On Virtues in Common

568. Just as there are vicious habits by which we are inclined to sin, so likewise there are in us good habits, by which we are sweetly disposed to honorable and meritorious acts: but these are called virtues. Habits of this kind can naturally be acquired by repeated acts, or supernaturally be infused into the soul by God. Wherefore, after preliminary notions concerning habits, we will speak:

I. Concerning acquired virtues;

II. Concerning infused virtues.

Since this matter is more philosophical than theological, we will recall only a few things concerning the notion, subject, origin and increase, loss and division of habits, setting forth those things which are more commonly admitted.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLIV; John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, Lyons, 1663, Tr. de Passionibus, habitibus et virtutibus, disp. XIII; Lequeux, De Virtutibus, Paris, 1843, diss. I, c. 2, p. 15-29; Barre, Tract. de Virtutibus, Paris, 1886, p. 93-119; Billot, De Virtutibus infusis, Rome, 1901, Prolegomenon, p. 17-29; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI (1899), p. 529-536; Rabier, Psychologie, p. 571-587; Marion, Lec. de Psychologie, Paris, Colin, p. 140-158.

569. 1. Notion. Habit (from the word habere, to have) in a general sense signifies a mode of bearing oneself. But in a more particular sense it designates a stable quality by which some being is perfected. But this can be completed in two ways: in its being and in its operations; in the former case, the habit is called entitative: thus, for example, health of body with regard to the natural order, habitual grace in the supernatural order; in the latter case, the habit is called operative: such are the virtues of prudence, fortitude, etc.

Here we treat of operative habits. In this sense, habit is usually defined as a stable quality which disposes and helps a potency for act. Therefore it is a certain reality, belonging to the genus of quality, added to some faculty, so that this faculty may become ready for acting. According to St. Thomas, it differs in some way from disposition, which is, as it were, an inchoate habit, but does not yet obtain that stability which is desired for habit properly so called.¹

¹ "Disposition is taken in two ways: in one way according as it is the genus of habit, for disposition is placed in the definition of habit. In another way according as it is something divided against habit. And disposition properly so called can be understood to be co-divided against habit in two ways: in one way as perfect and imperfect in the same species, so that disposition is said to retain the common name when it inheres imperfectly, so that it is lost easily; but habit, when it inheres perfectly, so that it is not easily lost, and thus disposition becomes habit, just as a boy becomes a man... From this it is clear that the name habit imports a certain lastingness, but not the name disposition." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.)

570. Habit helps a potency to act in a twofold way; a natural and acquired habit helps it to perform an operation more promptly, more easily, and more delectably; but a supernatural and infused habit² of itself does not confer facility, but elevates the potency, which by its nature is unfit for certain acts, so that it may be able to perform these acts; thus the infused virtue of faith indeed does not give promptitude for eliciting acts of faith. Yet it must be noted that facility of operating is acquired by the exercise of infused virtues, for example, by repeated acts of faith, insofar as obstacles are removed, and the potencies are rendered more apt for eliciting these acts, as will be explained below.

² To understand rightly the distinction between natural and supernatural habits, there must be recalled to memory the things which we said in Theologia Dogmatica, De Deo Creante, n. 144-146, and above n. 85. Supernatural virtues are infused by God, - tend toward a supernatural end, - are exercised under the influence of actual grace, - and do not of themselves give facility, but only the power for acting supernaturally.

571. 2. The subject of habit. (a) Habits properly so called do not exist in subjects determined to only one thing in operating, or to acting always in one and the same mode: for then it can scarcely be conceived what habit adds to a potency which always does the same thing and acts in the same mode. But it can exist in all subjects which are not determined to one thing, but can operate in diverse ways, and exercise their operations more or less promptly and perfectly: for then it can incline and dispose the faculties toward one or another genus of actions, and toward eliciting those actions more or less promptly and perfectly.

(b) Hence habits can be in the human body, because, insofar as it is substantially united to a spiritual soul, it can be disposed and habituated to serve promptly the operations of the soul.¹ Thus by the assiduous practice of temperance, chastity, and mortification, the body becomes accustomed to obey the command of the will more promptly and more easily; wherefore it is of the greatest moment to subdue the body by good habits, that it may be made a docile instrument of the soul.

¹ Nevertheless St. Thomas holds that habits of this kind are principally in the soul, and secondarily in the body, because the body receives its movement from the soul.

572. (c) The intellectual faculties of the soul are properly the subject of habits, because they are not determined to operating in one way; but the will is the principal subject in which they are rooted, because it, as endowed with free choice, most greatly possesses the power of choosing. Nevertheless also the sensitive powers are the subject of habits, although less principally, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75). This indeed is established by experience; through custom, the imagination is more or less subdued, or on the contrary is accustomed to wander; - through custom, passions are restrained or on the contrary are more easily borne toward illicit things. Indeed, with experience as witness, custom is conquered by custom: thus those prone to anger, by repeated efforts, become meek, the proud learn to cultivate humility, the ambitious turn themselves toward divine things, etc. (above, n. 107). Therefore it matters greatly to acquire good habits already from childhood, but utterly to eradicate evil ones.

573. 3. Concerning the origin and increase of habits. Some are supernaturally infused by God: concerning these below. Others are naturally acquired: and concerning these we must now treat.

