Part I — Chapter I: On the Existence of Right

28. State of the question. 1. In Natural Ethics, and also in the Treatise on the Last End, n. 25, it has already been demonstrated that God is the primary font of right: for He is the supreme Creator and Lord of all things, and possesses all rights in Himself. Now, when He creates certain beings, He at the same time assigns duties and rights to them. Since He Himself is the ultimate end of all beings, the duty of tending toward God as ultimate end is incumbent upon all; but they cannot fulfill this duty unless at the same time they have the right not only of existing, but also of exercising their faculties. Therefore, if there is question of the priority of right and duty, these things can be established: (a) if the rights and duties of men are compared in relation to God, right in creatures primarily flows from duty, inasmuch as creatures ought to serve God before they can vindicate any rights for themselves. Nevertheless rights often extend more widely than duties; for, once it is posited that the right of exercising our faculties inheres in us, we can legitimately do certain things to which we are by no means bound; thus, for example, besides the knowledge of divine and human things which we are bound to acquire for salvation, we can know many other things.

(b) But if the rights and duties of men among themselves are compared, they are indeed correlative, inasmuch as some duty corresponds to some right; nevertheless in the same order right is logically prior to duty, since duty has been instituted in favor of right: for if I have a right of doing something, by that very fact the duty is incumbent upon other men not to prevent that right.

29. 2. Sometimes rights and duties seem to be in conflict with one another, e.g., the rights of creditors and debtors, or the rights of debtors among themselves, the rights of owners and workers, etc. The collision is only apparent, since rights and duties flow from one sole font, namely God, and moreover there can be no contradiction in things established by divine ordering. Therefore the question is which right or duty prevails. Now the order of rights and duties must be determined according to the demands of the last end, according to that saying: in all things look to the end.¹ Therefore, in an apparent collision of rights, that right prevails which, other things being equal, is more excellent, or more necessary or useful in relation to the last end. And so a more certain right prevails over a more uncertain right, since it is more necessary; a particular right, other things being equal, yields to a universal right, or to the public good, since this is more excellent or more necessary.

¹ This is treated in the Treatise on the Last End, n. 31.

30. 3. Division. In this chapter we shall treat: 1. of the object of right, weighing what rights men have or can have; 2. of the subject of right, namely who can acquire rights; 3. of the various modes of acquiring rights.

31. There are three kinds of goods about which the dominion of man can be exercised: 1. the internal goods of man, or those closely pertaining to his person; 2. the external goods of fortune; 3. services to be furnished by other men.

Goods of this kind are: 1. the goods of body and soul; 2. reputation, which has been acquired by good works; 3. the products of one's own talent.

32. The goods of body and soul are of a twofold kind: some which are not distinguished from man himself, such as life (soul and body), the faculties of the soul, and the members of the body; others which are distinguished from man himself, inasmuch as they proceed from him and from his faculties, although they inhere in him, such as actions (not their external effects), both natural and supernatural, and habits, whether acquired or infused. - Concerning these goods let the following propositions be given.

33. Thesis: Man has useful dominion, but not direct dominion, over the internal goods which are not distinguished from himself.

The first part is proved (as to useful dominion). It is certain. For man has all those rights which God has granted to him; but God, by the very fact that He created and conserves man, and assigned to him a supernatural end, granted to him useful dominion over the goods internal to him, as altogether necessary for attaining his end.

The second part is proved (as to direct dominion). Thus commonly. The right of disposing of his own life cannot be attributed to man unless he has received it from God, either absolutely, so that he can use it in all cases and at will, or relatively, that is, for certain determinate cases and grave causes. But neither can be said to have been granted to man by God.

1. Not an absolute right. For the primary end of divine creation is that man promote the glory of God, and the secondary end is that he perfect himself and serve other men; and to obtain this end God assigned to man duties from the execution of which the whole harmony of the moral world ought to result. But that end would be endangered if it were permitted to each one at will to leave the course of life, since the possibility of greater perfection would vanish and society would suffer grave harm.

2. Not a relative right. For the express consent of God is lacking, nor can tacit consent be invoked; for, from the things to be said in nn. 297, 298, 299, 300, where we speak of suicide, the reasons alleged have no force.

Therefore man cannot, whether at will or for grave causes, dispose of internal goods which are not distinguished from himself.

Hence it is seen how the texts are to be interpreted: "I will kill and I will make to live,"¹ "For You are, O Lord, He who has power of life and death,"² and especially the precept of the Decalogue: You shall not kill.

¹ Deut. XXXII, 39.

² Wis. XVI, 13-14.

34. Thesis: Man has full dominion over internal goods which are distinguished from himself.

For from the things said in the preceding proposition, man has useful dominion over his faculties, whose actions and the goods acquired by them can be regarded as fruits; but each one has full dominion over those things which he acquires by his own industry, or produces by his own activity: therefore man can dispose at will of internal goods which are distinguished from himself, without violating justice toward God.

With regard to supernatural habits, it must be noted that they are infused gratuitously, and therefore that they and their acts are less perfectly subject to the dominion of man, although it cannot be said that a man is unjust who disposes of them, e.g., by losing them through sin; otherwise it would have to be said that he who has lost grace is immediately bound by justice to penance (which no one asserts).

35. Corollary. Princes do not directly have true dominion over the life or members of subjects, but indirectly, inasmuch as, from the right of jurisdiction, they are able to dispose of these for the public good, insofar as they act in the place of God.

(A) Not directly indeed, because the right of life and death directly belongs to God alone, from the things said; nor can it be proved that it was directly delegated to Princes.

Nevertheless indirectly they enjoy this privilege; for, by force of the power of jurisdiction with which they are endowed, they can do all those things which the public good truly demands; but the common good of society sometimes requires that the Prince be able to dispose of the life and members of subjects; thus, in the case of a just war, he can order soldiers to expose their life in order to defend the rights of the fatherland; likewise he can punish certain criminals with the death penalty, so that others may be deterred from similar crimes, when the public good requires it. Then he acts as bearing the place of God: "For he does not bear the sword without cause: for he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath against him who does evil."³

³ Rom. XIII, 4.

36. Principle: Man has direct and useful dominion over his own reputation, although limited. It is certain as to useful right; it is commonly held as to direct dominion.

The first part is proved, namely that he has direct and useful dominion, inasmuch as we can not only use a good name for our own advantage, but also renounce it for a higher good.

For we have not only useful but also direct dominion over those things which we acquire by our own labor, or legitimately obtain from those who have acquired the same things by their own labor; but so it is with good reputation: for we acquire or increase this by our own labor, namely by the upright exercise of our faculties; or we have received it from our parents by quasi-hereditary right; therefore we have true dominion over reputation. - Therefore we can protect it against unjust aggressions by our neighbor; and when taken away, reclaim it before judges as our own thing. - This indeed will appear even more manifestly if it is observed that reputation is truly estimable by price: for he who is engaged in commerce, or in an art or industry, conducts his affairs with a more prosperous outcome the more distinguished the reputation he has acquired for himself; therefore injury to reputation often also injures fortune, and therefore can oblige to pecuniary compensation.

Moreover, since reputation is truly ours, we can permit the loss of it in order to obtain a greater good, e.g., to cultivate humility, to seek counsel, to restore reputation to another, etc.; for, between two goods, it is permitted to choose the more excellent.

37. The second part is proved. Nevertheless that right is limited by a manifold obligation, namely (a) by duties toward oneself, inasmuch as it is no more permitted to defame oneself without cause than to dissipate goods of fortune, nor to sin or falsely impute sin to oneself for the sake of humility: for evils must not be done that goods may come. Hence rightly it is read in Scripture:¹ "Have care of a good name: for this shall continue with you more than a thousand precious and great treasures; the number of days of a good life is limited, but a good name shall continue forever." (b) By duties toward the neighbor: inasmuch as we cannot bring infamy upon ourselves if the infamy redounds upon the neighbor, e.g., upon one's family, convent, or community, or upon an accomplice; or also when reputation is necessary to someone for furnishing to the neighbor a duty which is owed to him by strict right, as it is necessary to a bishop or pastor for rightly fulfilling his duties; finally, when it is required for furnishing a duty which is prescribed not by justice, but by charity. In the first and second cases there is injustice, because of harm unjustly inflicted upon the neighbor; in the third, charity is injured.

¹ Ecclus. XLI, 15-16.

38. Besides the goods of body and soul, and also one's own reputation, man is able to make his own the products of his talent. Under this name come: books published by authors; paintings or other artistic works; various inventions by which the industrial arts are advanced, etc.

¹ Lugo, disp. XXVI, n. 171; Carriere, n. 55-62; Marres, l. I, n. 23-25; Lehmkuhl, n. 904-905; Meyer, II, n. 213-216; Ball. P., n. 53; Vermeersch, n. 246-253.

39. 1. What is certain. Now all concede that any man has full dominion over the fruits of his talent, so long as he has not made them public property: for nothing can be more proper to us than what we acquire by the labor of our own mind; and indeed, if external things bear fruit for the owner, much more do internal faculties, which immediately flow from our essence. Therefore he who would steal the manuscripts or inventions of another, and publish them, without the permission of the author, would sin against justice and would be bound to repair damages; for he violates the double right which belongs to the author, that the work written by him not be published against his will, and that the profit to be received from it not be diminished.

For the same reason, he who would take down in writing sermons or lectures heard, and make them public property, without the explicit or tacit permission of the preacher or professor, injures justice and is bound to restitution: for although he can use these for his own use, he cannot publish the same things. Nevertheless implicit permission suffices, which rests upon legitimate custom: thus many sermons are commonly published in periodicals without the explicit consent of the speaker.

40. 2. What is disputed? - But when a book has already been printed, or an invention has been made public property, it is controverted whether by natural right the author or inventor is able to prohibit others from committing the book to the press again or multiplying the thing invented. (a) Some deny this, because a work once published now becomes a common good, which can licitly be occupied by all. (b) Theologians, however, commonly affirm it; for natural right forbids anyone to be despoiled of the fruits of his own labor; but the author of a book or invention could not receive the fruit of his labor, if it were permitted to each one to print and sell anew a book published by another, or to spread the inventions of others, without any compensation; therefore natural right forbids this.

41. 3. Practical conclusion. Nevertheless all admit that nothing certain is defined by natural right as to the time during which an author or inventor can exclusively enjoy his own works. Therefore it is necessary that positive right intervene to determine the matter more accurately. This in fact has been done among all cultivated Nations; and since laws concerning literary and industrial property are determinative of rights, they oblige in conscience, in justice and under the burden of restitution. Likewise, where international agreements exist, these have the force of law.

Now an agreement of this kind was entered into on September 9, 1886, among the principal cultivated nations, by force of which authors who have published books according to the law in force in their own region enjoy the right of property in all regions which have adhered to this agreement.

42. In France, writers who have sent two copies of the books published by them to the legitimate authorities enjoy the exclusive right of selling these throughout their whole life, and their heirs for fifty years.¹ - With regard to inventions, those who, according to the forms determined by law, have obtained the diploma which is called Brevet d'invention, can enjoy the right of property for fifteen years.²

¹ Lyon-Caen and Delalain, Lois francaises et etrangeres sur la propriete litteraire et artistique, Paris, 1889-1890; Pouillet, Traite theorique et pratique de la propriete litteraire, Paris, 8th ed. 1889; Supplement for France, p. 1*-4*.

² Pouillet, Traite theorique et pratique des Brevets d'invention, 2nd ed., Paris, 1879; Supplement for France, p. 4*-7*.

We shall set forth in the Supplement the civil law in force among other nations.

43. Man cannot protect and preserve life unless there inheres in him the right of having certain external goods as his own, by which he can enjoy what is necessary for the support of himself and his own. We shall speak: 1. of the right of possessing external goods; 2. of the various kinds of goods, and especially of semi-full dominion.

44. Since the right of private property is today attacked by many, namely by communists, socialists, and collectivists, we shall: 1. briefly outline the history of these errors; 2. propose the Catholic thesis; 3. solve the principal arguments of adversaries; 4. suggest certain means for preventing socialism.

45. (A) It is scarcely possible to define socialism accurately: for it embraces so many and such diverse systems that a definition which fits one system by no means belongs to the others. - Nevertheless it can be described as the complex of systems which tend toward this, that they subvert the present order of Society, and substitute for it another order, in which the right of dominion is exercised principally, if not exclusively, by the State or Commonwealth itself.

¹ E. de Laveleye, Le Socialisme contemporain, 10th ed. Paris; J. Bourdeau, L'Evolution du Socialisme, Paris, 1901; Winterer, Le Socialisme contemporain, 4th ed. Paris, 1904; Leon de Seilhac, Le Monde socialiste, Paris, 1904; L. Garriguet, Introduction a l'Etude de la Sociologie, t. II, Paris, 1901; R. T. Ely, French and German Socialism in Modern Times, New York, 1883; Rae, Contemporary Socialism, 2nd ed., London, New York, 1898; E. Jager, Der moderne Socialismus, 1873; Cathrein, Der Socialismus, ed. 7, 1898; E. d'Eichthal, Socialisme, Communisme et Collectivisme, 2nd ed. Paris, 1901; V. Pareto, Les Systemes socialistes, Paris, 1902; M. Bourguin, Les systemes socialistes et l'evolution economique, Paris, Colin, 1906.

There are three forms of socialism: (a) communism, which wishes all goods, even those destined for consumption, to be common; (b) collectivism, which distinguishes two kinds of goods: some, which are reserved for producing new things (e.g., lands, instruments of labor, etc.), are to be retained by the State or Commonwealth; others, which are destined for consumption, remain under the dominion of private persons; (c) State socialism, which, while it retains private dominion with regard also to many means of production, advocates the universal and continuous intervention of the State in all affairs, and too greatly restricts the activity and rights of private persons.

Anarchism differs from socialism, for it intends the overthrow of the whole of society.

46. (B) Among the Pagans, certain traces of communism are found: practically among the Spartans in the time of Lycurgus; theoretically in Plato, who, in the treatise On the Republic and On the Laws, proposes communism as a means for establishing concord among citizens.

In the first centuries of the Church, certain Gnostics, and also Apostolics, and afterward in the Middle Age the Waldenses and Albigenses, advocated a certain community of goods, relying on the examples of the primitive community of Jerusalem; which errors the Anabaptists and a few sects of Protestants renewed.

The system of Plato was again proposed by Thomas More in his Utopia, yet polishing it and cleansing it from many vices, especially from the community of wives.

But various systems of this kind had scarcely any moment in minds; and modern socialism took its origin only in the middle of the eighteenth century.¹

¹ A. Lichtenberger, Le Socialisme au XVIIIe siecle, Paris, 1895.

47. A threefold cause of this system can especially be assigned: namely an industrial, philosophico-political, and religious revolution.

² Leo XIII treats of these things briefly, but profoundly, in the proemium of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, May 16, 1891.

(A) The industrial revolution, which began around the middle of the eighteenth century, must be ascribed to the invention of more perfect instruments in manufactured things. For since only the rich are able to acquire these new inventions, by that very fact there are found two classes of men plainly distinct: capitalists, or owners, who possess the instruments of labor; and proletarians, or workers, who labor not for themselves, but for others. Once this is posited: (a) workers depend entirely on the owners for whom they labor; formerly, after some years, they could acquire for themselves the instruments of labor and so become independent; but today for the most part through their whole life they must work in the workshops of others, and can be dismissed at the nod of the owners.

Moreover, by the aid of machines, not rarely more goods are produced than can be sold: from this it happens that workers are dismissed, at least for a time, and suffer want. From this they burn with anger and indignation against the owners.

48. (b) From this it also follows that relations between owners and proletarians have been changed: for he who is over many thousands of workers cannot care for each one in the same familiar and paternal manner as he who is over only a few; therefore if difficulties and dissensions arise, they cannot so easily be settled, but rather are increased, especially since among the workers there are some who not rarely impel their companions to rebellion.

(c) From this also the condition of capitalists is separated more and more from the lot of workers: for the latter, generally receiving a scant wage, can scarcely support themselves and their own; while the former, hiring a great number of workers, and receiving some profit from each of them, become very rich and often indulge in luxury; hence envies, desires, and dissensions are born.

49. (d) Moreover, the ancient guilds of artisans having now been destroyed, proletarians have been handed over, solitary and defenseless, to the inhumanity of owners; new associations have indeed been established, but by no means tempered by religion, which attempt to render the condition of workers better by the overthrow of the social order and by the diffusion of socialism.

50. (e) Finally, domestic life, which formerly was wont to furnish consolation to workers, is today much disturbed; for since the husband, wife, and children are often compelled to labor in various workshops, they can live together only for a few hours; the wife can hardly attend to the domestic matter and to the education of the little ones; the husband, finding a cold and filthy house, and badly cooked foods, gradually deserts his own hearth and frequents taverns.¹ Thus the family is overthrown, and workers, enjoying no domestic happiness, dream of destroying the whole social order.

¹ Concerning the miserable condition of workers, among others, the following have written: Villermé, Tableau physique et moral des ouvriers employes dans les manufactures, Paris, 1840; J. Simon, L'ouvriere, 1861; Comte d'Haussonville, Salaires et miseres de femmes, Paris, 1900.

51. (B) The philosophical and political revolution, which, under the leadership of J. J. Rousseau, pervaded all Europe. For he taught (a) that man is by nature essentially good, and that he was made evil only by the present social order of things: take away private dominion, take away mine and yours, and immediately man will betake himself to a better course; (b) that all men are by nature equal and enjoy the same rights; from which it is logically inferred that the right of property must be abolished, as necessarily favoring excessive inequality among men.

52. The French Revolution partly made these ideas its own, by proclaiming the rights of man and keeping silent about his duties, by establishing the political equality of all citizens, and by patronizing unbridled liberty; from this certain men, with Babeuf,¹ deduced the community of goods; for equality is vain, and liberty vain, unless all things are common.

¹ In order to obtain perfect equality, Babeuf wished all goods to be possessed by the State, all citizens to be compelled to labor, and the fruits of labor to be distributed according to the necessities of each one. Cf. Espinas, La Philosophie sociale du XVIIIe siecle et la Revolution, Paris, 1898.

53. (C) Finally, the religious change which took place in many owners and workers; for unbelief, which in the eighteenth century had invaded the minds of many, began to increase more and more. Now, once faith in the other life had been taken away, or at least greatly diminished, each one desired to obtain an earthly paradise in this life, by indulging in pleasure.

(a) Not a few owners, whose desires are no longer restrained by the bridle of religion, not rarely regard workers as slaves, or instruments of production; they use and abuse them in order to acquire riches more quickly, imposing more work than their strength can bear, and giving a wage which scarcely suffices for food.

(b) On the opposite side many workers, who no longer expect an eternal reward, often indulge in drunkenness and lust; and, since the wage furnished to them is unequal to acquiring the pleasures which they desire, they rebuke capitalists as guilty of injustice, and long to divide their spoils among themselves.

54. It is permitted to distinguish three principal phases in the evolution of socialism: the first, formative and utopian (1820-1850); the second, more scientific (1850-1873); and the third, more political.

55. (A) In the first period, more or less utopian theories were devised, and certain experiments of communism were attempted, but without a happy outcome.

(a) In France, Saint-Simon¹ (1760-1825) wished to establish a new form of society, in which industry organized by science would completely prevail; he taught that the whole value of things flowed from labor as from its proper and sole font, and therefore that workers were to be held in the highest esteem, and that industry, as the most excellent work of religion, was to be fostered and established under the paternal rule of a certain priestly hierarchy. Wherefore his disciples, Bazard, Enfantin, and others, judged that the right of inheritance was to be abrogated, and that goods were to be distributed according to the measure of merit; from this, gradually, private dominion and the family would vanish; but the fruits of labor would be divided according to the works and merits of each one; in place of marriage, free union of the sexes was to be permitted.

¹ Hubbard, Saint-Simon: sa vie et ses travaux, 1857; Weill, Saint-Simon et son oeuvre, Paris, 1894; Charlety, Histoire du Saint-Simonisme, Paris, 1896; P. Janet, Saint-Simon et le Saint-Simonisme.

56. (b) A little later, Charles Fourier² (1772-1837) advocated a certain form of organized communism: families were to coalesce into economic societies, called phalanxes, which would not exceed two thousand persons, and would live together in a spacious building, namely a phalanstery; any resources possessed by families would form a common fund. In each phalanx, agriculture, various crafts, and also liberal arts would be exercised, according to the talent and faculties of individuals, under the leadership of some overseer: all, even the lazy, would receive the necessities of life; but the industrious would obtain something besides, according to each one's merit. Several phalanxes would form some series, and the series multiplied throughout the world, under the rule of a supreme president (omniarch), would tend toward the common good of the whole human race; and thus universal harmony would reign throughout the earth. - An experiment of this system was made in the village of Conde-sur-Vesgre, but it had an unhappy outcome.

² Ch. Fourier, Traite de l'association domestique-agricole, 1822; Le nouveau monde industriel; Theorie des Quatre mouvements; Ch. Gide, Oeuvres choisies de Fourier, preceded by a Notice, Paris, 1890.

57. (c) E. Cabet proposed a more radical communism in the work entitled Voyage en Icarie;¹ according to him, all goods would be placed under the dominion of the Republic, individual citizens, led by brotherly love, would labor with equal spirit, and the fruits of works would be divided equally among the members of the community. He himself indeed wished to preserve the family and marriage; but his disciples soon preached free union. They attempted to bring his system into practice in the region of Texas, in the United States of America; but after some months the matter had an unhappy outcome.

¹ Cf. Ely, Socialism in France, p. 39-52; Malon, Histoire du Socialisme, p. 163.

58. (d) Louis Blanc proposed a mitigated form of communism; he contended that there is inborn in every man a right to labor, and therefore that national workshops were to be established, in which work would be divided according to the strength of each one, but the fruits according to the necessities of each one; wherefore private dominions would gradually have to be abolished, and the State would become the sole owner of all things.

59. (e) Proudhon² (1809-1865) defended a system not unlike anarchism, declaring that property is nothing else than theft, that the State must be abolished, and that every authority must be removed from the midst. Nevertheless he retains property under the name of possession: namely, citizens will be able to possess and transmit to heirs all those things which they are able to use personally; the rest must be left to others. But the fruits of labor will be divided according to the time consumed in working.

² Proudhon, Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? Paris, 1840; Creation de l'ordre dans l'humanite, ou Principe d'organisation politique, 1843; La Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise; Interet et Principal, 1849; Bourgin, Proudhon, Biblioth. socialiste, 1901.

(f) In England, Robert Owen,³ a supporter of mitigated communism, attempted certain experiments of communistic association; in Scotland he established a cooperative society of workers with sufficient success, but the properly communistic societies which he founded in England and America soon collapsed.

³ Cf. The Life of Robert Owen, written by Himself, London, 1857; J. Rey, Lettres sur le systeme de cooperation d'apres le plan d'Owen, Paris, 1828.

60. (B) The second phase of socialism was more scientific, and flourished especially in Germany.

(a) Charles Rodbertus⁴ (1805-1875) is regarded as the master of this school; he taught that all economic goods are the fruit of labor, and that they are not to be esteemed at a greater value than the labor by which they were, as it were, created; and therefore that society must gradually be transformed, so that no dominion exist except that which arises from labor itself.

⁴ Andler, Origines du socialisme d'Etat en Allemagne, Paris, 1897.

61. (b) Charles Marx¹ (1818-1883) succeeded him; he is regarded as the principal teacher of the school, and in the work Das Kapital reduced socialist principles to a true system. According to him, capital (i.e., whatever is reserved for the new production of goods) is nothing else than the fruit of labor unjustly taken away from workers. To demonstrate this, he distinguishes a double value of things: one of use (valeur en usage), which consists in the utility of the thing; the other exchange value (valeur en echange), which consists in the price which can be obtained for those things.² Now he asserts that the sole font of exchange value is the labor expended in producing the thing.

