On the Ultimate End of Human Acts, or the Foundation of Morality

1. Declaration of the title. Deservedly St. Thomas begins the moral part of the Summa theologica from the consideration of the ultimate end: for thus the connection between moral and dogmatic theology appears; since the morality of human acts ultimately depends on the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, this morality cannot be understood unless the ultimate end of man is first set forth. Thus also the question concerning the foundation or norm of morality, which today is agitated with great heat, can be solved: for below it will be demonstrated that the ultimate norm of morality is God, the ultimate end. Wherefore in one and the same treatise we treat concerning the ultimate end and concerning the norm of morality, because these are only two respects of one and the same question.

Division. There will therefore be two articles: the former concerning the ultimate end of man; the latter concerning the norm or foundation of morality.

I. Concerning the ultimate end of man:

• Preliminary matters: concerning end, good, perfection, beatitude.
• God as ultimate end, insofar as:
• He is to be formally glorified by us.
• He beatifies us.
• He is reached through Christ.
• Corollary: concerning the cooperation of God and man.

II. Concerning the norm of morality:

• Catholic norm:
• The intrinsic distinction between good and evil.
• God as the ultimate norm discriminating good and evil, and conscience as the proximate norm.
• God as the ultimate norm commanding.
• Corollary concerning sanction.
• Conclusion concerning the excellence of the Catholic norm.
• Non-Catholic systems:
• Utilitarianism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Kantism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Independent ethics: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Comparison between the Catholic norm and the others.

Since in Theology we use a twofold light, reason and faith together, here the end of man is treated, both natural and supernatural. Therefore we presuppose those things which in Philosophy were said concerning end, and which in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology we established concerning the elevation of man to the supernatural state.

Nevertheless, that the matters may be understood more clearly, we recall to memory the things more necessary to know: 1. concerning end, especially concerning the ultimate end; 2. concerning moral good, by which we tend toward the end; 3. concerning perfection, which is the complete evolution of this good; 4. concerning beatitude, which arises from perfection.

2. 1. Concerning end. (A) Notion. End in general is that toward which some being tends. Namely, every being, when it acts, tends toward something certain, determinate, and defined, which therefore is aptly called end, because it completes and, as it were, terminates the being itself; wherefore it is also called appetible, good, perfection.¹ And indeed every nature by its action spontaneously seeks its own perfection and completion. But man has this above other creatures, that he is master of his own operations, and thus not only is moved, but further moves himself toward his own end and good.²

¹ Properly speaking, "good either is an end, or is said in order to an end." Sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 1, ad 2. But "the end principally has the nature of good." Ibid., q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

² St. Thomas, De veritate, q. XXII, a. 1.

(B) Species. End is twofold: the end of the work and the end of the worker.

(a) The end of the work is that to which the work is destined by its own nature, independently of the intention of the agent: thus the relieving of a poor man is the end of almsgiving. This is called: 1. proximate, or intermediate, when it itself is ordered to another further end; 2. ultimate, however, when it is not ordered to another: ultimate in a certain respect, when it is such only in some series of things (for example, health with respect to medicine), ultimate absolutely and simply, when it is such in relation to all beings.

This ultimate end is more expressly called by St. Augustine "the end of our good,"¹ as it were the full completion of our good.

¹ De Civit. Dei, XIX, 1, P.L. XLI, 621.

Hence: a) the ultimate end, from its notion, is necessarily one; b) other goods cannot be desired except as beginnings or means relative to the ultimate end, and thus from the desiring of the ultimate end; c) our ultimate end and our perfect beatitude coincide: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite."²

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 8.

(b) The end of the worker is the motive on account of which the agent works: thus the end of the worker in almsgiving can be love of neighbor on account of God, or vain glory. This likewise is called proximate when it is so intended that something else is sought through it; ultimate, when one rests in it, and indeed either absolutely or in some series of operations.

3. 2. Concerning good. (A) Notion. Good in general is that which is fitting to some being, or that which terminates and quiets the appetite, or that which perfects a being. These notions complete one another: (a) indeed, that which is fitting to some nature is deservedly called good; (b) but a being deservedly quiets the appetite³ in the apprehension of some object fitting to itself; (c) on the other hand, it is perfected in the attainment of this good.⁴

³ Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas writes (I, q. 5, a. 1): "Good consists in this, that something is appetible"; and C. Gent., III, 3: "This belongs to the nature of good, that it terminates the appetite."

⁴ "Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect" (I, q. 5, a. 5).

(B) Species. Good is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delightful, and useful: honorable, that which perfects a rational being and therefore is consonant with right reason; delightful, that which brings some sense of delight; useful, that which is apt as a means for attaining some other good. - But since the useful good is not desired for its own sake, but insofar as it is a means for obtaining something else, there are only two genera of goods: honorable, which perfects rational nature, and delightful, which delights the appetite. It must likewise be noted that these two genera of goods are indeed diverse, but not necessarily opposed; for some delight can be honorable, namely when it is conformable to right reason.

The honorable good is also called moral, and is a certain reality perfecting and completing man in order to his end: for every being is called good insofar as it pursues its end and comes nearer to it. - Moral evil, on the contrary, is a certain defect of entity, in some way diminishing man, and turning him away from his end, or at least delaying him.

4. 3. Concerning perfection. (A) Notion. The perfection of some being is its complete evolution; for, as St. Thomas says, "that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking":¹ therefore it consists ultimately in the attainment of the end: "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing."²

¹ In 4 Sentent., q. 1, a. 4.

² St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.

Whence "the perfection of anything is its good";³ for perfection arises from the attainment of the end, which itself also is some good.

³ Cont. Gent., III, 16.

(B) Species. Perfection is twofold: absolute, in which a being totally attains its end; relative, by which a being tends toward the end because it will have attained it. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas says: "But each thing, if it lacks its proper perfection, is moved toward it, so far as it is in itself; but if it has it, it rests in it."⁴

⁴ C. Gent., III, 16.

5. 4. Concerning beatitude. (A) Beatitude, which belongs only to intellectual nature, when man is being treated is called "the perfect good of man,"⁵ or the stable possession of the perfect good; for it can be nothing other than that which perfectly befits him.

⁵ Sum. theol., Ia, q. 26, a. 1.

(B) It can be twofold: a) begun, which sufficiently, but not perfectly, quiets man; b) perfect, which totally quiets him, as it will be in the other life. Perfect beatitude, after Boethius, is described as a state perfected by the gathering together of all goods, or more accurately, the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul.

Division. With these things noted beforehand, we shall demonstrate that God is the ultimate end of man, and indeed in a twofold sense: 1. insofar as we are bound to tend toward Him by a free movement and to glorify Him; 2. insofar as in Him we find supreme beatitude; 3. we shall show that Christ is the mediator for glorifying God and attaining beatitude. Whence there will be a threefold thesis.

6. Thesis I: God is the ultimate end of man, in both the natural and supernatural order, insofar as we are bound to glorify Him formally, or by a free movement. It is certain.

It is declared. Irrational creatures tend toward God by necessity of nature and promote His glory only objectively, insofar as they are a trace of His perfections; rational creatures, such as man, are moved freely toward God and formally, or with full consciousness, glorify the Creator by praise, worship, love. - Here it is a question of external glory, which is defined as "clear knowledge with praise,"¹ or the rendering of honor to some person because of his excellence; but it is not a question of the internal glory of God, which consists in the knowledge and love of Himself, and cannot be increased.

¹ Sum. theol., Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 3.

Since man, from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator, nn. 152-176, was destined to a supernatural end, he ought to tend toward God not only in the natural order, but also in the supernatural order. Now the natural end of man consists in the knowledge and love of God proportioned to the powers of human nature; but man naturally does not see God intuitively, but knows Him deductively, understanding in some way His existence and attributes from those things which have been made. But there is another mode of knowing God, namely the mode by which God Himself knows Himself, by contemplating His own essence directly, immediately, intuitively. This mode, as altogether exceeding the proper powers of man and of the other creatures, is deservedly called supernatural.

7. It is proved. 1. God is the ultimate end of man in the natural order.

(A) God, in creating man, as a supremely intelligent being, had some end: for every intelligent being acts on account of an end. But God, supremely and infinitely perfect, cannot create on account of any other end than Himself; for every other end, as lower, is wholly unbecoming to Him. Therefore God created man on account of Himself.

(B) Every being is master of those things which it has produced, especially when it is the author of their whole being. But God created man from nothing, giving to him his whole being, and continuously conserving the same; therefore He is master of the whole man. But He would not truly be his master unless man ordered his life to God, by knowing, loving, and worshiping Him. Therefore man is bound to glorify God. - In other words: man, all that he is, is from God; therefore man, all that he is, depends on Him, and ought to tend toward Him by glorifying Him.

8. 2. That God is the ultimate end of man in the supernatural order is established from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator and concerning God the Consummator, where it is proved that man is destined to the beatific vision. Here let it suffice to relate the principal texts, from which it is evinced that men in heaven enjoy the immediate vision of God, are already adoptive sons of God, and that all things are to be referred to God.

(a) Men in heaven see God immediately and clearly: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known";¹ - "Beloved, now we are sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."² Therefore in heaven we shall see God face to face, that is, directly, immediately, intuitively; we shall see Him as He is, in the same mode (but not in the same degree) in which He sees Himself. But from Philosophy it is established that this is above all the powers and exigencies of man.

