What contumely is and its gravity

Our neighbour has a right not only to his good name but also to the honour or the external marks of our esteem, befitting his qualities and position. The Apostle exhorts us to “love one another with the charity of brotherhood, with honour preventing one another,’’¹ and in another place he bids us render honour to whom honour is due.² The sin of contumely is committed by any act or word which is contrary to the honour which we are bound to show our neighbour. It may be committed by neglecting to show him the honour which is his due, or by saying or doing something in his presence which expresses our contempt of him.

¹ Rom. xii 10.

² Rom. xiii 7.

Contumely of itself is a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation, as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Our Lord’s words show how grievous a sin is committed by treating another with contumely: “‘ Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.”¹ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be only a venial sin, for levity of matter, and chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate another, is of course harmless provided that it keeps within due bounds.

¹ Matt. v 22.

Contumely.—Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his presence.

(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples “foolish and slow of heart”; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as “senseless”). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms sparingly and only in case of great necessity.

(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for another’s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural perfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank, wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the salute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile and contemptible).

(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David’s ambassadors by the Ammonites, in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St. Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation that their words would be carried to him).

Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its strictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one’s superior in some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of mankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who are more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If honor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good quality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more worthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every rational creature (except the damned, who are irretrievably wicked and outside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or lowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul exhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii. 10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself (Philip., ii. 3).

Various Forms of Contumely.—(a) By reason of the signs used or the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the names “thief,” “lunatic,” “bastard”) or in deeds that are equivalent to word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or postcards, “poisoned pen” letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).

(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach, which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement (convicium), which ascribes to another either a fault or its consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of alcoholism), taunting (improperium), which twits another with misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the favors one formerly showed him).

Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.—(a) Circumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed against a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin of contumely.

The Sinfulness of Contumely.—(a) From its nature contumely is a grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls his brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the contumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this (e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful title, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be greatly dishonored).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter, contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not sufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.

The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.

(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his superior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior to give the name to his subordinate.

(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely, or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words. A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc., there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is not being made.

Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the offended person feels the injury less?

(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less, the gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the person offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not taken seriously (see 2015).

(b) If the contumely is felt less only because the person dishonored is very meek and patient, the gravity is not lessened, but is rather increased (see 1725). If the person offended does not feel the injury at all (e.g., because he is very thick-skinned or is very fortunate), less damage is done, but the wrong remains, otherwise, theft from the rich could be excused on the plea that they will not miss what is stolen.

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.—(a) As to the internal disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were implacable or who only sought material for accusations.

(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac, or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and fame—viz., virtue and a worthy life—than to possess honor and fame themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).

The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without fruit.

(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame; otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.—(a) If contumely is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.

(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person appear vile in his own eyes.

Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.—(a) One opinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that satisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that satisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity) before judicial sentence.

(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since men regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust deprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind, such as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can await an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation, such as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made without any such order (Matt., v. 24).

What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?—(a) In general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities, quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses also.

(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required, for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings, a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.

The Manner of Making Apologies.—(a) They should be made with at least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his regrets by letter or through a representative.

Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between the parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.

(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should be made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists on it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile name applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through ignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing respect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).

(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest by abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have. Hence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not be seemly for him to ask the child’s pardon, but he should show some mark of kindness to heal the wound.

Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a) Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b) Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.

A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain cases.

(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as when a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the admonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted, as when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In the case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders, it may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the parents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect. But, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such children to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.

462. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing it. But honor is the external testimony of esteem, which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. Now someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through something else in which he is represented in some measure.

But contumely can be done, 1. negatively, by omission of the honor due here and now; 2. positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred, 1. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3. reproach, by which poverty, defects, or obscurity of birth are cast up to someone.

397. 1. Notion and species. Just as reputation is injured by rash judgment and defamation, so honor is injured by contumely. For honor is the external manifestation of reverence owed to the neighbor on account of his excellence; it is owed to all those who, although otherwise imperfect, are endowed with certain distinguished gifts. - To this is opposed contumely, which is the unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and knowing it; or at least with the intention that it become known to the one injured, whether through a messenger or through letters. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the object, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while for the most part detraction is done concerning one absent. - Yet sometimes contumely is done before others, to whom a hidden offense of the offended person is manifested, and in this case it is joined with detraction.

