Defence of limb, chastity and property

Under the same limitations it is lawful to kill the assailant not only of one’s life, but also of limb, of chastity, and of property. For all these goods belonging to an innocent person may be lawfully defended by him even at the cost of the life of the unjust assailant of them, who is responsible for his own death by his unwarrantable action. When it is said that we may kill an unjust assailant in defence of property, it is supposed that the property which is threatened is of considerable amount. Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that, “As a rule I may kill a thief for the preservation of a gold piece.” This proposition is false, for a rich man would not be justified in shooting a thief whom he saw walking off with one of his silver spoons. If, however, the thief threatens property of considerable value—say, twenty pounds or so—and the only way of saving the money is by taking the life of the thief, this would be lawful. Moreover, when a highwayman demands my purse or my life, I am not bound to hand him my purse, even though it contain little money; I may always defend myself from such unjust attacks, even though it finally involves the death of the aggressor.

It is not lawful to kill another who attacks my honour with insulting words. The contrary used to be held by some theologians, but the doctrine was condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI. The reason of the difference between this case and the foregoing is that verbal insults are often not of very serious consequence; they are better and more effectively met by quiet contempt than by being taken seriously, and that would be a perilous doctrine which taught that a man might avenge an insult with the death of the offender. What constitutes an insult is often a very subjective question, and the results of the doctrine would be deplorable.

Is the same lawful for preserving the integrity of life? - It is lawful with the same moderation to kill an unjust aggressor also for the defense of members. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because each one has the right of preserving a good most necessary to life for himself, even with danger to the life of another, to which danger the other from his own malice exposes himself, provided another means is lacking and the death of the aggressor is not intended. C. L. 2367; L. 380, 398.

Is the same lawful for defending chastity? - It is lawful for a woman to defend herself by killing the invader of her modesty. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because the woman uses her own natural right, by which it is lawful to repel force by force, and she is more bound to provide for herself than for the life of another; for she exposes herself to the danger of consenting to the act of sin by permitting herself to be oppressed. Besides, if it is lawful to kill an invader of goods, how much more an invader of modesty, since it is a good of a superior order? Hence, although a girl is not bound to kill the invader, but can conduct herself passively, because chastity is not lost unwillingly, nevertheless she is not obligated to do this, both because even material bodily integrity itself is a very great good, and because there is present the danger of shame, which is more grave than death for good women. C. L. 2367; L. 368, 386.

Note: Here theologians rightly observe that it is lawful for a girl not only to repel the aggression in the act in which she suffers it, but also afterward she can strike the aggressor with slaps, fists, a rod, staff, and similar blows minimally dangerous, so that thus she may show her displeasure and constancy, and the aggressor may more easily depart and not return. Moreover this, provided it is done immediately after the injury received and never for vengeance, is not only to be permitted, but also altogether to be counseled to women. Struggl 28; L. 386; Lugo d. 10, n. 196.

Is the same lawful for defending goods of fortune? - It is lawful to defend goods of fortune of great importance with the killing of a thief, if they cannot otherwise be retained. Proof from the common opinion of theologians, which S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 7 supposes. Besides, because the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of a neighbor of a higher order, unless when he is in extreme necessity, but not when he himself of himself, voluntarily and from his own malice, meets the danger of death, as happens in the case. C. L. 2367 seqq.; C. B. 227 seqq., 904; L. 380, 382; Struggl 23; E. M.

Note: Of great importance; for it is not lawful to kill a thief taking away a thing of lesser importance, because charity then prohibits us from inflicting a most grave damage on our neighbor for our own light damage, although he voluntarily exposes himself to its danger. And indeed our damage is only light, whether the thing taken away is considered, which is of lesser importance, as is supposed, or the injury which is had in that taking away is considered, and consequently the contempt and dishonoring which follows that injury. For who is thought to be gravely dishonored because a thief has violently snatched some thing from him?