¹ K. Marx, Das Kapital, a work translated into various languages; Deville, Le Capital de K. Marx resume, 1883; V. Pareto, Karl Marx, extracts by P. Lafargue, and critique by Pareto; Rae, op. cit., p. 128-177.

² The value of use is that which is determined solely by the needs and desires of an individual at a given moment. Exchange value is the price which one can obtain by selling an object, what is called the current price, or the quotation.

62. This being posited, he argues thus: the capitalist, by hiring workers, buys their faculty of laboring for a determined price; but this price in fact is equivalent to the daily expenses which are required for the support of the workers, not however to the value of the things produced. For they produce more than that which is necessary for their own support, but part of the things produced is retained by the capitalists; thus capital is born and grows by theft. But by the natural law of evolution, capital and industries increase daily, and are converted into monopolies, destructive of all liberty. But the extreme evil carries its remedy with it; for when very few capitalists have appropriated to themselves all the instruments of labor and all riches, then the expropriation of those despoilers will become necessary, and all the means of production will be possessed collectively.

63. In order to break the empire of Capitalists more quickly and efficaciously, C. Marx established the international society of workers (L'Internationale), which celebrated international congresses at Geneva, in the year 1866; Lausanne, 1867; Brussels, 1868; The Hague, 1872; but afterward, in 1873, it was broken up because of internal dissensions which arose between C. Marx and Bakounine, the promoter of anarchy.

64. (c) Lassalle³ defended nearly the same system, and further expounded what they call the iron law (la loi d'airain). According to him, namely, in the present economic order, by an invincible necessity of things and as if by an iron law, it happens that wages never long exceed that which is necessary for one's own support and for the propagation of the human species: for if wages are increased, a greater number of children is procreated, and therefore there is a greater influx of workers, and soon, by the ineluctable force of competition, less price is paid to workers; for the more numerous the workers are, the less each one receives; and thus they live in a miserable state, having nothing except what is necessary for life.

³ Rae, op. cit., p. 92-127; R. Ely, op. cit., p. 189-203.

Engels, Bebel, Liebknecht, Singer, and others propagated the doctrine of Marx; Bernstein softened it a little, but K. Kautsky¹ defends it integrally, whose theories the Congress of Socialists held in Germany in the year 1903 approved.

¹ Bernstein, Socialisme theorique et Social-democratie pratique, trans. by Al. Cohen; K. Kautsky, Le Marxisme et son critique Bernstein, trans. by M. Martin-Leray, Paris, 1900. - Cf. P. Vialles, La Scission du Marxisme, Montpellier, 1900; Winterer, Le Socialisme allemand et ses dernieres evolutions, Paris, 1903.

65. (C) The third phase, which began around the year 1873 and endures even to the present days, is more political and practical. (a) Many socialists, namely those called Reformists, understanding that a total change of the economic matter cannot be obtained immediately, prepare the way for the social revolution through successive and progressive evolution. And so they attempt gradually to seize political power, and they propose laws which tend toward this, that they render the lot of workers better, but the condition of capitalists worse, by imposing new burdens and taxes upon them, especially those taxes which they call progressive. They advocate social democracy and State socialism, demanding, for example, that all railways, mines, etc., be possessed and administered by the Government. In order to pursue their ends more efficaciously, they establish associations, both national and international, by which they can resist the federation of capitalists, and spread their theories among workers, indeed also among farmers. (b) Others, however, think that only by violent revolution can the condition of workers truly be made better, by utterly abolishing every distinction between owners and workers; and they strive to prepare it.

66. But today, after the war had ended, which brought so many disturbances into the world, Socialism has grown in many regions:² in Great Britain, the guilds of workers which formerly pursued a better condition for workers now tend toward collectivism; in Germany, if one excepts independent socialists and a few communists, most workers favor State socialism; in France, the fight grows hot between seditious and moderate Syndicalism, and daily Christian Syndicalism increases, which promotes the doctrine of Leo XIII concerning the social matter; in Italy seditious syndicalism stirred up not a few disturbances, which Christian syndicalism tries to calm, and to which the nationalists (fascisti) oppose force; in the United States of America, moderate syndicalism still flourishes, notwithstanding a few anarchists who, arisen from Russia, attempted to overthrow public order. In one word, the world is restless, and it will not find peace and concord unless it returns to Catholic principles, as Benedict XV rightly declared many times.¹

² L. Garriguet, Question sociale et Ecoles sociales, 1922, ch. VIII.

¹ To the bishop of Bergamo, March 11, 1920, concerning the prescriptions of the Apostolic See in the social matter not to be neglected, indeed to be followed most religiously (A.A.S., XII, 109); to the bishops of Venice, Umbria (A.A.S., XII, 290, 292).

67. It must also be noted that many Socialists, especially communists, collectivists, and anarchists, favor atheism and positivism, and reject every cult as superstition, except the cult of humanity.² - Likewise they overthrow the foundations of the family, advocating free love and marriages dissoluble at will, and moreover entrusting the education of children exclusively to the State.

² In France almost all socialists, except the Reformists, show themselves most bitter enemies of religion, as is clear from their open declarations in the periodical Le Mouvement socialiste (Nov. 1902-April 1903). In the other regions they indeed assert that religion is a private matter, which is left to the decision and conscience of each one; but at the same time they contend that by socialism rightly understood religion must be put to flight, just as darkness is dispelled by light. Cf. Mouv. socialiste, 1902, pp. 1936, 1943, 1946, 2043, 2045 sq.

Today there are four principal forms of socialism:

68. (A) State Socialism,³ which does not wish utterly to remove private property from the midst, but strives to restrict it by handing over to the State the principal means of production, such as mines, railways, the greatest industrial factories, etc., whose revenues the Government will receive and distribute equably among the citizens. Thus many politicians, such as, in Germany, where this system was born and flourishes, Ad. Wagner, Ebert, and those who adhere to democratic Socialism; in France, those who are called radical-socialists.

³ Cl. Jannet, Le Socialisme d'Etat, Paris, 1890, and Bechaux, L'Ecole individualiste, le socialisme d'Etat, Paris, Alcan, 1907, set forth and refute this form of socialism; L. Garriguet, Question sociale et Ecoles sociales, 1922, ch. X.

69. (B) Agrarian socialism, which H. Spencer first advocated, but afterward rejected,¹ had H. George² as its principal patron. He taught that not all means of production must be possessed by the State, but only landed estates, because land, like the sea and air, is not capable of private dominion, but ought to be common to all. But lest public order be taken away, possessors of fields will not be despoiled, but will only pay a tax which corresponds to the price of leasing; and since it is foreseen that this tax will be equal to all public expenses to be paid, the other taxes will be removed from the midst, and therefore there will remain a single tax upon lands (single tax). But this system, which at first pleased a few in Ireland and the United States, is today rejected as unequal to solving the social question.

¹ H. Spencer, Social Statics, 1851, ch. IX; Justice, 1891, Appendix B.

² H. George, Progress and Poverty, New York, 1883, a work translated into various languages; The Land Question, New York, 1898; The Condition of Labor, New York, 1891; cf. L. Garriguet, op. cit., ch. XI.

70. (C) Collectivism, or Marxism (above, n. 62), whose doctrine is contracted thus: (a) the State or Municipality ought to retain as its own all the means of production, i.e., lands, mechanical instruments, money, etc.; (b) the use and administration of these means will be in the hands of public power, and the production of things will be so ordered that nothing useless is made, but provision is made for all the necessities of citizens; (c) by public authority the fruits of labor will be distributed among citizens: according to some, according to perfect equality; according to others, according to each one's labor and merit; according to others, according to each one's necessities. The part of the goods which is received by any citizen becomes private property, as acquired by labor; but it must be consumed, and not employed for producing new things, lest capital be established again under another form.³

³ Schaeffle briefly and clearly set forth collectivism in the little work translated into French, La Quintessence du Socialisme, Brussels, 1895, and Paris, 1903; cf. G. Renard, Le regime socialiste, 2nd ed., Paris, 1898; E. Vandervelde, Le Collectivisme et l'Evolution industrielle, Paris, 1921; L. Deslinieres, Projet de code socialiste, Paris, Giard et Briere, 1908. Cf. L. Garriguet, op. cit., ch. XII.

71. But concerning the mode of bringing this system into practice the Collectivists do not agree, but are divided into three schools: (a) some, called Possibilists or Reformists,¹ reject violent means, and wish gradually to attain the end by legal means, by handing over the principal industries to the State under the form of monopoly, by determining by law the price of work to be paid to workers, by promoting universal and obligatory insurances, etc.; and thus they differ little from State Socialism, except insofar as they propose to themselves as the ultimate end the expropriation of private persons. - Allied with these are the Evolutionists, who think that by necessary evolution this social change will come to pass.

¹ A. Millerand, Le Socialisme reformiste francais, Paris, 1903.

72. (b) But others contend that a change of this kind can be brought about only by revolution, and therefore by all means they try to obtain public authority, so that they may be able to reduce all the means of production into the power of the Government, and authoritatively receive and divide the fruits.² (c) Anarchists, proceeding still further, strive to overthrow the political power of the State, and wish to hand over all the means of production to Municipalities, which will be joined among themselves by an international federation. In order that civil authority may be torn up more quickly, it is expedient to use violent means, sword, fire, and all modern inventions. Thus Bakounine, P. Kropotkine, E. Reclus, S. Faure, A. Cipriani, and the Bolshevists, who first committed authority to popular assemblies, and afterward exercised a true tyranny.³

² Thus, among others, J. Guesde, Collectivisme et Revolution.

³ The Bolshevists, after the Russian empire had been destroyed, established a tyrannical authority, and in practice rejected anarchy as unequal to ruling the people. Cf. Max Hoschiller, Le mirage du sovietisme, Paris, 1921.

73. (D) Seditious Syndicalism,⁴ judging that the tyranny of the State and Municipalities is no less to be feared than that of owners, wishes all the means of production to be handed over to the guilds themselves of workers. To attain this end, first provision must be made for the education of workers, indeed the help of experts must be obtained, so that, once the owners have been ejected, the new ordering of industry may at once succeed the former. Meanwhile by all means, even violent means, but especially by cessation from work, both particular and general, the way is to be prepared for a general revolution by which the property of all goods may be transferred to the guilds of workers. When this has been accomplished, the State and Municipalities will be utterly removed from the midst, and the management of public and industrial matters alike will be in the hands of the various municipal, national, and international associations of workers. Then we shall have an earthly paradise, since the rightly ordered production of all things will be able abundantly to provide for the necessities of all. - Even among seditious syndicalists there are divisions, some promoting the bloody means of the Bolshevists, but others proposing less violent means; yet all think that some revolution is necessary.¹

⁴ Syndicalism which strives by violent means to overthrow modern society can be designated thus, and so is distinguished from moderate syndicalism, which strives by legitimate means to render the condition of workers better. Concerning each we shall treat a little more fully in the French language at the end of the work.

¹ G. Sorel, L'Avenir socialiste des Syndicats; H. Lagardelle, Syndicalisme et Socialisme; E. Pouget, La Confederation generale du Travail; Griffueilhes, Les Objectifs de nos luttes de classes, especially set forth the system of Syndicalism. Cf. L. Garriguet, op. cit., ch. XIII, and L'Evolution actuelle du Socialisme en France.

In the statutes which are proposed to the guilds of workers, these things are read, which clearly declare the end of the association and the principal means:

"Considering that, by reason of the effects of modern industry and of the logical support which power provides to the holders of property and of the means of production, there is a permanent antagonism between Capital and Labor;

"That, by this fact, two very distinct and irreconcilable classes are present: on one side, those who hold Capital; on the other, those who are the creators of all riches, since Capital is constituted only by a levy effected to the detriment of Labor;

"For these reasons, the Proletarians must therefore make it a duty to put into application the axiom of the International: 'The emancipation of the workers can be the work only of the workers themselves';

"Considering that, to attain this end, of all forms of groupings the Syndicate is the best, since it is a grouping of interests coalescing the exploited against the common enemy, the capitalist; that by that very fact it rallies within its bosom all producers, whatever opinion or philosophical, political, or religious conception they claim for themselves;

"Considering likewise that, if the Syndicate confined itself in a regrettable isolation, it would fatally commit - all proportions preserved - the same error as the isolated worker, and that it would thus fail in the practice of solidarity; there is therefore a necessity that all producers first unite in the Syndicate, and, this first act realized, complete the syndical work by causing their Syndicate to adhere to their local Federation or Labor Exchange, and through the channel of their national union to the General Confederation of Labor."

74. Thesis: The private, permanent, and exclusive right of dominion over external goods, even lands, circumscribed by just limits, is legitimate, flows from natural right, and in the present state is morally necessary.

¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical Rerum Novarum, May 16, 1891; St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 66, a. 1-2; Lugo, disp. VI, 1-9; Crotty, I, n. 177-206; Carriere, n. 20-27; Meyer, II, n. 162-177; Castelein, Instit. Philosophiae, th. 16; Castelein, Le Socialisme et le Droit de Propriete, Brussels, 1896; Vermeersch, n. 195-210; P. Leroy-Beaulieu, Le Collectivisme, passim; Capart, La Propriete individuelle et le Collectivisme, Namur, 1898; Thiers, De la Propriete, Paris, 1848; Bastiat, Harmonies economiques, Paris, 1851, p. 212-292; de Wulf, Le Droit de Propriete d'apres St Thomas; L. Garriguet, Etudes de Sociologie, La Propriete privee; Cathrein, Socialism, New York, 1892.

The thesis is explained. (a) A private right of dominion: there is question of dominion not only useful, but direct, belonging to individual men, not however to society; we do not deny that society itself can have some goods as its own, but we contend that private citizens enjoy the same right.

(b) Permanent and exclusive: the right in question can be exercised not only in a transitory manner, but also in a stable manner, and can be transferred to heirs or others; it is so proper that the owner of a thing can exclude all others from its possession.

(c) Over external goods, i.e., whether movable or immovable, whether they are intended for the new production of things, or for use.

75. (d) Circumscribed by just limits: for that right is not absolute, but, like other rights, is limited, and indeed in three ways: in a case of extreme necessity, each one can occupy that which is necessary for his own support (n. 446); sometimes also the common good requires that private dominion be diminished, restricted, or taken away by the State, by force of eminent dominion (nn. 123, 125, 131), which nevertheless cannot be done without a most grave reason and proportionate compensation; - finally charity demands that the rich bestow something from their superfluous goods upon the poor.¹

¹ Leo XIII explains this splendidly, Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "The foundation of this doctrine is placed in this, that just possession of money is distinguished from just use of money. To possess goods privately ... is a natural right for man ... But if it is asked what the use of goods must be, the Church indeed answers without any hesitation: As to this, man ought not to have exterior things as his own, but as common, namely so that he easily communicate them in the necessity of others ... When enough has been given to necessity and propriety, it is a duty to give what remains to the needy: 'That which remains, give alms' (Luke XI, 41). These are not duties of justice, except in extreme things, but of Christian charity, which indeed there is no right to seek by action at law." - St. Thomas had gone before Leo, 2. 2., q. 66, a. 2; q. 32, a. 5-6. - Cf. Meyer, II, n. 220-223.

76. (e) It flows from natural right and in the present state is morally necessary. For we do not contend that primary natural right always and everywhere demands that private form of dominion; for a state of things can be conceived in which the collective possession of certain goods in some place or in some community would sufficiently provide for the necessities and happiness of men, e.g., among pastoral tribes. But in the present condition of things, in which men commonly love themselves more than the neighbor or society, - and given the state of present-day civilization, in which men cannot live a pastoral life, but need strenuous labor in order to acquire necessities for themselves, - private dominion flows logically from natural right, as will be clear from the arguments set forth below, and therefore is rightly said to be morally necessary for the happiness of citizens and the peace of society. Hence it flows not from civil law alone, as Hobbes, Bentham, and Montesquieu held, nor from the social compact, as Grotius, Puffendorf, Heineccius, and others taught.

77. We indeed admit, according to St. Thomas and many scholastics, that the right of property is derived from the law of Nations; but, when the context and parallel places are inspected, the mind of the Holy Doctor is that the law of Nations of which there is question is not merely positive law introduced by international compact, but a conclusion deduced from natural right and accepted by common sense.² Therefore Leo XIII rightly says:³ "To possess things privately as one's own is a right given to man by nature."

² "Those things pertain to the law of nations which are derived from the law of nature as conclusions from principles, as just purchases and sales..." (S. Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 95, a. 4). Cf. Van Gestel, n. XXXVI, p. 82; Pottier, dis. I, n. 19-53.

³ Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

78. The first part of the thesis is proved, namely that the right of dominion is legitimate or licit. This is proved so clearly by Scripture and Tradition that it can be said to be of faith. 1. It is clear from Scripture.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) God, after He created the first parents, gave them the earth, that they might subject it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and all living things; likewise He gave every herb and all trees, which they could use for food.¹ Thus all external goods which are capable of occupation were given indivisibly to the human race, not so that they might remain undivided, but so that they might be possessed in a manner more suitable for procuring the necessities of life.²

¹ Gen. I, 28-30.

² Leo XIII explains this most excellently, Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "But that God gave the earth to the whole human race to be used and enjoyed can in no way be opposed to private possessions. For God is said to have given the earth in common to the human race, not because He wished promiscuous dominion of it among all, but because He assigned no part to anyone to possess, the delimitation of private possessions having been left to the industry of men and the institutions of peoples."

In fact, already the two sons of Adam are said to have possessed their own: for Abel was a shepherd of sheep, and offered to the Lord from the firstlings of his flock; Cain was a farmer, and offered from the fruits of the earth; afterward he built a city, which was his own, and therefore he called its name from the name of his son Henoch.³

³ Gen. IV, 2-4, 17.

79. (b) In the time of Abraham the right of private dominion over goods, whether movable or immovable, already appears manifestly: for he "was rich in the possession of gold and silver." - "But Lot also, who was with Abram, had flocks of sheep, and herds, and tents."⁴ At that time pastures indeed were common;⁵ but fields and caves were already under private dominion, as is evident from the compact by which Abraham, for four hundred shekels of silver, bought the field of Ephron and the double cave which lay hidden in it, that he might bury the deceased Sara there.⁶ - But that the right of dominion was permanent is clear from this, that Abraham himself, Isaac, Leah, and Jacob were buried in the same cave; moreover the bones of Joseph were buried in Sichem, "in the part of the field which Jacob had bought from the sons of Hemor, for a hundred young sheep."⁷

⁴ Gen. XIII, 1-2, 5.

⁵ Gen. XIII, 7-13.

⁶ Gen. XXIII, 1-20.

⁷ Josh. XXIV, 32.

80. (c) By the Mosaic law the right of private dominion over things, whether movable or immovable, was confirmed; for not only stealing is prohibited, but also coveting the goods of another: "You shall not steal... You shall not covet your neighbor's house; nor shall you desire his wife, not his servant, not his maidservant, not his ox, not his ass, nor anything that is his."¹ - In order to render the possession of fields firmer, it is strictly forbidden that the boundaries by which they are circumscribed be transferred.² - Indeed, so that they might remain in the same family, they were not sold in perpetuity, but could be redeemed; and, when the year of the great jubilee recurred, even fields not redeemed returned to the former possessor.³

¹ Exod. XX, 17; cf. Deut. V, 21.

² Deut. XIX, 14.

³ Levit. XXV, 23-28. - Yet the learned observe that a little before the exile, and afterward, this law of the jubilee was not always observed, and that certain Jews became richer by buying or invading the fields of others.

81. (B) Under the evangelical law. (a) Christ by no means condemned the right of private dominion which then flourished, but promoted the good use of riches: He called the poor in spirit blessed;⁴ to those who wished to be perfect He gave the counsel of selling all things and giving the price to the poor;⁵ He commanded all to bestow alms upon the needy.⁶

⁴ Matt. V, 3.

⁵ Matt. XIX, 21; Luke XII, 33.

⁶ Matt. XXV, 41-43.

(b) Relying on the evangelical counsels, the Christians of Jerusalem instituted a certain community of goods: "For neither was there anyone needy among them; for as many as were possessors of fields or houses, selling them, brought the prices of those things which they sold, and laid them before the feet of the apostles; and distribution was made to each one according as anyone had need."⁷ From this certain persons inferred that the Apostles were supporters of communism; but from the context it is manifest that they did not deny the right of private dominion, but rather affirmed it; for St. Peter thus addresses Ananias, who had defrauded concerning the price of the field:⁸ "Did it not remain to you while remaining, and when sold was it not in your power?" These words clearly show that Christians sold their goods freely and from charity, and that even after the goods had been sold they could have retained them for themselves. Moreover this community lasted only a few years, and provision was made otherwise for the necessities of the poor, especially through collections.

⁷ Acts IV, 34-35.

⁸ Acts V, 4.

Therefore Scripture teaches two things: (a) that the right of property is legitimate; (b) nevertheless that certain burdens are incumbent upon the rich, especially almsgiving.¹

¹ St. Paul sets forth the manner of acting with the rich thus (I Tim. VI, 17-19): "Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who gives us abundantly to enjoy; to do good, to become rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate, to lay up for themselves a good foundation for the future, that they may apprehend true life."

82. 2. The Church faithfully guarded the doctrine of Christ, and expressly defended it against heretics:

(A) By condemning the Apostolics (third century), who, as Augustine testifies,² "most arrogantly called themselves by this name because they did not receive into their communion those who used wives and possessed their own things... But these are heretics for this reason, because, separating themselves from the Church, they think that those who use these things have no hope."

² Book On Heresies, heresy 40.

(B) By teaching, with the Fathers, that riches are not evil, but were given unequally by God, so that to the richer there might be furnished the occasion of exercising kindness and charity, but to the poor the occasion of cultivating patience and acquiring merits.

83. Yet it must be admitted that certain Fathers of the fourth and fifth century, while speaking of the grave duty of helping the needy, and also of the avarice and hardness of heart of the rich, sometimes used a manner of speaking which, at first sight, seems to favor the community of goods. Thus they call those who do not clothe the naked, if they can do this, thieves; those who deny food to the hungry, guilty of injury;³ that goods are common, since we are all brothers in Christ;⁴ they extol the community of goods such as flourished among the Christians of Jerusalem;⁵ they teach that the rich, when they give alms, render a debt to the poor;⁶ that the superfluous things of the rich are the necessary things of the poor;⁷ that all riches descend from iniquity,⁸ etc.

³ St. Basil, Homily on that saying of Luke, "I will destroy..." n. 7, in Migne, P. G., XXXI, col. 275-278.

⁴ St. Gregory of Nyssa, On Loving the Poor, orat. 1, in Migne, P. G., XLVI, col. 466; St. Chrysostom, on I Cor., homil. 10, c. 3, in Migne, P. G., LXI, col. 86.

⁵ St. Chrysostom, on Acts of the Apostles, homil. 7, c. 2-3, in Migne, P. G., LX, 65-68.

⁶ St. Ambrose, De Nabuthe, one book, cap. 12, n. 53, in Migne, P. L., XIV, 747.

⁷ St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Ps. 147, n. 12, in Migne, P. L., XXXVII, col. 1922.

⁸ St. Jerome, Ep. 120 to Hedibia, c. 1, in Migne, XXII, col. 984-985.