¹ I Cor., XIII, 12.

² I John, III, 2.

(b) By such an elevation we do not remain simply servants of God, but we are made partakers of the divine nature, and adoptive sons of God, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.³ For God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons,⁴ and as many as received Him, He gave them power to become sons of God.⁵ And indeed, since we are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying: Abba, Father;⁶ for the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God: but if sons, also heirs, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.¹ Whence John deservedly exclaims:² "See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called sons of God and be so." Now divine adoption and also inheritance are in no way owed to man.

³ Which we set forth in the treatise concerning Grace, 139-145.

⁴ Galat., IV, 5.

⁵ John, I, 12.

⁶ Galat., IV, 6.

¹ Rom., VIII, 16-17.

² I John, III, 1.

But to this beatific vision, and to the perfect love which follows it, we are disposed in the present life through the practice of supernatural virtues, and especially of faith, hope, and charity; and thus already we begin to glorify God.

9. (c) From this Scripture infers: 1. that all things were created on account of God, and therefore that all things are subject to His dominion, and conspire unto His glory: "For from Him, and through Him, and in Him (in Greek, eis auton, that is, on account of Him) are all things: to Him be glory forever."³ Therefore we are as things of God, and ought to act on account of Him: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord; therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."⁴ 2. Especially the works of the Incarnation, Redemption, and Sanctification tend unto the glory of God: thus, when Christ was born, the angels sing: Glory to God in the highest;⁵ but Christ, when about to die, says to the Father: "I have glorified Thee upon earth";⁶ the Blessed in heaven say:⁷ "Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power"; finally Christ Himself will be subject to Him who subjected all things to Himself, that God may be all in all.⁸ - From these things it is deservedly inferred that God is the ultimate end, toward which we ought to tend, by promoting His glory: "All things are yours, but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."⁹

³ Rom., XI, 36; cf. Hebr., II, 10; Apoc., XXI, 6; Ps. XVIII, 2.

⁴ Rom., XIV, 7-8.

⁵ Luke, II, 14.

⁶ John, XVII, 14.

⁷ Apoc., IV, 11.

⁸ I Cor., XV, 28.

⁹ I Cor., IV, 22-23.

10. Thesis II: God is the ultimate end of man in the natural and supernatural order, insofar as in Him alone we find supreme beatitude. It is certain.

It is declared. The Vatican Council¹⁰ deservedly declares that God created the world "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures." For God, since He is the fullness of being, is altogether sufficient to Himself, and in the possession of Himself is perfectly blessed; for beatitude consists in the possession of the good which totally satisfies and quiets the appetite; but God, by possessing Himself, infinitely perfect, possesses such a good, since there is nothing outside God which is not already eminently contained in Him; therefore God did not create man in order to obtain something for Himself. - On the other hand, He proposed to Himself some end; therefore He willed to impart His perfection to others in some way, namely by communicating to them some participation of His being and of His beatitude.

¹⁰ Sess. III, cap. I.

11. It is proved: 1. By reason. For true beatitude two things are required and suffice: the possession of the perfect good, which totally quiets every legitimate desire, and the stable or interminable possession of this good. For (a) if we investigate the matter metaphysically, an imperfect good is not appetible for its own sake, but only on account of another, and therefore does not confer true and integral beatitude; on the other hand, if the good possessed is lost or can be lost, beatitude already fails: for that which passes cannot quiet the immortal desires of man. (b) Psychologically the same is established: when we look into our inward aspirations, we are conscious that we wish to attain perfect beatitude by fully developing our faculties, and that we wish to live not only for a long time, but perpetually.

But this possession of the perfect and perennial good is not found in created goods, but in God alone.

12. (A) Man cannot attain beatitude in created goods.¹ For these are of three kinds: external goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But goods of this kind, although in manifold respect they are desirable, lack the two aforesaid conditions.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 1-8; Cont. Gent., lib. III, cap. 26-36; Suarez, De ultimo fine hominis, disp. V; Meyer, t. I, n. 59-60; P. Lescoeur, La Science du Bonheur, Paris, 1873, pp. 9-44; 110-144; 321-341.

(a) External goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, etc.: 1. are not appetible of themselves, but only on account of another, insofar as they help toward procuring goods of soul or body; thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, honors suppose that some excellence is present in a man, but they do not confer it. - Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man; for often the more riches and honors abound, the more they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness of life; furthermore, many other things necessary for felicity can be lacking to those who have all these things, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc.

2. Nor are they stable; for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are possessed with solicitude, and at length sometime they pass away at the time of death.

13. (b) Goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, beauty, and the delight of the senses, do not confer true felicity: 1. by their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul; for what does strength of body profit, if the mind is weak and the will depraved? Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate desires of man; for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore do not satisfy the nobler faculties of the soul; indeed, when someone indulges immoderately in bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, morals are corrupted, and man, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them contrary to the right order of reason, becomes like a beast.

2. Moreover, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it.

14. (c) Goods of the soul, namely those which are acquired through the exercise of the faculties, such as wisdom and virtue, indeed contribute more to man's felicity, especially when they are found joined together with the moderate and legitimate use of the other goods, but they do not perfectly satisfy our desires. For the adequate object of the intellect and will is not any truth or good whatsoever, but universal truth and good, which is found only in God. 1. And indeed our intellect is so constituted that from the knowledge of finite beings it rises to the knowledge of the infinite, and from the notion of particular truths it in some way reaches to universal truth itself. Hence, however great may be the breadth of things which it knows, it wishes to learn many more things, and curiously to search out things unknown. 2. The same must be said of the will, which is able to rest only in the absolute good; wherefore friendship, even the most perfect, which brings friends so many and such great consolations, at least for a time, does not fulfill the desires of the heart; hence the noblest men exclaim with Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee."¹

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, n. 1, apud Migne, P.L., XXXII, 661.

15. (B) Man finds his beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, or in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

Here it is a question of knowledge and love of God relatively perfect, that is, with respect to the capacity of each man: for absolute perfection belongs to the infinite alone. But man is truly blessed when his capacity, whatever it may be, is sufficiently fulfilled.

It is proved. The supreme good of each being is known from its nature, faculties, and legitimate tendencies: for the most wise Creator placed these in it, as a manifest sign of its destination. But since man's proper faculties are intellect and will, he is perfectly blessed when faculties of this kind rest in the attainment of their object. Now the intellect and will of man, from what has been said, are capable of all truth and good, or of universal good and truth. Therefore they are perfectly satisfied when, according to their capacity, they know and love God, who alone is the highest truth and the highest good.

16. It is declared. 1. Man attains knowledge and love of God only imperfectly in the present life, whether naturally through reason or supernaturally through faith: for he is on the way in relation to perfection, and daily ought to reach a higher degree; and consequently he attains greater felicity the more perfectly he orders his whole life to God.

2. It must likewise be noted that for perfect beatitude the legitimate satiety of man's sensitive faculties is desired. This indeed does not belong to the essence of beatitude, but to its natural complement. For the sensitive faculties are truly a part of man, although subordinated to the intellectual powers; therefore they ought to be subjected to the spiritual part, and to aid it in attaining beatitude; and since the tendencies of these faculties are diverse among themselves, and also often contrary to the higher tendencies of the soul, in the present life they ought to be mortified, so that the spiritual man may be able more easily to attain his end. Nevertheless, when they are subjected to the will, they can attain a certain proper felicity even in the present life;¹ but in the future life, when the struggle between body and soul has ended, the sensitive faculties will enjoy legitimate joys more fully.

¹ The matter can be demonstrated historically, by showing that those who turn themselves to God are much happier than those who turn themselves away from Him. Cf. Baunard, op. cit., and La Foi et ses victoires, 7th ed., Paris, 1901-1902.

17. 2. By authority. (A) In the Old Testament, again and again Moses and the Prophets, the Sapiential books and the Psalms call him blessed who loves God from his whole mind, from his whole heart, and with all his powers, but unhappy him who departs from the way of God.

Ecclesiastes declares this clearly: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."² For indeed he had rejoiced in riches and pleasures, but in all these he had found nothing except vanity and affliction of spirit: "I enlarged my works, I built houses for myself and planted vineyards... And all

² Eccles., I, 14.

which my eyes desired, I did not deny them, nor did I forbid my heart from enjoying every pleasure... And when I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweat in vain, I saw in all things vanity and affliction of soul, and nothing remaining under the sun."¹ Wherefore he passed over to contemplating wisdom, and proposed to investigate all things which are done under the sun, but soon recognized that in these also there is labor and affliction of spirit, and that there is one and the same end of the wise man and the fool; whence again he exclaims: "If the end of me and the fool shall be one, what does it profit me that I have given greater labor to wisdom?... And therefore my life wearied me, seeing all evils under the sun, and all things vanity and affliction of spirit."²

¹ Eccles., II, 4-11.

² Eccles., II, 15-18.

(B) In the New Testament, Christ defines the conditions of perfect and eternal beatitude throughout the whole Gospel, but especially in the sermon on the mount, where He proclaims blessed those who, willingly renouncing earthly things, serve God alone, love Him perfectly, and their neighbor on account of God, and thus pursue the kingdom of God. Wherefore the Apostle, writing concerning piety, which embraces love of God and neighbor, exhibits it as most efficacious for earthly and eternal beatitude: "But piety is profitable for all things, having promise of the life which now is and of that which is to come."³

³ I Tim., IV, 8.

