§ I. On the Obligation of Correcting Defects Committed in Confession

643. Principles. - I. An error concerning the validity of the Sacrament committed with grave fault or grave negligence, supposing grave harm to the penitent ¹, must be repaired even with grave inconvenience to the Confessor. The reason is that the Confessor, from his office and from the quasi-contract entered into with the penitent, is bound to administer the Sacrament rightly to him. But if the error is inculpable or lightly culpable, the Confessor is indeed bound from justice ², but with lesser inconvenience. - St. Ligorius, no. 619.

¹ Grave harm or danger to the penitent would be present if, for example, you absolved altogether invalidly or in no manner a sick person near death who would for that reason incur danger to eternal salvation; or also, as St. Alphonsus says (no. 619), if the penitent were in grave danger of not confessing again, for example, while he undertakes a long sea journey. But this grave harm to the penitent would be absent when, even if the Confessor absolves beyond his faculties from reserved censures and sins, or imparted absolution altogether invalidly or in no manner, nevertheless, in the first case the reserved sins would also have been indirectly remitted to the penitent in good faith, as we suppose, while in the other cases a remedy would not be lacking either in the reception of the Eucharist, which per accidens, according to the common doctrine with St. Thomas, would confer first grace upon a man having attrition, or in a subsequent confession with another priest, by which even the preceding sins would be indirectly remitted, no differently than happens with sins omitted through forgetfulness.

But when that grave danger threatens the penitent, and accordingly the Confessor must admonish the penitent in order to repair the error, there are some who say generally that permission must be sought from him, because according to the common opinion the seal forbids the priest to speak, even with the penitent himself after a completed confession, about matters heard in it, etc.; and if the penitent refuses permission, nothing remains to be done by the Confessor. But St. Alphonsus (no. 622) deservedly excepts the case of absolution imparted either in no manner or invalidly. The reason is that, when the Confessor merely says, for example, that he did not absolve him, surely neither shame is cast upon the penitent nor does any reproach of sin intervene, and accordingly the reason why the penitent would be unwilling and the confession would thereby be rendered burdensome is absent. These are the causes why a priest, spontaneously mixing conversation with the penitent about things heard from him in Confession, is judged to act against the seal. For the rest, in the case the Confessor would not be bound to acknowledge that he culpably erred; it would suffice to say that an error intervened, or even more simply that it is necessary for him to absolve him again. But if the penitent, not yet admonished, returns to the same Confessor, it will not even be necessary to admonish him concerning the error; for if he is excited to sorrow for all the sins previously confessed also, the present absolution will be directly terminated also to the preceding sins.

² St. Alphonsus, whom the Author alleges in this place, prefers that a Confessor who has erred inculpably is bound only from charity, unless he is the pastor of the penitent. But, as seems truer to others, the priest indeed hears the confession from charity; nevertheless, after the confession has been heard, he is bound from justice to complete the Sacrament, because he is bound from his office, however spontaneously undertaken, and from a certain quasi-contract. This condition of the Confessor remains the same even if he has erred without fault. Therefore, according as the error was culpable or inculpable, the obligation of the Confessor will differ, not because it presses now from justice and now from charity, but only as the obligation of keeping another unharmed differs according as harm is inflicted through a formal injury or a merely material one; or also as the obligation of restoring a thing unjustly taken away differs from the obligation of seeking the owner of a thing which someone found by chance. For the latter indeed undertakes the care of the thing from charity, but after this care has been undertaken he is bound, not from charity but from justice, to guard the thing and, as the circumstances require, to seek its owner.

** The VV., about to defend the holy Doctor Alphonsus, construct nearly eight columns (pp. 621-624) against this Note. Thus, therefore, they argue (p. 623): If someone gratuitously received a deposit from mere charity, he nevertheless is bound from justice to preserve and guard the thing with that diligence with which diligent men are accustomed to preserve and guard things of this kind.... But if, after the aforesaid diligence has been employed, the thing perishes or deteriorates without any fault, he is bound to nothing at all from the title of justice. And concerning the example proposed in the Note they add: After he has received the thing found, though from mere charity, into his deposit and care, he is bound from justice not only to seek the owner, as the circumstances require, but also to guard the thing with ordinary diligence; but if the thing perishes or deteriorates without fault on his part, and afterward the owner claims it, he is bound to nothing. And from these things they conclude: Therefore, there is no obligation from the title of justice for a Confessor who has erred inculpably to repair the harm. But if the Confessor is nevertheless bound, he is bound only from charity, and indeed from that general law of charity by which we are obliged to assist our neighbor and to avert temporal and spiritual harms from him insofar as this can be done without grave inconvenience.

