Acting with a doubtful conscience

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.

The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. The species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.

As long as the conscience is in a state of practical doubt, one may abstain from action altogether, or do what in any case would be licit. There is no danger of sin if, while doubting whether it is allowed to eat meat, one abstains from food altogether, or eats only what is allowed on days of abstinence. The axiom—In dubio pars tutior est sequenda—is to be taken in this sense. An effort may also be made to resolve the doubt by making inquiries of those who know, by consulting authorities, or by making use of certain principles of conduct which are approved by law and right reason. In this manner a certain conscience may frequently be formed.

142. The directive force of a doubtful conscience is clear from the following propositions. - With a practically doubtful conscience, whether an action is licit or illicit, it is illicit to act. - For only a certain conscience is the rule of morals. Cf. n. 13 seqq. Hence that saying: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. The safer, namely that which stands for the observance of the law. C. Inquisitioni 44, de Sent. exc.; L. l. 1, n. 22; St. Thomas, Quodl. 8, a. 13; Suarez tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5.

Whether the action is licit or illicit. And thus in doubt whether you ought to kill someone wounded in war, lest the pains of his wounds be prolonged, a person sins whether he kills or does not kill. Likewise in doubt whether an action is prohibited under grave sin or only under light sin, if someone nevertheless acts with this doubt, he sins gravely. On the contrary, in doubt whether today is a day of abstinence of stricter law, a person does not sin if he abstains from meats and milk foods, although the day is one of no abstinence.

143. With a speculatively doubtful conscience it is lawful to act, provided that a practically certain conscience can be formed. - For as is clear from what has been said, n. 13 seqq., a certain conscience, however finally it has been formed, if at least it rests upon moral certainty, is a sufficient rule of morals, indeed the only rule of morals. - It is lawful to act: where, namely, there is question of the licit or illicit alone. For where there is question of the truth of a thing and of an effect necessarily to be obtained, if it is illicit to act with probability, it is consequently illicit to act with doubt. Cf. n. 47 seqq.; L. l. 1, n. 25; Suarez d. 12, s. 5.

157. Therefore it is false that where there is speech generally of speculative doubt concerning the liceity or illiceity of an action, in doubts the safer part is to be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law there is not question of speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose the part altogether safe; but there is question either of practical doubt, namely of a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not lawful to act, or there is also question of those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But primarily there is question of the external forum, in which there is often a special reason for following the safer in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or there is question of honesty and of greater merit, not of the necessity of salvation. L. l. 1, n. 68, 79; H. A. tr. 1, n. 39; Struggl tr. 1, q. 5, n. 17.

330. Principle. It is never licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience (at least if positive doubt remains).

Thus almost all Catholic theologians,⁷⁴ and this is deduced as a corollary from the principle of the preceding article. For since certitude (broad) is required for acting licitly, it is not licit to act with positive doubt, because otherwise man would voluntarily expose himself to the proximate danger of formally sinning.⁷⁵ But the sin which one acting with positive practical doubt commits is of the same species and gravity as the same sin committed with certain conscience. Hence, for example, he who positively doubts whether the act here and now to be posited is a grave sin, and, notwithstanding such doubt, posits the act, truly sins gravely; he who positively doubts whether today the precept of abstinence obliges and nevertheless eats meat sins against the law of abstinence, even if perhaps in reality today is not a day of abstinence. - But I said: it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience; for speculative doubt in the sense set forth above does not render an action illicit, provided that before action it is changed into broad certitude in the way which will be stated below. - Finally I said: positive doubt remaining; for negative doubt does not harm the morality of the action. Hence such doubts are to be despised, because otherwise life would become intolerable, since in our acts there almost never exists such moral certitude against which even light reasons of doubting do not fight.

⁷⁴ Even the pagans themselves taught thus, for example, Cicero, saying: "They rightly command who forbid doing anything concerning which they doubt whether it is equitable or inequitable" (De offic. 1, 9). Pliny warns: "What you doubt, do not do" (Ep. 1, 18).

⁷⁵ St. Thomas, Quodlib. VIII, a. 13.

