Criminal assault and rape

Criminal assault is the using of violence against a woman to compel her to commit sins of impurity. It contains a grave and special sin against justice as well as the malice of impurity, and it is severely punished by criminal law. It is probable that there is no specific difference in the sin whether the woman be a virgin or not.

Rape is the violent abduction of a person from a place of safety for the purpose of satisfying lust. The violence may be offered to the person abducted, or to the parents, or to those who have charge of her, and it adds a special malice of its own to the sin besides the malice against chastity.

I. Notion. Stuprum can be taken in a broad and in a strict sense. Taken in the broad sense, it is defined: intercourse with a woman - whether a virgin or deflowered - who consents in no way or not freely, for example with one resisting, sleeping, insane, or consenting from fraud or fear. Taken in the strict or canonical sense, it is: intercourse with a virgin who consents in no way or not freely (St. Alphonsus III, 443); moreover, by the name of virgin here is understood one who retains the seal of virginity, even if perhaps she has sinned.

II. Morality. From what has been said, it follows that rape is opposed not only to chastity but also to justice, with respect either to the abducted person, or, if that person is a minor, to those under whose power the person is, or to both (St. Alphonsus III, 444). If a minor consents to his or her own abduction, injury persists with respect to those to whose care the minor is subject.

III. Penalties. 1. One who, with a view to marriage or for the sake of satisfying libido, has carried off an unwilling woman by force or deceit, or a woman of minor age who indeed consents but without the knowledge or against the will of her parents or guardians, is held ipso iure excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and furthermore is punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault (can. 2353).¹

2. A layperson who has been legitimately condemned for the crime... of rape of impubescent persons of either sex... is held ipso iure excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and furthermore is punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the penalty (can. 2354, § 1). A cleric is to be punished from § 2 of the same canon with various penalties according to the gravity of the fault.

General Note 1. It is clear that several of the species of sins explained can concur in one and the same act, as if someone has intercourse with a married blood-relative.

General Note 2. Insofar as acts of immodesty and of non-consummated lust contract the species of sins contained in consummated lust and explained above, we shall speak below.

¹ When it constitutes a diriment impediment of marriage, it is explained in the treatise on that sacrament.

Defloration and Rape.—Defloration and rape are distinct species of lust, for each of them in its very concept includes a special and notable deformity not found in other species of impurity.

(a) Defloration is unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman who is virginal in body (2488 a^†). It has the special deformity of depriving the woman of the physical integrity that is most highly prized among all the unmarried of her sex, or at least of her own self-respect, and of setting her on the way to become a strumpet rather than an honorable wife or spinster. Some authors do not consider defloration a special sin unless it is done by violence, or unless injury is done the parental right over the virgin; and even the authors who consider unforced defloration a special sin hold that the new or additional malice in it is slight and venial, and therefore not a necessary matter of confession. The first sin of fornication by a male is not a special sin, because the consequences are not so serious for the man as for the woman, but of course seduction is always a special sin, whether the injured party be male or female.

(b) Rape is physical or moral coercion (i.e., force or fear) employed against any person (male or female, married or single, pure or corrupt), or against his or her guardians, to compel him or her to an act of lust. It has the special deformity of inflicting bodily injury on the person ravished. The sin of rape should not be confused with the canonical crime of rape, which consists in abduction, and which is an impediment to marriage (Canon 1074); nor with seduction, as when an innocent person is deceived into believing that an act of impurity is lawful, or is tricked into sin by false promises of marriage. Equivalent to rape is the carnal knowledge of a person drugged, hypnotized, or otherwise unconscious, or the seduction of an infant. A person who is ravished is obliged to deny all consent internally, and to resist or make outcry when this is possible (see 2497 a).

427. • Raptus is the abduction of a person for the sake of lust from a safe place to an unsafe place by force or grave fear brought upon that person or upon those under whose power that person is. - St. Lig., n. 443.

As regards raptus, hold these things:

1. Raptus is a special sin, although the wicked act of lust does not follow ¹; because it consists chiefly in the injury which is brought in violent abduction for the sake of lust.

¹ Nevertheless in raptus itself there is a double sin; for on the part of the end and intention it is a sin of lust, and on the part of the action there is a sin of injustice.

2. If after the raptus the desire of lust is fulfilled, it constitutes a diverse species of lust, which must be declared in confession ².

² Namely, the crime of raptus must also be declared at the same time.

3. It is not to be judged raptus if a woman fully consenting is abducted, unless nevertheless she is a minor, and at the same time her parents or tutors or curators suffer this against their will ³. - See the things to be said in the Treatise on Marriage ⁴. - St. Lig., n. 444.

