Mistakes of the confessor and restitution

ONE who culpably causes unjust harm to another is bound in justice to repair that harm as far as he can. Even if the action which causes harm to another is done innocently, there will nevertheless arise an obligation to prevent the harm as far as possible as soon as the danger is noticed, and if there is grave negligence in doing this without reasonable excuse, injustice will be committed and the obligation of making restitution incurred. A confessor who admits a penitent to confession is bound in justice to absolve him if he is properly disposed for absolution. And so if he has neglected to do so, he must repair the error afterward, especially if the penitent were in danger of death and may die in sin without sacramental absolution.

Similarly, if the confessor gave his penitent false instruction in faith or morals, or bad advice, or bound him to make restitution when he was under no obligation to do so by the law of God, or released him from such an obligation when he was really under it, the confessor must afterward correct his mistake, taking the precaution to ask the penitent’s leave to say something to him about his confession if an opportunity is afforded him only out of confession. When the penitent was wrongfully compelled to make restitution with grave fault on the part of the confessor, the latter is bound in justice to make him restitution for the loss that he has suffered, if he cannot otherwise recover his money. The confessor is in the same way bound to make restitution to the defrauded creditor when, with grave fault, he released a penitent from the obligation of paying a just debt, if in consequence the penitent is now unwilling or unable to fulfil his obligation.

If the confessor merely neglected to impose a penance, or supply for the deficiency of the penitent’s confession by questioning him, or failed to correct some mistake that he was labouring under, or to warn him of the obligation of making restitution, he did not thereby sin against justice, and he is not bound to make restitution, unless indeed in the circumstances his silence was equivalent to positive approval. Still, if knowingly and wilfully he did any of these things, he committed sin, and in as far as harm to his penitent or to others ensued he violated charity, which obliges every man to do what he can to prevent loss and damage to others. Even out of confession if he can prevent harm being caused by his failure to do his duty in the confessional, he should with the penitent’s leave do his best to prevent it.

A defect committed in confession can regard either the validity, or the integrity of the confession, or another obligation.

I. A defect concerning validity is committed if the confessor does not absolve the penitent who is to be absolved, or does not absolve validly. Now a defect of this kind must of itself be repaired, and indeed from justice, because a tacit contract has intervened between confessor and penitent (St. Alphonsus, VI, 619). I said "of itself," for, considering the inconvenience often annexed to reparation, the obligation of repairing the defect is often lacking. For the rest, the obligation is more determined by these points:

1. If grave damage threatens the penitent, for instance if there is danger that he or she will die in the state of sin or remain in it for a long time, the confessor must repair the defect, and indeed with grave inconvenience: 1. if he committed it with grave fault; 2. if, although grave fault is absent, the confessor is a pastor, or the penitent is in grave danger of eternal damnation (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. If grave damage does not threaten the penitent, for instance if he or she has confessed again to another confessor, or is judged shortly to be going to confess; if, being at least attrite, which disposition can be presumed, he or she received the Holy Eucharist, the obligation of repairing the defect committed, and of admonishing the penitent about the invalidity of the prior confession, is had almost only insofar as there is an obligation of consulting for the integrity of the confession that will follow; in other words, the obligation of procuring that the penitent in the following confession subject again to the keys the sins of the prior confession. Of this obligation there will be discussion under II.

Corollary. If a penitent, not absolved or not validly absolved, returns to the same confessor, the latter is not bound to admonish him or her about the invalidity of the prior confession, provided that he consults for the integrity of the confession; to obtain this end it suffices to induce the penitent to accuse himself or herself collectively of the sins already confessed in the prior confession.

II. A defect concerning integrity must be repaired or supplied in this way:

1. If the confessor acted negatively, by not questioning when there was an obligation of questioning, he is not bound to supply the defect unless the penitent returns; in that case he is bound, because otherwise this new confession would not be integral (St. Alphonsus, VI, 620).

2. If the confessor positively induced the penitent to a defect of integrity, he is bound from justice to reparation, and indeed with grave inconvenience if he sinned gravely, with lesser inconvenience if he sinned lightly. If he did not sin, he is not bound, because admonition outside confession cannot be made without inconvenience (St. Alphonsus, cited place). I said above: he is bound from justice, because by a lie he took from the penitent the liberty of confessing in such a way as to be immune from the burden of integrity.

III. A defect concerning an obligation distinct from the obligation of integrity is to be repaired or supplied in this way:

1. If the confessor acted negatively, one must distinguish:

a) If from the uncorrected defect no grave damage threatens either the penitent or a third party, he is not bound to supply the defect unless the penitent returns.

b) If from the uncorrected defect grave damage threatens either the penitent or a third party, for instance if he did not admonish the penitent concerning the obligation of avoiding an occasion or of making restitution, the confessor is bound from charity to correct the defect, if it can conveniently be done. A graver or lighter inconvenience excuses according as the defect was committed with grave or light fault or without fault (St. Alphonsus, VI, 621).

2. If the confessor positively induced an error, one must likewise distinguish:

a) If from the uncorrected defect no grave damage threatens either the penitent or a third party, for instance if the confessor undeservedly exempted the penitent from the obligation of fasting, he is indeed bound of himself to correct the defect, because he is bound to prevent the cause of violating the law from remaining. But in practice there will easily be an excusing reason, especially if the confessor was not gravely culpable (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

b) If from the defect grave damage threatens either the penitent or a third party, for instance if he undeservedly exempted the penitent from the obligation of avoiding an occasion or of making restitution, he is bound from justice to repair the defect, and indeed with grave inconvenience if he committed the defect with grave fault; otherwise with lesser inconvenience (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Insofar as the confessor himself can be bound to restitution because of a defect committed, see vol. I, n. 1005.

Corollary. If the penitent has departed but is foreseen to be going to return in time, it suffices to wait and to repair the defect in confession. Outside this case the defect cannot be repaired without the penitent being admonished about it outside confession. Now admonition of this kind, as being of a nature to introduce shame, cannot be made without the license of the penitent, except in the case in which the confessor omitted absolution through forgetfulness; for manifestation of this omission brings in no burden (St. Alphonsus, VI, 622).

Manner of Repairing Defects Made in Hearing a Confession.—(a) The Reparation to be Made.—If the penitent has been deprived of absolution, he should be absolved; if he has been wrongly instructed, he should be set right; if temporal loss has been caused, temporal restitution should be made.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Should Be Made.—The injured person should be compensated. Hence if restitution was mistakenly imposed on the penitent and he cannot recover his property, the confessor should reimburse him; if the penitent was mistakenly excused from restitution, payment is due the third party who loses by the advice.

(e) The Manner of Making Reparation.—If possible, the reparation should be made in the penitent’s next confession, as this is less troublesome to all concerned. But if the confessor has wrongly instructed the penitent in an important matter, he is bound more probably (after obtaining the penitent’s permission to speak about confession matter) to retract, even outside of the confessional, if this can be done without scandal or other serious evil, which would be rare.

Excuses from the Duty of Repairing Mistakes.—(a) Physical Impossibility.—If the confessor does not know who the penitent is or cannot find him, there is nothing to do but to repent over the mistake and to pray for the penitent that God may provide for him.

(b) Moral Impossibility.—Grave inconvenience excuses, unless the confessor has been seriously at fault against justice (e.g., by omitting absolution, by giving incorrect instruction in an important matter, by neglecting to warn against an occasion of serious sin, by wrongly advising on restitution of a large sum), or the salvation of a soul is at stake, as when an unabsolved penitent is dying (see 1797 sqq.)

1. Alphonsus, a confessor, does not grant absolution to penitents unless he is altogether certain of their good dispositions. Hence he always grants absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time; but afterward he always denies absolution to all relapsers and those in occasions, unless first the former abstain from every relapse and the latter remove the occasion. Finally, he always defers absolution for all when he himself is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitents.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. The manner of acting of Alphonsus cannot be approved, and he seems not to act well in all things. For first, so that the confessor can grant absolution, it is by no means required that he have complete certainty about the good dispositions of the penitent; but "it is enough that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent, and that on the other side a prudent suspicion of indisposition not stand in the way; otherwise hardly anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs of penitents furnish only probability of disposition." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 461.

