VI. On Scandal

What is scandal? - Scandal is defined: a word or deed less right, offering to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. Word or deed, under which name omission also is understood. Less right, i.e., what either is evil in itself, as if you speak shameful things before a youth, or has the appearance of evil, as if, from a just cause, you eat flesh-meat on a forbidden day before others ignorant of that cause. Less right; for those things which are and appear right are expedient and edify. Offering occasion; although, metaphysically speaking, occasion is not the same as cause, nevertheless here that occasion is a true moral cause; for since the neighbor is really enticed by it and induced to sin, it exercises a true moral influence. Therefore a fortiori induction or solicitation and provocation to sin participates in the malice of scandal, which consequently contains the malice of direct scandal. Of spiritual ruin, namely mortal or only venial sin. Therefore spiritual ruin is not rumor, or the wonder of others, and a fortiori horror concerning the deed committed; but grave suspicions and rash judgments of others, detractions, calumnies, etc. Yet scandal is still had if occasion is given to another of sinning only materially, e.g., if another does the same, believing it to be licit, for instance if a priest offers an unconsecrated host to be adored. - Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 1; de Cens., d. 6, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1; L. 43.

How many kinds of scandal are there? - Scandal is one kind direct, another indirect, according as the ruin of neighbor, or sin, either is intended, or, although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen, at least in confusion. And if the spiritual ruin of neighbor is intended, or the offense of God, it is called diabolical, against charity toward neighbor and God; but otherwise, if only the sin is intended, e.g., of fornication, but not as the spiritual ruin of another or as offense of God. - Likewise scandal is one kind active, another passive. Active is scandal given, and this is that to which the given definition belongs. Passive is scandal received, and is the spiritual ruin itself of the neighbor, which is improperly called scandal, since it should better be called the effect of scandal.

But scandal can be active, or given, without being passive or received, because an action apt per se for scandal can be posited without the effect following. And conversely it can be received without being given; but then scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones if it flows from the infirmity or ignorance of neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. L. 43; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1 ad 4; a. 3; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 127.

Resolves: It is not always scandal if you sin before others, but only when, attention being paid to circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin may be drawn to sin. Hence blasphemy uttered before religious and pious men does not have the account of scandal, but of horror and abomination. Likewise it is not scandal to sin before vile and infamous persons who already for another reason are about to sin, as if someone fornicates before others who are already prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example. - L. 43, 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 5; Struggl, q. 5, n. 29.

What kind of sin is scandal? Scandal is a grave sin from its genus, having a special specific malice, whether it is direct or indirect. Proof of the first part. Christ the Lord exclaims: Woe to the world because of scandals...! Woe to that man by whom scandal comes! Matt. 18:7. Therefore scandal from its genus, unless namely smallness of matter excuses, is a grave sin. Proof of the second part. Scandal is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of the sins of our neighbor is intended. Therefore it has a special specific malice against charity toward neighbor. Proof of the third part. "For if charity obliges one to correct neighbor and to impede him, when we can, lest he fall into sin, how much more does it oblige one not to impel him to sin by counsel or example?" L. 45; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 1, 4; E. M. 422.

Resolves: He sins only venially by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of only venial ruin. This is true even if he directly intends that ruin, and indeed through a mortal act. For charity is not then gravely injured. On the contrary, he sins gravely by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of mortal ruin, although he does this through an indifferent work, or only a venial one, e.g., if a religious utters joking and slightly shameful words before women, or before those who can take from them occasion of mortal sin. L. 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 4, 6; Ithur., Cas. 35.

Scandal given, as it is against charity, so from the same charity must be repaired. For if charity obliges us to correct a sinning neighbor, lest he sin, much more is he bound to draw neighbor back from sin who brought him into sin by scandal. It is regularly repaired by ceasing from scandal, by giving good example, by frequenting church and the sacraments, by detesting delicts and crimes. And if someone has spread false doctrines, by revoking and publicly retracting them.

What is the special malice of scandal? In direct scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue to whose violation the neighbor is induced. But in indirect scandal, both the opinion affirming and the opinion denying this other special malice are probable. Proof of the first part: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2.