³ Namely, the crime of raptus is had whether force is brought upon the abducted person alone, or only upon those under whose power the person is, or upon both.

⁴ Yet in the treatise on Marriage there is not treatment of raptus insofar as it is a species of lust, which namely is done for the sake of lust, but insofar as it is an impediment of marriage, and the person is abducted not for the sake of exercising lust, but for the sake of contracting marriage.

But concerning raptus the recent declaration of the S. Congregation of the Council must be noted, from which it must be established that it is to be called back to the crime of raptus not only if a person is abducted by force and fear, but also if by deceit and fraud.

318. - When the assent of the other party is lacking, a grave malice against justice is committed by fornication, which will be either stuprum or abduction. We have already spoken of adultery.

First let us speak of stuprum.

1. In moral theology, stuprum is the lustful oppression of an unwilling person: whether copulation or obscenity has been extorted by open force, or by fraud, for example by a deceitful promise of matrimony, by deception concerning the nature or malice of the act, as if the seducer were to abuse the girl's ignorance or trust; or by threats or entreaties so importunate that they are equated with violence ¹.

¹ Palmieri, Opus theologicum, vol. 6, no. 1010.

Furthermore, if the fornication redounds to the disgrace of the woman's family and to the grave sorrow of her parents, it will contain a grave fault against charity. And a woman then consenting will gravely offend against the very piety owed to her parents.

Moreover, one who oppresses a virgin is twice injurious, since, besides the abuse of her body, he also takes from her the seal of virginity. Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 7, disputation 14, no. 7; Noldin, De sexto, no. 24.

2. Stuprum is not so rarely a reserved sin and is punished by canonical penalties. Cf. canons 2357, § 1, and 2359, § 2, which will be recited below, after the other external sins against the sixth precept.

Stuprum is then, according to the opinion of the older authors, understood only of the defloration of an unwilling virgin. But she is considered a virgin who, although she perhaps has sinned, has nevertheless preserved the seal of virginity ². Cf. Noldin, De sexto, no. 24.

² Gratian, however, at canon Lex 2, Cause XXXVI, question 1, defined stuprum as "the illicit defloration of a virgin," and says that it is illicit when it takes place at least against the will of the father. And so the condition of an unwilling virgin entered the canonical essence of stuprum only afterward.

3. Fornication committed with a virgin who knows and consents contains no new malice, at least no grave one, from the removal of virginity: no injury is done to one who consents. Yet to cooperate in defloration through sin seems lightly to be opposed to charity.

319. - 1. While in stuprum the injury is committed by the very lustful act, the exterior act of the abductor alone is opposed to justice. For, in moral theology, abduction is: the injurious deprivation of liberty inflicted upon some person for the fulfillment of lust.

And so that person can be male or female, married or unmarried. Force can be inflicted both upon the person himself or herself who is deprived of liberty and upon those under whose authority that person is. And one who is deprived of liberty by guile and fraud is also considered morally to be abducted.

2. If a girl of full age willingly departs with a lover, without the knowledge of her parents, there is not properly abduction but elopement, which of itself adds no new species to fornication. Concerning a girl who is a minor, attention must now be given to canon 2353, to be alleged below.

3. Canonically, abduction which constitutes an impediment of matrimony must be distinguished: it concerns only a woman and supposes the intention of matrimony - this is treated in the treatise on matrimony - from abduction which is a crime to be punished in the external forum.

The crime of abduction requires the violent or fraudulent carrying away of an honorable woman from one place to another, whether for the purpose of entering matrimony or of fulfilling lust. According to canon 2353, it is committed even if a consenting girl who is a minor is carried away without the knowledge of, or against the will of, her parents or guardians. And fraud is equated with force, as had already been answered by the Sacred Congregation on January 24, 1608, and August 27, 1864.

Therefore, for the crime of the external forum, a carrying away is required; the deprivation of liberty alone is not sufficient. But it is already consummated if lust is fulfilled on the journey itself. When a prostitute has been carried away, the crime is not regularly committed. Indeed, according to several ³, who argue from canon Cum causa 6, De raptoribus, etc. (5, 17), 2, one who has carried away his betrothed woman, indeed a woman with whom he had entered into negotiations concerning matrimony, is immune from the crime. For thus reads the chapter mentioned: "We respond that abduction is said to be admitted where nothing has previously been done concerning nuptials: this man ought not to be called an abductor, since he had the woman's assent and had betrothed her before he knew her, although the parents protested." The earlier words sufficiently openly favor this opinion, but the later words, where the woman is said to have consented, weaken the force of the argument. Therefore, the matter is uncertain.

