Covetousness, liberality and prodigality

Covetousness or avarice is the inordinate love of wealth, It is not sinful to value and seek after money in moderation, but the love of money becomes inordinate when it causes a man to be too close and niggardly in spending it, too eager and absorbed in acquiring it, and ready to do what is wrong in order to come at it.

It is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it leads to the transgression of a precept which binds under grievous sin. Although it is of itself only a venial sin, yet it is very dangerous because of man’s proneness to it, and because the vice is apt to grow fast by what it feeds upon, until it becomes mortally sinful. Holy Scripture frequently condemns it and warns us against it.¹

¹ 1 Tim. vi 9, etc.

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

Sinful Cooperation in Providers of Food and Drink.—(a) There is explicit formal cooperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness, violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself drunk, there is explicit cooperation. There is implicit formal cooperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the circumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is unlawful material cooperation when one does not approve of the sin that will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful cooperation when a restaurant owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason than the profit he himself will make.

Material cooperation in providing food or drink to those who ask it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for cooperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as explained in 1519.

(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as indignation of a customer, might suffice for cooperation with a venial violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful. A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more harmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g., the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).

(b) A greater reason is required when the cooperation is closer. Thus, in supplying meat the butcher cooperates only remotely, while the cook who prepares it and the waiter who serves it cooperate proximately.

(c) A greater reason is necessary when one’s cooperation is essential to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat on a day of abstinence would excuse cooperation, whereas in a small village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against one’s business which the refusal of meat might evoke.

(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of those present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover, since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a great quantity of liquor to be brought to one’s table. Drunkenness is also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat under its influence.

The sins with which one cooperates by supplying food or drink to others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as they violate the natural law or only positive human law.

(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One may not cooperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is manifestly of this character.

(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders, blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to cooperate with intemperance, unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk, if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or serious injury to oneself.

(c) Violation of a fast or abstinence in itself is opposed only to positive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one is more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that of the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a right to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can decide more readily in the customer’s favor if there is question of fast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more readily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of abstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on Friday to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food indicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that as well as meat.

615. Notion. Liberality or largesse is a virtue moderating the love of money and rendering a man prompt to expend money according to the dictate of right reason.

Explanation. The material object of this virtue is money and other external goods, but its proximate and immediate object is the desire for money, which must be rightly moderated lest it be either too great or too small. Mediately and consequently, liberality is occupied with the right use and reasonable distribution of money, which a liberal man gives willingly, cheerfully, and abundantly, as right reason demands.¹⁰⁸² From these things it is evident that even the poor can possess the virtue of liberality as regards its proximate and immediate object, namely, when they have a right affection toward money so that they would be prepared to distribute it if they possessed it. The exercise itself of liberality, however, is often impossible for the poor on account of their poverty.

Liberality is a virtue annexed to justice because, although it does not equal justice in rendering strict and due equality, it nevertheless in some measure renders a due to one's neighbor. Liberality differs: a) from mercy, which proceeds from the motive of compassion; b) from beneficence, which proceeds from the motive of charity; c) from magnificence, in that liberality is occupied with moderate and ordinary distributions, but magnificence uses great expenditures for accomplishing splendid works,¹⁰⁸³ as will be said below, n. 631.

¹⁰⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 117, a. 2.

¹⁰⁸³ Ib., a. 3 ad 1.

I. Avarice is the inordinate appetite for riches, or immoderate love of having. It is called:

1. an appetite for riches, under the name of which come not only monies but all exterior goods, insofar as they are useful to man and their price is measured and estimated by money: "all exterior things which come into the use of human life are understood under the name of money insofar as they have the account of a useful good";¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 2 ad 1.

2. inordinate, that is, immoderate and excessive. For riches are a useful good for the sustaining of life according to someone's condition. But the useful is good insofar as it is commensurated to the end, and the excess of this measure is evil. Whence the appetite for riches insofar as they are necessary or useful for life is good, but to desire them beyond this is evil.

"In all things which are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure; for those things which are for an end must be commensurated to the end, as medicine is commensurated to health... But exterior goods have the account of useful things for an end. Whence it is necessary that man's good concerning them consist in a certain measure, namely while man seeks to have exterior riches according to some measure, insofar as they are necessary for his life according to his condition. And therefore sin consists in the excess of this measure, namely when someone wishes to acquire or retain them above the due mode, which pertains to the account of avarice, which is defined as immoderate love of having. Whence it is clear that avarice is a sin."²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 1.

