from love of justice, reproves or chastises the wicked, differs much from anger. Christ showed this zeal when he drove the sellers out of the temple, and poured out the money of the money-changers and overturned their tables;¹ but because Heli did not have zeal with regard to his sons, he deservedly stirred up against himself the movement of divine vengeance.

¹ John 2:13-17.

529. Often anger arises from pride; for when the proud think themselves injured, they are easily inflamed and seek vengeance. Nevertheless, since anger is a passion, not rarely it arises also from temperament itself, and from this head it is more easily excused.

St. Gregory graphically describes an angry man:² "For the heart kindled by the goads of its anger beats, the body trembles, the tongue trips itself, the face burns, the eyes are sharpened, and acquaintances are in no way recognized. With the mouth indeed it forms a cry, but the sense does not know what it says... Sometimes anger, to a troubled soul, as though from judgment, imposes silence; and because it does not express itself outwardly through the tongue, it burns the worse within... And so it happens that the troubled soul feels the greater clamor of its own silence, and the flame of shut-up anger consumes it more heavily."

² Moral., l. c., p. 724-725. - Gregory had been preceded by Seneca, who in Tr. de Ira, l. I, n. 1, thus depicts an angry man: "His eyes flame and flash, there is much redness over the whole face, as blood boils up from the depths of the breast; the lips are shaken, the teeth are clenched, the hairs stand on end and rise up; breath is forced and hissing, the sound of joints twisting themselves, groans and bellowings... You would not know whether the vice is more detestable or deformed."

530. 2. The various degrees of anger. The principal ones are: impatience, by which we are easily moved inwardly and outwardly even by light inconveniences or injuries; outburst, by which we manifest anger inwardly conceived through injurious words and shouts; violence, which incites not only to words, but also to injurious acts and to blows; fury, which adds to violence something unbridled, as it were a certain madness;¹ vengeance, or a vehement and assiduous desire of avenging.

¹ Hence Horace (Epist. I, 2), describing anger, says:

"Anger is a brief madness: rule the soul; unless it obeys, It commands: restrain it with bits, restrain it with chain."

Seneca elegantly describes the various forms of anger:² "For there are certain angers which settle within a cry; certain ones no less persistent than frequent; certain ones savage with the hand, sparing in words; certain ones poured out into bitterness of words and curses; certain ones do not go beyond complaints and aversions; certain ones are deep and grave, and turned inward. There are a thousand other species of this manifold evil."

² De Ira, lib. I, n. 4.

531. 3. The malice of anger. (A) Concerning anger considered in itself. To judge concerning its gravity, one must distinguish between anger insofar as it is a passion, and anger which is an appetite for vengeance.

(a) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate movement of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its kind. For this anger is not inordinate except in the mode, insofar as someone blazes up beyond what the matter deserves, or more often than is fitting; now an inordination which touches only the mode of acting is not grave of itself.

Nevertheless the excess can be so great that it becomes a mortal sin, when someone deliberately grows too ardently heated within, or outwardly manifests signs of anger, so that he loses the peace of soul, or gravely offends his neighbor. Yet often unexpected movements of anger, even more vehement ones, are excused from mortal sin, because they are not sufficiently deliberate.

532. (b) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite for vengeance, is a sin mortal from its kind. For it is opposed to charity, and sometimes to justice, namely when he concerning whom we wish to take vengeance is truly innocent; now each virtue obliges under grave obligation, as is explicitly taught where these virtues are treated. Here it is enough to report the words of the Master:³ "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say, Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire." For there he is affirmed worthy of grave punishment who is inwardly angry against his neighbor, or manifests inward anger by grave insults.

³ Matt. 5:22.

Yet not rarely even the appetite for vengeance is excused from grave sin, either on the part of the one desiring, for example when the movement of anger precedes the mature judgment of the intellect, or on the part of the object, when someone seeks to vindicate himself in some slight matter.

533. (B) But if anger is considered in its effects, it is the graver in proportion as the effects are worse.

(a) When it is carried to the extreme, it introduces many grave evils, which Seneca describes:¹ "You will see murders and poisons, mutual filth of accused men, destructions of cities, and ruins of whole peoples, and the heads of princes sold under the civil spear, and torches set under roofs, and fires not confined within walls, but immense spaces of regions gleaming with hostile flame... Look upon so many leaders handed down to memory: one anger stabbed in his bedroom; another anger struck among the sacred things of the table; another it tore to pieces amid the laws and the crowded spectacle of the forum; another it ordered to give his blood by the parricide of his son..." Yet generally anger does not indulge these unspeakable crimes.

¹ De Ira, lib. I, n. 2.

(b) Nevertheless it often brings after itself other effects, which Gregory describes:² through anger wisdom is lost, because the mind, vehemently moved, is soon clouded, and can scarcely know what is to be done and in what order; - the grace of social life is lost, because he acts inhumanely who does not temper by human reason the movement of anger, and thence concord is broken; - justice is abandoned: for while the troubled mind embitters the judgment of its reason, it thinks everything which fury suggests to be right; - grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are excluded: for since he resides only in a quiet soul, by expelling the quiet of mind, we close our soul to the Holy Spirit.

² St. Gregory, Moral., l. c., P. L., 724.

534. 4. Remedies against anger. (A) First indeed, insofar as it can be done, anger is to be forestalled, by removing the causes which can excite it.

Thus if we are irascible by nature, we ought carefully to restrain the first movements of anger, and before we break forth into words, to turn the tongue seven times in the mouth, or, as the Greek philosopher used to say, to pronounce the twenty-five letters of the Greek alphabet. - If anger is inflamed by the provocation of certain persons, these persons must be fled: "Choose simple, easy, moderate persons, who neither call forth your anger nor bear it. Still more will the submissive and humane and sweet be of profit, yet not unto flattery; for too much assent offends angry men."³ - If from too much weariness of body, from disorder of the nerves, attend to health. - If you are much moved by those things which are said against you, do not inquire at all about them: "Do you not wish to be angry? Do not be curious. He who inquires what has been said against himself, who digs out malicious speeches, even if they were held secretly, troubles himself."¹

³ Seneca, De Ira, lib. III, n. 8.

