Avoiding and removing scandal

If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the danger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain or omit the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in performing the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not bind to one’s own serious inconvenience.

On the other hand, I am not justified in omitting an action which is prescribed by the natural or divine law on account of the scandal which the action would give, and so when God’s honour or the salvation of my neighbour or my own requires that I should make public profession of the faith, I am bound to make it though my profession will make the enemies of the faith blaspheme.

Even a positive precept does not cease to bind on account of a general fear of scandal; whether it ceases to bind or not on account of scandal in a particular instance is a disputed point. Some theologians maintain that if a woman knows that her presence at Mass is a cause of grave sin to another and she cannot hear Mass elsewhere, she is obliged to abstain from hearing Mass at least for a Sunday or two, because the natural precept of avoiding scandal is more important than the positive precept of hearing Mass on Sundays. Others, on the contrary, hold that inasmuch as the scandal is taken and not given, the obligation of hearing Mass does not cease to bind in such a case. Practically, therefore, one is free to follow either opinion. This disputed question refers to scandal of the weak, for positive precepts do not cease to be obligatory on account of pharisaic scandal.

A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it; and so I may receive the sacraments even when they are not obligatory from a priest whom I know to be in a state of sin and unworthy to administer them.

Duty of Avoiding Scandal.—At times it is impossible to avoid giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.—(a) Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking undeserved offense.

(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others. Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).

(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning, even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt, vii. 6). Example: A wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.

(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own, are in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present. If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.

As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following cases:

(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent scandal.

(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.

(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal (Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et tamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum. But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.

(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro omisso domi manere.

In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater evil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the following conditions be verified:

(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain or slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a grave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be given, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that someone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention of the precept.

(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable hardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to attempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal. Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never read the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest scandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife absent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be provoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and exercise, lest an old relative be disedified. If we have to choose between occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and occasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we should rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold that scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass oftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require absence from Mass at all.

Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical poverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions (such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid scandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons these works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards those persons, according to the rules given for contravention of precepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have vowed them (e.g., religious).

(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates and other clerics because of their office.

Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are not to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be Pharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for others, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in a way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is danger of scandal: (a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to Mass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion blasphemy in one’s neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one puts off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of mind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be explained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a notorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders the reason of his visit.

When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of Avoiding Scandal.—(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner, but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the property of their charges.

(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one’s neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from a certain food, if one’s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).

(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by keeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.

The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous paragraph may be understood in a number of senses.

(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is held by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another to keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may call for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of scandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a friendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other man keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is also in good faith.

(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of the internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things spiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external sacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not always demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice would be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals. Thus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor who wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak as well (Matt, v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians should prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits against fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a willingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal, when a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean that it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other times.

(c) The surrender of temporal goods may be understood either of a giving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding to them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring temporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of scandal of the weak, that one should surrender one’s goods without any effort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because his priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him a service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and the duty of the members to contribute.

Temporal goods may be understood here either of things of great value (e.g., necessaries of life) or of things of minor value (e.g., luxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme spiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if this is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him in extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of minor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his converts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but only such food as they can get along without (Rom, xiv. 15; I Cor., viii. 13).

Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common), especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or priest ought to forego something really due the Church.

Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.—(a) If there is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who will be scandalized because more is not paid.

(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal. Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time, place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal both to Catholics and non-Catholics.

Must scandal of the little ones be avoided? - Scandal of the little ones or weak must be avoided, as often as it can be done without grave inconvenience, both by omission of an indifferent work and by omission of a good work not commanded. Proof. Because from charity we are bound to impede the evil of neighbor when we easily can, e.g., by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by delaying it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc., when neighbor falls into that danger from a cause given by us. But the little ones or weak fall into that danger from a cause in some way given by us; for although our action of itself does not influence the sin of neighbor, nevertheless in fact it influences it, although this is because of the ignorance and infirmity of neighbor. Therefore. 1 Cor. 8:7 seqq. Hence it is clear that scandal of the little ones is not purely received, but in some way given, namely given not by reason of the work done, but by reason of the circumstances in which that work is done, although these are entirely extrinsic. L. 48; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Must pharisaical scandal also be avoided? - Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work, or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. Proof. Such scandal arises from the sole malice of him who receives scandal, and for this reason is in no way given, but purely received. But charity in no way obliges us to impede the sins of others which are altogether voluntary to them and altogether independent of our manner of acting, at least ordinarily; for charity does not urge with so great an inconvenience. Therefore. Matt. 15:14. Ordinarily; for "if care concerning the good of neighbor can oblige one to doing good, why not also sometimes to omitting it? Especially since man is thereby deprived of no spiritual good... because this very thing, namely to deprive oneself of the merit of that work because of the good of neighbor, will be a greater merit than the good work itself. Whence in works of counsel the matter is clear." Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 3, n. 9. The case could be if, for example, fruit were hoped for from delaying a good work. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1723. But if the pharisaical scandal were for impeding spiritual goods, then it would altogether have to be contemned. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Does a girl sin mortally by presenting herself to be seen by a man who will suffer scandal? St. Alphonsus, 53, has these things: "Busemb., St. Antoninus, Sylvius, Navarrus, etc., affirm it.... But Cajetan, Sanchez, etc., very probably deny that she sins gravely. For it suffices, as they say, for excusing her, at least from mortal sin, the cause that she not be deprived of her own liberty, since on the one hand this scandal is not given, but received from the malice of the man; and on the other hand the matter would be very inconvenient for the woman and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not. But I could not excuse her from mortal sin if she, led by vanity, although she does not intend the scandal of that man, deliberately offers herself to his sight. Hence Sporer, Diana, Hurtado, rightly say that a woman is bound under grave sin to avoid the scandal of a determinate man, if she can conveniently go to another church, proceed by another way, abstain from a window, and similar things. Yet this is not to be understood for a long time, but only for one or another time, until the other can notice that he is being fled by her; and Sporer asserts that all consent in this. Nor could I excuse a woman from mortal sin if she sought some place which she would not go to unless she knew her lover was there."

Resolves: A woman who, from adornment even fitting to her state, probably foresees that someone in particular will fall mortally, is bound for a brief time to put it aside, or to flee the sight of such a one. For a brief time, because for a long time it would be too grave for her. But if the same thing were feared in particular from superfluous, vain adornment not fitting to her state, which to assume for the sake of vanity, other things being excluded, is only venial, she would be bound, speaking per se, to put it aside altogether, even under mortal sin, because she has no right to that adornment, and on the other hand is bound to avoid another's sin when she conveniently can.