84. To solve this difficulty, we note:

(a) That the same Fathers, when occasion is given, expressly assert the right of private dominion. Thus St. Basil:¹ "Is God unjust, who distributed to us the necessities of life unequally? Why are you rich, and he poor? Is it not indeed so that you may receive the reward of kindness and faithful stewardship, and he may be endowed with the great rewards of patience?" More explicitly St. Chrysostom: "Moreover he (St. Paul) knew that riches are not prohibited, if someone uses them as he ought. For as I have said: wine is not an evil thing, but drunkenness is evil; so riches are not an evil thing, but avarice is evil, cupidity is evil."² And afterward he adds that to sell all things is a counsel, not a precept. - This is otherwise clear from their manner of acting toward the rich, whom they do not excommunicate, but urge to help the needy.

¹ On that saying of Luke, "I will destroy," n. 7, in Migne, P. G., XXXI, col. 275.

² Homil. 2 to the people of Antioch, n. 5, in Migne, P. G., XLIX, col. 40.

85. (b) That the sayings of the Fathers must be explained from the context and circumstances: for the most part they are taken from sermons, in which they speak in an oratorical manner; furthermore they said these things either on the occasion of a great calamity, while many poor persons were living in necessity, or by addressing rich persons who showed no charity toward the poor.

86. (c) Thus in a broad sense the rich are called thieves and guilty of injury, who permit goods to be corrupted which they are bound to bestow upon the needy, inasmuch as they are stewards of the goods which the Creator has bestowed upon them. - Goods are called common, because they were created by God and handed over to men for relieving the necessities of the human race, so that in a case of extreme necessity they truly become common. - Therefore it is not strange that the customs of the first Christians are praised, because they left their goods to the Apostles to be distributed to the brethren: for this, although it is not commanded, must be placed among the evangelical counsels. - The rich, by bestowing alms, render a debt of charity to the poor, because God wills superfluous things to be given at least in part to the poor: in this sense the superfluous things of the rich are the necessary things of the poor; for God commands the rich to relieve the necessities of the poor from their superfluous goods. - Finally, riches flow from iniquity, inasmuch as, according to many Fathers, the division of goods, and therefore the origin of riches, took its beginning only from original sin and the corruption of morals which followed from it: for in the state of innocence all things could have remained common.

87. (C) Whenever heretical sects, such as the Waldenses, attacked the right of property, the Church defended it more explicitly.³ Hence, when the errors of communism and socialism were raging everywhere, Pius IX and Leo XIII expressly set forth and vindicated Catholic doctrine.¹

³ Thus Innocent III declared against the Waldenses that the rich, possessing their own things and giving alms, could be saved (Denzinger, n. 373).

¹ Pius IX, Encyclical Qui pluribus, Nov. 9, 1856; Quanta cura, Dec. 8, 1864; Leo XIII, Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

88. 3. The second part of the thesis: the right of dominion flows from natural right. It is certain. That form of dominion flows from natural right which is demanded, on the one hand, by the nature of man and his private good, and, on the other, by the common good, or the end of society. But, given the present condition of human nature, the form of private, exclusive, and permanent dominion is morally necessary both for the private good of man and for the common good of society.

89. 1. For the private good of man, inasmuch as he can be regarded as an individual and as the head of a family.²

² Leo XIII explains this argument splendidly in the cited Encyclical.

(A) Inasmuch as he is an individual, man, since he is a rational, provident, and progressive being, has the right of possessing as his own not only those things which are actually consumed, but also movable or immovable goods which are necessary for providing for future necessities. For upon him there is incumbent the right and duty of protecting his own life not only in the present, but also in the future, insofar as this can be done. - But he cannot securely provide for future necessities unless he has the right of possessing in a stable manner at least certain goods as his own, from which he can sustain life in time of sickness, or old age, or want and poverty; for man can and ought to foresee that he will not always be fit to acquire for himself food or clothing and other things of this kind; and therefore, if he is wise, he ought to provide for future necessities, not only physical, but also intellectual and moral. This indeed cannot be done better than by acquiring for himself and permanently preserving not only fruits and other kinds of foods, which are easily corrupted, but also fruitful lands, or things estimable by price, from which by his own or another's labor he can obtain all things necessary for himself.

90. (B) Inasmuch as he is the father of a family, man, who by natural instinct and divine ordination has procreated children for the conservation of the species, is bound by natural right to provide not only for himself, but also for his wife and children. But he cannot furnish this prudently and safely unless he has the right of acquiring for himself and transmitting to his own goods, whether movable or immovable, especially fruitful possessions, from which he can sustain his family in time of poverty, or of broken strength, or even after death. Therefore.¹

¹ This is confirmed by the natural instinct innate in all, by force of which they wish to make useful external things their own: even infants vindicate certain things for themselves as their own, e.g., little gifts; adults likewise wish to have as their own, insofar as can be done, not only the fruit of their labor, but also the instruments which they use for laboring, the house which they inhabit, and other things of this kind. This innate propensity indeed, as universal and consonant with reason, must be said to arise from nature itself.

91. Most socialists indeed concede this rather freely; but they contend that better provision would be made for the necessities of individuals and of the family if the dominion of all things which serve production were placed in the hands of the State itself. To refute this, we observe the following. (a) The State is later than individuals and families both logically and chronologically, since it is nothing else than an aggregation of individuals and families;² and therefore the right of possessing belongs primarily to individual men and families, and only secondarily to the State. Now when private citizens, whether by their own industry or that of their ancestors, have legitimately acquired goods so that they may provide for themselves and their own, they cannot be despoiled of these goods unwillingly,³ unless the common good requires this and equitable compensation is given; for the State was instituted not for destroying, but rather for protecting, the rights of citizens. Moreover we shall soon show that this spoliation is by no means required for the common good. Therefore the invasion of private rights which the collectivists propose would be unjust.

² "For man is older than the republic; wherefore he ought by nature to have had his own right to protect life and body before any State had come together." (Encyclical Rerum Novarum.)

³ Leo XIII declares this thus (cited Encyclical): "Therefore if, by sparing expenses, he himself (the worker) has saved anything, and has placed the fruit of his thrift, so that its custody may be safer, in land, assuredly land of this kind is nothing else than wages themselves clothed in another appearance; and therefore the field thus purchased by the worker will be as much in his power as the wages acquired by labor... Therefore in that the Socialists strive to transfer the goods of private persons to the common, they make the condition of all wage-earners worse, since, the liberty of investing wages having been taken away, by that very fact they despoil them of the hope and faculty of increasing the family estate and of acquiring advantages for themselves."

92. (b) Moreover, public authority is constituted not so that it may provide for the necessities of individual citizens, but only for the common good; nor so that it may restrict without necessity the free activity of private persons, but rather foster and protect it. But if, under the pretext of providing for all the necessities of private persons, the State makes all productive goods (all capital, as they say) its own, by that very fact it limits the activity of individuals, by furnishing that which individuals can do by their own powers; and the tyranny of the State is greatly to be feared, since it alone possesses productive things, and citizens depend entirely upon it with regard to food, clothing, and other things necessary for life. Hence it has rightly been said that private dominion is the best bulwark of individual liberty;¹ and experience shows that those citizens enjoy greater liberty and activity who depend less upon the State, and trust more in their own powers.²

¹ This many socialists freely concede in Laveleye, op. cit., p. 537, although they deduce false consequences from it.

² H. de Tourville shows this, Histoire de la formation particulariste, Paris, F. Didot, 1905.

93. (c) Finally, as St. Thomas rightly observes,³ private dominion is superior to public dominion for three reasons: "First indeed, because each one is more solicitous to procure something which belongs to himself alone than that which is common to all or to many: because each one, fleeing labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common, as happens in a multitude of servants.⁴ - In another way, because human affairs are handled more orderly if the proper care of procuring some thing lies upon individuals. But there would be confusion if each one indifferently were to procure anything whatever.¹ - Third, because through this the state of men is preserved more peaceful, while each one is content with his own thing. Hence we see that among those who possess something commonly and undividedly, quarrels arise more frequently." This indeed will be more clear from the following argument. - Therefore, if the good of the individual is considered, there is already required a private and exclusive right of possessing things as one's own.

³ Sum. Theol., 2. 2., q. 66, a. 2.

⁴ Socialists cannot deny a fact of this kind, but they say that altruism, by which we pursue the good of others more than our own, will soon succeed the egoism which prevails in the present order of things. - But it is so natural to man, as he now exists among us, to love himself and his own more than others, that a universal change in this matter cannot be hoped for. In fact collectivists who become richer generally at least retain for themselves and their own the goods acquired, and do not divide them among proletarians, so that these rightly complain about that manner of acting; indeed workers themselves, who cultivate a garden by their own labor, by no means share with other workers the fruits growing there.

¹ Thus, for example, if all lands remained common, since not all are equally fertile, contentions would often arise concerning the possession of the fields which are more fruitful: if today such lawsuits arise among coheirs, how much more among strangers? - But if lands are distributed by public authority, will there not be place for respect of persons, and therefore for envy and quarrels?

94. 2. Private dominion contributes greatly to the good of society itself. For since the end of society is to promote the common good, with the rights of citizens preserved, that form of dominion must be said to be more consonant with natural right which more efficaciously fosters the abundant production of goods and an equitable distribution, and at the same time protects the legitimate liberty of citizens. But the matter stands thus when the right of private dominion is preserved; for (A) men, when they know that they are laboring to increase their own resources, and to transmit them to their children or to others dear to them, apply eagerness and far greater zeal: and this indeed greatly contributes to the abundance of fruits and to increasing the riches of the State; and in fact, under this form of private dominion, riches have grown to an immense degree and grow daily.² But on the other hand, when citizens expect no private profit to be retained for themselves and transmitted to posterity, most remain idle and sluggish, relying on the labors of others, and thus resources are gradually diminished and vanish. - This indeed is confirmed by experience: for in various regions, in France, Great Britain, America, Australia, Algeria, etc., villages and hamlets were established in which goods were common, under the leadership of Rob. Owen, Stephen Cabet, and other socialists or politicians; now nearly all those communities, although endowed with all necessary aids of life and with very ample economic apparatus, after some years vanished, dissolved by the laziness of many and by internal dissensions;¹ but if certain ones flourished longer, this must be attributed to the special industry of some leader, who was able to settle dissensions and restrain the natural carelessness of the associates.²

² With regard to the nations of Europe, see G. d'Avenel, La Fortune privee a travers sept siecles, Paris, 1895; E. Thery, Histoire economique 1890-1900, Paris, 1902; and with regard to the United States of America, C. D. Wright, The Industrial Evolution of the United States, New York, 1895.

¹ H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, London and New York, 1897, t. III, ch. XXII, translated into French under the care of Cazelles and Gerschel: Principes de Sociologie; L. Reybaud, Etudes sur les Reformateurs ou socialistes modernes; Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les nouvelles societes anglo-saxonnes, Paris, Colin, pp. 145, 152, 156 sq.

² W. H. Mallock shows this by various facts and reasons, Social Equality, London and New York, translated into French: L'Egalite sociale, under the care of F. R. Salmon, Paris, 1883.

95. (B) But we call an equitable distribution of goods that which is made according to each one's merit, or is proportioned to the social value of the work furnished, not that which is made equally to all without any respect to the value of the work furnished; for otherwise laziness, carelessness, and just complaints are fostered.³

³ W. H. Mallock, op. cit., ch. VII.

(a) But, given the right of private dominion, generally speaking, each one receives goods according to the social value of the work furnished: capitalists indeed gain more, because they contribute more to the production of things, namely the very means by which riches are multiplied, and also the intellectual labor altogether necessary for increasing things,⁴ and moreover they take upon themselves the risk of fortune, often very great; but workers receive less, because they contribute less, nor are they exposed to the danger of losing goods already acquired. Yet, from what commonly happens, they receive a price of labor proportioned to its social value, which, as common prosperity increases, grows daily; and since, moreover, many things become cheaper in price on account of their abundance, although others are dearer, they can today acquire for themselves many more things than in past centuries.⁵

⁴ W. H. Mallock likewise demonstrates this, Property and Progress, London and New York, 1884.

⁵ Cf. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, De la Repartition des richesses, 6th ed., ch. 16, p. 450-451; A. De Foville, La France economique, Paris, 1887, p. 171-878. To the point, P. Leroy-Beaulieu, l.c.: "For 40 or 50 years, the expenses of the life of a household of workers may have increased by 20 to 25 percent, about a quarter. Now, since for 40 or 50 years the generality of wages in France has risen by at least 80 to 100 percent, one sees that real progress, taking account of the variations of prices, still remains from 50 to 75 percent."

Moreover, if they live frugally, they can often set something aside, and gradually render their condition better; indeed not a few are placed over the administration of industrial affairs and soon are numbered among the capitalists themselves.

96. (b) On the other hand, while collectivism flourishes, the distribution of goods cannot be done equitably: for if it is done according to each one's merits, as pleases some, then inequality, which socialists wish to take away, will soon return under another form, since the merits of various workers are wholly unequal; moreover who will bear an equitable judgment concerning the merits of others, especially in a society in which administrators are elected by votes? - If goods are distributed according to each one's necessities and demands, who again will judge equitably concerning these? Will not those who labor more and receive less complain justly? - But if they are dispensed equally to all and each, then the stimulus to labor will be lacking, many will indulge in laziness; "the incentives of individual talent and diligence having been taken away, the very fountains of riches will necessarily dry up; and that equality which they imagine in thought would in reality be nothing other than the equally miserable and ignoble condition of all men, without distinction."¹

¹ Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

97. (C) Certainly no form of dominion can be admitted which would remove from the midst the legitimate liberty of citizens, or would diminish it beyond what is equitable; for true liberty is necessary at once for the dignity and the happiness of man. But as long as the right of private dominion remains, a certain liberty flourishes in the choice of state of life, home, education of children, religious worship, etc. But when collectivism reigns, the liberty of individuals will be diminished and often trampled upon. (a) With regard to the choice of mechanical or liberal art, each one will depend entirely upon the State, since it is the universal distributor of offices and duties; an inquiry into the aptitudes and merits of individuals will be necessary, so that each one, according to the demands of society, may be applied to fitting labor; and often citizens will be compelled to perform a kind of labor wholly repugnant to them, all the more because the judges will be political men, who will strive to please electors rather than follow the laws of equity; and since, moreover, burdensome and lowest offices far exceed in number those which are pleasing and honorable, and men are accustomed to think more highly of their own talents than is fitting, the division of labor made by social power will displease very many, and will excite complaints and envies, not without great detriment to society. Furthermore, since the State alone is the owner and administrator of all things, nothing will remain for those who will not be content with their lot except to flee into exile, or to depart from this world.

98. (b) With regard to many other things liberty will likewise be constrained. For since the State, according to the theories of the Collectivists, ought to provide for the education of all children, now the father of a family will lose his rights over his own children,¹ and will lack the very great consolation which is found in domestic life. - Furthermore, since all presses, buildings, and other things of this kind are possessed by the Government, what will become of the liberty of publishing one's own thoughts, whether by books or sermons? No book will be able to be committed to type, no meeting to be held, unless the permission of the State has been added; and this very probably will be denied, if the ideas to be expressed by the writer or speaker differ from those which please the civil authority. - We say nothing of religious liberty: for there will be one religion, namely the religion of the State, one worship, namely the cult of humanity. - In one word, since the State alone is owner and master of all, and possesses all things which serve production, the omnipotence of the State must be acknowledged, and all private liberty perishes. - Therefore collectivism must be rejected.

¹ Leo XIII excellently declares that these rights flow from nature (Encyclical Rerum Novarum): "Paternal power is of such a kind that it cannot be extinguished or absorbed by the republic, because it has the same and common principle with human life itself. Children are something of the father, and, as it were, a certain amplification of the paternal person: and if we wish to speak properly, they enter and participate in civil society not by themselves per se, but through the domestic community in which they were begotten. And for this very reason, because children are naturally something of the father... before they have the use of free will, they are contained under the care of parents. Therefore what the Socialists introduce, having set aside the providence of parents, namely the providence of the Republic, they do against natural justice, and dissolve the framework of homes." Cf. St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 10, a. 12. - How collectivism destroys domestic life Richter pleasantly described, Ou mene le Socialisme? Paris, 1893, pp. 17, 24, 38, 61. - How much socialism harms liberty Huxley excellently declares, Man versus State, translated into French under the care of Gerschel: L'Individu contre l'Etat, 5th ed., Paris, 1901.

Therefore for the social good and the private good together there is altogether required a private right of dominion; therefore that right is altogether consonant with reason, and flows from nature itself.

Socialists propose arguments of a threefold kind: historical, moral, and economic.

99. 1. Historically they contend, with E. de Laveleye,¹ that everywhere and among all Nations the original possession of estates and fields was collective; that it became individual late and gradually, when, because of the multitude of men, the cultivation of fields had to be more intensive; and that private dominion was introduced only by Roman law, and prevailed among the Nations of Europe. - From this they infer that private property in fields, introduced not by natural instinct and ordering, but by positive law, can be abrogated by the free decision of men.²

¹ E. de Laveleye, De la Propriete et de ses formes primitives, 5th ed., Paris, 1901; cf. P. Lafargue, La Propriete, origine et evolution; - Refutation by Yves Guyot, Paris, 1895.

² Yet de Laveleye himself does not advocate collectivism, but rather a certain State socialism, op. cit., ch. 36, p. 542-560.

To solve this difficulty, we observe two things:

100. (A) Laveleye by no means proves the historical fact which he asserts. He indeed alleges facts from which it is clear that among the Ruthenians, Germans, Javanese, Swiss, and certain other peoples certain goods were possessed collectively by a tribe or municipality; and from this he infers that these are traces of collectivism which always and everywhere flourished. Now there is no one who does not see that the conclusion extends more widely than the premises.

101. In fact, if the historical facts which have recently been investigated are attended to,³ three stages, as it were, can be distinguished in the mode of possessing fields: (a) as long as men lead a pastoral life, pastures are possessed collectively by the tribe itself, so that invasions of neighboring tribes may be repelled better and more efficaciously; for since pastures are not cultivated, individuals care little about the exclusive possession of this or that estate, provided the grass growing spontaneously in the pastures suffices to nourish their flocks. But cattle, tents, and other movable things are possessed exclusively. (b) Once men and flocks have multiplied, it now becomes necessary to cultivate the earth for a while, so that it may produce more abundant fruits; but as long as this cultivation is not very intensive, men indeed possess the fields cultivated by themselves exclusively, but not permanently, but only during the time which passes between sowing and harvesting; for then it is expedient to cultivate new fields every year; hence among certain tribes or Nations fields are divided yearly among the inhabitants of a place. (c) But soon the time comes when, men having multiplied, more intensive cultivation of fields is now necessary for feeding the citizens; then a more permanent, and soon perpetual, possession of estates begins. For since strenuous labors are required for this cultivation, and by these assiduous labors fields are rendered much more fruitful, those who have sweated in this work do not wish to be expelled from the fields cultivated by themselves, and public authority itself understands that no one can be compelled to leave the fields which he has cultivated with so much labor without just compensation; and thus exclusive and permanent possession of fields becomes necessary among cultivated Nations. - This indeed is confirmed by history; for among the Egyptians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Chinese, and other most ancient peoples, it is certainly proved by the most ancient documents that private possession of fields was protected by laws.¹

³ Cf. P. Bureau, La Propriete Fonciere, in the periodical La Science Sociale, XXIV, Oct. 1902, p. 335-353; P. Lacombe, L'appropriation du sol, in the periodical Revue de synthese historique, Paris, 1903, t. VII, p. 29-39 and 291-301; S. T. Lapsey, The origin of property in land, in American historical Review, New York, 1903, t. VIII, p. 426-448.

¹ With regard to the Egyptians, cf. Lenormant, Hist. anc. de l'Orient, continued by E. Babelon, 9th ed., t. 3, Paris, 1883, pp. 16-18; Maspero, Histoire anc. des peuples de l'Orient, t. 1, Paris, 1895, p. 76-78. From the documents published there it is clear that among the Egyptians the right of private dominion flourished in nearly the same manner as in Europe during the Middle Age: namely, Pharaoh was considered to possess all the earth, but he divided it among priests and soldiers, who handed it over to farmers to be cultivated; but estates were so proper to their owners that they were transmitted to others by inheritance or purchase. Cf. Birch, Ancient History from the Monuments, London, pp. 31, 45, and elsewhere throughout.

With regard to the Assyrians, many contracts of purchase-sale have been found and published, and indeed most ancient ones, from which it is clear that fields, under certain civil and at the same time religious forms, were transmitted to other citizens; and that those who move the boundaries of estates are worthy of every execration. Cf. Sayce, Records of the Past, I, 139; VII, 111; Lenormant, op. cit., t. 5, p. 77-81; Maspero, op. cit., p. 760-764. - But especially let the Code of laws be read which Hammurabi promulgated, who was king of Babylonia 2000 years before Christ, in Scheil, O.P., Textes Elamites-Semitiques, Paris, 1902, where laws are handed down concerning the private dominions of houses and estates, p. 33-47.

Among the Chinese, already from ancient times there prevailed a system of dominion which can be equated with the feudal system. Cf. Eug. Simon, La cite Chinoise, Paris, 1884.

But the communities which flourish among the Ruthenians (mir russe), Javanese (dessa javanaise), ancient Germans (marke germanique), Swiss, and other peoples (biens communaux), exist together with the right of private dominion, and by no means exclude it; but they only show that a certain collective property can flourish in determined places and times, where cultivation is imperfect; or also, because of the kind of labor to be performed on estates (e.g., where canals of irrigation are desired), that it can sometimes be more useful than private property.¹

¹ Concerning these communities see P. Leroy-Beaulieu, Collectivisme, l. I, ch. 6. - It must likewise be noted that, even among the Ruthenians, fields which formerly were divided every year among the inhabitants of the same village are now distributed only every third, or fifth, or even fifteenth year, because it is rightly understood that, for intensive cultivation, a longer possession of the same estate is required: for who would make great expenses to render a field more fertile, which would soon pass to strangers?

102. (B) But from this it is by no means clear in a general way that collective dominion is useful or necessary; for since history shows that such a system gradually decreases and gives way to private dominion as the number of men increases and as the necessity of cultivating fields in a more perfect manner increases, it is rightly inferred that this evolution is consonant with reason, indeed necessary for cultivated Nations, so that to return to collectivism would truly be regression and not progress. To illustrate the matter by an example, at the time when a certain community of fields flourished among the Germans, the land could not nourish a twentieth part of the inhabitants dwelling there today; and so with the other regions.

103. 2. The arguments drawn from the ethical order are these: (A) According to Karl Marx (above, n. 62), the profit of capitalists arises from theft, inasmuch as they retain for themselves part of the wages owed to workers.

Resp. He indeed asserts this gratuitously, but by no means proves it; indeed the contrary is gathered from the facts.² - If the matter stood thus, all honest and capable capitalists would have prosperous affairs; but experience shows that from ten capitalists scarcely three or four make enormous profits, while the others gain little or nothing. - But the reason why some greatly increase their resources can be assigned as threefold: (a) very great expenses were made to build the workshop and furnish it with machines; hence capitalists ought to receive some increase from the money expended in all these things; (b) the risk of fortune is great, and under this title there is a right to proportionate profit; (c) intellectual labor, very arduous, is required in the ordering and direction of workshops, and also in fruitfully selling the fruits of production; and this is the principal reason why, among capitalists, only a few greatly increase their resources, namely because few apply themselves to this arduous and diligent labor. Thus it is explained how, without theft, capitalists gain much more than workers. And indeed the hope of profit is not only useful, but necessary, in order to impel the rich to devote themselves to industrial matters: if this is removed, most would quietly enjoy their goods, and would not think of constructing workshops, and thus many workers would be able neither to labor nor to make gain.