³ For example Palmieri, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1013, after St. Thomas, II-II, question 154, article 7, reply to objection 4, and Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, no. 70, against Wernz, De matrimonio, no. 280, note 32.

Canon 2353 describes and sanctions abduction in these words: "One who, with a view to matrimony or for the purpose of fulfilling lust, has carried away by force or fraud an unwilling woman, or indeed a consenting woman who is a minor but without the knowledge of, or against the will of, her parents or guardians, is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and, in addition, is to be punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault ⁴."

⁴ That a carrying away is still required even now can be gathered from the opposition of canon 1074, § 3, which expressly denies that a carrying away is required where there is question of the impediment of matrimony. But legitimate acts are: the office of godfather in baptism or confirmation; administration, by virtue of an office, of ecclesiastical goods; the act of a judge, auditor, relator, defender of the bond, promoter of justice and of the faith, notary and chancellor, usher and apparitor, advocate and procurator in ecclesiastical causes; a vote in elections; the exercise of the right of patronage.

But according to canon 2354, § 1: "A layman legitimately condemned for the crime of... abduction... is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, without prejudice to the burden of repairing the damages." According to § 2, a cleric is to be punished, according to the gravity of the fault, with various penalties, even deposition.

320. - Those who, because of an office undertaken or an agreement entered, must take care of the spiritual or moral good of certain persons by an obligation of justice from which the consent

of those persons cannot release them, if they sin carnally with these persons, at the same time gravely violate commutative justice.

Such an obligation is held by a bishop in relation to his diocesans, a pastor in relation to his parishioners, the instructor or superior of a college in relation to the pupils entrusted to him by their parents, and a guardian in relation to his ward.

But the assistants of pastors, or coadjutor vicars, and of the director of a college, or masters and prefects of discipline, do not participate in this obligation; but they will usually already be gravely scandalous for this reason, because they have defamed the priestly order or the religious state, and have weakened religion itself in the soul of the accomplice.

Concerning a confessor who sins with a penitent, there has been doubt. It is indeed certain that one who has abused the occasion of confession, or even knowledge obtained from confession, in order to sin will be guilty of grave sacrilege; indeed, so will one who has sinned in those circumstances in which irreverence or detriment would redound from the sin upon the sacrament ⁵. But inquiry is made concerning a confessor who sins apart from every relation to confession.

⁵ Cf. Cardinal de Lugo, De sacramento paenitentiae, disputation 16, no. 355.

And there were those who affirmed this, relying either upon decrees which specially prohibited sins of the flesh to confessors, or upon some bond of spiritual relationship which would be contracted from this sacrament. Thus Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 7, disputation 55, nos. 3 and 4.

But with Cardinal de Lugo ⁶ and most of the more recent authors, this must be denied. St. Alphonsus ⁷ considers this opinion more probable. For today there certainly are no positive decrees; the bond of spiritual relationship is affirmed gratuitously, since from confession, as such, no stable relation arises between confessor and penitent ⁸.

⁶ De sacramento paenitentiae, disputation 16, no. 357; cf. no. 359.

⁷ Book 3, no. 451.

⁸ Cf. de Lugo, in the cited place, no. 357.

There are, even now, those who affirm of a habitual spiritual father, even one chosen by the penitent, what they deny of a confessor. Lugo thinks that this can rather easily be conceded ⁹. But we consider that it should instead be denied. Certainly, even an elected spiritual father is bound in justice to give no fraudulent counsel and not to abuse his authority. But if, as an equal to an equal, he has proposed the sin and it is accepted, the office ceases or is interrupted by mutual consent, and here too that saying holds true: no injury is done to one who consents. Yet we do not on this account disapprove the peculiar horror which a sin of this kind produces; but that horror demonstrates the enormous scandal and easy abuse of authority which usually accompany that sin.

⁹ In the same place, no. 358.

But a more severe judgment must be made concerning one who is appointed by legitimate authority to exercise the properly so-called office of spiritual father, such as the spiritual director of a monastery is accustomed to hold. No forgiveness by a spiritual daughter can then exempt the man from his special obligation.

321. - Because of what we wrote in no. 48, at the end of p. 43 and on p. 44, concerning an anointing by which infection with venereal disease can be avoided, you will ask:

1. Whether one who applies an antiseptic ointment before fornication so that he may be immune from infection formally sins or not;

2. Whether the use of this ointment can be advised or not;

3. Whether it is lawful for pharmacists to have this ointment for sale or not?

To 1. Although, as it seems (cf. Times, January 1917), certain Anglicans in England scrupulously distinguished between a use which precedes the sin and one which follows it, and prohibited the former but approved the latter, it must not be doubted that even an anointing performed by one about to sin is to be called formally blameless. We do not touch upon the case of a woman who by an anointing of this kind renders copulation infertile.