(a) That natural propensions transmitted by heredity are given we already noted above, n. 116-117; inclinations of this kind can be called latent habits, insofar as they remain sleeping until, by an external occasion, they are aroused as though from sleep; thus sons born from drunken parents not rarely have contracted an inclination toward alcoholic drinks, which as soon as it is excited by libations passes into habit.

(b) According to St. Thomas,² certain habits are implanted by nature itself, at least inchoatively. Thus, with regard to first principles (for example, the whole is greater than its part, good is to be loved), we are so inclined to knowing them that the habit of these principles can be called naturally implanted. Likewise in certain individuals are found certain natural propensions which are, as it were, inchoate habits: for there are some disposed, from the proper complexion of the body, toward chastity, others toward gentleness, others toward fortitude, as was said above, where temperament and character were treated, n. 120-121.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1. - Others indeed, with Suarez (Disput. metaph., disp. 44, sect. 13, n. 7), do not wish these propensions to be called habits; but the question is more about the name than about the thing.

574. (c) But especially from multiplied acts habits are generated and increased, as experience establishes: namely, the more frequently, longer, and more intensely acts are repeated, provided nevertheless that the powers are not exhausted, the greater facility and promptitude are obtained for doing the same acts. The first act already produces some disposition, which the second increases; other acts will complete the generation of the habit. The reason for this is that any faculty is at the same time active and passive; insofar as it is active, it impresses a certain movement, and insofar as it is passive, it receives and retains an impression, by force of which subsequent acts become easier.

Nevertheless, according to St. Thomas,¹ an act does not increase a habit unless it is at least equally intense as the habit itself; for if it is more remiss, it does not dispose toward its increase, but rather toward its diminution; thus he who has already acquired the habit of fervor does not increase it, but rather diminishes it, when he prays remissly and tepidly.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3. - Yet some on the contrary hold with T. Raynaud, De Virtutibus, l. I, c. 2, that even remiss acts increase with some proportion the force of the habit.

575. (d) Habits can grow in two ways, extensively and intensively: extensively, when the object with which they are concerned is multiple and is successively amplified; thus the habit of knowledge grows when it extends itself to more things, and humility is increased when the various degrees of this virtue are reached; intensively, when they are rooted more deeply in the soul, so that actions are elicited more easily and more delectably. This indeed can be explained thus: through the repetition of acts, difficulty in acting is diminished, and therefore with the same effort subsequent acts are performed more easily, and consequently more delectably.² But how habits influence liberty we explained at n. 109-110.

² "In proportion as the act no longer requires for being repeated except a lesser effort, the excess of power, which the cause does not expend in reproducing it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts." (Lemoine, apud Rabier, Psychol., p. 587.)

576. 4. Concerning the loss of habits. That acquired habits are diminished or sometimes utterly perish is established by experience. (a) First, according to all, they decrease or perish through contrary acts, especially intense and long-lasting ones; thus the habit of temperance is gradually diminished and finally utterly taken away through often repeated acts of drunkenness. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is conquered by custom; thus facility of using food and drink moderately soon decreases when someone begins to indulge gluttony and drunkenness: for, just as by repeated acts of temperance a good habit had been acquired, so by frequent contrary acts an evil habit is contracted; now, when contrary habits are present, the stronger destroys the weaker.

577. (b) Moreover they are diminished and sometimes perish through long cessation from exercise, not indeed directly, as the more probable opinion holds, but indirectly, insofar as, exercise ceasing, impediments are multiplied, and little by little contrary habits are introduced which overwhelm the former ones. Thus memory is diminished unless you exercise it. The same must be said of moral habits: for when someone, for a long time, does not use the habit of virtue for moderating passions, these are accustomed to rise up against reason, and to transgress just limits; thus the inclination to good is gradually diminished, and depraved habits are born which can overturn good ones.¹ Nevertheless, if after some time new efforts are made before the habit is utterly extinguished, it revives more easily.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3.

But by accident habits impressed upon organic powers can be altered by an alteration of the organ itself; thus sometimes memory is diminished or perishes.

578. 5. Concerning the division of habits. (a) By reason of the object with which they are concerned, habits are good or vicious, according as their object is good or evil. Good habits are called virtues, but evil ones vices; here we treat only of the former, since we have already spoken of the latter, where sins were treated. (b) By reason of origin and nature, virtues are acquired or infused: concerning these we must treat separately.

579. Preliminary matters. (A) Virtue (from the word vir, man) first indeed designated a quality proper to a man, or fortitude,¹ but afterward any endowment,² especially that by force of which we operate according to the dictate of right reason. In this sense it is usually defined as a habit disposing man's powers to operating rightly,³ or a good habit. Therefore it is a quality added to the faculties, helping them toward acting according to right reason.

¹ Thus Cicero, Tuscul., l. II, 18: "For virtue was named from man: but what is most proper to a man is fortitude, whose two greatest offices are contempt of death and of pain." Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 441.

² Apud Cicero, Brut., 17: "In Cato's orations all oratorical virtues will be found."

³ According to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. - These last words can be predicated of infused virtues alone; but the former also regard acquired virtues.