Reply. I deny the Supposition and accordingly the parity; and from this I deny the Consequent and the Consequence. The supposition is that through the error of the Confessor the matter has been brought into such a state that it cannot be repaired through those means to which the same Confessor is bound from his office, just as provision cannot be made through that diligence to which a depositary is bound for a thing deposited which has already perished without the fault of the depositary. But that this is manifestly false appears from the very state of the question. For if the error of the Confessor is supposed irreparable, it is wrongly disputed whether he is bound to correct it from justice or only from charity. Moreover, St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 619) affirms that the Confessor is bound from charity to amend his error. Therefore, the question does not concern a thing reduced to such a condition that it can be compared with a deposited thing which has already perished.

In its own manner, a somewhat more fitting comparison would be with a depositary who through an inculpable error perhaps sold or gave away the thing deposited, or placed it in a place in which he afterward observed that it would perhaps perish or suffer harm. Let the question then be posed: Would this man be bound from charity alone, or rather from justice, to recover the thing perhaps sold or given away, if it can be done, or to remove the thing from the place in which it would suffer harm? And still more clearly to our matter: Would the diligence to which the depositary is bound from justice require that, in the hypothesis, he take care to recover the thing handed over to another, or remove it from a harmful place, or would we call this an office of mere charity? Let it therefore be concluded that the VV. deduced a false consequence from an incongruous parity.

Nor, indeed, was St. Alphonsus led by such a parity or argument when he asserted that in the hypothesis the Confessor is obliged from charity alone to admonish the penitent concerning an error committed by himself. The holy Doctor (loc. cit.) seems to have used this reasoning: the obligation in the case does not press under grave inconvenience; therefore the Confessor is bound from charity alone. Yet none of the Doctors whom St. Alphonsus alleges there reasons thus. For all derive the obligation of admonishing from the office of the Confessor, however much they add that in the hypothesis it does not press with great detriment or inconvenience. De Lugo explains the matter well (On Penance, disputation 22, no. 62), whom St. Alphonsus also alleges:

Everyone (De Lugo says) is bound FROM JUSTICE not only not to inflict evil directly and purposely upon his neighbor, but also to take care, insofar as he CONVENIENTLY CAN, that harm contrary to the right of his neighbor does not arise from his action; for example, if you inadvertently set fire to another's house, you are bound from justice, as soon as you notice it, to extinguish the fire if you can conveniently do so, although another who did not set the fire would be bound not from justice but from charity to extinguish it. For although the action was inculpable, it was nevertheless yours, and you are bound to take care that your neighbor suffer no detriment in his own goods from your action, if you conveniently can; for this obligation is lesser than that other obligation of not harming positively, and therefore you are not bound to this unless you can conveniently prevent it. Likewise, if in good faith you defamed someone, thinking that the crime which you had heard about him was true, you ought afterward, if you conveniently can, once the error is known, to repair his reputation and extinguish the fire of reputation which you had inculpably kindled. But the same De Lugo (loc. cit.) had excellently premised this principle, namely, when the error happens without grave fault: Then, he says, according to the rule established above it must be said that he ought, if he conveniently can, to admonish the penitent concerning the error; OTHERWISE THE IGNORANCE OF THE PENITENT WILL NOW BEGIN TO BE IMPUTED TO HIM.

II. An error concerning the accidents of the Sacrament is not to be repaired outside confession if the Confessor conducted himself in this matter only negatively, even culpably. The reason is that the Confessor is not bound to procure the integrity of the Sacrament and the utility of the penitent except in confession, as a spiritual physician and minister of the Sacrament. But an error is to be repaired even outside confession if it was committed positively and with grave fault, because by natural law everyone must remove the cause of evil which he positively and voluntarily placed ³. Nevertheless, the permission of the penitent must be sought; if the penitent denies it, the Confessor is bound to nothing further. - St. Ligorius, no. 620.

³ That the Author seems to require for the obligation of admonishing outside confession that the error was committed with grave fault appears indeed to be against the more common opinion of the Doctors. They (see De Lugo, On Penance, disputation 22, no. 63, and St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 620) concede only that one who has erred to the harm of the penitent without fault or with light fault is excused from giving the admonition by a lighter cause than if the error proceeded from grave fault. In this matter, there are moreover to be weighed, on the one hand, the inconvenience and detriment of the Confessor in admonishing, as well as whatever burden there may be to the penitent in renewing a discourse about the matter of confession, and, on the other hand, the harm or danger to be feared from the error. This can be lighter, if, for example, the Confessor erroneously said that the penitent is not bound to fast or to hear Mass and things of this kind; or graver, if, for example, the Confessor so deceived the penitent that he remains in a proximate occasion, or does not remove a scandal, or contracts an invalid marriage, etc.