¹ Seneca, ibid., n. 11.

535. (B) But because we cannot avert all causes of anger, we ought to be prepared to tolerate all injuries with an even soul.

Gregory explains this excellently:² "For the first thing is that the solicitous mind, before it begins to do anything, set before itself all insults which it can suffer, so that, thinking of the reproaches of its Redeemer, it may prepare itself for adversities... For he who is caught unprepared by adversity is found by the enemy as though sleeping, and the enemy kills him, because he pierces one not resisting. For he who by solicitude foreknows the evils threatening, awaits hostile attacks as though watching in ambush, and from this is valiently girded for victory." - But in order that we may more patiently tolerate the vexations of others, we must consider our own excesses toward others: "For he patiently tolerates an injury inflicted who piously remembers that perhaps he still has something in which he himself ought to be tolerated. And as fire is extinguished by water, so, when fury of soul arises, each one's own fault is recalled to mind; because he is ashamed not to spare sins, who recalls that he himself has often sinned things to be spared either by God or by neighbor."³

² St. Gregory, Moral., P. L., t. LXXV, 725-726.

³ St. Gregory, op. cit., P. L., LXXV, p. 726.

536. (C) But if anger nevertheless has blazed up, as soon as you notice it arising, restrain it; at the beginning indeed it is rather easy to temper it; but if it has grown strong by long delays, this becomes altogether difficult.

Wherefore the Apostle says:⁴ "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down upon your anger... Let all bitterness, and anger, and indignation, and clamor, and blasphemy be taken away from you, with all malice. Be kind to one another, merciful, forgiving one another, just as God also in Christ has forgiven you." - For the same motive, one ought to establish or decide nothing about the vindication of some wrong unless anger has cooled; otherwise the mind, troubled by commotion, will not be able to contain vengeance, otherwise just, within just limits.

⁴ Eph. 4:26, 31, 32.

537. (D) The best remedy indeed, which Christ taught by word and example, is fraternal benevolence toward all, even enemies, by force of which we do good to those who pursue us with hatred, far from seeking vengeance for their injuries: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."¹

¹ Matt. 5:44-46.

Christ indeed wonderfully performed this; for at the time when we were still enemies, he gave himself over for us: "When he was cursed, he did not curse; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but delivered himself to him judging him unjustly."² The Apostles taught the same:³ "But if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: for doing this, you shall heap coals of fire upon his head." The coals which are treated here are not penalties to be inflicted upon enemies, but, as Augustine says,⁴ "burning groans of penance, by which the pride is healed of him who grieves that he has been the enemy of a man by whom his misery is helped." In reality the first Christians patiently tolerated the most savage torments, and, far from being angry with their persecutors, prayed for them and their amendment.⁵ "Patience is," says Cyprian,⁶ "what both commends and preserves us to God. It is what tempers anger, governs the mind, guards peace, rules discipline, breaks the impulse of lust, compresses the violence of swelling pride, extinguishes the fire of rivalry, restrains the power of the rich, refreshes the poverty of the poor, guards blessed integrity in virgins, laborious chastity in widows, undivided charity in those joined and married."

² 1 Pet. 2:23.

³ Rom. 12:20.

⁴ St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, l. III, c. 16, n. 24, P. L., XXXIV, 75. Whence Séailles did not understand this text, who faults Paul because there the Apostle approves the pleasure of vengeance (Les Affirmations de la Conscience moderne, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 73-74).

⁵ Concerning patience in persecutions Tertullian discourses eloquently, De Patientia, P. L., I, 1249-1274; and St. Cyprian, De Bono patientiae, P. L., IV, 621-638.

⁶ St. Cyprian, op. cit., c. 20, P. L., 635.

The three vices of which we have already treated are called spiritual, because they are concerned with goods of the soul; there are two which are called carnal, because they inordinately seek goods of the body, namely gluttony, which is concerned with food and drink, and lust, which inordinately pursues venereal pleasure: but concerning the latter we will treat where Chastity is treated. - We will speak: 1. concerning gluttony in general; 2. concerning drunkenness, or concerning excess in drink which reaches even to the privation of the use of reason; 3. concerning alcoholism, or the habit of frequently drinking alcoholic liquors: these are, as it were, three degrees of one and the same vice.

538. (A) Notion. (a) Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of eating or drinking, and therefore is opposed to the virtue of temperance. That inordination can happen especially in five ways:

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148; De Malo, q. 14; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 1081-1110; Jaugey, De quatuor virt. card., 1876, p. 569-574; Ball. P., n. 716-735.

"Too hastily, sumptuously, too much, ardently, daintily."

Sumptuously or daintily, when, namely, more exquisite foods or drinks are sought, or ones prepared too delicately; - too much, when someone exceeds as to quantity, or beyond the appetite of nature; - too hastily, if someone anticipates the due time, or eats or drinks more often than is fitting; - ardently, when someone takes food too eagerly.

(b) The effects which often flow from intemperance (and which are commonly called the daughters of gluttony) are: foolish joy, which provokes a less honorable kind of joking; much-speaking, or too much garrulity, by which secrets are frequently manifested; scurrility, or immoderation in words and external acts transgressing the just limits of honorableness; dullness of mind, which renders a man less apt for the contemplation of truth, and for actions which require the attention of reason and the moderation of prudence; a certain propensity to lust: "Do not be drunk with wine, in which is luxury."²

² Eph. 5:18.

539. (B) The malice of gluttony. (a) To perceive moderate delectation in food and drink is no sin; for the author of nature joined delectation to foods, that we may use them gladly for preserving bodily health; therefore he who takes delectable food delectably, and consents to this delectation, is not to be blamed, provided that he avoids every excess (above, n. 191). Yet it is more perfect affectively to renounce this delectation, and to take food only on account of an honorable and supernatural end, according to that saying of the Apostle:³ "Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." See above, n. 155-157, 195.

³ 1 Cor. 10:31. This indeed is said concerning things sacrificed to idols, but can be extended to any eating whatever.