580. (B) Therefore virtues properly reside not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: for these are immediately ordered to act.⁴ Now the faculties in which virtues properly so called inhere are rational powers, namely intellect and will, but especially the will.⁵ For virtues properly so called rightly order our acts in the moral order; now the only truly moral act is that which proceeds from the will with previous knowledge of the intellect (above, n. 66); and therefore virtues properly inhere in those faculties which elicit moral acts, chiefly in the will. Nevertheless other faculties participate in the nature of virtue insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75): for under this respect they are made capable of morality, and therefore secondarily can be the subject of virtue: thus the virtue of temperance in some way inheres in the sensible appetite for moderating sensual passions.⁶

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3 and 6.

⁶ Ibid., a. 4; cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 74, a. 4.

581. (C) Since there is a twofold order, natural and supernatural, virtues are of a twofold kind, namely natural, or acquired, and supernatural, or divinely infused. Here we treat only of the former.

Acquired virtues can be found even in pagans or heretics, since these are capable of good works and consequently of habits, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 34. - But the faithful, who enjoy the gift of true faith and sanctifying grace, ought to cultivate with all their powers these virtues, which of themselves are natural, and indeed in a more perfect manner than unbelievers, so that by examples they may manifestly show that grace does not destroy, but on the contrary perfects whatever good is in human nature.¹ But, that they may be truly Christian, they ought to cultivate these virtues in a supernatural manner, that is, on account of a supernatural end, and under the influence of actual grace: for thus they will pursue not only an honorable end, but the supernatural end to which in fact they are ordered, and will acquire supernatural merits.

¹ Concerning certain natural virtues Cardinal Gibbons excellently discusses, The Ambassador of Christ, Baltimore, 1896, ch. 8-10; translated into French by Andre: L'Ambassadeur du Christ, Paris, Lethielleux; cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introd., 3rd Part, ch. 36; Ribet, Honnete avant tout.

Virtues of this kind are of two species: intellectual and moral: the former perfect the intellect with regard to the knowledge of truth; the latter perfect the will with regard to the pursuit of good: concerning both we must speak separately.

582. 1. Notion. (A) Three speculative intellectual virtues³ are commonly distinguished: (a) understanding, or the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing first principles intimately; for to understand is the same as to read within. (b) Knowledge is the habit perfecting the intellect for logically deducing conclusions contained in first principles. (c) Wisdom is the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing things not only in themselves, but also in their causes, especially in God, who is the highest and ultimate cause of all; wherefore he is called truly wise who knows God as the first principle and ultimate end of all, and judges concerning all things insofar as they are referred to God. - Thus wisdom contains under itself understanding and knowledge, since it judges both concerning principles and concerning conclusions deduced from the same. - Perhaps therefore it can be said that there is one intellectual virtue, namely wisdom, which ascends from created things to God, and uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions for judging concerning created things according to their relation to God.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-58; Suarez, in I-II, Tr. IV, disp. 3; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. 16; Billuart, De Passionibus et Virtutibus, diss. II; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 33 and 74-81; Barre, op. cit., p. 143-147 and 165-184.

³ Besides the speculative virtues, two practical ones are enumerated, prudence, concerning which below where moral virtues are treated, and art, or the habit disposing the intellect to making artificial things rightly, concerning which nothing special occurs to be said.

583. (B) But wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, is not properly a virtue except insofar as it is ordered to acting rightly. For virtue has regard to forming morals honorably; therefore if someone is endowed with knowledge and speculative wisdom, but does not use it for a right institution of life, from this he cannot be said to be endowed with virtue; but wisdom which is ordered to acting honorably is deservedly called a virtue;¹ and all Christians indeed ought to cultivate it, but especially those upon whom the office rests of illuminating and teaching others, and most of all the ministers of Christ, to whom it was said: "Going therefore, teach all nations."²

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

² Matt. 28:19.

584. 2. Excellence. Scripture often commends this wisdom, insofar as it rightly orders us to God, and impels us to fulfilling the divine law. (a) Namely, wisdom ought to be preferred to all riches: "I preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... But all good things came to me together with her, and innumerable honor by her hands."³ (b) Its endowments are almost innumerable: "For in her is the spirit of intelligence, holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, mobile, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving good, acute, which nothing hinders, beneficent, humane, benign, stable, sure, secure, having every virtue, seeing all things, and who can take in all spirits, intelligible, clean, subtle."⁴ (c) Hence God loves only those who cultivate wisdom: "For God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."⁵ (d) It operates strongly and at the same time sweetly: "Therefore she reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly."⁶ (e) It teaches the other virtues: "For she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."⁷ From these and many other things which may be read in the books of Proverbs and Wisdom, the excellence of wisdom can be understood.

³ Wis. 7:8, 11.

⁴ Ibid., 22-23.

⁵ Ibid., 28.

⁶ Wis. 8:1.

⁷ Ibid., 7.

But today not a few, especially positivists, by the name of knowledge understand the cognition of things which can be investigated by experience and induction, and at the same time contend that it is impossible to reach the first cause, and therefore reject not only theological, but also metaphysical knowledge; nevertheless they extol positive knowledge as the only norm of the true and honorable, and the means by which the human race will finally attain perfect happiness.¹ We refuted this error above, n. 43-47. That knowledge of this kind is not a virtue, although it discovers and teaches many useful things, is clear from this, that it turns us away from God, far from directing us to him.