Therefore man's beatitude is found in God alone; therefore God is our end insofar as He is the author of our beatitude.

18. Conclusion. From this it is inferred that the glory of God and the beatitude of man are connected intimately, not only extrinsically from the will of God, but also intrinsically, from the very nature of the matter, and in fact fall back into the same thing: for man is blessed by glorifying God, and by pursuing true beatitude he glorifies God: for by the same acts of knowledge and love of God each end is acquired, and deservedly St. Thomas⁴ says: "God does not seek His glory on account of Himself, but on account of us."

⁴ Sum. theol., IIa IIae, q. 131, a. 1 ad 1.

If, however, we compare one end with the other, the glory of God is the primary ultimate end, man's beatitude the secondary end, since this beatitude by its nature is referred to glorifying God and is subordinated to Him. Therefore let us do all things for the greater glory of God, and by that very fact we shall be blessed.

For attaining each end, we need Christ as mediator.

19. Thesis III: For glorifying God and attaining eternal beatitude, man, in the present state, needs the grace of Christ the Redeemer. It is certain.

It is declared. In the treatise concerning God the Creator we proved that man, raised to the supernatural state, fell, and in the treatise concerning the Incarnate Word that the same man was redeemed by the infinite satisfactions and merits of Christ, so that the Lord is the necessary mediator to God. Therefore it will be enough to touch briefly on a matter proved elsewhere.

It is proved. 1. Christ is the perfect mediator of religion, by whom we are able to glorify God: "One mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as a redemption for all."¹ Hence St. Peter exhorts all that they honor God through Christ: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ."²

¹ I Tim., II, 5.

² I Peter, IV, 11.

In reality the Lord instituted the sacrifice of the Mass, in which anew He offers Himself to the Father as a victim of praise, not only in His own name but in our name, since He is truly the head of the mystical body of which we are members. Moreover, through holy communion, He communicates Himself to us with the spirit of religion, so that through Him and with Him and in Him, not only at the very moment of communion, but throughout the whole day, we may be able to glorify God, by offering our actions to the Father with Christ as so many spiritual victims.

2. Christ is also the perfect mediator of sanctification, insofar as He merited for us all graces by which we may be able to attain perfection and beatitude. For He Himself not only revealed to us the truth which we ought to believe, nor only showed by His virtues the way which we ought to follow, but also merited all graces by which we are able not only to be freed from sin but also to cultivate all virtues, and we tend toward eternal beatitude: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life³... And for them I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth⁴... Blessed be God... who has blessed us with every blessing in the heavens in Christ⁵..." - Therefore Jesus is not only the exemplary cause, but also the meritorious cause of our justification: "The causes of this sanctification," says Trent,¹ "are indeed the final cause: the glory of God and of Christ and eternal life; but the efficient cause: the merciful God... and the meritorious cause: His most beloved Only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us and satisfied God the Father for us."

³ John, XIV, 6.

⁴ John, XVII, 19.

⁵ Ephes., I, 3.

¹ Sess. VI, cap. VII (Denzing., 799).

There is, therefore, an obligation of tending toward God the ultimate end, of glorifying Him, and thus of attaining salvation through Christ.

20. Corollary. From this it follows that the means for attaining our end are the cooperation of God and of ourselves.

A) Namely, God, out of superabundant goodness, makes deiform the essence and faculties of the soul which He created, through habitual grace, infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit; moreover He not only assists the exercise of human faculties through natural concurrence, but also fittingly elevates it through actual graces. But God provides these internal supernatural means, in order that He may accommodate Himself to human nature, constituted of soul and body, through external means, especially through the Sacraments.

B) Thus elevated and made a partaker of the divine nature, man moves himself freely to the end, by acting under God and with Him cooperating, according to the norm of the precepts imposed by God both naturally and supernaturally, with Christ as leader and helper, the perfect exemplar and meritorious cause of all virtues.

This indeed will be clearer from what is to be said concerning the norm of morality.

That man may attain his end, he needs a rule or norm to which he may render his deliberate acts conformable. This norm can be twofold: general or fundamental, by which a distinction is established between good and evil, obligatory acts and non-obligatory acts; special, by which it is determined in species which actions are licit or not, commanded or not. Here it is a question only of the general norm.

We shall set forth: 1. the Christian norm of morality; 2. various systems of non-Catholics.

21. State of the question. From the things said concerning the ultimate end it is permitted to infer what is the true norm of morality, or that rule by which the distinction is constituted between good and evil acts, between acts obligatory or not. For since the perfection of man consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, actions which tend toward God are good, but those which turn us away from Him are evil; those which are necessary to the end are obligatory, those which are only useful are non-obligatory. We shall weigh three things: 1. whether there is an intrinsic distinction between good and evil; 2. what is the norm discriminating between good and evil; 3. what is the commanding norm, or that which imposes obligation.

As to the first question, certain things are to be noted beforehand.

That there is some distinction between good and evil all philosophers of sound mind admit, but they by no means agree concerning its nature.

(A) For not a few contend that the reason of this distinction arose from man himself: (a) namely from civil laws, according to Hobbes (1588-1679), who teaches that the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, are civil laws, and therefore that is to be held as good which the legislator has commanded, that as evil which he himself has forbidden;¹ this theory J. J. Rousseau renewed and many modern politicians embrace; (b) from education, according to Montaigne (1533-1592); or from public opinion and the tradition of peoples, as Saint-Lambert² held (1717-1803); or from the evolution of social sense, as the evolutionists hold.

¹ Hobbes, Elementa philosophica de Cive, c. XII, § 1.

² St-Lambert, Principes des moeurs chez toutes les nations, Paris, 1798. - To this also pertains the opinion of those who, with Levy-Bruhl (La Science des moeurs, Paris, Alcan, 1904), hold that ethics is occupied with morals as they exist, not with duties to be fulfilled: for these duties, they say, arise only from social influence (pression sociale); these A. Fouillee refuted in the periodical Rev. des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1, 1905, p. 519-550.

(B) Some teach that the distinction between honorable and dishonorable acts must be placed in the free will of God, so that, before every law and apart from God's good pleasure, what is good and what is evil cannot be defined; thus Scotus, Descartes, and Samuel Pufendorf³ (1632-1694).

³ Pufendorf, De jure naturae et Gentium, l. I, c. 2, § 6.

Against these we shall establish that at least certain actions, from their own nature, independently of every will, are good or evil, and that this distinction is ultimately to be placed in the divine reason or nature, which is the supreme norm of good and evil.

22. Thesis I: There are certain actions intrinsically good or evil, even if they had been commanded or prohibited by no law, even divine law. - We indeed confess that there are many actions which are morally good for this reason, that they have been commanded by some divine or human law, and others similarly evil, because they have been prohibited; but there are certain actions which are commanded or prohibited for this reason, that in themselves they are honorable or dishonorable. - This indeed is declared rather than demonstrated.

23. 1. Historically and psychologically it is established that there are certain actions which, by the common and perpetual persuasion of men, have always been held as essentially honorable or dishonorable; thus, for example, to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, and other things of this kind, are deservedly reputed good; on the contrary, to pursue parents with hatred,¹ to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to utter a lie harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are deservedly judged as something base and dishonorable.² This persuasion indeed flourishes among all nations, even barbarous ones, nor is it diminished or lost except when the moral sense is diminished or destroyed.

¹ There are indeed barbarians who cultivate piety toward parents in a singular way, for example by killing the aged, lest they suffer bitter pains longer or be reduced to captivity by enemies; thus they indeed err concerning the manner of cultivating piety, but not concerning the obligation itself of loving parents.

² J. L. de Lanessan confesses (La Morale des Religions, Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 557) that in all religions, whether ancient or modern, these duties are found prescribed. - It is evident, on the other hand, from the things to be said below, n. 213, concerning the existence of natural law.

But so constant and universal a persuasion, deeply inhering in minds so diverse and disagreeing about almost all other things, does not arise from civil law, which is diverse among various nations, nor from education or public opinion, which likewise is not the same among diverse peoples, but is derived from nature itself. For public opinion is nothing else than the manifestation of ideas which flourish among individual citizens; education transmits only notions which appeared rational to ancestors; if therefore the distinction between good and evil is recognized by all today, that surely cannot arise except from the common persuasion that such a distinction is so consonant with reason that it draws its origin from nature itself.

Nor can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution of God; for just as there are certain speculative truths which are true independently of the divine will (for example, that which is, is; two and two make four, etc.), so likewise there are certain moral actions which of themselves are so honorable or dishonorable that not even the divine will can change their morality; for example, God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor piety a sin: this will be clear from the following argument.

24. 2. Philosophically it is established that an essential distinction must be admitted between good and evil. (a) For from what has been said, every action which tends toward God, the supreme good and ultimate end, cannot fail to be good. But certain actions, considered through themselves, independently of every law, tend toward God in this way; for example, love of God and of neighbor rightly ordered is so disposed in relation to the ultimate end and the common good, that no one of sound mind can say that acts of this kind are depraved; on the contrary, contempt of God, His existence being posited, the unjust killing of the innocent, and other things of this kind are so opposed to right reason that they can never be honorable. Therefore, by the judgment of right reason, these actions can only be good, while the contrary acts are necessarily evil.

