Doubt I: On avarice

TWO are the vices opposed to Liberality, namely, Avarice, and Prodigality.

AVARICE consists in an immoderate appetite for having, even if it injures no one. Thus St. Doctor defines it in the Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 6: Avarice is an immoderate love of money to be sought, or retained. There he sets forth splendid similitudes of avarice and reviews its harms.

He there enumerates the twelve daughters of Avarice, and these are they. Usury, Rapine, Robbery, Unjust Tallies, The fraud of traders, The deception of Advocates, The acceptance of gifts, Simony in the promotion of relatives, The sins of Anchorets, that is, of those who are promoted by favor and the power of Princes, The fraud of merchants, Avarice for knowledge, The iniquity of Gamblers. This is roughly what he has in the places cited, and they are rather material species, as also those referred to in 4 Eth. cap. 1.

In Compend. Theolog. verit. lib. 3. cap. 19. he defines Avarice thus from D. Bernardo, epist. 42: Avarice is an insatiable and dishonorable desire for things of any kind. Or from Tullio: It is an immoderate love of having.

That this is a grave sin he proves from the Apostle Ephes. 5, where it is called: the service of idols, because it renders to money what is owed to God; for it hopes in money, places in it its ultimate end, and loves it supremely. Hence Eccles. 10 says: Nothing is more wicked than the avaricious man; but avarice does not have this precisely in itself, but because it — covetousness — is the root of all vices, on account of which many have erred from the faith; for all crimes are wrought through avarice: thefts, perjuries, homicides, debaucheries, adulteries. Second, because it is against the law of nature, Luke 6: Whatever you wish that men do to you, etc. Third, because it is against the written Law, Luke 6: Be merciful, etc. Fourth, because it is against the law of universal communication; for the avaricious man holds goods captive so that they may not be shared.

He asks, indeed: whether it is lawful to heap up treasures. And he answers that it is not lawful with the affect of avarice, without one's own or another's necessity; but it is lawful from consideration of necessity; thus it is lawful for parents, for raising children and endowing daughters, but not for enriching them; and this with the manner or state of the person preserved.

It is lawful also for Princes and Kings to heap up treasure for the preservation of the Kingdom. But Ecclesiastical persons, he says, may not, because the Church has money not to keep it, but to spend it, as St. Ambrose says, lib. 2. offic. cap. 28. He there enumerates the seven daughters of Avarice. See him.

In p. p. Centil. sect. 22. he hands down many definitions of avarice, and besides those enumerated above he brings another from D. Augustino, lib. 14. de civit. cap. 15: Avarice is the lust of having money; he soon brings the reason why it is called: the service of idols, Eph. 5: because the worshiper of God is compared to him in three ways, by honoring, by hoping, by loving; and the avaricious man renders these to money.

But St. Doctor observes that Avarice is opposed to liberality, and to Charity, and insofar as it is against liberality, it is an immoderate appetite for money, and thus it is not a mortal sin, if it stops there, so that it does not prefer its love to the Divine love or the love of neighbor, so that one is not willing to do anything against what is owed to God or neighbor. So also D. Thom. q. 118. art. 4, and commonly, as Tanner says, num. 45.

But as it is opposed to Charity, it is mortal; for he loves money, preferring it to the commandments of God, to almsgiving, to restitution, etc.; he does not shun frauds, betrayals, perjuries, violences, mercilessness, and the like.

He treats all these things more exactly in speculo animae, cap. 2.

But he notes there that this is the concupiscence of the eyes, of which John speaks in epist. 1. He says that three branches arise from this stock: namely, the Inordinate appetite for having, Inordinate acquisition, and inordinate possession. From inordinate love arise inordinate desire of having, inordinate love of what one has, and inordinate grief over what is lost. From inordinate desire of having arise solicitude in the mind, and injustice in deed. This solicitude can be mortal, if on account of it the commandments are omitted, for instance of sanctifying the Feast, or hearing Mass.

Injustice in deed is either open or hidden, and the latter is called fraud: the open is divided into Theft, Rapine, Usury, An unjust sentence, Unjust advocacy, Unjust tolls, Extortions, the acceptance of gifts, the use of forbidden games.

Hidden injustice contains frauds in contracts, not only about temporal things, but also spiritual ones, as about benefices, judgments, sentences, counsels, etc.

Inordinate love of having causes Mercilessness toward the poor, delay of restitution, non-recompense, illiberality, etc. All these have been discussed in the preceding Tractates.

In Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 26. he gives rules for knowing when avarice is mortal or venial. He presupposes, however, the definition of avarice from Cicero above: It is an immoderate love of having.

This desire consists either in appetizing, or in acquiring, or in retaining. As to desire in acquiring, he assigns five modes.

The FIRST is, if one appetizes efficaciously, and would proceed to the act if the faculty were present; and it is a lethal sin.

The SECOND, if one appetizes with an incomplete illicit will, namely insofar as one procures, but simoniacally, so as to obtain an Ecclesiastical benefice undeservedly.

The THIRD, if one appetizes simply to have superfluous things, with an appetite that suffocates the mind from care for oneself and consideration of divine things, so that on this account one falls away from God, wishing rather to be enriched than to observe the commandments; and this is lethal.