² Leroy-Beaulieu demonstrates this by many arguments, Collectivisme, p. 242-250.

104. (B) According to the same man, it is historically clear that the riches which capitalists possess were acquired in an unjust manner, namely by invading fields already cultivated by other Nations, ecclesiastical goods, etc.

Resp. - (a) We do not deny that certain goods were acquired unjustly; and if today there are any owners who by force or fraud invaded the resources of others, they are rightly to be compelled to restitution. But certainly there are many present-day capitalists who, by their own labor or that of their parents, have justly acquired riches; and these cannot be despoiled of their goods without injustice.

(b) Even when from the beginning the invasion of estates was unjust, after a long time it can become legitimate by prescription: not indeed in the sense that an unjust acquisition becomes just by the mere lapse of time; but because the social good demands that those who for a very long time have possessed estates and cultivated them cannot be disturbed in their possession; all the more because often the value of an estate has been increased a hundredfold by cultivation. Concerning this more fully where we speak of prescription.

105. (C) According to H. George, we can possess only those things which we acquire by labor: for by exercising our own faculties, we produce something which is truly ours; therefore fields cannot legitimately be possessed, because they are not the fruits of labor.

Resp. We indeed admit that labor is one of the legitimate modes of acquiring things as one's own, but we deny that it is the only legitimate mode. H. George indeed admits that a fisherman and hunter legitimately acquire the fish and animals which they occupy, when these belong to no one; nevertheless these are not the fruits of labor, but goods given indiscriminately to all, which legitimately become the property of the first occupant. Why can the same not be said of fields? "For a field," says Leo XIII,¹ "subdued by the hand and skill of the cultivator changes its condition greatly: from wild it becomes fruitful, from barren fertile. But those things by which it has been made better so inhere in the soil and are thoroughly mingled with it that for the greater part they are separable from the soil by no compact. But whether justice would allow anyone to seize and enjoy that in which another has sweated?" Since, therefore, the principal value of fields depends upon labor, it is equitable that they remain in the hands of those who have sweated in cultivating them.² The common good also demands this: for who would cultivate fields by strenuous labor which he foresaw would soon be occupied by strangers?

¹ Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

² H. Spencer felt the force of this argument; for at first he judged that owners of fields, after equitable compensation had been paid for their expenses, were to be expropriated; but, after the matter had been weighed more maturely, he understood that the expenses made by owners or their predecessors greatly surpass the sale value of the fields, so that it is by no means expedient that owners be expropriated.

106. (D) The same George proceeds: There inheres in all an equal right of living; but such a right is vain unless the goods which nature brings forth for all are common, especially estates; just as air and sea ought to remain common, so likewise fields.

Resp. - We indeed concede that the right of living inheres in all, and therefore that in a case of extreme necessity those goods can be occupied which are necessary for sustaining life. But from this it by no means follows that fields must be possessed collectively; for those who do not have estates labor on the estates of others, or exercise gainful arts, whence they acquire food and clothing for themselves. - Nor should it be said that workers are thus partly deprived of the fruit of their labor, since another part is retained by the owner of the field; for this is equitable, since both the labor of the worker and the natural powers legitimately acquired by the owner concur in the production of fruits. Moreover the possessors of fields, by paying taxes from which workers are immune, often render to society more than the primitive value of the soil occupied. - But the comparison brought forward has no force; air and sea are of inexhaustible use, nor can they be efficaciously occupied by private persons; while estates are easily exhausted, and do not bring forth fruits unless they are cultivated; moreover they are capable of occupation. Hence the public good requires that air and sea remain common, and that estates be occupied privately, so that they may be cultivated better.

107. H. George insists: the value of estates grows daily not so much from the industry of man as from the progress itself of society; namely, in cities, or in their vicinity, or near railways, the price of some property is increased tenfold or twentyfold in a few years, because a greater number of citizens is gathered there. Now such an increase (which in English he calls unearned increment) is by no means owed to the private owner of this property, but to citizens collectively taken, or to the State.

Resp. - A fact of this kind is not always, nor everywhere, verified, but only in certain places, in which many inhabitants are gathered together; but in other places the value of properties either remains the same, or sometimes decreases. Therefore it is not a universal fact, from which one ought to conclude that the mode of possessing fields must be changed universally, which moreover is very useful, indeed necessary, from the things said above. - Besides, there is question here of a matter of chance, which before every event can benefit or harm certain private persons, since no one knows with certainty whether the value of this or that property will be greater or less; nor is it unjust that those who probably foresaw such an increase enjoy it. - For the rest, nothing prevents the State in this case from imposing greater taxes on owners, by which at least a part of this increase will profit all. But from this it by no means follows that the right of private persons in properties must be removed from the midst.¹

¹ For a fuller refutation of H. George, consult Rae, op. cit., p. 440-500; Mallock, Property and Progress; Hollaind, Le socialisme americain, translated from English into French, under the care of Buton, Brussels, 1900.

108. 3. Arguments from the economic order we have already anticipated above (n. 94-96). Socialists indeed wonderfully describe and extol the advantages which they expect will come from collectivism; but thus far all experiments attempted in various places have turned out empty.

(A) Yet they argue from those anonymous companies and monopolies (trusts) which today succeed prosperously, and from this infer that greater utility is to be hoped for from a universal monopoly to be established under the authority of the State.

Resp. That comparison limps altogether; for societies of this kind prosperously succeed because their administrators expect greater profit for themselves from the greater production of goods which arises from it; indeed they establish monopolies only to increase their own resources more efficaciously; and they constitute them according to the method of capitalists, not that of collectivists. Now if the State makes all profits its own, and divides them equally, then the efficacious stimulus to arduous labor ceases.² - Moreover experience already shows that certain ones of these monopolies, precisely because they were too universal, underwent an unhappy outcome.

² P. Leroy-Beaulieu shows this lucidly, Collectivisme, p. 344-358; Repartition des Richesses, p. 315-349; and Schaeffle, otherwise favoring socialism, admits it, op. cit., p. 64: "It is not yet enough, in a community of production composed of millions of men, that producer A know to say to himself: my income from social labor depends on my other 999,999 co-operators being as diligent as I. This does not yet awaken the necessary control, does not stifle the inclination to laziness and dishonesty, does not prevent the diversion of labor to the prejudice of the community, does not destroy egoism and cunning which manifest themselves through the exaggerated and unjust taxation of isolated works."

109. (b) Some draw an argument from the community of goods which flourishes in religious orders. - We indeed admit that this community is greatly useful in small groups of men who strive for perfection, and, on account of the love of God and of souls, deny their own will and their own advantages, so that they may more freely and efficaciously serve the utility of others; but perfection belongs to few, nor can collectivism be advocated unless men first learn to despise their own things, and to love brothers or fellow-citizens more than themselves. Now sad experience shows that charity, or altruism, as they say, thus far does not flourish among most men.

110. The third part of the thesis, namely that the right of private dominion is justly limited by the extreme necessity of the neighbor and by the demands of the common good.

1. It is certain that there inheres in the neighbor a strict right of limiting private dominion in a case of extreme necessity, as will be more opportunely declared below, n. 447. It is indeed controverted whether the rich man sins against justice who in this case neglects to succor someone in need, n. 452; but by justice he is bound at least not to impede the exercise of that right.

111. 2. It is likewise certain that there inheres in the prince the right of limiting private dominion on account of the common good.

For exterior things ought to yield to the common utility of all, and the right of possessing them ought to be determined so that it contributes to the justice, peace, and prosperity of citizens. But upon the prince there is incumbent the right and duty of promoting the common utility and providing for justice, peace, and prosperity. Therefore he can establish concerning exterior goods those things which are required for obtaining this end.

N.B. But limits which arise from charity alone render the use of dominion illicit indeed, but not invalid.

112. Corollary. The right of private dominion can be exercised only through the primordial fact of legitimate occupation. Thus commonly.

It is certain that some fact of appropriation is required so that private right of dominion can be exercised: for right is not exercised in the abstract, but in the concrete, and therefore through some particular fact by which things that belong to no one are appropriated. For there is not question here of the derivative modes by which goods already possessed by others are acquired, but of the original or primordial mode of acquiring dominion.

Now a fact of this kind, according to certain economists, is placed in labor or work expended upon the thing (n. 105). But undeservedly; for many things, e.g., natural fruits, are acquired without labor distinct from the occupation itself.

113. But it is commonly asserted that the primordial fact of appropriation is legitimate occupation, that is, occupation clothed with the due conditions (n. 211). For for legitimate dominion it is required and suffices that some thing be so connected with some person that it is called his own thing. But for this it is indeed required that it be occupied by some person to whose power it is subjected or whose utility it serves; but this also suffices. For by this occupation the thing, which previously was common to all, passes into the special utility of the occupying person, and is so connected with him that others can rightly be excluded from its possession. Therefore occupation is the primordial fact by which the right of dominion is acquired.

114. Since the causes leading to socialism are of many kinds, the remedies to be employed for preventing it likewise ought to be various; Leo XIII wisely proposes them in the Encyclical often praised, and we shall briefly contract them, since they are declared more fully in other parts of Theology.

¹ Encyclical Rerum Novarum, second part; Encyclical Graves de Communi re; Godts, Scopuli vitandi in pertractanda quaestione de condit. opificum, Appendix I; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, La Papaute, le Socialisme et la Democratie, 4th ed., Paris, 1893, p. 92-276; Max Turmann, Le Mouvement social Catholique, Paris, 1901; L. Gregoire (Goyau), Le Pape, les Catholiques et la Question sociale, 3rd ed., Paris, 1899.

There are three remedies which must be furnished by the Church, the State, and Private persons, namely owners and workers.

1. First of all the intervention of the Church is required, since here there is question of a matter regarding morals. This indeed furnishes a divine remedy by doctrine, precepts, and social institutions.²

² This will be developed more fully in the Treatise on Contracts, n. 786-863, according to the principles of Leo XIII, whose Encyclical Rerum Novarum you will find at the end of the work.

115. 2. The intervention of the State is desired, by which a remedy may be furnished for the economic causes of socialism. This it can furnish:

(A) By fostering public prosperity, and by protecting the rights both of the rich and of proletarians, but especially of the latter, who, on account of want, can scarcely defend their own rights.

116. (B) More specifically: (a) by protecting the private possessions of owners; (b) by protecting the rights of workers, lest their labor exceed their strength; especially lest boys and women labor to their own harm.

117. 3. Owners themselves and workers can do much in this cause, namely by those institutes, associations, or societies, either mixed, in which owners and workers are gathered together at the same time, or also separate, in which workers or owners come together for protecting their own rights.¹

¹ Concerning these associations, which are called patronages or professional guilds (syndicats professionnels), there is fuller treatment in the Treatise on Contracts, n. 833 sq.

118. Now that the right of property has been placed in safety, a few things remain to be said concerning the various genera and species of goods, and also concerning the various modes by which semi-full dominion can be had in these goods. Now external goods are divided:

(A) Into corporeal and incorporeal goods: (a) the former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, furniture; (b) the latter are said to be those which are not obvious to the senses, namely rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, etc. This division is not opposed in its members, but only analogous, nor is it very useful except in the matter of prescription.

119. (B) Into movable or immovable: (a) the former are those which, without notable injury, are judged capable of being transferred from place to place physically, morally, or juridically, whether by their own force or by extrinsic force; (b) the latter are said to be those which cannot be transferred without detriment, such as a house, field, etc.

120. By French law, (a) immovable goods are such either 1) by their nature (les terrains, les vegetaux adherents au sol, les edifices); or 2) by destination ("accessories of an immovable to which they are attached"); or 3) by reason of the object to which they are referred (thus real rights of usufruct of immovable things, of servitude, use, habitation, and of most mortgages; thus also immovable credits, immovable actions);² or 4) by declaration (les actions de la Banque de France, les rentes sur l'Etat peuvent ainsi devenir immobilieres); or 5) by annexation (dans un cas: la redevance en argent dont est grevee une mine en faveur du proprietaire du sol).¹

² Civil Code, art. 526; cf. art. 518-525; Planiol, I, n. 2232, 2233, 2648.

¹ Planiol, ibid., n. 2201-2237.

(b) But movable goods are such: 1) by nature (meubles corporels), 2) by anticipation (moissons et recoltes qui font l'objet d'une saisie ou d'une vente), 3) by determination of law² (droits reels - propriete, usufruit, gage, privileges - portant sur une chose mobiliere; certains offices comme etudes de notaire, d'avoue...; creances de sommes exigibles, rentes, actions et interets dans les societes).³

² Civil Code, art. 527.

³ Planiol, ibid., n. 2237-2262.

But this distinction of immovable and movable goods is of the greatest moment for rightly understanding and executing many dispositions of civil law, with regard to testaments, donations, etc., etc.⁴

⁴ Planiol, ibid., n. 2197.

121. (C) Into private or public. Private goods are either those of individuals, or of free groups (richesses collectives privees); but public goods belong to political groups, namely the State, provinces, municipalities (domaines de l'Etat, des departements, des communes, - et aussi Etablissements publics).⁵

⁵ Cf. Planiol, I, n. 3005 sq.

122. (D) Into consumable or non-consumable. Consumable goods are those which are consumed by first use either physically, as food, or morally, as money; - non-consumable goods are those which even by prolonged use are by no means destroyed or changed, as houses, clothing.⁶ The practical utility of this distinction appears in those things which regard usufruct and loan.

⁶ Planiol, ibid., n. 2179.

(E) Into fungible or non-fungible. Two things are said to be fungible between themselves when one can take the place of the other in the payment of a debt: such are things which are commonly numbered, measured, or weighed, as money, oil, grain. Hence fungibility is a relation of equivalence between two things; if this is lacking, there is non-fungibility.⁷

⁷ Ibid., n. 2181, 2182.

Full dominion embraces the right of disposing, enjoying, and excluding others. Now it can be limited under this threefold respect, and, when it is thus limited, it is called restricted, or semi-full.

123. The right of freely disposing which belongs to perfect dominion is restricted in two ways:

(A) By the necessity of alienating, which the State can impose by force of eminent dominion: (a) on account of public utility:¹ for the particular good ought to yield to the public good; (b) on account of private utility,² which nevertheless redounds to the public good. In each case equitable compensation is owed, which generally is determined by the tribunals themselves.

¹ In France alienation of this kind, which is called expropriation for the cause of public utility, is established and defined by the law of May 3, 1841, in Riviere, Lois usuelles, p. 281-285.

² For France, cf. Civil Code, a. 682; Planiol, I, n. 1081-1087.

(B) By the prohibition of alienating, which can arise: (a) from a law prohibiting certain persons, e.g., minors, wives, interdicted persons, from alienating their goods; or prohibiting certain goods, e.g., a dowry estate, from being alienated; (b) from man, when the condition of not alienating is attached to some contract or testament.

Sometimes dominion is so divided that bare ownership belongs to one person, and the right of enjoying to another. But the right of enjoying, which can be granted both by law and by man, assumes a double form, namely usufruct, or use or habitation.

124. Notion. When direct dominion of some thing remains in the possession of one person, while another can use and enjoy it, this latter has usufruct, which is defined: a real right of enjoying things of another, with their substance preserved.

It is called: (a) real, i.e., attached to the thing itself, so that it may be distinguished from the right of a lessee or tenant-farmer, which is personal, inasmuch as the lessor is personally bound toward the lessee; while in usufruct, the obligation is bound to the estate or thing itself; (b) of enjoying, i.e., not only of using the thing, but also of receiving its fruits, just as if the usufructuary were the owner; (c) with their substance preserved; for since the right of disposing remains in the possession of the owner, the usufructuary cannot alienate the thing, or consume it, or transform it into another form, even a better one, but must preserve it entire for the owner.

125. Usufruct arises either from law, which is diverse for diverse Nations,¹ or from man, whether by testament, or by an act between the living, or by prescription.² - It ceases by the death of the usufructuary, by the destruction of the thing subject to usufruct, or by the lapse of the appointed time.

¹ For France, cf. Civil Code, a. 384 and 754; Planiol, n. 1565-1589.

² Civil Code, a. 579; Planiol, n. 1574-1589.

126. Rights and duties of the usufructuary. (a) Rights: 1) He has the right of receiving all fruits: natural, which are produced without special industry; industrial, which are acquired especially by labor; civil, which are owed by force of a contract or of some obligation, as the price of leasing, rent, interest for loaned money, etc. Under the name of fruits do not come treasures found in an estate, nor mines which, at the time when the usufruct began, were not yet being worked; but only those things which grow and are received at certain times. - For the rest, let the civil laws be consulted.³

³ Civil Code, a. 582-599; Planiol, n. 1614-1662; Supplement, p. 10*.

2. He can also lease or give his right to another: for he can enjoy either through himself or through another.

127. (b) Duties: He ought to enjoy as a good father of a family; 1) hence generally by civil law he is bound at the beginning to describe the goods whose usufruct he enjoys, with the owner present or at least summoned, so that he can render them such as they substantially were. Likewise he ought to be watchful lest the thing become worse.

2. He is bound to moderate repairs (reparations d'entretien), which are required so that the thing may be preserved entire; but not to greater repairs (grosses reparations), which, if they are made, must be paid by the owner himself.

3. He ought to pay annual burdens which are judged burdens of the fruits, such as taxes, real rent, expenses of a lawsuit in which there is question of usufruct.⁴

⁴ For France, cf. Civil Code, a. 600-616; Planiol, n. 1663-1682.

128. Duties of the owner.⁵ (a) He suffers the usufructuary to enjoy, i.e., he ought to do nothing by which the enjoyment of the usufructuary is diminished or extinguished. Upon him indeed lies the care of greater repairs, but he cannot be compelled to make them. He pays the expenses of a lawsuit when there is question of dominion over the thing.

⁵ For France, cf. Planiol, n. 1683-1695.

(b) He does not furnish enjoyment, i.e., he is not personally obliged toward the usufructuary; he ought to hand over the thing in the state in which it is found, but he is not bound to render it better.

129. Use is a real right of using a thing of another for personal advantage only, with the substance of the thing preserved. That use is called habitation when the thing of which there is question is a house.

Of itself, use does not imply the right of receiving fruits; but from the concession of law, the user can receive certain fruits for his own advantage, or for the utility of the family. But he cannot lease the right to use nor grant it to another gratuitously. - Hence in practice the civil laws are to be consulted.¹

¹ For France, Civil Code, a. 625-635; Planiol, n. 1741-1749; Supplement, p. 15*.

130. (A) Notion. (a) The right of excluding others, which belongs to full dominion, is restricted through real servitudes (servitudes foncieres), which are defined: burdens imposed on some thing for the advantage of a thing belonging to another owner.²

² Cf. Civil Code, a. 637-710; Planiol, n. 1750-1926; Supplement, p. 16*.

Hence servitude is real in two ways: because it falls upon an immovable thing, not upon a person; and it yields directly to the advantage of another thing, but indirectly to the utility of him who possesses this thing.

131. (b) Servitudes are divided: 1) by reason of origin, into natural servitudes, which are founded in the situation of places or in the mutual relations of estates; legal, which arise from law; and conventional, which are established from a pact.

2. By reason of mode, into continuous servitudes, which can endure without the intervention of man, as an aqueduct; and non-continuous, which demand the intervention of man, e.g., the right of passing through a field or drawing waters; - into apparent, which are manifested by some external signs, e.g., a door or window; and non-apparent, which reveal themselves by no exterior sign, such as the prohibition that a house or wall be raised higher.

132. (B) Principles concerning servitudes. (a) He who suffers the servitude, or the possessor of the servient estate, cannot do anything from which the right of another would be impeded, diminished, or taken away; he can free himself from the servitude by relinquishing the servient estate.

(b) He who enjoys the servitude, or the possessor of the dominant estate, can, even on the estate of another, do whatever is necessary for the use of his right; but he ought to abstain from that which would render the condition of the servient estate worse.

For the rest, see the jurists.

133. I. State of the question. That men can preside over other men is clear from the fact that some are superior to others, and also from the hierarchy which God willed to exist among men. It is likewise certain that no man has full dominion over other men, with the right of life and death; for this belongs to God alone, inasmuch as He is the supreme Lord of all things, as was shown above (n. 34). From this it follows that full dominion belongs to no man over the person itself or even over the internal faculties of other men: for each one has useful dominion not only over life and members, but also over the faculties, and can exercise them at will, provided he does not usurp the rights of God or of citizens. - But the external exercise of liberty can be restricted, lest that exercise harm other citizens or the public good.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 57, a. 3 ad 2; a. 4 ad 2; De Lugo, disp. III, n. 19-63; disp. VI, n. 10-31; Lessius, l. II, cap. 4, n. 13-17; Carriere, n. 42-54; Meyer, II, n. 119-123; P. Allard, Les Esclaves chretiens, Paris, 1876; Esclaves, Serfs et Mainmortables, Paris, 1884.

134. But the question is whether dominion can be acquired over the works of others, or the fruit of labor. Now all concede that it is permitted to anyone to acquire a right over the works of others for a time, as will be said where we speak of the contract of labor. But the question is whether the same right can be acquired in perpetuity, or in other words, whether servitude is licit.

For servitude is perpetual service for perpetual food and clothing, or, more fully, that service by which, for the whole time of life, works are sold or leased, under the condition that the master furnish necessary food and clothing. - This is servitude theoretically and considered in itself; for historically many things were generally attached to servitude which are opposed to natural or divine right, namely the separation of little children from parents, of husbands from wives, the right over life or members, and other things of this kind.

135. II. Principle: Servitude considered in itself, when it is free from every abuse, is not intrinsically opposed to natural or divine right, but nevertheless is less consonant with human dignity and is liable to grave dangers.

1. The former is proved. (A) By reason. For servitude consists in this, that someone promises to furnish all his works to a master throughout his whole life; now if someone can, for wages received, oblige himself to serve for a year, why will he not be able to do this for a longer time, indeed for his whole life? For although he ought to retain the right over his internal faculties and their free exercise, nothing prevents him from renouncing the external liberty of disposing of his own labor and its fruits for a just wage, whether for a time or in perpetuity; for the right of disposing of one's own labor is not necessary to man, but only useful.

136. (B) Scripture did not condemn servitude as intrinsically illicit, but only restrained its abuses, and inculcated principles from which logically and gradually servitude had to be abolished.

(a) Moses did not prohibit servitude already existing,¹ but tempered it; for he forbids anyone to covet the male servant or maidservant of his neighbor;² he indeed permits them to take servants from strangers and foreigners;³ but if one of the sons of Israel has been reduced to servitude, he will become free in the year of jubilee.⁴

¹ Gen., XVII, 23.

² Exod., XX, 17.

³ Levit., XXV, 45-46.

⁴ Levit., XXV, 54-55; cf. Exod., XXI, 2.

(b) Under the New Law, the Apostles command that servants be subject "in all fear to masters, not only to the good, but also to the harsh";⁵ they counsel that servants be made free, if this can be done, but otherwise that they patiently tolerate servitude;⁶ they admonish masters to treat servants kindly,⁷ and sometimes exhort, but do not command, that they free them.⁸

⁵ I Pet., II, 18; cf. Coloss., III, 22; Ephes., VI, 5.

⁶ I Cor., VII, 20-24.

⁷ Ephes., VI, 9; Colos., IV, 1.

⁸ On this matter let the whole Epistle to Philemon be read.

(c) Nevertheless they set forth principles from which the abrogation of servitude logically flows. For all are sons of God, brothers in Christ, members of one body whose head is Christ, so that before God there is now neither Gentile nor Jew, servant nor free;⁹ for all have been redeemed from the servitude of sin by the merits of Christ.¹ Thus, as if from the root, whatever was inhuman in the manner of acting with servants was cut away, and at the same time the way was prepared for their full emancipation.²

⁹ Galat., III, 26-28; Coloss., III, 11; I Cor., XII, 13.