331. If it is never licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, it follows manifestly that a man existing in such a state ought either to lay aside the doubt or to desist from the action. But there exists a twofold way of laying aside such doubt: one direct, the other indirect. Doubt is laid aside directly if, either through consultation of a wise man or of an approved book, or through one's own investigation into the truth of the matter, the mind finally assents to one or the other part with moral certitude. Hence if the confessor cannot solve some difficult case with certitude, he is bound, if time permits, to consult books or even learned theologians (with the sacramental seal nevertheless preserved). But if such a direct way is not possible, then the doubt must be laid aside indirectly through the so-called indirect principles, concerning which we shall immediately discuss. But if moral certitude cannot be had even in this way, and if the action also cannot be deferred, then the safer part is to be chosen. But the safer part is that which includes observance of the law and excludes the danger of sinning.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ The worn rule: "in doubts the safer part is to be chosen," must be rightly understood. The safer part is sometimes understood as the more perfect part; thus, for example, in the religious life a man works out his salvation more safely than in the secular life. It is not required that the safer, i.e., the more perfect, part always be chosen. This is clear per se. - Sometimes to the safer part there is opposed a part that is not safe but sinful. Thus, for example, it is safer not to be in a proximate occasion of sinning than to be in it. The rule noted above holds in this sense, and indeed a) if there is question of any practical doubt, because it is never licit to act with practical doubt; b) if there is question of the doubtful validity of the sacraments or of a certain right of another or of things altogether necessary for salvation. Cf. below n. 333, where the reflex principle will be explained: "A doubtful law does not oblige."

332. Reflex principles. From the origin of Probabilism, direct principles are customarily distinguished, which immediately and per se produce either intrinsic evidence or at least evident credibility of some conclusion. Thus, for example, from the intrinsic and direct principle: "God, as supreme Lord, is to be worshiped," there follows immediately and per se: therefore any blasphemy is intrinsically evil. - Indirect or reflex principles are certain true and clear general norms which indeed do not directly and per se prove the matter whose truth is investigated, but nevertheless serve for driving away practical doubt and for obtaining moral certitude in a practical case. Therefore these principles as it were reflect their own light upon an obscure practical doubt and scatter its darkness for the moment of the action to be posited. If reflex principles are accepted in this sense, nothing prevents them, rightly understood and rightly applied, from being admitted.⁷⁷ For then they are very consonant with reason and similar to those 88 Rules of Law which were already in use under Boniface VIII. The more principal reflex principles are the following:

1. A doubtful law does not oblige.

2. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands.

3. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better.

4. A delict is not presumed, but must be proved.

5. In doubt favor is to be shown to the accused.

6. In doubt the presumption stands for the superior.

7. In doubt judgment is to be made from things ordinarily occurring.

8. In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act.

9. In doubt favors are to be enlarged and unfavorable things restricted.

10. In doubts, what is least is to be held.

Especially concerning the three prior principles, obscurities and falsities turn; hence it is helpful to explain them in a few words.

⁷⁷ St. Alphonsus deservedly says (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64): "It is certain and commonly explored among all doctors that moral certitude of some opinion, if it is not proved from some certain direct principle, is nevertheless proved from another reflex principle likewise certain."

333. 1. A doubtful law does not oblige. From the rise of Probabilism this principle caused very sharp controversies. Some, namely the more rigid Probabiliorists (Concina,⁷⁸ Patuzzi, etc.), reject it altogether, teaching that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. Others, namely the laxer Probabilists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini, Moya, etc.), on the contrary proclaim this principle as the philosopher's stone and apply it without any exception, whether there is question of the validity of the act or of its licitness, whether of strict doubt or broad doubt. But since the Holy See condemned this exaggerated application of the principle in some matters, hence moderate Probabilists indeed admit the principle, but do not extend it to the four following cases:

a) If there is question of the validity of the sacraments. For from the virtue of religion and charity, indeed sometimes also from the virtue of justice, the minister ought to administer the sacraments validly, because otherwise great irreverence is caused to God and great harm to the man receiving. Hence, unless grave necessity urges or unless the Church supplies the defect, it is a grave sin to administer a doubtfully valid sacrament. For this reason Innocent XI also proscribed proposition (1): "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer one having been abandoned, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids this. Hence an opinion only probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, priestly order, or episcopal order."⁷⁹

b) If there is question of things necessary for salvation, for example, of truths to be believed by necessity of means, of baptism to be received when someone doubts whether he was validly baptized, of the proximate danger of sinning, etc. For eternal salvation must be obtained and eternal damnation necessarily avoided; hence if there is question of danger to eternal life, the safer part must be chosen. Right love of self manifestly demands this. Even the "prince of the laxists" himself, Caramuel, teaches this.⁸⁰ Hence likewise proposition (4) was condemned by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."⁸¹

c) If there is question of a certain right of a third person. Hence in a civil case the judge is bound to render judgment according to the more probable opinion. The reason is that the judge is obliged from justice to settle the litigation according to objective truth without any acceptance of persons. But there would be manifest acceptance of persons if the judge, abandoning the certainly more probable opinion, judged according to the less probable opinion.⁸²