Always to grant absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time is not right. For the fact that relapsers and those in occasions of this sort have not previously approached confession, or have approached only once and again, certainly is not an argument of the good disposition of those penitents, who can well approach confession without the necessary contrition. Therefore the norm of absolution to be given cannot be that the penitent confesses the first or second or third time, but the prudent judgment in the confessor concerning sorrow and purpose. Indeed, "the penitent must be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and altogether to abstain, provided that the confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously." Sporer, c. 2, n. 330, cited by St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463, as handing down the common opinion.

It is also not right always to deny absolution to relapsers, unless first they abstain from every relapse. If it were so, then that would have to be deleted which is contained in the Roman Ritual, Order of Administering the Sacrament of Penance: "But to those confessing more rarely or later, or easily falling back into sins, it will have been most useful to counsel that they confess often, say once in a month, or on certain solemn days, and, if it is expedient, communicate." How will they be able to communicate unless they are first absolved? Nevertheless there is question also of relapsers, and of relapsers easily falling back into sin.

Likewise it is not right always to deny absolution to those in occasions, unless first they remove the occasion. For first, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 457 at the end, affirms to be held most commonly, any penitent and always can be absolved who approaches confession with true sorrow and purpose, so that hope of amendment shines forth. Besides, an occasion can be voluntary, from which one can withdraw by his own will; but it can also be necessary, which one cannot remove; nor indeed is he bound to remove it, speaking absolutely, but he is bound only to render it remote from proximate, by using the means which a prudent and discreet confessor will suggest. Therefore if the penitent truly uses these means and tries not to sin, although in fact he has sinned, he can still sincerely grieve and propose; and the very means used and the effort employed can be an argument of that sincere sorrow and purpose. Indeed even still, after experience of no progress, true sorrow and the required purpose can stand, without the will of taking away the occasion with so great a detriment. Therefore the penitent can be absolved. For nothing else is required except confession with sorrow and purpose. Finally, as St. Alphonsus also says, l. 6, n. 454: "The doctors commonly affirm that the penitent is not bound to dismiss the occasion, if otherwise he is going to suffer grave temporal harm, provided meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means ... The reason is that the occasion of sinning is not in itself a sin, nor does it bring a necessity of sinning; wherefore true detestation of sins, and a firm purpose of not relapsing and of using due remedies, can well stand together with it."

It is likewise not right that absolution is always to be deferred when the confessor is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitent. For even in that case of doubt absolution is to be given, although conditionally, if from absolution denied grave spiritual harm of the penitent would follow. Gury, Comp., vol. 2, n. 435.

Therefore it must be said that in this matter of absolution to be granted, deferred, or denied, "a certain rule cannot be established, but the confessor must direct himself from the occurring circumstances." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463. And from circumstances of this sort he will easily be able to form a prudent judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent. And, if the priest, clothed with the bowels of the mercy of Christ, who did not come to call the just but sinners, knows how to act studiously, patiently, meekly with those penitents who seem unprepared, and by every industry of charity to stir them to sorrow and purpose, it will indeed be difficult for them not to exhibit some sufficient sign of their mind. Cf. Commentarium De absolutione danda, differenda, deneganda, ed. 5.

691. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether a Confessor is held to restitution if from grave negligence or ignorance he omitted to warn the penitent about restitution to be made?

Resp. More probably negatively. For although from office the Confessor is held to instruct the penitent well, and therefore sins gravely if he omits this when it is necessary, nevertheless he is not held to this from an obligation toward a third party. Except if the silence of the Confessor is equivalent to positive approval, for example, if when asked he so declines a response that the absence of obligation is suggested to the penitent. - St. Lig., n. 578. - Lugo. - Suarez, and others commonly.

Q. 2. Whether servants are held to restitution when culpably ¹ they do not impede damages which are brought upon the master?

¹ Some fault could be present even short of the obligation of restoring, when they are held from charity alone; for in the present matter an obligation from charity can be present even in those cases in which no obligation of justice is present.

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, as it seems ², if it is a matter of damage inflicted by outsiders. The reason is that by the very fact that servants are admitted into the family, they are judged to undertake the obligation of defending it against outsiders. - St. Lig., l. 3, n. 344. - Lugo, Vogler, etc.

² The word it seems, from the sentence of St. Thomas, is the word of one opining. And in this sense it is more probable that the Author used it. Indeed Lugo (De Iust., Disp. 19, n. 106), however much, with Soto, Navarro, and Lessius alleged, he adheres to this sentence, does not conceal that just as many adhered to the opposite one, namely Molina, Rebellus, Azor, and Bonacina. Therefore the Confessor ought to abstain from urging the obligation of restitution.

Resp. 2. More probably negatively, if it is a matter of damage inflicted by other servants, unless the thing had been specially committed to them; because hired servants do not seem to be hired except for labor and for defending the household from outsiders. - St. Lig., ibid. - Others nevertheless dissent not improbably ³.

³ On this matter Lugo (Disp. 19, n. 105): All admit that he is not held when he sees theft being done by another domestic servant, unless care and custody has been committed to him by a special office. Therefore the opposite opinion must be held as the anomaly of some more recent author. But Lugo adds these things as regards practice: A servant would also be held when a key is given to him for taking something out of some place, because for that time the custody of that place is entrusted to him. Those also are held who have care of the pantry, or are placed over the custody and vigilance of domestic things or the household.

643. Principles. - I. An error concerning the validity of the Sacrament committed with grave fault or grave negligence, supposing grave harm to the penitent ¹, must be repaired even with grave inconvenience to the Confessor. The reason is that the Confessor, from his office and from the quasi-contract entered into with the penitent, is bound to administer the Sacrament rightly to him. But if the error is inculpable or lightly culpable, the Confessor is indeed bound from justice ², but with lesser inconvenience. - St. Ligorius, no. 619.

¹ Grave harm or danger to the penitent would be present if, for example, you absolved altogether invalidly or in no manner a sick person near death who would for that reason incur danger to eternal salvation; or also, as St. Alphonsus says (no. 619), if the penitent were in grave danger of not confessing again, for example, while he undertakes a long sea journey. But this grave harm to the penitent would be absent when, even if the Confessor absolves beyond his faculties from reserved censures and sins, or imparted absolution altogether invalidly or in no manner, nevertheless, in the first case the reserved sins would also have been indirectly remitted to the penitent in good faith, as we suppose, while in the other cases a remedy would not be lacking either in the reception of the Eucharist, which per accidens, according to the common doctrine with St. Thomas, would confer first grace upon a man having attrition, or in a subsequent confession with another priest, by which even the preceding sins would be indirectly remitted, no differently than happens with sins omitted through forgetfulness.

But when that grave danger threatens the penitent, and accordingly the Confessor must admonish the penitent in order to repair the error, there are some who say generally that permission must be sought from him, because according to the common opinion the seal forbids the priest to speak, even with the penitent himself after a completed confession, about matters heard in it, etc.; and if the penitent refuses permission, nothing remains to be done by the Confessor. But St. Alphonsus (no. 622) deservedly excepts the case of absolution imparted either in no manner or invalidly. The reason is that, when the Confessor merely says, for example, that he did not absolve him, surely neither shame is cast upon the penitent nor does any reproach of sin intervene, and accordingly the reason why the penitent would be unwilling and the confession would thereby be rendered burdensome is absent. These are the causes why a priest, spontaneously mixing conversation with the penitent about things heard from him in Confession, is judged to act against the seal. For the rest, in the case the Confessor would not be bound to acknowledge that he culpably erred; it would suffice to say that an error intervened, or even more simply that it is necessary for him to absolve him again. But if the penitent, not yet admonished, returns to the same Confessor, it will not even be necessary to admonish him concerning the error; for if he is excited to sorrow for all the sins previously confessed also, the present absolution will be directly terminated also to the preceding sins.

