§ 3. On the System of Probabilism.

233. Probabilism teaches: where there is question of the honesty alone of an action, it is lawful to follow an opinion truly and certainly probable, even if the opposite opinion for the law is more probable. This principle the more recent authors now commonly hold, such as Gury, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Sabetti, Bucceroni, Bouquillon, Delama, Rappenhoner, Gopfert, Van der Velden, Raphael a St. Joseph, Waffelaert, Haine, Genicot, Schindler, and others.

Where there is question of the licit or illicit alone. By these words the ambit of probabilism is determined.

1. There are actions or omissions in which there is question of their honesty or liceity alone, and there are actions or omissions in which there is question not only of their liceity, but besides this of an end or effect necessarily to be obtained through them, or of an evil necessarily to be avoided. Therefore doubts concerning actions to be placed or omitted are of two kinds: some regard actions in which there is question of the liceity of the action alone; others regard actions in which there is also question of an effect necessarily to be obtained through them, or of an evil necessarily to be avoided.

If it is doubtful whether that food is meat, and therefore whether on a prohibited day it is lawful to eat it, there is question of the liceity alone of this action. If it is doubtful whether this matter is water, and therefore whether it is lawful to baptize in it, there is question not only of the liceity of this action, but at the same time it is asked whether it can produce the effect which must necessarily be obtained through baptism, and whether through it the evil which must necessarily be avoided is guarded against, namely damage to the soul which arises from the frustration of the sacrament. If you do not know whether that which lies hidden in a thicket is a man or a beast, and therefore whether it is lawful to fire at it, there is question not of the liceity alone of this action, but at the same time it is asked whether through it the evil necessarily to be avoided, namely the killing of a man, is guarded against. In doubts of the latter kind, it is not so much asked whether the action is licit, but rather whether the action is a suitable means of obtaining a necessary effect, whether by its placing the evil necessarily to be avoided is sufficiently guarded against.

2. The principle of probabilism can be employed in doubts concerning actions of the first kind, but not in doubts concerning actions of the latter kind: for in the former the law or obligation is doubtful; but in the latter the law or obligation is not doubtful, but altogether certain, and therefore the action or omission is certainly illicit or certainly prescribed. Therefore only in those doubts in which there is question of the honesty of the action is it lawful to follow a probable opinion, because in these alone the law and obligation are doubtful. Since in other doubts the obligation is certain, they wander outside the ambit of probabilism, which by its own nature is concerned with doubtful laws. Therefore in all doubts in which there is question of an end necessarily to be obtained, the safer part is to be chosen, so that the necessary end may certainly be obtained.

Thus in the examples given, certainly it is not lawful to baptize so long as it is doubtful whether the matter is water, because baptism must be certainly valid; and certainly it is not lawful to fire so long as it is doubtful whether the shot falls upon a man, because it is not lawful to introduce the danger of killing. And certainly: he who is bound to the end is also bound to employ means through which the end is certainly obtained, and he who must absolutely guard against an evil must also guard against the action by which the danger of the evil is introduced.

234. When the safer part is to be chosen. In a twofold case one must act according to the principle: in doubt the safer part is to be chosen: a. in practical doubt, if someone cannot form for himself a certain conscience concerning an action to be placed here and now (n. 222, 3); b. in all those cases in which the law, beyond the honesty of the action, enjoins the obligation of obtaining some effect or avoiding some evil. But the cases in which there is question of an end absolutely to be obtained or of an evil necessarily to be avoided can be reduced to three heads:

a. Where there is question of a means necessary for salvation: for by the precept of charity eternal salvation must necessarily be obtained, eternal damnation necessarily avoided; therefore where there is question of a condition upon which eternal salvation depends, that condition must be employed in such a way that eternal salvation is not brought into danger.

b. Where there is question of the value of a sacrament: for from the virtue of religion and charity, and indeed also of justice, the minister must administer the sacraments validly, lest injury be inflicted on God or damage on man; therefore where there is question of a thing upon which the value of a sacrament depends, a certain means must be chosen, unless necessity is present, or unless the Church supplies the defect; concerning this twofold exception it will be said in the treatise on the sacraments.

c. Where there is question of the certain right of another: for from justice the right of one's neighbor must be preserved unharmed; therefore any action by which the certain right of one's neighbor is brought into danger must be omitted. Wherefore a physician is bound to employ safer and more certain means, so long as they can be had, both so that the effect necessarily to be obtained may be obtained and so that the evil necessarily to be avoided may be guarded against. The same must be said in similar cases, as concerning a hunter, to whom it is not lawful to fire where he judges only probably that a beast and not a man will be killed.

There are some who less aptly call these cases, in which the safer part must be chosen, exceptions from the principle of probabilism: for the principle does not suffer exceptions; and in reality they are not exceptions, since they do not pertain to the proper matter of probabilism, but are placed altogether outside its ambit. Certainly the principle of probabilism is referred to those cases in which a doubtful law occurs; but where there is question of an end necessarily to be obtained, the doubt is concerned with the efficacy of the means for obtaining the end, and in no way with obligation.