Nevertheless, even in this case, if precisely the force which is brought against the owner guarding his own thing, although of lesser importance, is considered, it will always be lawful for him to repel force by force, but with the moderation of blameless defense. The reason is that "when someone thus defends his own things, regularly he defends at the same time his own person, which he exposes to danger for the defense of his things." Molina tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, n. 4. Besides, the public good itself demands this. Otherwise the impunity of crimes would render the wicked more audacious for doing harm. C. L. 2367; Laymann l. 3, tr. 3, c. 3, p. 3, n. 4.

Generally speaking, however, those goods are judged to be of great importance, which, if taken away, would leave someone without sustenance for himself and his own; theologians of grave note, among whom is Card. de Lugo, teach that even those things can be given this name whose loss would bring a notable harm to the owner according to the quality of the person. Although it must not be denied either that some gravity of damage must be admitted, absolutely grave with respect to all, and far greater than that which suffices for mortal theft. Therefore, absolutely speaking, the sum of 4 or 5 gold coins certainly does not suffice; today, 40 or 50 lire. But the sum of 40 or 50 gold coins seems to suffice; today, 400 or 500 lire. L. 382, 383, 384, 385; Struggl 23, 24; E. M.

Is the same also lawful for defending honor? - It is not lawful indeed to kill an invader of honor if honor is attacked by words only. For, since the injury can, must, and usually is then repelled otherwise, a striking and killing has the nature not of defense, but of private vengeance. Likewise it is not lawful to kill an invader of honor if honor is attacked by deeds after the deed itself. For even an injury to the aggressor after the deed does not have the nature of defense, but of private vengeance. But it is lawful, with due moderation, to defend oneself against an invader even of honor, if it is attacked by deeds, for example, by a slap or kicks, or a staff, before the deed itself. The reason is that all laws permit force to be repelled by force. Therefore he is not to be reproved who wishes to use that right which all laws permit for guarding a good great in the estimation of men, which is better than a thousand precious and great treasures, Ecclus. 41:15, and who defends himself with fists and also with kicks and a staff. C. L. 2367; Lugo d. 10, n. 166; La-Croix 803; Struggl 25, 26, 31; L. 380, 381, 382, 391; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 41, a. 1; E. M.

361. Thesis IV. The killing of an unjust aggressor, at least indirect, is licit for defending life or an equivalent good, with the moderation of blameless defense being observed.

It is said 1) licit, and not obligatory, because generally no one is bound to defend himself in this hard way, but he can, from a motive of virtue, permit his own death, unless he is very necessary to his family or to the common good, or unless he distrusts his own state of grace;⁴

⁴ Let it not be said that he who offers his life for his neighbor is always in the state of grace, because he performs an act of heroic charity; for that is true only if he so acts from the motive of perfect love of God.

2. the killing of an aggressor, that is, of one who actually brings force to bear, or at least in some way has begun the work and morally is already invading, as if he displays signs of an imminent aggression (by drawing a sword, seizing a firearm, etc.), or has altogether determined to attack and is now seeking the occasion of aggression and this is established from some present indication; but in doubt there would be place for caution or for interrogation, not for defense.⁵ For to kill before the aggression would be to forestall it, not to defend oneself against it; and when the aggression has ended, it would no longer be defense, but vengeance;

⁵ Hence Alexander VII condemned proposition 18: "It is licit to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, even a judge, from whom an unjust sentence is certainly imminent, if in no other way can an innocent person avoid harm."

3. unjust; therefore it is illicit to defend oneself against the just action of ministers of justice or of officers, but licit against a materially unjust aggression attempted by a drunken man or a madman, unless that man certainly is in the state of sin and the one attacked is certainly in the state of grace;

4. at least indirect: we say this because some, such as Lugo and Waffelaert, think that in the case the direct killing itself is licit, provided that it is not intended as an end but chosen as a means; nevertheless we judge it more conformable to truth, with St. Thomas, that bloody defense is nothing except indirect killing;

5. for defending life or an equivalent good, whether one's own or another's, so that there is present a good effect proportionate to the death of the aggressor; but an equivalent good is the integrity of members to be preserved, or sensation or the use of reason not to be irreparably lost: whether another good can be judged equivalent is left aside for now;

6. with the moderation of blameless defense, that is, so that no more be done than is necessary for defense; whence it is illicit to kill if it suffices to wound, illicit to wound if it suffices to shout, or if it is possible to flee without dishonor, but not if it would be done with great detriment: a soldier or nobleman cannot always flee without dishonor; a cleric, a man of the common people can; indeed a soldier or nobleman can before a madman or a drunken man.