² St. Alphonsus, whom the Author alleges in this place, prefers that a Confessor who has erred inculpably is bound only from charity, unless he is the pastor of the penitent. But, as seems truer to others, the priest indeed hears the confession from charity; nevertheless, after the confession has been heard, he is bound from justice to complete the Sacrament, because he is bound from his office, however spontaneously undertaken, and from a certain quasi-contract. This condition of the Confessor remains the same even if he has erred without fault. Therefore, according as the error was culpable or inculpable, the obligation of the Confessor will differ, not because it presses now from justice and now from charity, but only as the obligation of keeping another unharmed differs according as harm is inflicted through a formal injury or a merely material one; or also as the obligation of restoring a thing unjustly taken away differs from the obligation of seeking the owner of a thing which someone found by chance. For the latter indeed undertakes the care of the thing from charity, but after this care has been undertaken he is bound, not from charity but from justice, to guard the thing and, as the circumstances require, to seek its owner.

** The VV., about to defend the holy Doctor Alphonsus, construct nearly eight columns (pp. 621-624) against this Note. Thus, therefore, they argue (p. 623): If someone gratuitously received a deposit from mere charity, he nevertheless is bound from justice to preserve and guard the thing with that diligence with which diligent men are accustomed to preserve and guard things of this kind.... But if, after the aforesaid diligence has been employed, the thing perishes or deteriorates without any fault, he is bound to nothing at all from the title of justice. And concerning the example proposed in the Note they add: After he has received the thing found, though from mere charity, into his deposit and care, he is bound from justice not only to seek the owner, as the circumstances require, but also to guard the thing with ordinary diligence; but if the thing perishes or deteriorates without fault on his part, and afterward the owner claims it, he is bound to nothing. And from these things they conclude: Therefore, there is no obligation from the title of justice for a Confessor who has erred inculpably to repair the harm. But if the Confessor is nevertheless bound, he is bound only from charity, and indeed from that general law of charity by which we are obliged to assist our neighbor and to avert temporal and spiritual harms from him insofar as this can be done without grave inconvenience.

Reply. I deny the Supposition and accordingly the parity; and from this I deny the Consequent and the Consequence. The supposition is that through the error of the Confessor the matter has been brought into such a state that it cannot be repaired through those means to which the same Confessor is bound from his office, just as provision cannot be made through that diligence to which a depositary is bound for a thing deposited which has already perished without the fault of the depositary. But that this is manifestly false appears from the very state of the question. For if the error of the Confessor is supposed irreparable, it is wrongly disputed whether he is bound to correct it from justice or only from charity. Moreover, St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 619) affirms that the Confessor is bound from charity to amend his error. Therefore, the question does not concern a thing reduced to such a condition that it can be compared with a deposited thing which has already perished.

In its own manner, a somewhat more fitting comparison would be with a depositary who through an inculpable error perhaps sold or gave away the thing deposited, or placed it in a place in which he afterward observed that it would perhaps perish or suffer harm. Let the question then be posed: Would this man be bound from charity alone, or rather from justice, to recover the thing perhaps sold or given away, if it can be done, or to remove the thing from the place in which it would suffer harm? And still more clearly to our matter: Would the diligence to which the depositary is bound from justice require that, in the hypothesis, he take care to recover the thing handed over to another, or remove it from a harmful place, or would we call this an office of mere charity? Let it therefore be concluded that the VV. deduced a false consequence from an incongruous parity.

Nor, indeed, was St. Alphonsus led by such a parity or argument when he asserted that in the hypothesis the Confessor is obliged from charity alone to admonish the penitent concerning an error committed by himself. The holy Doctor (loc. cit.) seems to have used this reasoning: the obligation in the case does not press under grave inconvenience; therefore the Confessor is bound from charity alone. Yet none of the Doctors whom St. Alphonsus alleges there reasons thus. For all derive the obligation of admonishing from the office of the Confessor, however much they add that in the hypothesis it does not press with great detriment or inconvenience. De Lugo explains the matter well (On Penance, disputation 22, no. 62), whom St. Alphonsus also alleges:

Everyone (De Lugo says) is bound FROM JUSTICE not only not to inflict evil directly and purposely upon his neighbor, but also to take care, insofar as he CONVENIENTLY CAN, that harm contrary to the right of his neighbor does not arise from his action; for example, if you inadvertently set fire to another's house, you are bound from justice, as soon as you notice it, to extinguish the fire if you can conveniently do so, although another who did not set the fire would be bound not from justice but from charity to extinguish it. For although the action was inculpable, it was nevertheless yours, and you are bound to take care that your neighbor suffer no detriment in his own goods from your action, if you conveniently can; for this obligation is lesser than that other obligation of not harming positively, and therefore you are not bound to this unless you can conveniently prevent it. Likewise, if in good faith you defamed someone, thinking that the crime which you had heard about him was true, you ought afterward, if you conveniently can, once the error is known, to repair his reputation and extinguish the fire of reputation which you had inculpably kindled. But the same De Lugo (loc. cit.) had excellently premised this principle, namely, when the error happens without grave fault: Then, he says, according to the rule established above it must be said that he ought, if he conveniently can, to admonish the penitent concerning the error; OTHERWISE THE IGNORANCE OF THE PENITENT WILL NOW BEGIN TO BE IMPUTED TO HIM.

II. An error concerning the accidents of the Sacrament is not to be repaired outside confession if the Confessor conducted himself in this matter only negatively, even culpably. The reason is that the Confessor is not bound to procure the integrity of the Sacrament and the utility of the penitent except in confession, as a spiritual physician and minister of the Sacrament. But an error is to be repaired even outside confession if it was committed positively and with grave fault, because by natural law everyone must remove the cause of evil which he positively and voluntarily placed ³. Nevertheless, the permission of the penitent must be sought; if the penitent denies it, the Confessor is bound to nothing further. - St. Ligorius, no. 620.

³ That the Author seems to require for the obligation of admonishing outside confession that the error was committed with grave fault appears indeed to be against the more common opinion of the Doctors. They (see De Lugo, On Penance, disputation 22, no. 63, and St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 620) concede only that one who has erred to the harm of the penitent without fault or with light fault is excused from giving the admonition by a lighter cause than if the error proceeded from grave fault. In this matter, there are moreover to be weighed, on the one hand, the inconvenience and detriment of the Confessor in admonishing, as well as whatever burden there may be to the penitent in renewing a discourse about the matter of confession, and, on the other hand, the harm or danger to be feared from the error. This can be lighter, if, for example, the Confessor erroneously said that the penitent is not bound to fast or to hear Mass and things of this kind; or graver, if, for example, the Confessor so deceived the penitent that he remains in a proximate occasion, or does not remove a scandal, or contracts an invalid marriage, etc.

III. There will be no obligation to admonish outside confession if the defect concerns the integrity of confession, because this error can scarcely, or not even scarcely, harm the penitent or others ⁴. - Thus commonly.

⁴ Some distinction seems to be employed here. For it is one thing if the Confessor merely did not take care that the confession be integral; it is another, as De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 22, no. 73), if he was the positive cause why the penitent did not confess integrally, saying, for example, that it was not necessary to confess the species or number of sins. In the first case, the doctrine of the Author avails; concerning this see Suarez (On Penance, disputation 32, section 6, no. 8). In the other case, those things which were said in the preceding note rather have place. Yet there are two things which seem to diminish this obligation of admonishing outside confession. One is that in the following confession another Confessor will ask both the species and the number and will instruct the penitent who perhaps hesitates on account of the error with which he had been imbued, and accordingly will correct the error; and from this the necessity of admonition ceases. The other is the fact that in the case an admonition, from the nature of the matter, which necessarily concerns grave sins, introduces a discourse about them and thereby brings great shame to the penitent; and for this reason his offense can deservedly be feared. Hence a fortiori that which St. Alphonsus (no. 619) had observed concerning the omission of an admonition in the case of invalid absolution avails: for in our case more than in that case this offense and burden to the penitent arise of themselves.