II. The gravity and species of avarice. - The love or appetite for riches can be immoderate in two ways:

a) in one way, in receiving and retaining riches, insofar, namely, as man acquires or preserves them more than is due. Thus it is directly a sin against the neighbor and is opposed to justice, and it is mortal from its genus, while nevertheless admitting lightness of matter;

b) in another way, in interior affection, if someone loves riches too much, desires them, or is delighted in them, even if he does not wish to snatch away the goods of others. Thus it is a sin of man in himself, and is opposed to liberality, and according to itself is venial, unless on account of affection for riches someone does not fear to commit some mortal sin, or establishes his last end in riches.³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 1 ad 2; a. 3 and 5; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 13, a. 1 and 2.

From these things it is clear that avarice, or immoderate love of having, is not only the love of retaining riches, but of desiring them in any inordinate way whatsoever.

III. The general influence of avarice upon other sins. - The Apostle says in 1 Tim. 6:10: Cupidity is the root of all evils; this is to be understood of avarice properly so called.⁴ The reason is that through riches man acquires the faculty and facility of perpetrating any sin whatsoever, and the occasion of desiring any sin whatsoever, because man can be assisted by money in order to have any temporal goods whatsoever, according to Ecclesiastes 10:19: All things obey money. Whence just as a root furnishes nourishment to a tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin. And therefore avarice is the root of all sins, not indeed in this sense, that every sin viewed individually arises from it, but because every genus of sin can arise from it and more frequently does arise from it.⁵

⁴ Several indeed have understood this of avarice improperly so called, namely a) of inordinate conversion or tendency toward any temporal good whatsoever, which is found in every sin. This general cupidity is called the cause of sins on the part of conversion toward created good, from which sin is nourished and fostered, whence it is called the root. Also b) of the inclination of fallen nature toward inordinately desiring temporal goods, from which all sins come. These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly speaks of avarice properly so called, which is a special sin, namely the inordinate appetite for riches. I-II, q. 84, a. 1.

⁵ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 1.

Therefore avarice properly so called, like pride properly so called, is the cause of all sins, not indeed on the part of aversion, but each on the part of the act or of conversion toward a created good which is in sin. Nevertheless they differ: 1. in the account of causality, for pride is the final cause of all, while avarice is a disposing cause toward all, insofar as it procures the means of acquiring all things which the other vices desire; whence 2. each is first in a different order: pride in the order of intention, in which the end is the principle that precedes the means; avarice in the order of execution, in which, on the contrary, the means precede the end, which is their term: "It must be considered that in voluntary acts a twofold order is found, namely, of intention and of execution. In the first order (pride) has the character of principle and of end. . . . But on the part of execution, that is first which furnishes the opportunity of fulfilling all the desires of sin, which has the character of a root, namely riches. And therefore on this side avarice is said to be the root of all evils."⁶

⁶ Ibid., a. 2.

IV. Avarice is a capital sin. - A capital vice is that from which other vices arise according to the character of an end, that is, because it has a supremely desirable end: whence, to obtain it, a man does many other things, even evil ones. But the supremely desirable end is happiness, "and therefore the more anything participates in the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is." Now one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficient, a condition which is verified in riches: for money, which all things obey, most of all gives a man what suffices for himself. Therefore avarice is a capital vice. - Money, namely, although by its nature it is a useful good, and hence is not an end but a means to the end, nevertheless because of its universality, inasmuch as it is useful for acquiring all external goods, virtually contains all things, and so has a certain likeness to happiness, and is exceedingly desirable.⁷

⁷ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 7; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 13, a. 3.

Nor does this stand in the way: that pride is not numbered among the capital vices because it is itself the cause of all; therefore, by parity, avarice too is not to be placed among the capital vices, since it is the root of all sins. - For pride is the cause of all sins under the character of an end, and therefore it is not a capital vice, which is the final cause of some sins only; avarice, however, is not the root of all sins inasmuch as it is their end, but inasmuch as it disposes toward all and furnishes the faculty and the means of desiring and perpetrating all, and under this respect it is not a capital vice; but because it is besides the final cause of some, it is rightly numbered among the capital vices.⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4, ad 4.