Because any virtue prohibits not only that someone injure it, but also that he will and cause it to be injured by others. Proof of the second part: 1. because for each opinion there are grave theologians. 2. Because, as the indirect voluntary suffices for sinning, so also it suffices for sinning against such a virtue with respect to which it is indirectly voluntary; whence it is that in morals the direct and indirect voluntary pertain to the same species. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue which is injured by the neighbor. But against this is that virtues do not oblige us to impede in others opposed vices, even if foreseen, but only that we not intend and procure that others injure them. It is proper only to charity alone to forbid giving another an occasion of injuring it. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is not given sin against the virtue which the neighbor violates. "For just as in natural things that which is per accidens does not constitute species, so neither in moral things, in which that which is intended is per se, but what follows beside intention is as it were per accidens." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1. - Lugo, de Poen., d. 16, nn. 159, 168; Struggl, q. 5, n. 21 seqq.; L. 44, 45, 46, 47; l. 3, n. 537.

Resolves: It suffices in Confession to express generally the sin of scandal, nor is it necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary that circumstances be expressed which perhaps add species to the sins of others, e.g., whether those who could be induced to lust by a shameful speech or picture are married or bound by vow, etc. The circumstance of soliciting and inducing another to sin, e.g., to fornication, is only an aggravating circumstance, and therefore it suffices to confess the fornication alone. For the same malice of induction or scandal is had, although less, when someone does not solicit but only consents; for by consenting he still participates with the other in his sin, and is a cooperating cause toward his ruin. Therefore this malice is only more aggravated within the same species if someone positively solicits another. And the same must be said about shameful conversation and similar things. Thus Lugo, whose opinion seems sufficiently probable to St. Alphonsus, "since even in cooperation toward fornication there is present a sin against charity, well distinct from the sin of cooperation toward fornication, by cooperating toward the ruin of the other party." L. 46.

Must scandal of the little ones be avoided? - Scandal of the little ones or weak must be avoided, as often as it can be done without grave inconvenience, both by omission of an indifferent work and by omission of a good work not commanded. Proof. Because from charity we are bound to impede the evil of neighbor when we easily can, e.g., by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by delaying it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc., when neighbor falls into that danger from a cause given by us. But the little ones or weak fall into that danger from a cause in some way given by us; for although our action of itself does not influence the sin of neighbor, nevertheless in fact it influences it, although this is because of the ignorance and infirmity of neighbor. Therefore. 1 Cor. 8:7 seqq. Hence it is clear that scandal of the little ones is not purely received, but in some way given, namely given not by reason of the work done, but by reason of the circumstances in which that work is done, although these are entirely extrinsic. L. 48; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Must pharisaical scandal also be avoided? - Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work, or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. Proof. Such scandal arises from the sole malice of him who receives scandal, and for this reason is in no way given, but purely received. But charity in no way obliges us to impede the sins of others which are altogether voluntary to them and altogether independent of our manner of acting, at least ordinarily; for charity does not urge with so great an inconvenience. Therefore. Matt. 15:14. Ordinarily; for "if care concerning the good of neighbor can oblige one to doing good, why not also sometimes to omitting it? Especially since man is thereby deprived of no spiritual good... because this very thing, namely to deprive oneself of the merit of that work because of the good of neighbor, will be a greater merit than the good work itself. Whence in works of counsel the matter is clear." Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 3, n. 9. The case could be if, for example, fruit were hoped for from delaying a good work. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1723. But if the pharisaical scandal were for impeding spiritual goods, then it would altogether have to be contemned. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Is it licit to advise a lesser evil to someone already determined to carry out a greater one? Some deny it, because he who advises a lesser evil truly advises evil. Others more probably affirm it, because this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that the greater sin not be committed. Therefore formally it advises only good. And Sanchez with the Salmanticenses adds that this is licit not only for private persons, but also for confessors, parents, and others upon whom from office it is incumbent to impede the sins of subjects. L. 57; l. 5, n. 77.

Resolves: It is licit to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, for example, from committing homicide. L. l. 5, n. 77. Cf. 337. - It is licit to advise one willing to inflict greater harm upon one person to inflict lesser harm upon the same person. The same person, because by reason of justice the same does not seem licit with respect to another determinate person, at least ordinarily and speaking per se, because then that counsel is a true cause, of itself efficacious, of another's harm, and unjust; for the other is not bound to suffer that harm, whence he would be reasonably unwilling. Ordinarily and speaking per se; for, as Viva affirms, prop. 36 Innoc.