The intention of fornication is certainly evil, just as it is always evil to sin and to will to sin; but it is not evil, while sinning, at the same time to seek means which are indifferent in themselves for avoiding the harmful consequences of the sin.

To 2. One would certainly sin if, by revealing the medicine or advising its use, he were to induce someone to sin; but nothing prevents him from indicating to one who has resolved to sin a means by which he may sin with less bodily harm.

To 3. The sale would certainly have to be refused if men would abstain from fornication for this reason. But there are so many who expose them- selves to the danger of infection that such a fruit cannot be hoped for from refusing the sale. Again, this must not be concealed: ready availability of the preventive medicine will remove from many the fear of fornication. But since venereal disease threatens not only the sinner but also many innocent persons, so that it can be called a common evil, there is a most just cause for permitting this temptation of many. Moreover, the uprightness of one who is restrained from sin by fear of disease alone is slight. Add that this remedy can also benefit spouses, so that its use may accompany an altogether honorable action.

Raptus (oplichting), as a distinct species of lust, is taken by Saint Thomas in the broader sense, and is present whenever some violence in lust is employed in any way whatever, and it can be defined as force inflicted upon any person, or upon her parents, for the sake of fulfilling libido. But according to more recent authors it is taken strictly of a special violence, and is the violent or injurious abduction of a person for the sake of fulfilling libido. Hence what recent authors call stuprum strictly so called is called raptus by Saint Thomas.

IV. Every raptus contains injustice, because in it man uses an unjust means. Understood in the stricter sense, it is a special injustice, namely deprivation of liberty inflicted for the fulfillment of libido, and thus it constitutes a sin distinct in species. Hence it differs from the impediment of raptus, which is incurred when abduction is done for the sake of marriage. But if a girl of majority age is taken away from her parents by her own consent, it is not raptus, but flight; on the contrary, if a minor consents, when the parents or guardians are unaware or contradicting, it is raptus (can. 2353).

V. Observations. 1. A woman to whom violence is inflicted cannot bear herself merely passively; and therefore she is bound not only to resist pleasure internally, but also to manifest dissent externally, by crying out and by repelling the aggressor according to her strength. Nevertheless she is not bound to resist in that exterior mode which would expose her to danger of death or infamy, provided the proximate danger of internal consent is absent.

2. To a woman who has not had copulation voluntarily, but was oppressed by force or deceit, it is illicit to expel not only a fertilized ovum but also semen before conception. For man does not have dominion over semen, and moreover it is a greater injury, against human generation and the common good, to expel semen from the final seat destined for this by nature, than to procure pollution by which it is expelled from its instrumental seat.

But as to what some say, that in this case, immediately after copulation, before conception occurs, the semen bears itself in the manner of an unjust aggressor whom it is licit to repel: this is true during the action of copulation, but not once copulation has been posited, because then the aggression has ceased and the semen is already in its proper natural place. For copulation is ended by the very introduction of semen into the female genital canal,³ because, the semen having been ejaculated, the work of man ceases and the work of nature alone begins, whereby it happens that the emitted semen, by its natural propensity and by the attraction of the female genital canal, enters the female organs more deeply for fertilization. But to break off the work of nature in human generation is illicit.⁴

³ And not by fertilization itself, as the adversaries suppose; otherwise the impossibility of generating would make one not only sterile but impotent, and would render marriage invalid.

⁴ The question is only touched upon in passing, because it does not directly pertain to the present matter; and moreover it makes little difference for practice, because the case in which the oppression of a woman is to be attributed to violence alone and was altogether involuntary is very rare. For if it began by force or deceit, to which subsequent consent acceded, it will already not be simply unjust; and there will already be no place for blameless protection, since the woman ought to have used other licit means.

3. Nevertheless, an oppressed woman can and ought to move and turn herself and in every way impede and break off copulation lest she receive the semen, although it is to be poured out, because she has the right and obligation of impeding copulation, and the effusion of semen is to be ascribed to the malice of the man alone.