¹ Rom. VI, 15-23.

² How the Church gradually took care that many servants be freed and extinguished servitude we briefly set forth in De Vera Religione, n. 157, and Wallon, Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'antiquite, Paris, 1879; Allard, Les Esclaves chretiens, Paris, 1876, declare it fully. Leo XIII also sets this forth splendidly, Encyclical In plurimis, May 5, 1888.

138. The latter is proved, namely that servitude is less consonant with human dignity and is full of dangers.

(A) Less consonant with human dignity. For through Christ man has been freed from the servitude of sin, raised to the dignity and liberty of a son of God; and fraternal communion has been established among all men of all Nations; for all tend toward the same end through the same means: "All are members of the same body, and all sharers of the same divine table: to all the gifts of grace are open, and likewise to all the gifts of immortal life."³ Now those who, for food and clothing alone, expend their whole activity throughout their whole life for the utility of another and at his nod fall into the danger of forgetting Christian dignity, and of putting on a base character and base sentiments which are unworthy of an adopted son of God, indeed of a man conscious of his own dignity.

³ Leo XIII, cited Encyclical.

139. (B) Full of dangers; while servitude flourishes, masters easily become proud, cruel toward servants, idle, and given over to luxury: for they easily judge themselves by nature wholly superior to servants, and that these have no rights, so that it is permitted to use and abuse them. This is moreover confirmed by history: for although masters were not lacking who treated their servants kindly, for the most part servitude gave occasion to many abuses.⁴

⁴ Allard, Esclaves chretiens, p. 148-184; Esclaves, Serfs..., p. 48-75.

140. III. On the titles by which servitude was customarily constituted. - Concerning voluntary handing over of oneself we have already spoken in the thesis itself. Other modes were:

1. Purchase and donation: when someone had been legitimately subjected to servitude, it was permitted to the master to sell or give his services (but not his person) to another. Yet this right was restricted in many ways, lest infants be separated from mothers, wives from husbands, or those worn out by old age handed over to harsh men. - Generally also theologians handed down that a father, oppressed by necessity, when he could be helped in no other way, could sell or pledge his son; yet that he was bound to redeem him as soon as his affairs turned out prosperously. - This is not licit in our days, since there are other means of relieving the necessities of parents.

2. The right of war; for since in antiquity it was judged permissible for the victor to kill the conquered, a fortiori it was thought equitable that an enemy whose life had been spared could be reduced to servitude. But today this is rightly judged to be opposed to the law of Nations.

141. 3. Birth from servants, by force of which those who were born from servants were regarded as servants. This indeed was judged legitimate at the time when servitude flourished as a permanent social institution; but in itself it was not consonant with equity. He who had been born from servants could indeed have been regarded for a time as a servant, by title of compensation for expenses made in his education, but not in perpetuity.

"And so to the Catholic Church... the expeller of servitude, and the effectress of true liberty, fraternity, and equality among men, there can never be enough praise or gratitude."¹

¹ Leo XIII, cited Encyclical.

142. Thesis: Only an intellectual nature is capable of having dominion.

For he alone is capable of dominion who can morally dispose of some thing and suffer injustice: for this is clear from the very notion of right, which is a moral and inviolable power of having something, etc. But only an intellectual nature can morally dispose of some thing, since moral faculty necessarily supposes intellect and will; likewise only such a nature can suffer injustice: for no one suffers injury unless he is unwilling reasonably, and he cannot be unwilling who lacks will and reason. - Hence brute animals do not properly have rights, and without injury properly so called they can be harmed or killed; nevertheless man owes it to himself and to the natural order that he not injure or destroy animals without sufficient reason: he can indeed use them, but not abuse them.

143. Corollary. From this it is asked whether the insane and little children lacking the use of reason are capable of dominion.

If natural right alone is inspected, the matter is not without difficulty: for these, since they are radically endowed with reason, seem capable of dominion; but moreover it is not clearly conceived how especially he who never has had the use of reason, or will have it, can obtain true and proper dominion, since he can perform no moral act, not even the acceptance of goods.

But civil law, as it flourishes among most Nations, has composed the matter equitably, by establishing that there inheres in little children and the insane a right of dominion, but that the administration of the goods which they possess must be exercised by tutors or curators. And rightly indeed; for, on the one hand, these are subject to human necessities and are capable of a certain radical dominion; on the other hand, since they are incapable of administering their own goods, the administration of goods is to be committed to those who enjoy the use of reason. A law of this kind, as just and determinative of the right of property, obliges in conscience; and therefore those sin against justice who usurp the goods of the insane or of infants.

These things being posited, we shall treat of those whose dominion is restricted or subject to special difficulties.

144. 1. Notion. Children under paternal power are called legitimate, or legitimated,² children who are still under paternal power, and who therefore are neither emancipated nor of age.

¹ Lessius, l.c., n. 7-12; Lugo, disp. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 488; Carriere, n. 226-245; Ball. P., n. 43-50; Marres, l. I, n. 28-39.

² Legitimate are those who have arisen from a marriage contracted according to the laws; legitimated are those who, although not born from a legitimate marriage, nevertheless afterward by the authority of the Prince acquired the rights of legitimate children.

Now they become of age at the age determined by law, i.e., in France when the twenty-first year has been completed. - But they are emancipated either explicitly, by a special juridical act, or implicitly, by contracting marriage.

145. 2. Principles. (A) The right of possessing, which naturally belongs to minors, is restricted by various limits according to various laws, especially with regard to the administration of goods; and rightly so: for although they are capable of dominion as soon as they have acquired the use of reason, they are judged not mature enough to administer their own affairs prudently;¹ moreover certain burdens are incumbent upon them in relation to parents, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

¹ By Roman law, which the older authors follow, the goods of children were of a fourfold kind: military, which children acquired by reason or occasion of military service; quasi-military, acquired by reason of some public office; profectitious, acquired from the things of the father, or in view of the father; adventitious, which came from elsewhere. Cf. Ball. P., n. 44-45.

146. (B) By French law, (a) children, even minors, retain direct dominion over all goods legitimately coming to them; (b) but they do not have usufruct before the eighteenth year of age, or before they are emancipated; unless there is question of goods acquired by separate industry, - or given under the express condition that neither father nor mother enjoy them, - or coming from a succession in which the parents have been declared unworthy. - Outside these cases, the usufruct yields to the father, or, when he is dead, to the mother if she has not entered a new marriage; this was established by way of compensation for the education of the children; (c) but the administration of goods is in the hands of the parents or tutor, until the children become of age or emancipated.²

² Civil Code, a. 371-396; a. 476-487; a. 730; Planiol, I, n. 2105-2238; Allegre, I, p. 256 sq.; Supplement for France, p. 21*-24*.

147. 3. Corollaries. (A) When there is question of the right which children have in small goods given by parents, attention must be paid to the intention of the parents, whether express or reasonably presumed: (a) if they have been given absolutely, the children have full dominion over them, and can enjoy them for every legitimate use; (b) if for a determined use, e.g., for acquiring books, or carrying out studies, those act unjustly who expend the money received on another use, say on immoderate recreations or pleasures; (c) if the express intention has not been given, it can be discerned from the circumstances, especially from the nature of the thing itself; e.g., if there is question of a thing consumable by first use, it is judged to have been given in an absolute manner; if of a non-consumable thing, e.g., books, clothing, it is judged to have been given for a determined use, and therefore it cannot be sold so that the money may be employed for another use. - When money is given not by parents, but by relatives or friends, it is judged to be given absolutely, unless the contrary is said.

148. (B) When children, laboring either within or outside the paternal house, make profits, these things seem to be established:

(a) If they labor outside the father's house, and acquire something by their own industry, they can retain the profit for themselves, because this is implicitly granted by the parents by the very fact that permission to work outside the paternal house was given to them. - Yet except if they receive food and clothing from the parents: for then, since the father is not bound to support a son having his own goods, expenses of this kind must be compensated; - or if the parents labor under need: for then children ought to relieve their necessities, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

149. (b) If within the house and from the goods or industry of the father the children gain profit, more probably they have a right to a stipend proportioned to their labor, which they can retain, after expenses for food and other things of this kind have been deducted, and with the obligation remaining of helping needy parents. The reason is that whoever labors has a right to obtaining wages, after expenses made for his sake have been deducted; nor is there any reason why minors should be deprived of this right. - I said more probably, because some think that nothing is strictly owed to minor children who labor at home, since the father can use their labor for administering domestic affairs, by way of compensation for the education given to them.¹ - Yet according to all it is expedient that children be allowed to gain something for themselves, so that they may be incited more efficaciously to labor.

¹ Thus Laymann, l. III, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 11; Antoine, Part III, c. V, quest. 13; Billuart, diss. IV, a. 4. But most theologians, both older and recent, favor our opinion. Since by French civil law, also flourishing in certain other regions, the usufruct of a thing acquired by common industry with the father belongs to the father until the minor son has reached the eighteenth year, he cannot occupy profit of this kind without the explicit or tacit consent of the father.

(c) When among several children some labor at home, and others can labor outside the house and gain something for themselves, it is equitable that the former obtain some stipend, after expenses for food, clothing, etc., have been deducted. - This especially holds if the children are already of age.

150. (d) So that all difficulties may be more easily removed, it is altogether expedient that an agreement be made between father and son when this son begins to gain something either at home or elsewhere; and this agreement must be observed. - If no contract has intervened, in practice it can be discerned from the circumstances, the customs flourishing in the place, and the presumed intention of the parents what the rights of the children are. If some doubt remains, before the fact hidden compensation is by no means to be counseled, by which namely the son would take something secretly from the parents as a reward of labor; - for this is full of dangers, as will be said below; - after the fact, those are not to be compelled to restitution unless they have morally certainly violated the rights of the parents.

151. I. Preliminary remarks. Husband and wife, by contracting marriage, form a certain society, of which the husband is the head. By natural right the wife remains capable of full dominion, and could not only possess her own goods, but also administer them, yet with the duty of helping to bear the burdens of marriage. But since the husband is supposed to be more skilled in administering economic affairs, and generally is, it is fitting, even when natural right alone is inspected, that the wife effect nothing of any moment in managing goods without consulting her husband. - But in practice what the rights and duties of the wife are has been defined by civil law among the various Nations; perhaps in certain regions it has granted more than is equitable to the man, but in these last times the laws have been changed somewhat, and probably will also be changed, to this end, that the rights of the wife may become more secure.²

¹ Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 64-74; Lessius, l. II, c. 12, n. 82-89; St. Alphonsus, n. 489; Carriere, n. 246-282; Marres, l. I, n. 44-96; Ball. P., n. 51-52 and n. 322-327; Genicot, n. 473-474; Lehmkuhl, n. 892-897.

² Cf. A. Boistel, Des limites a apporter aux pouvoirs du mari, in La Reforme Sociale, Jan. 1902, p. 48-60; Turgeon, Le Feminisme francais, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 125-172.

152. 1. General prescriptions.³ (A) Spouses can enter any agreement whatever, provided it is not opposed to good morals, to marital and paternal authority, or to civil law. If a special pact is lacking, the marriage is judged to have been entered under the regime of community.

³ Civil Code, a. 1387-1398; Planiol, n. 762-845, Supplement, p. 24*.

(B) Agreements must be entered before the celebration of marriage, before a notary; once entered they can be changed in the same form before, but not after, the celebration of marriage.

(C) Under whatever regime, the wife depends upon the husband with regard to the alienation of immovable goods, and in order to appear in a civil trial; yet that dependence ceases when the matrimonial bond has been dissolved, - or through separation as to bed, according to the law of February 6, 1893.

153. 2. On the principal regimes under which marriage can be contracted. There are three: the regime of community; the regime excluding community; the dotal regime.

(A) The regime of community¹ can be twofold: community is legal or conventional.

¹ In France five marriages out of seven are contracted under the regime of legal community. In the year 1898, 287,179 marriages were celebrated, of which 204,833 were without a special pact, and therefore under the regime of legal community; 68,412 under some regime of community; 10,112 under the dotal regime. - Cf. Bulletin de la Societe de legislation comparee, 1900, p. 562. - Planiol discusses wisely the advantages and disadvantages of community, III, n. 907.

(a) Legal community is had whenever no special contract is entered, or the spouses declare that they wish to contract under the regime of community.

Now under this regime,² there remain proper to each spouse: 1) all immovable goods which were possessed before marriage, or afterward came to him or her from donation or succession, except those which are given under the explicit condition that they ought to be common; or were acquired by onerous title, from the price of a proper good sold; 2) movable goods given with the explicit condition that they be proper.

² Civil Code, a. 1401-1496; Planiol, III, n. 901-1425.

But the following become common: 1) all movable goods, both present and future, except those which are expressly given as proper; 2) the fruits of all immovable goods; 3) all immovable goods bought from common goods during the marriage.

154. These things being posited, while the community remains, the wife retains ownership, but not the administration of her goods, which passes to the husband; nor usufruct, which passes to the community, of which the husband is the head and administrator. And so she cannot alienate her own goods without the consent of the husband; likewise the husband cannot alienate the goods proper to the wife without her permission. - With regard to common goods, the wife enjoys neither administration nor fruition, but has a right to honorable support, according to her condition. But the husband, as administrator of all these and owner of one half part, has the right of selling, alienating, or burdening them with mortgages, without the consent of the wife, according to the limits fixed by law.

155. When the community has been dissolved (by death, divorce, separation of bodies or goods, or the very long absence of one spouse): 1) the wife recovers full dominion over all goods which are proper to her; 2) with regard to common goods, she can either vindicate for herself one half part, if she wishes to pay one half part of the debts; or repudiate this half, if she does not wish to be burdened by the common obligations: in which case she can demand nothing besides clothing. - When she vindicates the half for herself, she ought to take care that an inventory be made, so that frauds may be removed more efficaciously, and that she not be burdened by common debts beyond the proportionate part of the profit which she receives from the common goods; this indeed she obtains, provided that this inventory has been made in good faith.

156. (b) Conventional community is had when the spouses by a special pact extend the legal community, e.g., by declaring that all movable and immovable goods, present and future, will be common; or restrict it, e.g., by establishing that only those goods are common which during marriage were acquired from the revenues of each (communaute reduite aux acquets),¹ or that common goods are to be divided not equally, but according to a given proportion.²

¹ Concerning this regime see Civil Code, a. 1498-1499, Supplement, p. 35*.

² Concerning these see Civil Code, a. 1497-1528; Planiol, III, n. 977-1014.

157. (B) The regime excluding community³ can be had in two ways: (a) without community of goods; (b) with separation of goods.

³ Civil Code, a. 1529-1539; Planiol, n. 1416-1462.

(a) Without community of goods: then the wife preserves direct dominion over her goods, or at least over their value; but the husband has the usufruct and administration of the same, excepting those which have been specially reserved to the wife, and with the burden of providing for the honorable support of the wife. - When the regime has been dissolved, the wife recovers full dominion over her goods, but cannot reclaim the fruits already received by the husband.

(b) With separation of goods: each spouse retains not only ownership, but also the usufruct and administration of his or her goods; nevertheless the wife cannot exercise the right of alienating immovable goods without the husband's consent. Each spouse ought to sustain the burdens of marriage according to a proportionate part; if a pact is lacking, the wife ought to hand over a third part of her revenues to the husband. If either falls into poverty, the other ought to bear the burdens of the domestic matter.

158. (C) The dotal regime is especially situated in this, that the dotal goods of the wife, at least immovable ones, cannot be alienated. This regime is not had unless the spouses expressly declare that they enter marriage under this regime. Then the goods of the wife are of a double kind: dotal, which by the nuptial pact are constituted as dowry (during marriage they can neither be constituted nor increased); and paraphernal, which are outside the dowry; for the general rule is that all goods are paraphernal which are not explicitly constituted as dotal in the nuptial pact itself.

(a) The wife retains direct dominion of the dowry, but its administration and usufruct are in the hands of the husband. - Immovable dotal goods can neither be alienated, nor obligated, nor prescribed, even if the wife consents, except in a few cases excepted by law. But movable dotal goods can more probably be alienated, yet with the burden of restoring their value when the marriage has been dissolved.

(b) With regard to paraphernal goods, the wife retains administration and usufruct, but without being able to alienate immovable goods without the consent of the husband.

The dotal regime or separation of goods protects the rights of the bride better, but imports a certain distrust toward the husband; moreover, in a case, money which is often required for commerce is borrowed with greater difficulty. Hence, in practice it is often expedient to embrace a mixed regime, especially that which is called communaute reduite aux acquets.

159. Whatever the civil law may be, certain principles must be established, by which it can be discerned when spouses inflict injury on one another.

1. Generally the civil law determining the various rights and duties of spouses in this matter must be observed in conscience, because there is question of a law determinative of property, and also of a contract freely entered between the parties. - Nevertheless, since rights and obligations proceed with equal step, if one of the spouses does not fulfill his or her obligations, he or she cannot vindicate for himself or herself the rights corresponding to them. - Moreover if deceit and fraud intervened in the contract itself, the injured party is not morally bound to fulfill those obligations which were unjustly imposed upon him or her.

160. These things being posited, the wife (A) has a right to honorable support according to her condition, even if she has brought no goods, nor any pact was explicitly entered: for natural right demands this.

This honorable support embraces not only food and clothing, but also honorable recreations, according to her condition; and the faculty of bestowing moderate alms, since the wife remains bound by the law of charity.

161. (B) If the woman is bound to succor her own parents, or children received from a preceding marriage, she ought to furnish this from her own goods, if she has any; - but if these are lacking, she can relieve their grave necessity from common goods or from the goods of the husband; and indeed without the consent of the husband, if the donations can be regarded as alms; but if they are more ample, with the consent of the husband, since he is administrator of the common goods and owner of his own. - Certain persons probably say the same concerning brothers and sisters who are in grave necessity.

162. (C) Since the wife is not a servant, but an associate, she is not bound explicitly to ask from the husband those things which are necessary for her own support, but can vindicate them for herself, - indeed secretly subtract them, if the husband is irrationally unwilling.

Likewise, if the husband is prodigal, the wife can hide certain goods and preserve them for future necessities. - Likewise, if he culpably neglects to furnish necessities to a son studying or laboring outside the house, she can supply these from common goods or from goods proper to the husband. - Yet in these matters care must be taken that she not indulge too much either herself or her children, since not rarely wives are prone to extending their rights beyond what is equitable.

163. 2. When full separation of goods flourishes, each spouse sins against justice if, while the other is reasonably unwilling, he or she diverts part from the other's revenues. Yet a greater quantity is required for constituting grave sin for spouses than for strangers, because they are judged less unwilling.

164. 3. The husband sins against justice:

(A) By dissipating the goods proper to the wife: (a) either by alienating them against the wife's will or against civil laws; or by extorting the wife's consent by moral violence or fraud: for he is not the owner of these goods, but only the administrator; - (b) by managing them badly and negligently; for he ought to administer the wife's thing as a good father of a family; otherwise he inflicts harm, and as a damager is bound to restitution.

165. (B) By alienating common goods in a manner prohibited by civil law, e.g., by giving immovable goods, or by hiding a donation under the appearance of a sale; for one half part of these goods belongs to the wife, and the husband cannot dispose of this part except by concession of law; therefore he usurps the rights of the wife by alienating common goods against the prescriptions of the law. - But if the husband has dissipated these goods within the limits of the law, by selling or exchanging them, more probably indeed he sins against justice, because he violates the wife's right of co-ownership in those goods;¹ but, according to some,² in this case charity indeed is violated, but not justice. - In practice, the former opinion is to be advised before the fact; after the fact, that which has been done according to the latter can be tolerated. - But to prevent the dissipation of goods, the wife can request separation.

¹ Marres, I, n. 69.

² Carriere, n. 276.

Here there is question only of seculars; concerning Regulars, however, the question will be treated in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States.

³ Thomassin, Anc. et Nouv. Discipline, Paris, 1725, t. III, l. III, h. 26-46; Lugo, disp. IV; Molina, Tract. II, disp. 143-148; Lessius, lib. II, c. 4, n. 51; Billuart, diss. III, art. 5; St. Alphonsus, lib. IV, n. 490-492; Carriere, I, n. 148-194; Ballerini-Pal., n. 38-42.

166. I. Preliminary remarks concerning the various species of goods of clerics. Goods possessed by clerics can be of four kinds: -

1. Patrimonial, or profane, goods, i.e., those which come to them from parents or others either by inheritance or donation, etc.; or those which by their own labor or industry they gain, by exercising an art distinct from sacred duties, e.g., by writing books, making statues, etc.

2. Casual, or quasi-patrimonial, goods, which accrue to them from labor spent in exercising ecclesiastical duties, such as Mass stipends, offerings received on the occasion of preaching or of the administration of the sacraments, stole revenues, etc.

167. 3. Ecclesiastical goods, namely the revenues which come from ecclesiastical benefices, or from those goods which are proper to the Church; pensions which are paid by the Government for ecclesiastical goods unjustly taken away, or supplements which are paid out by the community for the suitable support of clerics, if by public authority they are substituted in place of benefices.⁴

⁴ Thus, e.g., in France what is called denier du culte.

4. Parcimonial goods, namely those which, by living sparingly, clerics reserve for themselves from ecclesiastical revenues which they licitly could have consumed for honorable support.

168. First principle: Clerics have full dominion of patrimonial, casual, and also parcimonial goods. It is certain.

(A) With regard to patrimonial goods there is no difficulty: by natural right they belong to clerics; who, moreover, have emitted no vow of poverty, nor by any positive law are they deprived of the free disposition of these goods.

(B) Casual goods, or quasi-patrimonial goods, according to the common and in practice safe opinion, belong to clerics. For they are given by the faithful not indeed as the price of a sacred thing, but as compensation either for labor expended on the occasion of a sacred thing, or for expenses which clerics had to incur while preparing themselves to exercise sacred duties rightly, or by reason of gratitude. Now it is by no means established that the intention of the faithful is that clerics spend these offerings for pious uses; rather, from the circumstances they are judged to have given these absolutely, without any condition; therefore clerics are able to dispose of them at will.

169. Nevertheless the Church could make laws about this matter, which would have force in conscience, as in fact she made laws in the first centuries of the Church, and also in our days in certain dioceses: for the good of the Church can require this.

With regard to the division of casual goods between the pastor and his vicars, nothing is prescribed by the general law of the Church; hence particular Statutes, legitimate customs of places, and the intention of the faithful are to be attended to.

170. When there is question of offerings which are truly owed, e.g., on the occasion of marriage or a funeral, ordinarily it is defined by the Statutes what is owed, and what part is to be assigned to the pastor, to the vicars, or to other ministers: this law must be stood by altogether in conscience.¹

¹ In the Paris Statutes (Statuts Synodaux 1902, n. 580), it is rightly decreed that priests who demand more than has been determined by the Bishop act unjustly and are bound to restitution; in the same place (n. 581) it is recommended that casual rights are not to be exacted too rigorously, nor vindicated before tribunals without episcopal license; and (n. 583) that nothing is to be demanded from the poor, lest perhaps they be kept away from the sacraments.

If there is question of spontaneous offerings, and nothing has been defined concerning them, either by law² or by custom, the intention of the faithful must be attended to, since it is free to them to give something or not, and to whomever they wish. Generally they intend to bestow this offering on the priest himself who performed the sacred rite; but in a case of doubt, their will can be discreetly explored by this or a similar question: Do you wish to give this to the pastor, or to me?