XI, to one wishing to steal something from Peter, because of which Peter would be reduced to extreme poverty, it could be advised that he steal a little from Paul, a very rich man, who otherwise would be irrationally unwilling in this. Indeed there are those who hold that it is licit to advise a lesser evil even with respect to a different determinate person, because this is always only to turn away from a greater evil, and not also to induce to a lesser, and it is confirmed by the example of Lot, who offered his daughters to be violated in place of the guests. Gen. 19:1 seqq. Sanch., de Matr., l. 7, d. 11, n. 16 seqq.; Vasquez, Opusc. de Scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14; L. l. 3, n. 565; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, de Scand., r. 36.

Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected, and even to set it up? - R. Affirmatively, when the other is judged probably to be ready from another source to continue the sin. The reason is that to permit is not to induce to sinning, and there is a sufficient reason for permitting; because the permission is then impeditive of a greater evil, for one sin is permitted lest several be done. Likewise even to set up the occasion of sin is not from its nature to induce to sin, but is an act of itself indifferent, from which a twofold effect follows, one good, which is intended, the other evil, beside the intention of the agent and from the malice of the sinner; and besides there is a sufficient reason for positing that act. Thus more probably, and it can be confirmed by the example of Judith, who, when she saw that the permission of lust in Holofernes would be an impediment of very many evils for the whole Israelite people, voluntarily set before him an occasion, namely her adornment; and nevertheless in this they commonly judge that she did not sin. Judith 10. - Struggl, q. 5, n. 34; L. 58.

Resolves: It is lawful for a father and master not to remove an occasion of stealing from sons or servants, when they know them nevertheless to be inclined and ready to steal, so that thus, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses. It is licit for a keeper of fields to hide himself, so that he may catch those causing damage and keep himself safe from the danger of damage to come. L. l. c.; S. Th. S. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

Does a girl sin mortally by presenting herself to be seen by a man who will suffer scandal? St. Alphonsus, 53, has these things: "Busemb., St. Antoninus, Sylvius, Navarrus, etc., affirm it.... But Cajetan, Sanchez, etc., very probably deny that she sins gravely. For it suffices, as they say, for excusing her, at least from mortal sin, the cause that she not be deprived of her own liberty, since on the one hand this scandal is not given, but received from the malice of the man; and on the other hand the matter would be very inconvenient for the woman and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not. But I could not excuse her from mortal sin if she, led by vanity, although she does not intend the scandal of that man, deliberately offers herself to his sight. Hence Sporer, Diana, Hurtado, rightly say that a woman is bound under grave sin to avoid the scandal of a determinate man, if she can conveniently go to another church, proceed by another way, abstain from a window, and similar things. Yet this is not to be understood for a long time, but only for one or another time, until the other can notice that he is being fled by her; and Sporer asserts that all consent in this. Nor could I excuse a woman from mortal sin if she sought some place which she would not go to unless she knew her lover was there."

Resolves: A woman who, from adornment even fitting to her state, probably foresees that someone in particular will fall mortally, is bound for a brief time to put it aside, or to flee the sight of such a one. For a brief time, because for a long time it would be too grave for her. But if the same thing were feared in particular from superfluous, vain adornment not fitting to her state, which to assume for the sake of vanity, other things being excluded, is only venial, she would be bound, speaking per se, to put it aside altogether, even under mortal sin, because she has no right to that adornment, and on the other hand is bound to avoid another's sin when she conveniently can.

Speaking per se, for since superfluous adornments, practically speaking, soon pass into the custom of the country's women who are honorable, it cannot be said absolutely that such a woman does not have a right to follow the custom of her country, nor is grave inconvenience lacking. If a woman thinks not so much in particular, but only in general, that some will be scandalized in her, provided she does not intend their lasciviousness nor take pleasure in it, although she may be pleased that she is praised as beautiful, she does not seem to be bound to abstain from that adornment, even superfluous, under mortal sin, e.g., by painting the face, etc.