But it is permitted to observe that the doctrine which we propose, which is that of Saint Alphonsus, can be strengthened especially by a twofold consideration:

1. a priori: he who does not have dominion over human life or the human body also does not have dominion over that which is nothing but the principle of human life and body. But human semen is nothing other than the principle of human life and body. Therefore man does not have dominion over that semen, which is man in proximate potency (Saint Thomas, Disputed Question De Malo XV, a. 2). And therefore every action which is directly exercised about semen is illicit, except that which is intended by nature, namely matrimonial copulation.

2. also a posteriori: if it were licit directly to expel semen before conception, because it would bear itself in the manner of an unjust aggressor, by parity, indeed a fortiori, it would be licit directly to expel the fetus after conception, because in that case it would be more of an aggressor and unjust. But the Church teaches that this is illicit. Therefore the same must logically be held concerning the expulsion of semen.

And although a woman oppressed by prevailing force can protect the ovum lest it be fertilized, nevertheless she would not licitly do so by an action which would directly touch the semen or harm it; just as neither is it licit directly to kill an innocent person in order to protect oneself against unjust harm. Here the principle holds: evils are not to be done that goods may come.

He who desires more may go to our Questions concerning Embryology, p. 43, and in the appendix, "Concerning Conception Impeded after Stuprum."

The doctrine set forth above concerning the illicit expulsion of seed by a violated woman,¹ we have already handed down when writing Questions concerning Chastity and Lust.²

¹ See I, q. V, art. 4, pp. 43-44.

² Q. 3, a. 2, an. 2, pp. 38-39.

The Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses (Jan. 1927), with great benevolence, wished to pronounce praise of that little work, yet at the same time placing a restriction concerning the doctrine indicated, which they call more obscure and which they seem to hold as very doubtful.

But so that obscurity and doubt, as far as can be done, may be removed from the midst, let it be permitted to us to illustrate the critical observations of the distinguished reviewer by the following considerations.

Among other things he asks:

1. whether expulsion of the seed during the action of copulation is possible;

2. whether the fecundated ovule and the seed before fecundation are to be equated;

3. whether the formula is to be approved: "the seed is now in peaceful possession of its proper place," which smacks of anthropomorphism, which in the present matter is not to the point;

4. whether the mode of exercising onanism, by impeding conception through the killing of the sperm, is a sin against justice? For since a human person is not yet present, there is not a right, and therefore neither a violation of right nor injustice.

We respond:

1. that the distinguished professor perhaps suffered distraction in reading; we did not say that it is licit during copulation to expel the seed, but we wrote "to repel";

2. that the fecundated ovule and the seed are to be equated, because each, more or less proximately, is on the way to man. Certainly to cast out the embryo or fecundated ovule is not illicit only because probably it is already animated by a rational soul. Even by those who admitted later animation, this was held illicit, because it impedes human generation. And the same principle seems to hold concerning the seed, which is man in potency, as Saint Thomas says, Q. D. de Malo 15, a. 2;³

³ Indeed the Holy Doctor adds: "disorder concerning the emission of seed is concerned with human life in proximate potency."

3. that it is altogether fitting to avoid anthropomorphism and to use proper modes of speaking; but thus we gave a response to those who hold the seed as an unjust aggressor, which is more anthropomorphic;

4. that justice is toward another; but this is understood by the distinguished professor as toward another human individual. But:

a) there is also injury against human society, indeed legal justice is first among the species of justice. Moreover all lust is against the common good of human society, and by this reason is mortal sin;

b) injury can be not only against another man, but also against God. He gave us dominion over all exterior things; but not over human life, nor over our body, but only use, according to the nature of the thing and according to the mind of the Creator; whence suicide is a sin against justice. By this reason lust also contains injustice against God. "From the fact," says Saint Thomas (II-II, q. 153, a. 3, ad 2), "that someone uses his body inordinately through lust, he does injury to God, who is the principal lord of our body." For "the order of nature is from God Himself. And therefore in sins against nature, in which the very order of nature is violated, injury is done to God Himself, the ordainer" (ib., q. 154, a. 12, ad 1).

But if we do not have right and dominion over life or over the human body, neither do we have it over the fetus, who is on the way to a human body and life, nor over the seed, which is nothing other than a principle of life.

Whence every act by which we dispose of these is injustice against the Creator and human society.⁴

⁴ The same doctrine is set forth in the little work generally praised, even by the distinguished reviewer, without restriction: Duynstee, C.SS.R., De Leer der Kuischheid.

The Ephemerides Lovanienses attacked our manner of speaking and arguing more than the thesis itself concerning the illicit expulsion of seed by a violated woman, since recently they declared (Oct. 1927, p. 653) that it is established from those things which we said that this is a sin against nature. But the Collectanea Mechliniensia (May 1927) have progressed further: "With moralists of the best note," they say, "it must be said that the oppressed woman can expel the seed before conception. But if the reason brought forward by the author were to be applied to this case: to break off the work of nature is illicit, neither could the woman agitate herself, thus causing the effusion of the seed, nor would it ever be licit to break off copulation, for then also the work of nature has begun."