But if the case of each litigant is equally probable, the judge is bound either to divide the controverted matter between them or to persuade them to an amicable settlement. Hence it is easily understood why the following propositions were condemned: "I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."⁸³ "When litigants have opinions equally probable for themselves, the judge can receive money for rendering a sentence in favor of one rather than the other."⁸⁴ - When one part of the litigants already possesses the thing in good faith, then the adage must be applied: "The condition of the possessor is better." And so the thing is not to be adjudged away from the possessor unless the other party proves his right. - In a criminal case favor is to be shown to the accused as long as his crime has not been proved. Hence Rule of Law 11 in VI: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, favor is to be shown to the accused rather than to the plaintiff," and the Code of Canon Law, c. 1748, § 2, establishes: "If the plaintiff does not prove, the defendant is absolved."

d) If there is question of grave danger of spiritual or temporal harm (whether one's own or another's), which we ought to prevent from charity or from justice. Therefore a physician is bound to employ more certain and safer remedies (when they can be had) and sins if without urgent necessity he employs doubtful remedies, so that the life of the sick person is endangered. Likewise it is illicit to take a drink that is doubtfully gravely poisonous.

These four exceptions, which, even the Probabilists themselves admitting it,⁸⁵ must be added to the famous principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," show enough and more than enough that it is not so precious a philosopher's stone as certain Probabilists advertise it. But if that principle is understood with the clauses added, and if there is question of a true and serious doubt concerning the existence of a law, nothing prevents it from being applied to eliminate practical doubt.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 3.

⁷⁹ Denz. n. 1151. John Lugo taught a similar proposition, De sacr. in genere, disput. VIII, n. 139 and 141.

⁸⁰ Theol. fund. n. 533.

⁸¹ Denz. n. 1154.

⁸² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 63, a. 4.

⁸³ Innocent XI (Denz. n. 1152).

⁸⁴ Alexander VII (Denz. n. 1126).

⁸⁵ Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De consc. n. 236. The author nevertheless thinks that those four cases are not exceptions from the principle of probabilism. It is a quarrel about words.

⁸⁶ So also St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64). The difficulty nevertheless remains, when the law is truly doubtful.

334. 2. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands. This principle was already in use among the old Canonists⁸⁷ and Moralists and is the foundation of many others. Presumption is not unfittingly defined: an anticipated proof of a doubtful matter, drawn from valid arguments and indications. It is said: anticipated proof, because presumption before proper proof admits something as true until the contrary is clearly proved. The matter becomes clearer by examples: Someone comes under suspicion of a certain crime. But since up to now he has been a pious and just man, he is presumed innocent until the contrary has been proved. And therefore the principle related above in the fourth place establishes: "A delict is not presumed, but must be proved," or also: "Anyone is presumed good unless he is proved evil." - Another example: A subject doubts concerning the obligation and rightness of some command made by a superior. Nevertheless he ought to obey, because in doubts the presumption stands for the superior, whose authority is not weakened by the doubt of the subject. - A third example: Someone is accused of a certain crime, whose existence nevertheless cannot be clearly proved. In this case the presumption stands for the accused, and therefore he ought to be freed according to the reflex principle related above: "In doubt favor is to be shown to the accused." Nevertheless, if the indications of the guilt of the accused are so strong that they generate moral certitude concerning the crime committed, the penalty can be inflicted. - A fourth example: Some religious made profession, but afterward doubts whether he had sufficient intention and knowledge of the obligations which arise from profession. The profession is nevertheless valid according to the adage: "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act." But the reason is that the presumption stands for the validity of the profession.

⁸⁷ Cf. tit. 23 de praesumptionibus l. 2 Decretal.