Speaking per se, for since superfluous adornments, practically speaking, soon pass into the custom of the country's women who are honorable, it cannot be said absolutely that such a woman does not have a right to follow the custom of her country, nor is grave inconvenience lacking. If a woman thinks not so much in particular, but only in general, that some will be scandalized in her, provided she does not intend their lasciviousness nor take pleasure in it, although she may be pleased that she is praised as beautiful, she does not seem to be bound to abstain from that adornment, even superfluous, under mortal sin, e.g., by painting the face, etc.

The reason is both because the scandal is rather received than given, and that adornment and beauty only remotely provokes to sin, and because it would be too grave for that sex, especially if she seeks a husband, perpetually to abstain thus; since that occasion is universal and perpetual, and more beautiful women would never licitly go outside, since natural beauty moves more than artificial beauty. As to the custom of women walking with the breast uncovered, if the uncovering were not immoderate, and in some place there were a custom that women walk in this way, it would indeed be reproved, but not altogether condemned as mortal sin. The reason is the very common opinion of doctors, and because the breast is not a part vehemently provoking to lasciviousness, and custom diminishes the force of concupiscence. Thus St. Alphonsus, 55. - L. 53, 54, 55; l. 3, n. 425; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169, aa. 1, 2; S. Antonin., p. 2, t. 4, c. 5; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, r. 9.

Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal? R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking; for either a great loss of money must be suffered, and charity toward neighbor does not urge with so great an inconvenience; or there is only a light loss of money, and this, since it could occur rather often, already easily becomes grave. Besides, it would harm the common good, because an occasion would be given to wicked persons of extorting and seizing others' things, and it would be harmful to the wicked themselves, since thus they would be confirmed in their depraved will. Ordinarily speaking; for if, in some particular case, grave inconvenience ceases, and the scandal were not of Pharisees but of little ones, then either temporal goods must be given up, or the scandal must be calmed through some admonition. L. 52; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 8.

Resolves: You are not bound to pay more than is fair to a worker or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme. - A parish priest is not bound to give up stole fees, although he foresees that several will detract. - These persons sin not because of infirmity, but because of their own improbitity, and therefore regularly no care is to be taken for them.

Are precepts sometimes to be omitted because of scandal?

R. Negatively, if from that omission one's own salvation would be endangered, or grave harm would be imminent to others, especially to the community. Hence spiritual goods necessary for salvation neither ought nor can anyone give up because of anyone's scandal. R. Negatively also, if that omission is intrinsically evil. Therefore negative natural precepts likewise neither ought nor can be omitted. - As to affirmative natural precepts, per se and generally, they are not to be passed over. For scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. Nevertheless they can sometimes be omitted; indeed they even must be omitted if, all things prudently weighed, it is better to avoid the ruin of neighbor, and grave harm does not come to us from it. Yet more truly it is said in that case that those precepts cease and do not oblige, e.g., of correcting sinners, or punishing delinquents, when harm is feared more than fruit is hoped for.

As to positive human precepts there is controversy. The first probable opinion denies, because again the scandal is not properly given, but received; and therefore the precept does not cease. The second probable opinion affirms, grave inconvenience being excluded, because the precept of avoiding the scandal of neighbor, as natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone if she goes to the prescribed Mass is bound to omit it once or again, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; yet not several times because of the grave inconvenience which would follow from it. Nevertheless several others, no less probably, hold that she can rightly omit Mass once or again, but is not bound to this. She can, because of the probability of the latter opinion. She is not bound, because again the scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. But it must be noted here that the present controversy also has place only in scandal which someone in particular can suffer; but by no means when there is a general fear that perhaps someone may be scandalized, because this would be too difficult. Likewise the matter concerns only the scandal of the little ones; for if the scandal were pharisaical, occasion would be given for maliciously always impeding good things. - Struggl, q. 5, nn. 30, 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7; L. 50, 51, 52.

Is it a sin of scandal to ask something from another which he will not furnish without sin, when he is already prepared to sin? St. Alphonsus, 47, has these things: "If the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil of itself, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin, as is asking fornication from a prepared prostitute, several doctors are not lacking who say that it is not a sin of scandal, because since such a woman is always in actual or virtual will of sinning, he who offers her the occasion of executing that sin is judged to cooperate not gravely, but lightly. Thus Soto, Henriquez, Azor, Valentia, etc. I venerate the authority of such great doctors, but I would not dare to depart from the contrary opinion, which I judge must be followed, and which Sanchez holds with Cajetan, etc. The reason seems very powerful to me, because, although the prostitute is in actual will of sinning, nevertheless certainly she inflicts on herself a much greater ruin by completing in act that particular sin of fornication.

Therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating the sin sins gravely in two ways, both against charity and against chastity." "If the thing which is asked is indifferent, and can rightly be furnished without sin, as would be asking a loan from a usurer and similar things, the first opinion holds that it is not a grave sin to ask without just cause. The reason is that, since that usurer already has a deliberate will of sinning, you will not inflict grave harm upon him if you propose to him an occasion by which he may execute sin beside your intention. For that anticipation of the external work varies his sin only accidentally. (If you do not ask now, another asking will soon come, and he will certainly give. And this also holds for the preceding case.) Thus Lugo, Cajetan, etc. The second opinion, which we embrace, holds that this is a mortal sin both against charity and against the virtue toward whose injury occasion is offered to neighbor, by asking from him a loan, etc., without grave cause; for when there is a grave cause, the one asking is altogether excused. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4, Elbel, etc. The reason is that since the sinner by the external act inflicts a notably greater ruin on himself, he cannot be excused from grave sin against charity who without grave cause cooperates with him toward executing the work.... But when we have a grave cause for asking, we cannot abstain from asking without grave inconvenience, and therefore then indeed we excuse.

Thus Busemb., Sanchez, Valentia, etc." "But Sporer, Pontas, etc., note that for licitly asking a loan from a usurer, precise necessity is not required, but any notable utility suffices, whether for the conservation or for the decency of state or family." - Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, rr. 34, 55; L. 48, 49, 78; l. 3, n. 103, q. 5; n. 149; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4.

Note: From the resolution of this question, the resolution of other questions is clear: whether it is licit to accept, offer, give, sell, or do something which another does not give, accept, receive, buy, or use without sin. In all these, scandal is by way of cooperation. Cf. 440.