644. Questions. - QUESTION 1. To what is a Confessor bound who improperly released a penitent from making restitution, or, on the contrary, obliged him to it?

Reply 1. If from malice, vincible ignorance, or grave negligence he improperly released the penitent, he is bound to correct the error; and if he does not correct it, or if the penitent, who otherwise would have made restitution, has meanwhile become unable to make restitution, the Confessor himself is bound to make restitution in his place, because he violated the right of the creditor, namely, by impeding the restitution owed to him.

Reply 2. Likewise, if from malice or grave ignorance or negligence he obliged the penitent to undue restitution, he is bound from justice to retract the error; and if the penitent has already made restitution, he is bound to compensate him for the harm.

Reply 3. If inculpably or from light negligence he improperly obliged the penitent or released him from the obligation, he is bound from justice to correct the error, but not with so grave an inconvenience. The reason is that, on the one hand, everyone is bound from justice to prevent his own action, even an inculpable one, from causing another a harm which he can easily prevent; and, on the other hand, an obligation with grave inconvenience does not ordinarily arise from light fault or merely material fault. - St. Ligorius, no. 621.

645. • QUESTION 2. To what is a Confessor bound who omitted to admonish a penitent concerning restitution to be made?

Reply 1. If he foresees the harm, he is bound to admonish the penitent concerning the obligation with some inconvenience, if no fault or only light fault intervened, at least by reason of charity; but with greater inconvenience if he sinned gravely in the omission. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, no. 624.

Reply 2. More probably, he is not bound to make restitution, even if he sinned gravely by omitting the admonition. The reason is that the Confessor is not bound from justice to prevent harm to the one to whom restitution is owed. Recall the things said in the Treatise on Justice and Right, where negative cooperators are discussed, no. 691. - St. Ligorius, ibid.

646. • QUESTION 3. Is one bound to restitution who from only light fault released a penitent from the obligation of making restitution, if he afterward neglects to admonish him when he can easily do so?

Reply. Yes. The reason is that, although the Confessor released the penitent from restitution without at least grave fault, nevertheless, since his counsel continues to influence the harm of the creditor, once the error is known he is bound from justice to remove the cause of the harm, if he can easily do so. - St. Ligorius, no. 622, and others commonly.

QUESTION 4. Can a Confessor, without the permission of the penitent, speak with him outside confession about a defect committed in confession?

Reply. No, if the penitent has already departed. The reason is that this admonition outside confession is burdensome to the penitent. Moreover, after absolution the judgment is complete; nor does it matter that the admonition is made to repair a defect of the same confession. - St. Ligorius, no. 622; Lacroix, no. 1776, etc. Nevertheless, if the error of the Confessor brings the penitent into danger of salvation, for example, if he had not absolved him, he could, even without permission being sought, disclose his error abruptly by saying, for example, that he had not absolved him. Surely in this way neither is the seal broken nor can a reasonable offense of the penitent be present. - St. Ligorius, no. 619.

491. Principle: An error invalidating the sacrament, committed from grave fault of the confessor, and with grave harm of the penitent still persevering, must from justice be repaired under grave obligation, even with grave harm of the confessor. It is certain.

For the confessor, from a quasi-contract with the penitent, and therefore from justice, is bound to impart valid absolution to one rightly disposed; therefore, if from grave fault he has absolved invalidly, by that very fact he is an unjust damager, and so he is bound under grave obligation to repair the grave harm unjustly inflicted, even with grave inconvenience.

It is said: (a) from grave fault, because if the error was committed without fault or with only light fault, say from forgetfulness or a certain negligence, there is indeed an obligation of repairing the harm, at least from charity, but not with great inconvenience; - unless, however, the penitent were in grave danger of dying in the state of mortal sin, because he is in the article of death;¹ or in probable danger of no longer confessing, because he is about to undertake a long and dangerous journey.

¹ Nor is the priest excused from this office by the fact that he administered viaticum to the dying person; for it is very probable, but not certain, that by viaticum mortal sins are remitted for him who is in good faith (De Sacramentis, n. 54); now when there is question of eternal salvation, the safer part is to be followed. Cf. Lehmk., n. 471, note 1.

(b) From fault of the confessor; for if the error comes from the part of the penitent, because, for example, he was knowingly indisposed, the confessor is indeed bound to repair the harm as a cooperator, but not so strictly, except in the case of extreme necessity, because the penitent can provide for himself otherwise, by making a new confession.

(c) With grave harm still persevering; for if the harm is light, for example, because the penitent had not accused mortal sins; or if the harm does not persevere, because the penitent approached another confessor by whom he was validly absolved, the obligation no longer urges.

492. Manner of repairing the defect. (a) If defects are detected immediately or shortly after confession, and the penitent is still morally present, he can be absolved again, even without a previous warning, provided it is established that he is rightly disposed; if he is too far away, he should be recalled to the sacred tribunal, if this can be done without inconvenience; otherwise, the confessor himself should approach the penitent and absolve him.

(b) But if the error was not repaired immediately or after a short time, let the confessor induce the penitent to confess again to him; let him exhort him to be sorry not only for those accused in the present confession, but for the past ones, especially for those accused in the last confession; and let him absolve him rightly.

(c) But if this cannot be done, the confessor, after first obtaining from the penitent permission to speak with him about a matter pertaining to confession, should warn him of the invalidity of the absolution, so that the error may be repaired.

493. When the error concerns not the validity but the integrity of the sacrament, a distinction must be made:

(a) If the error was positively committed, so that the penitent was deceived from the words or manner of acting of the confessor concerning some doctrine (for example, understood that such a sin is light which in reality is grave, or that it is not necessary to accuse individual mortal sins), the confessor is bound to correct the error, even outside confession, after first obtaining the permission of the penitent, provided this can be done without grave harm or scandal. For each one is bound to repair the harm which he has positively inflicted and to remove its cause: and this in the case cannot be done except by correcting the error. - But if this cannot be done without grave harm, he is not bound to warn the penitent outside confession: for grave harm excuses from material integrity, and the error can afterward be corrected in confession.

(b) If the error was only negatively admitted, for example, from the fact that the confessor omitted to question about species and number, or to prescribe proper remedies, the confessor must not repair the defect outside confession; because on the one hand such a defect is accidental and easily reparable, and on the other a warning outside confession often brings annoyance to the penitent. But when the penitent has returned to the same confessor, the defect is to be corrected, since this can be done without grave inconvenience.

494. When the error admitted concerned the obligations of the penitent, with temporal harm of a third party or of the penitent himself, which can occur in the matter of restitution, a distinction must be made:

(a) If the confessor positively and culpably (which is to be understood of grave fault) led the penitent into error, for example, by asserting that restitution must be made when no such obligation was urgent at all, or vice versa, he is bound under grave obligation from justice, even with grave inconvenience, to correct the error, whether within or outside confession (permission having first been obtained). For each one is bound to guard against harm following for others from his action; and if he has culpably omitted to do this, or then only warned when the penitent has already become unable to repair the injustice, the confessor is bound to repair the harm itself that followed from this action, since he is truly the efficacious, unjust, and culpable cause of this harm, insofar as he is an unjust cooperator or counselor. - But if the confessor corrected the error at an opportune time, he is bound to nothing, because he is no longer the efficacious cause of the harm.

But one who, without grave fault, positively committed an error of this kind, is indeed bound from justice to warn the penitent, but not with grave inconvenience; but if he culpably did not correct the error when he could conveniently have done this, he is bound to restitution, not indeed by reason of the error, which is inculpable, but by reason of the omitted retraction, which is truly the unjust and efficacious cause of the harm.