(b) But gluttony, insofar as it is an immoderate appetite of food or drink, is a sin⁴ slight of itself, which nevertheless becomes mortal, when someone so clings to delectation that he is prepared to transgress a grave precept rather than renounce it.

⁴ That gluttony is a sin is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (8) by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To eat and drink even to satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health." (Denzing., n. 1025; Viva, on this proposition.)

Thus those gravely sin who place supreme happiness in food and drink, whose God therefore is the belly; who, in order to satisfy gluttony, do not pay debts, knowingly gravely harm their own health, or render themselves unfit to fulfill offices obliging under grave obligation. Apart from these or similar excesses, gluttony is indeed a sin, as opposed to right reason, but a light one, because it does not import a grave disorder.

540. (C) Remedies against gluttony. (a) To keep before the mind that food and drink are not the end of man, but only a means for repairing strength, whereby we may be better able to labor for God. Likewise to think about the depraved consequences which follow from gluttony, about diseases of the body, accelerated death, dullness of memory and talent, etc. (b) The incentives to this vice are to be avoided, namely foods too delicate, seasoned exquisitely, frequent banquets especially with those who are accustomed to indulge intemperance; and therefore generally common foods are to be used, which are more beneficial for health. (c) In banquets themselves, temperance is to be carefully cultivated, and something is to be withdrawn especially from those things which are sweeter to the palate.

These things indeed the Wise Man commends in many places: "Do not be in the banquets of drinkers, nor in the feasts of those who bring meats to eat, because those vacant for drinking and giving contributions will be consumed¹... Exultation of soul and heart is wine drunk moderately... much wine drunk makes irritation, and anger, and many ruins."²

¹ Prov. 23:20-21.

² Eccli. 30:36-38.

541. (A) Its malice. The special malice of drunkenness is situated in this, that it induces privation of the use of reason without cause, and brings the drunken man into danger of perpetrating actions contrary to good morals. - There are degrees in drunkenness: it is called imperfect when the use of reason is diminished, without being utterly taken away, as, for example, when the feet and knees totter, the tongue hesitates, the eyes look upon objects duplicated or moving themselves in a circle; - but it is called complete when the use of reason is utterly taken away, for example, when someone does unusual things which, in control of himself, he is not accustomed to do, or does not know how to distinguish between good and evil, or does not remember notable things which he did while drunk, or collapses destitute of the senses. These things being posited:

542. (a) Voluntary drunkenness, at least that which deprives one of every use of reason, even admitted once, is of itself a mortal sin. It is declared; here the question is of voluntary drunkenness, namely that which is incurred knowingly and willingly; for if someone drinks wine or liquor too strong, yet whose power of intoxicating he did not know, so that he did not foresee at least probably that drunkenness would follow from it, he does not sin; say the same if, on account of weakness of strength or an empty stomach, unexpectedly from a few draughts, without moral foresight, he becomes drunk. - Likewise the question is of drunkenness which is full, or at least gravely disturbs reason and induces the danger of grave disorder; for imperfect drunkenness does not exceed venial sin, as long as someone retains that knowledge which is necessary for acting morally rightly.¹ - This drunkenness, even admitted once, is a grave sin, whatever a few theologians say to the contrary, who think only the custom of drunkenness to be a mortal sin.

¹ Some say that he does not gravely sin who for a short time, which does not reach an hour, deprives himself of the use of reason; thus Noldin, n. 509. - Yet we reject this as less probable; for if someone knowingly and willingly drinks in such a way that he certainly foresees that for half an hour he will be deprived of the use of reason, and indeed without any necessity, this is a grave disorder, and therefore a mortal fault. Besides, as Noldin himself rightly notes, it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for longer than the space of an hour.

It is proved. Scripture vehemently reproves drunkenness, and reckons it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness, and to drink until evening, that you may be inflamed with wine... But take heed to yourselves lest perhaps your hearts be weighed down in surfeiting and drunkenness... Neither thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God."²

² Isa. 5:11; Luke 21:34; 1 Cor. 6:10.

In reality, through drunkenness, man voluntarily, without necessity, on account of mere pleasure, deprives himself of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from beasts, namely the use of reason, so that the lower faculties, which are not lulled to sleep, lack the guidance and rule of reason: thus he is made not only unfit for good, but prone to evil. This indeed is a grave disorder, which certainly is not excused by pleasure alone, as is certainly gathered from the common sense of honorable persons.

543. (b) Nevertheless drunkenness is not so intrinsically evil that it cannot be permitted for a grave cause, for example, for curing a disease, or for breaking the force of poison taken from a serpent's bite. Thus more probably, with St. Alphonsus (n. 76), against Collet, Billuart, etc., who think that voluntary privation of reason is wholly and utterly evil. For through drunkenness reason itself is not lost, but only the use of reason for some time; now to render oneself impotent, in a transitory manner, for using reason is something evil if it is done from pleasure alone, because an inferior good is preferred to a superior good; but if this is done on account of a grave cause, which compensates for the evil effect, it cannot be called illicit, because then the lesser of two evils is chosen. Who, for example, will ever blame him who takes an intoxicating drink absolutely necessary for saving life?

544. Hence it is probable that it is licit to bring about privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink, if this is necessary for more safely performing a surgical operation. - Likewise, more probably, he does not sin who, from fear of death struck into him, drinks with the danger of making himself drunk, because he does not intend drunkenness, but only wishes to avoid death.

545. To provide someone the occasion of drunkenness, without a grave cause, is not licit, as is clear from the things said concerning cooperation in evil, above, n. 185; but, when a proportionately grave cause exists, this is probably licit; for materially to cooperate in an evil action is not prohibited, provided the act is not intrinsically evil, and besides there is a proportionate reason for cooperating, from what was said above, n. 185. Thus he seems to be excused who, captured by robbers, gives them wine abundantly, so that he may be able to escape from their hands. - But we think it is not licit by positive counsel to induce someone to formal drunkenness: for this is nothing other than positively to advise sin. But if it can be foreseen from the circumstances that the drunkenness is not going to be culpable, because, for example, those of whom the question is are ignorant of the strength of the wine or liquor, it is probably not illicit to induce them to drink, with the foresight that they are going to be made drunk, when this is necessary for avoiding a greater evil, for example, homicide: for then moral evil is not advised, but an action of itself indifferent is placed, with foresight of the evil effect, and indeed for avoiding a greater evil. In any hypothesis, account must also be taken of scandal, or of the effects which are foreseen to follow from drunkenness, even material drunkenness.