335. 3. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. This principle is the foundation of Equiprobabilism, and is briefly called the "principle of possession." With respect to the matter of commutative justice, this principle is most true and was already pronounced by Alexander III, who, having been asked whether some church is bound to hand over tithes which are claimed by another church, responded that it is not bound, "because by divine and human right the condition of the possessor is better."⁸⁸ Benedict XIV calls the same principle a "worn adage."⁸⁹ But Billuart⁹⁰ assigns the following reasons why that principle is best in the matter of justice: "1. because, since men on the one hand, eager for things, are not accustomed to leave their own [things] with others, and on the other hand an upright man is not accustomed to acquire possession of some thing without a title, hence in doubt possession brings in a presumption: that he who possesses the thing is the owner of the thing; 2. because, since goods of fortune are subject to human power, legislators have established, in order to the common good, that in doubt the possessor can retain as his own the goods which he possesses, lest the ownerships of things remain uncertain and litigations be interminable." - But deservedly the principle of possession is extended by analogy also to other matters besides justice,⁹¹ because Alexander III cited above attributed value to it in divine and human right. Hence St. Alphonsus continually applies it for discerning whether some law obliges or not. For law and human liberty can be considered as two possessors. Law possesses the force of obliging, and human liberty possesses the faculty of acting freely (with the order of the end nevertheless preserved). Hence according to this principle of possession, he who doubts whether he committed a grave sin, or whether a sin certainly committed is mortal, is not bound, strictly speaking, to declare acts of this kind in confession. For liberty possesses, as they say; for man is free from the obligation of confessing as long as he is not certainly guilty of mortal sin. - On the contrary, he who, certain of a mortal sin committed, seriously doubts whether he confessed it, is bound to confess it again. The reason is that the law possesses; for the law of confessing mortal sins certainly exists, and it is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Considered at first glance, this principle of possession seems to be very clear, but outside the matter of justice it suffers rather great difficulties, because often it is not established what possesses, namely whether liberty or law. But if it remains obscure whether law or liberty possesses, then let humanity and facility prevail, as St. Gregory Nazianzen says.⁹²

⁸⁸ It is found in c. 6, X 2, 26. Cf. also Rule of Law 65: "In an equal delict or case the condition of the possessor is stronger."

⁸⁹ Const. "Postremo mense" § 33, d. 28 Febr. 1747.

⁹⁰ De consc. diss. 6, a. 2, obj. 3.

⁹¹ That this principle does not hold except in the matter of justice is taught commonly by Probabiliorists, for example, Billuart (l. c.); besides Azor, Vasquez, Salas, etc. On the contrary all Probabilists and Equiprobabilists extend it also to other matters, for example, Suarez, Lugo, Sanchez, Sporer, etc.; to whom modern authors commonly accede; cf. St. Alphonsus l. c. l. 1, n. 26.

⁹² Orat. 39 in sancta lumina n. 19 (Migne, Patr. graec. 37, 358). See the sharp refutation of this principle applied in favor of probabilism in Concina, De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 2. Cf. also Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 302.

336. Scholion. On the reduction of reflex principles to one. To one diligently considering the diverse reflex principles, it appears that in reality there is only one reflex principle, to which all the others are easily reduced, namely: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands." For, to pass over the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," which is altogether rejected by many, and which today is accepted by no one except with the limiting clauses brought forward above, all the other principles are nothing but corollaries deduced from the principle of presumption. For why in doubt is the condition of the possessor better? Because the presumption stands for the possessor. - Why in doubt must one stand for the validity of the act? - Because the presumption stands that an act once placed was placed rightly. - Why is a delict not presumed, but must be proved? - Because the presumption stands for the accused, since no one ought to be held evil unless it has been clearly proved. And so on. - Hence it is better and simpler if this principle alone of presumption is applied for obtaining the moral certitude necessary in any particular act. For this principle is admitted by all; it is easily understood even by the uneducated; it is applied in the forum both civil and ecclesiastical; before the controversies about Probabilism arose it was applied by the Scholastics; and finally, with it rightly applied, it is right to hope that the difficulties, and especially the interminable and in practice altogether useless altercations among the diverse moral systems, will gradually cease.

89. Thesis I. In all practically practical doubts the principle must always be applied: In doubts one must act more safely.

Namely, it is to be applied a) if the one doubting does not wish to inquire into the truth; or b) if the means of arriving at certitude is lacking, for example if there is no time for examining or approaching a learned man, or if the indirect principle is not known, etc.

It is proved: In these cases and doubts the formation of a certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action is impossible, and therefore man is held to do the safer thing, i.e., to abstain from the action about whose honesty he doubts, and if he must altogether act, he is held to choose what removes more the danger of sinning; - for otherwise he would voluntarily cast himself into the proximate danger of sinning, and would will to place the action whether it is honest or is not, which is sinful (n. 78).

Therefore, in the case of practically practical doubt or doubtful conscience, the principle is valid: In doubts - in which we cannot arrive at certain conscience - the safer way must be chosen.