R. The work of nature, which is perfected without the cooperation of man and independently of free will, and the voluntary work of man, must be carefully distinguished: this latter, insofar as it is evil, is to be impeded, as much as possible, and stopped; and if it is good, it can licitly be broken off for a proportionately grave reason. But to break off and impede the former is a sin against nature. Now carnal copulation is not the work of nature, but the voluntary work of man; but when copulation has ended, the work of nature begins, by which the seed received in the female genital canal moves itself by its own powers so that it penetrates the body of the woman more. Therefore, after copulation has ended, to intervene for impeding the work of nature is illicit; but the work of man, namely copulation, if it is rape, to interrupt or impede it lest the seed be received is licit; and it is also licit to break off conjugal copulation for a proportionately grave reason. Or if then the work of nature is said already to have begun, nevertheless it is not broken off insofar as it is the work of nature, since the received seed is not expelled; but insofar as it is the voluntary work of man, lest the copulation itself be continued. And thus all things agree logically.

And although in the case some authors have said that it is probable that it is licit to expel the seed, because they judged that the seed can be considered after the manner of an unjust aggressor, nevertheless, because this reason is of no value, the probability of their opinion also vanishes.

Behold what seems true to us. Therefore the seed, in its whole being, exists uniquely for the sake of generation; therefore every use of the seed for another end and impeding generation is illicit.

And just as every lie is not only intrinsically but also essentially evil because it is against the nature of speech, which exists only for expressing the concepts of the mind, so every emission of seed impeding generation is against the nature of the seed, which is only for generation.

And from this it is understood why every direct expulsion of seed, outside that which is done in carnal copulation, in whatever way and for whatever cause it is procured, and therefore also every artificial fecundation properly so called, is essentially illicit, because the action, as much as is of itself, from its nature and from the mode in which it is done, so casts forth the seed that generation is naturally impeded; although by accident, from another consequent action, this defect can be met and the seed ordered to generation and thus contribute to it in an artificial way.

Saint Thomas places the principle in its whole universality and without any limitation, l. III c. Gent., c. 122: "It is the good of each thing that it should attain its end; but its evil is that it should be turned away from its due end. But as in the whole, so also in the parts it is necessary to consider, namely that each part of man, and any act of his, should obtain its due end. But the seed, although it is superfluous as regards the preservation of the individual, is nevertheless necessary as regards the propagation of the species; but other superfluities, such as excrement, urine, sweat and the like, are necessary for nothing; whence it pertains to the good of man only that they be emitted, but not this alone is required in the seed, but that it be emitted for the utility of generation, to which coitus is ordered... From this it is clear that every emission of seed in such a mode that generation cannot follow is against the good of man; and if this is done deliberately, it must be a sin. But I say a mode from which generation cannot follow according to itself, as every emission of seed without the natural conjunction of male and female; on account of which sins of this kind are called against nature."

V. Corollary concerning Forcible Violation and Fornication. - Similar things hold for unjust or violent violation, which is carnal union with an unwilling unmarried woman, or the oppression of an honorable woman, even if not a virgin or not a minor; to whom damaging injury can be inflicted by reason of future marriage and by reason of offspring perhaps to be born. Now the unjust violator is bound to restore from justice:

1. On account of temporal damage, as inability or difficulty of marrying, infamation and dishonoring, syphilitic infection, etc., if in fact it has been inflicted, provided that it arose of itself from his action and consequently was foreseen in confused fashion. To this the one who oppressed the woman is also bound: to marry her, if he promised this, even fictitiously, and therefore truly deceived the woman, or if the damage cannot be repaired otherwise and graver evils are not prudently feared; otherwise he ought to dower her or increase her dowry, or otherwise take care that she can marry according to her condition, or contribute to her support, according as the damage was inflicted and it is possible to repair it.¹ Nevertheless he is not bound to compensation if in fact the woman has suffered no damage, as if she has already married well, or even otherwise could not have married, or has entered religion, or has been defamed from her own indiscretion, or has now died by premature death.

¹ See more in Summa Theol. Mor., II, n. 382.