⁴ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 72; Soto, lib. V, quaest. 9, art. 1; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 189-196; Sayrus, lib. XI, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, n. 984-990; Carriere, n. 977-980; Martinet, lib. IV, art. 14, § 2; Noldin, n. 651-654.

Contumely can be inflicted positively by words or deeds which express contempt; and negatively, by omitting due honor, e.g., a greeting in circumstances in which this is owed. To contumely is referred mockery or derision, by which the defects of the neighbor are turned into laughter, to his shame and confusion; and also insult, or reproach, by which a vice is disgracefully cast before him. For the most part contumely, mockery, and insult arise from anger, or from hatred.

398. 2. Principle: Contumely is a sin mortal from its kind against justice.

For every man has a right to honor on account of the natural or supernatural gifts with which he is endowed, - for example, on account of the grace and virtues with which he is adorned, doctrine or prudence or other qualities by which he shines forth, or by reason of the duty or office committed to him; and this indeed is true even if he labors under certain defects or vices, since by these the excellent gifts with which he is furnished are not taken away. Now contumely violates that right, by despising the neighbor through words, deeds, or omission of due reverence; but this injury is of itself grave, because honor, by the common estimation of men, is placed before the goods of fortune, and therefore is held as a good of great moment; yet it can be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the voluntary act. Hence Scripture strictly prohibits injuries of this kind, under most grave penalties: "But he who shall say to his brother, raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say, fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire";¹ on the contrary, it wills that Christians be "anticipating one another with honor,"² and "in humility esteeming one another superior to themselves";³ wherefore he who despises his brother is wholly opposed to the evangelical spirit.

¹ Matt., V, 22.

² Rom., XII, 10.

³ Philip., II, 3.

399. 3. On the gravity of contumely. In order that judgment may be made rightly concerning the gravity of contumely or mockery, attention must especially be paid to these things:

(A) To the dignity of the person offended and the gravity of the injury; generally the more honorable the offended person is, the graver the contumely is, other things being equal; but the gravity of the injury is not taken only in itself, but in relation to the person; thus insults with which common people affect one another injure honor less than similar words held among persons of a nobler condition.

(B) To the person offending, and his dispositions; if he is endowed with authority, the offense is greater, because more care is taken of it; if he is of a more lowly condition, it is more easily held as nothing; likewise, if it arises from anger or levity, it is certainly less grave than if from hatred, envy, or contempt.

(C) To the effects going to follow from it; namely, the sin is greater if it is done before many persons, who take scandal from this; likewise if it is foreseen that quarrels, enmities, and contentions are going to arise from it.

400. Corollaries. (A) Mockery is a sin of the same species as contumely; therefore the same must be said concerning its gravity. Yet an urbane kind of joking is more easily excused from sin, if it is done by way of honorable recreation, among friends who plainly understand the matter. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, let it be used soberly and prudently, and not for too long, lest perhaps he concerning whom there is question be made too sad or be provoked to anger.

(B) Sometimes insult and reproach are not only excused from sin, but are praiseworthy, namely when they are done cautiously and moderately by superiors or friends from the intention of correcting a subject or brother. But then let them be done with right intention, when a grave reason is present, and indeed in such a way that it can be understood that they are brought forward not from anger or passion, but from the mind of correcting and amending the offender.

183. Injury to honor. Honor is chiefly wounded by contumely,³⁶³ which can be defined: unjust dishonoring of a person present. This dishonoring for the most part is done by a positive act, namely, by word or deed; but ordinarily the omission of an honorific act does not suffice. Thus, e.g., when a friend from anger or for another reason now no longer greets a former friend, he does not yet commit contumely, unless nevertheless that omission, on account of special circumstances, is equivalent to a positive act.