546. (c) Sins committed in drunkenness are imputed in the way in which they were foreseen; wherefore, if they are foreseen only confusedly, generally they are not mortal; but if rather clearly and distinctly, by him who knows by experience that in the state of drunkenness he is liable to such sins, nothing prevents them from being mortal in the cause, from the things said above, n. 171.

547. (B) Concerning the use of morphine, cocaine, and chloroform.¹ Today, for easing the pains of the sick and for performing surgical operations more safely, narcotic remedies are often employed, which sometimes take away the use of reason for some time. It is expedient to note a few things concerning their use.

¹ Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 34-42.

(a) Morphine (say nearly the same concerning cocaine) is taken not only by way of drink, but also, and more often, by subcutaneous injection. It is altogether efficacious for easing pains; indeed it provokes a certain sense of cheerfulness; but at the same time it weakens the nerves, and induces a great desire of receiving again and again new injections. If the physician, overcome by repeated complaints of the sick person, acquiesces, the power of resisting pains decreases in the sick person, and the injection of morphine is sought more frequently day by day. But the more frequent and more copious use of this remedy soon brings morphinomania with it: then the sick person appears now livid and sluggish, now agitated; he trembles like a drinker, loathes food and digests only with difficulty; he labors under insomnia and anxiety of soul, and not rarely falls into fury and delirium tremens.

548. These things being posited, physicians can use so dangerous a remedy only cautiously and moderately, namely when it is judged necessary or very useful; therefore let them strenuously resist the importunate complaints of the sick, whenever these seek morphine without sufficient reason. But those who already labor under morphinomania generally can be cured only in a special hospital, where for some time they are kept as though imprisoned: otherwise, they soon fall into dementia.

At the article of death, it is not licit to furnish morphine for the purpose that the sick man be deprived of the use of reason and depart without consciousness of pain. This indeed would be wicked, if the sick man were not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation. - If he is rightly disposed for death, generally it is not licit to deprive him of the use of reason, because thus he would lack the opportunity of acquiring merits, and of immediately preparing himself for death, and also of eliciting acts of obedience, patience, confidence, love, by which his glory in heaven can be so greatly increased. - Nevertheless if the pains are excessive, and the sick man is very liable to movements of impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into sin, the aforementioned use of morphine indeed cannot be positively permitted, but can be tolerated.

549. (b) Chloroform, employed in surgical operations, induces sleep and insensibility, and from this head operations are performed much more easily and safely. But sometimes, although rarely, death is caused from it. Wherefore it is licit to use this remedy only for a grave cause and cautiously, after a diligent examination, from which it is clear that in the case there is no probable danger of death for the sick person. But before someone gives himself over to physicians, prudence suggests that he consult his conscience through devout reception of the sacraments.

550. By the name alcoholism is designated the habit of frequently drinking various alcoholic liquors, even without drunkenness, from which it happens that a nearly invincible desire of drinking is contracted, and the whole body, infected by alcoholic poison, is weakened day by day.

¹ Centennial Temperance Volume, New York, 1876; Farrar, Talks on Temperance, London; Cyclopaedia of Temperance, New York; M. Vanlaer, L'alcoolisme et ses remedes, Paris, Colin, 1897; Mgr Turinaz, Trois fleaux de la classe ouvriere, Nancy et Paris; id., Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Racl, Alcoolisme et decadence, Paris, 1900; Riemain, Plan de campagne contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Dr Legrain, Un fleau social, l'alcoolisme, Paris, Gautier; Oudaille, Le Foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; J. Bertillon, L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre, Paris, 1904; Cheysson et Riemain, Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, Asselin, 1904 (which work we allege below with one word, Congres).

(A) The origin and causes of alcoholism. This vice, very common among pagans,² and never entirely extirpated by Christianity, began to revive and creep everywhere from the time when alcoholic liquors, by the help of the chemical art, could more easily be extracted from almost all substances: for then it prevailed not only among the rich, but also among workers and the poor. Politicians favored this vice not a little: for, to obtain the votes of citizens, they did not hesitate to multiply taverns and drinking-shops more than enough; indeed, to capture popular favor, they did not blush to distribute money to be dissipated in drinking bouts. Workers, who often live in sordid houses or rooms, do not care to remain at home in the evening hours, but prefer to converse with companions in taverns and other places where liquors are sold. Moreover, nourished by light and scant food, they not rarely seek a certain compensation in alcoholic drinks.³ - Sometimes, even among the richer, there are those who, given over to idleness, seek consolation in often repeated libations.¹ - By force of heredity, the propension to drinking is frequently transmitted, and is confirmed by education: for there are not lacking parents who do not blush to pour harmful liquors even for infants! And thus the way is prepared for innumerable evils, which are born from alcoholism.²

² A. Westphal, L'alcoolisme dans l'antiquite, in Congres, p. 31-50.

³ Concerning alcoholism prevailing among workers, cf. Pelloutier, La vie ouvriere en France, Paris, 1900, p. 303-322; Congres, p. 341 and 487-518.

¹ M. Peter, L'alcoolisme chez les gens du monde, apud Congres, p. 550.

² From the following table, which we borrow from Bertillon, op. cit., p. 5, the reader will understand what quantity of alcohol is consumed in the principal regions.

Number of liters of brandy (reduced by calculation to 50 per cent alcohol), of beer and of wine absorbed in one year by one inhabitant (1891-1895):

In some regions alcoholism increases, while in others it gradually diminishes, according as laws and private associations favor or oppose it.³

³ From the same work, p. 11, these things are to be noted concerning the quantity of spirits of wine (brandy) consumed at different times:

551. (B) The evils which arise from the abuse of alcohol. These are almost innumerable with regard to individuals, the family, society.⁴

⁴ Two distinguished physicians, Debove, dean of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, and Faisans, physician of the hospital which is called Hotel-Dieu, briefly described these effects in a publicly published document, in the year 1902 (apud Bertillon, op. cit., p. 217-218): "The habit of drinking brings with it alienation from the family, forgetfulness of all social duties, disgust for work, misery, theft, and crime. It leads, at the least, to the hospital; for alcoholism engenders the most varied and most deadly diseases: paralyses, insanity, affections of the stomach and liver, dropsy; it is one of the most frequent causes of tuberculosis. Finally it complicates and aggravates all acute diseases: a typhoid fever, a pneumonia, an erysipelas, which would be benign in a sober man, quickly kill the alcoholic drinker."

(a) For alcoholism not only diminishes physical powers, but also induces grave diseases, especially paralysis, dropsy, tuberculosis, alteration of the stomach and liver, sometimes delirium tremens, insanity, etc.; moreover it renders incidental diseases much graver, such as pleurisy, pneumonia, erysipelas, and renders them lethal.¹ - It has intellectual and moral effects: thus it gradually dulls the acuteness of mind, diminishes memory, extinguishes noble and generous affections, increases depraved propensions, and little by little makes man like a brute in body and soul. Hence many more crimes are committed by drunkards and alcoholics than by sober men.²

¹ Bertillon, op. cit., p. 44-72; Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 23-36; Congres, p. 375-388; 421-426.

² E. Masoin, L'alcool et le crime, apud Revue neoscolastique, Nov. 1901, p. 362-369; cf. Congres, pp. 89 and 92-95.

(b) Moreover, it dissolves the bonds of the family; for generally alcoholic liquors are taken not at home, but at taverns, and therefore fathers of families and adolescents spend a long time in drinking-shops, far from wife, sweet children, or brothers. Meanwhile the money necessary for sustaining the family is dissipated, and children, very badly educated, lead a miserable life. Not rarely they themselves labor under the same vice: infected with the alcoholic plague already from the womb, they desire nothing more eagerly than to imitate paternal morals;³ if money is lacking, they steal. - How many quarrels, dissensions, divorces must be attributed to this vice? From it families are dissolved and perish.

³ Roux, L'alcoolisme et l'enfance, apud Congres, p. 321-331.

(c) From it even society itself is endangered; for with the strength of citizens weakened, agriculture, commerce, and industry languish;⁴ if war arises, soldiers and leaders, enervated by alcoholism, are unable to repel the invasion of enemies, and soon are forced to give conquered hands.⁵ Since alcoholic propension is propagated by heredity, and by education puts down deep roots, the restoration of the nation becomes more difficult day by day, and can be accomplished only by strenuous and heroic efforts.¹

⁴ Roy, apud Congres, p. 349-352.

⁵ Cf. Congres, pp. 87, 95-96; 666-674.

¹ What harms alcoholism has brought upon one of the wealthier provinces of France, namely Normandy, Douarche set forth apud Congres, p. 52-84.

552. (C) Remedies against alcoholism. Against so destructive an evil all honorable citizens ought unanimously to fight with manly and assiduous effort:

(a) The necessity of temperance is to be inculcated by word and example upon infants themselves at home, and upon the young in schools, by clearly and strenuously laying open the harms induced by alcoholism.² In colleges, academies, and seminaries, and also in public sermons, this plague should be openly denounced and reproved as something shameful, harmful to body and soul, pernicious no less to country than to religion. But parents, teachers, priests, or other educators will profit little or nothing unless by example they confirm what they teach by mouth, and therefore abstain not only publicly, but privately, from the frequent and useless use of liquors, even that which by many is held as moderate: for experience establishes that alcoholism is induced not only by the immoderate, but also by the assiduous, although moderate, use of alcohol.³

² Galtier-Boissiere, L'enseignement de l'anti-alcoolisme; id., Tableau mural d'Anti-alcoolisme, Paris, Colin; cf. Congres, p. 685-687.

³ Bertillon, op. cit., p. 37-43.

553. (b) The mother of the family, according to her condition, should keep the home so clean and decorous, and furnished with all things which please husband and sons, that they may not think of deserting the paternal home, but rather may seek in it the honorable recreations of which they are in need.⁴

⁴ "Considering only her action in the anti-alcoholic struggle, the woman who is the first to suffer from the plague can exercise a twofold apostolate: to the child, she will make alcohol unknown; to the man, that great child, she will make him forget it." (Oudaille, op. cit., p. 217). Cf. M. Duclos and Knutzel, apud Congres, p. 558-581; Willard, Woman and Temperance, Hartford.

(c) Everywhere associations favoring temperance should be established. Many already exist: some, such as the societies founded by T. Mathew and spread not only in Ireland and England, but also throughout the whole world, preach total abstinence from every alcoholic liquor, even wine;⁵ others prescribe abstinence from distilled liquors, as they say, but commend the moderate use of wine or other liquors of this kind; others, however, only forbid access to taverns and other places where intoxicating drinks are drunk; others establish hospitals for the cure of drunkards, or build shops where non-fermented drinks are sold, in which alcoholic poison is not contained.¹

⁵ Father T. Mathew (1790-1856), born in Ireland, entered the order of the Capuchins, and founded temperance societies in Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States of America, to which, before he died, about 4,000,000 had already adhered; therefore he is deservedly called the apostle of temperance. Cf. J. F. Maguire, Father Mathew, a biography, 1863.

¹ Concerning these societies, cf. Winskill, History of the Temperance Reformation, New York, 1886; Congres, pp. 590-603; 604-610; 627-638. - In France, various anti-alcoholic societies have decreed to constitute one federation; cf. Congres, p. 741-742.