2. On account of offspring born, so that, if he is the certain father, he ought from justice to provide for the whole support and education, according to the condition of the mother, until the offspring can suffice for himself. But if the father is uncertain, because several have had carnal union, he is bound to restore in proportion to the doubt, at least if they acted thus by common counsel or knowingly, because the voluntary cause is of the uncertainty of the father, which already is a great damage for the mother and offspring; otherwise he cannot be obliged to restore anything, since rather the mother is the cause why the father cannot be established.

In the case in which the woman has suffered violence or injury in no way, but has freely consented, the man contracted no obligation from justice of itself, but can be obliged from piety and charity. And indeed:

1. To the support of the offspring, according to the condition of the mother, by natural right he is bound for half the part, if he is the certain father, even if the civil law prohibits inquiry concerning the illegitimate father; but he is bound in solidum with the mother, so that, if she supplies nothing, he ought to provide for the whole; but if the civil law or the civil judge petitioned according to law should determine the quantity of support to be paid by the illegitimate father, this would have to be paid. But if there are several uncertain fathers, they are bound to half the support in proportionate part, at least if they acted thus by common counsel or knowingly, as was said above; otherwise none can be obliged to compensate for the support of the offspring.

779. Definition. Raptus (not insofar as it is an impediment of matrimony, but insofar as it is a species of lust) is defined: The violent abduction of a person, for the sake of satisfying lust.

It is said: abduction, i.e. carrying from a safe place to an unsafe one where liberty is taken away; violence, i.e. force brought in, whether physical or moral, either to the abducted person herself, or to those under whose power she is, namely parents or guardians or husband; of a person, female or male, whether married, virgin, etc.; for the sake of satisfying lust: hence, if someone is abducted for another end, for example so that she may be used for services, that raptus is a sin against justice, but is not a species of lust. - Similarly if a woman of full age or emancipated departs of her own accord with a lover, the parents being unaware, such departure is not properly raptus, but flight, nor in this case is a new species of malice added to fornication (III, 444).

780. Principles. I. Raptus is a grave sin against chastity and justice. Against chastity, on account of the lustful intention; against justice, on account of violence brought in either to the abducted person, or to those under whose power she is, or to both.

II. Raptus is a sin specifically distinct from stuprum. For the raptor unjustly takes away liberty, which is a good distinct from integrity of flesh. From this it follows that the circumstance of raptus must necessarily be disclosed in confession, although lust had not been satisfied, or although the abducted person finally had freely consented to the sin.

Note. In Canon Law (caus. 36, q. 1), raptus is called any violence brought against a woman for the cause of lust; and against such violence the same penalty is established, without the circumstance of abduction being mentioned. In this sense, therefore, stuprum does not differ from raptus according to species, but only as the inferior from the superior, so namely that every stuprum is raptus, but not vice versa.

499. Definition. - Raptus is committed in two ways: either by violently leading away a resisting woman from place to place for the sake of contracting Matrimony; - or by leading away a man or woman for the sake of fulfilling lust, from a safe place to one not safe, through force or grave fear inflicted either on the person carried off, or on those under whose power she is, that is, parents, or guardians, or husband.

Principles. - I. Raptus for the sake of Matrimony is not only a grave sin, but also induces a diriment impediment, and is punished in Canon Law with most grave penalties.

II. Raptus for the sake of lust (of which here there is question) is a grave sin, by which both chastity and justice are harmed. - 1° Chastity, on account of the fornication itself, or at least on account of the libidinous intention. 2° Justice, because force is inflicted either on the one carried off, or on those whose power she is under, or even on both.

Note. - If a woman sui juris (of age or emancipated) consents to one wishing to carry her off, and departs of her own accord, even without the knowledge of her parents, it is not properly raptus, but flight (elopement), which does not add a malice distinct in species from fornication.³

But importunate prayers also constitute raptus; likewise deceit and fraud. This, with respect to Matrimony, was decided by the Sacred Congregation of the Council on Aug. 27, 1864.⁴

I speak of rape, as it is a species of Lust. It is defined, attending only to Canonical law: It is the violent abduction, or carrying away, of a woman, or of an honest person, from place to place, for the cause of lust. Thus it is defined also by D. Bonaventure in spec. animae, cap. 3. Three things therefore are required for rape. First, abduction; second, violence; third, that it be done for the cause of lust.

And so this abduction must be from place to place, for the cause of ravishing; for if you lead her out from a public open place, and take her through a few steps into a secret place, so that he may sin with her more conveniently, it will be fornication. So Clarus, lib. V sent. § Raptus; and Bertrand, lib. VI consil. 39; Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 2.

For incurring the penalties of the Council of Trent, sess. XXIIU, cap. 6 — as Sanchez notes, lib. VII de matrimonio d. 13, num. 7 — it is not necessary to have conducted the ravished woman to the destined place, but one incurs them at once, as soon as she was ravished.