² In the United States of America, concerning this division various laws are found in various dioceses: (a) in certain ones, e.g., Trenton (Statuta, n. 353-354), the alms which are paid out on the occasion of baptism, marriage, nuptial Mass, a sung Requiem Mass, all yield to the rector or pastor; he uses these to pay the expenses of the parochial house, and to supply suitable support to the vicars; if anything is left over, it is divided equally between the rector and his vicars. (b) In others, however, e.g., Baltimore and Wilmington (Stat. Wilmington., n. 282), alms of this kind are contributed in common, and then are divided so that, if there is one vicar, two parts yield to the pastor and one to the vicar; if there are two vicars, one half part yields to the pastor, and the other half is distributed equally among the vicars.

171. (C) Parcimonial goods are altogether under the dominion of clerics; for they have a right to honorable support, and therefore make their own those ecclesiastical revenues which are necessary for living honorably; hence if, by living sparingly and abstaining from legitimate recreations, they can set aside something from those revenues which they have made their own, this can be regarded as the fruit of industry and frugality, and it belongs altogether to them.

172. Second principle: Clerics are bound under grave obligation, at least from ecclesiastical law and charity, to spend the superfluous revenues of ecclesiastical goods on pious uses. It is certain.

It is explained. Here there is question only of revenues, not however of the goods themselves; for since the Church has made these goods her own, clerics cannot alienate ecclesiastical estates without injustice. But from these revenues clerics can turn to their own use whatever is required for honorable support, since benefices were instituted primarily for this end. But what remains is called superfluous; and these things, according to all, must be spent on pious uses from the law of the Church and from charity; whether also from justice or not will be said below.

173. It is proved. (A) From authority; besides the ancient canons¹ which explicitly treat of this matter, we have the Tridentine Council, which concerning Bishops, Cardinals, and consequently other beneficiaries, decrees as follows:² "Let them not strive, from the revenues of the Church, to enrich their blood-relatives or household members, since even the canons of the Apostles forbid ecclesiastical things, which are God's, to be given to blood-relatives; but if they are poor, let them distribute to them as to poor persons; but let them not divert them, nor dissipate them, for their sake..."¹

¹ See these in the Decree of Gratian, cause 12, q. 1.

² Sess. XXV, cap. I de Reformat.

¹ Today, however, from the Code, c. 239, n. 19, Cardinals can freely dispose of beneficial revenues; but, from can. 1473, other beneficiaries are bound to spend superfluous fruits for the poor or for pious causes.

(B) From the intention of donors: for they gave moneys and other goods to the Church so that they might be turned to pious uses, not however to profane uses, and therefore for the support of clerics and other pious works, not however for increasing the riches either of clerics or of their family.

174. Disputed question. (A) From this not a few canonists and theologians infer that clerics are bound from justice to spend the superfluous revenues of ecclesiastical goods on pious uses. For (a) according to the Fathers and sacred canons, ecclesiastical goods are the patrimony of Christ, the patrimony of the poor, so that clerics who spend these goods for profane uses are held guilty of rapine and sacrilege.² Now this signifies nothing else than that they are guilty of true injustice, and therefore are bound to restitution. (b) The faithful, in giving their goods to the Church, intended nothing else than to support clerics, relieve the poor, and foster divine worship; not however to enrich clerics or their nephews; but clerics, by accepting benefices, at least implicitly and by force of a quasi-contract, take upon themselves to execute the intentions of the donors; therefore, by dissipating ecclesiastical revenues, they violate the quasi-contract and therefore justice.

² Thomassin expressly reports these texts, op. cit., ch. 26-33.

175. (B) The more probable opinion, however, holds that the obligation of spending the superfluous goods of ecclesiastical goods on pious uses is not from justice.³ For (a) before the division of ecclesiastical goods, a fourth part was distributed to clerics for their support, and what remained fell altogether under their dominion as the wages of labor; but, after the division of goods had been made, benefices correspond to this fourth part, and therefore the revenues of benefices fall under the dominion of clerics; therefore, by spending them, even contrary to the laws of the Church, they do not violate justice, but obedience and charity.

³ St. Thomas, Quodlibet VI, p. 7, a. 12, ad 3; Soto, l. X, q. 4, a. 3; Lugo, disp. IV, n. 17; Lessius, l. II, c. 4, n. 43; Salmantic., c. II, n. 155; St. Alphonsus, n. 492; most recent authors.

(b) From the Tridentine Council, beneficiaries who reside in the place of the benefice and fulfill their duties make the fruits of their benefices their own; for this is drawn from the fact that those who do not reside, or do not emit the profession of faith, do not make the fruits their own; but to make the fruits one's own is the same as to acquire dominion over them; and if they truly acquire dominion of fruits of this kind, they do not sin against justice, even by squandering them.

176. Ecclesiastical goods are indeed called the patrimony of Christ, because they have been given in view of Christ; the patrimony of the poor, because the superfluous revenues must be distributed to the poor from charity; and those who dissipate these superfluous goods are held guilty of rapine, because, as was said above, n. 85-86, the Fathers with a certain oratorical exaggeration accuse of injustice the rich who do not feed the hungry.

177. Hence in practice it is permitted to follow the more benign opinion, nor are beneficiaries who have not spent these superfluous goods on pious uses to be compelled to restitution; but at the same time they are to be admonished that there lies upon them a grave obligation of applying these to pious uses, at least from charity.

Moreover, from can. 1299-1301, beneficiaries are bound to take care that sacred furnishings acquired from ecclesiastical goods be given to their own church.

178. Notes for France and the United States. (A) In France there are no longer benefices properly so called; but the Sacred Penitentiary responded several times that pensions which are paid by the Government to pastors, even removable ones, and to canons, assume the nature of benefices, and have attached to them the obligation of spending the superfluous on pious uses, and of observing residence under penalty of not making the fruits one's own. - But since pensions of this kind are so small that they scarcely suffice for honorable support, there is no difficulty.

179. (B) In the United States of America there are neither benefices nor pensions paid by the Government; but, according to the ecclesiastical laws there in force,¹ two kinds of goods must be carefully distinguished: (a) the revenues of the church, an account of which rectors must render, namely collections made in the church, unless the Bishop has otherwise determined concerning them; likewise all things which come from the rental of pews, from the cemetery and schools; legacies, annual subscriptions, and donations made to the rector of the church either by private individuals or by societies, especially of movable things, such as furnishings, priestly vestments, gold and silver vessels, unless the contrary has been explicitly declared by the donors. From these revenues all things must be taken which are necessary for divine worship, for the support of the clergy (according to the Statutes of each diocese), and of the parish School.

¹ Concil. Plen. Baltimor. III, n. 264-283; Statuta Baltim., n. 83-96, and other Statutes of each diocese.

180. (b) The goods which clerics can vindicate for themselves as their own, and which they can use and enjoy freely, namely: the fixed and determined sum of money which, under the name of salary, is assigned by the Bishop, within or outside the synod, to pastors and their vicars.¹ Priests, however, must be content with a smaller sum, if the parish or missions over which they preside cannot supply this; nor is the Bishop bound to make up the deficiency of salary, but only those things which are necessary for honorable support. Priests must collect their salary at an opportune time; if they have not collected it, nor vindicated it for themselves by a writing approved by the Ordinary or his Chancellor, they are considered by that very fact to have renounced their right.² - Mass stipends according to the tax fixed by custom or Statutes. - If a Mass is sung, what is above the ordinary stipend is commonly held as a stole-right and belongs to the pastor. - Offerings which they receive on the occasion of a sermon, or of another work of this kind; or donations spontaneously and explicitly made to them for their own utility.

¹ C. Balt. Plen. III, n. 273. - In certain dioceses no salary is assigned, but the special collection which is made on the days of the Nativity and Resurrection of the Lord is wholly permitted to the pastor by way of salary.

² C. Balt. Plen. III, n. 281.

181. Notion. A moral person in general is an aggregation of several persons,³ who form one moral or juridical body, enjoying the perpetual right of existing and of possessing goods collectively. It is also called a society, college, association.

³ In some regions, however, Great Britain, the United States of America, etc., one single person can be recognized as a moral person (corporation sole).

Species. (A) By reason of the end, moral persons are some civil, which directly pursue a temporal good, e.g., the State, Municipalities, industrial Societies, etc.; others, however, ecclesiastical, which directly pursue the spiritual good of the members or of other citizens.

(B) Again societies are either public or private, according as the good to which they tend is a common or particular good. Thus the State, Provinces, Municipalities are held as public societies; but colleges of workmen, or industrial societies, are regarded as private.

182. Now all concede that public societies can exist and possess goods by natural or civil right. And in fact among all Nations, the City and the Municipality legitimately possess certain goods exclusively and permanently.

Thus, in France, the Republic possesses two kinds of goods: certain ones which can neither be alienated nor prescribed, such as public ways, rivers, sea-shores, fortified citadels, and other things of this kind; but certain ones which can be alienated, such as places left by the sea, islands formed in rivers, goods which lack an owner, forests, public buildings. - Likewise Provinces (Departements) and Municipalities (communes) possess certain goods collectively.

The principle is that it is no more licit to invade public goods than the goods of private persons; for the right of dominion exists equally in legitimate societies and in individuals.

But with regard to common goods (communaux), which citizens can enjoy, the conditions determined beforehand by legitimate authority must be observed, so that in this way the rights of all may remain intact.

183. State of the question. That there exists in men a natural right of associating themselves is admitted by all who acknowledge that man is a social being. But the question is whether, after the institution of the City or State has been posited, citizens retain the power of forming private societies. Now not a few Politicians contend that the right of constituting such societies is not natural, but emanates from the State itself, so that no society can exist and acquire goods unless the consent of public authority is added. Hence they try to overthrow societies, especially ecclesiastical and religious ones, and unjustly usurp their goods.

¹ Fonsegrive, La Crise sociale, ch. V, p. 255-299; Perin, De la Richesse dans les Societes chret., Paris, 1882, t. I, l. II, ch. 14, p. 359; Say-Chailley, N. Dict. d'Economie Politique, word Association; Rambaud, Elements d'Economie Politique, Paris, 1895, p. 173; Antoine, Economie sociale, ch. XIV, p. 384; Revue Catholique des Institutions, 1880, t. II, p. 486-556; 1884, t. I, p. 277; 1899, t. I, p. 289; Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 15, 1901, La liberte d'Association, by P. Dareste; P. Brochard, La Mainmorte Ouvriere, Paris, 1900.

184. Thesis: To enter private societies, with the faculty of possessing goods, even after the institution of the State has been posited, is a natural right which cannot be taken away or limited by the Government; except insofar as the public good requires this.

185. 1. To enter private societies is a natural right. For that right must be called natural to man which is necessary for cultivating his faculties, attaining happiness, and protecting rights. But the right of private association, even after the institution of the State has been posited, is necessary for these three things.

(A) For cultivating faculties rightly, whether physical, or intellectual and moral, or even religious. (a) The physical powers of any man are very limited, so that many things are most useful to him, indeed morally necessary, which he cannot accomplish unless helped by others; thus in building houses, exercising mechanical arts, etc., one proceeds much more quickly and efficaciously if the powers of several are united together: for by the conjunction of powers energies are much increased. (b) Say the same of the intellectual and moral order: for experience establishes that letters, the liberal arts, indeed rectitude of morals, are promoted by schools, academies, colleges, and various institutes of this kind: by the mutual help which associates give one another, by conversations, exhortations, counsels, examples, and other means of this kind, they are more and more enlightened and strengthened; so that today, when a special end wishes to be obtained, immediately some society is instituted for pursuing the same. (c) Nor must one speak otherwise concerning religious matters; for in order that men may tend to God more securely, they need the exhortations, counsels, and examples of others; and this indeed is more necessary when there is a revealed religion, founded on authority, which supposes a sacred hierarchy. Therefore there exists in men the natural right of associating themselves, which the State cannot take away without unjustly depriving citizens of a means morally necessary for fruitfully exercising their faculties.

186. (B) For attaining happiness; for man, since he is a social animal, cannot be happy without social fellowship with his neighbors; for the most part, when he is alone, he experiences weariness of life; for since the good is diffusive of itself, he most greatly desires to associate with others, so that he may impart something to them, or receive something from them; he wishes to love certain persons specially, and to be loved by them; and he attains the greatest happiness by fostering mutual benevolence and compassion. Now all these things can scarcely be attained unless citizens institute private societies among themselves, in which they may be able to enjoy the fellowship of others.

187. (C) Finally private association, especially in the present time, is a morally necessary means for protecting the rights of citizens, whether against other men or against the State itself, which, because of today's centralization, is able to oppress the rights of citizens.

Rightly therefore with Leo XIII¹ one must conclude: "It is granted to man by the right of nature to enter private societies; but the state has been instituted for the protection of right, not for its destruction; and if it forbids assemblies of citizens to associate, it plainly acts in contradiction with itself, because both it and private assemblies are born from this one principle: that men are by nature disposed to gather together."

¹ Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

188. 2. Societies of this kind by natural right can acquire and possess goods. For he who has a right to attaining an end likewise has a right to the means. But a private society cannot be truly useful and pleasant to men unless it enjoys certain resources, by which the intended end can be obtained; thus if men associate for cultivating fields, for devoting themselves to commerce or the arts, they need money and other goods for pursuing the work; the same is true concerning literary, moral, and religious matters: without money or other resources, neither can books be procured or distributed, nor meetings assembled, nor means employed for restraining vices or promoting religion. Therefore by natural right private societies can possess some goods.

189. Nor should it be said that these societies are useless, because in a democratic and free State the Government itself supplies all things which are desired for the exercise of faculties and the happiness of citizens. - For public authority, since it resides among men who are endowed with limited faculties and activity, cannot wisely take care of all things; it can scarcely provide for the general administration of affairs, especially since this becomes more complex and intricate day by day; hence many things, useful to the private and public good, will remain either undone or done in a very imperfect manner, unless citizens preserve the innate faculty of associating themselves and of performing those things for which the State is unequal. - Besides, if the Government wishes to attend to all things, then the activity of private persons will perish, and all the inconveniences of Collectivism (above, n. 97-98) will return.

190. Politicians further object that private societies are dangerous both economically and politically: (A) Economically, because, if they are able to possess goods, these will remain outside commerce; for since they enjoy the right of perpetual succession, the immovable goods which they have acquired are not sold or changed; this harms the public good, and deprives the treasury of taxes which are received in transfers.

191. The answer is that these inconveniences can easily be avoided: (a) for the State can circumscribe within certain limits the domains which can be possessed by private societies, lest they grow too much; now if these domains, according to the end of each society, are contained within certain limits, they bring no harm to the public good, but on the contrary render aid, since the prosperity of private societies redounds to the public good. Moreover those goods which are called of dead hand can be burdened with special taxes, which correspond to the taxes received in transfers.

192. (B) Private societies are politically dangerous, say the Politicians, because by force of the authority and resources which they obtain, they can resist the State and restrict too much the exercise of civil authority.

Resp. The State was instituted for promoting the public good, not however for destroying the legitimate activity of private persons; if it vindicates every authority to itself, then it is over with the liberty of individuals and families, and a monstrous tyranny will soon prevail. Therefore whoever is a lover of true liberty ought to desire that the omnipotence of the State be restricted by certain limits: and this can be performed in no more efficacious way than by the institution of private societies. Nor is it to be feared that in this way the authority of Government will be too much restricted; for by opportune laws the usurpations of communities can be restrained, "namely, if they pursue anything by their institution which openly disagrees with uprightness, with justice, with the welfare of the republic."¹ Nevertheless, as Leo XIII warns (l.c.), "it is necessary that it employ the greatest caution, lest it seem to violate the rights of citizens, nor establish anything under the appearance of public utility which reason does not approve."

¹ Leo XIII, Encycl. Rerum Novarum.

193. Various laws exist among different Nations concerning the rights and obligations of private societies.

By French civil law societies formed among private persons are permitted and juridically recognized, even without the intervention of the Government, provided they are commercial, or civil, or are instituted among farmers or workmen for protecting their rights; indeed, from the new law of July 2, 1901, all associations of whatever kind, with the exception however of religious Congregations, which cannot juridically exist unless they are approved by a special law. How much a restriction of this kind is opposed to the equality and liberty of citizens there is no one who does not see, since Congregations, far from harming the public good, on the contrary promote it most greatly, whether within or outside France. It is no wonder, therefore, that this manner of acting had already previously been condemned by the Roman Pontiffs; let Leo XIII especially be heard, Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "Here we consider in mind the various sodalities and colleges and religious orders, which the authority of the Church and the pious will of Christians had brought forth: with how great a salvation of the human race, history speaks down to our memory. Societies of this kind, if reason alone judges, since they have been entered for a just cause, appear to have been entered by natural right. But in that part by which they touch religion, it is the Church alone to which they justly obey... In many places the republic has violated communities of this kind, and indeed with manifold injury: since it has both bound them by the bond of civil laws, and stripped them of the legitimate right of a moral person, and despoiled them of their fortunes. In these fortunes the Church had her own right, the individual members had their own, likewise those who had assigned them to a certain cause, and those for whose benefit and consolation they had been assigned."

194. Practical conclusion. Therefore there lies upon Catholics the right and duty of using manfully all legitimate means for obtaining a wider liberty of the right of associating themselves; and in the meantime of prudently and strenuously instituting societies and colleges, according to the norm of the new law of 1901, so that, vain complaints and dissensions at last set aside, they may be able to break the strength of the enemies of the Church; for in our days, since the evil everywhere and as if in rivalry are mutually united, the good cannot vindicate their rights unless, with great heart and willing spirit, with united and federated powers, they manfully defend themselves and their rights.¹

¹ Hence in the first Encyclical E supremi apostolatus cathedra, Pius X recently exhorted Catholics to institute societies among themselves: "Our Predecessors long ago approved, and sanctioned with good prayer, that Catholic men should come together among themselves into a society, with various designs indeed, but always for the good of religion. Moreover We also do not hesitate to adorn this excellent institute with our praise, and we vehemently desire that it be widely introduced and flourish in cities and fields... For the times demand action; but that action which consists wholly in observing holily and integrally the divine laws and the prescriptions of the Church, in freely and openly professing religion, and finally in exercising works of every kind of charity, with no regard for self or earthly utilities."

Two things must be set forth: 1. whether the Church has the right of possessing temporal things; 2. to whom in the Church this right belongs.

¹ Thomassin, op. cit., t. I. - De Angelis, lib. III, tit. 5, De Praebendis; Cavagnis, Instit. Juris Publici eccles., 3rd ed., t. III, l. IV, c. 2, art. 7; Bourgain, Etudes sur les biens ecclesiastiques, Paris, 1890.

195. Errors. (A) Certain heretics denied that the right belongs to the Church of acquiring temporal goods, because she is a spiritual society; among whom are: Arnaldus Brixinensis, in the twelfth century; the Waldenses, in the thirteenth century; Marsilius of Padua and Wyclif, in the fourteenth century; and also many Protestants, under Luther as leader, in the sixteenth century. They contended, namely, that "it is against Sacred Scripture that ecclesiastical men have possessions; that Pope Sylvester and Emperor Constantine erred by endowing the Church; that the Pope, with all his clerics having possessions, are heretics, because they have possessions, and besides all consenting to them, namely secular lords and other laymen."²

² In Denzing., nn. 486, 509, 512.

(B) But not a few modern Politicians attack the same right in a twofold way: (a) others, the bolder, hold that the Church has no right of possessing temporal things unless this power has been conceded to her; and that this faculty, once conceded, can be revoked at will, and goods previously acquired can be snatched away. (b) Others, more moderate, indeed confess that there belongs to the Church a certain right of possessing and administering temporal things, but that it must be limited by the State in the manner in which the State itself judges this opportune.

196. Thesis: The Church has the right of possessing and administering temporal goods, granted to her divinely, and therefore independently of the State. It is certain from the Code, c. 1495.

Scripture. (A) Already from the Old Testament it can be gathered that priests and levites received from God the right of possessing and administering certain temporal things. It is true indeed that in the division of the land of Canaan no part was assigned to them, because the Lord wished to be their portion and inheritance.³

³ Num., XVIII, 20.

(a) But the priests had a right to the first-fruits, which were offered to God by the children of Israel;¹ the levites to the tenth part of the fruits;² but they were bound to give the tenth part of the tithes to the priests.³ (b) Besides, the Lord commands the children of Israel "that they give to the levites, from their possessions, cities to dwell in and their suburbs round about; so that they themselves may remain in the towns and the suburbs may be for cattle and beasts of burden."⁴ In fact forty-eight cities were assigned to the levites, of which thirteen were reserved to the priests. - From these things it is established that God, on the one hand, wished the levites to be immune from temporal cares, and on the other, wisely provided for their necessities. From which already it can probably be inferred that the right belongs divinely to the Christian Church of possessing something, so that she may provide for the necessities of ministers.

¹ Num., XVIII, 8-19.

² Num., XVIII, 21.

³ Num., XVIII, 26.

⁴ Num., XXXV, 2-4.

197. (B) Under the New Law nothing indeed has been explicitly defined concerning this matter, but only the general principle has been declared, namely that those who serve the altar can eat from the altar: "Do you not know that they who work in the sanctuary eat the things that are of the sanctuary: and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained for those who announce the Gospel, to live by the Gospel."⁵

⁵ I Cor. IX, 13-14.

But the Church vindicated to herself the right of possessing from the beginning.

Thus in the first centuries she already possessed the Catacombs, in which the martyrs and departed Christians were buried; and afterward those buildings which were constructed over the Catacombs and elsewhere for celebrating the divine offices. This is surely established from various testimonies; according to Eusebius,⁶ Gallienus restored to the Church temporal goods taken away in the time of persecution; the Liber Pontificalis likewise testifies to this, where it treats of Pope Dionysius:⁷ "He divided churches among the priests, and established cemeteries and parishes of the diocese"; so also Aurelian restored to the Bishop of Antioch goods usurped by Paul of Samosata. But Constantine ordered to be restored "not only those places to which Christians had been accustomed to assemble, but also others... belonging to the right of their body, that is, of the Churches, not of individual men."¹ Besides, he donated the Lateran palace to the Roman Pontiff, and built many basilicas, which he gave to the Church; and from this time the Church acquired many temporal goods, and her rights were fully recognized by the State.² - Now, if in the time of persecutions she vindicated to herself the right of possessing, this power was considered to flow not from the Roman Emperors, who pursued her with hatred, but from Christ Himself.

⁶ Hist. eccles., VII, 13, in Migne, P. G., XX, col. 675.

⁷ Lib. Pontif., ed. Duchesne, Paris, 1886, t. I, p. 157.

¹ In Lactantius, De morte persec., 48, P. L. VII, col. 269. - Cf. Marucchi, Elements d'Archeol. chret., 1900, t. I, p. 117; Duchesne, Les Origines chret., c. 23, § 4; Allard, Hist. des Persec., t. II, ch. I.

² Gosselin, Pouvoir du Pape au moyen age, 2nd ed., Paris, 1845, p. 98-141; Rivet, Du Regime des biens d'Eglise avant Justinien, specialement sous les Emp. chretiens, Lyon, 1891; Fourneret, Les Biens d'Eglise apres les edits de pacification, Paris, 1902.

