§ 5. On Injury To Honor

182. Notions. Honor is the testification concerning someone's excellence.³⁶⁰ This testification indeed is usually made in a threefold way: by words, when someone pronounces by mouth the excellence of someone; by deeds, such as by inclinations, by yielding the first place; by external things, e.g., by the offering of gifts, the conferring of dignity, etc. But this testification must be shown to the person present, or at least to his image or another representative. Thus the king present is honored, or represented through his delegate; thus the saints are honored in their images or relics. When the testification of excellence regards someone absent, it pertains more to his reputation than to his honor.

The difference from St. Thomas between honor, reverence, praise, and glory must be noted.

"Reverence is not the same as honor. But on the one hand it is the first motive for honoring, insofar, namely, as someone from the reverence which he has toward someone honors him; but on the other hand it is the end of honor, insofar, namely, as someone is honored for this, that he may be held in reverence by others."³⁶¹

"Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways: in one way, because praise consists only in signs of words (whether oral or written); but honor consists in any external signs whatever, and according to this praise is included in honor. In another way, because through the exhibition of honor we render testimony concerning the excellence of someone's goodness absolutely; but through praise we testify concerning someone's goodness in order to an end, as we praise one who works well for the sake of the end. But honor is also of the best things, which are not ordered to an end, but are already in the end.

"But glory is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports; ... for glory is clear knowledge with praise."³⁶²

The difference between honor and reputation must also be noted. Honor is a testification of another's excellence; reputation is public opinion concerning another's excellence. Honor is shown to one present; reputation is borne concerning one absent. Honor is wounded by contumely; but reputation is wounded by calumny, detraction, and whispering.

³⁶⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1. But since the excellence of a man is considered especially according to virtue (ibid. q. 145, a. 1), all other things which are below virtue are honored insofar as they assist toward works of virtue, such as nobility, power, riches (ibid. ad 2). H. Gay has written well on honor, L'honneur, sa place dans la Morale (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1913).

³⁶¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1 ad 1.

³⁶² Ibid. a. 1 ad 3.

183. Injury to honor. Honor is chiefly wounded by contumely,³⁶³ which can be defined: unjust dishonoring of a person present. This dishonoring for the most part is done by a positive act, namely, by word or deed; but ordinarily the omission of an honorific act does not suffice. Thus, e.g., when a friend from anger or for another reason now no longer greets a former friend, he does not yet commit contumely, unless nevertheless that omission, on account of special circumstances, is equivalent to a positive act.

Dishonoring can be done in many ways: 1. by objecting moral vices to another, e.g.: you are a thief - and then this dishonoring is called contumely in the strict sense;³⁶⁴ 2. by objecting physical defects to another: you are one-eyed, or blind cow; and especially "when someone injuriously brings back to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him suffering necessity. Hence it is said in Eccli. 20, 15: He will give little things and reproach much."³⁶⁵ Dishonoring of this kind is called reproach;³⁶⁶ 3. by deriding another with words and laughter, and then there is mockery³⁶⁷ or derision; 4. by manifesting contempt for another with ridiculous gestures, as the soldiers did when genuflecting before Christ crowned with thorns, and then there is derision with contempt.³⁶⁸ All these diverse modes are indeed diverse sins,³⁶⁹ but they are reduced to the same moral species of contumely, because their end is the same, namely, externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored. Hence it is not necessary to indicate in confession in what way the contumely was done.

³⁶³ Beschimpfung, outrage, insult. Rash judgment also and detraction wound honor, but concerning them there will be special discussion afterward.

³⁶⁴ Schmähung.

³⁶⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3. The Angelic Doctor himself asserts in the same place: "Sometimes, however, one of these is put for another."

³⁶⁶ Vorwurf, opprobre.

³⁶⁷ Verspottung; if it is done jokingly: Fopperei, Hänselei, Spöttelei, "Aufziehen," raillerie.

³⁶⁸ Verhöhnung.

³⁶⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 75, a. 1.

184. The malice of contumely. Contumely is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

That contumely is from its genus a mortal sin is plain from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall say (to his brother), Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna."³⁷⁰ But St. Paul numbers the contumelious among those whom God handed over to a reprobate sense.³⁷¹

That contumely wounds justice is clear from the fact that any man has a strict right to honor; and this right indeed contumely violates. And certainly honor is a good more excellent than riches. But to steal the riches of another is from its genus a mortal sin against justice. Therefore, more strongly, to take away honor, which contumely does, is such a sin.