554. (d) Nor is the discreet cooperation of the State to be rejected, which by opportune laws can restrain the vice of intemperance, and furnish help to those societies which favor temperance. In certain States of America the sale of intoxicating liquors has been entirely prohibited; yet generally the law was not observed. In other regions the number of taverns has been limited within certain limits, either by exacting a greater tax from tavern-keepers, or by proportioning taverns to the number of inhabitants. Elsewhere a certain monopoly has been instituted, both for diminishing the quantity of liquor sold and for improving the quality. By these various experiments alcoholism was indeed not extinguished, but weakened.² But what is more efficacious depends on many circumstances, and therefore in any region it must be determined from the counsel of the prudent, and especially by experience.

² Bertillon wrote concerning these various methods and their outcome, op. cit., p. 80-214.

555. (e) Finally religion can and ought to provide the most efficacious remedy for the diminution of so great a vice: for it is necessary that it instruct the young about the pernicious effects of this vice, and admonish parents that they turn their sons away from it. By inculcating virtues, especially fortitude of soul and mortification of sensuality, it disposes wills for strenuously resisting the temptation of abusing liquors. In the pulpit, and also in the sacred tribunal, priests should frequently teach temperance and sobriety. Where there are sodalities, patronages, and other Catholic societies, certain articles concerning temperance and the means of preserving it should carefully be inserted among the statutes. Finally let them keep before the mind that for extirpating this vice nothing is more efficacious than the example of clerics themselves: wherefore worthy of all praise are those who not only enroll in temperance societies, but, on account of love of souls, abstain from every intoxicating drink.¹

¹ To the matter, Council of Baltimore III, n. 262: "We approve and greatly commend the laudable custom of many, who in our times abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating drinks, that they may more safely restrain the vice of intemperance, either by removing from themselves occasions of the same, or by displaying to others a distinguished example of the virtue of temperance." - But concerning priests it establishes, n. 261: "Let them never cease to cry out strongly against drunkenness and its occasions; but especially when they have spiritual exercises for the people... Moreover, since words only move, but examples draw, let priests themselves, who, with the Apostle admonishing, ought to be a form of the flock from the heart, be examples of the virtue of temperance." - In France a Catholic temperance society has recently been established, La Croix Blanche, 1271, Boulevard Raspail, Paris.

All these means being wisely and assiduously employed, it is to be wished that the alcoholic plague may gradually be diminished, and finally utterly extinguished.²

² J. B. Dumas thus contracts all these things, apud Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 165: "Let us therefore appeal at once to science, to laws, to morals, and to religion. For the enemy whom we have to combat will not be easily conquered. It has as accomplices all the evil sentiments of humanity, all its fatal inclinations. It personifies, in the highest degree, the insubordination of matter against spirit, the subjection of the soul to the fierce appetites of the body. In the name of the family, of the country, and of religion, let us therefore once again appeal to the lights of science, to the devotions of charity, and to the foresight of reason of State, to remove from our beloved country moral miseries which have had their part in its past misfortunes and which could bring about its ruin."

556. 1. Notion. (A) Avarice is the immoderate love of riches. It can be immoderate especially in three ways: (a) if riches are acquired not from an honorable end, such as is the intention of providing for one's own necessities or those of the family, but from inordinate love of money, which is delighted in accumulated wealth; (b) when riches are acquired with excessive solicitude, so that the mind thinks of nothing, the heart seeks nothing except gain; (c) when money is spent with excessive parsimony, insofar as someone deprives himself and his own of those things which, according to each one's state, are held necessary.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118; De Malo, q. 13; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., p. 819-951; Ball. P., n. 708-709; Pruner, p. 344-346; Descuret, t. II, p. 275-297; Massillon, Discours synodaux, De l'avarice des pretres, De la compassion des pauvres; Monsabre, Retraites pascales, 1892-1894, Paris, Les Idoles: la richesse.

(B) Avarice is found not only in the rich, but sometimes also in the poor, insofar as they cling with too great affection to the things possessed, or gape with immoderate desire after those things which they do not have. - Although it is sometimes found in the young, nevertheless it is more frequent in the old, who, when the other passions have been weakened, adhere to this one, and, from immoderate prudence, fear lest perhaps they lack necessities.¹ - Formerly, when money was retained at home and carefully guarded in chests, there were not lacking avaricious men who cultivated coins as certain idols, and truly served mammon, depriving even themselves and their own of necessities.² But today, since money is fruitful in such diverse ways, generally it is not loved for its own sake, but on account of the diverse conveniences which it brings, namely splendid houses, exquisite foods, pleasures, honors, authority over others, since all things obey money.³

¹ "But what is here most deplorable for this vice in a priest is that age and reflections usually cure the other passions, whereas this one seems to revive and take on new forces in old age... The more death approaches, the more one broods with one's eyes over one's miserable treasure; the more one regards it as a necessary precaution for an imaginary future. Thus age rejuvenates, so to speak, this unworthy passion; years, illnesses, reflections, everything thrusts it more deeply into the soul; and it is nourished and inflamed by the very remedies which cure and extinguish the others." (Massillon, op. cit., Oeuvres, Besancon, 1822, t. IX, p. 183).

² "The other (the avaricious man) amasses only in order to amass: it is not to provide for his needs; he refuses them to himself: his money is more precious to him than his health, than his life, than his salvation, than himself; all his actions, all his views, all his affections, refer only to this unworthy object." (Massillon, op. cit., p. 180).

³ Thus many modern rich men (plutocrats), as may be seen apud Carnegie, The Empire of Business.

557. But the effects which it produces (commonly they are called its daughters) are: (a) hardening of heart toward the poor, because the heart, clinging to riches, is not softened by mercy, nor does it wish to help the miserable, but addresses them harshly and repels them, indeed rigorously exacts debts from them, even if they are unequal to paying them; (b) disquiet of heart, or anxious application of the mind to acquiring and preserving riches, or many solicitudes and fears lest the wealth sought with so much solicitude be lost; (c) frauds, fallacies, for deceiving contracting parties concerning the quality or quantity of things sold, so that gain may be perceived more easily and more quickly; to these are sometimes joined perjuries, indeed also betrayals, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ; (d) violence and crimes, by which others' goods are unjustly seized.