235. Declaration of the principle. 1. In order that someone may follow a probable opinion with a safe conscience, it is required: a. that it be truly and solidly probable, and indeed for the very one who follows it: for otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain for him; b. that the opinion be certainly probable: for doubtful probability is not true probability; besides, an opinion which is not certainly probable cannot serve for forming a practically certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action.

Therefore by the fact that the opinion must be truly probable, the use of an opinion tenuously probable is excluded; by the fact that it must be certainly probable, the use of an opinion doubtfully probable is excluded.

2. In order that some opinion can be called truly and solidly probable, these three things are required: a. that it rest upon a truly grave motive of reason or authority; b. that neither a definition of the Church nor certain reason is opposed to it; c. that it be relatively probable, i.e. that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposite sentence, retain their probability; but it is not required that the degree of probability of one be compared with the degree of probability of the other.

Whether an opinion probably probable must be held as truly and solidly probable depends upon the sense which is subjected to the term probably probable: for if an opinion is called probably probable which is affirmed on account of a reason truly grave and prudent, it is certainly truly and solidly probable; but if that opinion is called probably probable which is affirmed on account of a reason which is not certainly, but only doubtfully and probably, truly grave and prudent, it cannot be called truly (certainly) and solidly probable.¹

3. Even if the opposite is truly more probable: for the more probable opinion for the law can be neglected so long as it itself is within the bounds of true probability and is not morally certain.

a. I have thought one must abstain from the affirmation "even if the opposite is certainly more probable," because some authors equate an opinion certainly more probable with an opinion notably more probable, whose opposite is not truly and certainly probable, although the term certainly more probable by its force in no way signifies an opinion notably more probable. Wherefore to an opinion certainly more probable for the law, of itself there can be opposed an opinion truly and certainly probable for liberty. Indeed, from the rules of logic, of itself nothing prevents even an opinion much or notably more probable from being opposed on the other side by an opinion truly and certainly probable; nevertheless in moral matters it can scarcely happen that an opinion is known as truly and certainly probable whose opposite is certainly demonstrated to be much or notably more probable.

b. Against this affirmation the probabiliorists object: the greater probability of one opinion eliminates or destroys the lesser probability of the opposite; therefore the less probable in the concurrence of the more probable is not probable. - Greater probability eliminates the lesser can signify two things: either the greater force of arguments on one side by that very fact brings it about that the force of the arguments of the other part becomes lesser; or the greater force of arguments on one side altogether destroys the probability of the other part. Now if the probability of each opinion is taken from the same principle, the increase of one by that very fact depresses the probability of the other; but if the probability is taken from diverse principles, the greater probability of one does not by that very fact diminish the lesser of the other, but the latter retains its force, even if the opposite is greater, because it deduces its arguments from other principles, "just as," says St. Alphonsus, "a weight of ten pounds by no means brings it about that a weight of eight pounds placed in the other pan ceases to be, and to be truly called, heavy."² But indeed in either case, whether probability is taken from the same or from diverse principles, the greater probability destroys the opposite if its excess is so notable that it approaches closely to moral certitude: for then the opposite becomes doubtfully or tenuously probable.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I. n. 190.

² Scholastic-moral dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, from the year 1755. n. 13.

236. On external probability. There is no doubt that external probability can constitute an opinion truly and certainly probable: for if several authors, and those grave, say that an opinion is probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons. Therefore of itself it is lawful to follow external probability which truly militates for some opinion, even if its internal motives are not known.

a. Not only a sentence which is called probable by most theologians, but also a sentence which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, science, and prudence hold as true or probable must be judged truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason.

b. One author ordinarily does not suffice to constitute a sentence truly probable against the authority of others; therefore proposition 27 was condemned by Alexander VII.¹ Nevertheless it cannot be denied that it can happen that even one author renders an opinion truly probable: namely, if an author grave and of great name treats some question seriously and diligently ex professo, confirms his sentence by grave reasons which others have not brought forward, and sufficiently solves the contrary reasons of others, his authority suffices for procuring true probability for the sentence. Today this can be affirmed with the more confidence because the holy see expressly declared that a confessor who follows the doctrine of St. Alphonsus only on account of his authority is not to be disturbed, even if he has not weighed his reasons.

c. Since external probability is essentially founded upon internal probability, it is not lawful to appeal to external probability when the sentence is known to be false and therefore destitute of probable reason, even if authors of great name hold that sentence. External probability with precision from internal probability can be invoked only when there is question of an obscure matter entangled with difficulties which has not yet been sufficiently explained by authors.

d. Concerning internal probability, only learned men and those very versed in moral matters can judge; to these that is probable which, after all things have been diligently considered, appears to rest upon grave reasons. Concerning external probability, learned and unlearned can judge. To the latter that is probable, indeed practically certain, which is said to them by a learned and upright man (parish priest, confessor), if there is no serious reason for doubting his authority. But if there is reason for doubting, they are bound to inquire further. From these things it now follows: a. if a theologian furnished with sufficient doctrine diligently and without disordered affection considers a sentence and finds it resting upon a grave reason, he can follow it as probable for himself; b. an uneducated man can stand by the sentence of a confessor or parish priest whom he knows to be upright and prudent; c. a confessor or parish priest in practical questions can follow the authority of approved theologians, indeed even of one truly grave and approved doctor, especially St. Alphonsus.