90. Thesis II. Even in certain speculatively practical doubts of fact, sometimes one must act more safely, as often as there is a certain and absolute obligation of obtaining a determinate end or effect, and there is doubt not only about the honesty, but also about the value and conditions of the act, or about the necessity of a means so required for the end that without it perhaps the end would not otherwise be obtained. Whence: In doubts about the validity of an act to be placed, one must act more safely, or by that whereby, with perfect security, the end to be obtained is attained.

Thus as often as a good effect (for example, salvation, health, a sacrament) is absolutely to be obtained, or an evil one (damnation, death, unjust harm) is absolutely to be avoided, and there is doubt not only about the honesty, but also about the necessity or efficacy of the fact or means required for this, or about the value of the act which one is altogether bound to procure, or about one's own or another's harm which one is altogether bound to impede. In other words, as often as a determinate effect is to be obtained or avoided, which the use of a means doubtfully or probably inept would bring into danger, so that the effect could fail to be obtained or avoided.

It is proved: 1) He who is absolutely and certainly held to obtain a good end is also held to the means by which the end is certainly (or more certainly) obtained, and he who must absolutely beware of evil must also beware of an action by which the danger of evil is brought in. But by the safer part alone the end can be certainly (or more certainly) obtained: for, from the hypothesis, a means doubtfully or only probably apt brings into peril the end which someone is held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is illicit to use a means doubtfully or only probably apt; rather, fitter means, and the same safer ones, are to be chosen.

2. The foundation is that, if the honesty of an action depends upon reason and conscience, not so its value and efficacy or the aversion of harm; for our judgment, doubt, persuasion, or system, is not able to change the nature of things and consequently to render a null act valid, or to bring it about that what is required for the validity of an act is not required, or to cause the due effect to arise from some action, or to prevent harm from following from it. Thus doubt or an opinion, however probable, cannot effect that what is not a sacrament should be a sacrament, or that what is rather poison should be medicine; it cannot remove the danger of not obtaining the intended end or of incurring harm which someone fears. Therefore to expose oneself to such danger, by following a doubtful or probable sentence, is not licit.

"We say," says St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 42, "that it is never licit to use a probable opinion with probability of fact, with danger of harm to another or to oneself, because probability of this kind by no means takes away the danger of harm: for if that opinion is false, the harm of the neighbor or of the one acting will not be avoided; for if, for example, Baptism conferred with saliva is really null, so that the infant remains without Baptism, probability in the opposite direction cannot effect that it be valid."

3. For in these cases there is no practical doubt or probability present for the licitness of the less safe part, and therefore the formation of a certain conscience concerning the honesty of an action doubtfully valid or harmful is impossible, because the reflex judgment of conscience (or system) is incapable of taking away positive doubt concerning the value and efficacy of the means and of removing the danger. And therefore there is a certain obligation of placing the action which will certainly obtain the effect, and of abstaining from the action which perhaps inflicts harm; - and if that certitude cannot be had concerning the obtaining of the effect, there is a certain obligation of employing at least fitter and safer means for pursuing the end or averting harm. Otherwise the one acting would voluntarily expose himself to the danger of not attaining the said end and of inflicting harm, while nevertheless, as much as he can, he ought to obtain the end or avert the evil.

This obligation is certain, not indeed directly by force of the particular law which is doubtful, but indirectly

a) by force of a certain higher law (of charity, religion, justice) which imposes this end as to be absolutely obtained;

b) or by force of a special obligation arisen either from a vow, for example if someone has obligated himself to doing the safer thing, or from positive law, for example a priest doubting whether he was the efficacious cause of a homicide cannot exercise sacred order.

Thus, after the propositions of the laxer probabilists were condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI, all now teach.

91. The higher law which imposes the safer part is:

A. First, the law of charity, which sometimes obliges absolutely to procuring certainly one's own or another's good, or to avoiding certainly spiritual or temporal harm; and then it is certain that we cannot choose the less safe part (even if it is more probable), but we are bound to choose the more secure and safer part, for example in the matter of faith and in things necessary for salvation, according to the axiom: No security is excessive where eternity is imperiled.

Hence we are held a) to inquire concerning the true religion and faith until we arrive at certitude, and we are not excused by a less probable opinion (prop. 4 condemned by Innocent XI),2 nor is faith in only probable knowledge (prop. 21);3 - b) explicitly to believe and to teach others the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, although perhaps they are not necessary to be believed by necessity of means (prop. 64);4 - c) again to receive or confer (under condition) Baptism or another necessary sacrament, although perhaps it has already been administered; - d) to impose the safer opinion and not to teach the less safe, if, with attention to the common or special fragility of the one acting, it is certainly joined with the proximate danger of sinning formally, as can easily happen in the matter of lust and vengeance.