495. (b) If the confessor behaved only negatively, even if culpably, by omitting to warn the penitent about restitution to be made, - not from justice, but only from charity is he bound afterward to warn the penitent. For he is not obliged from justice in the sacred tribunal to guard against harm to a third party, but only to procure the good of the penitent; therefore if he is silent about restitution to be made, he is not guilty of injustice; unless, however, the penitent had asked the confessor to warn him about the obligation of restoring; for then silence is equivalent to a positive affirmation. But from charity he is bound to warn the penitent, with greater or lesser inconvenience according to the gravity of the harm and of the fault; for he must guard against the penitent being incited to violate justice from such an omission.

110. Corollaries. 1. A confessor who, even from culpable negligence, omits to warn a penitent concerning restitution to be made, of himself is not held to reparation of the damage which arises from this silence for the legitimate owner. The reason is that the confessor by force of his office is not constituted for protecting the temporal goods either of his penitent or of others. Nevertheless such a confessor administers the sacrament badly and therefore sins; indeed, if his silence is equivalent to positive approval, and especially if the penitent expressly asked concerning the obligation of restitution, then the confessor is the efficacious cause of the damage and is bound to restitution.⁶⁹

2. A servant who does not avert damage from the master's goods specially committed to him is bound to restitution. But when it is a question of other goods of the master not specially committed to his care, many think that servants from justice ought to impede damage which is inflicted by outsiders, but not damage which is inflicted by a domestic person, e.g., by sons of the family or by a fellow servant.⁷⁰ Others, however, probably deny both and acknowledge only an obligation of charity. Yet this obligation of charity can easily be grave both toward the master and toward the evildoer; servants maintaining deep silence concerning the thefts of sons of families should be mindful of this obligation.

3. Parents or superiors who freely permit sons or subjects to inflict damage upon a neighbor indeed sin, but are not bound to reparation of the damage. The reason is that the quality of parent or superior of itself is not sufficient that someone be constituted as a kind of sponsor for the damages of subjects. Nevertheless parents and superiors ought to repair damage of this kind, 1) if the sentence of a civil judge has condemned them on account of juridical fault committed, for such a sentence is just; 2) if that silence is rather to be compared to positive influence and is held as counsel or excitation; 3) if the damage inflicted was by a child before the use of reason, i.e., before the first seven-year period was completed, because if parents or superiors culpably do not impede such damage, they injure commutative justice.

4. Guards of customs, forests, fields, etc., are bound to reparation of notable damage inflicted, if they permit the damagers to go away unpunished; but if it is a question of damages of lesser moment, they ought not to exercise the greatest rigor toward the damagers, both because otherwise they would procure greater inconveniences for themselves and others, and because this is the reasonably presumed will of the injured owner.

5. He who has accepted money from a thief or other damager for desisting from denunciation⁷¹ is certainly bound to reparation, if from office he ought to denounce; he is also certainly bound to return money perhaps coming from the theft itself. But outside these cases it is controverted. Some deny,⁷² because then justice is not injured, but only charity; others affirm,⁷³ because to accept money and be silent in this case is nothing other than to provide help and security to the thief. The second opinion seems truer, if the money is provided before the theft or damage is to be committed; on the other hand, the first opinion is truer and safe in practice, if the money is provided to him who, after the theft or damage has been perpetrated, learned this by chance. But always (although he does not sin against justice) he who receives money for concealing the theft or damage caused acts badly, because it is a disgraceful contract, and because he exposes himself to great infamy and dangers, if his foul mode of acting is discovered.

⁶⁹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 528.

⁷⁰ St. Alphonsus, l. c. n. 344.

⁷¹ Commonly Schweigegeld, hush-money, pot de vin.

⁷² Lugo, De iust. et iure disp. 19, n. 102; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1208; Génicot, Theol. mor. I, n. 574, Quaer. V.

⁷³ Tanquerey, De virt. iust. n. 541; Crolly, De iure et iust. III, n. 703.

An error or defect can occur: a) concerning the validity of the sacrament, for example, if the confessor omitted the essential words of absolution; b) concerning the integrity of the sacrament, for example, if the confessor omitted to question concerning the species and specific circumstances of sins; c) concerning the obligations of the penitent, for example, if the confessor omitted to admonish him concerning restitution to be made.

440. a) Concerning the validity of the sacrament, if the confessor erred in such a way that the sacrament administered was null, he is obliged to correct the error. But the gravity of this obligation must be measured: alpha) from the gravity of the harm which otherwise will befall the penitent; beta) from the gravity of the fault or negligence which the confessor committed by frustrating the sacrament.

Not only the pastor and other curators of souls are bound from justice validly to administer the sacrament to one who has rightly confessed, but also any confessor whatsoever, although not in the same degree. For a confessor who is not a curator of souls indeed hears a confession from charity; but once the confession has been heard, by reason of an onerous quasi-contract, and therefore from justice, he is bound validly to administer the sacrament. Accordingly, if he does not do this, he is an unjust damager, and a material one if he did this without any fault (which rarely occurs in practice). But if grave harm thereby befalls the penitent, he must prevent it, although not with great harm to himself. When, however, through his own grave fault he frustrated the sacrament and inflicted grave harm, he is a formal unjust damager and is bound to repair the evil which arose even with grave harm to himself.

The matter becomes clear from examples. 1. A confessor hearing the grave sins of a dying person in confession forgets to give absolution. If the confessor does not correct this error, great harm befalls the dying person, since he has not been absolved and it is not certain that his sins are removed by the reception of Viaticum. The penitent, therefore, will perhaps be damned in hell unless the confessor corrects the error. Moreover, the confessor can scarcely be excused from grave negligence if in such a case he forgets to give absolution. Therefore he is bound under grave sin to correct the error if he can. 2. A confessor forgets to give absolution to a penitent burdened only with light sins. The harm to the penitent is not so grave, and consequently the confessor is not bound under grave sin to correct the error. 3. A confessor forgets to give absolution to a penitent burdened with grave sins; but since alpha) it is piously believed that such a penitent, being attrite, becomes contrite in Communion and receives the remission of sins; and since beta) it is certain that in the following confession these sins will be absolved indirectly, harm not so great befalls the penitent, and consequently the confessor is not obliged to correct the error committed with grave inconvenience. Nevertheless, let every confessor be exceedingly diligent in practice lest he ever commit an error concerning the validity of the sacrament.

441. b) Concerning the integrity of confession, if the confessor committed a defect, a distinction is necessary. Either he conducted himself negatively (that is, he omitted to question concerning the species, number, and specific circumstances, or to impose a penance), and then he is indeed bound to repair the defect within this confession or the following one, but he is bound to nothing outside confession. The reason is that a defect of this kind is easily repaired within confession, but not outside confession. On the other hand, no great harm befalls the penitent from such an omission, since he was validly absolved if he was in good faith. Or he conducted himself positively (that is, he expressly said: this is not a grave sin, or it is not necessary to accuse all mortal sins), and then he is bound to correct this error both within confession and also outside it, although in this latter case the permission of the penitent to speak concerning matters heard in confession must first be obtained. The reason is that the confessor culpably induced the penitent into a pernicious error.

442. c) Concerning the obligations of the penitent, if the confessor committed a defect, the same distinction must be employed. Either he omitted to admonish the penitent concerning some obligation, for example, concerning restitution to be made, the proximate occasion to be avoided, and so forth; and then from charity (and not under grave sin) he is bound to correct the error, because the sacrament was validly administered and no great harm arose which the confessor was strictly bound to prevent. Hence, a fortiori, a confessor who was silent concerning the obligation of making restitution is not bound personally to make restitution to the third person, because he is not bound from justice to take care that the harm to the third person be repaired.³⁸⁸ Or he positively and culpably induced the penitent into error, for example, by saying that he was not bound to restitution; and then from justice he is bound to repair the harm caused. For he is an unjust damager as one counseling the harm. Therefore, when with grave fault he falsely induced the penitent to make restitution or falsely drew him away from it, he is bound to retract the error; and if he does not do this, he himself must make restitution either to the penitent or to the third person.