¹ "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, provided it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic see as improbable." This proposition is false, because it affirms that for the probability of an opinion it suffices that it be called probable by a modern author and has not been rejected by the Church.

237. The principle is demonstrated. 1. From reason:

a. A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which true and solid probability is had is truly doubtful; therefore a law against which true probability is had does not oblige.

To the major. Only a known law can induce obligation: for law cannot oblige the will immediately and of itself, but in order that the will remain obligated, the law must be exhibited and applied to it through knowledge; therefore only a known law can oblige the will, which St. Thomas teaches in these words: no one is bound by some precept except through knowledge of that precept;¹ but so long as the intellect doubts concerning the existence of the law, it does not know the law: for only certain knowledge is true knowledge; he who doubts concerning some truth knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring into its existence, but he does not know the truth itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige the will.

To the minor. Certitude and an opposed probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore so long as the opinion for liberty is probable, the opinion for the law cannot be certain. But it makes no difference whether this opinion is less, equally, or more probable, provided the opinion for liberty is probable.

Others demonstrate the major proposition in this way: a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; for promulgation is necessary so that a law may obtain the force of obliging; but a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. But it is better to take the argument from knowledge of the law, so that it may be effective from every side.

b. An uncertain law cannot induce true obligation; but a law against which a truly and solidly probable opinion militates is truly uncertain; therefore a law against which a probable opinion militates cannot impose certain obligation.

To the major. The right of liberty, and indeed certain and innate liberty, precedes the right of law and its obligation. Certainly, if the rights of law and the rights of human liberty are compared with one another, it must be said that according to the order of nature the right of liberty precedes and the right of law and obligation follows, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason: for obligation supposes a free will which is bound; but a certain right cannot be restricted except by a certain obligation: for the effect cannot be greater than its cause; therefore an uncertain law cannot produce certain obligation.

a. This argument is taken from the relation which exists between liberty and law. As regards positive law, both divine and human, liberty is anterior to law in time, since those things which are prohibited by positive law are licit of themselves and become illicit only through a law enacted in time. But where there is question of the law of nature, which is eternal law, liberty is anterior to law by reason. And certainly by the very fact that man has been created by God, according to his whole essence he depends on God and is subject to Him. From this dependence follows the debt of contracting obligations which God shall have willed to enjoin upon him, and the obligation of investigating and knowing laws if He is going to give any to him. In this sense man is not born free but subject to God: for this debt of subjecting oneself to all divine laws precedes liberty or rather coexists with liberty. But if there is question of a determinate law to which a particular rational creature is subject, liberty precedes law by reason. For God by reason first conceives the essence of the creature and its liberty, and by reason afterward the law to which it is subject: since law by its own nature is a means by which the creature is directed to its proper end, first of all the nature must be known, so that the law suitable to it, by which it is directed to the end, can be determined. Therefore sacred Scripture says: God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel; He added His commandments and precepts;² and St. Thomas says: that is called licit which is prohibited by no law.³

b. From these arguments it is established that of itself only certain knowledge of law obliges the human will; yet if the opinion for the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite, we are bound to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain sentence, because its opposite is not truly and certainly but only doubtfully or tenuously probable, and therefore cannot supply a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience. Hence it happens that an opinion of this kind is called quasi morally certain or practically certain.

¹ De verit. q. 17. a. 3.

² Eccli. 15, 14. 15.

³ In 4. dist. 15, q. 2. a. 4. ad 2.

238. 2. From authority. A moral system cannot be false which in any time whatever is explained, vindicated, and employed in particular questions as a rule of morals by the greater part of theologians; of this kind is the probabilistic system.