V. Avarice has seven daughters. - From avarice, as from a final cause, seven vices more frequently arise, according to Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), which are called its daughters. Inasmuch as it is immoderate in retaining, there arises: 1. hardness of heart, or inhumanity against mercy toward one's neighbor; - inasmuch as it is immoderate in taking, there arises 2. in the affection: restlessness, or superfluous solicitude about goods to be acquired; in effect: 3. violence, when someone uses force to acquire goods; 4. deceit and 5. perjury, when he uses guile in words, whether simple words or words confirmed by oath; 6. fraud, when he uses guile in deed as to things; and 7. treachery, when he uses guile as to persons, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ.⁹

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 8; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 13, a. 3.

VI. Remedies against avarice. - Besides prayer, there is customarily proposed a twofold kind of remedy: one internal, in the mind; another external, in work.

A. In the mind: consideration both a) of the loftiness of heavenly things and the vanity of earthly things; and b) of the example of Christ the Lord, who, though He was rich, became needy, that He might show us that the contempt of riches is the more certain way of salvation; and c) of the baseness, unhappiness, and dangers of avarice; and d) of death, which will despoil us of all earthly things.

In particular, think:

1. how inconstant are the riches of this world, which pass away "as a shadow" (Wis. 5:9), and like things possessed in sleep, after which, when it has passed, "all the men of riches have found nothing in their hands" (Ps. 75:6);

2. whither riches acquired with such solicitude will go: strangers will snatch away my labors, my heirs and those born of them will squander them. God warns the avaricious man: "Thou fool, this night do they require thy soul of thee; and whose shall those things be which thou hast prepared? So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God" (Luke 12:20-21);

3. how vile are the goods of this world: they are extrinsic, they make the possessor neither better nor blessed, but for the most part restless, forgetful of heaven, proud, luxurious, a contemner of divine things, hard also toward the miserable, as Sirach 10:9-10 testifies: "There is nothing more wicked than the avaricious man... Nothing is more wicked than to love money; for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale."

B. In work: a) largess of alms, b) visitation of the miserable, and c) conformity to the divine will in the loss of goods: namely, let the poor love poverty; let the rich be drawn back from riches by the good use of them.

In particular, call to mind the sayings of Scripture:

1. "He that giveth to the poor shall not want; he that despiseth him that asketh shall suffer want" (Prov. 28:27).

2. "He lendeth to the Lord who hath mercy on the poor" (Prov. 19:17); "As long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me" (Matt. 25:40); "And do not forget beneficence and communication, for by such sacrifices God is merited" (Heb. 13:16).

3. "The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord." He is truly rich who possesses God; poor is he who lacks God.

4. "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth,... but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven... Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you" (Matt. 6:19-20, 33; printed citation: Mt. VI, 19, 20, 23). "For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?" (Matt. 16:26).

S. Th. II-II, q. 117-119.

884. Liberality (vrijgevigheid) is a virtue moderating the love of riches and rendering a man prompt to disburse them when right reason dictates; but under the name of riches come all external goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be valued by money.

It is a virtue, because in distributing money it moderates affection and use according to the dictate of reason, and so makes one use well those things which we can use badly.

Immediately it is concerned with passions: the estimation and affection of money, by moderating these so that money is not esteemed more or less than it ought; mediately and consequently it is concerned with the use of riches: both indirectly, by removing the impediment of right use, namely, excessive love of them; and directly, by moving to their prompt distribution to others. As regards the use of money toward oneself, nature sufficiently moves each person, but for distributing it to others when and how one ought, there is need of a special virtue added above nature. From this it follows that the poor can have the virtue of liberality as to its immediate object, when they have a right affection toward money, so that they are prepared to distribute what they would possess.

It is annexed to justice, because on the one hand it falls short of it, since it does not render to another what is his, but what is one's own; on the other hand it agrees with it, insofar as it is toward another and is concerned with external things as justice is: thus in some way it renders a debt according to the equality of that which is becoming.

Hence it differs a) from mercy and from the beneficence of charity: these also give to others what is one's own, but from diverse motives, because one has compassion for the needy or because one loves; but liberality does so because it does not esteem money more than it ought; hence it gives even to the unknown, not only to friends;

b) from magnificence: this uses riches under a special account, according as they are assumed for the completion of some great work; liberality is concerned with moderate disbursements. Hence magnificence is added above liberality.

885. Liberality is not the greatest of the virtues, because it is less to moderate affection concerning the use of riches than to moderate passions pertaining to one's own body, which temperance does; and than to procure the common good, which fortitude and justice do; and than to be concerned with the divine good, as the theological virtues are. Yet consequently it has a certain excellence and is useful for many things: for from the fact that a man is not too affected toward money, it follows that he easily uses it both for the utility of others and for the glory of God.