Dishonoring can be done in many ways: 1. by objecting moral vices to another, e.g.: you are a thief - and then this dishonoring is called contumely in the strict sense;³⁶⁴ 2. by objecting physical defects to another: you are one-eyed, or blind cow; and especially "when someone injuriously brings back to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him suffering necessity. Hence it is said in Eccli. 20, 15: He will give little things and reproach much."³⁶⁵ Dishonoring of this kind is called reproach;³⁶⁶ 3. by deriding another with words and laughter, and then there is mockery³⁶⁷ or derision; 4. by manifesting contempt for another with ridiculous gestures, as the soldiers did when genuflecting before Christ crowned with thorns, and then there is derision with contempt.³⁶⁸ All these diverse modes are indeed diverse sins,³⁶⁹ but they are reduced to the same moral species of contumely, because their end is the same, namely, externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored. Hence it is not necessary to indicate in confession in what way the contumely was done.

³⁶³ Beschimpfung, outrage, insult. Rash judgment also and detraction wound honor, but concerning them there will be special discussion afterward.

³⁶⁴ Schmähung.

³⁶⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3. The Angelic Doctor himself asserts in the same place: "Sometimes, however, one of these is put for another."

³⁶⁶ Vorwurf, opprobre.

³⁶⁷ Verspottung; if it is done jokingly: Fopperei, Hänselei, Spöttelei, "Aufziehen," raillerie.

³⁶⁸ Verhöhnung.

³⁶⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 75, a. 1.

184. The malice of contumely. Contumely is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

That contumely is from its genus a mortal sin is plain from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall say (to his brother), Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna."³⁷⁰ But St. Paul numbers the contumelious among those whom God handed over to a reprobate sense.³⁷¹

That contumely wounds justice is clear from the fact that any man has a strict right to honor; and this right indeed contumely violates. And certainly honor is a good more excellent than riches. But to steal the riches of another is from its genus a mortal sin against justice. Therefore, more strongly, to take away honor, which contumely does, is such a sin.

Honor, which is founded upon true virtue, obtains the first place among all the external goods of man. Hence not rarely men sacrifice riches, health, indeed even life itself, for acquiring or retaining honor. Concerning this matter St. Thomas teaches: "Things which come into the use of man are exterior things, among which simply the greatest is honor: both because it is nearest to virtue, as being a certain testification existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for attaining honor and avoiding blame."³⁷² From these things it follows that unjust wounding of honor is a very grave sin against justice. Nor is that sin diminished from the fact that he who is dishonored does not always feel great damage, although this sometimes happens. For a very rich man upon whom notable damaging is inflicted does not even feel damage of this kind much, on account of abundant other riches; and nevertheless the damaging inflicted remains a great sin.

Contumely often has other malices joined to it, such as: irreligiosity, if, e.g., a cleric or religious is dishonored; wounded piety, if, e.g., the contumely is against parents; blasphemy, if it is against God or the saints; scandal, etc.

Contumely becomes a light sin:

1. from imperfection of the act, e.g., inadvertence, lack of deliberation, from sudden anger;

2. from the intention of not gravely wounding honor, e.g., if someone from jest or not so seriously says to another: You are an ass;

3. from the condition of the speaker and hearer. Hence Soto, Sylvius, and others deservedly teach that insults by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelsome women attack one another, crying that the other is a prostitute, an adulteress, a scoundrel, the devil himself, etc., are not mortal sins. The reason is that by these exclamations no great wounding of honor is caused to anyone. The same holds for contumelious words which are brought forth by parents against children, by teachers against pupils, etc.

Mockery, which, as was said above, is reduced to contumely, is often no sin; indeed, it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done jokingly concerning another's small defect and with small embarrassment for him; for it pertains to honorable recreation.³⁷³ Yet let there be nothing excessive! For from jokes of this kind charity is sometimes wounded.

³⁷⁰ Matt. 5, 22.

³⁷¹ Cf. Rom. 1, 28-30.

³⁷² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, Ethic. l. 4, c. 8.

³⁷³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 1.