It is called violent, that is, injurious either to the woman herself only, or to her parents and guardians, or to those who take the place of parents, or to the betrothed or husband, if she is betrothed or married. So Toledo, lib. VII, cap. 17; Fagundez, num. 3. It is also injurious and involuntary not only if done by force, but also if by guile or fraud; for these are equivalent to violence, Leg. un. § siquidem, vers. poenas autem. Leg. de raptu virginum. So commonly the Doctors with Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12. Likewise if you abduct her with feigned promises. So Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 6; Fagundez, num. 3.

But if she consented with him, it will be rape only with respect to the parents, not with respect to her. And so if she is of her own right (sui iuris), it will not be rape. So Sanchez, num. 10; Clarus, lib. V sent. § raptus.

It is called for the cause of lust. Note, however, that the civil law imposes the penalties for rape done for the cause of lust, and of marriage; but whether the Tridentine does so for the mere liberty of marriage seems more probable. See Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 13; Farinaccius, tom. IV, quaest. 145; Salsedus on the Practica of Bernardus; Diaz, cap. 78; Rodriguez, tom. II sum. cap. 213; Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 4. Wherefore if anyone ravished a virgin for the cause of lust, he can validly contract marriage by reason of the Council of Trent, as many teach with Diana, p. 3, tract. 4, resol. 261; Sanchez, tom. II, lib. VII, disp. 13.

Hence you have that the Council punishes every rape of a woman, even one dishonest, although such rape be ordered to marriage.

The civil law indeed punishes with the ordinary penalty the rape of the honest woman only; yet if the woman be a married harlot, and both she and her husband resist, the rape is punished by the ordinary penalty of death. So Farinaccius, num. 177; Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12, num. 23. The ordinary penalty of rape is death, leg. 1 C. de raptu virginibus; the same penalty is imposed on accomplices, helpers, etc. Likewise their goods are published (confiscated). See Farinaccius, quaest. cit. num. 7.

By Canonical law they are excommunicated, can. si quis virginem, q. 2, where: If anyone shall have ravished a virgin or a widow without marrying her, with those favoring him, let him be anathema — where excommunication is not imposed ipso facto, but to be incurred, as Sanchez learnedly notes, lib. VII de matrim. d. 17, num. 2; Sylvester, verb. luxuria, quaest. 6; and others with Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 11.

The reason is that the words Anathema sit — let him be excommunicated — never signify a sentence latae sententiae but one to be incurred, except in the matter of heresy and in definitions of faith in Councils, because there it is gathered from other texts that it is imposed by these words: Excommunicatio ipso facto, as Sanchez proves, num. 1.

By Canonical law, the Council of Trent, sess. XXIIU de reformat. cap. 6, punishes ravishers and their helpers and abettors with excommunication ipso facto and by law, and with perpetual infamy, and renders them incapable of contracting validly with the ravished woman as long as she shall be under their power and not established in a free place. Moreover it declares them incapable of every dignity.

And so the law corrects: Si quis virginem; for it imposes excommunication ipso facto, and invalidates the marriage which there was valid.

It can happen that a woman rape a man; but this rape is subject to the arbitrary penalties of the judge, as Clarus warns, lib. V sent. § Raptus; Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12, num. 25. For since this happens most rarely, it is not defined by the laws, which provide for ordinary cases, not for the rarest. But if a woman rape another woman for lust, many teach, cited by Fagundez, num. 8, that she is to be punished by the ordinary penalty of the law; but others decree an arbitrary penalty.

But if anyone should ravish a boy for lust, without doubt he is to be chastised with the penalty of death. So Clarus, num. 32; Farra, quaest. 145; Fagundez, num. 9; and others cited by these.

You ask whether it is rape if the ravished woman consents, and the parents refuse; or contrariwise.

It is answered briefly that it is rape in either case: if the woman is under another's power and assents, or if the parents assent and she herself refuses. See Fagundez, cap. 11. Nevertheless, if she herself assents, the marriage will be valid, as Diana says with Sanchez above; Filliucius, tom. I, Tract. 10, part. 2, cap. 8, num. 165.

The ravisher, however, will not be punished with the penalties of the Council of Trent in their whole rigor if the woman consents, the parents being ignorant, in whose power she is: the reason is that she is mistress of her own body. So Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 13, num. 13; Farinaccius, num. 124, quaest. cit.

But if the parents refuse, it is commonly taught that he is to be punished with the whole rigor: but Sanchez, num. 13, alone denies it.