886. Avarice is opposed to liberality by defect. - Avarice is an inordinate appetite for riches, which is twofold:

a) an inordinate appetite in accepting and retaining unduly, which is opposed to justice and therefore from its genus is gravely evil;

b) an inordinate affection by which riches are loved too much, or desired, or are too pleasing to delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, because it is only an excess in love of a thing indifferent and licit according to itself; unless on account of affection for riches someone is prepared to commit some mortal sin, or constitutes his last end in riches.

The sin of avarice in some respect is graver and baser than others, namely, on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected. For since it is baser to be inordinately subject to a lower good than to a higher one, the less is the good to which the appetite is inordinately subjected, so much the more deformed is the sin. But the good of external things, to which the avaricious man is subjected, is the lowest among all human goods, namely, less than the good of the body or of the soul. Therefore avarice in this respect is baser than other sins. - Yet simply it is not graver, namely, on the part of the good which it corrupts or of which it deprives: for according to this, a sin which is against God is graver, and under this is a sin against one's own or another man's person, and under this that which is only against external things, which are deputed for the use of man, as avarice is. But since the privation of good has itself formally in sin, while conversion to a created good has itself materially, the consideration according to the formal element is weightier; therefore, speaking simply, avarice is not the greatest of all sins.

Yet it is a capital sin, indeed the root of all sins, as was explained in the treatise on Sins (I, n. 504 and 497).

887. Prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. - Prodigality is called the superfluous disbursement of one's own things; it is against liberality, which places measure according to right reason in disbursing riches, which measure prodigality removes, not precisely because it exceeds in quantity, for the liberal man can give more than the prodigal, but because he does not disburse according to right reason, insofar as he gives where, when, what, and to whom he ought not give.

But it is opposed to avarice according to excess and defect at the same time: in affection for riches the avaricious man exceeds, the prodigal falls short; in the use of riches the prodigal exceeds in giving, falls short in retaining, whereas the avaricious man falls short in giving and exceeds in retaining. Hence someone can be at the same time avaricious and prodigal, avaricious in acquiring, prodigal in giving, as if he is avaricious so that he can be prodigal.

Yet prodigality is a lesser sin than avarice: a) by reason of the object, because the latter differs more from the opposite virtue: for giving, in which the prodigal abounds, pertains more to liberality than accepting or retaining, in which the avaricious man abounds; b) also by reason of the effect, because the prodigal man is useful to many, but the avaricious man to no one, not even to himself; c) by reason of duration, because prodigality is easily healed, by age or by the want which it causes, but avarice is not.

According to itself it is a venial sin, because it is only an excessive use of one's own goods, and indeed of the lowest goods. Yet it can be mortal: 1) by reason of a mortally evil end, as if riches are poured out for lust; 2) by reason of harm, as if someone thereby becomes unable to pay debts or to procure necessities for the family; 3) by reason of a special obligation of giving superfluous things to a determined cause, for example to pious causes, as concerning ecclesiastical goods (n. 195).

TWO are the vices opposed to Liberality, namely, Avarice, and Prodigality.

AVARICE consists in an immoderate appetite for having, even if it injures no one. Thus St. Doctor defines it in the Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 6: Avarice is an immoderate love of money to be sought, or retained. There he sets forth splendid similitudes of avarice and reviews its harms.

He there enumerates the twelve daughters of Avarice, and these are they. Usury, Rapine, Robbery, Unjust Tallies, The fraud of traders, The deception of Advocates, The acceptance of gifts, Simony in the promotion of relatives, The sins of Anchorets, that is, of those who are promoted by favor and the power of Princes, The fraud of merchants, Avarice for knowledge, The iniquity of Gamblers. This is roughly what he has in the places cited, and they are rather material species, as also those referred to in 4 Eth. cap. 1.

In Compend. Theolog. verit. lib. 3. cap. 19. he defines Avarice thus from D. Bernardo, epist. 42: Avarice is an insatiable and dishonorable desire for things of any kind. Or from Tullio: It is an immoderate love of having.