It is proved: It is licit to posit a cause of a double effect, one good, the other evil, when certain conditions are present (n. 352). But this is verified in the case. For a) the indirect killing of an unjust aggressor is an action not evil, since it is nothing except to repel force by force and just defense; b) from it there equally and immediately arises the good effect, namely the preservation of life, just as the evil: the death of the aggressor; c) the good effect is proportionate to the evil, because the life of the innocent one attacked is worth the life of the guilty aggressor, and it is not otherwise to be preserved; d) only the good effect is intended in itself, not thus the evil, since if it could be done otherwise it would not be inflicted. Therefore it is licit.

This was solemnly consecrated by the Law, as Innocent III relates: "Although all laws and rights permit force to be repelled by force, nevertheless, because this must be done with moderation of blameless defense, not for taking vengeance but for driving away injury..."⁶

⁶ Cf. French Penal Code, a. 328; Belgian, a. 416; German, a. 53; likewise English law.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 64, a. 7: "Nothing prohibits there being two effects of one act, of which one only is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention... Therefore from the act of someone defending himself a double effect can follow: one indeed, the preservation of his own life; but the other, the killing of the attacker. Therefore an act of this kind, from the fact that the preservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the character of the illicit, since this is natural to anyone, that he preserve himself in being as much as he can. Yet some act proceeding from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportionate to the end. And therefore if someone, for defending his own life, uses greater violence than is fitting, it will be illicit. But if he repels violence moderately, the defense will be licit, for according to the laws 'it is licit to repel force by force with the moderation of blameless defense.' Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate defense in order to avoid the killing of another, because a man is bound to provide for his own life more than for another's life. But because it is not licit to kill a man except by public authority on account of the common good..., it is illicit that a man intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, unless he is one who has public authority; and he, intending to kill a man for his own defense, refers this to the public good, as is clear in a soldier fighting against enemies, and in a minister of a judge fighting against robbers, although even these sin if they are moved by private passion."

362. For protecting what goods is bloody defense licit? - Theologians have disputed whether such indirect wounding or killing of an aggressor can be licit for defending other lesser goods of oneself or of another: goods of fortune, chastity, reputation and honor. Now:

1. Many have said that it is licit for defending goods of fortune.

But this certainly does not hold a) for goods to be possessed and for a right to the thing, as moreover is established from the condemned proposition 32 by Innocent XI,⁷ but at most for goods actually possessed and for a right in the thing; b) nor for goods of lesser moment, for example, formerly for one or another gold coin,⁸ or now for 500 lire or 1,000 francs, even of gold value, but at most for goods of great value; but a matter of great moment would be to fall from one's state, or to suffer great detriment in it, whence it must be considered not only absolutely but relatively; c) nor for those things which could also be recovered otherwise... For goods of great moment, already possessed, whose loss would probably be irreparable, this can be sustained as probable, because it pertains to public security and to the common good that violent robbers should not be able to snatch goods of this kind with impunity, without incurring danger to life. Yet this is not certain, because, as others say: it is not licit as punishment, because punishment does not belong to private persons; nor as defense, because proportion is lacking between the fortune of the attacked one to be preserved and the very life of the attacker.

⁷ "Not only is it licit to defend by lethal defense the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we will possess."

⁸ Proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."

2. A fortiori many have held it licit for defending chastity.

But this also is very doubtful. For the integrity of the flesh does not seem of such value that it can be equated with life. But the integrity of the soul can be preserved otherwise, by not consenting to sin.