Honor, which is founded upon true virtue, obtains the first place among all the external goods of man. Hence not rarely men sacrifice riches, health, indeed even life itself, for acquiring or retaining honor. Concerning this matter St. Thomas teaches: "Things which come into the use of man are exterior things, among which simply the greatest is honor: both because it is nearest to virtue, as being a certain testification existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for attaining honor and avoiding blame."³⁷² From these things it follows that unjust wounding of honor is a very grave sin against justice. Nor is that sin diminished from the fact that he who is dishonored does not always feel great damage, although this sometimes happens. For a very rich man upon whom notable damaging is inflicted does not even feel damage of this kind much, on account of abundant other riches; and nevertheless the damaging inflicted remains a great sin.

Contumely often has other malices joined to it, such as: irreligiosity, if, e.g., a cleric or religious is dishonored; wounded piety, if, e.g., the contumely is against parents; blasphemy, if it is against God or the saints; scandal, etc.

Contumely becomes a light sin:

1. from imperfection of the act, e.g., inadvertence, lack of deliberation, from sudden anger;

2. from the intention of not gravely wounding honor, e.g., if someone from jest or not so seriously says to another: You are an ass;

3. from the condition of the speaker and hearer. Hence Soto, Sylvius, and others deservedly teach that insults by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelsome women attack one another, crying that the other is a prostitute, an adulteress, a scoundrel, the devil himself, etc., are not mortal sins. The reason is that by these exclamations no great wounding of honor is caused to anyone. The same holds for contumelious words which are brought forth by parents against children, by teachers against pupils, etc.

Mockery, which, as was said above, is reduced to contumely, is often no sin; indeed, it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done jokingly concerning another's small defect and with small embarrassment for him; for it pertains to honorable recreation.³⁷³ Yet let there be nothing excessive! For from jokes of this kind charity is sometimes wounded.

³⁷⁰ Matt. 5, 22.

³⁷¹ Cf. Rom. 1, 28-30.

³⁷² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, Ethic. l. 4, c. 8.

³⁷³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 1.

185. Restitution of honor. He who has inflicted true contumely upon another is held to sufficient reparation of honor. Therefore he who publicly inflicted contumely is held also publicly to repair the honor taken away; but he who privately and secretly dishonored another ought at least privately to satisfy. This obligation of repairing honor is of itself grave and to be done as quickly as possible. For after Christ said: "Whoever shall say to his brother: Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna," He adds: "If therefore you offer your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to your brother."³⁷⁴ Satisfaction, or restitution of wounded honor, must be made by a new exhibition of honor and reverence. But how this ought to be done in individual cases depends both on the person wounded and on the person who inflicted the contumely. Subjects and equals who have inflicted contumely are often held to ask pardon, especially if the person wounded by grave contumely demands this and does not wish to accept another satisfaction. Nevertheless, in some regions it is not the custom, and therefore there is no obligation of asking pardon. Superiors who have inflicted a not so grave contumely upon their subject are, generally speaking, not held to ask pardon, "lest," says St. Augustine,³⁷⁵ "among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of governing be broken." Therefore superiors can satisfy wounded subjects by exhibiting special signs of benevolence. - Wounded honor ought not to be repaired by payment of money.³⁷⁶ Sometimes nevertheless a monetary fine is imposed by the judge on the one who committed contumely, to be paid for the poor or for pious causes.

³⁷⁴ Matt. 5, 22 sqq.

³⁷⁵ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1383).

³⁷⁶ Cf. nevertheless below, n. 204.

186. Scholion. On contumely to be tolerated patiently. In a special article St. Thomas³⁷⁷ investigates whether and when someone ought patiently to tolerate contumelies inflicted upon himself. A man indeed is held with great patience to tolerate contumelies inflicted and not to exact satisfaction solely on account of desire for private honor. Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to repel the contumely inflicted, especially on account of two things: first, indeed, on account of the good of him who inflicts the contumely, namely, so that his audacity may be repressed and that he may not attempt such things afterward; ... in another way, on account of the good of many, whose progress is impeded on account of contumelies inflicted upon us. Hence Gregory says: "Those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them, lest those who could hear their preaching do not hear it, and thus, remaining in depraved morals, they contemn living well."

As to the manner of repelling contumely, the moderation of blameless defense must altogether be observed. Wherefore it is not lawful to provoke to a duel, nor to kill an aggressor of honor.³⁷⁸ Sometimes, however, it is lawful to retort contumelious words or blows upon the one committing contumely by the same words or blows, namely, if otherwise reparation of wounded honor cannot conveniently be obtained.

³⁷⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 3.

³⁷⁸ Cf. proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI.