Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 2. On The Means For Solving Practical Doubt
331. If it is never licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, it follows manifestly that a man existing in such a state ought either to lay aside the doubt or to desist from the action. But there exists a twofold way of laying aside such doubt: one direct, the other indirect. Doubt is laid aside directly if, either through consultation of a wise man or of an approved book, or through one's own investigation into the truth of the matter, the mind finally assents to one or the other part with moral certitude. Hence if the confessor cannot solve some difficult case with certitude, he is bound, if time permits, to consult books or even learned theologians (with the sacramental seal nevertheless preserved). But if such a direct way is not possible, then the doubt must be laid aside indirectly through the so-called indirect principles, concerning which we shall immediately discuss. But if moral certitude cannot be had even in this way, and if the action also cannot be deferred, then the safer part is to be chosen. But the safer part is that which includes observance of the law and excludes the danger of sinning.76
76 The worn rule: "in doubts the safer part is to be chosen," must be rightly understood. The safer part is sometimes understood as the more perfect part; thus, for example, in the religious life a man works out his salvation more safely than in the secular life. It is not required that the safer, i.e., the more perfect, part always be chosen. This is clear per se. - Sometimes to the safer part there is opposed a part that is not safe but sinful. Thus, for example, it is safer not to be in a proximate occasion of sinning than to be in it. The rule noted above holds in this sense, and indeed a) if there is question of any practical doubt, because it is never licit to act with practical doubt; b) if there is question of the doubtful validity of the sacraments or of a certain right of another or of things altogether necessary for salvation. Cf. below n. 333, where the reflex principle will be explained: "A doubtful law does not oblige."
332. Reflex principles. From the origin of Probabilism, direct principles are customarily distinguished, which immediately and per se produce either intrinsic evidence or at least evident credibility of some conclusion. Thus, for example, from the intrinsic and direct principle: "God, as supreme Lord, is to be worshiped," there follows immediately and per se: therefore any blasphemy is intrinsically evil. - Indirect or reflex principles are certain true and clear general norms which indeed do not directly and per se prove the matter whose truth is investigated, but nevertheless serve for driving away practical doubt and for obtaining moral certitude in a practical case. Therefore these principles as it were reflect their own light upon an obscure practical doubt and scatter its darkness for the moment of the action to be posited. If reflex principles are accepted in this sense, nothing prevents them, rightly understood and rightly applied, from being admitted.77 For then they are very consonant with reason and similar to those 88 Rules of Law which were already in use under Boniface VIII. The more principal reflex principles are the following:
1. A doubtful law does not oblige.
2. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands.
3. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better.
4. A delict is not presumed, but must be proved.
5. In doubt favor is to be shown to the accused.
6. In doubt the presumption stands for the superior.
7. In doubt judgment is to be made from things ordinarily occurring.
8. In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act.
9. In doubt favors are to be enlarged and unfavorable things restricted.
10. In doubts, what is least is to be held.
Especially concerning the three prior principles, obscurities and falsities turn; hence it is helpful to explain them in a few words.
77 St. Alphonsus deservedly says (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64): "It is certain and commonly explored among all doctors that moral certitude of some opinion, if it is not proved from some certain direct principle, is nevertheless proved from another reflex principle likewise certain."
333. 1. A doubtful law does not oblige. From the rise of Probabilism this principle caused very sharp controversies. Some, namely the more rigid Probabiliorists (Concina,78 Patuzzi, etc.), reject it altogether, teaching that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. Others, namely the laxer Probabilists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini, Moya, etc.), on the contrary proclaim this principle as the philosopher's stone and apply it without any exception, whether there is question of the validity of the act or of its licitness, whether of strict doubt or broad doubt. But since the Holy See condemned this exaggerated application of the principle in some matters, hence moderate Probabilists indeed admit the principle, but do not extend it to the four following cases:
a) If there is question of the validity of the sacraments. For from the virtue of religion and charity, indeed sometimes also from the virtue of justice, the minister ought to administer the sacraments validly, because otherwise great irreverence is caused to God and great harm to the man receiving. Hence, unless grave necessity urges or unless the Church supplies the defect, it is a grave sin to administer a doubtfully valid sacrament. For this reason Innocent XI also proscribed proposition (1): "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer one having been abandoned, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids this. Hence an opinion only probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, priestly order, or episcopal order."79
b) If there is question of things necessary for salvation, for example, of truths to be believed by necessity of means, of baptism to be received when someone doubts whether he was validly baptized, of the proximate danger of sinning, etc. For eternal salvation must be obtained and eternal damnation necessarily avoided; hence if there is question of danger to eternal life, the safer part must be chosen. Right love of self manifestly demands this. Even the "prince of the laxists" himself, Caramuel, teaches this.80 Hence likewise proposition (4) was condemned by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."81
c) If there is question of a certain right of a third person. Hence in a civil case the judge is bound to render judgment according to the more probable opinion. The reason is that the judge is obliged from justice to settle the litigation according to objective truth without any acceptance of persons. But there would be manifest acceptance of persons if the judge, abandoning the certainly more probable opinion, judged according to the less probable opinion.82
But if the case of each litigant is equally probable, the judge is bound either to divide the controverted matter between them or to persuade them to an amicable settlement. Hence it is easily understood why the following propositions were condemned: "I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."83 "When litigants have opinions equally probable for themselves, the judge can receive money for rendering a sentence in favor of one rather than the other."84 - When one part of the litigants already possesses the thing in good faith, then the adage must be applied: "The condition of the possessor is better." And so the thing is not to be adjudged away from the possessor unless the other party proves his right. - In a criminal case favor is to be shown to the accused as long as his crime has not been proved. Hence Rule of Law 11 in VI: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, favor is to be shown to the accused rather than to the plaintiff," and the Code of Canon Law, c. 1748, § 2, establishes: "If the plaintiff does not prove, the defendant is absolved."
d) If there is question of grave danger of spiritual or temporal harm (whether one's own or another's), which we ought to prevent from charity or from justice. Therefore a physician is bound to employ more certain and safer remedies (when they can be had) and sins if without urgent necessity he employs doubtful remedies, so that the life of the sick person is endangered. Likewise it is illicit to take a drink that is doubtfully gravely poisonous.
These four exceptions, which, even the Probabilists themselves admitting it,85 must be added to the famous principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," show enough and more than enough that it is not so precious a philosopher's stone as certain Probabilists advertise it. But if that principle is understood with the clauses added, and if there is question of a true and serious doubt concerning the existence of a law, nothing prevents it from being applied to eliminate practical doubt.86
78 De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 3.
79 Denz. n. 1151. John Lugo taught a similar proposition, De sacr. in genere, disput. VIII, n. 139 and 141.
80 Theol. fund. n. 533.
81 Denz. n. 1154.
82 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 63, a. 4.
83 Innocent XI (Denz. n. 1152).
84 Alexander VII (Denz. n. 1126).
85 Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De consc. n. 236. The author nevertheless thinks that those four cases are not exceptions from the principle of probabilism. It is a quarrel about words.
86 So also St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64). The difficulty nevertheless remains, when the law is truly doubtful.
334. 2. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands. This principle was already in use among the old Canonists87 and Moralists and is the foundation of many others. Presumption is not unfittingly defined: an anticipated proof of a doubtful matter, drawn from valid arguments and indications. It is said: anticipated proof, because presumption before proper proof admits something as true until the contrary is clearly proved. The matter becomes clearer by examples: Someone comes under suspicion of a certain crime. But since up to now he has been a pious and just man, he is presumed innocent until the contrary has been proved. And therefore the principle related above in the fourth place establishes: "A delict is not presumed, but must be proved," or also: "Anyone is presumed good unless he is proved evil." - Another example: A subject doubts concerning the obligation and rightness of some command made by a superior. Nevertheless he ought to obey, because in doubts the presumption stands for the superior, whose authority is not weakened by the doubt of the subject. - A third example: Someone is accused of a certain crime, whose existence nevertheless cannot be clearly proved. In this case the presumption stands for the accused, and therefore he ought to be freed according to the reflex principle related above: "In doubt favor is to be shown to the accused." Nevertheless, if the indications of the guilt of the accused are so strong that they generate moral certitude concerning the crime committed, the penalty can be inflicted. - A fourth example: Some religious made profession, but afterward doubts whether he had sufficient intention and knowledge of the obligations which arise from profession. The profession is nevertheless valid according to the adage: "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act." But the reason is that the presumption stands for the validity of the profession.
87 Cf. tit. 23 de praesumptionibus l. 2 Decretal.
335. 3. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. This principle is the foundation of Equiprobabilism, and is briefly called the "principle of possession." With respect to the matter of commutative justice, this principle is most true and was already pronounced by Alexander III, who, having been asked whether some church is bound to hand over tithes which are claimed by another church, responded that it is not bound, "because by divine and human right the condition of the possessor is better."88 Benedict XIV calls the same principle a "worn adage."89 But Billuart90 assigns the following reasons why that principle is best in the matter of justice: "1. because, since men on the one hand, eager for things, are not accustomed to leave their own [things] with others, and on the other hand an upright man is not accustomed to acquire possession of some thing without a title, hence in doubt possession brings in a presumption: that he who possesses the thing is the owner of the thing; 2. because, since goods of fortune are subject to human power, legislators have established, in order to the common good, that in doubt the possessor can retain as his own the goods which he possesses, lest the ownerships of things remain uncertain and litigations be interminable." - But deservedly the principle of possession is extended by analogy also to other matters besides justice,91 because Alexander III cited above attributed value to it in divine and human right. Hence St. Alphonsus continually applies it for discerning whether some law obliges or not. For law and human liberty can be considered as two possessors. Law possesses the force of obliging, and human liberty possesses the faculty of acting freely (with the order of the end nevertheless preserved). Hence according to this principle of possession, he who doubts whether he committed a grave sin, or whether a sin certainly committed is mortal, is not bound, strictly speaking, to declare acts of this kind in confession. For liberty possesses, as they say; for man is free from the obligation of confessing as long as he is not certainly guilty of mortal sin. - On the contrary, he who, certain of a mortal sin committed, seriously doubts whether he confessed it, is bound to confess it again. The reason is that the law possesses; for the law of confessing mortal sins certainly exists, and it is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Considered at first glance, this principle of possession seems to be very clear, but outside the matter of justice it suffers rather great difficulties, because often it is not established what possesses, namely whether liberty or law. But if it remains obscure whether law or liberty possesses, then let humanity and facility prevail, as St. Gregory Nazianzen says.92
88 It is found in c. 6, X 2, 26. Cf. also Rule of Law 65: "In an equal delict or case the condition of the possessor is stronger."
89 Const. "Postremo mense" § 33, d. 28 Febr. 1747.
90 De consc. diss. 6, a. 2, obj. 3.
91 That this principle does not hold except in the matter of justice is taught commonly by Probabiliorists, for example, Billuart (l. c.); besides Azor, Vasquez, Salas, etc. On the contrary all Probabilists and Equiprobabilists extend it also to other matters, for example, Suarez, Lugo, Sanchez, Sporer, etc.; to whom modern authors commonly accede; cf. St. Alphonsus l. c. l. 1, n. 26.
92 Orat. 39 in sancta lumina n. 19 (Migne, Patr. graec. 37, 358). See the sharp refutation of this principle applied in favor of probabilism in Concina, De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 2. Cf. also Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 302.
336. Scholion. On the reduction of reflex principles to one. To one diligently considering the diverse reflex principles, it appears that in reality there is only one reflex principle, to which all the others are easily reduced, namely: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands." For, to pass over the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," which is altogether rejected by many, and which today is accepted by no one except with the limiting clauses brought forward above, all the other principles are nothing but corollaries deduced from the principle of presumption. For why in doubt is the condition of the possessor better? Because the presumption stands for the possessor. - Why in doubt must one stand for the validity of the act? - Because the presumption stands that an act once placed was placed rightly. - Why is a delict not presumed, but must be proved? - Because the presumption stands for the accused, since no one ought to be held evil unless it has been clearly proved. And so on. - Hence it is better and simpler if this principle alone of presumption is applied for obtaining the moral certitude necessary in any particular act. For this principle is admitted by all; it is easily understood even by the uneducated; it is applied in the forum both civil and ecclesiastical; before the controversies about Probabilism arose it was applied by the Scholastics; and finally, with it rightly applied, it is right to hope that the difficulties, and especially the interminable and in practice altogether useless altercations among the diverse moral systems, will gradually cease.