To the major St. Alphonsus notes: if the principle of probabilism were false, so many doctors would not have admitted it, nor would the Church have tolerated it: for the Church can tolerate by prudent silence particular erroneous opinions, but not others "which contain a general doctrine, as is the benign sentence, which imports the direction of all consciences concerning all particular cases; whence, if it were false, the deception of the whole Christian people would have been brought in."¹

The minor will be confirmed by the following historical survey. a. In the first centuries of the Church this question is not explicitly proposed, namely by what reason doubts concerning the obligation of a law are to be solved; therefore neither is any principle conceived in a determinate formula found, by which the question is resolved. Nevertheless in the practice of the Church several indications of the probabilistic principle are had: for in particular questions doubts are resolved according to the probabilistic principle.²

b. In the Middle Ages not only does the use of this principle occur in particular questions, but the principle itself occurs implicitly and virtually: for truths are handed down from which the principle of probabilism is deduced by necessary inference; indeed formulas occur which exhibit it equivalently. Yet it is not denied that at the same time formulas are also found which rather favor probabiliorism and tutiorism.

c. Bartholomew Medina was the first of all to propose explicitly and demonstrate by arguments the principle of probabilism (1577). This principle so pleased theologians of every order that by common consent they accepted it and for almost an entire century, with scarcely anyone protesting, explained it in published books and applied it to particular cases.

d. Around the middle of the 17th century the attacks against probabilism began. Besides one or another theologian, the Jansenists rose against it with more bitter anger; in attacking the system, the Dominicans by common consent joined them (1656). Thence it happened that theologians, as regards the moral system, were split into two parts: some from any school defended probabiliorism; others likewise from any order held and vindicated probabilism. With great contention and keen zeal the battle was fought on each side; nevertheless the greater part of doctors always adhered to probabilism.

Three principal reasons can be assigned on account of which several authors, having left probabilism, embraced probabiliorism: a. The license of opining of many authors, who, led by a slight reason, sold opinions scarcely probable as probable and practically licit. Now they thought they could remedy this evil effectively only by leaving the system of probabilism itself. b. The attacks of the Jansenists, who, carried away by hatred against the Society of Jesus, were denouncing the moral system to which most theologians of the Society were devoted as the source of laxism and the corruption of morals. c. The condemnation of proposition 3 of Innocent XI (n. 231); for several theologians thought that by this proposition not only the use of a tenuously probable sentence, but the system itself of probabilism as the source of laxism, was condemned.

e. In the midst of these disturbances, by the wonderful counsel of providence, God sent St. Alphonsus to His Church, who by his works brought it about that disputes were ended and Jansenian rigor and the system of probabiliorism went into exile from the borders of the Church.³

¹ St. Alphonsus, Scholastic-moral dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, year 1755, apud Ballerini-Palmieri I. p. 194.

² Cf. Christianus Lupus, De antiquitate et legitimo usu sententiae probabilis.

³ Cf. Bouquillon, Theolog. mor. fundam. n. 304 ss. Kirchenlexikon, Moralsysteme.

239. 3. From the approval of the Church. a. The Church has indeed never explicitly approved probabilism; but implicitly it clearly and indubitably manifests its mind by that peculiar approval by which it marked the moral works of St. Alphonsus, namely by which his opinions are declared practically safe. But it is impossible to approve the opinions which are contained in the works of the holy doctor without indirectly and implicitly approving the moral system by whose use and application the individual sentences were deduced and established; but the system which St. Alphonsus used in writing moral theology is simple probabilism.

It cannot be denied that the (negative) approval of the Church is referred to all the writings of the holy doctor and therefore also to the dissertations in which he first maintains probabilism and then either truly or apparently equiprobabilism. But likewise it cannot be denied that the positive and peculiar approval by which his writings are celebrated with great praises, because he fortified for moderators of souls a safe way between laxer and more rigid sentences,¹ is attributed especially to his moral theology. For he did not bring it about by his dissertations concerning the moral system that he paved a middle way between laxism and rigorism, but chiefly by the solution of particular questions, whereby by prudent judgment among lax and rigid opinions he chose safe ones. But in choosing opinions, employing the principle of probabilism, he investigates this one thing: whether the opinion is probable; and the opinion which he judges still probable, he proposes and commends to the reader as a norm of acting.

b. The equiprobabilists contend that the Church has openly turned away from the system of probabilism and has tried to extinguish it. To prove this they call the principal document the decree of Innocent XI or of the Holy Office, 26 June 1680, whose first part is directed to Fr. Thyrsus Gonzalez, the other to the general of the Society of Jesus, Fr. Oliva. The authentic form of the decree is this:

When the relation had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents in the letters of Fr. Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the most eminent lords said that it should be written by the secretary of state to the apostolic nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Thyrsus that His Holiness, his letters having been benignly accepted and read not without praise, commanded that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the sentence of those who assert that in the concurrence of the less probable opinion with the more probable so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable, and that he make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the sentence of those asserting that in the concurrence of the less probable opinion with the more probable so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that anyone, as it shall please him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one, and that he command them to submit altogether to the mandate of His Holiness.

a. Thyrsus Gonzalez, then professor at Salamanca, had given repeated letters to the supreme pontiff and at the same time had sent a little work against probabilism, in which he sets forth that all theologians of the Society are devoted to probabilism and that no one dares to attack that doctrine and defend the opposite, lest he incur the offense of superiors. In these few things the occasion of the decree is contained.

b. Innocent XI turned away from probabilism and desired that it be extinguished, but by his supreme authority he neither extinguished it nor did anything else against it. But from the fact that the supreme pontiff in his private sentence turned away from probabilism, the system is shown to be neither false nor damnable.

c. Therefore it is wrongly asserted by adversaries that this decree is a solemn and authentic testimony of supreme ecclesiastical authority against probabilism: for the decree is not doctrinal but disciplinary, and that particular, from which nothing against the system of probabilism can be drawn. Indeed from the fact that it is lawful for theologians of the Society to defend it, far from being rejected, it is admitted by the holy see equally as probabiliorism is.

¹ Pius IX in apostolic letters concerning the confirmation of the title of doctor, 7 July 1871.

240. On the use of probable opinion. 1. In order that it be lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, it is required above all that a practically certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action be formed explicitly or at least implicitly; this indeed can be done in this way: that action against the law is certainly licit for which a truly probable opinion militates: for a doubtful law does not oblige; but for this action a truly probable opinion certainly militates; therefore this action is certainly licit.

From this argumentation two things are rendered manifest which we hinted above (n. 235): a. that the opinion which someone follows must be certainly probable: for if it were not certainly probable, the conclusion of the syllogism and therefore the dictate of conscience, from the rules of logic, would not be certain; and b. that the opinion must be probable for that very one who follows it: for there is question of informing the conscience of the one operating himself.

2. It is lawful to follow a probable opinion against any law whatever, whether natural, divine, or human: for concerning all laws the principle is equally valid: A doubtful law does not oblige, since it is demonstrated from the very nature of obligation.

There are some who have denied this affirmation as regards the law of nature, judging that concerning the law of nature an insoluble doubt or invincible ignorance cannot be admitted. But although invincible ignorance is not had concerning first principles and proximate conclusions, nevertheless concerning deduced truths, especially the more remote, insoluble doubt can have place (n. 114).

3. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion for liberty in all cases of doubtful law, whether the opposite for the law is less, equally, or more probable: for since the arguments by which the principle is demonstrated, A doubtful law does not oblige, are taken from the very nature of obligation, it follows spontaneously that neither probable nor more probable knowledge, but only certain (broadly, morally) knowledge of the law can oblige the human will, and therefore that the use of probable opinion is lawful where the law is truly doubtful.

a. Therefore the probabilistic principle, altogether universal, extends not only to doubt concerning the existence of a law but also to doubt concerning a law ceasing. For doubt concerning a law can be concerned either a. with the existence of the law, namely if it is doubted whether a law was issued or promulgated, whether the time of obligation has already arrived, whether it extends to this case or to these persons; or b. with the cessation of the law, namely if the existence of the law was certain and it is doubted whether it has ceased, either because it has been abrogated, or because someone is excused or dispensed from its observance, or because he has already fulfilled the law, etc. But in each case the principle of probabilism can be employed. Therefore neither he who probably judges that he did not emit a vow, nor he who certainly emitted a vow but probably judges that he has already satisfied it, is held to anything by strict obligation: for by the very fact that the law has probably ceased, the existence of the law becomes doubtful; but a doubtful law does not oblige.

b. Therefore in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the principle of probabilism can licitly be employed even in the matter of justice, unless the debtor's culpable negligence is the cause why doubt concerning the payment made exists, and unless the doubt is merely negative, i.e. unless there is no reason or only a slight reason for doubting concerning the payment made. They indeed object that justice differs from other virtues in this, that it must preserve equality; hence, so long as the matter is doubtful, restitution must be made at least in proportion to the doubt. But justice requires that equality be preserved by the fact that each one is rendered his own right when the right of the other is certainly established; when the right of the other is doubtful, justice does not require that one rather than another, especially since he is a possessor in good faith, be despoiled of his own thing.¹ Besides, perfect equality in this case on account of invincible ignorance of the payment made cannot be restored, even if payment is made anew: for if the payment has already been made, the other has more than is owed to him; but since equality cannot certainly be restored, there is no reason why in doubt the creditor should receive more rather than the debtor, unless fault of the debtor is the cause on account of which equality cannot be restored.

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscient. (Typogr. augustin. 1903) n. 12, 5.

241. Whether it is lawful for the same person concerning the same matter to follow now one, now another of two probable opinions.

a. Nothing prevents someone in diverse cases concerning the same matter from using at will now one, now another probable opinion: for each renders conscience equally safe. Thus the same person can for one testament use the opinion by which a testament lacking the formalities of law is valid, and for another testament the contrary opinion.

b. But in the same case he cannot concerning the same matter follow one probable opinion insofar as it brings advantage, and then another contrary one insofar as this brings advantage. Thus it is not lawful to hold the same testament lacking the formalities of law as valid, so that the inheritance can be entered upon, and as invalid, lest the legacies which are contained in it must be paid, because it cannot at the same time be valid and invalid.¹

It is not lawful voluntarily to introduce a state of insoluble doubt concerning a law, although afterward it is lawful to use a probable opinion against the law. Thus if someone doubts whether the twelfth hour of night has already elapsed or not, it is not lawful for him to drink, lest he expose himself to the danger of at least materially violating the law of the Church. But if nevertheless he had drunk, he can celebrate or communicate, because it is not established that he broke the fast; yet by drinking he sinned (venially), unless a reasonable cause, e.g. great thirst and the impossibility of ascertaining the hour of night, excused him. Likewise it is not lawful for a priest to consume a doubtfully consecrated host before the reception of the precious blood, lest he deliberately induce a state of doubt concerning the natural fast with danger of violating the law. To expose oneself often in this way voluntarily to the danger of materially violating the law would be mortal.²

¹ Cf. Lugo, De eucharist. disp. 15. n. 47 ss., where several examples of this kind are brought forward and judged.

² Cf. Bucceroni l. c. n. 13.

242. Very many difficulties by which probabilism is customarily attacked are solved without difficulty from the theory set forth above; others will have to be untangled below; therefore in this place these few things will suffice.

1. From the law of nature we must sincerely tend toward agreement with objective morality or with the objective ordination of the eternal law; but he who follows the less probable opinion against the law does not sincerely tend toward agreement with objective morality; therefore he who follows the less probable opinion against the law offends against the eternal law and therefore places a morally evil action.¹

This difficulty can be turned back upon equiprobabilism. For if the sanctity and necessity of agreement between human actions and the eternal law is so great that man must tend toward it as much as he can according to his knowledge, he must establish that agreement not only where he judges the law to exist more probably, but also where he judges the law to exist probably. But if God permits an exception from the necessity of establishing that agreement in favor of liberty, there is no reason for failing from agreement when the opinion for liberty is equally probable, but not likewise when it is simply probable.

To the major. This principle contains two things which are very true. Namely, on account of our essential and absolute dependence on God the creator, we are bound habitually to bear a sincere will of observing all particular laws which God is going to give us; and since we cannot observe laws unknown to us, we are bound with the same sincere will to tend toward knowledge of laws issued by God and actually to observe those that are known. Whether our dependence on God and the habitual obligation resulting from it of tending toward agreement with objective morality obliges us only to observing particular laws sufficiently known, or also to observing those whose knowledge we cannot acquire and which probably objectively do not exist, is a question controverted among theologians, which probabilists demonstrate by invincible arguments must be resolved in the negative part. Therefore those who contend that by force of this principle we must observe opinions which in our judgment agree more probably with the objective ordination of the eternal law than they disagree affirm the very thing which is to be proved and which from the arguments of the probabilists is shown to be false. But if thereafter they contend that the law which in our judgment more probably exists is known, they again affirm what is false. If finally they concede that the obligation of a law more probably existing does not arise directly from the law itself more probably existing, as being not sufficiently known nor sufficiently promulgated, but indirectly from this higher principle: we must tend toward agreement with objective morality, they commit the same begging of the question. For antecedently to a known law there exists no other obligation except that of inquiring with moral diligence into the existence of the law, which, if it is not sufficiently known, leaves to the will its natural liberty.

The minor must be altogether denied: for that a sincere tendency of the will toward agreement with the eternal law always strictly requires (not only sometimes counsels and inclines, which all concede) that in a conflict of opinions the more probable opinion be chosen, is an invention which is demonstrated by no reason. Therefore he who affirms that by force of the aforesaid principle we are bound not only to investigating the existence of the law and to observing laws sufficiently known, but also to observing laws more probably or more plausibly existing, commits a begging of the question and besides affirms what is false. Hence he who follows the less probable for liberty, far from placing a morally evil action, rather directs his actions according to the principle of probabilism, uniquely true and demonstrated by certain arguments.

2. He who follows probabilism exposes himself to the danger of sinning. - The danger of formally sinning is excluded by the fact that he who follows probabilism acts with a practically certain conscience, namely with certain persuasion that the action which he places is licit. But the danger of materially sinning is present, because the law against which probability militates can in reality exist, since probable reasons can be false; yet it is not necessary that this danger be avoided. For if it is established that the use of probable opinion against the law is lawful, by that very fact it is established that God does not impose upon us the obligation of avoiding this danger of materially sinning: for an intolerable burden would be imposed upon us if, for avoiding this danger of materially sinning, we were bound to observe all uncertain laws; for very often we would have to observe a law which does not exist.

3. Probabilism in practice leads to a lax life. - The fear of laxism is empty where a certain and unshaken moral principle is applied for directing morals: for truth cannot beget a lax life. Moreover, in this matter two things must be distinguished, namely what must be done for fulfilling the strict law, and what must be done for attaining Christian perfection. If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what strict law postulates from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly live a life little worthy of a Christian man; but the practice of probabilists is this: where there is question of imposing obligation and of judging sins, they are benign for avoiding the dangers of formally sinning; but where there is question of attaining perfection and of the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty.

§ 6. On equiprobabilism.²

¹ Cf. Der kath. Seelsorger (Paderborn, Schoningh. 1900) S. 495 ff. Lehmkuhl, Probabilismus vindicatus (Friburgi. Herder. 1907).

² Gaude, C. SS. R., De morali systemate s. Alphonsi etc. (Romae. Cuggiani. 1894). Ter Haar, C. SS. R., De systemate morali antiquorum probabilistarum (Paderbornae. Schoningh. 1894). Aertnys, C. SS. R., Probabilismus oder Aequiprobabilismus? (Paderborn. Schoningh. 1896). Hippert, Probabilismus oder Aequiprobabilismus? (Zeitschrift f. k. Theol. 1895) S. 467 ff. Noldin, Aequiprobabilistische Beweisführung. (Zeitschrift f. k. Theol. 1896) S. 670 ff. De Caigny, De genuino probabilismo licito (Brugis. Desclee. 1901. Idem, De genuino morali systemate s. Alphonsi (Brugis. Desclee 1901).

243. 1. Equiprobabilism teaches: in doubt concerning the existence of a law it is lawful to follow an opinion equally or almost equally probable for liberty, but not a less probable one in the concurrence of one certainly more probable.

a. There are two points in which equiprobabilism theoretically differs from probabilism: the one indeed refers to the very principle of the system, the other to its use. For it contends a. that a probable opinion which stands for liberty is lawful to follow only when it is equally or almost equally probable as that which stands for the law; therefore if the opinion favoring the law is, in comparison with the opposite, certainly or certainly and notably more probable, the law must be observed; it contends b. that the system can be applied only if the doubt turns about the existence of a law, but not if the doubt concerns the cessation of a law; in this case the law must always be observed.

b. Practically the equiprobabilists differ from the probabilists in this, that they do not apply their system in doubts concerning the cessation of a law. They therefore oblige him who positively doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow certainly emitted to fulfill it again, and him who positively doubts whether he has already confessed a sin certainly committed to confess it again. But in the selection of opinions they scarcely differ from the probabilists: for above all they embrace all opinions which St. Alphonsus calls probable, even if they are less probable; but if there is question of a new question which St. Alphonsus did not treat, they follow in practice the opinion for liberty when they understand it to be supported by a solid reason. Indeed even in the manner of speaking they do not depart from the probabilists: for the opinions which we can licitly follow they scarcely ever call equally probable, but, after the example of St. Alphonsus, simply probable.

2. Equiprobabilism is defended especially by the theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Haringer, Marc, Aertnys, Konings, Vindiciae alphonsianae, etc., being persuaded that St. Alphonsus was an equiprobabilist. In this question several other theologians follow them: Gousset, Del Vecchio, Ninzati, Scavini, Pruner, E. Muller, Simar, P. Hilarius, etc.

Nevertheless, not all defend equiprobabilism in the same sense; and that this may be well understood, it must be noted that there are two formulas which equiprobabilism excludes: a. it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, even if the opposite is certainly more probable, and b. it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, even if the opposite is certainly and notably more probable. Equiprobabilists who understand their system so that they exclude only the second formula differ from probabilists only in words; those who understand equiprobabilism so that they exclude both formulas differ from probabilism not only in words, but in the matter itself.

244. The arguments by which equiprobabilists demonstrate the system in general are the very same arguments of the probabilists; then the arguments by which they demonstrate that part in which they differ from probabilists are these:

1. The law which is sufficiently promulgated must be observed; but the law to which an opinion certainly or certainly and notably more probable is favorable is sufficiently promulgated; therefore the law to which an opinion certainly or certainly and notably more probable is favorable must be observed.

a. Some demonstrate the minor proposition in one way, others in another: for some affirm that the law for which an opinion certainly, or certainly and notably, more probable militates is sufficiently promulgated, because an opinion certainly, or certainly and notably, more probable is morally or quasi-morally certain. Others, however, contend that an opinion certainly more probable does not exceed the limits of probability, and nevertheless that the law to which an opinion of this kind is favorable is sufficiently promulgated and to be followed: for an opinion certainly more probable approaches more closely to the truth; but we are bound to embrace, by assent and as the norm of acting, the opinion which approaches more closely to the truth.¹

b. To these things it must be observed: a. an opinion certainly and notably more probable practically is equivalent to a morally certain opinion: for if the excess of probability of one opinion is notable, and this is known certainly, the opposite opinion will be only doubtfully probable; but it is not lawful to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. But an opinion certainly more probable of itself neither theoretically nor practically is equivalent to a morally certain opinion, but is an opinion simply, although more, probable. b. It indeed cannot be affirmed that the more probable opinion approaches more closely to the truth, but nevertheless the more probable opinion has a greater likeness and appearance of truth than the opposite; therefore it is conceded that, as regards the assent of the mind, it must be preferred; but it must be denied that it constitutes a norm of acting which must necessarily be followed: for he who adheres by assent to the more probable with fear of erring knows that the law is uncertain; but we are not bound to observe a law unless its existence is certain (broadly, morally).