Resolves: Therefore it is not licit to ask, for example, from a notary something opposed to his office. But it is licit to ask the sacraments from an unworthy minister, or an oath from one who is going to commit perjury, provided a just cause is present, namely for the first case, if there is necessity or notable spiritual utility; for the second, if a judge asks for an oath by reason of office, or it matters greatly to you, as by perjury for manifesting the frauds of another, so that you may obtain your right. A girl sins by accepting gifts from a lover if they proceed from shameful love, for they foster that shameful love; but otherwise, as is clear, if they proceed only from honorable benevolence and friendship, or if they are offered before others and cannot be refused without the scandal of others and her own infamy. In no way is it licit for an innkeeper, in order to allure more guests, ordinarily to admit gravely shameful dances in his house, or to propose to them for reading public papers which are evidently and ordinarily adverse to religion or good morals. In cities in which it is permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is licit to rent a house to a usurer and to a prostitute, especially if other tenants are lacking, or it is easy for them to rent another house, unless nevertheless the prostitute would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the location would give greater occasion to sins. It is not licit to call a non-Catholic minister so that he may furnish his helps of false religion to the sick or dying person. S. O. 15 Mar. 1848.

L. 47, 60, 61, 70, 76, 77, 79; l. 3, nn. 434, 734; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 11; q. 98, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 26.

It is licit to sell indifferent things, or things which can easily have a good use, if the seller knows nothing about the evil intention of the buyer, because evil is not to be presumed. Hence it is licit to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, wine, etc., although very many abuse these things, because these are not ordered per se to sin, indeed often they serve good use. - But it is not licit to sell these same indifferent things when it is certainly known that the buyer will use them badly, unless they could not be denied without grave inconvenience, or also unless they would equally be bought from others; for in this last case, if the seller sinned, this would be only because he does not impede the sin of neighbor. But although he did not sell, he would not thereby impede the sin; for there would be another who would sell. Hence it is not licit to sell honorable ornaments to a girl, if it were established to the seller concerning future abuse, unless he would suffer notable damage, or unless she would equally buy them from others. Thus La-Croix, l. 2, n. 263, and others. But St. Alphonsus, 71, does not admit this last case. Cf. here 442. It is not licit to sell wine without grave and proportionate cause to those who resell it mixed with water. Likewise it is not licit for an innkeeper to sell wine to those who are foreseen to be about to become drunk, or to offer flesh-meat to those who are going to eat it on a forbidden day, unless a grave reason excuses, for instance if otherwise he would be notably harmed from diminution of buyers. Hence it is also commonly licit for an innkeeper to give flesh-meat when it is asked, unless the request is made in contempt of religion, because it would be a most grave inconvenience to inquire about the reasons of each one asking. L. 68, 69, 78. Indeed it is generally licit for an innkeeper, at whose place public coaches stop, to set a table with licit or illicit foods, because since it is established that several are going to ask for flesh-meat, it does not seem necessary to ask from individuals what they wish. A fortiori it is licit to sell flesh-meat on days of abstinence and in the time of Lent, because the seller cannot judge concerning the reasons of those buying, nor does it pertain to him to inquire about them. L. l. 3, n. 1030.

But it is not licit to sell things which by their institution or use are destined for evil, unless in a particular case it is established that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a grave and proportionate reason excuses. Hence it is not licit to sell poison, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it well, e.g., for the making of colors, medicine, etc. Nor is it licit indiscriminately to sell depraved books, namely to any buyer. Nevertheless sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men who can read books of this sort usefully, e.g., for refuting them, etc. Except, however, books altogether obscene, which must be extirpated from the root. Tambur., in Decal., l. 1, § 4, n. 37; L. 66, 72, 76.

It is licit for workers to build and adorn theaters, if the ornaments are honorable in themselves, although another grave reason is lacking, because it is licit for Princes to permit spectacles. It is lawful, with the legitimate magistrate permitting, to restore and build synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, yet scandal and any contempt of religion being excluded, especially if it would equally be done without them. It is also licit to make statues of idols if these are not to be used for false worship, but for the adornment of streets, buildings, etc. On the contrary, it is not licit to build temples of idols, or to cooperate in their building; likewise it is not licit, so that danger of death or exile may be avoided, to build altars or idols, or to cooperate in their building, when this is had as a deed protestative of false religion. It is licit for Christian captives, from grave fear, to row in the galleys of infidels against Catholics. For they do nothing intrinsically evil, nor proximately pernicious to Christians. Besides, there is a most grave and proportionate cause for doing this. It is not licit to compose or represent gravely shameful comedies, whatever the profit may be. This also holds concerning shameful representations in Cinematographs. "Likewise those sin gravely who paint or publicly expose obscene images, namely with the shameful parts uncovered or covered with a thin veil; otherwise if, other parts being uncovered, the shameful parts are covered." L. 56. Yet except if something of this sort must be painted, e.g., for teaching or learning anatomical or obstetrical science. L. 73; l. 3, nn. 427-429; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1733, 1748, 1845; E. M. 365, 366, 367, 368.

842. 2. Malice of scandal. (A) Scandal directly willed is a grave sin from its genus, both against charity, and against the virtue to which the neighbor is induced to do injury.

(a) Scripture strictly reproves scandal:⁴ "But he that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come. Nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh!"

⁴ Matt. 18:6-7; cf. Mark 9:42; Luke 17:1.

(b) Truly, if God so loves men that, for their salvation, He handed over His only-begotten Son, if Christ gave His own blood for the redemption of souls, does not he gravely offend God and Christ who by word or deed induces others to sin, and wills to destroy those for whom the Redeemer died? - Again, if charity commands that we love the neighbor and sincerely desire his eternal salvation, if we are bound to correct the neighbor who is slipping, and to turn him away from evil, do we not sin gravely when we intend his spiritual ruin, and allure him to evil by words or examples?

843. Moreover the gravity of scandal depends upon many circumstances. (a) Generally speaking, scandal is grave when the sin to which another is moved is lethal; otherwise it is light. Hence a sin venial in itself can be mortal by reason of scandal, namely when the neighbor is induced to grave fault; on the contrary, a sin mortal in itself sometimes causes only light scandal, by reason of the circumstances. (b) Besides, the gravity of scandal depends much upon the influence of the scandalous action upon the ruin of the neighbor; and this influence can be greater if the person acting is constituted in dignity, or if the person suffering scandal is weaker in mind; thus, other things being equal, scandal given to younger persons is more grave, since they more easily contract depraved habits from it. Hence parents, superiors, priests, and religious ought carefully to abstain from less right actions, which furnish scandal much more easily to children, subjects, or laypersons than if they were performed by the common people.