(b) This indeed is also clear from the consequences of the contrary opinion; for if there is no essential and objective distinction between good and evil, a broad way is opened to moral skepticism; for that which today is held as evil, tomorrow, with laws or tradition or education changed, can be held as licit; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes. For obligation is conceived as something permanent and universal, prescribing certain actions not hypothetically but categorically, while civil laws or traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can create only hypothetical obligation. Therefore, with this distinction removed, by that very fact the moral order falls, as will be still more clear from the things to be said below concerning other systems of ethics.

25. Thesis II: The ultimate discriminating norm of morality is God Himself, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end of all things; but the proximate norm, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, whether in itself or in its relations with others.

It is declared rather than proved. Although all Catholics agree concerning the substance of the norm of morality, nevertheless they differ as to the mode of explaining the same. For all admit that God is the ultimate norm of morality; but, according to some, this norm is the divine essence itself; according to others, it is the divine reason or eternal law,¹ or conformity with divine reason or with the natural order of things. Again, as to the proximate norm for man, some assert that it is man's rational nature, others that it is right reason or conscience.² But these are various modes which, when rightly explained, fall back into the same thing.³

¹ Thus, for example, St. Thomas (Ia IIae, q. 21, a. 1): "But in those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Therefore whenever a man's act proceeds toward the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is turned aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin."

² Concerning these various systems, cf. Meyer, op. cit., n. 181-185; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 22-23; Cathrein, Philosophia Moralis, 3rd ed., 1900, Freiburg, n. 84-95.

³ For some hand down the principally objective norm (the nature of God, the rational nature of man), others the directly subjective and indirectly objective norm (divine reason, right reason); but since divine reason infallibly perceives the divine nature itself, and right human reason judges of things according to man's rational nature, the difference is rather in the mode of speaking than in the thing itself.

1. We have said that the ultimate norm of morality is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and ultimate end. (a) That is the ultimate norm of morality from which, as from a fundamental principle, acts derive their goodness. But God, supreme goodness and the source of all perfection, by that very fact is the fundamental principle of every goodness. Therefore God is the ultimate norm of morality, and therefore our actions are morally good or evil according as they are conformable or deformed in relation to the divine goodness. (b) That is the supreme norm of morality according to which acts attain their ultimate end: for, from what has been said, every being is good insofar as it attains its ultimate end. But God is the ultimate end of all things, and especially of the rational creature, and therefore of human acts. Therefore God is the supreme norm of morality. Therefore human acts are good when they tend explicitly or implicitly toward God, evil when they decline from the ultimate end.

Thus moral goodness depends neither exclusively nor primarily on the divine good pleasure, but ultimately on His wisdom and goodness: for God wills nothing except what is consonant with His infinite wisdom, and wisdom approves nothing except what is consonant with the divine nature itself, or infinite good. Therefore they err who say that the Christian norm of morality is arbitrary, as resting on the free and blind will of God. Even when God promulgates positive laws, He prescribes nothing except what He sees to be good, since His will is not really separated from His wisdom and goodness.

26. 2. We have said besides that the proximate norm of morality, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, in itself and in its relations with others.

(A) The proximate norm of morality is rational nature. It is proved: (a) in a deductive manner. Every being is good insofar as it attains its end, from what was said above. But it does not attain its end except by perfecting acts conformable to its nature; therefore man acts well by following his rational nature. This is valid especially for man, who, created to the image of God, participates in His goodness in some way. Therefore, by following our rational nature, by that very fact we live conformably with the divine nature and tend toward our ultimate end.

(b) In an inductive manner. Good is called that which perfects us, but evil that which depresses us; but it is established by experience that we are perfected by the harmonious and hierarchical exercise of our faculties, so that the sensitive faculties, as lower, are subjected to the higher reason.¹ Therefore we are perfected by acting according to our rational nature.

¹ A. Eymieu, La Loi de la Vie, demonstrates this by many facts, and concludes, p. 157: "... Life, every life composed of diverse elements, exists, lasts, and develops only on the condition that the superior element coordinate and therefore subordinate, dominate, the elements which compose it, and subject them to itself in order to use them."

(B) The proximate norm of morality is nature considered integrally, that is, according to all its parts, both rational and sensitive or vegetative, insofar as these parts also are truly human and ought to be subjected to reason; indeed, even according to the individuating notes proper to each one, namely his temperament, character, propensities, special duties and offices, etc. For human nature ought to be considered not in the abstract, but in the concrete: for it can happen that what is licit to one becomes illicit to another, because, with attention given to his character or condition, it is evil, or at least proximately inducing to evil.

(C) Again, the nature of each man must be considered not only in itself, but in its relations with other men, and also with beings inferior to him, or superior, and especially with God, to whom it is subordinated as to its end.

(D) Since in the present state man is destined to a supernatural end through Christ the Redeemer, man's nature must be considered as Christian, aided by grace and subject to supernatural laws.

27. Conclusion. (a) These things being posited, an action is deservedly called good which is truly consonant with the integral nature of man, and is exhibited to right reason as honorable.¹ For when we pursue the good proportioned to our rational nature, toward which we are naturally inclined, we cannot act badly in the moral order; otherwise the defect would be poured back upon the author of nature Himself. Deservedly therefore St. Thomas² says: "For each one, that is good which is connatural and proportioned to him." - From this it follows that the ancient precept "live according to nature" is legitimate, provided it is rightly understood, in the sense explained.

¹ I say honorable, because the delightful or useful is not always consonant with reason, and therefore is not morally good.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1; cf. q. 29, a. 1. - That the matter may be declared by examples, temperance is something good, but intemperance something evil, because it is consonant with rational nature that we use food and drink only moderately for perfecting the whole man; so also acts of justice are good, because it is consonant with rational nature considered in its relations with others that to each one his own right be rendered.

28. (b) Since we have been raised to the supernatural order, God has manifested His will to us not only by the light of reason, but also by the light of faith, by which we know the divine ordering of things in a more perfect and more certain manner. Indeed, the Son of God, made man, led a human life, and by cultivating natural and supernatural virtues, showed the way to attaining the end not only by precepts but by examples, and thus handed down to us a living rule of morals. This rule is briefly contracted in these words: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."¹ For since our perfection consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, namely God the supreme good, we ought, as far as possible, to imitate the divine morals, adhering to the footsteps of Christ.

¹ Matt., V, 48.

29. Thesis III: The ultimate commanding norm of morality (that is, imposing moral obligation) is God the supreme legislator, or the divine command moderated by wisdom; the proximate norm is the necessary connection with the ultimate end perceived by reason.

The first part is proved. (A) Among the goods which lead us to the ultimate end, some are truly necessary for attaining the end, either of themselves or from the wise will of God, but others are only useful. But God, infinitely good and perfect, cannot fail to command those things which are necessary to the end; otherwise He would not truly will the end itself. Therefore He wills certain goods to be truly obligatory. - Other goods, however, which are only useful, He does not command; and these are matters of counsel.

(B) On the other hand, God alone, by reason of the supreme dominion by which He alone has power over all wills, has the right of imposing those things which He wisely judges to be necessary for the end. But He manifests His will both by natural law, manifested through conscience, and by positive law: concerning which things the treatise concerning Laws treats.

30. The second part is proved, or the proximate norm is the necessary connection of actions with the ultimate end. For the will is invincibly borne toward that which is supremely appetible, namely toward beatitude, which is found in the ultimate end. But there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily connected with beatitude or the ultimate end. Therefore there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily to be desired, or as morally obligatory. On the other hand, there are other goods whose connection with beatitude is not established, and these are only matters of counsel.

Therefore the proximate norm of obligation is the necessary connection of acts with the ultimate end or beatitude, perceived by reason.

31. Corollary. Besides the norm of morality and of obligation, there must be admitted a certain sanction, by force of which those acting honorably receive some reward and those acting badly undergo punishments.

(A) From the things said above, n. 10, God willed that men acting honorably should find their beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, and that those acting perversely should find, in the loss of the end, the lack of beatitude, and therefore supreme unhappiness. This is the primary and best sanction, flowing from the very nature of things and the divine ordering, or from a certain immanent justice, by force of which virtue ultimately obtains beatitude and vice is punished by the privation of the same.

(B) On the other hand, right reason shows that some sanction is necessary; for, (a) God, as infinitely wise, good, and just, must establish order in the moral order as equally as in the physical order. But the moral order requires that beatitude not be separated from good, at least at the end, since beatitude is nothing other than the quiet possession of good.

(b) God can be considered as ruler and guardian of the moral society, whose members are individual rational beings, and therefore He ought to provide for the common good of that society; but He would not wisely do this unless He rewarded the good and punished the evil; for, given human nature as it exists, many, enticed by passions, will violate the moral order and disturb the peace of society, unless they are deterred from evil by fear of punishments; on the other hand, unless reward is granted to the good, not a few of those who wish to cultivate virtue, broken in spirit because of the innumerable difficulties by which they are beset, and not strengthened by hope of some recompense, will abandon the arduous path of perfection, and soon will increase the number of violators of the law. Therefore, as wise provider and ruler of society, God ought to reward the good and punish the evil.