¹ Brunetiere excellently shows the insufficiency of knowledge for the right institution of moral life, and true happiness of heart, in Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1895; cf. M. d'Hulst, L'empoisonnement de la Science, in Melanges oratoires, t. IV, p. 174-189.

585. 1. Notion. (A) Moral virtues are acquired habits perfecting the will and appetite for acting rightly. - Insofar as they are natural, they rest upon a natural motive, namely honorableness, which comes from conformity with right reason. The end toward which they of themselves tend is the natural perfection of man and his happiness. - Nevertheless, since in fact man is destined to a supernatural end, virtues of this kind, although of themselves natural, can be referred to a supernatural end, and be exercised under the influence of supernatural grace; indeed they can even be supernaturally infused, as will be said below, n. 598.

586. (B) It has been doubted whether the aforementioned virtues are virtues of the true name. Now it is certain that they truly have the nature of virtue, when through charity they are referred to the ultimate supernatural end. It is likewise certain that the same, as long as they remain within the natural order, cannot merit or attain eternal salvation, since there is lacking proportion between the supernatural end and the acts of natural virtues.

Nevertheless it can be said that these are true and perfect virtues in their own genus; for, as Benedict XIV rightly says, "if unbelievers can do honorable works, and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire for themselves and procure habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."²

² Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatific., lib. III, c. 21, n. 6.

587. 2. Division. Among moral virtues, there are four principal ones, which are called cardinal, because on these, as on hinges, the other virtues lean: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.³

³ Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, 1714.

The Fathers and theologians often gather this division from these words of Wisdom:¹ "For she teaches sobriety (that is, temperance), and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men." There indeed is not handed down a scientific division of virtues, but an enumeration of certain principal ones. - Pagan philosophers likewise numbered four principal virtues consonant with the aforementioned ones.² But this division already from the time of St. Ambrose became common in the Church.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Cicero, Tuscul., c. 14; De officiis, lib. I, c. 20.

588. (A) He seems to have been the first who called the four praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that there are four cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude."³ But afterward he hands down their notion thus:⁴ "In the first place they established prudence, which is concerned with the investigation of truth, and infuses the desire of fuller knowledge; secondly justice, which gives to each his own, does not claim another's, neglects its own utility in order to guard common equity; thirdly fortitude, which both in military matters is eminent by the greatness of an exalted soul, and at home, and excels in the powers of the body; fourthly temperance, which preserves the measure and order of all things which we judge either must be done or must be said."

³ Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., lib. V, n. 62, P. L., XV, 1653.

⁴ De officiis ministrorum, lib. I, c. 24, P. L., XVI, 57.

589. (B) This theory, generally accepted by the other Fathers, St. Thomas refined, namely by explaining why there are four cardinal virtues, and in what way they are distinguished from one another. He observes first that the cardinal virtues can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, which are found in all virtues; thus prudence is a certain rectitude of practical judgment, by which discretion is preserved in individual acts; justice is a rectitude of soul by which man bears himself rightly in all things to be done; fortitude is a certain firmness against any impulses of the passions or labors of operations; temperance is understood as a certain moderation in all things. In this sense, these virtues are not distinguished from one another, but are called cardinal, because they are the general conditions or properties of any virtue, which must be at the same time prudent, just, moderate, and strong. (b) But the aforementioned virtues can be considered in another way, according as they are concerned with formally diverse objects, and are subjected in various powers. Thus prudence resides in the practical intellect, and perceives and suggests the means to be used for attaining the honorable end in individual acts; justice inclines the will to bearing itself rightly concerning actions due to another, or to rendering to each his own; fortitude perfects the irascible appetite, so that it may stand firmly against all dangers; temperance is in the concupiscible appetite for restraining sensual delectations, especially those which arise from touch. According to this acceptance, the aforementioned virtues are truly and really distinguished, although they are in some way connected.

590. Moreover in the cardinal virtues there can be distinguished integral, subjective, and potential parts. Integral parts are certain conditions or dispositions which, although they do not constitute the virtue essentially, are required for its integral perfection; thus for the perfection of prudence memory, understanding, providence, etc., are desired. - Subjective parts are called the various species of some virtue; thus justice is divided into commutative and distributive. - Potential or annexed parts are called certain less principal virtues which are joined to another more principal one, although they do not perfectly attain its nature; thus religion and piety toward parents are potential parts of justice, because they incline us to rendering to God and parents whatever is due to them, yet in such a way that we cannot render to equality what is due to them.

That this division is sufficiently intricate is clear from the mere consideration of the tree of virtues which certain Scholastics delineated. And indeed, for the perfection of Christian life, it is not necessary to hand down an accurate notion of all virtues with all their parts; but it is enough to set forth and cultivate the principal ones; for since many are connected, he who strives to acquire the principal ones, by that very fact makes progress in the others.

591. 3. Concerning the properties of moral virtues. Here we will explain two things, namely in what sense moral virtues are connected, and what is understood by the axiom: virtue stands in the middle.