(c) The gravity is also increased from the number of persons who are scandalized by the same action, although it is disputed whether scandal is multiplied numerically according to the number of these persons.

(d) Finally it depends most of all upon the foresight and intention of the agent: for nothing is willed unless first known; therefore, the graver the harms foreseen by the agent, the greater is the scandal.

From this it is inferred that scandal, even direct scandal, is sometimes light from lightness of matter, or lightness of influence, or from imperfect advertence.

845. (B) Indirect scandal is not licit, except when the action is good in itself or indifferent, the end of the agent is honorable, and a proportionately grave reason is had for permitting the sin of the neighbor. For then the principle concerning the indirect voluntary, set forth above, n. 175, can be applied.

(a) The Apostle inculcates this, setting forth the manner of acting concerning idolothytes, or foods which were offered to idols. Certain Christians, knowing that idols were nothing but vain images, did not doubt to eat idolothytes; but others suffered scandal from this, because they thought the eating of these things polluted the conscience. Paul indeed agreed with the former, but admonishes them not to furnish scandal to weaker brothers:⁶ "But take heed lest perhaps this your liberty become a stumbling-block to the weak. For if a man see him who hath knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not his conscience, being weak, be emboldened to eat those things which are sacrificed to idols? And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? Now when you sin thus against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, you sin against Christ. Wherefore, if meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother."

⁶ 1 Cor. 8:9-13.

(b) Reason suggests the same. For, on the one hand, we are generally bound, by the law of charity, to avoid whatever can induce the neighbor into sin, and therefore to abstain from an action on whose occasion we foresee that the neighbor will sin. On the other hand, however, if there is a grave reason for doing some act, private and public good demands that this act not be prohibited because of an evil effect which is foreseen to follow from the weakness or malice of the neighbor.

When, moreover, the good effect compensates the evil can be judged from the things already said, n. 175-181, and from the following rules.

846. Practical rules. (a) If there is question of works which, although not prohibited, nevertheless have in themselves the appearance of evil, one must generally abstain from them, unless an urgent and grave reason is present, or unless scandal can be removed by some explanation. Thus a priest ought to abstain from frequenting suspicious persons, even if he is moved by no depraved motive, unless a reason urges him to administer the sacraments to them; likewise a cleric ought to abstain from prohibited food, unless he informs those standing by that, on account of weak health, he has been dispensed from the law of abstinence.

(b) When there is question of good or indifferent works not prescribed, we are generally bound to omit them in order to avoid scandal, if this can be done without grave inconvenience; but not with grave inconvenience.

If a woman knows that she is shamefully loved by a determined man, so that she is for him an occasion of sinning, she ought to flee his sight, if she easily can, for example, by walking by another way, by not coming to a meeting where he will be present. But under this head she is not bound to abstain from every walk or recreation: for this would be too burdensome.

847. (c) If there is question of works prescribed by positive law, whether divine or human, they can be omitted on account of scandal, and indeed sometimes they ought to be, for a time, if a proportionately grave reason requires this. For when two precepts concur which cannot be fulfilled at the same time, generally the natural precept of avoiding scandal prevails, as the greater and stricter one.

Hence a girl who knows that a young man takes occasion from the sight of her for sinning can, and sometimes ought for a time, abstain from hearing Mass in the church where this young man is present. Likewise a wife can and ought sometimes to omit the hearing of Mass or fasting, if she foresees that her husband, in such or such a circumstance, will from this take occasion of blaspheming and despising religion. But I have said for a time, because we are indeed bound to defer a prescribed work in order to avoid a greater evil, but not for a long time or altogether to abstain from it, with great spiritual detriment. Wherefore, if a husband altogether forbids his wife to hear Mass or to make confession, the wife can abstain from these for a time, in the hope of alluring the man to better things; but, after some time, she ought sweetly and firmly to vindicate and exercise her rights.

848. Corollaries. (a) From this it is possible to understand what must be said about the scandal of the little ones and pharisaical scandal. Scandal of this kind is not active, or given, but passive, or received: if it arises from the ignorance or weakness of the one sinning, it is called scandal of the little ones; if from his malice, it is called pharisaical.

These things posited, scandal of the little ones is to be avoided whenever this can be done without grave inconvenience. For this is gathered from the text of Paul cited above, n. 845. Pharisaical scandal, however, is not necessarily to be avoided, provided there is even a slight reason for acting; for the whole malice of the act proceeds from him who is scandalized. Thus a priest, for a slight cause, can pass through streets where he will find haters of religion who for that reason will blaspheme.

(b) From the same principles the question can be solved whether it is licit not to remove an occasion of sinning, or even to place one, although it is foreseen that the neighbor will sin from it. Each is licit, provided a proportionately grave reason is had; for, of itself, to place such an occasion is not to cause evil, but only to permit it; which is licit for a just cause. Thus parents and masters can leave money in an open place, or purposely open a chest in which coins are stored, in order to test the fidelity of children or servants; for it is of great moment that they be able to correct or dismiss them, if they are found unfaithful.

The duties that arise in connection with the giving and taking of scandal may be briefly defined as follows:

1. It is a sin to give scandal (scandalum activum) knowingly and wilfully, because by so doing a man violates charity; it is a mortal sin if one knows that by committing the act in question he will become the occasion of mortal sin to another.

The guilt incurred by giving active scandal is measured by the position, reputation, and influence of the person who gives it. The larger the number of those who are injured, and the more grievous the sin they are induced to commit, the greater is the guilt of him who gives scandal. Nor is it necessary that the sin of one's fellowman be directly intended or directly caused by the scandalous act (seduction), but it suffices that his spiritual ruin was foreseen and so at least indirectly willed.

The gravity of this sin can be inferred from our Lord's solemn utterance recorded in the Gos- pel of St. Matthew: "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come: but nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh. And if thy hand or thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to go into life maimed or lame, than having two hands or feet, to be cast into everlasting fire. And if thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee having one eye to enter life, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire. See that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say to you, that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven."¹

¹ Matth. XVIII, 6 sqq.: “But whoever shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that an ass’s millstone be hung about his neck and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals. For scandals must needs come; nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes. And if thy hand or thy foot scandalizes thee, cut it off and cast it from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed or lame than, having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire. And if thy eye scandalizes thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life with one eye than, having two eyes, to be cast into the hell of fire. See that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.”