32. From the things thus far set forth it is clear that the Catholic norm of morality, such as it has been explained, is at once consonant with reason and most excellently accommodated to human nature.

For this it is required and sufficient that this norm be: 1. lucid, complete, and accommodated to all; 2. that it provide motives apt for doing good; 3. that it supply efficacious means for fulfilling duty. But these three things are found in the Catholic norm:

1. A neat, complete rule, accommodated to all; since: (a) it clearly sets forth the distinction between good and evil, between duties and counsels, by showing that good is that which is consonant with divine wisdom and will, insofar as it is manifested by right conscience, but evil that which is contrary to this will; duty is that which is wisely commanded by God as a necessary means to the ultimate end; counsel is that which is useful but not necessary to the end.

(b) It commands all duties: 1. toward God, whom, as Creator, Lord, and Father, we ought to reverence, love, and worship; 2. toward neighbor, whom we ought to love as an adoptive son of God and brother in Christ, and whose rights we ought to protect; 3. toward family and society, by revering the very authority of God in parents and rulers; 4. toward ourselves, by polishing through the practice of virtues the image and likeness of God impressed upon our minds.

(c) It is accommodated to all: by its perspicuity it can be understood by the simple, since it sets forth duties not abstractly but concretely; by its profundity it pleases philosophers, since it places the reasons of good and evil, of duty and counsel, in the highest cause.

2. It provides motives most apt for acting well: to deter from evil, it excites fear of God and of punishments; for cultivating virtues, it raises hope by the consideration of rewards; for acting perfectly, it fosters love of God and neighbor; and thus progressively it snatches men from vices and lifts them to the summit of virtues.

3. It supplies most efficacious means, namely:

1. The examples of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Saints, which more efficaciously than words draw even the weak to the perfection of Christian life;

2. Innumerable graces, which, whether through visible signs or sacraments, or in a merely internal manner, perfect our faculties, increase spiritual powers, and render the observance of the commandments not only possible but also easy for all those who, conscious of their own weakness, trustingly invoke the help of God.

This will also be clearer from a simple exposition of the systems of non-Catholics.

33. Innumerable are the systems devised by various philosophers concerning the foundation or norm of morality. Yet the principal ones can be reduced to two genera, which we shall weigh historically and critically. These are: 1. utilitarianism, to which modern evolutionism has succeeded, according to which the norm of morality is utility or pleasure, whether individual or social; 2. rationalism, which seeks the norm of morality from human reason alone; of which there is especially a twofold form: stoicism, whether ancient or modern (Kantism), which contends that the norm of morality is moral obligation itself, or duty, independently of any utility or pleasure, and independently of God; and the system of independent ethics, which is explained in diverse ways by diverse authors, as will be declared below.

34. Utilitarianism, which is also called hedonism (hedone, pleasure), or eudaemonism (eudaimonia, beatitude), places the ultimate good of man and his ultimate end in felicity, or pleasure, so that actions are to be called good which, after a prudent estimation of things has been made, bring more pleasure than pain. Therefore the supreme rule is: "Pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled." - A twofold utilitarianism is distinguished: individual utilitarianism, which regards only the pleasure of the individual; social utilitarianism, which regards also the felicity of others and of the whole human race.

¹ L. Carrau, with great erudition, described utilitarianism historically and critically, La morale utilitaire, Paris, 1874; cf. M. de Baets, Les Bases de la Morale, Paris and Ghent, 1892, p. 37-79.

35. (A) Among the ancients, the principal favorers of individual utilitarianism were Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus (hence the name Epicureanism), Democritus, Lucretius; among the moderns, La Mettrie, Condillac, Helvetius, Diderot, Feuerbach, and others. The summary of Epicurus's doctrine is this:² experience establishes that the supreme rule of life, common to men and beasts, is flight from pain and pursuit of pleasure: for to this nature impels us. Nevertheless we do not embrace every pleasure; for we observe that sometimes greater pains follow from pleasure, and that from the toleration of pains greater delight often follows; wherefore the wise man uses things moderately, and chooses those actions which, all things considered, throughout the whole course of life finally bring more pleasure than pain. - And in this he is distinguished from Aristippus, who admitted only present pleasure as the norm of morality.

² Guyau, La morale d'Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan; cf. L. Carrau, op. cit., p. 10-36.

A nobler form of eudaemonism Aristotle had proposed, the Stagirite, born in Thrace, disciple of Socrates and Plato, according to whom the norm of morality is situated in the highest good of man, such as can be obtained in the present life; but that good consists not in the pleasure of the senses, nor in some state or potentiality of the soul, but in the activity proper to rational man, whose completion is had in the contemplation of honorable and divine things.¹

¹ L. Olle-Laprune, Essai sur la Morale d'Aristote, Paris, 1881.

36. (B) Social utilitarianism was advocated, among others, by Francis Bacon² (1561-1626), who held that the common good, or public utility, is the rule of morals; Hartley (1705-1757) and Paley, who likewise taught that one's own advantage does not suffice for morality, but that benevolence toward others, or sympathy, is also required;³ but especially J. Bentham (1747-1832) and Stuart Mill (1806-1873) perfected and completed that system. As a general principle they defend that the norm of morality must be placed not only in private good, but also in social good, or in the felicity of all men.

² Apud Carrau, p. 40-56; Guyau lucidly sets forth the various systems of the English concerning moral matters, La Morale anglaise contemporaine, Paris, Alcan.

³ Apud Carrau, p. 143-165.

37. Bentham⁴ contends that the method of experimental observation alone, commended by Bacon, is to be employed in moral matters: "What experience is for the physicist," he says, "that observation is for the moralist."

⁴ Bentham, Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation, 1789; Traites de Legislation civile et penale, a work extracted from the manuscripts of Bentham by E. Dumont, Paris, 1820; cf. Carrau, p. 167-217.

(a) Now by observation he finds that all men seek delight and flee pain; therefore, he says, every delight is some good and ought to be sought, while every pain is some evil which ought to be avoided.

(b) Therefore man ought to tend toward the greatest possible sum of delightful good in the whole course of life, with a calculation of things employed, which he calls deontological, namely by comparatively estimating delightful and painful things according to intensity, duration, proximity, extension, purity, and fecundity, which he computes in an arithmetical manner.¹

¹ Thus he compares drunkenness and sobriety, or temperance:

Drunkenness: intensity + 30; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity - 20; extension - 20; fecundity - 10 = 20.

Sobriety: intensity + 20; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity + 30; extension + 20; fecundity + 20 = 130.

Therefore sobriety is worth more than drunkenness. - But what is to be understood by characters of this kind, he himself declares: "The value of pains and pleasures can be estimated by their intensity, their duration, their proximity, their certainty, and their extent. Their intensity, their duration, their proximity, and their certainty regard individuals. Their extent concerns the number of persons placed under their influence... A fecund pleasure is one which has the chance of being followed by pleasures of the same kind. A fecund pain is one which has the chance of being followed by pains of the same kind. A pure pleasure is one which does not have the chance of producing pains. A pure pain is one which does not have the chance of producing pleasures." (Deontologie, t. I, p. 77; Traites de legislation, t. I, p. 58.)

(c) Although man acts on account of a principle that is in itself egoistic, he contributes something to the felicity of others; for, given that men are constituted in society, an intimate and necessary relation exists between general and individual felicity, so that the felicity of one redounds to others and vice versa. Therefore the supreme principle of morality is reduced to this: Direct your activity in such a way that it produces the greatest sum of felicity and the least of pain, not only for yourself, but also for others, or at least for the greatest number of other men. But in a case of collision, place your own felicity before the felicity of others.

38. Stuart Mill² polished that system and propagated it widely; for he taught that delightful goods are to be measured not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, and that those which are of a higher order are much more excellent and to be esteemed far more than those which are of the lowest order; from this he infers that the felicity which is found in the exercise of virtue is to be preferred to the pleasure which arises from the senses. Moreover, according to him, at first indeed we do good to others in order that we may procure our own felicity; but afterward, abstracting from our own advantage, we directly intend the felicity of others; this disposition indeed can and ought to be increased in the young by education. Thus explained, utilitarianism does not differ much from the eclectic system, in which the norm of morals is situated in right reason.

² S. Mill, Utilitarianism, rendered into French, L'Utilitarisme, Paris, Alcan; cf. Carrau, p. 227-268. - Recently Sidgwick adhered to the same system, Methods of Ethics; cf. Fouillee, Critique des syst. de Morale contemporains, 3rd ed., Paris, 1893, p. 36-38.

39. (C) To social utilitarianism succeeded another form of utilitarianism, which is accommodated to the theories of evolution; whose principal favorers were in England: Herbert Spencer¹ (1820-1904), and C. Darwin² (1809-1882); but in France, A. Comte,³ Littre and Taine⁴ defended almost the same system under the name of positivism; to these can be added M. Guyau, who has as the rule of morals the intensity and expansion of life;⁵ Bourgeois, Payot, and many others who today advocate solidarity.⁶

¹ H. Spencer, The Principles of Ethics, London and New York, 1900; idem, Les Bases de la Morale evolutioniste, Paris, Alcan; cf. F. H. Collins, Resume de la Philosophie de H. Spencer, translated by H. de Varigny, Paris, 1891, p. 513-542; J. Halleux, L'Evolutionisme en Morale, Louvain, 1901.