B. Similarly, the law of religion obliges absolutely to reverence toward sacred things, especially the sacraments, and therefore the minister or recipient cannot expose the sacrament to danger of nullity; whence it is certain that he cannot choose the less safe part when there is question of the value of a sacrament (even if it is more probable), but he is held to make or receive a certainly valid sacrament (Innocent XI, prop. 2),5 or to abstain from it, for example if the matter or form is doubtful, or a condition for valid reception is doubtful; similarly, if the ordination of a priest is doubtful, he cannot celebrate.

An exception is made a) if there is a case of grave necessity and a certainly valid sacrament cannot be had: then let it be administered under condition, because then the law of charity prevails, which urges more than religion; - b) if the doubt does not render the sacrament doubtfully valid, because the Church supplies the defect, namely: if a priest absolves with probable jurisdiction, if persons enter marriage with a probable impediment of ecclesiastical law, if a priest has probable delegation for assisting at marriage. But the Church cannot supply those things which are of natural or divine law.

C. Likewise the law of justice. And indeed:

1. Commutative justice obliges absolutely and strictly

a) to wholly guarding against certainly unjust harm1 to the neighbor.

Whence someone is certainly held to abstain from an action which can be harmful for a third party and violative of a certain right, although perhaps it does not inflict harm, for example from the divulging of a secret or crime even if it is probably already public.

b) to procuring the good from office or contract.

Thus a physician is held to employ safer remedies of health, a pastor to indicate the more salutary way, an advocate to bring better arguments, a notary better counsels, a priest from a stipend to apply a certainly valid Mass.

2. Distributive justice absolutely obliges the judge

a) in civil causes, as to the fact applying the law, to await the proof of the plaintiff, according to the axiom: proof lies upon the plaintiff, and consequently to leave the possessed thing to the possessor in good faith, unless it is established that he possesses unjustly.

For the common good requires that dominions be stable and secure, and that lawsuits not be multiplied; and therefore possession is judged a certain title, and the condition of the possessor is better until the contrary is proved.

b) as to law, where there are diverse interpretations of law, for example for a thing not yet possessed, he is held to render sentence in favor of him for whom the stronger reason stands, because he ought to distribute right according to the weights of the cause (Innocent XI, prop. 2 condemned2).

And if the reason on each side is equal, let him counsel an amicable settlement or propose division of the thing in controversy (prop. 26 condemned by Alexander VII1), unless however positive law commands him to render sentence, in which case he will strive to form his own opinion.

c) but in criminal causes he is held not to condemn anyone unless he is certainly guilty.

For man possesses life, liberty, just reputation, etc., from which he is not to be deprived unless he is certainly guilty: for by the absolution of a guilty man the republic is injured less than by the condemnation of an innocent man. Hence the axiom: In doubt one must favor the accused.

3. Legal justice, by reason of the common good and of order to be preserved and scandal to be avoided, certainly obliges a subject to obey a superior (even a judge) commanding a thing which perhaps is illicit, or useless for the common good, or exceeding the limits of his power.

For presumption stands for the superior, and right order forbids subjects to deny obedience unless it certainly appears that he has abused his power, both because, says Suarez, de Leg., book I, c. 9, n. 11, he has a higher right and possesses it, and also because he can have universal reasons hidden from subjects, and also because otherwise subjects would assume too great a license of not obeying laws, since they can scarcely be so just that they cannot be brought into doubt by some persons through apparent reasons.2

1. Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 42-52 and 31.

2. "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."

3. "The assent of supernatural faith useful for salvation stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken."

4. "A man is capable of absolution... even if... he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." Cf. Holy Office, 3 May 1703.

5. "It is not illicit in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the value of the sacrament, the safer one being left aside."

1. Unjust, that is, unless a proportionately grave reason excuses, namely, unless our utility or that of a third party prevails over the harm to be guarded against.

Certain conscience is that by which someone firmly and without fear of erring judges something to be good or bad.

Although certainty is distinguished in three ways among philosophers, that which is called moral is chiefly considered by moralists. This certainty, which rests upon the laws by which men are ruled in their acts, is subdivided into perfect and imperfect. The former is that which is so founded upon moral laws that the proposition is clearly perceived to be unable to be false. This is reduced indirectly to metaphysical certainty. The latter is that which belongs to those propositions in which it is not absolutely repugnant that there be error, although this can happen most rarely. This admits various degrees.

Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action; for doubt is the suspension of assent between opposites.

Multiple doubt is distinguished, namely: 1st, positive or negative; the first is had when the intellect suspends assent on account of grave reasons for doubting, or at least reasons apparently such; but the other when assent is suspended on account of a defect of motives; 2nd, of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or its obligation, or with some particular fact; 3rd, speculative or practical, according as it is concerned with the abstract cognition of truth and in common, or with truth which here and now is ordered to work.

Only certain conscience is the right rule of morals, and therefore it is never licit to operate with a practically doubtful conscience. The reason is both because, according to the Apostle, Rom. xiv, 23: "all that is not from faith is sin"; and because the agent with a conscience not certain voluntarily admits the danger of transgressing a precept, and therefore, by virtually consenting to its violation, formally sins. But morally certain conscience, even imperfect, suffices; because only that certainty is required which alone for the most part can be had; otherwise the rule of acting, to which man is proximately subject, would be very little accommodated to the human condition. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 41.

You Will Resolve. 1st. As often as someone doubts whether the act which he is about to place here and now is licit or not, he is bound to apply diligence congruent to the gravity of the matter and the condition of person and place for the inquiry of truth; let him consult upright and skilled men, investigate their practice, and weigh the reasons with the sole zeal for truth; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of violating the law from negligence in inquiry, and by that very fact sins.

2nd. If he cannot inquire, nor by himself is able to weigh the reasons of each side, nor in another way, for example through reflex principles, free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical doubt, that is, with a conscience truly doubtful and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3rd. He who, after diligent and sufficient inquiry has been completed, still doubts whether there is a law commanding or prohibiting, is not bound to obey this law, if nevertheless he can form for himself a conscience from a reflex principle, namely that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where probabilism is treated.

4th. Merely negative doubt is to be held as nothing, because it is founded upon no reason at all, or upon a very light one. Therefore, even if it remains, because it cannot bring it about that the opposite moral certainty is overthrown, nevertheless the obligation presses, or liberty stands, according as it existed before. But if a prudent suspicion of error, resting upon a grave motive, arises for you, the doubt ceases to be merely negative, and you are bound to inquire. And so, when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, you will easily dissolve them, this rule having once been established, and therefore we shall attend only to positive doubt. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

Question 1. Does he who operates with practical doubt concerning the gravity of sin sin gravely?

Response. Affirmatively. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to the common principles, sins in that species of sin, both moral and theological, concerning which practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he surely violates the grave obligation of taking care lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of the law which could be grave.

Question 2. What is to be done in the case of a perplexed conscience, namely when someone, placed between two precepts, remains doubtful which of the two he ought to follow?

Response. 1st. Consult, if you can, a confessor or other prudent men, because in that case ignorance is vincible. 2nd. If you cannot consult and there is a necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave harm, choose what seems to you the lesser evil, yet not so that you do evil, but so that you recede more from evil. Know, moreover, that the law of an inferior order ought to yield to the law of a superior order. 3rd. If each precept seems to you equally grave, choose anything, and you will not sin; for there is not given a necessity of sinning. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Note 1°. Doubt is distinguished threefold: speculative, speculative-practical and practically-practical. Merely speculative is that which turns upon the nature, substance, value, quality and condition of things, whether speculative or moral: as if you doubt whether the angelic nature is universal, whether baptism conferred in rose water is valid. Speculative-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act in itself and in common, which goodness or malice is called objective and material: as if you doubt whether it is licit to baptize in rose water, to journey on a feast day, etc. Practically-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act to be done here and now, with all the circumstances attended to, which is called formal goodness or malice: as if you doubt whether it is licit for you here and now to baptize in rose water a dying infant.

What I said of doubt must be said of judgment, namely that it is threefold: merely speculative, concerning the nature or quality of things; speculative-practical, concerning the objective goodness or malice of actions; and practically-practical, concerning the formal goodness or malice of actions.

That the doubt or judgment which we call speculative-practical may be such, it must regard action in itself indeed, but as to be exercised, or in order to practice, and to influence it, inasmuch as from it the doubt or judgment practically-practical is formed: otherwise it will be purely speculative. But in the doubt or judgment alone practically-practical is situated the doubtful or probable conscience.