That this is a grave sin he proves from the Apostle Ephes. 5, where it is called: the service of idols, because it renders to money what is owed to God; for it hopes in money, places in it its ultimate end, and loves it supremely. Hence Eccles. 10 says: Nothing is more wicked than the avaricious man; but avarice does not have this precisely in itself, but because it — covetousness — is the root of all vices, on account of which many have erred from the faith; for all crimes are wrought through avarice: thefts, perjuries, homicides, debaucheries, adulteries. Second, because it is against the law of nature, Luke 6: Whatever you wish that men do to you, etc. Third, because it is against the written Law, Luke 6: Be merciful, etc. Fourth, because it is against the law of universal communication; for the avaricious man holds goods captive so that they may not be shared.

He asks, indeed: whether it is lawful to heap up treasures. And he answers that it is not lawful with the affect of avarice, without one's own or another's necessity; but it is lawful from consideration of necessity; thus it is lawful for parents, for raising children and endowing daughters, but not for enriching them; and this with the manner or state of the person preserved.

It is lawful also for Princes and Kings to heap up treasure for the preservation of the Kingdom. But Ecclesiastical persons, he says, may not, because the Church has money not to keep it, but to spend it, as St. Ambrose says, lib. 2. offic. cap. 28. He there enumerates the seven daughters of Avarice. See him.

In p. p. Centil. sect. 22. he hands down many definitions of avarice, and besides those enumerated above he brings another from D. Augustino, lib. 14. de civit. cap. 15: Avarice is the lust of having money; he soon brings the reason why it is called: the service of idols, Eph. 5: because the worshiper of God is compared to him in three ways, by honoring, by hoping, by loving; and the avaricious man renders these to money.

But St. Doctor observes that Avarice is opposed to liberality, and to Charity, and insofar as it is against liberality, it is an immoderate appetite for money, and thus it is not a mortal sin, if it stops there, so that it does not prefer its love to the Divine love or the love of neighbor, so that one is not willing to do anything against what is owed to God or neighbor. So also D. Thom. q. 118. art. 4, and commonly, as Tanner says, num. 45.

But as it is opposed to Charity, it is mortal; for he loves money, preferring it to the commandments of God, to almsgiving, to restitution, etc.; he does not shun frauds, betrayals, perjuries, violences, mercilessness, and the like.

He treats all these things more exactly in speculo animae, cap. 2.

But he notes there that this is the concupiscence of the eyes, of which John speaks in epist. 1. He says that three branches arise from this stock: namely, the Inordinate appetite for having, Inordinate acquisition, and inordinate possession. From inordinate love arise inordinate desire of having, inordinate love of what one has, and inordinate grief over what is lost. From inordinate desire of having arise solicitude in the mind, and injustice in deed. This solicitude can be mortal, if on account of it the commandments are omitted, for instance of sanctifying the Feast, or hearing Mass.

Injustice in deed is either open or hidden, and the latter is called fraud: the open is divided into Theft, Rapine, Usury, An unjust sentence, Unjust advocacy, Unjust tolls, Extortions, the acceptance of gifts, the use of forbidden games.

Hidden injustice contains frauds in contracts, not only about temporal things, but also spiritual ones, as about benefices, judgments, sentences, counsels, etc.

Inordinate love of having causes Mercilessness toward the poor, delay of restitution, non-recompense, illiberality, etc. All these have been discussed in the preceding Tractates.

In Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 26. he gives rules for knowing when avarice is mortal or venial. He presupposes, however, the definition of avarice from Cicero above: It is an immoderate love of having.

This desire consists either in appetizing, or in acquiring, or in retaining. As to desire in acquiring, he assigns five modes.

The FIRST is, if one appetizes efficaciously, and would proceed to the act if the faculty were present; and it is a lethal sin.

The SECOND, if one appetizes with an incomplete illicit will, namely insofar as one procures, but simoniacally, so as to obtain an Ecclesiastical benefice undeservedly.

The THIRD, if one appetizes simply to have superfluous things, with an appetite that suffocates the mind from care for oneself and consideration of divine things, so that on this account one falls away from God, wishing rather to be enriched than to observe the commandments; and this is lethal.

The FOURTH, if with a superfluous love one clings to temporal things, yet beneath God, not on that account wishing to be wanting to God's commandments; and this is venial.

The FIFTH, which he records in the third place, is of one who appetizes such things, whether illicit or another's, with a conditional will, namely, if one could have them without offense to God or injury to neighbor. And then it is either no sin, or venial, if one actually or habitually adds such a condition.

This being said, that great question is resolved: Whether a conditional consent, by which one wills something under that condition — if it were lawful for me, or if it were not a sin — excuses, when the act is mortal.