2. In regard to taking scandal (scandalum passivum) it is necessary to make a distinction. No attention need be paid to the scandalum pharisaicum, that is, one need not omit any act dictated by duty or necessity on account of the offence it may give to persons of a hypocritical turn of mind. This rule can be inferred from the conduct of Christ Himself and that of St. Paul.

When Our Lord declared: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man,"² and His disciples told Him that the Pharisees were scandalized by what He had said,³ He replied: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."⁴ St. Paul informed the Galatians that he would not yield to the false brethren who pretended to be shocked because the converts from paganism were not circumcised.⁵

² Matth. XV, 11: “Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man, but that which proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles a man.”

³ Matth. XV, 12.

⁴ Matth. XV, 14: “Let them alone: they are blind, and leaders of the blind.”

⁵ Gal. II, 3 sq.

As for the scandalum pusillorum, even the semblance of injustice should be avoided unless the act to which it attaches is dictated by strict duty.⁶ Whatever is necessary and a matter of duty may and should be done, but Christian prudence and charity will avoid giving needless offence to the weak and ignorant.

⁶ Rom. XIV, 13 sqq.; 1 Cor. VIII, 9 sqq.; X, 22 sqq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 43, art. 7 sq.

Regard for the pusilli should not, however, be carried so far as to give scandal to the mature and educated.⁷ The maxim, “In omnibus caritas,” is correct only when taken in conjunction with, “Ante omnia veritas.”

⁷ John VIII, 32, 36.—St. Gregory the Great, Hom. in Ezech., l. I, 7, n. 5: “Insofar as we can without sin, we ought to avoid scandalizing our neighbors. But if scandal is taken from the truth, it is more useful to allow scandal to arise than for the truth to be abandoned.” (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 842).—Cfr. St. Bernard, Epist., 34, n. 2: “It is better that scandal should arise than that the truth should be abandoned.” (P. L., CLXXXII, 140).—IDEM, Epist., 78, n. 10 (P. L., CLXXXII, 197); Apol. ad Guilielm., c. 7, n. 15 (CLXXXII, 908).

St. Paul's admonition: “Ab omni specie mala abstinete vos”¹¹ means, not that we should avoid the semblance of evil, but that we should abstain from evil in every shape.

¹¹ 1 Thess. V, 22: ἀπὸ παντὸς εἴδους πονηροῦ ἀπέχεσθε.

Women in our licentious days have a special duty to avoid giving scandal by an immodest and seductive attire.

The ethics of clothing have been explained in a previous volume of this Handbook.¹²

¹² Vol. III, pp. 27 sqq. On giving scandal by immodest dress see Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., l. II, pp. 123 sqq.

610. Obligation of avoiding scandal.

1. Pharisaic scandal is not necessarily to be avoided if there is some reasonable cause for acting.

The reason is that such scandal arises from the malice alone of him who takes scandal. This indeed is confirmed by the example of Christ, who answered the disciples saying: "Do you know that the Pharisees, having heard this word [concerning foods], have been scandalized? - Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind."¹²⁶ Sometimes, however, charity requires that even this scandal be avoided; e.g. a cleric is bound from charity, if he easily can, not to pass through a street where wicked men, seeing him, would break forth into blasphemies against religion.

2. The scandal of the little ones is to be avoided as often as this can be done without grave inconvenience.¹²⁷

The reason is that charity obliges us to prevent the evils of neighbor when it can be done easily. But if a notable inconvenience arises for the agent, then scandal of the little ones can be permitted; and this inconvenience ought to be the graver in proportion as the sin feared is graver, as it is more certainly foreseen as going to happen, and as there are more persons going to suffer scandal. Hence indifferent works, or works which are only of counsel, are sometimes to be omitted in order to avoid scandal of the little ones; e.g. a girl who knows that she is being foully desired by a young man is bound sometimes, but not for a long time, to omit hearing Mass on weekdays; indeed, according to several theologians, even once or twice on days of precept.¹²⁸ Likewise entrance into Religion ought to be deferred somewhat if otherwise parents would take grave scandal, and there exists hope that they will shortly give consent. On the contrary, no one is bound to pay more to some workman, even if he foresees that the man, notwithstanding the just price received, will blaspheme. The reason is that such a workman by a greater payment would be rendered still more insolent and worse another time. A parish priest who is not fasting could, indeed would be bound to, celebrate Mass if otherwise a great scandal would arise among the people. The reason is that the positive law of the Eucharistic fast ought to yield to the natural law of avoiding scandal. But never (as, moreover, is self-evident) is it licit to do something intrinsically evil in order to avoid scandal; e.g. it is not licit to deny the faith in order to avoid the blasphemies of heretics.

3. It is not a sin of scandal, from a just cause, to permit an occasion of sin or even to place it by some honorable action.

Thus St. Alphonsus¹²⁹ and theologians commonly. St. Thomas agrees, saying: "To induce someone to sin is licit in no way; nevertheless to use the sin of another for good is licit; because even God uses all sins for some good; for from any evil whatever He draws out some good";¹³⁰ and: "Sometimes a man, having his wife suspected of adultery, lays snares for her, so that he may be able to discover her with witnesses in the crime of fornication; and thus he can proceed to accusation."¹³¹ Hence Judith, for a most grave reason, offered Holofernes an occasion of sinning. The reason, however, is that to permit sin is not something evil in itself, since God also permits many sins. But for discerning in practice when it is licit to permit sin, those rules are to be applied which were given above, where there was treatment of the indirectly voluntary (n. 57 sqq.), namely when it is licit to place a cause from which there follows a double effect, one good, the other evil. E.g. it is licit for a master not to remove the occasion of stealing from sons and servants, so that, having been detected, they may be suitably punished and corrected; guards of gardens, orchards, and vineyards can hide themselves so that those doing damage may be apprehended; it is licit to borrow money from a usurer from a just cause, even if he is going to commit the sin of usury.

Certain questions are usually proposed and solved here by theologians, namely:

¹²⁶ Matth. 15, 12-14.

¹²⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 7 et 8.

¹²⁸ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 51.

¹²⁹ Ib. n. 58.