² Darwin, The Origin of Species; The Descent of Man; in French: L'origine des especes; La Descendance de l'homme, translated by E. Barbier, Paris, Schleicher.

³ A. Comte, Cours de Philosophie positive; Politique positive; L. Levy-Bruhl, La Philosophie d'A. Comte, Paris, 1900, p. 349-394.

⁴ Littre, La Science au point de vue philosophique; Taine, Les Philosophes francais au XIXe siecle; cf. Fouillee, Critique des systemes de Morale, p. 39-56.

⁵ Guyau, Esquisse d'une Morale; idem, Education et heredite, Paris, Alcan. - Man, he says in the cited work, pursues good from the fact that he naturally desires to expand his life: for when he becomes conscious of his powers, he wishes to exercise them; by instinct and education he understands the necessity of living not only for himself but for others; but he overcomes difficulties by a certain natural desire of going to meet dangers and arduous things; and thus he progresses daily.

⁶ L. Bourgeois, Solidarite, Paris (Colin); idem, Essai d'une Philosophie de la solidarite, Alcan; Payot, Cours de Morale, Paris, 1904.

The foundation of this system is the theory of evolution, by force of which higher beings proceed from lower beings by a long process: thus living things drew their origin from non-living things, animals from plants, men from beasts; men themselves first lived for a long time in a state of barbarism, but afterward were gradually made more cultivated. Now morals followed almost the same evolution. In the beginning indeed men, scarcely distinct from beasts, imitated the morals of beasts, and sought nothing except their own advantage; but afterward, living in groups, they gradually understood that they could not seek their own pleasure with the detriment of others: for those to whom injury is done do not hesitate to seek punishments; to avoid these, it is better to suffer something, or to abstain from some pleasure; and thus under the influence of society in which men are united, from egoism is born altruism, or the inclination toward promoting the felicity of others, so that one's own advantage may be better procured.⁶

⁶ Littre tries to explain the origin of altruism in another way: there are, he says, two essential functions in man, nutrition, by which the life of the individual is preserved, and generation, by which the human species is propagated. Now nutrition indeed produces egoism, but generation promotes altruism by fostering love. (Apud Fouillee, op. cit., p. 41.) This Fouillee deservedly rejects; for altruism which arises from generation extends only to a few, and often excites egoism, indeed hatred, against strangers. But he himself thinks that love toward others arises from a purely intellectual idea, which, as universal, impels us to love of humanity; thus especially in the work La Psychologie des Idees-forces, Paris, 1893.

40. These things being posited, the origin of the ideas of good and evil can be explained in this way. Men first observe that certain acts are useful to society, but others harmful; the former are praised and sometimes receive some reward, but the latter are disapproved and punished with penalties. From this it is inferred that certain actions are truly praiseworthy and worthy of reward, but others are to be blamed and punished: this indeed is nothing other than the idea of merit and demerit. From it follows the idea of good and evil: namely, an action is declared good if it is praiseworthy, or useful to society, but an action is declared evil if it is demeritorious, or harmful to society. - These ideas, once arisen, are much rooted by heredity and education.

Moreover primitive men devised that there are certain invisible beings which they called gods; and, since virtue often does not receive reward on earth, nor vice sufficient punishment, it belongs to the gods to reward good acts in the other life, and to punish vicious ones. All these things, they say, are nothing other than dreams, as modern science has demonstrated.

41. Nevertheless the evolutionists reject utilitarianism as incomplete: for it does not set forth how and why certain actions are useful, but others pernicious. They themselves explain the matter scientifically by the aid of evolution. For since all nature tends toward a certain evolution of life, those actions are truly useful and good which promote the expansion of life in any order, physical, biological, psychological, and sociological, or when they are rightly ordered to their end, namely the evolution of present life; but those are pernicious and evil which more or less stand in the way of this end. - On the other hand, it is historically established that the human race constantly progresses in every order, and especially that altruism, or the sense of solidarity, prevails more day by day; wherefore the time will come when, by force of perfect solidarity, men will become exceedingly good and happy.

42. Here it is worth the labor to note how Darwin explains remorse of conscience. In a general way the altruistic sense prevails in man; nevertheless, under the influence of violent passion, egoism sometimes conquers. For when the movement of passion is urgent, the will so vehemently desires the object pleasing to itself that it no longer attends to the altruistic sense. If someone in this case yields to pleasure, the appetite is now quieted and the movement of violent passion ceases; wherefore man, now calmed, perceives that he has done something which is repugnant to altruism, and from this perception he experiences a certain sadness which is called remorse of conscience.

43. We do not deny that there is something true in the more recent forms of utilitarianism; it is indeed true that there is some connection between virtue and felicity, especially when this is placed not in the pleasure of the senses, but in the fulfillment of the nobler desires of the mind, and in the good of the whole society. Nevertheless that system, even as it is explained by Stuart Mill and H. Spencer, is deficient and imperfect, nor does it hand down the true norm of morality.

(A) First, the method which it uses, namely experimental observation, is incomplete; for determining the rule of morals, historical and psychological observation of facts and actions is indeed useful, but by no means sufficient; for the question is not only what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what they ought to do. Now for this experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required: for we must search out what is the origin and cause of this moral obligation of which we are conscious.

Moreover most utilitarians use the method of observation only imperfectly; when they assert that there is no man who does not ultimately act on account of his own advantage, and who seeks anything other than his own felicity, they do not attend sufficiently to the fact that there are certain men who, on account of God and fellow citizens, spend themselves and all that is theirs. - Likewise, if most men act on account of felicity, they nevertheless have the idea of the right and the just, wholly distinct from the idea of felicity, and they conceive that certain acts are good, indeed best and heroic, which, far from bringing pleasure, cause sadness and detriment: they do not render an explanation of this fact;¹ and therefore they do not explain the norm of morality.

¹ Kant declares this excellently as follows (Critique de la Raison prat., ed. Picavet, p. 63): "He who has lost at play may indeed be angry with himself and his imprudence, but if he is conscious of having cheated (although he gained by this means), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. Therefore this must be something quite other than the principle of personal happiness. For in order to be obliged to say to oneself: I am infamous, although I have filled my purse, one must have another rule of judgment than in order to approve oneself and say: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my cashbox."

44. (B) Utilitarianism is not the true and supreme norm of morality, since it can be called neither universal, nor immutable, nor efficacious.

(a) Not universal. For it is not easily accommodated to all; since, according to Bentham, each one ought to weigh and measure the advantages and disadvantages which follow from this or that action, before he can judge whether this is good or evil; but who will be able to do this quickly and wisely at the same time? The difficulty is increased if, according to Stuart Mill and the positivists, he ought to consider not only his own advantage, but also that of the whole society, indeed the good of the human race. And, since he himself is the ultimate judge, is it not to be feared that he will favor himself, to the detriment of others? Will not altruism more often yield to egoism, and private good be placed before public good?

Nor likewise does it explain all honorable acts, especially those which imply self-renunciation. For all men of heart deservedly approve the manner of acting of those who spend themselves and their own things for the utility of others; thus a physician who, when a plague is raging, often offers his life into danger in order to aid others, is judged to act rightly. Now if felicity alone is the norm of morality, why must such a manner of acting be called good? If one's own felicity is sought, surely it is better and safer to flee a city infected by plague. The utilitarians answer that the physician in this case finds his felicity in devoting himself for others. This indeed I understand if virtue is praiseworthy for its own sake, or on account of a higher end; but by no means if only on account of the felicity which it brings; for many physicians will think themselves happier if it is permitted them to abandon a city infected by plague. They indeed remain there, not on account of felicity, but on account of fulfilling duty, because the voice of conscience dictates that this is good.

45. (b) Nor immutable; for since felicity is something subjective and relative, it is not conceived in the same way by all, but according to various times, regions, and men it is understood in diverse ways, so that nothing is more mutable than a rule of this kind. In reality some call felicity whatever pleases the senses; but others contend that the pleasure of the senses must be despised, and that a nobler felicity of the mind must be sought; not a few think that it is enough to obtain one's own advantage, while others hold that attention must be given to the good of others. Now, unless recourse is had to a higher principle, who will be able to define which of these systems is to be preferred? One indeed will say that greater felicity is obtained in promoting public good rather than private good; but another will deny this, and will choose to lead a quiet life rather than undergo the danger of death in order to aid others. In reality, how few there are who care more solicitously for the public good than for their own good? Therefore unless recourse is had to a superior and objective principle, all things will be uncertain and unstable.

46. (c) Nor efficacious for imposing moral obligation. The supreme norm of morality ought to be imperative, or apt for producing moral obligation. But temporal felicity alone, which utilitarians advocate, is able to impose no obligation. For if it is a question of one's own felicity, who can ever bind me to pursue it? We indeed tend naturally toward beatitude, and perhaps we can be called foolish if we do not pursue it; but by what argument can it be proved that we are morally obliged to obtain temporal felicity? The idea of duty by no means follows from the idea of beatitude; we indeed wish in a general way to be blessed, but this volition or inclination by no means demonstrates that we are bound to do this or that, but only that we shall be happier if we in fact elicit such an action. - But if it is a question of the felicity of others, the matter becomes still more difficult. For why does an obligation lie upon us of promoting the good of others, with our own detriment? Why, for example, is a poor man bound to abstain from theft? Why ought he to care for the felicity of a rich man rather than his own? You say to me that greater beatitude is found in doing good to others and especially to society. But, if felicity alone is the norm of morals, I shall say that nothing pleases me more than to pursue my own beatitude, even with the detriment of others, or at least by abstracting from the good of the community: let others devote themselves to the good of the fatherland, if they wish! I pursue a quiet life and find felicity in it.