558. 2. The malice of avarice and cupidity. (A) Considered in itself, avarice (a) is a mortal sin from its kind, when it is opposed to justice, namely by stealing or retaining the goods of another, as is explained fully in the Treatise on Justice; (b) but it is a venial sin when it is opposed to liberality, because this virtue of itself obliges only under light obligation; nevertheless if someone, in a particular case, from inordinate cupidity, were to deny aid to a poor man placed in extreme necessity, he would sin mortally, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning Charity.

559. (B) But in its effects, avarice not rarely draws to grave sins against God, neighbor, and oneself: (a) against God, insofar as the avaricious man, on account of temporal good, despises eternal things, and cultivates riches, not God. Hence avarice is called by the Apostle service of idols,¹ and Christ says:² "You cannot serve God and mammon," because, namely, no one can serve two masters. In reality there are not lacking those who, on account of love of riches, do not fear to act against the love of God. (b) Against the neighbor, because, as St. Thomas says,³ "in exterior riches one man cannot abound unless another lacks, because temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time." Now the rich are able to become richer, and sometimes by unjust contracts, wicked lawsuits, monopolies, and iniquitous exactions they vex and despoil the poor. Wherefore St. Ambrose, recalling the history of Naboth, despoiled by cruel Jezebel, writes:⁴ "The history of Naboth is old in time, daily in use. For what rich man does not daily covet others' things? What one of the very wealthy does not strive to drive a poor man from his little field, and to eliminate the needy man from the boundaries of his ancestral land? Who is content with his own? Whose rich soul is not inflamed by a neighboring possession?" (c) Against himself, insofar as the avaricious man is made a slave of riches; for he does not possess gold, but rather is possessed by gold, and is made a captive of his own opulence; for how many labors, solicitudes, vigils are required for gathering or guarding or increasing that wealth? He is cruel against himself, defrauding himself of true spiritual goods in order to obtain perishable riches. In the highest affluence of goods he is needy and poor, not only because he lacks tranquillity of soul and joy of heart, but also because he always seeks greater riches: for avarice is insatiable, and cannot be filled even in man's old age. - Moreover he renders himself liable to many temptations: the richer someone is, the more frequently he falls into occasions of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹ "For those who wish to become rich fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many useless and harmful desires, which plunge men into ruin and perdition. For cupidity is the root of all evils."

¹ "For understand this, that every fornicator, or unclean man, or avaricious man, which is service of idols, has no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God" (Eph. 5:5). Yet not a few think, from the context, that by the name avaricious man is designated him who immoderately indulges lust.

² Matt. 6:24.

³ St. Thomas, q. 118, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴ De Nabuthe, c. 1, P. L., XIV, 731.

¹ 1 Tim. 6:9-10.

560. 3. Remedies against avarice and cupidity. (a) The vanity of temporal goods, compared with the excellence of spiritual goods, ought to deter Christians from avarice: "Do not store up treasures for yourselves on earth, where rust and moth destroy, and where thieves dig through and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth destroys, and where thieves do not dig through nor steal... Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you."²

² Matt. 6:19-20, 33.

He indeed is rich who possesses God, and he is very poor who, abounding in wealth, lacks the grace of God. Wherefore the first Christians were not ashamed of their poverty, but gloried in it: "Moreover, because most of us are called poor, this is not our infamy, but glory: for as the soul is loosened by luxury, so it is strengthened by frugality; and yet who can be poor, who does not lack, who does not gape after another's goods, who is rich in God? He is rather poor who, although he has many things, desires more."³

³ Minucius Felix, in Octavio, c. 37, P. L., III, 351; cf. Bossuet, Sermon sur l'eminente dignite des pauvres, - sur nos dispositions a l'egard des necessites de la vie.

Besides, death comes, and separates us even unwilling from all riches, and therefore he acts foolishly who places his hope in perishable things: "Fool, this night they demand your soul from you: but the things which you have prepared, whose shall they be?"⁴

⁴ Luke 12:20.

561. (b) Especially powerful above all is the example of Christ, who, although he was rich, became poor for us, that by his poverty we might be rich;⁵ namely born of a poor mother in a stable, and wrapped in swaddling clothes in a manger, he led a poor life with the poor, chose poor disciples, openly declared the poor blessed, died most poor on the cross, despoiled of his own garments. The sign of his divine mission is the evangelization of the poor. Therefore our patrimony is the poverty of Christ, and he denies Christ who glories in riches and adheres to them with his whole heart.

⁵ 2 Cor. 8:9.

(c) Therefore let the poor not be ashamed of their poverty, but rather be content with it, gaping after eternal goods. But let the rich redeem past sins by alms, and guard against future ones by using wealth to do good to the poor: "Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God... to become rich in good works; to give easily, to communicate; to store up for themselves a good foundation for the future, that they may apprehend true life."¹ - In reality nothing more efficaciously turns the mind away from earthly things, nothing renders salvation more secure than the copious pouring forth of alms into the bosom of the poor.

¹ 1 Tim. 6:17-19.

562. 1. Notion of acedia. Thus far concerning the vices which impel us to acting badly; now concerning sloth, which on the contrary induces us to not acting or to acting remissly, when some office to be fulfilled presses. Sloth in a general way is a propension to acting remissly and negligently, or to idleness. When this negligence is concerned with spiritual things and generates a certain weariness, it is called acedia. Therefore this is usually defined as sadness or weariness concerning spiritual good (degout des choses spirituelles), on account of the labor joined to it. Namely, in the present order of things we are able to accomplish no good without labor, whether in the natural order or in the supernatural order. Now we naturally flee more or less from every laborious work, and therefore not rarely are saddened when the question is of fulfilling an arduous office, and on account of this we abstain from doing it.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, and De Malo, q. 11; Nat. Alex., op. cit., p. 1148-1170. - In Greek, akedeia signifies negligence.

Acedia is concerned with spiritual things; sloth with any offices whatever, even those of natural life. Each defect arises from the same vicious principle, namely horror of difficulty and labor.