¹³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 78, a. 4.

¹³¹ Suppl. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.

958. Active scandal is defined: A less right word or deed furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is said:

1. word or deed, but not something desired, because a merely internal sin cannot furnish to another an occasion of sinning. But since affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed there also comes omission: not said, not done;

2. less right, that is, what according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if someone speaks of shameful things before an adolescent, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday before others who are ignorant, or works on Sunday: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except according as it has a defect of rectitude, because that which is properly right rather fortifies man against a fall than induces him to ruin;

3. furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this cause is his will alone, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that someone sin before others (for scandal does not fall upon the perfect man nor upon the altogether impious),¹ nor is it required that the ruin of neighbor in fact follow, but that an occasion be furnished to him, that is, that the action, either always or in these circumstances, of itself be naturally apt to move him to sin. But if the action does not move in itself, but by accident someone is moved to sin on account of it from his own disposition, the scandal will not be active, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, q. 43, a. 5; and St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. 2, n. 47, ad 5: "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does this before those who either are so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright that no one is moved to sin, for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, quarrels, or strikes another."

959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).

b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by an affirmative precept) to correct neighbor and to impede him from rushing into sin; therefore much more (by a negative precept) it obliges us not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.

It is mortal from its genus; because it can be venial not only on account of imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, if the other is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.

Moreover the sin of scandal is so much graver as the ruin of neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (for example, given before an adolescent or by a priest), and as the persons who are moved to sin are more numerous.

960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when someone is the true moral cause of the sin of neighbor, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, request to commit sin, etc.; - and indirect, when someone places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for neighbor, as an evil example is.

Direct scandal is a sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violating of which it induces neighbor; indirect scandal is a sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if someone by command, counsel, etc., has led someone to sin mortally, for example, to commit adultery, the species of sin to which he led him, in the case adultery, must be declared in confession; on the contrary, if someone has scandalized by evil example alone, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because any virtue obliges not only that we not violate it, but also that we not be a cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige that we not furnish to another the mere occasion of violating it, nor that we impede its violation. And indeed the sin of another cannot be imputed to us (directly and in itself) unless we are its cause. Whence he who only gave to another the occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound solidarily to restitution, and this is a sign that he did not sin against justice. And similarly concerning other virtues.²

² Do not say that it is indirectly imputed to us, insofar as we are bound to impede it, while direct and indirect voluntary are of the same species; - for we are bound to impede the sin of another insofar as it is his evil and is against charity, not insofar as it is such an evil and of such a species, and is against such a virtue.

961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it is formally and in itself intended (as an end), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor insofar as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or is simply intended (as a means), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor on account of his own utility or pleasure; - and implicit or interpretative, if someone does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action from which it can probably be feared that another will be drawn to sin.³

³ That scandal which is formally intended is called by St. Thomas active in itself, that is, from the intention of the agent or on the part of the one operating, "when someone by his inordinate word or deed intends to draw another to sinning," and it is called a special sin, because "the end gives species in morals"; - any other active scandal whatever, even direct, is only scandal by accident, or "besides the intention of the agent, as when someone by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will, and thus even active scandal is not a special sin, because what is by accident does not constitute a species." Thus in article 3; elsewhere St. Thomas uses similar terminology but in an entirely diverse sense, which must be carefully noted. For example, in article 1, ad 4, every active scandal is called a cause of sinning in itself, on the part of the work, "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sinning, or even if he does not intend this, the very deed is such that by its character it has that it is inductive to sinning"; - but in merely passive scandal, the deed of one is a cause of sinning for another by accident, "when both besides the intention of the one operating and besides the condition of the work someone badly disposed takes occasion" of sin.

But just as someone can sin by a merely internal act, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by a desire or affection for scandal, so also by an internal act someone can desire the sin of another more than he procures it externally by scandal. Hence if someone directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by merely indirect scandal, as if by evil example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affection against the virtue (for example, of chastity) which he intends to be violated, which must be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal, as being indirect, is against charity alone.

But if someone formally, with a diabolical intention, intends the sin of neighbor, he commits a special (that is, a distinct species) and most grave sin against charity toward neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as an end the special and most grave harm of neighbor, which is spiritual ruin. But the end gives species to human acts. Otherwise the character of scandal is as it were a circumstance changing the species of another sin.

962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as much as can be done: for if anyone from charity is bound to forestall the fall of another and to procure the amendment of one sinning (or erring), a fortiori he who through scandal was the occasion why another sinned is bound. The obligation arises from charity alone, because no injury is done to one knowing and willing; not, however, from justice or office, unless someone used unjust means, for example, deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects for whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to provide.

As regards the mode of reparation: 1. It suffices to repair implicitly indirect scandal given by example alone, namely, by cessation from scandal, good example, public reception of the sacraments, prayer for the one scandalized, etc.

2. Direct scandal, given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, depraved books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence is removed, and then the evil caused is compensated, so that he who suffered scandal may be recalled to good. Thus wicked counsel and false doctrine are to be recalled, machination against the Church is to be publicly detested, the diffusion of depraved books is to be impeded as much as can be done, and good books are to be written or spread.

3. Hence public scandal must also be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence may be removed, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all and profit them.

The mode of public reparation can be diverse: either a retraction drawn up in writing is published through public newspapers, or it is done before witnesses (two) who will afterwards publish the matter, or before the parish priest who will afterwards publish that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, provided it suffices for removing the scandal. But since the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that he who has not removed public scandal cannot be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed, the minister would commit scandal, because he would furnish an occasion of judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and that scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound first to leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. - In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, and bishops to determine the congruent mode of reparation.

963. Observations. - 1. It can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial scandal, for example, if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or immodesty, for example, if a religious utters a less honorable word before women or those who from it can take occasion of sinning mortally, or a priest keeps a suspect person at home.

2. Scandal can contain several other malices acceding to it, either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example, if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples: for these are bound not only from charity but also from office to forestall the ruin of subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to shameful things; or on account of the mode in which it is committed, if unjust means such as force or threats are employed.

3. "Some deed is not therefore scandal because another begins to suspect or think evil concerning such a man, because this latter does not sin if he suspects on account of sufficient indications. Nevertheless it is otherwise if he begins to think evil concerning the Catholic faith, the clergy, a religious order, or to be less disposed toward piety" (St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 44, 6). For it makes no difference whether the sin by which scandal is given furnishes an occasion for sins of the same species or for sins of a diverse species. Hence those give scandal more easily who are of greater authority, or piety, or esteem.