(A) Concerning the connection of virtues. Already in his time Augustine thought that the four cardinal virtues are so connected among themselves that one cannot truly and properly be cultivated without the others:¹ "Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has had one virtue has all, and all are lacking to him to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate: for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Furthermore if there will then be prudence, if it also is strong, and just, and temperate, certainly where it will be, it has the others with itself. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, and temperate. Thus where some one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."

¹ St. Augustine, epist. 167 (al. 29) ad Hieronymum, P. L., XXXIII, 735.

The Scholastics embraced this theory, in the sense that perfect moral virtues are so connected among themselves that, when one is lost, the others lose their perfection. But virtues are called perfect when they are not mere inclinations, but firm inclinations to following reason, and have all things required for their integrity. Then it can truly be said that these virtues are connected, because we cannot persevere long in one unless we are also adorned with the others; thus no one can be just for a long time unless he is prudent, temperate, and endowed with fortitude. Hence he who perfectly and stably cultivates one of these, by that very fact makes progress in the others, as we were saying just now.

592. (B) Concerning the mean of moral virtues. Virtues of this kind consist in the middle: (a) insofar as they avoid opposed excesses;¹ for example, fortitude stands in the middle between cowardice and rashness. For they are moral because they are conformed to the rule of morals; now they can deflect from the rule in a twofold way, either by exceeding the measure, or by falling short of it; therefore, to avoid this twofold excess, they ought to consist in the middle. (b) Moreover, when there is a collision of rights or duties, the mean of virtues consists in this, that one virtue is tempered by another: thus, if justice inclines to punishing the guilty strictly, sometimes clemency counsels that, all circumstances attended to, the penalty be mitigated. - But it belongs to prudence, insofar as it is the charioteer of the virtues, to suggest this mean.

¹ This was the doctrine of the Stoics, with Horace as witness, Ep. 18, 9:

"Virtue is the middle of vices, and drawn back from each side."

593. 4. Concerning the increase, diminution, and loss of acquired moral virtues, the principles handed down above concerning acquired habits are valid, n. 573-577.

594. Besides acquired virtues, in the soul of the just there are supernatural habits divinely infused, by which it is directed toward choosing meritorious acts and attaining the supernatural end. For, by a certain analogy with natural life, three things are required for supernatural life: (a) a vital principle, which is nothing other than habitual grace, perfecting and elevating the substance of our soul, so that it can be the remote principle of supernatural actions; (b) operative faculties, or infused virtues, by which the powers naturally implanted in us are so elevated that they can be the proximate principle of supernatural acts; (c) the supernatural concurrence of God, namely actual grace, by force of which our faculties, strengthened by infused virtues, are excited and helped toward eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62-63; Suarez, De Passionibus et habitibus, diss. III; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XVI; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 40-49 and passim; Muller, § 114-119; Pesch, Praelect. dogmaticae, t. VIII, n. 19-96; Billot, op. cit., th. 1-5.

595. (A) Infused virtues are supernatural habits implanted by God, by which the faculties of the soul receive the power of eliciting supernatural acts. (a) For in this they are primarily distinguished from natural virtues, that they are not acquired by repeated acts, but are divinely infused. Certain virtues are called infused of themselves, because they cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone, and therefore cannot exist unless they are infused; but others are infused by accident, because, although they can be acquired by repeated acts, nevertheless they are conferred by God from his special benevolence. (b) Moreover, according to the common opinion, they do not furnish facility, but only the power of acting supernaturally: for experience seems to establish that those who received infused virtues in baptism are not conscious of this facility for acting supernaturally, - and on the contrary, through repeated acts of these virtues, they are soon sweetly inclined to eliciting the same more easily and delectably.

596. (B) Infused virtues can be theological or moral. (a) The former are so called because they are referred immediately to God; for the material object with which they are concerned is not a created thing, but God himself supernaturally known; but the motive (formal object) on which they rest is one of the divine attributes. There are three, namely faith, hope, charity, concerning which we will soon discuss.

(b) Moral virtues are immediately concerned with some created object (for example, justice renders to each his own), and the motive on account of which they are cultivated is the honorableness of the supernatural act itself. They are recalled to four, which are called cardinal; these do not differ on the part of the object from the four acquired cardinal virtues of which above; but only by reason of origin, since they are divinely infused, by reason of exercise, since they are exercised under the influence of actual grace, and by reason of end, because of themselves they tend toward a supernatural end.

597. Thesis: It is certain that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification itself, and commonly the same is held concerning the moral virtues, especially the cardinal ones.

(A) Scripture rather clearly intimates this with regard to charity, and more obscurely with regard to the others: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us";¹ for there charity (of God toward us, and therefore our charity toward God, since charity is mutual) is said to be infused by the Spirit at the very instant in which he is given to us, that is, in which we are justified. The other virtues likewise are exhibited as a gift of God: "For God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."² - The Fathers, although they do not expressly uphold our thesis, not rarely assert that Christian virtues are the gift of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, given through grace. Thus, among others, Augustine: "Grace will come after the Law; it is itself the blessing. And what has this grace and blessing furnished to us?" He answers that through grace many virtues are given, which he enumerates, and, after describing the four cardinal virtues, adds: "These virtues now in the valley of weeping are given to us by the grace of God."³

¹ Rom. 5:5.

² 2 Tim. 1:7.