185. Restitution of honor. He who has inflicted true contumely upon another is held to sufficient reparation of honor. Therefore he who publicly inflicted contumely is held also publicly to repair the honor taken away; but he who privately and secretly dishonored another ought at least privately to satisfy. This obligation of repairing honor is of itself grave and to be done as quickly as possible. For after Christ said: "Whoever shall say to his brother: Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna," He adds: "If therefore you offer your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to your brother."³⁷⁴ Satisfaction, or restitution of wounded honor, must be made by a new exhibition of honor and reverence. But how this ought to be done in individual cases depends both on the person wounded and on the person who inflicted the contumely. Subjects and equals who have inflicted contumely are often held to ask pardon, especially if the person wounded by grave contumely demands this and does not wish to accept another satisfaction. Nevertheless, in some regions it is not the custom, and therefore there is no obligation of asking pardon. Superiors who have inflicted a not so grave contumely upon their subject are, generally speaking, not held to ask pardon, "lest," says St. Augustine,³⁷⁵ "among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of governing be broken." Therefore superiors can satisfy wounded subjects by exhibiting special signs of benevolence. - Wounded honor ought not to be repaired by payment of money.³⁷⁶ Sometimes nevertheless a monetary fine is imposed by the judge on the one who committed contumely, to be paid for the poor or for pious causes.

³⁷⁴ Matt. 5, 22 sqq.

³⁷⁵ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1383).

³⁷⁶ Cf. nevertheless below, n. 204.

S. Th. II-II, q. 72; q. 73, a. 1; q. 75 and 76; q. 103, a. 1.

435. Notions. - Just as reputation is injured by detraction, so honor is injured by contumely (beleediging). Honor is the external testimony of another's excellence, made by words or equivalent signs. It can be done by laudatory words which pronounce another's excellence, by calling him, for example, lord, eminent, most wise, - by deeds or actions such as inclination, going to meet him, yielding place, - or by exterior things, such as gifts, the erection of a statue, the setting up of an image, etc.; all these are employed from the intention of the one honoring, to signify another's excellence or his superiority in regard to oneself, under some respect, or in regard to others.

The foundation of honor is qualities or gifts, of whatever kind, internal and external, natural or supernatural, by which someone excels, especially virtue, which is the true excellence of man.

Honor proceeds as from its first motive from reverence, insofar as someone, from the reverence which he has toward another, honors him; and at the same time it tends to reverence as to an end, insofar as he honors him so that he may be held in reverence by others. But its effect is glory, which is clear knowledge of excellence among others. It differs from good reputation: a) reputation chiefly consists in the internal opinion of many, honor in external testimony; b) reputation is borne concerning one absent, honor is shown to one present, either through himself, or through another which represents him, such as an ambassador or image; c) reputation concerns a certain perfection simply, but honor concerns excellence or superiority in perfection.

436. Definition of contumely. - Contumely is directly opposed to honor; whence it is the unjust dishonoring of a present person. It is said:

1° dishonoring, i.e., not only the negative absence of honor even when due, but a positive contrary act which expresses contempt, which is chiefly done by words uttered or written, also by deeds insofar as they are equivalent signs which have the force of words, for example, by a contemptuous look or gesture, by an infamous picture, by a slap inflicted, by the breaking of an image or defacing of a door. Whence the privative omission of due honor is not contumely, unless because of special circumstances it is equivalent to a positive act of contempt, as if, all being greeted, one is deliberately neglected;

2° unjust, because it could also be a just punishment of a delict;

3° of a present person, at least in some way, whether through himself, or in an ambassador or in an image, or in such a way that the injury is made known to him through a messenger or through letters. For "he who utters words against someone in secret, seems to fear him rather than to despise him, whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor" q. 73, a. 1. Hence for contumely it is not necessary that it be done before others; for "if someone says his defect to someone... to him alone, it can be contumely insofar as he who speaks acts unjustly against the reverence of the hearer" q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

437. Contumely is made from the intention of dishonoring and by this differs from other sins. - Its end is externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored; therefore:

1. It differs really from detraction a) by reason of the object or end, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; b) by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while detraction of itself is done concerning one absent. But if contumely is done before others in such a way that a delict, whether false or unknown, is imputed to another while he himself is present, then it is joined with detraction but formally is contumely.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 73, a. 1: "Just as by deed someone harms another in two ways: openly indeed as in robbery,... but secretly as in theft...; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely,... in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction. But from this, that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to despise him; whence from this very fact he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. But he who utters words against someone in secret seems to fear him rather than to despise him; whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor, but to reputation, insofar as one uttering such words secretly, as far as in him lies, makes those who hear have an evil opinion of him against whom he speaks: for the detractor seems to intend this, and strives for this, that credence be given to his words. Whence it is clear that detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the mode of proposing words, because namely the contumelious man speaks openly against someone (i.e., to his face), but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the end, or as to the harm inflicted, because namely the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation."