3. Some also have held it licit for defending reputation and honor, which are esteemed more than goods of fortune, indeed more than life.

But this last is true of the foundation of honor, namely, of virtue, which is worth more than life, not of honor itself, which is a very fragile thing. Moreover reputation and honor cannot be defended by the wounding or killing of one defaming or dishonoring. For after the fact, it would not be defense but vengeance by private authority: for if a nobleman who has unjustly received a slap or an insult strikes back, this certainly does not avail for defending honor thus taken away, but for obtaining from vengeance a new and false honor. But before the fact, it would be prevention, not defense; nor is that necessary, because the loss of honor and reputation is not irreparable, since by other means it can be preserved or at least recovered (for example, by verbal retort, by judicial way, or by goodness of life), and the wounding or killing of the attacker is of itself an inept means for conserving or recovering such a good, since it is rather defamatory. Therefore this was deservedly condemned.⁹ Besides, violent defense of honor or reputation would afford an entrance to countless slaughters and enmities with great detriment to the common good.

⁹ Proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an attacker who endeavors to bring calumny upon him, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone gives a slap or strikes with a staff, and after the slap has been given or the blow of the staff flees." And proposition 17 condemned by Alexander VII: "It is licit for a religious and a cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to scatter grave crimes about him or about his religion, when another way of defending is not available; as it does not seem to be available if the calumniator is prepared publicly and before very grave men to impute the aforesaid things either to the religious himself or to his religion, unless he is killed."

All the aforesaid things are to be understood of these goods alone; but it would have to be said otherwise if at the same time there were an aggression against the person, especially if bodily integrity came into danger or an aggression against life could deservedly be feared. For someone can defend his own things (or chastity) even by force, and if the aggressor resists and seriously threatens mutilation or death, he can kill him by necessity of defense. And if one attempts to strike with a slap or a staff, the other can impede him by force; and if he who has struck is prepared to continue the injury, the one attacked can repel force by force (if there is no place for flight), even with the killing of the aggressor when he threatens death.

The first opinion seems to be that of D. Bonav. at the place cited, dub. 1, namely that it is not lawful. Accursius and others follow him, whom Navar. cites in Man. cap. 15. The same is held by Archid. and Panormit., whom Sylvester cites, v. homic. 1. quaest. 4. The same seems to be Tabiena's view, v. Homicid. quaest. 7, and v. Irregularitas, 2. num. 25. Gerson, tract. de Euch., August. de Ancona, de authoritate Ecclesiae, Abul. on cap. 15 Matthaei, as cited by Diana p. 5. Tractatu 5. resol. 17, deny it absolutely; the same is upheld by Farinac. t. 4. quaest. 225. de homicid. tit. 14. num. 221. fol. 220. It appears from cap. 2 in fine, extra de homic., in which perpetual penance is imposed upon a priest who kills a thief to recover a thing stolen from him, with the death of the thief; Zabatella there, ante numerum primum; Hostiensis num. 9 v. presbyter, and ex C. suscepimus, same title, there. Ioan. Audr. there n. 1. Butrio num. 4. Felinus 1. not. 1. These canonists say that consequently he incurs irregularity and even excommunication, if the thief be a cleric.

The second opinion is that it is indeed lawful for seculars, but not for Ecclesiastics: Panormit. cap. suscepimus, de homic.; Tolet. lib. 5. summae, cap. 6. n. 14.; Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7.; D. Anton. 3. part. tit. 4. cap. 3.