2. For acting licitly moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required; but such certainty cannot be had if the opinion for liberty is certainly less probable: for an opinion certainly less probable is not truly and certainly probable.

To this affirmation, that an opinion certainly less probable cannot be truly probable, this must be answered: it is not lawful to follow an opinion which is not truly and certainly probable; therefore if an opinion whose opposite is certainly more probable is no longer truly and certainly probable, it is not lawful to follow it; but whether an opinion whose opposite is certainly more probable can still be truly and certainly probable is not a moral question, but a logical question; and logicians teach that an opinion can be truly probable whose opposite is not morally certain. But if it is conceded that the less probable opinion is truly probable, from the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige, it is lawful to follow it.

3. A law does not oblige if it is truly doubtful; but it is truly doubtful only when concerning it there is a strict doubt, i.e. if the mind suspends assent because of equal reasons from either side; therefore the law does not oblige only if from either side, for the law and for liberty, there are equal or almost equal reasons.

A law does not oblige if it is truly doubtful; but from the arguments by which the probabilistic principle is demonstrated, it is clear that a law is truly doubtful if it is simply uncertain, whether the doubt existing about it is strict or broad; therefore a law does not oblige whenever it is simply uncertain, whether the reasons for the law are equally or more probable.

¹ Very recently in time the equiprobabilists do indeed bring forth diverse other arguments (cf. Commer, Jahrbuch XVII, S. 106 ff.), which nevertheless, more accurately inspected, are only variations of this argument invented by the ancient probabiliorists (n. 230, 2).

245. Refutation of the system itself. 1. Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use no other arguments than probabilists, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these arguments not equiprobabilism, but by necessary inference the formula of probabilism follows; therefore equiprobabilists deduce not the whole, but only a halved conclusion from their own principles.

2. A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that on each side not only the force and moments but also the degrees of reasons be weighed, and that it be determined whether the opposed opinions are equally or less or more probable, is a system practically unfit: for almost always it is impossible to determine when on each side there stand reasons equally or almost equally probable; and authors who think that they can accomplish that without difficulty deceive themselves and others.

3. An opinion certainly more probable either is quasi-morally certain or is simply probable; if the first, it must be conceded that it is not lawful to follow the opposite, because this is not truly probable; if the second, by no right are we prohibited from following the opposite, since to a probable opinion there is opposed one likewise probable.

246. On the use of probabilism, where there is question of the cessation of a law.

1. Already long ago among theologians there was agitated the controversy whether the principle of probabilism can be extended also to doubt concerning the cessation of a law. Authors of great name, such as Suarez, de Lugo, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Lacroix, Billuart himself the probabiliorist, and others, employ probabilism also in doubt concerning the cessation of a law.

2. St. Alphonsus in the first periods likewise extended his probabilistic system even to questions in which there is question of the cessation of a law; afterward, however, he retracted this opinion and changed several particular questions of his moral theology according to this reformed doctrine.

But if nevertheless in the work of moral theology there occur resolutions which do not agree with this doctrine,¹ this must either be attributed to inadvertence, or it must be said that the holy doctor in certain particular questions did not wish to urge the reformed opinion.

3. Besides the authority of St. Alphonsus, they bring forward especially two arguments by which the equiprobabilists demonstrate this part of their system: a. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but in this case the law possesses; therefore the law must be observed. b. Since doubt concerning the cessation of a law very often arises from the fact that someone has probably already satisfied the law, they say: a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore it must be satisfied again.

4. But these two arguments do not prove the matter. Concerning the principle of possession there will be discussion below; concerning the other argument, thus: a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment, it must be distinguished: by a negatively doubtful fulfillment, I concede; but by a probable fulfillment it is not satisfied certainly, yet it is satisfied probably; but an obligation which has probably already been satisfied ceases to be certain, and an uncertain obligation is none.²

Note. These things having been set down beforehand, we can now settle the matter itself in this way: the opinion which extends the principle of probabilism also to cases of the cessation of a law is defended by many and approved authors, is validly confirmed by reasons taken from the nature of the matter itself, and the arguments of the contrary opinion are aptly solved; for which reason the principle of probabilism can safely be employed also in the case of the cessation of a law.

¹ Cf. l. 1. n. 99; l. 4. n. 150; l. 6. n. 505; l. 3. n. 290. n. 112.

² Cf. Lugo, De eucharistia disp. 19. n. 249.