563. The effects (or daughters) of acedia are: (a) a certain derision of all things which pertain to piety: for those who neglect their duties, by a certain natural instinct, deride those things which they do not wish to perform; (b) indignation against those who by exhortations, admonitions, and rebukes incite the slothful to perfection and labor: for these men shudder at being disturbed in their rest; (c) torpor, by which the observance of precepts is either utterly omitted, or is performed only perfunctorily and yawningly: thence arises tepidity, which, with Scripture as witness, greatly displeases God;¹ (d) pusillanimity, which disdains and turns away from arduous works; (e) sometimes despair, which is born from the fact that care of one's own salvation, on account of difficulties to be overcome, is cast aside.

¹ Apoc. 3:15-16.

564. 2. The malice of acedia and sloth. (A) Acedia, considered in itself, is a mortal sin whenever it induces perfect sadness concerning divine good, and negligence of one's own salvation and of the means necessary for attaining it. For then it is gravely opposed to the command of loving God from the whole heart, from the whole soul, and from all one's powers. - But sloth is a sin more or less grave according as it induces neglect of an office more or less grave.

(B) But if they are considered in their effects, sloth, and a fortiori acedia, cause many and indeed grave evils: (a) the soul of the slothful man is deservedly compared to a field in which not the crops of good works, but the nettles and thorns of vices grow wonderfully: "I passed through the field of the slothful man, and through the vineyard of the foolish man; and behold nettles had filled it all, and thorns had covered its surface."² (b) It is liable to many temptations and sins: "Idleness has taught much malice... This was the iniquity of Sodom, your sister: pride, satiety of bread, and abundance, and her idleness and that of her daughters."³ In reality, since the mind cannot be entirely empty, nor the will entirely at rest, if we give ourselves to leisure, by this very fact depraved thoughts invade the mind, and solicit the will to depraved actions. (c) It casts one into danger of eternal salvation: for since each one receives his own reward according to his labor,⁴ he who does not make good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire.⁵ For it is not enough, for attaining salvation, to abstain from evil, but it is also necessary to work good, and especially to fulfill diligently the offices of one's state: "For," says St. Chrysostom,⁶ "not to have done good, this is to have done evil. For tell me, if you have some servant who neither steals, nor is insulting, nor contradicts, and abstains from drunkenness and from all other things, but perpetually sits idle, and does nothing of those things which a servant ought to render to his master, will you not beat him with lashes, will you not torment him?" Furthermore we are servants of God, condemned to arduous labor, not only on account of the fault of our first parents, but also on account of personal sins; workers hired in his vineyard for obtaining the reward of labors; and therefore we ought to labor strenuously and assiduously, for obtaining the reward of eternal life.

² Prov. 24:30-31.

³ Eccli. 33:29; Ezek. 16:49.

⁴ 1 Cor. 3:8.

⁵ Matt. 7:19.

⁶ St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Ephes., hom. 16, n. 1, P. G., LXII, 112.

565. 3. Remedies against acedia and sloth. (A) Frequent thought concerning the necessity of working good and laboring strenuously. For God wishes all men, even the rich and noble, to flee idleness and to work good assiduously. But the law which imposed labor upon Adam the sinner¹ binds all sinners, men and women,² the richer equally with the poor. For all are held to bring forth fruits of good works, and to labor manfully in the vineyard of the Lord; otherwise the father of the family will deservedly rebuke the slothful in this way:³ "Why do you stand here all day idle?" and if the fig-tree brings forth no fruit, it will be cut down, according to that saying:⁴ "Cut it down therefore; why does it also occupy the ground?"

¹ "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread" (Gen. 3:19).

² Concerning the utility and necessity of labor with regard to girls and wives, the Countess Z. wrote wisely, Sur le Travail, Paris, Lethielleux, 1902; with regard to boys and men, Payot, Educ. de la volonte, l. IV, ch. 4; P. Doumer, Le Livre de mes fils, Paris, 1906, p. 63-72.

³ Matt. 20:6.

⁴ Luke 13:7.

For the rich who are given over to idleness it is indeed difficult to enter into the kingdom of heaven,⁵ because idleness has taught much malice, especially that which abounds in wealth; but the rich who labor strenuously will receive their own reward according to their labor: "He who sows sparingly, sparingly also shall reap, and he who sows in blessings, from blessings also shall reap."⁶ - And, if difficulty and weariness deter from labor, let thought of the reward promised to good workers inflame one to it: "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... For that which is present and momentary and light in our tribulation works in us above measure an eternal weight of glory on high."⁷

⁵ Luke 18:25.

⁶ 2 Cor. 9:6.

⁷ Rom. 8:18; 2 Cor. 4:17.

566. (B) Those who do not need to labor for themselves should not disdain to work for the relief of others. For there are so many poor who cannot nourish themselves and their families by their own labor, - so many ignorant of religious things, who need instruction, - so many little ones who receive no education at home and, unless they are educated Christianly, will soon be numbered among socialists and anarchists, - so many workers, imbued with prejudices against religion and the social order, whom it is necessary to teach true principles. Those who tend toward idleness should turn these and other things of this kind over in their mind, and should understand that in present-day society it is licit for no one to indulge acedia and sloth: for useless trees and fruitless fig-trees will soon be cut down and cast into the fire of tribulation.

567. (C) Let them likewise think that none are more miserable than the idle: weariness of life, vices of the flesh, intemperance, often dissensions and discords render these men unhappy. They are deservedly despised by honorable persons, they excite the envy of the poor, and they are made gravely burdensome to themselves and others. But in spiritual things, acedia generates tepidity; and the tepid lead a miserable life: for they enjoy neither the pleasures of the world, which conscience forbids, nor the divine consolation which is reserved for the truly devout, but are contemptuously rejected by God, according to that saying: "I know your works, that you are neither cold nor hot; would that you were cold or hot! But because you are tepid, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit you out of my mouth."¹

¹ Apoc. 3:15-16.

Therefore let us burn with the fire of charity, lest we burn with the fire of tribulation: this ardor snatches us upward, to glorifying God, to relieving the neighbor, to cultivating the virtues, concerning which it remains to be treated.