The third opinion contends that it is lawful absolutely for all. So Bartol. Lib. 1. num. 2. Cod. unde vi.; Butrio cap. olim, 1. de restit. spoliat.; Angelus in Leg. Is qui aggressorem, num. 2. Cod. ad Leg. Cornel. de sicav.; Iaso in Leg. ut vim, num. 10. ff. de Iust. et iure; Paulus Paris. in cap. Dilectissimi filii, num. 36. de except.; Alex. consil. 109.; the Gloss in cap. significasti, 18. de homic.; the Abbas there; Socin. in cap. ad Audientiam de homicid.; Villadiego tract. de irregular.; Nauar. sum. cap. 15. num. 5.; Plouuius de Irregul. reg. 36. These indeed say that the slayer nonetheless becomes irregular. But others of this opinion deny this: Suarez de censur. disp. 46. sect. 2.; Petr. Nauar. Lib. 3. de restit. cap. 3. num. 414.; Tolet. Lib. 5. summae, cap. 6.; Henricus Boicins in cap. 2. de homic. num. 13.; Annan. there, num. 9.; Felinus in dictum cap. num. 5.; Iacobus AEmilianus conf. 2. num. 54.; Couar. in Clem. si furiosus 3. part.; Fortunius in Leg. ut vim, ff. de Iustitia, et iure; but these two shrink from it; Castro Lib. 2. de lege poenal. cap. 14.; Sotus 5. de iust. quaest. 2. art. 8. Hence he would not even incur excommunication under cap. si quis suadente diabolo, which is incurred for a mortal sin alone, as is commonly taught, according to Suarez disp. 22. de cens. sect. 1. num. 25.; Molina Tomo 3. de iust. tract. 5. disput. 51. num. 6.; and this doctrine holds even if there be doubt whether the thief came with the sole intention of stealing, or also of killing; for when life is in doubt, even a cleric may defend himself, as Farinaq. teaches, quaest. 125. de homic. tit. 14. num. 224.; Polyd. tract. de tempore nost. cap. 24. rubr. de fure, num. 53.; Iacobus Aixer. de homic. necessit. par. 1. num. 139. These Fagundez alleges and follows, Lib. 5. cap. 3.

Others cited by Diana part. 5. tract. 4. resol. 17. followed this opinion, which he calls the common one. So Tanner Tom. 3. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 4. num. 41., who cites Syluestrus, Nauarrus, Sotus, Valencia, Aragonius, Bannes, and Lessius. Add Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 2. disp. 27. dub. 2. num. 15.; Marchantius in summarefol. pastor. ad Decal. cap. 5. quaest. 5.; Baldellus Tom. 1. Lib. 3. disp. 26. num. 10.; Layman lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 3. cap. 3.; Petrus Binsfeldius de iniuriis, cap. 1. quaest. 5.; Molina tomo 4. tract. 3. disp. 16.; Azorius Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 1. quaest. 19.; Filliucius tom. 2. tract. 19. cap. 3. num. 36.; Bassaeus V. Homic. 1. num. 19., speaking loosely.

For Religious, however, Binsfeldius and D. Antoninus deny it; but Diana loco cit. num. 97. affirms it positively; Syluest. quaeritur 8, with Lessius lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 11. num. 72.; Malder. 2. 2. tract. 3. cap. 1. dub. 13.; Becano 2. 2. Tom. 2. quaest. 7. de homicidio.

Diana adds that a fleeing thief may be killed if he flees with the stolen goods, because the invasion of the property lasts until he reaches a place of safety; and he brings forward the authorities alleged above.

Strouersdorf adds, de Iustitia, quaest. 64. art. 7. in 2. 2., that it suffices for you to be able to kill if you cannot otherwise keep the goods, even if you could recover them afterwards; for no one seems bound to suffer that his property be snatched away, even if it can be recovered later.

Yet I am not carried away by this torrent of Doctors, nor moved to the first opinion.

Therefore I assert that it is not lawful to defend one's private property by killing the thief.

It is proved by D. Bonauent. on 6. Lucae, in those words: And from him who takes away your garment, do not forbid him to take your tunic also. There the Seraphic Doctor notes that Christ speaks of robbers who wrongfully seize things of weight, of which Iob. 24: They strip men naked, taking away their garments, etc., and of these it is said: do not forbid him the tunic also, that is, by wrangling or resisting, following the example of the Savior, of whom Psalm. 21: They divided my garments among them.

He adds that this is a commandment forbidding contention and the lust of vindicating; he declares that unbridled lust, which blazes so fiercely against others for transitory things, is what is meant, as we read in cap. suscepimus, de 2. homicidio, where the Pontiff uses the argument of D. Bonauentura.