198. By reason. And rightly; for he who wills the end wills the means. But Christ wished the Church not only to subsist, but to advance, and to lead the Nations to the true faith. But the Church cannot perform this unless she has the right of acquiring certain temporal things. Indeed (a) she cannot subsist without ministers, who promote divine worship, preach Christian doctrine, minister the sacraments, and therefore expend themselves for the salvation of souls; but ministers cannot carry this out unless they are suitably educated and decently supported, having at least food and things with which they may be covered. (b) She cannot propagate the faith without incurring many expenses by sending missionaries to foreign Nations, distributing Catholic books, building new churches, providing for the necessities of the poor, widows, and orphans, etc. (c) For divine worship itself there are required temples, altars, sacred vestments, and other things of this kind. (d) Since the Church is a hierarchical society, there are Superiors, whose necessities must be aided; ecclesiastical tribunals, Congregations, in one word all those things which are altogether necessary for ruling a most ample society. Therefore if Christ wished the Church to subsist and fulfill her offices, by that very fact He wished temporal goods necessary for attaining this end to be possessed. - Moreover elsewhere it has been proved (Treatise on the Church, n. 109) that the Church is a complete and independent society; therefore she has the right of possessing independently of the State.

199. Difficulties are solved. (A) If the Church has the right of possessing independently of the State, she will soon become richer, because ecclesiastical goods are not alienated, but are increased daily; and from this corruption will pervade ecclesiastical men.

Resp. We do not deny that abuses can sometimes creep in on the occasion of ecclesiastical goods; but from this it by no means follows that the right itself of possessing is evil and therefore must be destroyed; otherwise every right would have to be overthrown, as liable to abuses; reason itself demands that abuses indeed be removed, but not the right itself of possessing. Now the Church prevents many abuses by her laws; for, as was said above (n. 181), beneficiaries who have richer revenues are bound to spend the superfluous on good works, and thus they can enrich neither themselves nor their family. - If sometimes ecclesiastical goods are increased, likewise the number of the faithful increases, and the necessities to be relieved also increase; moreover the greatest part of pagans has not yet received the Gospel, and under this head abundant resources are required for converting the Gentiles.

200. (B) Ecclesiastical goods generally are badly cultivated and administered; and this surely does much harm to the public good.

Resp. That an abuse of this kind was not common is established historically; for Religious Orders, even according to non-Catholic writers as witnesses,¹ generally fostered the cultivation of fields most greatly, and by tireless labor and skillful industry converted deserted regions into fertile fields;² in fact a long possession of the same fields increases their fertility not a little, since abundant crops can be received from uncultivated earth only after many labors and a long time. - But if, from the lack of skill or laziness of certain beneficiaries, some ecclesiastical goods are badly cultivated, let the abuse be removed, while the right itself of possessing remains safe.

¹ Thus Taine, L'Ancien Regime, 9th ed., Paris, 1880, p. 6-7.

² Montalembert, Les Moines d'Occident, 7th ed., Paris, 1892, t. I, p. 69 sq.; t. II, p. 446-461; Martin, Les Moines, Paris, 1880, t. I, ch. 6; G. Kurth, Origines de la civilisation moderne, Paris, 1886, t. II, p. 168-185.

201. (C) If ecclesiastical estates are multiplied, then the State is defrauded of taxes, since those estates, according to ecclesiastical law, enjoy immunity.

Resp. From history it is established that this immunity was not harmful to the State. For the Church often, when public calamities were threatening, spontaneously and freely brought help to the State, so that she gave more than the Government could have demanded under the name of taxes.³ Today, however, by taxes on dead hand and other things of this kind, ecclesiastical goods are often burdened more heavily than lay possessions. Therefore Politicians complain unjustly under this head.

³ Viollet, Histoire des Instit. politiques et administratives de la France, Paris, 1898, t. II, p. 398 sq.; Bourgain, Contribution du Clerge a l'impot sous la Monarchie francaise, Questions Historiques, new series, t. IV, p. 66 sq.

202. Three principal opinions have been produced concerning this matter.

(A) Certain persons, with Navarro,¹ said that the dominion of ecclesiastical goods is in the power of God and Christ, not metaphorically, but properly, so that the Church and the Sovereign Pontiff have only the dispensation of these goods, not however dominion. - Yet this opinion is today deservedly judged antiquated; for it can in no way be proved that God or Christ resumes under His own special dominion goods whose dominion He left to men from the beginning. These are indeed said to be dedicated, or donated, to God, but metaphorically, insofar as they ought to be spent in His honor, and cannot be snatched away without a special injury done to God; but dominion must remain in the power of some human person.

¹ Navarro, De Reditibus ecclesiasticis, q. I, monit. 40.

203. (B) Others hold, after Fagnanus,² that dominion of these goods is in the power of the Sovereign Pontiff, or of the universal Church, of which he is the head. Yet we judge this less probable. To the universal Church belong indeed those goods which have been specially donated to her, or were acquired by her, for the general rule of the Christian people; but not those which have been legitimately acquired by various communities canonically erected, on account of the argument soon to be set forth.

² Fagnan, In lib. III Decret., cap. Relatum, Ne clerici vel monachi, n. 26 sq.

204. (C) The third opinion, and today certain from the Code, c. 1499, is that the particular dominion of ecclesiastical goods is in the power of particular churches and colleges canonically erected, to which they have been donated, as long as they remain united to the Catholic Church. - It is called particular dominion, because high or eminent dominion remains in the power of the Pontiff, who, on account of the public good, can alienate or transfer these goods, as we said of the State with regard to the goods of private persons.

205. The fundamental reason is because (a) on the one hand, parishes, communities, and colleges, by the very fact that they are canonically erected, obtain from the Church the right of accepting donations and acquiring goods; (b) on the other hand, the faithful, when they bestow these goods on some church or college, do not intend to give them to the universal Church, but to this church or community which they favor with special love. - And this is confirmed by the practice of the Church; for when doubts arise concerning the legitimate possession of this or that ecclesiastical estate, or lawsuits between two communities, the Roman Congregations are accustomed to inquire to which community or college a good of this kind was donated, and what the intention of the donors was.

206. Yet it was said: as long as the churches or communities remain united to the Apostolic See; for they received this faculty of possessing from the universal Church, nor can they retain it against her will when they are separated from her. Moreover the intention of the faithful was to give these goods to such a parish or community insofar as it was Catholic, and therefore united to the center of Catholic unity.

207. Corollaries. (A) The Supreme Pontiff has the right of supreme dispensation of all ecclesiastical goods, and can alienate or transfer them insofar as the common good of the Church requires this.

For these goods were donated to churches or communities for promoting the good of the Church; now sometimes it happens that the good of the Church demands that these goods be transferred or ceded to others, because the colleges which enjoy them cease to exist, or abuse these goods, or because peace between the Church and the State cannot be retained or restored without a partial or total cession of ecclesiastical goods.

208. In fact the Roman Pontiffs have sometimes, although rarely, used this power; thus Clement V, in the Council of Vienne, transferred most of the goods of the Templars to the institute of St. John; Martin V, in the Council of Constance, granted to the Teutonic nation that it might retain certain ecclesiastical goods acquired simoniacally; Benedict XIV conceded to the bishops of Albania the faculty of condoning ecclesiastical goods unjustly seized to their possessors, lest otherwise these fall into apostasy; Pius VII, for the good of peace and the happy restoration of the Catholic religion in France, declared that those who had acquired alienated goods of the Church were not to be disturbed.

209. (B) These goods, from Code c. 1514, must be spent on the uses predetermined, unless the Sovereign Pontiff, by his supreme power, on account of the good of the Church, has judged otherwise. - For this is clear from the quasi-contract between the donors and the churches to which the goods were given. Moreover, if the utility of the Church demands something else, the Supreme Pontiff can interpret the will of the donors. Therefore recourse must be had to him for the commutation of pious works which can no longer be fulfilled.

210. Five modes are enumerated by which dominion can be acquired: occupation, accession, hereditary succession, contract, prescription.¹ Of these one is original, by which, namely, a thing belonging to no one, or having no owner, is acquired; and this is called occupation; but the others are derivative, by which a thing already placed under someone's dominion is acquired. Concerning succession and contract there will be treatment in the other part of this Treatise, where contracts are treated; here, however, there will be treatment 1. of occupation; 2. of accession; 3. of prescription.

¹ Labor is indeed one of the modes of acquiring; but, when it concerns one's own thing, it is reduced to the right of accession; if it concerns another's thing, it is referred to contract.

211. Conditions required for legitimate occupation. (A) Occupation is the apprehension of a thing which belongs to no one, with the intention of making it one's own. - Four conditions, therefore, are required so that occupation may be a legitimate mode of acquiring: (a) that the thing occupied belong to no one; for if it has a legitimate owner, the occupation of it, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, is furtive; (b) that the thing be truly and really apprehended: yet this apprehension can be actual or moral, according to the nature of the thing or civil laws; (c) that the one occupying have the intention of making the thing his own; for if he has another intention, e.g., of passing through such a place, or of spending the night in a house for some days, dominion is not acquired; (d) that this intention be manifested exteriorly: otherwise it can neither be known nor proved, and therefore cannot oblige others; what external signs are required will be set forth below.

² Lugo, disp. VI, n. 40-152; Molina, disp. 40-56; Lessius, lib. I, cap. 5, n. 28-67; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 2; St. Alphonsus, n. 602-605; Carriere, n. 285-360; Ball. P., n. 56-108; Lehmk., n. 906-916.

Today the right of occupation is greatly limited, since there are few things altogether belonging to no one, and generally by civil law it is determined to whom vacant goods belong.¹ Three things remain concerning which inquiry can be made: animals, treasures, things lost or abandoned.

¹ Cf. Civil Code, art. 539 and 713, Supplement, p. 47*.

212. Three kinds of animals can be distinguished in relation to occupation: (a) wild, or sylvan, which enjoy natural liberty and have no owner; such as lions, eagles, vultures, hares, fish, etc.

(b) Tamed, or trained, which, although by themselves of a wild nature, have been subjected to dominion by human industry, such as doves returning to the dovecote, bees in a hive; to these can be added wild animals enclosed in places from which they cannot escape.

(c) Tame, or domestic, which are so accustomed to the society of men that they no longer flee from the power of the owner, but serve domestic uses, e.g., sheep, hens, dogs, horses, etc.

213. Principles. Wild animals, which enjoy native liberty, become the property of the first occupier; for they truly belong to no one, and therefore can legitimately be occupied and retained by the successful captor. But they are judged occupied when they are so placed in the power of the hunter that they cannot escape. But if, after they have already been captured, they recover their liberty, they again become the property of no one: which happens when they have escaped and can be apprehended again by the former owner only with great difficulty.

214. Corollaries. (A) From this it can be inferred what must be said of a wild animal wounded by one person and captured by another; for if it has been so wounded that it cannot escape the hunter, it is truly placed under his power, and cannot legitimately be captured by others; but if it can flee, or the hunter has ceased to pursue it, it is judged to have recovered its liberty, and can be retained by the first occupier.² Thus most civil laws,³ which in this matter must be obeyed.

² The same distinction applies to a wild animal caught in a snare: if it cannot escape, it belongs to him who set the snare; but if it is now soon going to escape, it becomes the property of the first occupier, although equity would suggest that it be divided between him who set the snare and the one capturing it, since each cooperated toward capturing the wild animal.

³ For France, see Villequez, Droit du chasseur sur le gibier, 2nd ed., 1884; more briefly Planiol, I, n. 1248-1252, in Supplement, p. 48*.

215. (B) With regard to those who hunt on another's land, these things must be established: (a) If the land is open, although the owner can prohibit anyone from invading his fields for the sake of hunting, wild animals captured there do not belong to the owner of the land, but to the hunter; nevertheless the owner can demand that damages inflicted on the land be compensated.¹ - But if another's land is enclosed and so fenced for the custody of animals that all are truly placed under the power of the owner, he who occupies them sins against justice and is bound to restitution. - If the place is indeed enclosed, but ample, justice is indeed injured, but strictly speaking only those animals must be restored which the owner himself could have captured; and at the same time damages must be repaired which happen from the fact that wild animals are not multiplied as the owner could legitimately expect.

¹ By French civil law, if a wounded wild animal flees onto another's land, the owner of this land can prohibit the hunter from capturing the wounded animal there. Thus Cassation, Apr. 29, 1862, in Planiol, n. 1252, in Supplement, p. 48*.

216. (C) Fish which live in the sea or in rivers which can be navigated are the property of the first occupier, at least by natural right. But in smaller rivers, or all the more in private ponds, the right of fishing is generally reserved to the neighboring owners of the banks; concerning this see the civil laws.²

² For France, consult Planiol, n. 1253-1261, in Supplement, p. 48-49*.

217. (A) Tamed animals remain under the dominion of the one possessing them as long as they have not escaped his custody, nor lost the habit of returning. But if for a notable time they have lost the habit of returning, e.g., if doves have taken refuge in another dovecote, they have now recovered their liberty, and become the property of the first occupier, i.e., in the case mentioned, of the one into whose dovecote they fled.

Hence a swarm of bees cannot be occupied by another as long as the owner has probable hope of recovering it; but if he has ceased to pursue it, it can legitimately be captured by another.³

³ In this matter civil laws must be attended to; for France: Civil Code, a. 564; Law of April 4, 1889, a. 9.

To use frauds and artifices for drawing to oneself and occupying trained animals is unjust, and often causes grave dissensions. - But what comes under the name of fraud must be determined by civil laws or custom.¹

¹ In the time of sowing and harvest doves must be enclosed, lest they inflict damage on fields; and if they are not enclosed, every owner has the right of killing them on his own land and making them his own (Law of Aug. 4, 1789, a. 2).

218. Tame animals remain under the dominion of him to whom they belong, even if they have wandered away; for since they have never had their liberty, they are truly the object of a permanent dominion; and if they have been lost, they must be restored to the owner, even dead; and this holds even if they have been rescued from destruction by the industry of the one occupying them.

By French civil law (Law of April 4, 1889, a. 5), farmyard animals (animaux de basse-cour) which have taken refuge with another owner can be acquired by accession, after one month computed from the day on which this other owner declared before the mayor (maire) that these animals had been received by him. For this to hold in the forum of conscience, it is necessary that the first owner remain unknown;² indeed natural equity at least suggests that these animals be returned to the owner, if he has certainly been known, even after several months have passed.

² If domestic animals inflict damage, the owner is bound to compensate it; if birds do this, they can be killed by the owner of the land as long as they are on the land itself (Civil Code, a. 1385; Law of Sept. 28 - Oct. 6, 1791, tit. II, a. 12).

219. Corollary: on the violation of civil laws concerning hunting and fishing. The faculty of hunting and fishing is restricted by civil law in various ways. (A) He who hunts without due license, of itself indeed sins against legal obedience, but only lightly, because there is no question of a grave matter; indeed often not even lightly, because many are persuaded that this law is merely penal. Therefore under this head there is no place for restitution, since no strict right of anyone is violated.

220. (B) But he who hunts or fishes at a prohibited time or place sometimes sins against justice, and indeed gravely or not, according as the damage inflicted was grave or light. For such a prohibition is often made on account of a motive of public or private utility, namely lest animals be notably diminished, with detriment to the republic, or lest the crops of private persons be destroyed, or their rights of hunting or fishing invaded; therefore violators of these laws inflict damage either on the community or on private persons, and under this head sin against justice; but the gravity of the sin depends on the gravity of the damage inflicted; hence the principles to be set forth below concerning the damager must be applied.

Hence hunters who frequently devote themselves to illicit hunting (braconniers, poachers) of themselves sin gravely, both on account of the damage inflicted on others, and on account of the danger which they incur of repelling by force and wounding the keepers of the forests.

221. 1. Notion of treasure. Treasure can be defined as a noble, precious, and hidden thing, whose owner cannot be found. Two things therefore are required: (a) that the precious thing truly be hidden, not found in an open place; otherwise it will be a lost thing, not however a treasure; (b) that it can rightly be presumed a thing belonging to no one; hence, if someone can prove that he is the owner of this thing, it is not a treasure.

222. 2. To whom does treasure belong? (A) By natural right, it belongs wholly to the finder: for since it is a thing belonging to no one, it becomes the property of the first occupier. But he is deservedly called the finder who, whether through himself, or through another hired for this end, first discovers it, or renders it visible, although he has not yet apprehended the same by hand.

The reason is that treasure cannot be regarded as a thing of the owner of the land, since it is not established that it was hidden there by his ancestors; nor as a thing of him who hid the treasure, since by hypothesis he cannot be found; therefore treasure truly belongs to no one, and consequently to the first occupier.

223. (B) But civil law can determine something concerning this matter which obliges in conscience, since there is question of a temporal matter belonging to the State. (a) Now in France, and in many other regions, treasure found in another's land is divided equally between the finder and the owner of the land.¹ This law is equitable; for there is some presumption that the treasure was hidden by the ancestors of the owner, especially when possession of the land was continued in the same family for a long time; moreover the State can define to whom goods belong whose dominion is uncertain; therefore the civil law in this case obliges in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge.

¹ Civil Code, art. 716; Planiol, I, 1268-1271.

224. (b) By French civil law it is prohibited that the lands of others be dug up for finding treasures; if, therefore, someone by design and without the owner's consent has sought and found a treasure in another's land, he must hand over half part to the owner of the land, from what has been said; and moreover he is deprived of the other half part of the treasure: nevertheless this latter disposition is commonly held as penal, and therefore does not have force in conscience before the sentence of a judge.

He who buys a field at the common price, in which he suspects a treasure lies hidden, uses his own right, nor is he bound to divide the treasure found with the former owner of the land; but it must be said otherwise of him who hides a treasure already found, and, after buying the field, vindicates the whole for himself; for by the very fact that he finds it, he is now bound to hand over half part to the owner.

225. Notion. Lost goods are called those which, while the owner is unwilling, have fallen out of his possession although they are not hidden. - They differ from treasure in that they are not hidden by design, and moreover it is often possible to find their owner.

(A) A lost thing remains under the dominion of him who involuntarily lost it as long as he has reasonable hope of recovering it; but if, all things considered, he does not retain such hope, or, in other words, if it is morally impossible to find the owner, the lost thing becomes no one's, and can be legitimately retained by the finder.

Certain theologians indeed contended that even in this case the owner retains his right in the lost thing; but today this is commonly denied; for in the case mentioned it is impossible that dominion be exercised with regard to the lost thing, and the public good demands that this be occupied and so serve human uses.

226. (B) The finder is not bound from justice to take up a lost thing in order to guard it; but he is often bound to this from charity, namely when the thing otherwise is going to perish. - But if he has taken it up, he is bound from justice, according to the common opinion, (a) diligently to preserve the thing as a good father of a family; (b) more probably diligently to inquire about the owner, with diligence proportioned to the value of the thing found, not at his own expenses, but at the owner's. This twofold obligation arises from a quasi-contract by which, in apprehending the lost thing, he takes upon himself the obligation of caring for it as a good father of a family.

227. (C) If the owner appears before the time required for prescription, the thing must be returned to him, with the expenses however deducted which the finder underwent for the custody of the thing or the inquiry into the owner: for he made these as the owner's mandatory. - Nothing more is owed from justice to the finder, unless some reward has been promised.

228. (D) If, after diligence has been applied, the owner does not appear nor is there probable hope of finding him, the finder strictly speaking can retain the thing, because it can be held as a thing belonging to no one. But if he has disposed of it, and afterward the owner appears before the time of prescription has elapsed, the finder is bound to nothing except insofar as he has become richer from it, as will be said below concerning the possessor in good faith. But when the time necessary for prescription has elapsed, the thing becomes the finder's.

But if someone has culpably neglected to inquire about the owner, or all the more has hidden the thing lest perhaps the owner recover it, he is now a possessor in bad faith: concerning whom it will be said below.

229. Formerly theologians commonly held that a lost thing whose owner could not be found had to be spent on pious uses; for the owner of the lost thing has not lost his rights, and therefore it is not licit to use this except according to his presumed will; but the owner is presumed to wish that the thing be spent on pious uses, and so profit him spiritually.

But most modern theologians deny this; for (a) it is by no means established that dominion of the thing remains in the power of him who lost it without probable hope of recovering it, as was said above; (b) moreover it is not established that such is the presumed intention of the owner; this perhaps was the mind of the faithful in the time when faith and charity prevailed; but today there are few who care about this matter; they desire one thing, namely that the thing be faithfully preserved, so that it may be returned to the owner, if at some time at last he becomes known. - Hence in practice, distribution to pious uses is not to be imposed.

230. 2. Prescriptions of civil law. Where by civil law provision is made concerning lost things, its prescriptions must be observed. Now in France there are various laws not indeed concerning all but concerning certain lost things.¹ Besides, in many cities Municipalities have ordered that lost things be brought to a certain place: these statutes indeed are not determinative of property, and therefore do not oblige from justice; but it is equitable to obey them.

¹ Cf. Planiol, I, n. 1282-1286. - See Supplement, p. 50*-51*.

231. Notion. Those things are called abandoned which the owner has voluntarily renounced from himself, nor transferred their dominion to others; e.g., fruits which, when the harvest has already been completed, have been left behind; dry wood which lies on the ground; old rags which are thrown away, etc.

Vacant goods are those which, when the owner has died, become no one's, because on the one hand the deceased did not dispose of his goods by testament, and on the other there are no heirs who can or wish to accept the succession.

232. Principle. By natural right, these goods, as belonging to no one, can legitimately be occupied by the first occupier.

But in most regions civil law establishes that abandoned and vacant goods devolve to the State,¹ with the exception however of movable things of little importance. This law is consonant with reason, and is to be observed in conscience, at least after the sentence of a judge, according to all; indeed more probably even before this sentence, because a law of this kind is not penal, but determinative of property.

¹ For France, cf. a. 539 and 713 Civil Code; Planiol, I, n. 1243-1246.

233. But things lost by shipwreck (epaves) or thrown into the sea to save a ship, or carried away by inundation, are by no means to be held as abandoned: for the owners did not freely and spontaneously reject them, but wish to retain dominion over them insofar as they can; concerning these, therefore, the same thing must be said as concerning lost things. Hence civil laws² generally punish with severe penalties those who snatch away these goods; and deservedly, especially when it is known to whom these things belong; for theft in this case assumes a certain species of cruelty.

² For France, Civil Code, art. 717; Planiol, n. 1279.

234. Accession is a mode of acquiring dominion, by force of which the owner of some thing, movable or immovable, legitimately acquires all those things which his thing produces, or which are united to it. - It rests upon these two principles: A thing fructifies for its owner; - the accessory follows the principal. - Hence the right of accession arises under a twofold head, from production and from union.

¹ Lugo, disp. VI, n. 153-174; Molina, Tr. II, disp. 57; Billuart, diss. IV, a. 2, § 8; Carriere, I, n. 369-394; Crolly, disp. XXVIII, n. 639-640; Kenrick, Tr. X, n. 67-74; Ball. P., n. 109-137; Lehmk., n. 916; Haine, q. 65-66.

235. Principle. He who obtains full dominion of some thing has a right to all the fruits arising from the same, according to that saying: A thing fructifies for its owner; and deservedly, since full dominion imports the right of enjoying. But if dominion is divided, so that one has the right of disposing, but another the right of enjoying, this latter will make the fruits his own, as was said where usufruct was treated (n. 126).

236. Species of fruits. Now four kinds of fruits are distinguished: - (a) natural fruits, which arise spontaneously without any or almost any labor, e.g., hay, certain trees, some apples hanging from trees; but there are very few altogether in our regions which grow without any labor; (b) industrial fruits, which are produced only by cultivation, such as certain crops and legumes, wine, etc. - Often fruits are mixed, since they are begotten partly by nature, partly by labor; (c) civil fruits, which do not arise from the thing itself, but come from a contract entered concerning this thing, e.g., the price of leasing, annual revenues, pensions, profit received from loan;² (d) offspring of animals, that is, young born from animals; in this matter the principle must be followed: the offspring follows the womb, or he who legitimately has the mother obtains the right to the young born from her.