Note 2° doubt is again distinguished into negative and positive. Negative is, when there are no reasons or only very light ones for or against; and, as I already noted, it is improperly called doubt, and better named nescience or ignorance. Whence they err who recognize this doubt alone as doubt properly so called. Positive doubt is, when because of contrary reasons, on either side equally or nearly equally probable, the mind fluctuates suspended between both parts, assenting to neither.

Note 3°. Certitude, which is opposed to doubt, can be distinguished threefold: metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical certitude is the adherence of the mind to truth which cannot be otherwise even by God, as: The whole is greater than its part; anything either is or is not. Physical certitude is the assent to truth which cannot be otherwise according to ordinary laws, although it could be otherwise through miracle, as a faggot thrown into fire to burn. Moral certitude is the assent to some truth founded and reasonable without fear of the opposite, although the opposite could absolutely and without miracle be, such as is that which is had in law through two witnesses worthy of faith, or that which is had about the baptism of anyone from the baptismal register; because, although it could happen that two witnesses held worthy of faith depose falsely, and that the pastor wrote falsely, yet that rarely happens, and it is a remote danger, which ought not prudently to be feared: otherwise there would be no end of doubts. These observations run through various parts of Theology; whence, set down once for all, they are to be firmly retained in memory.

I say: It is never licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable properly so called ¹] ¹ This is to be understood with the supposition that, the conscience not yet formed at least by reflex principles, the practically-practical doubt persists; for it is always true that it is not licit to act except with certitude. It is asked what is to be done in the case of the morally permanent conscience concerning the goodness of the act, and this certitude alone confers formal honesty upon the act, whatever be the goodness of this act objectively or materially taken.

instead of a probable or more probable practically-practical doubt or judgment concerning the formal goodness or malice of the action; but only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. It is certain and common, even among probabilists.

It is proved. 1° Conscience is the immediate rule of our actions. But a rule ought to be certain and infallible, at least morally: otherwise it would not be proposed as a rule, but would be regulable. Therefore.

2° He who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does not act prudently. Therefore he sins. — The antecedent is proved. That anyone may act prudently, he ought to have no reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act; for the act of prudence is always practically true and morally certain. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, or one only probable and more probable, concerning the formal honesty of his act, has a reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act, because those consciences do not go beyond the bounds of probability or opinion, whose account it is that it is with reasonable and founded fear of the opposite; and otherwise, if there were not reasonable and founded fear, it would already be moral certitude. — It is confirmed. He who takes a drink of which he doubts whether it is poisoned, or which he believes only probably and more probably not to be poisoned, while he has another not poisoned, acts imprudently. Therefore similarly.

3° He who does what he reasonably suspects offends God, by this very fact offends him, and contemns his friendship; just as he who would do what he reasonably suspects offends a friend, by this very fact would offend him and contemn his friendship. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does what he reasonably suspects offends God. Therefore.

[Perplexed, that is, when someone, placed between two precepts, one of which cannot be fulfilled without the other being omitted, remains in doubt which of the two he ought to prefer, and believes he will sin by omitting either one.

I answer. 1ª If the perplexed person can suspend the action, he is bound to defer it until he has consulted his confessor or another man expert and prudent, by whose judgment his conscience be formed.

2° If he cannot consult and there is present necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave damage, then he is bound to choose the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of the natural law than of the divine or human positive law; for the law of the lower order must always yield to the law of the higher order. It is supposed however that, in departing from the precept of lesser weight, he does not intend evil, but rather so acts as to avoid evil.

3° If both precepts seem equally grave to him, or he does not discern what the lesser evil is, let him choose whichever part, he will not sin, because in this case the liberty required for sinning formally is lacking, and from elsewhere necessity of sinning is never given. — So St. Alph., lib. I, tract. 1, n. 10, and Gury, n. 43.]

We resolved in the preceding dissertation, from the common opinion, that it is not licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable, but that only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. Now we ask whether upon an opinion or speculative-practical judgment, probable or more probable, concerning the objective and material honesty of an action, there can be founded mediately, namely through reflex principles intervening, a morally certain conscience concerning the formal and subjective honesty of the action; consequently whether it is licit

V. Question II. Is it a sin to act with a conscience in doubt about sin? Answer. All affirm that you sin. You doubt whether that contract be licit; and, the doubt remaining, you celebrate the contract: it is certain that in this case you sin. For so long as you do not lay aside the doubt about the justice or injustice of the contract, the intellect remains undecided; and if the will undertakes the work, it is so disposed that it wills to execute it, whether it be, or be not, against the Law of God. For he who acts while doubting exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning mortally, since the sin is as probable as the absence of sin.