He proves it secondly from D. Augustinus, epist. 5. ad Marcellinum: Care must be taken lest, through the desire for revenge, patience itself be lost; which must be prized above every good that an enemy can take from an enemy. He concludes therefore that what is forbidden here is not the correction of one's neighbor, nor the hindering or prohibition of evil, or the punishment of crime by one who can and ought to prevent it — which belongs to the minister of justice — but the lust of revenge, both as to the hand, and as to the sign, and as to the mind.

From this testimony of S. Augustinus is drawn the reason which the authors of the first opinion use: namely, that a greater good is not to be demanded for a lesser, because that is against justice; but the life of one's neighbor is a greater good than one's private property: Therefore.

Diana answers in the name of all: that although by its nature this order is observed, yet through the malice of the aggressor it can be overturned.

On the contrary: since the equality of justice is primarily an equality of things, malice can neither add to nor subtract from it, so as to overturn the order of these same things, when the same circumstances remain unchanged.

Fagundez num. 17., with Tanner, answers thus: Christian Charity does not oblige us to prefer the life of our robbers to things of great moment, except when he is in extreme necessity; but in the present case he is not in extreme necessity, but in wicked intent.

Moreover, no one intends to take away his life, but to recover his own goods; nor is that thief in full possession of his life. Valencia adds that it relates negatively to Charity toward one's neighbor.

I do not understand these metaphysical little proofs. For Christ knew the laws perfectly well, and better than Fagundez, even though the latter was joined to the long company of the Jurists; and yet he denies that these orders are absurd. For it is one thing that I am not bound, in extreme necessity, to spend my private property; another thing to wish to defend stolen goods at the cost of another's death. Moreover, that necessity is extreme which is to be weighed above private property, even if a man has come to it through his own fault; for life is still of a lower order, nor does private property, being of a higher order, take away the right of the higher good, that is, of life. Finally, against Valencia we are bound positively by the order of Charity, when the goods to be loved concur simultaneously in act.

It is proved thirdly from D. Bonauent., serm. 8. de decem praeceptis, from D. Augustinus Lib. 1. de Lib. arb. cap. 1. et 5., where he expressly seems to deny that it is lawful, as Valencia admits, disp. 5. quaest 8. puncto 4.; nor does he answer well by saying it is to be understood of cases in which the moderation of blameless self-defense is not observed.

For on the contrary: when goods are set forth for which one may kill, yet without the lust of vengeance — namely life and chastity — he entirely omits honor and private property, about which he had been asked. Therefore he does not grant that it is lawful even with moderation.

PROBATUR fourthly from S. Bonavent. in confessionali, cap. 3. particula 14, from cap. 2. extra de homicidio, where perpetual penance is imposed upon the Priest, even with moderation, as slayer of the Robber; but to the secular it is said: that if he is able, let him fast for the image of God slain, and give alms liberally.

RESPONDet Fagundez num. 17. that it speaks there on the supposition of an excess in the moderation of blameless self-defense, which response he gathers ex cap. suscepimus, where the excess is related.

ENIM but the passage I now allege supposes no excess; nay, it adds: But if without the mediation of hatred you have slain such members of the devil, delivering yourself and yours, I say in indulgence, on account of the image of God, if you can fast somewhat, it is good for you, and give alms liberally; if a priest has done the same, let him not be deposed, but let him do penance as long as he lives.

EN in the bare act of homicide, with whatever moderation, it places fault and imposes penance, because hands were laid upon the Image of God.

TEXTUS but that passage suscepimus, although it censures the excess of that Monk, yet even if it had been done without excess it condemns it, as a licentious excess, by the argument taken from Christ Lucae 6., on which S. Bonavent. relies. For he says: But since it was better, after the tunic, to leave the cloak and bear the loss of goods, than to blaze so fiercely against others for trifling and transitory things, let this man humbly abstain from the ministry of the Altar, and let each strive to expiate his sin at your discretion. Therefore, even if it had been necessary for the preservation of those goods, as being trifling things compared with the life of man, he decides that the man ought not to have been killed; and he execrates the homicide.

