Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Three: On Liberality
S. Th. II-II, q. 117-119.
884. Liberality (vrijgevigheid) is a virtue moderating the love of riches and rendering a man prompt to disburse them when right reason dictates; but under the name of riches come all external goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be valued by money.
It is a virtue, because in distributing money it moderates affection and use according to the dictate of reason, and so makes one use well those things which we can use badly.
Immediately it is concerned with passions: the estimation and affection of money, by moderating these so that money is not esteemed more or less than it ought; mediately and consequently it is concerned with the use of riches: both indirectly, by removing the impediment of right use, namely, excessive love of them; and directly, by moving to their prompt distribution to others. As regards the use of money toward oneself, nature sufficiently moves each person, but for distributing it to others when and how one ought, there is need of a special virtue added above nature. From this it follows that the poor can have the virtue of liberality as to its immediate object, when they have a right affection toward money, so that they are prepared to distribute what they would possess.
It is annexed to justice, because on the one hand it falls short of it, since it does not render to another what is his, but what is one's own; on the other hand it agrees with it, insofar as it is toward another and is concerned with external things as justice is: thus in some way it renders a debt according to the equality of that which is becoming.
Hence it differs a) from mercy and from the beneficence of charity: these also give to others what is one's own, but from diverse motives, because one has compassion for the needy or because one loves; but liberality does so because it does not esteem money more than it ought; hence it gives even to the unknown, not only to friends;
b) from magnificence: this uses riches under a special account, according as they are assumed for the completion of some great work; liberality is concerned with moderate disbursements. Hence magnificence is added above liberality.
885. Liberality is not the greatest of the virtues, because it is less to moderate affection concerning the use of riches than to moderate passions pertaining to one's own body, which temperance does; and than to procure the common good, which fortitude and justice do; and than to be concerned with the divine good, as the theological virtues are. Yet consequently it has a certain excellence and is useful for many things: for from the fact that a man is not too affected toward money, it follows that he easily uses it both for the utility of others and for the glory of God.
886. Avarice is opposed to liberality by defect. - Avarice is an inordinate appetite for riches, which is twofold:
a) an inordinate appetite in accepting and retaining unduly, which is opposed to justice and therefore from its genus is gravely evil;
b) an inordinate affection by which riches are loved too much, or desired, or are too pleasing to delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, because it is only an excess in love of a thing indifferent and licit according to itself; unless on account of affection for riches someone is prepared to commit some mortal sin, or constitutes his last end in riches.
The sin of avarice in some respect is graver and baser than others, namely, on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected. For since it is baser to be inordinately subject to a lower good than to a higher one, the less is the good to which the appetite is inordinately subjected, so much the more deformed is the sin. But the good of external things, to which the avaricious man is subjected, is the lowest among all human goods, namely, less than the good of the body or of the soul. Therefore avarice in this respect is baser than other sins. - Yet simply it is not graver, namely, on the part of the good which it corrupts or of which it deprives: for according to this, a sin which is against God is graver, and under this is a sin against one's own or another man's person, and under this that which is only against external things, which are deputed for the use of man, as avarice is. But since the privation of good has itself formally in sin, while conversion to a created good has itself materially, the consideration according to the formal element is weightier; therefore, speaking simply, avarice is not the greatest of all sins.
887. Prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. - Prodigality is called the superfluous disbursement of one's own things; it is against liberality, which places measure according to right reason in disbursing riches, which measure prodigality removes, not precisely because it exceeds in quantity, for the liberal man can give more than the prodigal, but because he does not disburse according to right reason, insofar as he gives where, when, what, and to whom he ought not give.
But it is opposed to avarice according to excess and defect at the same time: in affection for riches the avaricious man exceeds, the prodigal falls short; in the use of riches the prodigal exceeds in giving, falls short in retaining, whereas the avaricious man falls short in giving and exceeds in retaining. Hence someone can be at the same time avaricious and prodigal, avaricious in acquiring, prodigal in giving, as if he is avaricious so that he can be prodigal.
Yet prodigality is a lesser sin than avarice: a) by reason of the object, because the latter differs more from the opposite virtue: for giving, in which the prodigal abounds, pertains more to liberality than accepting or retaining, in which the avaricious man abounds; b) also by reason of the effect, because the prodigal man is useful to many, but the avaricious man to no one, not even to himself; c) by reason of duration, because prodigality is easily healed, by age or by the want which it causes, but avarice is not.
According to itself it is a venial sin, because it is only an excessive use of one's own goods, and indeed of the lowest goods. Yet it can be mortal: 1) by reason of a mortally evil end, as if riches are poured out for lust; 2) by reason of harm, as if someone thereby becomes unable to pay debts or to procure necessities for the family; 3) by reason of a special obligation of giving superfluous things to a determined cause, for example to pious causes, as concerning ecclesiastical goods (n. 195).