But if the confessor erred through light negligence, or if he caused only a small harm, the obligation of retracting the error and preventing or repairing the harm is not so great. Nevertheless, in practice that confessor can scarcely be free from grave fault who positively induced someone falsely to make or omit restitution. For then he either has an altogether insufficient knowledge of moral theology or acted very precipitately and imprudently. And there is no reason why such a confessor should merit excessive indulgence.

³⁸⁸ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 621.

1487. Principles. - I. An error gravely culpable and gravely harmful to the penitent himself, by the confessor, from justice, and therefore also with damage relatively grave to himself, speaking per se, must be repaired.

I say: 1° gravely culpable, because an inculpable or lightly culpable error must be repaired from charity alone, and therefore per se with only light inconvenience.

I say: 2° from justice, as is clear from what was said n. 746. For the error, as in the principle is supposed, was an efficacious and theologically gravely culpable cause of damage; it was moreover an unjust cause, even in him who heard the penitent's Confession from charity alone, because to the obligation of charity there was added the obligation of justice, namely by force of the quasi-contract concerning the Sacrament to be administered rightly, by which contract the confessor is bound by the very fact that he undertakes the Confession of anyone.

I say: 3° speaking per se: for the case is to be excepted in which he could not repair the error without injuring the seal, for example because he would gravely offend the penitent by renewing discourse about the Confession; likewise the case of a penitent invalidly absolved who afterward either had confessed to another or had received the Most Holy Eucharist, because in either case he is presumed with moral certainty to have been justified (n. 1208. q. 2°), and the damage was repaired.

II. An error harming some third party is to be repaired according to the rules concerning cooperation in damage: namely from justice, if the confessor positively, by command or counsel, cooperated in the damage of the third party (n. 1438. q. 1°. R. 1°. 3°); but from charity alone, if negatively, by not admonishing concerning restitution to be made, since, as confessor, he is bound toward that third party by no bond of office or quasi-contract (n. 774. q. 1°).

III. An error, even gravely culpable, concerning the integrity of Confession is committed either negatively (when the penitent was not questioned concerning species or number, though he ought to have been questioned concerning them), or positively (by inducing him not to explain them).

In the former case it is not to be corrected outside Confession: for the obligation of confessing integrally directly affects not the confessor, but the penitent; hence, although the former is held to question the latter within Confession concerning species and number, nevertheless when the judgment has been finished this obligation ceases in the confessor.

In the latter case a gravely culpable error must be corrected even outside Confession: for by natural law everyone is held to remove the cause why another violates a grave precept, namely of integral Confession. Except if the error cannot be repaired without scandal or grave damage to the confessor; for these things excuse the penitent from integrity, and therefore also the confessor. "But if the error shall not have been gravely culpable, a much slighter cause will excuse from correcting it outside Confession, and this cause will never not be present, since the confessor can never admonish the penitent concerning the error admitted without inconvenience and shame."

1488. Questions. - Quaer. 1° To what is a confessor held who unduly released a penitent from making restitution, or on the contrary obliged him to it?

Resp. 1° If with grave fault he unduly released the penitent, he is held to correct the error; but if he does not correct it, or the penitent, who otherwise would have made restitution, meanwhile has become unable to make restitution, the confessor himself is held to restore in his place, because he violated the right of the creditor, namely by impeding the restitution due to him. I said: who otherwise would have made restitution. For if, although admonished, he would not have made restitution before the inability, neither will the confessor be bound.

Resp. 2° If with grave fault he obliged the penitent to undue restitution, he is held from justice to retract the error; and, if the penitent has already restored, he is held to make good the damage to him.

Resp. 3° If inculpably or from light negligence he unduly obliged or released the penitent from the obligation, he is held from justice to correct the error, not however with so grave an inconvenience. The reason is that on the one hand everyone is held from justice to impede lest by his action, even inculpable, he cause damage to another which he can easily forestall; but on the other hand from light or only material fault ordinarily there does not arise an obligation with grave inconvenience.

Quaer. 2° To what is a confessor held who omitted to admonish the penitent concerning restitution to be made?

Resp. 1° He is held to admonish the penitent within Confession concerning the obligation, with some inconvenience, if no or only light fault intervened, at least by reason of charity; but with greater inconvenience if in the omission he sinned gravely, or perhaps also if he to whom restitution is to be made would suffer very grave damage thence, although the confessor sinned in no way or only lightly in the omission.

Resp. 2° Whether in that case the confessor is held to restore, see n. 774. q. 1°. and what was said n. 1487. under II.

Quaer. 3° Whether he is held to restitution who from only light fault released the penitent from the obligation of restoring, if afterward he neglects to admonish him, when he easily can?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that, although the confessor without fault, at least grave, exempted the penitent from restitution, nevertheless, since his counsel continues to influence the damage of the creditor, he himself, the error being known, is held from justice to remove the cause of the damage, if he easily can (n. 749. q. 3°).

Quaer. 4° Whether a confessor, without the license of the penitent, can speak with him outside Confession concerning a defect committed?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more probable opinion, to which St. Alphonsus subscribes and which Lugo calls common, if the penitent has already departed; the reason is that that admonition outside Confession is burdensome to the penitent. Besides, since after absolution the judgment has been completed, that admonition would be separated from Confession. Nevertheless, if the confessor had not absolved the penitent, or had not absolved him rightly, i.e. with the form badly pronounced, even without license asked he could, and speaking per se ought, to disclose his error, saying, for example, that he did not absolve; by which manner indeed neither is the seal broken, nor can there be a reasonable offense of the penitent.

I. A threefold defect or error can occur: 1) either the error vitiates the very value of the sacrament, for example, forgetfulness of absolution, an invalid form, indisposition of the penitent, lack of jurisdiction; - or 2) the error offends the mere integrity of confession or of the sacrament, for example, a due question omitted concerning the species or number of sins, satisfaction not enjoined; - or 3) the error regards the obligations of the penitent and inflicts damage on the penitent or on a third party, for example, a proximate occasion which is not removed, undue restitution imposed, due restitution not imposed.

II. An error invalidating the sacrament and gravely damaging to the penitent is of itself and regularly to be corrected, and indeed under grave obligation and from justice; - indeed even with grave inconvenience, if it was committed from grave fault of the confessor. For the confessor, from a quasi-contract with the penitent and therefore from justice, is bound to impart absolution to one rightly disposed; from charity indeed he hears confession, but once it has been heard, now from justice he is obliged to furnish the remaining necessary things. Therefore if he erred as to the value of the sacrament, he is bound from justice to correct it if he can, and if he erred from grave fault, even with great inconvenience: for then he is an unjust damager, and consequently he is bound to repair grave damage unjustly inflicted even with grave inconvenience; - otherwise without grave inconvenience, unless nevertheless the penitent were in grave danger of dying in the state of sin, as if he were placed in the article of death or in probable danger of not confessing any more, in which case the confessor would be obliged even with grave inconvenience, but from charity.

Therefore justice does not always oblige in an equal mode, but when wounded from fault it obliges more strictly than when wounded without fault, as appears in the case of one holding a thing of another in good or bad faith as regards restitution. Hence the gravity of the obligation and of the inconvenience to be undergone is to be measured both from the gravity of the damage and from the gravity of culpability or negligence.

The principle supposes 1) that the error is still gravely damaging to the penitent; for if the damage is light, for example, because the penitent had not accused mortal sins, or if the damage does not persevere, because the penitent approached another confessor by whom he was validly absolved, or because he was justified in another way (namely by Extreme Unction or perfect contrition), the obligation now does not urge;

2. that the error comes from the part of the confessor; for if the error comes from the fault of the penitent, because for example he was knowingly indisposed, the confessor indeed is bound to repair the damage as a cooperator, but not so strictly, - except in the case of extreme necessity, - because the penitent could otherwise provide for himself by instituting a new confession.