NEQUE do those Canonists of the second opinion satisfy me, who say that this decree concerns Religious only. I grant that it is there written to Religious; but the argument is taken from the Gospel, which binds all by its precept: for it is taken from the order of Charity, which is common to all by the law of nature, namely that for the preservation of worthless things the life of man, which is of a higher order, should not be killed.

DEINDE observe that the text does not exclude from irregularity those who kill for the sake of preserving mere riches, unless it is also necessary, in order to save one's life from the robber, to kill him. Therefore the Pontiff says: delivering yourself and yours, etc., as above; and in the Clementina Si furiosus he excepts only the defense of one's own life, and there excuses him who cannot otherwise escape death.

NEQUE does Fagundez satisfy me, saying num. 15. that in the Clementine it is not said that the slayer, in defense of his goods, becomes irregular. I know it; but the exception confirms the rule, for there he alone is exempted for the defense of life.

Moreover in cap. 2. de homicidio, he saves only him who had killed while delivering himself and his own. Nor let Fagundez say with Suarez num. 8. that the particle que sounds as vel; for that is contrived gratuitously, above all in decrees which are to be sanctioned, so great is the temerity of changing words, so that they render as exclusive what is expressed as conjunctive.

COLLIGE that Bassaeus num. 20. falsely asserts that he may be killed who endeavors to overturn me with falsehoods in a court of judgment, unless you can otherwise prevent him. This is condemned by Alex. VII. on 24 Sept. 1665, as may be seen in the former tome, disp. 17. de conscientia, quaest. 10. sect. 18., where also in sect. 2. you have expounded what some ancient Canones, with D. Augustino, thought about killing a nocturnal thief, or even a diurnal one, attacking life with arms.

LICITUM — that a young man, or a woman, may kill an assaulter of her chastity, when she cannot otherwise defend herself, even if the assaulter be a cleric or a Religious — is affirmed by very many, as gathered by Fagundez in Quintum praeceptum, Lib. 5. cap. 3. num. 24. So Tolet. Lib. 5. summae cap. 6.; Lessius tom. 1. Lib. 2. dub. 12. num. 76.; Sylvester V. homic. 1. quaest. 5. num. 9.; Petrus Navar. Lib. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 393.; Fatinac. tract. 4. quaest. 125. de homic. tit. 14.; Baldus in Leg. ut vim, ff. de Iust.; Decius there, num. 32.; and it is clear from the text in L. 1. §. item, Decius ff. ad Legem Cornel. de sicar.: the Divine Adrianus responded that he who slew one offering violence to him for the violation of himself or of his own is to be let go, and the Gloss there; Alberici L. 1. num. 17. Cod. Unde vi.; Iodocus in pract. cap. 80.; Bossius tit. de homicid. num. 81.; Hugolin. de censur. part. 2. cap. 11.; Iacobus Ayrerius de homic. necessitate, part. 1. num. 135.; Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. quaeritur 9.; Rodriquez in sum. tomo 1. cap. 220. num. 14.; Diana part. 5. Tract. 4. resol. 36., where he says it is the common opinion.

FALLITUR however, together with Tanner Tom. 3. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 4. num. 68., when he says that D. Augustinus doubted in this matter Lib. 1. de lib. arb. cap. 5.; for S. Augustinus seems to grant it only on account of the danger of consent, because then the soul would perish; and S. Bonaventura holds the same with him, serm. 6. Decalogi.

AT Toletus loco cit. and Sylvest. §. 8., with Fagundez, say that, the danger of consent being removed, one can refrain from killing and endure that injury, which will be doubled before God for a crown; but these two say it is safer to kill, if one can; yet more piously does the Seraphic Doctor admit it only, with D. Augustino, when the danger to the soul from the peril of consent is imminent; so also Bassaeus V. Homic. 1. num. 21.