WE do not treat here of scandal per se special, or inherent; but of the general kind arising from an action alone.

MANY rules are given on this matter by Gregory of Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. puncto 4. Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 9. after D. Bonav. p. 1. Centil. sect. 31. whose full import Bassaeus delivers, 2. Scandalum, from num. 8.

THE FIRST is, that to avoid scandal it is not lawful to do a thing, or to omit one, which to do or to omit would be a sin mortal of itself intrinsically. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 7. and D. Bonav. loc. cit. and others cited below. The first reason is, because sin is not ordainable to good.

It is PROVED secondly: For, as it is said Rom. 3. Evils are not to be done that goods may come of them. And it is confirmed from the order of charity, for each man must keep himself more immune from spiritual ruin than another.

THE SECOND rule is, that neither is it lawful to do anything intrinsically venial. So D. Thom. art. 1. ad 5. Valentia loc. cit. and D. Bonav. above, Tanner. disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 9. Diana p. 5. tract. 7. resol. 21. and seq. Bass. num. 12. and others among these authors.

THE THIRD rule is, that to avoid the scandal of the weak, all those things are to be avoided which can be avoided without sin, lest the weak and simple fall. So D. Gregory homil. 7. in Ezech. Beda on cap. 9. of Mark, and the Doctors commonly.

It is PROVED from the nature of charity, which is bound to provide for the neighbor's salvation in necessity, if it can. So also D. Bonaventura after D. Bernard, and the Saintly Doctor gathers this from that passage of Matthew 17. But that we not scandalize them, go to the sea, etc. Truly Christ was not bound to the tribute, nor the Apostles. Bassaeus adds num. 12. that when their scandal cannot otherwise be avoided, they must be made capable of the thing.

THE SAINTLY Doctor gathers this rule also from the Gloss, on that passage Matt. 15. Know that the Pharisees, having heard this word, were scandalized, where it says: Everything that can be set aside, with the threefold truth preserved, namely of life, of doctrine, and of justice, is to be omitted on account of scandal. The Truth of life comprehends all actions conformable to reason, and therefore true, practically containing the precepts, indeed even the counsels. The Truth of doctrine contains those things which the duty of truth imposes on masters. The Truth of justice looks to Prelates, as to punishing the wicked and rewarding and sustaining the just, and therefore in relation to another. So nearly also Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. punct. 4. with Adriano quaest. 1. art. 2.

These things truly, after D. Hieronymo, are not to be omitted for fear of scandal. But if scandal arise from the mere malice of the beholder, it is to be despised, as the Saintly Doctor admonishes there on 6. of John, citing that passage Matt. 15. Let them alone: they are blind. The Saintly Doctor has the same doctrine on 18. of Luke on those words: It is impossible that scandals should not come. The Apostle said he would abstain from meats lest he scandalize, Rom. 14. and first Corinth. 8. because scandal could arise from it. See also Tanner at number 15.

THERE arises indeed the question: whether at some time, to avoid scandal, we are bound to omit some precept.

Vasquez denies it, opusc. de scandalo, art. 8. dub. 1. Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 1. disp. 96. dub. 1. Becanus 2. 2. Tom. 1. cap. 27. quaest. 5. Basilius Pont. de matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. 2. Castrus Palaus T. 1. tract. 6. punct. 16. num. 3. It seems gathered from Innocent III. cap. Cum ex iniuncto de novi operis nunciatione.

YET many AFFIRM it: Hurtado 1. 2. disp. 173. sect. 20. a §. 256. Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. punct. 4. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. num. 9. Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 8. concl. 2. Tanner. T. 3. quaest. 6. quaest. 6. dub. 9. num. 120. Gordonus Tom. 1. lib. 6. quaest. 16. cap. 5. §. 1. Sà on the word audire missa, num. 3. Lorca 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 8. num. 10. Henriquez lib. 8. cap. 47. Bannes brings the example of a woman who, lest she offend her jealous husband, omits the sacred rite.

DIANA Tom. 5. tract. 7. de scandalo judges both probable, but embraces the first more; Yet if anyone wishes to follow this latter one, he ought to attend to when precepts are to be omitted to avoid scandal, which Hurtado delivers §. 268.

FIRST, when the precept is human, and no evil follows from its omission, then it is to be avoided. For example. If I cannot hear the Sacred rite without giving someone occasion of grave anger, hatred, lust, I am bound to abstain from the Sacred rite. Valentia teaches the same loc. cit. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3.

YET they judge the OPPOSITE of a woman who would be an object of concupiscence if she went to the Sacred rite: Castro Palao T. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. punct. 16. Granado 2. 2. contr. 3. tract. 13. disp. 5. sect. 5. num. 28. Azorius tom. 2. lib. 12. cap. 18. quaestio 12. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, quaest. 43. art. 8. dub. 2. num. 27. Diana loc. cit. resol. 22. Tannerus num. 121.

BUT IF from the omission of the precept another grave harm to the neighbor impends, the precept is not to be passed over; e. g. if I am bound to assist a needy person, and another, on seeing it, would detract and judge wickedly of a suspected conversation with that person, e. g. a widow, I am bound to help her. Whatever Bannes may say at art. 8.

HENCE you may easily also discover: whether a woman is bound not to adorn herself, and not to go out in public, to avoid the scandal of others.

FOR I JUDGE that, no necessity existing, wanton adornments and empty outings are to be avoided. So many Doctors in Diana resol. 31. See also concerning the adornment of women Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. n. 10. Gordonum tom. 1. lib. 6. quaest. 16. cap. 5. §. 2. num. 15. Sanchez T. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 17. Layman lib. 2. t. 3. cap. 13. num. 11. quaest. 13. who nevertheless says that women adorning themselves, exposing their breasts bare, are excused according to the custom of their country.

THE DOCTORS also report VERY MANY cases, teaching when we are bound to undergo dangers to avoid scandal.

FIRST indeed the danger of damnation is not to be undergone, for instance if the necessity of confession presses, and no one is present except an unworthy Priest.

INDEED many, in Diana resol. 4., beyond necessity, assert it is lawful to seek the Sacrament from an unworthy minister exposed; for he is not thereby induced to sin; indeed it is lawful to seek it even from an excommunicate who has not the absolving power. So Sanchez de Matrim. tom. 2. lib. 7. disp. 9. n. 8. Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 113. sect. 18. §. 249. They rely on the decree of the Council of Constance, and of Martin V. Therefore it will not be a scandal to ask.

SECOND, SECOND, there would not be a sin of scandal in the painter, ¶ should he paint the disgraceful image of the lover of Amasia, to avoid death. So many with Diana resol. 5. Bassaeo. §. 5.

For that cause many, in Diana resol. 6., say it is permitted to paint an Idol; nevertheless that seems so evil that no excuse is left.

The same some say, in Diana resol. 27., of servants carrying disgraceful love letters; but this seems absurd, as Peter Ledesma notes, sum. tom. 1. tract. 27. cap. 9. diff. 3. and Martinus Ledesma in 2. p. q. quaest. 17. art. 7. Alphonsus de Leone de offic. Confess. tom. 1. recoll. 14. num. 63. Rebell. p. 1. lib. 2. quaest. 14. num. 53. Bonac. de matrim. quaest. 4. p. 14. num. 6. Laym. lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. and it seems Sanchez tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 7. num. 26. who nevertheless teaches the opposite lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 46. num. 34. as Diana notes.

SOME assert, in Diana resol. 28., that it is lawful for a servant, to avoid grave harm, to hand the ladder to his master ascending, to have intercourse with a woman. So also Bassaeus num. 10. §. 1. Similarly others, in Diana resol. 29., for a like cause, say a maidservant can lead her master's concubine into the house of the heir. Bassaeus in the place cited.

SIMILARLY many, in Diana resol. 30., say that Christian galley slaves can help the Turks in war, and in laying waste the houses of Christians, that they may avoid death. So also others with Bassaeo num. 10. excepting, however, the case in which, if they did not help in the war, they would give us the victory.

In the same manner, to avoid death, many say, in Diana resol. 33., that it is lawful to use the cap of the Jews, or the Turban of the Turks. So Gordonus Summa, Tom. 2. lib. 6. quaest. 12. cap. 9. §. 3. Duallius 2. 2. Tract. de fide, quaest. 3. art. 3. Vuigers 2. 2. quaest. 3. art. 2. num. 50. Tanner. tom. 3. disp. 1. quaest. 7. dub. 5. num. 110. Palaus Tom. 1. tract. 4. disp. 1. punct. 17. Coninch. de fide, disp. 15. dub. 3. concl. 8. Hurtadus 2. 2. disp. 48. sect. 3. §. 27.

Similarly others, in Diana resol. 34., say that under such necessity it is lawful to use garments and other signs instituted for superstitions. See them there.

SIMILARLY many say, in Diana resol. 35., that it is lawful for one passing through the lands of heretics to eat meats, to avoid grave harm.

NOR do others, on a like reasoning, assert, in Diana resol. 36., that it is lawful to sell an idol to a gentile, to avoid grave harm. See other cases in Diana himself there.

THEY ASK also: whether the rule holds that one must not seek money from a usurer, ready to commit the sin of usury, without an honest cause.

Palai ASSERTS it, Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. p. 10. Poncius de matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. num. 50. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, art. 8. num. 33. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. Molina Tom. 2. tract. 2. disp. 335.

BUT Hurtad. DENIES it more probably, 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 14. § 176. et 177. Diana resol. 8. Indeed Sanchez T. 1. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 27. Valentia tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 21. punct. 4. Molina de Iustitia T. 2. disp. 335. concl. 5. Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 78. art. 4. dub. 2. say that one may say to the usurer: give me a loan, even with interest, which opinion Suarez judges probable de Religione, T. 2. De Iurament. lib. 3. cap. 13. num. 9. Diana resol. 8.

From what has been said you have what must be said of the one paying usury; for the same reasoning holds in both cases. Wherefore Valentia judges the same of the one paying and the one seeking. See Diana resol. 12.

From what has been said also you have nearly the manner in which goods, whether spiritual or temporal, are to be given up on account of scandal; of which Tannerus treats dub. 9.

FIRST therefore every action having the appearance of evil is to be omitted, as D. Thom. says quaest. 43. art. 2. and commonly among Sylvestrum, Caietanum, and Sà, see Scandalum, according to that text Thessal. 5. From every appearance of evil abstain. And first Corinth. 6. All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient. In a case, however, of great utility, which would greatly outweigh the ensuing scandal, Tannerus judges it not illicit. Peter seems an example of this, whom many Fathers also excuse from sin, and yet he was reproved by Paul. Galat. 3.

THEN spiritual goods, here and now necessary to salvation, are not to be omitted to avoid scandal. So with Thom. art. 7. and D. Bonav. above, all Theologians teach.

THIRDLY, spiritual goods which are not necessary to salvation are not to be omitted on account of the scandal of the Scribes. So D. Thom. art. 7. and it is established by that text Matt. 15. Let them alone. See Bassaeus.

FOURTHLY, spiritual goods, not necessary to salvation, are to be deferred, lest the weak suffer scandal, until they become capable of them.

FIFTHLY, certain works ordered to removing scandal are to be omitted, if scandal would arise from them. Such is the punishment of certain criminals. So D. August. lib. 3. contra epistolam Parmen. cap. 2. Such also is fraternal correction.

1. When is one obliged to avoid giving scandal to others ?

We must of course avoid giving scandal to others by doing anything wrong ourselves which will lead them into sin. We are also obliged to omit any action which is indifferent or good but not of precept by which scandal would be given to the weak or ignorant, if we can do so without serious inconvenience. We may not omit in this case an action which is prescribed by natural law; whether we are bound to omit what is prescribed by positive law is a disputed question among theologians. We are not bound to avoid pharisaic scandal by omitting an action which is good or indifferent and which has no appearance of evil.

3. What is the obligation of omitting works both of precept and of counsel in order to avoid scandal?

158. Thesis IX. We are obliged to refrain from giving scandal.

Explanation. Our duty towards the will of our fellow-man amounts to this: that, in charity, we ought to aid him in the attainment of his highest good, and, in justice as well as in charity, we must never deter him therefrom. We may so deter him, and thus become accessory to another's wrongdoing, in various ways, and especially by bad example, all of which we include under the general term, scandal. For scandal may be given by any word or deed not entirely right, which is an occasion of wrongdoing on the part of others.

Proof. We are obliged to will that others should attain their last end (Thesis VII.). But to give scandal is to will the contrary, because it tends to lead men away from their last end. Therefore, we are obliged to refrain from giving scandal.