Many respond thus categorically. When the added condition takes away all malice, it excuses from fault, as, if it were not a sin, I would kill Peter; but not when the condition does not take away the malice, as by saying, if there were no infamy, I would steal. Thus Gerson 2. part. in reg. moral. alphab. 24. littera G, where he has the same words which I reported from D. Bonavent. Caietanus summa, verb. Cogitatio, Armilla num. 1. Sà verb. Peccatum, num. 2. And they speak also of sins against the law of nature. Alcozer follows them, sum. cap. 6. doctrina 2. Manuel citing others, tom. 2. sum. in 2. edit. cap. 112. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 74. art. 8. dub. 116. cap. 2. num. 4. Sayrus in clav. reg. lib. 8. cap. 7. num. 28. and 29. This is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in the place cited, and it is true.

The OPPOSITE indeed others hold, distinguishing: for if that thing be intrinsically evil, as if it is against the law of nature, they say the malice is never purged by a condition, because, being essentially evil, it cannot be purged by any condition, and the condition added involves a contradiction. Thus Adrianus quodl. 10. art. 2. Azor tract. 1. Instit. moral. lib. 4. cap. 6. quaestio 10. Sanchez Tom. 1. in Decal. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 23, citing others.

I ASSERT with the former opinion that a condition wholly purging whatever malice there is in the act excuses from sin.

It is PROVED, because whenever the malice is taken away from the act, there is no sin; but in this case it is taken away: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the will is borne in the manner in which it represents the object to itself under the condition; but this is, not to will the object efficaciously unless it is purged of malice; for it is not borne efficaciously absolutely into the object, but efficaciously conditionally. Here Sanchez was deceived, urging that the will is borne efficaciously into that object. For I say it is borne efficaciously, therefore not with mere complacency; but not efficaciously absolutely, rather conditionally, if it were lawful; and it has no act of not willing the thing, but it would have one, if it were lawful; whence, just as it implies that the object is purged of malice, because it is intrinsically evil, so it implies that the will is not borne absolutely into that object.

But let us now return to our opinion.

The SECOND branch of avarice consists in acquiring unjustly; and this in three ways: First, in any manner whatever. Second, by such a forbidden work, and these are lethal. Third, by a work venially evil, as in games, as those who teach dogs to dance — and it is venial, unless out of delight he conducts himself dissolutely in such things, altogether forgetful of all else. If, however, he should devote himself to such an art altogether out of necessity, because he has no other means of livelihood, St. Doctor says it is not mortal, even if he devotes himself wholly to it, provided he does not omit the commandments.

The THIRD branch is unjust retention, and it is divided into three other branches. The first is to retain those things that must be restored, when one knows it and can restore them. Second, if one retains superfluous things, unwilling to spend what is his own in the extreme or grave necessity of a neighbor, when he can. Third, if one retains superfluous things out of the utmost covetousness, letting things rather rot than being willing to dispense them — and these are mortal. A fourth retains superfluous things out of an inordinate love of mere largesse, and this is venial.

SIMILAR things St. Doctor has de profectu religiosi, lib. 1. cap. 34.

VERY MANY examples of avarice from the Scriptures St. Doctor reports in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 75.

REMEDIES for avarice he enumerates in the book cited, de profectu religiosi, cap. 35. and other places.

The FIRST is, to leave all things for Christ, as the faithful did in the time of the primitive Church. Act. 2. and 4. Hence Luke 14. Matth. 19. Christ imposes on those wishing to be his disciples that they renounce all things.

The SECOND remedy is to consider that riches are full of the dangers by which they are acquired, of the solicitudes by which they are preserved, etc. See the splendid things there.

The THIRD is confidence in God, as is said Matth. 6: Be not solicitous. See St. Doctor. He teaches things not unlike in Pugna spirituali, cap. 5.

HOW the confessor ought to interrogate about this vice. See in Confessionali, cap. 2. particula 6.

You have SPLENDID things from the Fathers against this vice in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 11. for sermons. I do not enumerate them here, so as to remit the reader to the fountain of Siloe, where he will be able to draw the waters of wholesome doctrine for irrigating the dry hearts of the people.

The HARMS of avarice St. Doctor enumerates in great number in Diaeta, salut. tit. 1. cap. 6. and 12. and Compend. Theolog. veritat. lib. 3. cap. 19., where he also brings similitudes of the avaricious man, which serve exceedingly well for sermons: The things pertaining to the species of this vice have their Tractates scattered through this work.