2. It also differs really from mockery or jeering, by which the defects of one's neighbor are turned into laughter, whether by words, or by gestures such as with wrinkled nose, or by deeds, to his illegitimate blushing, disturbance, and confusion. Therefore mockery has an end diverse from contumely: to procure blushing, which is not dishonoring but fear of dishonoring (q. 75, a. 1).

3. It differs also under some respect from abusive speech and reproach (versmading), by which generally any vice whatsoever, or defect of fault or penalty or merely natural defect, is disgracefully objected to someone to the detriment of honor, or a lessening or need, while contumely strictly so called objects fault (q. 72, a. 1, ad 3).

438. Principle. Contumely is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - For it takes away from one's neighbor a notable good which is usually esteemed more than riches, indeed in external goods it holds the first place, "both because it is very near to virtue, as being a certain testimony existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for obtaining honor and avoiding blame" (q. 129, a. 1). But to take away such a good is against justice, because it is done while one's neighbor is unwilling, who has a right to it because of natural or supernatural qualities and gifts, especially because of honesty and virtue.

Whence Christ, Mt. V, 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council: but he who shall say, Thou fool (i.e., madman), shall be liable to the hell of fire." And the Apostle admonishes Christians that they be "anticipating one another with honor" (Rom. XII, 10), and "in humility judging one another superior to themselves" (Phil. II, 3).

Nevertheless it can be venial a) on the part of the agent, if it is done from inadvertence, lack of deliberation, sudden anger, or from an intention of not gravely injuring honor, as if someone speaks in jest or not so seriously;

b) on the part of the matter, if there is no grave injury of honor. Whence contumelious words which are uttered by parents against children, and abusive speeches by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelling women attack one another and vomit forth whatever occurs, are easily excused from grave sin, because they are usually considered as of lesser moment or are even not seriously uttered.

439. The gravity of the sin of contumely is to be weighed not only absolutely from the thing itself or the contumely uttered according to itself, but also respectively

1° to the dignity of the person offended: for injury is measured from the dignity of the person offended to whom it is terminated; whence the same contumely brought upon a father, bishop, or king is much graver than if it is brought upon an equal;

2° also to the offending person and his dispositions: thus an offense which arises from hatred, envy, or contempt is graver than that which arises from anger or lightness; greater if it is uttered by a person of great authority than by a man of lower condition;

3° to the effects to follow from it: the sin is greater if it is done before several persons or before those who from this receive scandal, or if quarrels, contentions, enmities are foreseen.

440. Mockery (beschimping, bespotting) agrees with contumely in matter; but it differs in mode and end, and consequently is of a diverse species; for it is had when someone objects to another a defect or fault in a joking manner, so that the other blushes or is ashamed (Mt. XXVII, 41-44; Lk. XXIII, 36). It is called jeering when someone is exposed to ridicule not by words but by gestures or movements of the body (Mt. XXVII, 40). It is called derision when the same is done by means of some deception (Mt. XXVI, 68; XXVII, 29; Lk. XXII, 63). Cf. St. Thomas, q. 75.

The gravest sin is mockery of God and of those things which are of God (Is. XXXVII, 23), because it is also blasphemy against religion; the second place is held by mockery of parents because it is also against piety (Prov. XXX, 17); in the third place derision of the just is grave insofar as the virtue and simplicity of the just man is derided (Job XII, 4), which derision is very harmful because through this men are impeded from acting well. Besides, derision will be a grave sin against justice if it notably offends and shames one's neighbor, or causes grave damages and sins (Prov. XXII, 10).

But derision concerning a light evil or defect, or one not sufficiently deliberate, is a venial sin, indeed none, if it is done moderately and with a just cause, for example, so that the one derided may abstain from a defect or sin, or that honest recreation may be fostered. Nevertheless, even friends should deride soberly, prudently, and not too long, especially if the neighbor is foreseen to be not lightly moved by this; wherefore St. Thomas wisely admonishes (q. 72, a. 2, ad 1): "It pertains to eutrapelia to say some light abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed. But if someone does not fear to sadden him against whom a joking abusive speech of this kind is uttered, provided he excites laughter in others, this is vicious."

441. Cursing, concerning which St. Thomas treats after derision (q. 76), can be understood in three ways:

1° one is merely enunciative, by which someone reports the evil of another, and this is nothing but detraction;

2° another is causative or imperative, by which someone moves others by command to bringing evil upon another; and this is the first of the nine modes of cooperation, concerning which we spoke above (n. 309);

3° another is optative, by which someone expresses an evil affection or desire and wishes evil to another (verwensching). This can be defined: a dishonoring by which someone imprecates evil upon someone insofar as it is evil, and thus it is against justice; besides, it contains the sin of hatred against charity, if evil is wished from the heart.

Optative cursing, just like imperative cursing, is a sin if someone intends the evil of another insofar as it is evil; but it is not a sin if someone intends the evil of another under the aspect of good, because then the intention of the one speaking is not referred to evil but to good, whether because it is just (for example, to desire just punishment), or because it is useful (for example, for correction). This however is to be understood, provided it is done according to the order of charity: thus he would sin who wished the death of his father because of the inheritance.

Cursing is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is against charity; nevertheless it can be venial either because of the smallness of the evil which one wishes to another, or because of the imperfection of the affection, because it is not done from the heart but from lack of deliberation or without the mind of one desiring, for example, from a sudden movement of anger or from custom. And nevertheless curses even light of themselves can from circumstances be mortal, whether by reason of the person against whom they are made, for example, if they are made against God, against parents, against superiors especially present, or by reason of scandal.

It is a sin so much graver according as we ought more to love and reverence the person whom we curse and according as we wish graver evils. Whence

1. it is gravest to curse God, which is also blasphemy against religion;

2. then to curse parents, which is also against piety;

3. then to curse superiors, which is also against observance;

4. then against other neighbors according to the gravity of the evil wished; but if by a simple evil affection diverse things are also wished under the general aspect of evil, because they are evil, the sin is against charity insofar as evil is desired, and against justice insofar as, by uttering it, one's neighbor is dishonored; but if by an efficacious desire someone desires to inflict diverse evils upon another, the sins are diverse in species against justice according to the diverse evils wished;

5. to curse irrational creatures: a) if they are regarded according to themselves, it is not a mortal sin, because they are not a subject of right and injury, but it is idle and vain, and therefore venial; b) insofar as they have a relation to evil, there is no sin because it is to curse evil itself; c) insofar as they are creatures of God, it is blasphemy against God; d) insofar as they are useful to man, it is the same as to curse man.

Concerning the comparative gravity of detraction and cursing, St. Thomas teaches, q. 76, a. 4 [Original misprint: q. 77]: "The enunciation of fault is a sin, insofar as some harm is thereby brought upon one's neighbor; but to bring harm is graver than to desire harm, other things being equal. Whence detraction according to the common account is a graver sin than cursing expressing simple desire. - But cursing which is done by way of command, since it has the account of a cause, can be graver than detraction, if it brings greater harm than the denigration of reputation; or lighter, if less."

442. Remark: On patience in tolerating contumelies. - From patience we are bound to endure contumelies in preparation of soul, but not always to do this in act. As St. Thomas clearly explains, q. 72, a. 3: "It is the precept of the Lord: if someone has struck you on one cheek, offer him also the other, namely, so that a man be prepared to do this if there is need; nevertheless he is not always bound to do this in act, because neither did the Lord himself do this, but when he had received a slap, he said: Why do you strike me?... Sometimes it is necessary that we repel an inflicted contumely, especially for two reasons: 1) because of the good of him who brings the contumely, so that his audacity may be repressed, and he may not attempt such things thereafter; 2) in another way because of the good of many, whose progress is impeded because of contumelies inflicted upon us. Whence Gregory says: those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them."

Contumely is an unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and aware. But honor is the external testimony of estimation which is had internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image and through something else in which he is represented in some way. Contumely can be done either negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; or positively, namely by words, deeds, or signs of contempt. When it is done by words, it receives various names, which often are used indiscriminately, yet differ somewhat among themselves. For it is called reviling if it casts up natural defects; contumely simply so called, if moral defects; reproach, if it objects neediness, baseness of lineage or condition. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 72, art. 1, ad 3.

To contumely are referred: 1st. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2nd. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; they differ from it because contumely intends to depress honor, but these intend to cause shame and embarrassment. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 75, art. 1.

I say. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus, and induces a strict obligation of reparation. The reason for the first is both because in the estimation of men honor is often reputed more than reputation, and accordingly contumely is a graver sin than detraction, and because it is said, Matth. v, 22: "Whoever shall say to his brother ... Fool, shall be guilty of Gehenna of fire." But the reason for the second is that an injured and reparable right ought to be repaired. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 966.

Contumely is defined by St. Bonaventure in the little opuscule Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae, about the middle: Contumely is the will that avenges itself by the reproach of evils.

And in the speculum animae, cap. 1. at the end: Contumely is the casting up of a crime committed.

The Seraphic Doctor, moreover, admonishes that Contumely proceeds from anger, whence it is called Contumelia, as it were contumens through the irascibility of the soul, as St. Isidore says l. 10. Ethymol. cap. 3.; or from contemning, as Ulpian says, Lege 1. ff. de Iniuriis.

It is also described by Valentia disput. 5. quaest. 16. puncto 1. by Sylvester, and other Summists, with the word Contumelia, by Soto Lib. 5. de Iustitia, quaest. 9. art. 1. Navar. in manu. cap. 18. num. 10.: it is an angry expression of a thing, done against someone's honor.

Or it is a saying, or doing, by which in the presence of someone we wound and violate his honor, as Fagundez says in the eighth precept, lib. 8. cap. 1. num. 3.

It must be noted first, that honor is the exhibition of reverence in sign of some excellence, or virtue, as the Seraphic Doctor teaches in the Compendio Theologiae, lib. 5. cap. 63. and in the speculo disciplinae ad Novitios, part. 1. cap. 6. and Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 34. and on 12. Luke at those words, Honorificabis eum Pater meus, and in 3. dist. 9. art. 1. quaest. 4. in the body, where he establishes a twofold honor.

For honor is shown to someone in a twofold manner; sometimes as an act of obedience of reverence; and that is the honor of veneration; sometimes in testimony of virtue, and a service of complaisance, and that is the honor of adoration. The same also St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 103. art. 1. ad 2. and the Thomists there define honor: It is a certain testification of another's good opinion and excellence, made by words or external signs; by words indeed, as when one honorably addresses someone by calling him prudent, wise, endowed with virtue: by signs, as by submission of body, inclination of the head, etc., as St. Bonaventure teaches in the places cited; and concerning this Aristotle says in the first book of the Ethics: Honor is the exhibition of reverence in testimony of virtue; yet by the name of virtue is understood some excellence of superiority with respect to others, which we recognize in another, such as nobility, etc.

It must be noted second, that expression among men is made first by words; then by deeds, as St. Augustine teaches lib. 2. de doctrina Christiana; for words are the indications of those conceptions which we have in the mind, as Aristotle says in the first Periherm. cap. 1. and St. Bonavent. in primo, dist. 27. part. 2. quaest. 4.

Now therefore contumely is made chiefly in words, as the Seraphic Doctor proves in the place cited, Pharetrae de convitiatione, cap. 3. from the Fathers.

St. Gregory Lib. 8. moral. cap. 23.: Often the wicked, while ignorant of the vice of their own fortitude, boldly lacerate the rectitude of others: and thence against the good they seize for themselves the authority of rebuke, or they bring forward those good things which they learned not by seeing, but by hearing, or they mendaciously ingratiate into others those evils which they themselves committed, and Lib. 5. cap. 8. moral.: Often those who are in power burst forth everywhere into contumelies against their subjects, and those who, vigilant in their governance, serve well, they lose through the wantonness of the tongue, weighing the words of a judge, puny of rectitude as it were; he who shall have called his brother fool without cause, casts himself into the fires of gehenna.

St. JOHN Chrysost. lib. 1. de compunctione cordis before the middle: Whoever shall have called his brother fool, or vain, or a Robber, or shall have inflicted an injury, or a curse, upon him by any other name whatsoever; by each of these terms, under the title of a curse, he is condemned to the punishments of the fire of gehenna.