III. The apt mode of repairing the defect is diverse:

1. If because of defect of jurisdiction the sacrament is invalid, let the confessor induce the penitent to confess again, and, if it is necessary for this, admonish him concerning the invalidity of absolution, even without permission of speaking about confession previously obtained from the penitent: for since the reason of nullity is exclusively on the part of the confessor, not from defect of the penitent, there is no use there of things heard in confession.

2. If because of omission or defect of absolution, and a) this is detected immediately or shortly after confession and the penitent is still morally present, he can be absolved again, even without previous admonition, provided that it is clear he is duly disposed; b) and if he is too distant, let him be called back to the sacred tribunal, while it can be done without inconvenience; otherwise let the confessor himself approach the penitent and absolve him; c) but if the error was not repaired immediately or after a short time, let the confessor induce the penitent to confess again; let him exhort him to grieve not only concerning the sins accused in the present confession, but also concerning past sins, especially concerning those accused in the last confession; and let him duly absolve him.

3. If because of the indisposition of the penitent, let the confessor approach the penitent and induce him to confess again as has been said; but if this cannot be done efficaciously, the confessor, having first obtained the permission of the penitent to speak with him about a matter pertaining to confession, should admonish him concerning the invalidity, so that the error can be repaired.

IV. In a case of error touching only the integrity of the sacrament: 1) If the confessor negatively impeded integrity by omission (whether from forgetfulness or from culpable negligence), he is not bound to repair the damage or admonish the penitent outside confession, because the obligation of procuring integrity affects the confessor as minister of the sacrament, that is, within confession, and on the other hand admonition outside confession is of itself and generally troublesome to the penitent; - yet in another confession, where the confessor is spiritual physician and minister of the sacrament, the error is to be corrected if it can be done without great inconvenience.

2. If he positively impeded integrity, the confessor is bound to admonish even outside confession (the permission of the penitent having first been obtained), provided that he can do so without scandal and grave inconvenience, and more strictly if he erred culpably than if inculpably.

The reason is that each one is bound to repair damage which he positively inflicted, and to remove the cause of it which he placed; namely, he is bound lest from his positive action others take damage, even from material sin. Yet not with grave inconvenience, because if grave damage excuses the penitent from preserving integrity, a fortiori it excuses the confessor from procuring it; thence a somewhat lesser cause will excuse him who erred inculpably. And in fact the confessor is rarely bound to correct.

V. In the case of an error which inflicts damage on the penitent or on a third party, a principle similar to that in the preceding case is valid:

A) If he erred negatively by omission, from office the confessor is bound toward the penitent, even outside confession, to admonish and correct, if from that omission the penitent is moved to believing licit and doing that which is illicit or to the damage of a third party: more strictly or less strictly, with greater or lesser inconvenience, according to the gravity of the damage and culpability. But he is not bound from justice to repair the damage of the third party, because from office the confessor is not bound to procure the good of the third party.

B) But if he positively induced the penitent into error, for example, if, when questioned, the confessor pronounced that restitution was to be made, where there existed no obligation of making restitution, or the converse; and

1. the error was culpable (for example, from malice, vincible ignorance, grave negligence), the confessor is bound from justice, even outside confession, and in grave matter under grave obligation, to repair and restore either to the penitent or to the third party: for he was positively cooperating with the damage of another through counsel;

2. if the error was inculpable, likewise the confessor is bound, if he can without grave inconvenience, to repair; but if he does not do this, he will be bound to restore.

The reason is that everyone is bound from justice, not only not to inflict damage directly and deliberately on a neighbor, but also to procure that from his action damage not come to the neighbor; but if he does not correct the error when he can, he is bound to restore by reason of omitted retraction, which is truly an unjust and efficacious cause of damage by which that damage becomes voluntary and culpable. But he is bound only without grave inconvenience, because the damage does not arise from an unjust injury, since the action was inculpable.

629. The third obligation is to supply defects and to correct errors. - A threefold defect or error can occur: 1) either the error vitiates the very value of the sacrament, e.g., forgetfulness of absolution, an invalid form, indisposition of the penitent, lack of jurisdiction; - 2) or the error offends the mere integrity of confession or of the sacrament, e.g., a due question omitted concerning the species or number of sins, satisfaction not enjoined; - 3) or the error regards the obligations of the penitent and brings harm to the penitent or to a third party, e.g., a proximate occasion which is not removed, undue restitution imposed, due restitution not imposed.

A. An error invalidating the sacrament and gravely harmful to the penitent, of itself and regularly, must be corrected, and indeed under grave obligation and from justice; - indeed even with grave inconvenience, if it was committed from grave fault of the confessor (II, n. 296, A). For the confessor, from a quasi-contract with the penitent and therefore from justice, is bound to impart absolution to one rightly disposed: from charity indeed he hears the confession, but once it has been heard, he is already obliged from justice to provide the other necessary things (n. 614). Therefore if he erred as to the value of the sacrament, he is bound from justice to correct it, if he can; and if he erred from grave fault, even with great inconvenience; - otherwise without grave inconvenience, unless, however, the penitent were in grave danger of dying in the state of sin, as if he were in the article of death or in probable danger of not confessing any more, in which case the confessor would be obliged even with grave inconvenience, but from charity.

Therefore justice does not always oblige in an equal manner, but justice injured from fault obliges more strictly than justice injured without fault, as appears in the case of one detaining the thing of another in good or bad faith as to restitution. Hence the gravity of the obligation, as also of the inconvenience to be undergone, must be measured both from the gravity of the harm and from the gravity of culpability or negligence.

The principle supposes 1) that the error is still gravely harmful to the penitent; for if the harm is light, e.g., because the penitent had not accused mortal sins, or if the harm does not persevere, because the penitent approached another confessor by whom he was validly absolved, or because in another way he was certainly justified (namely, by Extreme Unction or perfect contrition), the obligation no longer urges;

2. that the error comes from the part of the confessor; for if the error comes from the fault of the penitent, because, e.g., he was knowingly indisposed, the confessor is indeed bound to repair the harm as a cooperator, but not so strictly - except in the case of extreme necessity - because the penitent could provide for himself otherwise, by making a new confession.

The apt manner of repairing the defect is different:

1. If because of defect of jurisdiction the sacrament is invalid, let the confessor induce the penitent to confess again, and, if this is necessary for that, let him admonish him about the invalidity of the absolution, even without permission to speak about the confession having been obtained beforehand from the penitent: for since the reason of nullity is exclusively on the part of the confessor, not from a defect of the penitent, there is no use there of things heard in confession.

2. If because of omission or defect of absolution, and a) this is detected immediately or shortly after confession and the penitent is still morally present, he can be absolved again, even without previous admonition, provided it is clear that he is duly disposed; b) and if he is too far away, let him be recalled to the sacred tribunal, so long as this can be done without inconvenience; otherwise let the confessor himself approach the penitent and absolve him; c) but if the error was not repaired immediately or after a short time, let the confessor induce the penitent to confess again; let him exhort him to grieve not only for those things accused in the present confession, but also for past things, especially those accused in the last confession; and let him duly absolve him.

3. If because of the indisposition of the penitent, let the confessor approach the penitent and induce him to confess again, as was said; but if this cannot effectively be done, after the confessor has first obtained the permission of the penitent to speak with him about a matter pertaining to confession, let him admonish him about the invalidity, so that the error can be repaired.

B. In the case of an error touching only the integrity of the sacrament:

1. If the confessor negatively impeded integrity by omission (whether from forgetfulness or from culpable negligence), he is not bound to repair the harm or to admonish the penitent outside confession, because the obligation of procuring integrity affects the confessor as minister of the sacrament, i.e., within confession, and on the other hand an admonition outside confession of itself and generally is troublesome to the penitent; - yet in another confession, where the confessor is spiritual physician and minister of the sacrament, the error must be corrected if it can be done without great inconvenience.