47. From this it follows that the explanation of remorse which Darwin hands down, above, n. 42, is deficient; indeed he rather happily explains how the sensible emotion is diverse at the instant when passion urges and at the time when, pleasure having been completed, the soul is quieted. But remorse of conscience implies something nobler, namely sadness concerning a violated moral obligation, which Darwin by no means explains: for when passion is urgent, man did not perceive the moral obligation of rejecting pleasure for the utility of others, and therefore was not conscious of violated duty; consequently he ought not to experience moral sadness.

We say nothing of the theory of evolution itself, which is weighed elsewhere;¹ but it is permitted to note that the evolutionists err when they assert that the idea of good and evil arose from the fact that there are actions which are useful and others harmful to society; for between the useful and the good there is often the greatest contrariety: perjury, for example, can sometimes be useful even to some society, but no one will say that it is good.

¹ Synopsis Th. Dogm., De Deo Creante, n. 35-51.

Spencer indeed comes nearer to the truth by saying that the goodness of acts is taken from the fact that they are ordered to an end, namely to the evolution of life; but an end of this kind, namely the evolution of temporal life, is only a subordinated end, and no one can prove that the duty of pursuing such an end lies upon us: it surely is useful, but why it is obligatory Spencer does not explain.

Nor can it be said, with Guyau, that good necessarily follows from the intensity and expansion of life; for life, even the most intense, is not always good, but is sometimes full of injustice, indeed of cruelty; therefore it is necessary that another norm be found, by which life may be ordered to honorable good.

48. (A) Among the ancients,¹ stoicism first flourished at Athens, afterward at Rome. The founder was Zeno (336-264), born from the island of Cyprus, and his school was called Stoic from the porch (stoa) in which his disciples were accustomed to assemble. To this school adhered, among the Greeks, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Posidonius, and others; among the Romans, Persius Flaccus, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, etc. The foundation of morality, according to the Stoics, is to live according to reason and nature; but by the name of nature they understand not only the individual nature of man, but also the universal nature of the whole world, which man participates. Virtue consists in this, that the will with all its powers and constantly strives to live conformably to nature; it is more perfect the more intense and constant the striving is; hence the highest good is life agreeing with itself. The good, which does not differ from the beautiful, is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another; therefore it is an end in itself; but the other things, such as health and riches, are indifferent; nevertheless health and riches are useful things, or advantages which are preferable to sickness and poverty. - But the true wise man follows this rule: endure, abstain; he patiently endures all disadvantages; he abstains from vain joys; he subjects all affections of soul and passions to reason, and, through a certain impassibility, is so elevated above all things that he cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure.²

¹ Ritter, Hist. de la Philos. ancienne, Paris, 1836, t. III, p. 516-583; Card. Gonzalez, Hist. de la Philosophie, translated by P. de Pascal, Paris, 1890, t. I, p. 355-367; J. C. Meyer, Commentatio in qua doctrina Stoicorum ethica cum christiana comparatur, Gottingen, 1823; A. Chollet, La Morale stoicienne en face de la Morale chretienne, Paris, Lethielleux.

² The description of the just man outlined by Horace (Od., III, 3, 8) can therefore be accommodated to the Stoic:

The just man, tenacious of his purpose, is not shaken from his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding wicked things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant, nor by the South Wind, stormy leader of restless Hadria, nor by the great hand of thundering Jove; if the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him fearless.

49. (B) To ancient stoicism succeeded modern Kantism,³ although it differs from it not a little. In each system, duty must be fulfilled for its own sake; but, according to the Stoics, we ought to live conformably to nature, while, if we listen to Kant, we ought always to fight against nature.¹

³ Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785; Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788; works rendered into French: Fondements de la metaphysique des moeurs, translated by Barni, Paris, 1848; Critique de la Raison pratique, translated by Picavet, Paris, 1902. Cf. Theod. Ruyssen, Kant, Paris, 1900, p. 191-285; A. Cresson, La Morale de Kant, Paris, 1904; A. Fouillee, Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain, Paris, Alcan, 1905; Delbos, La Philosophie pratique de Kant, Paris, 1905; H. Sidgwick, Lectures on the philosophy of Kant, London, MacMillan.

¹ You will find a comparison between stoicism and Kantism apud Cresson, op. cit., p. 171-179.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), author of critical philosophy, after he had tried to demonstrate that by pure speculative reason the existence of God and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty, resolved to establish the foundation of ethics by another way, with the help of practical reason.

Now the foundation of ethics is duty; which he declares thus: among worldly things, there is one which is truly and in itself good, namely the good will. But this will is good not from the object which it intends, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; but that motive can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled. Duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law, which is engraved in practical reason. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, ought to do what is commanded, and because it is commanded; for if it fulfills the law on account of obtaining some felicity or utility, now it pursues the useful, not the good, and therefore it is not morally good.

50. The moral law is truly commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be blessed, do this), but absolutely and categorically: do the good; hence it is called the categorical imperative; and we ought to obey this simply, without any respect to the consequences of the act or the reward to be obtained, and without further inquiry into its authority. For the moral law proceeds from rational nature, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Therefore we ought to act from reverence for the law alone, abstracting even from the divine will, because our will remains autonomous.

That the will may be able to obey this categorical law, it ought to be free: for if it were compelled to act, it could not be morally good.¹

¹ From this the philosopher rises to God and the immortal soul: the supreme good, he says, consists in the intimate and permanent conjunction between beatitude and virtue; but, in the present life, such a connection by no means exists, since very often we must act against natural tendencies in order to cultivate virtue; therefore it is necessary that there be another life, in which God will grant supreme felicity to those who have cultivated virtue.

51. These things being posited, the fundamental rule established by Kant is this: "Act in such a way that the rule of your will can become a universal rule," that is, before you act, carefully weigh whether something absurd would follow from your action, on the supposition that all were commanded to act in the same way, and thus in fact acted. He explains this rule elsewhere thus: "Act in such a way that you regard yourself and others as an end, but not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself and others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty. From these principles he infers many conclusions, which this is not the place to relate.

52. Renouvier² taught and propagated Kantism in France, with a few changes however: indeed he admits that there is some categorical imperative, but he derives its obligatory force from abstract and universal human reason, nor does he disapprove those who act honorably not only on account of duty, but also on account of reward. - Yet Fouillee deservedly observes that this abstract and universal reason does not really exist except in God.³

² Renouvier, La science de la Morale, Paris, 1869; G. Seailles, La Philosophie de Ch. Renouvier, Paris, Alcan, 1905.

³ Fouillee, Critique des systemes de Morale, p. 222.

Among the disciples of Kant, some, such as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, fell into pessimism; for, thinking that felicity cannot be obtained, and that the practice of duty is impossible, they held that the miseries of this life must be mitigated by a certain affection of compassion toward others, but that their cessation cannot be obtained except through the annihilation of oneself, or entrance into nirvana.⁴

⁴ Schopenhauer, Fondement de la Morale, 1841; French translation by Burdeau, 1888. - F. Nietzsche taught pessimism together with sensualism (Par dela le bien et le mal; La Genealogie de la Morale, translated by H. Albert, Paris, 1900); there are two kinds of men, he says: the former, learned and noble, who are called super-human, need no law, and can freely follow their propensities, whatever they may be; the latter, or the uncultivated, ought to restrain their passions, so that they may humbly serve the former. How much such a system is opposed to right reason, there is no one who does not see. Cf. Fouillee, Nietzsche et l'immoralisme, Paris, 1903.

53. We say nothing concerning the stoicism of the ancients, which is now antiquated; on the other hand, the principal arguments which we shall bring against Kant are valid also against Zeno.

Kantism surely comes nearer to truth than utilitarianism: for it deservedly asserts that the moral law is absolute, universal, and truly obligatory; likewise it excellently describes duty, and assigns to the human will a motive which is much more perfect than utility or pleasure. Nevertheless a system of this kind is deficient and teems with very many errors.

54. (A) The method which it uses, namely the sole method a priori, is incomplete; reason surely is necessary for defining what we ought to do, as we said above, n. 43; but historical and psychological observation of human nature cannot be rejected; otherwise, the rule of morals will not be proportioned to human powers. Thus Kant declares that an act honorable in itself, which is elicited with hope of reward or fear of punishment, is not morally good: now it is established historically and psychologically at the same time that very few men do good without any respect to beatitude, or are deterred from vice without fear of some punishment; therefore a norm of this kind is not accommodated to human weakness. - Moreover, by defending the incapacity of speculative reason for attaining truth, by that very fact he greatly depresses the force of practical reason for knowing good: for why are we more certain concerning the existence of moral obligation than concerning merely speculative truths?