St. AUGUSTINE rule 3. cap. 38. Whoever shall have wounded anyone with a reproach, or a curse, or even a casting up of a crime, let him remember to cure as quickly as possible by satisfaction what he did: And he who was wounded, to let it go without disputation: But if they wounded each other, they will owe to relax the debts mutually owed to one another.

St. JEROME epistola 1. ad Heliodorum: Nor let anyone applaud himself on the chastity of his body, since for an idle word, whatever men have spoken, they shall render an account of it on the day of judgment; since a reproach against a brother is even a guilt of homicide.

THEREFORE from these I deduce that contumely, by genus, is a mortal sin; for it takes away immediately the honor owed, which is a grave injustice, taking away a thing esteemed at a great price.

MOREOVER, because contumely wounds a man's honor in his face, or while present, or as it were present before others; while detraction wounds the good reputation of one absent; contumely is the graver, the more so because reputation is ordered to honor, as to an end. That it is lethal the Seraphic Doctor proves cap. 1. Speculi animae, not from Diana, or Bonacina, but from the mouth of Christ, Matth. 5. Whoever shall have said to his brother, fool: he shall be guilty of the fire of gehenna.

The Seraphic Doctor, moreover, OBSERVES that, since words are signs of the intellects, per Aristotle in the first Perhierm. cap. 1., great consideration must be given to the mind with which the words are spoken.

IT HAPPENS, however (he says), that such words are spoken from indiscreet zeal, or from a certain surreption, and a sudden movement of anger, and then it would not be to be judged mortal, unless the excess were so great, and the words so disordered, that someone by such contumely would incur manifest defamation: For then the zeal of justice would in no way excuse him from sinning mortally; as if someone should kill another in play. But when one says to another a reproach, or contumely, or taunt, intending the confusion and dishonor of the neighbor, then he acts against the charity of the neighbor, and sins mortally, and thus is understood the word of the Lord, saying Matth. 5. Whoever shall have said to his brother, fool: he shall be guilty of the fire of gehenna.

HENCE also it comes about that, since reputation and honor are better goods than riches, and than the other external and temporal goods, which are subject to theft, according to that word proverbiorum 22. A good name is better than great riches, it is inferred that contumely and detraction are a greater sin than theft, as St. Thom. teaches 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 3. ad 2. and St. Bonav. in Speculo animae, cap. 3. argues.

YET it is a lesser sin than homicide; for life is a greater good than honor and reputation; since these are reparable goods, and that irreparable.

It is a lesser sin also than adultery, because this is against the order of the human species in the order to human generation, through which entrance is given to eternal life.

THUS entirely do they hold, with St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas quaest. 23. art. 1. 2. et 3. Cajetan there, Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 9. art. 1. Lessius l. 2. cap. 11. de detract. et contum. dub. 3. num. 11. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 1. num. 12. and the rest.

ADVERT that not rarely contumelies, materially grave, are formally venial, if the gravity is not intended and adverted to, or because they are not credited, being ascribed to levity: Such occur among boys and little women.

NOTE also, that contumelies in those who are proud in the spirit of correcting are not sins. So Valent. disput. 5. quaest. 16. p. 2. Molin. disp. 18. Clau. Reg. l. 12. cap. 4. Bonac. de rest. disp. 2. quaest. 5. q. 1. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 2. Yet Bast. num. 3. admonishes that Prelates proceed cautiously, modestly, compelled by necessity, for the profit, and because usually such reproaches are false, and do not help, but exasperate; he exhorts that they abstain from these, with Navar. Man. cap. 18. Rodriq. t. 2. qq. 41. art. 2.

CONTUMELIES, however, are of the same species; for they agree in the formal reason of taking away honor unjustly, as Sà says v. Contum. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 1. Azor. 3. p. l. 13. cap. 5. Sotus de iust. l. 3. quaest. 9. art. 1. Molin. t. 4. disp. 21. Reginald. l. 24. num. 102. Fillic. tract. 40. quaest. 6. Bast. num. 4. with St. Bonav. locis cit. Yet it can be so exceeded that it is necessary to confess its gravity, as if you call someone a heretic, a traitor, or a Sodomite.

IF the contumely is inflicted upon parents, it has a special malice to be expressed in confession. Diana p. 1. tract. 7. Resol. 29. He cites Soto, and Reginaldus for this opinion, but he himself dissents.