The reason is both because the scandal is rather received than given, and that adornment and beauty only remotely provokes to sin, and because it would be too grave for that sex, especially if she seeks a husband, perpetually to abstain thus; since that occasion is universal and perpetual, and more beautiful women would never licitly go outside, since natural beauty moves more than artificial beauty. As to the custom of women walking with the breast uncovered, if the uncovering were not immoderate, and in some place there were a custom that women walk in this way, it would indeed be reproved, but not altogether condemned as mortal sin. The reason is the very common opinion of doctors, and because the breast is not a part vehemently provoking to lasciviousness, and custom diminishes the force of concupiscence. Thus St. Alphonsus, 55. - L. 53, 54, 55; l. 3, n. 425; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169, aa. 1, 2; S. Antonin., p. 2, t. 4, c. 5; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, r. 9.

Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal? R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking; for either a great loss of money must be suffered, and charity toward neighbor does not urge with so great an inconvenience; or there is only a light loss of money, and this, since it could occur rather often, already easily becomes grave. Besides, it would harm the common good, because an occasion would be given to wicked persons of extorting and seizing others' things, and it would be harmful to the wicked themselves, since thus they would be confirmed in their depraved will. Ordinarily speaking; for if, in some particular case, grave inconvenience ceases, and the scandal were not of Pharisees but of little ones, then either temporal goods must be given up, or the scandal must be calmed through some admonition. L. 52; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 8.

Resolves: You are not bound to pay more than is fair to a worker or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme. - A parish priest is not bound to give up stole fees, although he foresees that several will detract. - These persons sin not because of infirmity, but because of their own improbitity, and therefore regularly no care is to be taken for them.

Are precepts sometimes to be omitted because of scandal?

R. Negatively, if from that omission one's own salvation would be endangered, or grave harm would be imminent to others, especially to the community. Hence spiritual goods necessary for salvation neither ought nor can anyone give up because of anyone's scandal. R. Negatively also, if that omission is intrinsically evil. Therefore negative natural precepts likewise neither ought nor can be omitted. - As to affirmative natural precepts, per se and generally, they are not to be passed over. For scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. Nevertheless they can sometimes be omitted; indeed they even must be omitted if, all things prudently weighed, it is better to avoid the ruin of neighbor, and grave harm does not come to us from it. Yet more truly it is said in that case that those precepts cease and do not oblige, e.g., of correcting sinners, or punishing delinquents, when harm is feared more than fruit is hoped for.

As to positive human precepts there is controversy. The first probable opinion denies, because again the scandal is not properly given, but received; and therefore the precept does not cease. The second probable opinion affirms, grave inconvenience being excluded, because the precept of avoiding the scandal of neighbor, as natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone if she goes to the prescribed Mass is bound to omit it once or again, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; yet not several times because of the grave inconvenience which would follow from it. Nevertheless several others, no less probably, hold that she can rightly omit Mass once or again, but is not bound to this. She can, because of the probability of the latter opinion. She is not bound, because again the scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. But it must be noted here that the present controversy also has place only in scandal which someone in particular can suffer; but by no means when there is a general fear that perhaps someone may be scandalized, because this would be too difficult. Likewise the matter concerns only the scandal of the little ones; for if the scandal were pharisaical, occasion would be given for maliciously always impeding good things. - Struggl, q. 5, nn. 30, 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7; L. 50, 51, 52.

Is it a sin of scandal to ask something from another which he will not furnish without sin, when he is already prepared to sin? St. Alphonsus, 47, has these things: "If the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil of itself, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin, as is asking fornication from a prepared prostitute, several doctors are not lacking who say that it is not a sin of scandal, because since such a woman is always in actual or virtual will of sinning, he who offers her the occasion of executing that sin is judged to cooperate not gravely, but lightly. Thus Soto, Henriquez, Azor, Valentia, etc. I venerate the authority of such great doctors, but I would not dare to depart from the contrary opinion, which I judge must be followed, and which Sanchez holds with Cajetan, etc. The reason seems very powerful to me, because, although the prostitute is in actual will of sinning, nevertheless certainly she inflicts on herself a much greater ruin by completing in act that particular sin of fornication.

Therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating the sin sins gravely in two ways, both against charity and against chastity." "If the thing which is asked is indifferent, and can rightly be furnished without sin, as would be asking a loan from a usurer and similar things, the first opinion holds that it is not a grave sin to ask without just cause. The reason is that, since that usurer already has a deliberate will of sinning, you will not inflict grave harm upon him if you propose to him an occasion by which he may execute sin beside your intention. For that anticipation of the external work varies his sin only accidentally. (If you do not ask now, another asking will soon come, and he will certainly give. And this also holds for the preceding case.) Thus Lugo, Cajetan, etc. The second opinion, which we embrace, holds that this is a mortal sin both against charity and against the virtue toward whose injury occasion is offered to neighbor, by asking from him a loan, etc., without grave cause; for when there is a grave cause, the one asking is altogether excused. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4, Elbel, etc. The reason is that since the sinner by the external act inflicts a notably greater ruin on himself, he cannot be excused from grave sin against charity who without grave cause cooperates with him toward executing the work.... But when we have a grave cause for asking, we cannot abstain from asking without grave inconvenience, and therefore then indeed we excuse.