55. (B) Kant affirms that the moral law is universal, absolute, and obligatory, but he does not render the reason of this obligation. He does not derive it from God, but only from human reason:¹ but this is not universal, but individual, nor absolute, but relative and finite, borrowing its perfections from uncreated Reason, nor can it be conceived by what authority it is able to command so categorically. For this cannot be explained unless our reason is nothing other than a manifestation of uncreated Reason, which, as infinitely wise and supreme mistress of all things, can establish a universal and categorical law. But Kant denies this, when he asserts that reason is autonomous. - He falls into another error, by saying that human nature is an end in itself: for since it is finite and created, it must necessarily be referred to its Creator. - He likewise falsely supposes that those actions alone are good which the moral law absolutely commands, and because it commands them. For often actions are deservedly held as honorable which are in no way commanded, for example, if someone freely devotes himself wholly to works of mercy. Moreover, why would actions not be good which are done, not because they are commanded, but from the motive of charity, because they are useful to the neighbor?

¹ Afterward indeed he recognizes, once the existence of God has been admitted, that the command of reason can be considered as a divine command (Raison pratique, pp. 235, 238); but he establishes the foundation of obligation before he has demonstrated the existence of God. - Certain Christians, while they reject the errors of Kant, nevertheless borrow certain principles from him in order to lead to the Christian faith those who favor subjectivism and criticism; cf. Fonsegrive, Le Kantisme et la pensee contemporaine, in the periodical La Quinzaine, March 1, 1904, p. 86-107.

56. (C) Kant contradicts himself, by asserting on the one hand that an act elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not morally good, and on the other hand that the supreme good is situated in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For, if the supreme good implies true beatitude, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? Surely it cannot be evil to pursue what is more perfect; but, with Kant as witness, it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to enjoy beatitude; and nevertheless, if we think of beatitude and desire it, our action ceases to be morally good!

All systems of this kind agree in this, that they wish to be independent; nevertheless in a diverse degree and in a diverse manner, as will be clear from the following.

57. (a) Namely, some hold that ethics is indeed independent from revealed religion, but not from God.¹ Concerning these we do not now treat; we by no means deny that some code of moral laws can be established by reason alone; but, as was proved in the treatise concerning True Religion, n. 50, in the present state, the human race cannot morally, without some revelation, know a complete and perfect code of moral truths expeditiously, with firm certitude and with no admixture of error.

¹ Thus Ravaisson; Franck; P. Janet, La Morale; J. Simon, Le Devoir, Paris, 1854; E. Caro, Problemes de Morale sociale, 2nd ed., Paris, 1887, p. 15-95, where he expressly rejects and refutes the system of ethics independent from God.

58. (b) Others say that it is independent even from God, insofar as the essential principles of morals can be safely and certainly defined, without the existence of God being demonstrated, from the sole consideration of the moral order, such as can be detected by reason, once the liberty of man alone is admitted.¹ For we can recognize the existence of liberty by conscience alone, without any metaphysical investigations; but since liberty is an inviolable power, it supposes some right to which duty responds: and from the twofold idea of right and duty the whole of ethics can be deduced.

¹ Thus C. Coignet, La Morale independante, Paris, 1869; M. Ferraz, Philosophie du Devoir, 2nd ed., Paris, 1869; Beaussire, Les principes de la Morale, Paris, 1888.

On the other hand, it is of the greatest importance that ethics by no means depend on theodicy and metaphysics: for there are so many dissensions concerning metaphysical matters that unless the foundation of ethics is placed outside these controversies, it now becomes impossible to find a commonly received rule of morals.

59. (c) Others contend that the rule of morals is wholly independent from speculative reason itself, and is to be placed in the moral sense: namely, that must be called honorable or dishonorable which excites the sympathy or antipathy of the majority; or, as it pleases others, that which is conformable or deformed in relation to the moral sense. For, whatever may be said concerning merely speculative truths, men commonly agree concerning certain moral rules which by moral sense they recognize as true. But that sense is sometimes called common sense, moral instinct, sometimes moral sympathy and antipathy, or simply conscience. It indeed exists in all, but can and ought to be cultivated, especially by exciting sympathy toward others: then good is easily known and is perfected by a certain natural instinct.² This school flourished especially in England, although it gained not a few disciples in other regions.

² Thus, among others, Shaftesbury, An inquiry concerning virtue and merit, 1699; Adam Smith, Theory of moral sentiments; T. Reid, Inquiry into the Human mind, or the principle of common sense, Edinburgh, 1765; F. Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy, Glasgow, 1755; Hoffding, Morale, Essai sur les principes theoriques et leur application, translated from the German by L. Poitevin, Paris, 1903.

60. We do not deny that something true is found in these systems: indeed right reason can find certain rules of morals from the very contemplation of things and of the end to which they are destined; it is likewise true that some duties are manifested to us, without any discourse, by a certain moral sense, which is called the voice of conscience. But how incomplete and imperfect the norm of morality is when constituted independently from God will be clear from the following.

61. (A) The supreme norm of morals ought to be absolute and universal; but human reason and moral sense, if they are considered independently from God, bear before themselves nothing absolute and immutable: reason, as created and finite, perceives truth only in a finite and imperfect manner, and, unless it rests on divine reason, often errs; hence it is historically established that there have been no fewer dissensions of philosophers concerning the principles of morals than concerning metaphysical truths, as is established from the various systems already set forth above. Therefore human reason, if it is considered separately from divine reason, will often be uncertain, and will propose diverse rules according to diverse times or various nations; and consequently it will be essentially mutable and subjective.

62. (B) Moreover it lacks authority for imposing moral obligation; for this cannot be understood without a superior being. If right reason is a certain participation of divine reason, and the natural order is apprehended as a manifestation of the divine will wisely disposing all things, then there arises the obligation of living and acting according to this order constituted by the supreme Lord of all things; but if reason is considered in itself, without any respect to God, it can indeed perceive that some act is honorable, but it cannot impose the obligation of doing it, since reason is not superior to man, but only a part of man. The same must be said a fortiori concerning the moral sense: if it is the same as practical reason, it has no greater force; but if it is held as a special sense, distinct from reason, it will possess still less authority, since sense is or ought to be subordinated to reason. - We indeed confess that moral sense rightly informed is a sign of some obligation, but it cannot create or induce this obligation.

63. (C) In that system likewise sanction is lacking for inciting man to good. God indeed, as just and supreme remunerator, is able to bestow reward upon the good and punishments upon the evil, so that He may draw them to virtue and deter them from vice. But, if one abstracts from God, what will the sanction be? Not human felicity: for not rarely the just are oppressed and the evil abound in riches and pleasures. Nor remorse of conscience; for unless this is held as the voice of God, it terrifies the evil little: indeed the more wicked they are, the less they feel remorse, and by long custom of vice the voice of conscience is finally rendered mute. Therefore there will be no truly efficacious sanction; now although a few men, among the noblest, do not hesitate to fulfill the law without sanction, nevertheless most are accustomed to despise it.

64. By the critical exposition of these systems the Catholic norm of morality is confirmed not a little. For whatever true and honorable thing they contain is found in Catholic doctrine. Thus with utilitarianism we admit that beatitude is the end, not indeed the primary but the secondary end of man, and indeed true and perfect beatitude which perfectly quiets all his legitimate aspirations; that it is not indeed the norm of morality, but one of the motives by which we are helped toward acting well. With Kantism we confess that the moral law is absolute, universal, and categorically obligatory; but we exhibit the reason why the matter is so, namely because the moral law is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. We concede to rationalists that right reason is to be followed as the proximate norm of morality; but at the same time we show that this cannot be done except because our reason is a certain participation of divine reason, which is the ultimate and infallible rule of morals. Nor do we deny the existence of some moral sense, and its influence upon human morals; but we show that this sense is nothing other than the judgment of right reason, and a sign of a higher norm, namely of divine reason itself, which cannot be deceived.

With evolutionism we hold that some progress must be admitted, whether in individuals,¹ or in society; thus the new law is more perfect than the old law, and Christian society itself can make progress daily, by better understanding and cultivating Christian virtues; but this progress is directed not by blind necessity, but by wise Providence. We agree with those who, with Guyau, promote life most intense;¹ but we order life to God, the supreme and infinite good.

¹ "And he who is just, let him be justified still; and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still." (Apoc., XXII, 11.)

¹ "I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." (John, X, 10.)

On the other hand, the Catholic rule carefully avoids the errors and rocks of the other systems, as we have shown above; therefore it is to be admitted. Therefore in the whole course of Moral Theology nothing further remains except to weigh how, according to the light of reason and faith, our acts can be ordered to God, the ultimate end.

65. We tend toward the ultimate end through free, moral, and meritorious acts, which therefore are called seeds of eternal life. (a) They ought indeed to be free, because the ultimate end is obtained by way of prize and reward, and therefore through a free act, which alone is apt for reward; (b) moral and honorable, because God cannot reward evil acts; (c) meritorious, or clothed with those conditions which are required for supernatural merit, because in fact we are destined to a supernatural end. Therefore we shall speak:

I. Concerning free acts, or concerning the liberty of the human act.

II. Concerning moral acts, or concerning the morality of the human act.

III. Concerning meritorious acts, or concerning merit.

Concerning free acts:

• Notion and species.
• Principles which produce them.
• Causes influencing them.

Concerning moral acts:

• Elements from which morality is derived.
• Extension of morality to:
• the indirect voluntary;
• cooperation.

Concerning meritorious acts:

• Conditions on the part of:
• the one operating;
• the work;
• God.