III. There will be no obligation to admonish outside confession if the defect concerns the integrity of confession, because this error can scarcely, or not even scarcely, harm the penitent or others ⁴. - Thus commonly.

⁴ Some distinction seems to be employed here. For it is one thing if the Confessor merely did not take care that the confession be integral; it is another, as De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 22, no. 73), if he was the positive cause why the penitent did not confess integrally, saying, for example, that it was not necessary to confess the species or number of sins. In the first case, the doctrine of the Author avails; concerning this see Suarez (On Penance, disputation 32, section 6, no. 8). In the other case, those things which were said in the preceding note rather have place. Yet there are two things which seem to diminish this obligation of admonishing outside confession. One is that in the following confession another Confessor will ask both the species and the number and will instruct the penitent who perhaps hesitates on account of the error with which he had been imbued, and accordingly will correct the error; and from this the necessity of admonition ceases. The other is the fact that in the case an admonition, from the nature of the matter, which necessarily concerns grave sins, introduces a discourse about them and thereby brings great shame to the penitent; and for this reason his offense can deservedly be feared. Hence a fortiori that which St. Alphonsus (no. 619) had observed concerning the omission of an admonition in the case of invalid absolution avails: for in our case more than in that case this offense and burden to the penitent arise of themselves.

644. Questions. - QUESTION 1. To what is a Confessor bound who improperly released a penitent from making restitution, or, on the contrary, obliged him to it?

Reply 1. If from malice, vincible ignorance, or grave negligence he improperly released the penitent, he is bound to correct the error; and if he does not correct it, or if the penitent, who otherwise would have made restitution, has meanwhile become unable to make restitution, the Confessor himself is bound to make restitution in his place, because he violated the right of the creditor, namely, by impeding the restitution owed to him.

Reply 2. Likewise, if from malice or grave ignorance or negligence he obliged the penitent to undue restitution, he is bound from justice to retract the error; and if the penitent has already made restitution, he is bound to compensate him for the harm.

Reply 3. If inculpably or from light negligence he improperly obliged the penitent or released him from the obligation, he is bound from justice to correct the error, but not with so grave an inconvenience. The reason is that, on the one hand, everyone is bound from justice to prevent his own action, even an inculpable one, from causing another a harm which he can easily prevent; and, on the other hand, an obligation with grave inconvenience does not ordinarily arise from light fault or merely material fault. - St. Ligorius, no. 621.

645. • QUESTION 2. To what is a Confessor bound who omitted to admonish a penitent concerning restitution to be made?

Reply 1. If he foresees the harm, he is bound to admonish the penitent concerning the obligation with some inconvenience, if no fault or only light fault intervened, at least by reason of charity; but with greater inconvenience if he sinned gravely in the omission. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, no. 624.

Reply 2. More probably, he is not bound to make restitution, even if he sinned gravely by omitting the admonition. The reason is that the Confessor is not bound from justice to prevent harm to the one to whom restitution is owed. Recall the things said in the Treatise on Justice and Right, where negative cooperators are discussed, no. 691. - St. Ligorius, ibid.

646. • QUESTION 3. Is one bound to restitution who from only light fault released a penitent from the obligation of making restitution, if he afterward neglects to admonish him when he can easily do so?

Reply. Yes. The reason is that, although the Confessor released the penitent from restitution without at least grave fault, nevertheless, since his counsel continues to influence the harm of the creditor, once the error is known he is bound from justice to remove the cause of the harm, if he can easily do so. - St. Ligorius, no. 622, and others commonly.

QUESTION 4. Can a Confessor, without the permission of the penitent, speak with him outside confession about a defect committed in confession?

Reply. No, if the penitent has already departed. The reason is that this admonition outside confession is burdensome to the penitent. Moreover, after absolution the judgment is complete; nor does it matter that the admonition is made to repair a defect of the same confession. - St. Ligorius, no. 622; Lacroix, no. 1776, etc. Nevertheless, if the error of the Confessor brings the penitent into danger of salvation, for example, if he had not absolved him, he could, even without permission being sought, disclose his error abruptly by saying, for example, that he had not absolved him. Surely in this way neither is the seal broken nor can a reasonable offense of the penitent be present. - St. Ligorius, no. 619.