² With regard to French civil law, cf. Civil Code, a. 583-584; Planiol, I, n. 1619-1625; Supplement, p. 51*.

This kind of accession can occur both with regard to movable things and with regard to immovable things.

This can happen in three ways: by adjunction, specification, and commixture.

¹ Civil Code, a. 565-577; in France there is scarcely room for the application of these rules, on account of another rule to be set forth below: "In the matter of movables possession is equivalent to title." Cf. Supplement, p. 54*. - The rules which we hand down here are taken from Roman civil law, but are accepted by most Nations, as consonant with reason.

237. (A) By adjunction, by which things belonging to different owners are so united that they cannot be separated without detriment; e.g., a gem inserted into a gold ring, an image expressed on another's canvas, a poem written on another's paper. - The principle is that the whole thing belongs to the owner of the principal thing, under this condition, however, that he indemnify the owner of the other thing; for the accessory follows the principal. But what is accessory and what principal must be defined by the common judgment of prudent men, or by custom, or by civil law; e.g., a painting is certainly something principal in relation to the canvas upon which it is painted.

238. (b) By specification, by force of which from another's material a thing of another species is made, e.g., if a statue is made from another's marble, shoes from leather belonging to another, etc. The general rule is that the owner of the material has the right of keeping the thing thus effected, by paying the price of the labor, - unless, however, the work expended far exceeds the price of the material, e.g., if someone from cheap wood carved a most beautiful statue: in which case the artisan can retain the thing, after paying the price of the material.

239. (c) By commixture, which is the conjunction of several things equally principal belonging to different owners, as if two heaps of wheat, two vats of wine, are mixed. - The principle is that the things mixed become the common property of the owners according to the proportional part of each. Hence, if they can be separated, let his own part be returned to each owner; otherwise, either the mixed things must be divided according to the proportional part of each owner; or the whole must be sold, so that the money may be divided according to the proportional part of each.²

² In some regions, such as England and the United States of America, civil law establishes that he who in bad faith has mixed his own goods with those of another loses the right of recovering his own. This law, as penal, does not oblige except after the sentence of a judge; and often the rigor of the law is tempered by judges.

240. This accession can happen either by human industry, namely by building, planting, or sowing; or by nature, namely by alluvion and change of channel.

(A) In the former case, dominion of the soil draws with itself dominion of those things which are built, planted, or sown on it even by others: for all these things are judged to have been made at the expense of the owner. Nevertheless natural equity demands that he who in good faith has built, planted, or sown something on another's land should receive compensation for the labor and material employed, at least insofar as the owner has become richer from these.

Moreover civil law in various regions establishes many things concerning this matter, which oblige in conscience, as being determinative of property.¹

¹ Civil Code, a. 552-555; Planiol, I, n. 1519-1546.

241. (B) In the latter case, namely when accession happens through alluvion, change of channel, or formation of islands, these things generally are admitted in various regions as consonant with natural right: -

(a) Whatever is added little by little to an adjacent bank, - by the recession of the sea, a lake, or a river, - is legitimately acquired by the owner of the land which adjoins the bank;² for it is equitable that the owner of the land retain those things which naturally accrue to this land, all the more because at another time he may lose something of his estate.

² In France special rules exist with regard to alluvions of the sea, lakes, and ponds; Civil Code, a. 557-558; Planiol, I, n. 1517; Supplement, p. 52*.

(b) But if by a sudden rush of waters a large part of some land is torn away from it, the owner of the land does not lose his rights, and can vindicate this torn-away part for himself.

(c) When a river, its course having been changed, leaves its channel, the abandoned channel is legitimately acquired by those whose fields have been submerged by the river: for it is equitable that compensation be assigned to them according to the proportional part of the damage.

242. (d) Islands which are formed in rivers belong to the owner of the nearer bank. - Hence in many regions a distinction is made between navigable rivers and others: islands which are, as it were, created in navigable rivers yield to the Republic, which has the right of dominion over these rivers; - those which are formed in other rivers are legitimately acquired by the owner of the nearer bank; but if they are in the middle of the river, they are divided between the owners of the banks on each side; and the boundaries of the dominion of each are determined by a line which is supposed to be drawn through the middle of the river, or, as they say, through the middle thread of the water.³

³ Civil Code, a. 559-563; Planiol, I, n. 1515-1518.

243. State of the question. Prescription is a mode of acquiring dominion, or of freeing oneself from an obligation through a certain lapse of time, and under conditions determined by law or custom.

¹ Lugo, disp. VII; Lessius, lib. II, c. 6; Molina, Tr. II, disp. 60-80; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 504-517; Carriere, II, n. 395-500; Ball. P., n. 133-221; Marres, lib. I, n. 400-427; Lehmk., n. 917-927; Noldin, n. 389-397; Thiers, De la Propriete, l. I, ch. 13-14; Pothier, Traite de la Prescription; Troplong, De la Prescription; Planiol, I, n. 1391-1508.

From this it follows that prescription is twofold: acquisitive, by which dominion or right is acquired; liberative, by which someone frees himself from an obligation. The former is deservedly called usucapion.²

² Often prescription and usucapion are taken indiscriminately; but strictly, by force of the terms, prescription extends more broadly than usucapion, since the latter is limited to those things which are taken or acquired by use, while the former extends itself to those things which are obtained by use or non-use.

Now civil and canonical laws plainly acknowledge that prescription is a legitimate mode of acquiring. But the question is whether this mode is consonant with equity and has force in conscience. It would indeed be difficult to prove, if natural right alone is inspected, that dominion is transferred by long possession. But the right of nature permits this and approves it as very useful to the good of society; and supreme authority, by force of high dominion, completes natural right and confers obligatory force in conscience upon prescription, provided that it is clothed with certain conditions to be set forth below.³

³ Certain persons, however, hold that prescription arises from natural right alone, at least when it is immemorial; others from the Law of Nations; others from civil law alone. Cf. Carriere, n. 402-409.

We shall speak 1. of the legitimacy of acquisitive prescription; 2. of the conditions required for it; 3. of liberative prescription.

244. Principle: Prescription, clothed with the due conditions, is a legitimate mode of acquiring dominion, even in the forum of conscience. It is certain.

Indeed, for the legitimacy of prescription in conscience, it suffices that the supreme civil authority could and wished to confer this force upon it. But both are established: -

245. 1. Civil authority could do this; for the State, by force of the high dominion which it has over the goods of subjects, can perform that which favors the public good and moreover of itself injures the rights of no one. (A) But prescription, with the conditions to be set forth below posited, promotes the good of society most greatly. For it is of very great importance that dominions not remain uncertain, nor lawsuits concerning the property of things be perpetual; for if they remain uncertain and lawsuits are feared, fields are either neglected or at least are not cultivated with that industry which the utility of society demands; besides, the peace of families is disturbed, since it is to be feared lest those who judge themselves richer soon, through a lawsuit, be expelled from the house which for a long time they judged to be their own, and be despoiled of goods formerly possessed. Now, unless prescription is admitted, dominions will not rarely be uncertain; for sometimes the title is lost, nor can the legitimacy of this or that dominion easily be proved except with the help of prescription; moreover the title can be attacked as defective, and, when there is question of a fact which occurred already a long time ago, the difficulty will be solved with difficulty, and therefore lawsuits concerning the legitimacy of this or that title will be innumerable and perpetual unless the obligatory force of prescription is acknowledged. On the contrary, if long possession, clothed with certain conditions, is equivalent to title, it will be much easier to solve lawsuits and to define rights certainly.

246. (B) Moreover prescription of this kind of itself injures the rights of no one. That its equity may be judged, it must be considered not in one particular case, but in general and of itself. But of itself, before every event, it favors one no more than another; namely each has an equal fear of losing or hope of gaining. This can be illustrated thus: if the citizens of some republic by common consent established that goods should become his who possessed them in good faith for a long time, no one could think himself injured: for this would be an aleatory contract, before the event favoring all equally and therefore most equitable. Now what citizens can establish by pact, the legislator can decree in the name of all, provided that the public good demands it. Moreover citizens, in accepting this law, implicitly enter an aleatory contract among themselves.

Indeed prescription of itself profits all; for it renders each more vigilant and more diligent; for not a few would indulge in negligence and laziness, and sometimes would leave lands uncultivated, unless by fear of prescription they were compelled to assert their dominion and vindicate it by exercising certain acts. - Therefore prescription greatly contributes both to private and to social good; therefore the State could assign obligatory force to it in the forum of conscience.

247. 2. Supreme authority wished this. This is established:

(A) From the end of the law: for the law tends to promote public peace and security;¹ but such an end cannot be attained unless prescription has force in conscience; otherwise pious and honorable persons would labor under anxieties, while others less honorable would use the benefit of the law without scruple; and thus the law would serve to ensnare consciences.

¹ That this was the intention of the legislator in composing the French Code is clear from the speeches given before the Legislative Assembly; cf. Code et Motifs, t. VII, p. 134 sq.

(B) From the words employed in the law and from the interpretation of jurists. For the words used in various Codes either suppose or even openly declare that dominion is truly transferred or acquired;² indeed in certain regions a distinction is made between prescription properly so called, which transfers rights, and prescription improperly so called, by which the time is limited within which rights can usefully be vindicated before judges,³ without however being lost in this case; from which it is deservedly inferred that by prescription properly so called dominion is truly transferred, even in the forum of conscience. - This is confirmed by the testimony of jurists, many of whom explicitly teach that prescription has force in conscience, provided good faith has endured for the whole time of possession.⁴

² For France this is established from these or similar words: "Prescription is a means of acquiring or of freeing oneself by a certain lapse of time ... One cannot renounce prescription in advance ... Prescription can be opposed at every stage of the case, even before the court of appeal..." (Civil Code, a. 2219-2224, in Supplement, p. 55*-56*).

³ Thus in England and the United States of America.

⁴ In Carriere, n. 420.

248. (C) To these arguments there is added the authority of canon law, insofar, namely, as it asserts or supposes that prescription has force in the forum of conscience: "The sanctions of the holy Fathers and human laws, establishing irrefragably, have confirmed, and we in the present council, with all who are with us, irrefragably confirm, that all possessions belonging to the individual provinces of our brothers, by whom they have been possessed for thirty years, shall be held quietly and sincerely, without synodal proclamation, perpetually, and no voice of being heard shall be conceded to any adversary."¹ Likewise the Fourth Lateran Council defines "that no prescription, canonical as well as civil, is valid without good faith, since generally every constitution and custom is to be derogated which cannot be observed without mortal sin";² from which it is inferred that even civil prescription with good faith is valid. - Now if Pontiffs and Councils held prescription introduced by Roman civil law as legitimate in the forum of conscience, the same reason holds concerning that which modern Codes establish, which have imitated the Roman law in this matter. - The Code sanctioned this doctrine, c. 1508.

¹ Decretal. Gregor. IX, l. II, t. 26 de Praescript., c. 3, p. 382-383, ed. Richter-Friedberg.

² In Denzing., n. 364.

So that acquisitive prescription may be valid, five conditions are desired, expressed in these verses:

You shall not acquire by usucapion, unless you have these five things:

Let the thing be apt, faith, title, possession, time.

249. 1. An apt thing, that is, one which by its nature is capable of private dominion, and at the same time is not excluded by positive law from the scope of prescription. Now (a) things deputed to public uses, such as public roads, squares, bridges, etc., cannot be prescribed by private persons, because from the fact that they are destined to public use, they cannot be acquired by private persons, as is established from the law in force among various Nations; nevertheless they could be prescribed by one community against another community.

(b) Sacred things which are in the dominion of private persons can be acquired by prescription by private persons, but not for profane uses; those which are not in the dominion of private persons can be prescribed not by a private person, but by an ecclesiastical moral person against another (Code, c. 1510).

(c) Likewise ecclesiastical law prohibits certain things from being prescribed, on account of the public good, e.g., the certain boundaries of a diocese or parish legitimately constituted.¹

¹ Others are enumerated in the Code, c. 1509, especially: those which are of divine right or can be obtained from apostolic privilege alone; spiritual rights, of which laymen are not capable, if there is question of laymen; alms and Mass obligations; an ecclesiastical benefice without title; the right of visitation and obedience; payment of the cathedraticum.

(d) Likewise civil laws often impede certain goods from falling under prescription; thus, e.g., the dotal goods of wives under the dotal regime, the goods of wards. On this matter civil Codes should be consulted.

250. 2. Possession, that is, occupation and detention of the thing, or exercise of the right. This indeed is so necessary that without possession prescription does not proceed.² But in order that it may be valid, it must be fortified with certain qualities; indeed it must be:

² Rule of law 3 in the Sext.

(A) With the intention of an owner, not however with the intention of a depositary or usufructuary, etc.; for there is question of dominion legitimately acquired; but he who knows the thing is not his, but deposited, or leased, etc., cannot legitimately acquire it. - Hence he who possesses a thing in his own name prescribes for himself; but he who possesses in another's name, as a tutor in the name of a ward, prescribes not for himself but for the ward; but he who detains a thing through another, e.g., a servant, a procurator, can acquire it for himself.

251. (B) Peaceful and continuous; for if it is violent, it is not possession, but invasion;³ nor does useful possession begin except when the violence ceases; - but if it is suspended or interrupted before the required time has already elapsed, one of the conditions required for prescription is lacking. Now there is this distinction between suspension and interruption: (a) the former indeed prevents prescription from running, on account of the prescription of the law, - when, e.g., there is question of the goods of minors or of wives; - but when the impediment has now ceased, the time preceding the suspension is joined with the time following. (b) The latter exists when one of the conditions necessary for prescription is lacking, - e.g., if good faith ceases, or the owner usefully opposes; - and so harms prescription that the time which had previously elapsed is held as nothing.

³ Ball. P. indeed says (n. 173) that this is not required by natural right, but is drawn from the French Code; but in this the French law is consonant with natural right, as there is no one who does not see. Cf. Supplement, p. 56*.

252. 3. The required time, which is determined not by natural law, but by positive law, canonical or civil.

(A) By canonical law, (a) the goods of the Roman Church, both precious movable goods and immovable goods, are not prescribed except by the space of one hundred years.¹

¹ Code, c. 1511, § 1.

(b) Immovable goods of other churches, monasteries, hospitals, and other religious places are prescribed by thirty years;² precious movable goods are to be equated with these. - Certain monasteries enjoy a special privilege; thus against monasteries of the Benedictines one cannot prescribe except by sixty years; against monasteries of the Cistercians and Mendicants except by one hundred years.

² Ibid., § 2.

(c) Movable goods of other churches are prescribed by thirty years. - Nevertheless St. Alphonsus probably holds (n. 510) that these goods are prescribed by three years, provided that title is present.

(B) By civil law, the time required is diverse for various Nations; hence we shall treat of this in the Supplement.³

³ For France, cf. Civil Code, a. 2260-2280; Planiol, n. 1402-1488; Supplement, p. 59*.

253. 4. Good faith, which can be twofold: theological and juridical.

(A) Theological good faith is a prudent judgment by which the possessor believes that the thing is his own, or at least is possessed justly by him.

(a) Now prudent judgment is lacking when it does not rest on a grave foundation, e.g., when someone has gravely neglected to investigate the thing diligently. But invincible ignorance, whether of fact or of law, does not harm good faith.

Good faith is also lacking as soon as the possessor notices that he possesses another's thing; or also, if, seriously doubting concerning his own right, he nevertheless invades a thing possessed by another. But if doubt supervenes upon possession already begun in good faith, and, after the matter has been diligently investigated, remains, he can retain the thing, according to that saying: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; for although he is not morally certain that the thing is his, nevertheless he possesses it legitimately.

254. Here, however, the question arises whether a possessor in good faith legitimately prescribes, who succeeds a predecessor in bad faith. A distinction must be made: if he immediately succeeds a predecessor whose bad faith is certainly established, as a universal heir or by universal title (below, n. 702), he does not legitimately prescribe: for since he juridically represents the person of the deceased, he takes upon himself his obligations, and therefore is bound to restore to the owner that which the predecessor possessed in bad faith. Nevertheless if he knows the bad faith of the predecessor only after the time required for thirty-year prescription has elapsed, he licitly retains the thing, provided that the title of the predecessor was not defective or not properly translative of property. - But a mediate heir, probably at least, and all the more a particular successor, legitimately prescribe, because juridically they do not put on the person of the predecessor, and therefore they can continue prescription begun in good faith.

255. (b) That theological good faith is necessary during the whole time of prescription, so that this may have force in conscience, is certainly established: - 1) by authority; since Alexander III says:¹ "It must be guarded with vigilant care ... lest we be possessors in bad faith in the estates of others ... because no ancient possession of days by divine right helps any possessor in bad faith, unless he repents after he has known that he possesses another's things, since by right he cannot even be called a possessor in good faith." The Code teaches the same thing more openly, can. 1512: "No prescription is valid, unless it rests on good faith, not only at the beginning of possession, but during the whole time of possession required for prescription."

¹ Ibid., c. 5, p. 383, ed. cited.

2. By reason; for as soon as someone is conscious that the thing possessed by him is another's and is not possessed justly, before the time required for prescription has elapsed, he is bound to restore it morally as soon as possible to the owner; otherwise he becomes an unjust detainer of another's thing and injures justice; for the thing cries out to its owner. - Therefore if certain civil laws in certain cases do not require good faith, they do not wish to touch the forum of conscience in this respect;¹ or, if they wished to, they lack force, as being opposed to natural and divine right; for natural right demands that fraud and bad faith patronize no one; otherwise thieves would be incited to invade the things of others, and the whole social order would be disturbed.

¹ This is established for the French Civil Code from the declarations of those who proposed the law; thus Bigot-Preameneu, Expose des motifs, after vindicating the utility and necessity of prescription, adds: "But this sacrifice, required for the public good, only renders more culpable in the internal forum him who, having usurped, or him who, being certain that his engagement has not been fulfilled, abuses legal prescription. The cry of his conscience is the only recourse which the law can leave to the owner or creditor who has allowed prescription to run against him."

256. (B) Juridical good faith is that which civil laws require; and since prescription obtains its force not only from natural right, but also from civil law, juridical good faith is required for prescribing validly and licitly whenever it is demanded by a just law.

By French law, good faith consists in this: that the possessor thinks that he from whom he received the thing, by force of a title translative of property, truly is the owner of this thing. This is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, and it suffices that it exist from the beginning of possession.² It is not required in prescription of thirty years, but in prescription of ten or twenty years or a shorter one.³

² Planiol, n. 1431-1434; Civil Code, art. 550 and 2269; Supplement, 59*.

³ Civil Code, art. 2262, 2265, 2266, 2275; Planiol, n. 1431-1434; Supplement, 59*.

257. 5. Title, that is, the cause, or reason on account of which the possessor thinks the thing is his own; e.g., purchase, donation are titles from which the buyer or donee judge themselves to be owners of the thing bought or donated.

(A) Title is true when it validly transfers dominion; apparent, when, on account of some defect, it does not transfer dominion, but is judged to transfer it; defective, when by its nature it is not translative of property, e.g., leasing, deposit.

(B) That true title is not required here is clear from the fact that otherwise prescription would avail nothing. - Defective title certainly harms prescription, since from it it is established that the possessor is not the owner.⁴

⁴ Hence the axiom: "It is better not to have title than to have a defective one"; for sometimes without title someone can prescribe, but by no means with a defective title.

(C) Apparent title can be: (a) colored, when it has the appearance of a true title, even if, on account of a hidden defect, it is invalid; e.g., the purchase of a stolen thing; (b) putative, or supposed, when someone prudently believes himself to be the owner, although in reality he is not the owner; thus one who possesses something by force of a testament revoked by another; (c) presumed, which in reality does not exist, but, on account of long possession, is supposed by law to exist.

258. These things being posited, by natural right a colored or putative title suffices for prescription, because good faith can exist with each; indeed, with positive right at least added, a presumed title suffices for prescription of the longest time, because lengthy possession is deservedly presumed not to be without title; unless, however, the adversary can prove that in the case a title was never present: for presumption yields to truth.

But civil law concerning title is not the same among various Nations.¹

¹ French Civil Code, a. 2236-2241; 2262, 2263, 2265, 2267, 2279; Planiol, n. 1422-1430; Supplement, p. 57* sq.

259. Notion. 1. From the disposition of civil law, which however is diverse with regard to various Nations,² a debtor can be freed from his obligations through a certain lapse of time. For this there is not required possession properly so called, which in a matter of this kind becomes impossible, but the non-exercise of the creditor's right suffices. Nor is title required, but rather the creditor's counter-title is possessed. Good faith likewise is not required by civil law except negatively, insofar as an oath can be deferred to the debtor concerning payment made or not. It is necessary, however, that the obligation be prescriptible, that is, capable of extinction; hence one cannot prescribe against an obligation of natural or divine right.

² For France, Civil Code, a. 2262, 2271-2280. - We declare the sense of art. 2279: "In the matter of movables, possession is equivalent to title," in the Supplement, p. 61*.

With regard to the time required, prescription is of the longest or long time, when it is completed by thirty or ten years; of short time, when five or six years are required; of shortest time, when three or fewer years suffice.

260. 2. Its force in conscience. (A) Prescription of the longest or long time has force also in the forum of conscience. For here the arguments set forth above (n. 253) recur. For the legislator could and wished to assign this force to that prescription on account of the public good. The principal motives which demand this are reduced to these three: (a) after a long time, it is deservedly presumed that the debt has been paid: for creditors are not accustomed to wait so long; (b) it would be a grave burden for debtors to preserve proofs of payment beyond ten years, and to hand over a great sum of money which they thought had already been paid; (c) it is expedient that the carelessness and negligence of creditors be punished, so that they may be rendered more vigilant.

261. (B) Prescription of the shortest time does not have force in conscience, because the laws declare this explicitly or implicitly; for they do not deny action to the creditor except insofar as it is presumed that payment has already been made; hence, if by oath¹ or in another way it is proved that this was not made, the debtor is compelled to pay the debts.

¹ "Nevertheless, those against whom these prescriptions are opposed can defer the oath to those who oppose them, on the question of knowing whether the thing has really been paid." (French Civil Code, a. 2275.)

262. (C) Concerning prescription of short time there is controversy. In our judgment, the matter depends on the mind of the legislator; for he could indeed assign this force to prescription of five or six years, on account of the motives mentioned above (n. 268); whether he wished this or not depends on the very tenor of the law.

Now in France the legislator has set forth his mind sufficiently clearly from the fact that he admitted no proof in favor of the creditor, while on the contrary he permitted the oath to be deferred to the debtor in the case of prescription of the shortest time; for from this it is very probably inferred that he wished prescription of short time to have force in conscience. Hence in practice he who in good faith used this privilege of the law is not to be compelled to restitution.

263. 3. On the good faith required in this prescription. (A) Generally theological good faith is required in order to free oneself in conscience; for if someone is conscious that the debt has not been paid, by that very fact he acknowledges that the thing which he possesses is another's, and that he must restore it morally as soon as possible: otherwise he becomes an unjust detainer of another's thing.

(B) Nevertheless there are certain exceptions, which are easily understood from the very nature of the matter: (a) when someone prescribes against a servitude, he is not bound to warn another concerning the right of servitude which will soon be extinguished; but, although he is conscious of another's right, he can wait until that right is extinguished.

(b) Likewise if something is owed from a penal sentence, on account of a merely juridical fault, the debtor strictly speaking can wait until the fine or compensation is demanded by the other.

But in these or similar cases, properly speaking, good faith is not lacking; but he who is conscious of a debt, or of another's right, bears himself passively.

And let these things suffice concerning the modes of acquiring dominion and the existence of right.