³ St. Augustine, in Ps. 73, n. 11, P. L., XXXVII, 1065-1066.

598. (B) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was supposed as certain that virtues are infused with habitual grace in adults, but it was doubted whether the same must be said of little ones, and some said that by the virtue of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace is not conferred, nor virtues.⁴ The matter was afterward brought to the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311), and there it was declared:⁵ "But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little ones as upon adults, as more probable and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the saints and modern doctors of theology, should be chosen, with the sacred council approving."

⁴ Decretal. Gregor., l. III, tit. 42, c. 3.

⁵ Denzing., n. 411.

The Council of Trent declared the same as certain with regard to the theological virtues:¹ "In justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The Catechism of the Council of Trent holds that the same must be said concerning the other virtues; for, after describing sanctifying grace, it says: "But to this is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul with grace."²

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

² Catech. Trent., De sacram. baptismi, n. 42. The Catechism certainly does not possess the authority of the Council itself, but hands down the commonly accepted doctrine.

599. (C) Reason counsels this. In the natural order, God furnishes to man not only nature as the remote principle of acting, but also faculties by which he is immediately disposed to act. Now there is a certain analogy between natural life and supernatural life; and therefore it is deservedly inferred that God infuses into man not only habitual grace, which is the remote principle of acting supernaturally, but also proximate principles, or virtues. For although supernatural acts can be elicited through merely actual helps, it seems more consonant with divine wisdom that supernatural habits be infused, by whose aid these acts may be regularly produced.

600. 1. That virtues can be increased together with grace, Trent thus declares:³ "Thus therefore, having been justified, and having been made friends and members of the household of God, going from virtue to virtue, they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day;⁴ that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and exhibiting them as arms of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in the justice itself received through the grace of Christ, faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are more justified... But the holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and charity."

³ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10, apud Denzing., n. 685.

⁴ 2 Cor. 4:16.

601. 2. Virtues of this kind are increased through the worthy reception of the sacraments, and through merit de condigno.

(A) For the sacraments confer sanctifying grace, and indeed ex opere operato,¹ upon all who place no obstacle, and therefore they increase it in all who have received first grace; but grace growing, by that very fact the infused virtues which are connected with it grow.

¹ Synops. Theol. Dogmat., De Sacramentis, n. 45.

(B) Likewise supernatural good works, with Trent as witness,² truly merit the increase of grace, and consequently the increase of virtues which flow from it.

² Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, apud Denzing., n. 724; cf. Synops. dogmat., De Gratia, n. 193.

602. 3. But theologians dispute concerning the mode by which infused virtues are increased. (A) All indeed hold that they grow intensively, and indeed through divine infusion; for since they are supernatural, and are produced in the soul by God, they cannot be increased by the proper efforts of the will, but only by divine action. Wherefore the repeated acts of these virtues do not concur directly toward their increase, but only as a meritorious cause, insofar as God, in view of these merits, increases grace and virtues.

But when the question concerns the intrinsic reason of this increase, theologians do not agree: (a) Thomists hold that the increase of habits happens not by the addition of a new form or reality, but by a greater rooting in the subject, which the habit more subjects to itself, by more easily reducing its potentiality into act.³ (b) But Scotists⁴ think that the increase happens through the addition of a new reality, or of a new degree, which accedes to the former and with it effects something one and more perfect. - A question of this kind is more philosophical than theological, and modern philosophers generally declare that nothing certain can be defined about this matter.

³ Thus John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XIII, art. 6.

⁴ Scotus, in Sentent., lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLVI, sect. I, where he enumerates the various opinions and critically weighs them.

603. (B) But it is certain that by the exercise of infused virtues facility in exercising acts of the same virtues is gradually acquired. This indeed arises especially from a twofold head: (a) From the removal of impediments; for by the exercise of infused virtue the passions are moderated, prejudices are put away, difficulties are overcome: but, obstacles removed, by that very fact the acts of virtues become easier. (b) From custom itself: for just as, through the frequent repetition of natural acts, a greater facility is acquired for doing the same, so likewise, at least indirectly, through the repetition of supernatural acts, the facility of doing the same is increased: for thus the potency is better disposed and, as it were, inclined to act. Hence a sinner recently converted indeed with difficulty works acts of temperance, chastity, fortitude, etc.; but, provided that, helped by grace, he elicits acts of these virtues, gradually he will perform the same more easily and delectably.

604. 1. Infused theological virtues are lost through acts directly and gravely contrary to them; thus faith is destroyed through the grave sin of apostasy or heresy, - hope through the mortal sin of despair, - charity through any grave sin whatever, since it is opposed to divine charity.

(a) That faith is lost by infidelity (that is, by any grave sin against faith), but not by other grave sins, is clear from Trent:¹ "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which faith itself also is lost, but also by any other mortal sin whatever, although faith is not lost, the received grace of justification is lost."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, apud Denzing., n. 691. Cf. Synopsis Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, n. 141-147.

(b) But that charity is destroyed by any mortal sin whatever is likewise gathered from Trent; for, on the one hand, in the text alleged, it is declared that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin whatever; and, on the other, it is defined that justification happens "while through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them";² from which it is deservedly inferred that charity does not inhere in sinners. - This is otherwise clear from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is asserted that sin is opposed to dilection, and that by charity the sons of God are distinguished from sinners,³ as was said above, n. 449. And in reality, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 139-140, such is the nexus between grace and charity that one cannot subsist without the other.

² Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

³ John 14:21; 1 John 2:3-11; 3:7-12.

(c) Concerning hope nothing is expressly defined; but the common and true opinion holds that it is not destroyed when sanctifying grace is lost, on account of the analogy with faith, but is lost through despair or through an act contrary to faith; for since, with the Apostle as witness,¹ faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, with faith hope necessarily perishes; for what can we hope, when the foundation of hope, namely faith in God the remunerator, has already failed?

¹ Heb. 11:1.

605. 2. It is commonly held that infused moral virtues are lost, together with habitual grace, through any mortal sin whatever.

(A) This St. Prosper, disciple of Augustine, had already taught, writing against the semi-Pelagian errors of Cassian: "Virtues cannot dwell with vices: for what participation," says the Apostle,² "has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? For virtue principally is God: to whom having virtue is not something other than being virtue. When we are participants of this, Christ dwells in us, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God;³ faith dwells, hope, charity, continence, understanding, counsel, fortitude, and the other virtues. But when we withdraw from this good, all things opposite arise to us from us."⁴

² 2 Cor. 6:14.

³ 1 Cor. 1:24.

⁴ St. Prosper, Contra Collatorem, c. 13, P. L., LI, 247.

606. (B) Theologians commonly hold the same, led by this reason: infused moral virtues are, as it were, properties and the most noble company of grace, and therefore are infused so that they may order our life toward the supernatural end. Now, sanctifying grace having been lost, its properties are logically taken away; and since, through mortal sin, man is turned away from the supernatural end, he is consequently deprived of the virtues which tend toward the supernatural end. - It is indeed true, from what was said above, that faith and hope are not taken away by any grave sin whatever; but this happens from the special benevolence of God, who does not permit the very foundation of the spiritual building to be utterly overturned through mortal sin, but wishes faith and hope to remain in the sinner so that more easily he, moved by true penance, may return to the good Shepherd of souls.

Moreover if there are any naturally acquired virtues, they do not necessarily perish when grace is lost; thus he who has obtained the virtue of temperance or justice by repeated acts does not lose it by the very fact that he falls into a grave sin of lust.

607. 3. Corollary: concerning the diminution of infused virtues.

(A) It is commonly taught that infused habits are not diminished by venial sins. For if infused virtues were diminished by any venial sin, through many venial sins infused virtues and habitual grace itself could be totally destroyed; but this is opposed to the doctrine of Trent: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."¹ - This is otherwise clear from what was said concerning venial sin, n. 483; for since infused virtues are the most noble company of grace, they are increased or lost with it; but they are not diminished, because grace itself is not diminished by venial sins, which in no way turn us away from God.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, apud Denzing., n. 686.

608. (B) Nevertheless the fervor of charity and of the other virtues is diminished by venial sins. For (a) the facility of acting according to infused habits is diminished as soon as one sins against them even venially; (b) moreover he who frequently and deliberately commits venial sins, by that very fact is gradually disposed toward grave sin, as was shown above, n. 485, and thus a way is prepared for the very loss of charity: "Whence it follows," says St. Thomas,² "that charity can in no way be diminished, speaking directly; nevertheless the disposition toward its corruption can be called indirectly a diminution of charity, which happens either through venial sins, or even through cessation from the exercise of works of charity."

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 10.

For carefully avoiding such harm, nothing is of more profit than a constant effort toward making progress in Christian virtues. Concerning this progress it remains to be spoken in special moral theology.

609. After the consideration concerning human acts in general, insofar as, with law and conscience directing, they tend toward the ultimate end, - after the things said concerning sins and vices which turn us away from God, and also concerning virtues in common by which we are sweetly inclined toward God, it is necessary to discuss human acts in species: "For universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are in particulars."¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, Prologue.

But this part, which discusses acts in species, is called Special Theology. It is divided in diverse ways by diverse authors: (a) St. Thomas, whom many Scholastics have followed, distributes it into two parts, of which the former treats of those things which pertain to all states of men, but the latter of those things which pertain to determined states. But again he divides the former according to virtues; these are seven in number, namely three theological and four cardinal, concerning which he disputes separately and at length, describing them with all their parts, and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit which correspond to the same.

610. (b) Others, especially casuists,² who write for the use of confessors, omitting in their Institutions of Moral Theology all those things which are required for attaining Christian perfection, discuss only the precepts which are necessary for obtaining salvation: 1. concerning the precepts of the theological virtues; 2. concerning the precepts of the decalogue; 3. concerning the precepts of the Church; 4. concerning the penalties laid down by the Church against graver delicts; 5. concerning the sacraments insofar as they are means for preserving the precepts. - This order is useful indeed to the confessor questioning penitents, but is of less profit to the director, who ought not only to turn souls away from evil, but also to lead them in the way of Christian virtues. The confessor could indeed and even ought to read ascetical authors, but not a few omit this, thinking that moral theology suffices for all things. - Besides, the precepts of the Decalogue or of the Church do not exhibit a logical and scientific order, and often are only negative; therefore this division, although practical enough in catechetical instructions, seems less apt for a scientific exposition of Christian Ethics.

² Thus especially Busembaum, S.J. (1600-1668), Medulla Theologiae moralis, whom, among others, Lacroix and St. Alphonsus followed and expounded with commentaries.

(c) Others, adhering to the division of natural Ethics, discuss successively duties toward God, oneself, and neighbor:¹ duties toward God and oneself regard individual morals, duties toward the neighbor regard social morals. This division indeed, by reason of its simplicity and perspicuity, can be of much profit for a popular and compendious exposition of Morals; nevertheless it seems less apt for scientific investigation, because not a few virtues, such as charity, are referred to God, oneself, and neighbor, and things are better understood and connected when the various offices of one and the same virtue are declared in the same Treatise.

¹ Thus, for example, Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Paris, 1901-1902.

611. Therefore we follow the order delineated by the Angelic Doctor, yet accommodating it to present-day morals. Therefore we will discuss:

I. Concerning the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, which immediately reach God, and rest upon one of the divine attributes as upon a motive.

II. Concerning the virtue of religion, which regards divine worship, whether internal or external, and therefore consists as though in the middle between theological and moral virtues; in this treatise are set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

III. Concerning the moral virtues, which sweetly incline us to composing our morals honorably and Christianly, especially concerning prudence, temperance, and fortitude, which are called cardinal; to these is added a supplement concerning Chastity, where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is set forth.

IV. Specifically concerning the virtue of justice, by which to each is rendered his own; this is indeed one of the cardinal virtues, but, on account of the multiple rights and offices which it includes, it demands a fuller exposition. There the four precepts of the Decalogue are declared, namely the fifth, seventh, eighth, and tenth.

V. Concerning the various obligations of states, or concerning the offices which are proper to the principal states of laymen and clerics; there, among other things, the fourth precept of the Decalogue is set forth, concerning the mutual offices of parents and children, masters and servants.

But concerning the sacraments, which include at the same time a dogmatic and moral part, we discuss partly in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology, after the Treatise on Grace, partly in the Synopsis of Moral Theology.¹

¹ Nevertheless, for the use of Seminaries where the moral doctrine concerning the Sacraments is usually handed down separately, we publish a special volume including practical questions concerning the sacraments in general and in species.

In treating of the cardinal virtues, we will not describe all their integral, subjective, and potential parts, but only those which are more useful for practice. - Moreover, so that confessors may more easily be able to question penitents, in the Supplement concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church we will show how precepts of this kind correspond to various virtues, and what sins are usually committed against the precepts.

612. A theological virtue is a virtue infused of itself, whose immediate object, at least primary, is God himself, and whose motive is one of the divine attributes.

That there are three theological virtues, and only three, can be gathered from the common sense of pastors and of the faithful. Paul commemorates these:¹ "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." From the context, the matter here is not acts, but virtues, which remain; faith and hope indeed will be made void by the beatific vision, but charity will never fall away. - Augustine treats of the same in a special treatise, whose title is Enchiridion, or Concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity, where among other things he has these words: "On account of which the apostle Paul approves and commends faith, which works through dilection,² which certainly cannot exist without hope. Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor both without faith."³ But elsewhere he explains how virtues of this kind contribute to the spiritual building of perfection: "(The house of God) is founded by believing, raised by hoping, perfected by loving."⁴

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Gal. 5:6.

³ St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 8, P. L., XL, 235.

⁴ Sermon 27, n. 1, P. L., XXXVIII, 178.

613. But why there are three theological virtues, and how they are connected among themselves, St. Thomas declares.⁵ (a) Since the supernatural beatitude to which men are ordered is above our powers, it is necessary that we be disposed to it through supernaturally infused habits; but that we may be sufficiently ordered to God, three such habits are required. That our intellect may know God supernaturally in this life, faith is required, by which we assent to divinely revealed truths. But the will intends the supernatural end through hope, by which we trustingly expect eternal salvation and the means for attaining it. Finally the will is spiritually joined to God through charity, through which in some way it is transformed into him. - Nor are more theological virtues than three required; for the intellect, through faith, is referred to God under the aspect of truth; the will, through hope, is borne toward God, as he is our good, by which namely we are able to be perfectly made blessed; but through charity, it is borne toward him insofar as he is the supreme good in himself; and thus by these three we are sufficiently ordered into God.

⁵ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62.

(b) A twofold order is distinguished in theological virtues. In the order of generation, faith, as to exercise,¹ precedes hope and charity, for the will cannot be borne into God through hope or dilection, unless he is first supernaturally known through faith; likewise we are not accustomed to love God as good in himself, unless we first apprehend him as our good, and thus hope precedes charity. - In the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are formed by charity, and acquire the perfection of virtue; and thus charity is the mother of all virtues.²

¹ I say as to exercise, for the habits themselves of faith, hope, and charity are infused at the same time, from the things said in the Treatise on Virtues, n. 597.

² The excellence of charity and its preeminence are excellently described in 1 Cor. 13.

We will describe the theological virtues according to the order of generation, namely:

I. faith, through which we assent with the whole mind to God revealing;

II. hope, by which we trustingly expect the possession of God and the means for attaining it;

III. charity, by which we love God from the whole heart, and the neighbor on account of God.