Thus Busemb., Sanchez, Valentia, etc." "But Sporer, Pontas, etc., note that for licitly asking a loan from a usurer, precise necessity is not required, but any notable utility suffices, whether for the conservation or for the decency of state or family." - Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, rr. 34, 55; L. 48, 49, 78; l. 3, n. 103, q. 5; n. 149; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4.

Note: From the resolution of this question, the resolution of other questions is clear: whether it is licit to accept, offer, give, sell, or do something which another does not give, accept, receive, buy, or use without sin. In all these, scandal is by way of cooperation. Cf. 440.

Resolves: Therefore it is not licit to ask, for example, from a notary something opposed to his office. But it is licit to ask the sacraments from an unworthy minister, or an oath from one who is going to commit perjury, provided a just cause is present, namely for the first case, if there is necessity or notable spiritual utility; for the second, if a judge asks for an oath by reason of office, or it matters greatly to you, as by perjury for manifesting the frauds of another, so that you may obtain your right. A girl sins by accepting gifts from a lover if they proceed from shameful love, for they foster that shameful love; but otherwise, as is clear, if they proceed only from honorable benevolence and friendship, or if they are offered before others and cannot be refused without the scandal of others and her own infamy. In no way is it licit for an innkeeper, in order to allure more guests, ordinarily to admit gravely shameful dances in his house, or to propose to them for reading public papers which are evidently and ordinarily adverse to religion or good morals. In cities in which it is permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is licit to rent a house to a usurer and to a prostitute, especially if other tenants are lacking, or it is easy for them to rent another house, unless nevertheless the prostitute would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the location would give greater occasion to sins. It is not licit to call a non-Catholic minister so that he may furnish his helps of false religion to the sick or dying person. S. O. 15 Mar. 1848.

L. 47, 60, 61, 70, 76, 77, 79; l. 3, nn. 434, 734; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 11; q. 98, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 26.

It is licit to sell indifferent things, or things which can easily have a good use, if the seller knows nothing about the evil intention of the buyer, because evil is not to be presumed. Hence it is licit to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, wine, etc., although very many abuse these things, because these are not ordered per se to sin, indeed often they serve good use. - But it is not licit to sell these same indifferent things when it is certainly known that the buyer will use them badly, unless they could not be denied without grave inconvenience, or also unless they would equally be bought from others; for in this last case, if the seller sinned, this would be only because he does not impede the sin of neighbor. But although he did not sell, he would not thereby impede the sin; for there would be another who would sell. Hence it is not licit to sell honorable ornaments to a girl, if it were established to the seller concerning future abuse, unless he would suffer notable damage, or unless she would equally buy them from others. Thus La-Croix, l. 2, n. 263, and others. But St. Alphonsus, 71, does not admit this last case. Cf. here 442. It is not licit to sell wine without grave and proportionate cause to those who resell it mixed with water. Likewise it is not licit for an innkeeper to sell wine to those who are foreseen to be about to become drunk, or to offer flesh-meat to those who are going to eat it on a forbidden day, unless a grave reason excuses, for instance if otherwise he would be notably harmed from diminution of buyers. Hence it is also commonly licit for an innkeeper to give flesh-meat when it is asked, unless the request is made in contempt of religion, because it would be a most grave inconvenience to inquire about the reasons of each one asking. L. 68, 69, 78. Indeed it is generally licit for an innkeeper, at whose place public coaches stop, to set a table with licit or illicit foods, because since it is established that several are going to ask for flesh-meat, it does not seem necessary to ask from individuals what they wish. A fortiori it is licit to sell flesh-meat on days of abstinence and in the time of Lent, because the seller cannot judge concerning the reasons of those buying, nor does it pertain to him to inquire about them. L. l. 3, n. 1030.