The FOURTH, if with a superfluous love one clings to temporal things, yet beneath God, not on that account wishing to be wanting to God's commandments; and this is venial.

The FIFTH, which he records in the third place, is of one who appetizes such things, whether illicit or another's, with a conditional will, namely, if one could have them without offense to God or injury to neighbor. And then it is either no sin, or venial, if one actually or habitually adds such a condition.

This being said, that great question is resolved: Whether a conditional consent, by which one wills something under that condition — if it were lawful for me, or if it were not a sin — excuses, when the act is mortal.

Many respond thus categorically. When the added condition takes away all malice, it excuses from fault, as, if it were not a sin, I would kill Peter; but not when the condition does not take away the malice, as by saying, if there were no infamy, I would steal. Thus Gerson 2. part. in reg. moral. alphab. 24. littera G, where he has the same words which I reported from D. Bonavent. Caietanus summa, verb. Cogitatio, Armilla num. 1. Sà verb. Peccatum, num. 2. And they speak also of sins against the law of nature. Alcozer follows them, sum. cap. 6. doctrina 2. Manuel citing others, tom. 2. sum. in 2. edit. cap. 112. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 74. art. 8. dub. 116. cap. 2. num. 4. Sayrus in clav. reg. lib. 8. cap. 7. num. 28. and 29. This is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in the place cited, and it is true.

The OPPOSITE indeed others hold, distinguishing: for if that thing be intrinsically evil, as if it is against the law of nature, they say the malice is never purged by a condition, because, being essentially evil, it cannot be purged by any condition, and the condition added involves a contradiction. Thus Adrianus quodl. 10. art. 2. Azor tract. 1. Instit. moral. lib. 4. cap. 6. quaestio 10. Sanchez Tom. 1. in Decal. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 23, citing others.

I ASSERT with the former opinion that a condition wholly purging whatever malice there is in the act excuses from sin.

It is PROVED, because whenever the malice is taken away from the act, there is no sin; but in this case it is taken away: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the will is borne in the manner in which it represents the object to itself under the condition; but this is, not to will the object efficaciously unless it is purged of malice; for it is not borne efficaciously absolutely into the object, but efficaciously conditionally. Here Sanchez was deceived, urging that the will is borne efficaciously into that object. For I say it is borne efficaciously, therefore not with mere complacency; but not efficaciously absolutely, rather conditionally, if it were lawful; and it has no act of not willing the thing, but it would have one, if it were lawful; whence, just as it implies that the object is purged of malice, because it is intrinsically evil, so it implies that the will is not borne absolutely into that object.

But let us now return to our opinion.

The SECOND branch of avarice consists in acquiring unjustly; and this in three ways: First, in any manner whatever. Second, by such a forbidden work, and these are lethal. Third, by a work venially evil, as in games, as those who teach dogs to dance — and it is venial, unless out of delight he conducts himself dissolutely in such things, altogether forgetful of all else. If, however, he should devote himself to such an art altogether out of necessity, because he has no other means of livelihood, St. Doctor says it is not mortal, even if he devotes himself wholly to it, provided he does not omit the commandments.

The THIRD branch is unjust retention, and it is divided into three other branches. The first is to retain those things that must be restored, when one knows it and can restore them. Second, if one retains superfluous things, unwilling to spend what is his own in the extreme or grave necessity of a neighbor, when he can. Third, if one retains superfluous things out of the utmost covetousness, letting things rather rot than being willing to dispense them — and these are mortal. A fourth retains superfluous things out of an inordinate love of mere largesse, and this is venial.

SIMILAR things St. Doctor has de profectu religiosi, lib. 1. cap. 34.

VERY MANY examples of avarice from the Scriptures St. Doctor reports in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 75.

REMEDIES for avarice he enumerates in the book cited, de profectu religiosi, cap. 35. and other places.

The FIRST is, to leave all things for Christ, as the faithful did in the time of the primitive Church. Act. 2. and 4. Hence Luke 14. Matth. 19. Christ imposes on those wishing to be his disciples that they renounce all things.

The SECOND remedy is to consider that riches are full of the dangers by which they are acquired, of the solicitudes by which they are preserved, etc. See the splendid things there.

The THIRD is confidence in God, as is said Matth. 6: Be not solicitous. See St. Doctor. He teaches things not unlike in Pugna spirituali, cap. 5.

HOW the confessor ought to interrogate about this vice. See in Confessionali, cap. 2. particula 6.

You have SPLENDID things from the Fathers against this vice in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 11. for sermons. I do not enumerate them here, so as to remit the reader to the fountain of Siloe, where he will be able to draw the waters of wholesome doctrine for irrigating the dry hearts of the people.

The HARMS of avarice St. Doctor enumerates in great number in Diaeta, salut. tit. 1. cap. 6. and 12. and Compend. Theolog. veritat. lib. 3. cap. 19., where he also brings similitudes of the avaricious man, which serve exceedingly well for sermons: The things pertaining to the species of this vice have their Tractates scattered through this work.