2. If he positively impeded integrity, the confessor is bound to admonish even outside confession, after the permission of the penitent has first been obtained; provided he can do this without scandal and grave inconvenience, and more strictly if he erred culpably than if inculpably.

The reason is that each one is bound to repair the harm which he has positively inflicted, and to remove the cause of it which he placed; namely, he is bound lest from his positive action others incur harm, even from material sin. Nevertheless not with grave inconvenience, because if grave harm excuses the penitent from preserving integrity, a fortiori it excuses the confessor from procuring it; hence a somewhat lesser cause will excuse one erring inculpably. And in fact the confessor is rarely bound to correct.

C. In the case of an error which brings harm to the penitent or to a third party, a similar principle holds as in the preceding case:

1. If he has erred negatively by omission, from office the confessor is bound toward the penitent, even outside confession, to admonish and correct, if from that omission the penitent is moved to believe licit and to do what is illicit or to the harm of a third party; more strictly or less strictly, with greater or lesser inconvenience, according to the gravity of the harm and culpability. But he is not bound from justice to repair the harm of the third party, because the confessor is not bound from office to procure the good of the third party.

2. But if he has positively led the penitent into error, e.g., if the confessor, when asked, pronounced that restitution must be made where no obligation of making restitution existed, or conversely; and

a) the error was culpable (e.g., from malice, vincible ignorance, grave negligence), the confessor is bound from justice, even outside confession, and in grave matter under grave obligation, to repair and make restitution either to the penitent or to the third party: for he was positively cooperating in the harm of another by counsel;

b) if the error was inculpable, likewise the confessor is bound, if he can without grave inconvenience, to repair; - but if he does not do this, he will have to make restitution.

The reason is that each one is bound from justice not only not to inflict harm on his neighbor directly and deliberately, but also to procure that harm not come to his neighbor from his action; but if he does not correct an error when he can, he is bound to make restitution by reason of the omitted retraction, which is truly the unjust and efficacious cause of the harm, by which that harm becomes voluntary and culpable. But he is bound only without grave inconvenience, because the harm does not arise from an unjust injury, since the action was inculpable.

You Will Resolve. 1°. If the confessor from malice or vincible ignorance or grave negligence unduly released the penitent from making restitution, he is held to correct the error; but if he does not correct it, or if the penitent, who otherwise would have made restitution, has meanwhile become unable for restitution, the confessor himself is held to restore in his place, because he violated the right of the creditor, namely by impeding the restitution due to him. - Likewise, if from malice or ignorance or grave negligence he obligated the penitent to undue restitution, he is held from justice to retract the error; and if the penitent has already restored, he himself is held to repair the harm of the penitent.

2°. But if inculpably or only from light negligence he unduly obligated the penitent or released him from obligation, he is indeed held from justice to correct the error, yet not with grave inconvenience. The reason is because, on the one hand, each person is held from justice to impede lest by his own action, even inculpable, he bring forth harm to another which he can easily forestall; and, on the other hand, from light fault or only material fault an obligation ordinarily does not arise with grave inconvenience. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 621.

3°. But if in the aforesaid case the confessor neglects to correct the error by admonishing the penitent, when he easily can, he himself is held to making restitution. The reason is because, although he acted without fault, at least grave fault, when he gave the first decision, nevertheless he would sin gravely against justice if, since the matter is grave, he did not correct that first decision when he could easily perform this. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 622.

4°. The confessor who did not properly and positively release the penitent, but merely omitted to warn him concerning restitution to be made, is held to correct his error within confession with some inconvenience, if no fault or only light fault intervened; but with greater inconvenience if in the omission he sinned gravely. - But he is not held to restitution, at least according to the more probable opinion, even if by omitting the warning he sinned gravely. The reason is because the confessor could not even be called a negative cooperator with relation to him to whom restitution is owed; for in order that someone be a negative cooperator, it is required that from justice he be held to impede harm; and the confessor certainly is not held to this, because he enters upon a quasi-contract with penitents alone. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 621.

Titius borrowed one hundred pounds sterling from his relative Caius, who, since he knew that Titius was oppressed by straitened circumstances, did not seek the money owed for several years; but after seven years, when the affairs of Titius had changed for the better, he asked him to return the hundred pounds. Titius doubts whether, after so many years have elapsed, he is bound to pay the money, since the debt has been extinguished by what is called the Statute of Limitations; nevertheless, he approaches a confessor and asks whether he is bound or not. The latter says that it is honorable to pay the money, but that there is no strict obligation. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the Statutes of Limitation, and what are their effects?

2. To what is a confessor bound who has unduly exempted a penitent from the burden of restitution?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered above, p. 261.

2. What are the obligations of a confessor who has wrongly excused a penitent from the duty of making restitution?

If the confessor excuses the penitent out of malice or gravely culpable ignorance, he is bound to correct his error, and if he does not do so, or if now the penitent is unwilling, or is not able to make restitution, the confessor will be bound to make it for him. If there was no grave fault in the confessor’s advice, he will be bound to correct the mistake as far as he can, and if he can not do this, he will be excused from further obligation.

3. The case. Titius was wrong in thinking that the effect of the Statutes of Limitation for an action of debt is to extinguish the right after six years. Those who administer the law and lawyers are unanimous on the point, and agree that it only bars the remedy. But if the debt is not extinguished by the law, it still remains to be paid. The confessor, therefore, was wrong in his decision, and if he gave it from gravely culpable ignorance, he is bound to correct his mistake, and if Titius will not now make restitution, or can not now, though he could have done before, the confessor will be bound to make it for him, as was said above.

Case.—Paul admits in his confession that he has defrauded Serafino, in a business transaction, of the sum of five hundred dollars. He intended to make the proper restitution, but has learned that Serafino was lost in the Titanic disaster. He asks the confessor what to do about the money. Without reflecting, the priest advises him to give the-money to charitable works. Upon his promise to do so, Paul receives absolution and goes his way.

Question.—Was the decision of the priest wrong, and is he, therefore, himself bound to restitution?

Solution.—In the first place, we must note that the confessor gave no positive decision, He merely advised the penitent. Had he commanded, or obliged, Paul to give the money to the poor, his action would have to be judged in the light of stern theological principles. It is clear that the decision was given hastily and without due reflection. A little thought given to the facts would have resulted in an advice, or even a command, quite at variance with the suggestion made to the penitent. Without any doubt the money does not belong to the poor, but to the heirs of Serafino. Hence it is Paul’s duty to do his best to find the heirs, and to restore to them his ill-gotten goods. It may be claimed that he has made restitution, since upon the advice of the confessor he has deprived himself of the stated amount for the benefit of the poor. But such erroneous advice, even when followed to the detriment of the one who seeks it, does not satisfy the obligation existing by reason of the original fraudulent action. As a result, Paul remains indebted to the heirs of Serafino, provided he can find them. His putative restitution was his misfortune: but he can console himself by the thought of the good he has done and the Lord may graciously take his loss as an act of atonement. In the event of his refusal to restore a second time, is the confessor obliged to do so for him? The priest when he realized his mistake should have sought out the penitent, and with his permission spoken of the matter and corrected his mal-advice. If he could have done so without grave inconvenience, and yet did not do so, then he is-bound to make restitution in case Paul refuses. This is not because of the wrong decision, but because of the neglect to prevent the grave detriment to Paul when he could easily have done so. There is reason to think, however, that there was no grave theological fault in this particular case, and hence no sin upon the part of the priest; and in that case no duty of restitution. Wherefore, if he could not find Paul in time to prevent the distribution of the money among the poor, he would not be bound to make good in the name of Paul. If he has good reason to believe that his penitent would not agree to the second restitution, and would feel inimical because of the erroneous decision, he could leave Paul in good faith, either for a time or for good. Hasty decisions of the confessor are full of danger and are prone to work evil.