But it is not licit to sell things which by their institution or use are destined for evil, unless in a particular case it is established that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a grave and proportionate reason excuses. Hence it is not licit to sell poison, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it well, e.g., for the making of colors, medicine, etc. Nor is it licit indiscriminately to sell depraved books, namely to any buyer. Nevertheless sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men who can read books of this sort usefully, e.g., for refuting them, etc. Except, however, books altogether obscene, which must be extirpated from the root. Tambur., in Decal., l. 1, § 4, n. 37; L. 66, 72, 76.

It is licit for workers to build and adorn theaters, if the ornaments are honorable in themselves, although another grave reason is lacking, because it is licit for Princes to permit spectacles. It is lawful, with the legitimate magistrate permitting, to restore and build synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, yet scandal and any contempt of religion being excluded, especially if it would equally be done without them. It is also licit to make statues of idols if these are not to be used for false worship, but for the adornment of streets, buildings, etc. On the contrary, it is not licit to build temples of idols, or to cooperate in their building; likewise it is not licit, so that danger of death or exile may be avoided, to build altars or idols, or to cooperate in their building, when this is had as a deed protestative of false religion. It is licit for Christian captives, from grave fear, to row in the galleys of infidels against Catholics. For they do nothing intrinsically evil, nor proximately pernicious to Christians. Besides, there is a most grave and proportionate cause for doing this. It is not licit to compose or represent gravely shameful comedies, whatever the profit may be. This also holds concerning shameful representations in Cinematographs. "Likewise those sin gravely who paint or publicly expose obscene images, namely with the shameful parts uncovered or covered with a thin veil; otherwise if, other parts being uncovered, the shameful parts are covered." L. 56. Yet except if something of this sort must be painted, e.g., for teaching or learning anatomical or obstetrical science. L. 73; l. 3, nn. 427-429; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1733, 1748, 1845; E. M. 365, 366, 367, 368.

Is it never licit to cooperate in another's sin? - Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the depraved action of another. Cooperation is: 1. immediate or mediate, according as the one cooperating acts with the one sinning in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another. 2. Proximate or remote, according as the action of the one cooperating is more nearly or more remotely connected, from its nature or from circumstances, with the depraved action of another. 3. Positive or negative, according as the one cooperating either posits some action influencing the sin of another, e.g., by helping him, or omits a due act, e.g., if he does not oppose when he ought to oppose. 4. Formal or material. Formal cooperation concurs in the evil will of another, and cannot exist without sin, as intending cooperation itself toward the depraved action of another, either by the explicit intention of the one operating, or by an implicit intention in the work itself, which by its nature is ordered to the depraved action. Material cooperation concurs only in the evil action of another, without any intention of cooperating in sin, neither in actu signato nor in actu exercito.

As scandal, so cooperation can be had in two ways: 1. by inducing another to sin, and this is properly scandal; 2. by acting in some way together with him who sins, and this is properly cooperation; and it has the same malice in species as scandal, namely both against charity and against the virtue which another injures by sinning, when the cooperation is formal. It is certain that formal cooperation is never licit, since this morally influences the sin of another, and consequently is its moral cause. Material cooperation is licit, provided: 1. the action is per se good, or at least indifferent; 2. one is not bound from office to impede the sin; 3. there is present a just and proportionate cause according to the gravity of the sin of another and the proximity of concurrence toward the execution of the sin. The reason is that when you furnish an honorable or indifferent action, without depraved intention, if another wishes to abuse it for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore by positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin; for his sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action.

A proportionate cause; for since the obligation of avoiding that action arises from the obligation of the virtue to which the neighbor's sin is opposed, and the obligation of every virtue is not equal, but some things approach more, some less, to sin; besides, there is not always equal certainty that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; nor indeed is the right to the action always the same, but sometimes greater, sometimes less; therefore an equal cause will not always be proportionate for furnishing this cooperation, but sometimes a greater, sometimes a lesser one will be necessary. Hence a more urgent cause is desired when the sin is against justice than against charity alone, and such a cause as can rightly be preferred to another's harm. The reason is that in the former an innocent person unwillingly suffers damage; but in the latter the one sinning alone undergoes spiritual detriment, and this by his own will, which same detriment he suffers when he sins against justice. - But when from the circumstances scandal can be had, and material cooperation in sin can signify consent in sin, a protestation must be premised. - Sanch., l. 1, c. 7, n. 12; L. 59, 63; cf. here 212; E. M. 440.

Resolves: It is lawful for a servant to open the door to a prostitute, because material cooperation of this sort is sufficiently remote, especially while, even if he did not open, there would still be someone who would open. It is certainly not illicit if a servant saddles the master's horse when he is going away to sin, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more in the master's sin than by opening the door to a prostitute. It is licit for a servant to accompany his master to the house of a concubine when, even without the servant as companion, the master would go, and he is not thereby rendered more bold, because then it is mere accompanying; and service itself sufficiently excuses. Thus Busemb. and others. But St. Alphonsus, 63, 64, and others excuse this case and the preceding only from fear of grave harm. But if the master should use the servant as companion so that he may sin more safely and freely, then it would certainly be illicit, because he would already proximately influence the sin. Likewise it would be altogether illicit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or carry a ladder for, the master ascending to fornicate, to open a door by force, and similar things; for the cooperation is altogether proximate, and makes sin easier, to the most grave harm of a third party. Nevertheless, since these actions are not intrinsically evil, they would still not be illicit if fear of death or mutilation acceded. St. Alphonsus adds, 66, that no other fear excuses the one cooperating except fear of death; for otherwise, because of mere fear of loss of goods or infamy, it is not licit to concur in the dishonoring of a girl to be deflowered. Sporer, de 8 Pr., c. 1, n. 99, also excuses a servant carrying gifts to a prostitute, "because," he says, "on the one hand he from his office and condition is bound to serve and obey masters; but on the other hand cooperation in sin is merely material and only remote." But others require another very grave reason, because since these gifts are apt for fostering lust, the cooperation is proximate. And because of this same reason it is not licit for a servant to carry love letters to the concubine of his master, unless a graver and proportionate reason is present. Nevertheless others, as concerning carrying gifts, so concerning letters to be carried, do not require this special reason beyond service itself. For here it does not seem to be necessary to attend whether the letters or gifts have force for fostering shameful love, but the very action of carrying letters or gifts must be considered, which of itself is indifferent. Otherwise, since sight has greater force for fostering shameful love, it will not be licit even to open the door. Moreover the servant is not bound to inquire what is contained in letters. - L. 63-68, 75; l. 3, n. 571; Salm., tr. 21, c. 3, n. 72; Sanch., in Dec., l. 1, c. 7, nn. 22, 23.

Political elections are permitted in Italy, in particular cases, when by reason of necessity, because of the good of souls and of the Church, Bishops request it from the Holy See. Pius X, Encyclical Letter, 11 June 1905. They were also declared licit in France, in the present circumstances of things, 2 Apr. 1906, yet with the consent of one's own Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place. Likewise in Spain, from the declaration of 20 Feb. 1906, party zeal being set aside, Catholics ought to labor so that those may enter the assemblies of cities and of the kingdom who will better provide for the good of religion and the fatherland. Cf. E. M. 440, 441.

Is it licit to serve prostitutes or concubinarians? Is it licit for Catholics to attend civil funerals? R. To the first. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both because of the scandal of others and also because of the greatest danger of falling. Therefore those cases which are to be excepted in practice will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and the circumstances of persons, removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning. R. To the second. Affirmatively, per se, because the homage is merely civil. Per accidens, by reason of scandal, it can easily be illicit.

Is it ever licit to cooperate in publishing depraved books? - In this matter, indeed, the author sins by the sin of scandal; the publisher and the owner of the printing house by the sin of cooperation. But as to others who devote labor to the printing of these books, generally it does not seem licit immediately to cooperate in the printing of such books, e.g., to arrange types, place paper on the types, direct the printing, etc., because this approaches very closely to spreading the depraved doctrine of books. Nevertheless, in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, something of this sort could be materially furnished, since the matter finally is not intrinsically illicit. But it is licit, from a grave cause, to cooperate mediately or remotely, e.g., to prepare ink or paper, or to arrange printed books. Laymann, de Carit., c. 13, n. 4. But sellers are numbered among proximate cooperators, and therefore, generally speaking, they sin gravely.

If someone has received a depraved book lent by another to be read, can he restore it to the owner? - R. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience persuades otherwise. This flows of its own accord from the obligation of impeding the sins of others by reason of charity, when this can be done without grave inconvenience. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner.