How betrothal is dissolved

541. How They Can Be Dissolved. Betrothals are a contract dissoluble by its own nature, since neither divine law, as in matrimony, nor human law, as in religious profession, requires their perpetuity. Betrothals can be dissolved in two ways: either by law itself on the part of each party, or by the will of one party to whom a just cause of withdrawing is given. Therefore now the causes by which betrothals are dissolved by law itself on each side must be indicated, and the causes which excuse one party from fulfilling the promise or grant that party the faculty of rescinding the betrothals.

Since valid betrothals now exercise their force only before God and in conscience, but confer no right of action for urging the celebration of matrimony, those things which follow here will be useful only to pastors and confessors. But it will be clear that the causes which excuse from fulfilling the promise are so various that a pastor of souls can rarely urge the obligation of contracting matrimony if one or the other party wishes to withdraw from the betrothals.

When a cause exists which dissolves betrothals by law itself on each side, liberty of entering another matrimony is granted to each party. Three causes of this kind are numbered: mutual consent, a supervening impediment, and choice of a more perfect state.

542. Mutual Consent, by which the betrothed can remit to each other the obligation of the betrothals, even if they had been confirmed by oath; for every contract can be dissolved by mutual consent, just as it arose by mutual consent, unless its dissolution is resisted by right; but right does not resist the dissolution of the betrothal contract.

a. This has force even in the case in which the betrothed after the betrothals have had carnal copula; for by copula the betrothals do not acquire greater firmness. Yet other obligations must be fulfilled if the bride has become pregnant.

b. He who adds an oath to betrothals obliges himself before God to contracting the promised matrimony; but God accepts the obligation in favor of him or her to whom the matrimony was promised; therefore if that person remits the obligation, God also is judged to remit it. Hence even betrothals confirmed by oath are dissolved by mutual consent. Therefore an oath which is added to betrothals is made with this tacit condition: unless it is remitted by the other party.

543. A Supervening Impediment, by which the promised matrimony is rendered impossible: for what renders the betrothed altogether incapable of entering the promised matrimony entirely removes the obligation of the betrothals. Supervening impediments can be:

a. Indispensable impediments either of natural law, such as insanity, impotence, or of ecclesiastical law in which one is not accustomed to be dispensed.

Supervening impediments in which dispensation cannot be given are, besides insanity of one party and impotence, validly entered matrimony, solemn vow, sacred order. Two supervening impediments in which dispensation could be given and concerning which authors used to treat in this place, namely spiritual relationship and affinity from illicit copula, after the dispositions of the new Code can no longer supervene.

b. Religious profession, whether solemn or simple, and reception of sacred order; for he who emits profession or receives sacred order is rendered incapable of contracting, since religious profession and sacred order constitute an impediment perpetually diriment of matrimony. As regards solemn religious profession, another reason is added: for if by disposition of law betrothals de praesenti are dissolved through profession, a fortiori betrothals de futuro are dissolved, so that they no longer revive.

c. Matrimony contracted with another person, which nevertheless does not certainly but only probably dissolve betrothals.

All concede that the other betrothed party has the right at once of entering another matrimony; but the question whether the obligation of betrothals is entirely extinguished through a subsequent matrimony entered with another person, or only suspended during the matrimony, so that when the matrimony has been dissolved it revives again, is controverted. Those who teach that betrothals are altogether dissolved bring forward this reason: the firmer obligation of matrimony extinguishes the less firm obligation of betrothals. Moreover one who contracts matrimony is rendered per se incapable of entering the promised matrimony, since he assumes a state perpetual of itself, which is repugnant to the promised matrimony. But if the matrimony is dissolved by the death of the other party, this happens per accidens and does not change the nature of the thing. But those who with St. Alphonsus, n. 875, teach that betrothals are only suspended argue in this way: he who contracts matrimony is not rendered absolutely incapable, since the contracted matrimony is not repugnant to the promised matrimony for the time at which the prior matrimony will have been dissolved by the death of the other party. Moreover he who after emitting a vow of chastity contracted matrimony is held, once the matrimony has been dissolved, to fulfill the vow; therefore also he who after entering betrothals contracted matrimony is held, once the matrimony has been dissolved, to fulfill the betrothals, if the other party wishes. Finally, one's own fraud ought to patronize no one. Since each opinion is truly probable, Ballerini rightly writes: a confessor cannot compel a widow to fulfill that former promise.¹

¹ Gury-Ballerini II, n. 733.

544. Choice of a More Perfect State. 1. For betrothals are always made with this tacit condition: unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state;¹ therefore each betrothed reserves to himself or herself the right of passing freely and licitly to a more perfect state, the matrimonial state having been left.

There are indeed those who do not attribute this force of dissolving betrothals to the choice of any more perfect state, but only to the choice of the religious state or to the will and vow of professing religion; for they say that the choice of another state and consequently the vow of assuming a more perfect state is illicit and therefore invalid, because God does not accept what has already been promised to another. But since the same reason militates for every more perfect state, it must be extended equally to all. But the reason is the tacit condition under which betrothals are made. For betrothals are dissolved because of a notable supervening change, such that, if foreseen, betrothals would not have been entered; but a change of this kind is vocation to a more perfect state and the will of assuming it.²

2. A more perfect state of this kind is: a. the state of virginity, which one chooses who emits a vow of perpetual chastity.

In the external forum indeed betrothals because of a private vow of perpetual chastity are not judged dissolved; but in the internal forum this vow renders one immune from the obligation of betrothals, provided it was emitted from a true and sincere will.

b. The clerical state in sacred order, which is chosen both by one who makes a vow of receiving sacred orders and by one who receives minor orders or enters a clerical seminary with a true and sincere will of receiving sacred orders.

c. The regular state in an order or congregation with perpetual vows, which is chosen both by one who makes a vow of entering religion and by one who enters religion with a true and serious will of emitting profession in it.

Authors dispute whether by the choice of a more perfect state betrothals are dissolved on the part of each party, or whether only the right of withdrawing from the betrothals is given to the other party, if that party wishes. According to the first opinion, betrothals, in the internal forum, are dissolved through the very act of the will by which one of the betrothed sincerely dedicates himself or herself to divine service in a more perfect state. According to the second opinion, through the will of choosing a more perfect state the other party becomes free, because the one choosing a more perfect state yields his or her right; but that one becomes free only after taking up the more perfect state, that is, after receiving sacred order or emitting religious profession.

Since the opinion affirming the dissolution of betrothals on each side is truly probable, the confessor does not have the right of compelling to fulfilling the betrothals one who does not execute the conceived will of embracing a more perfect state, but, e.g., after some time leaves the novitiate or the seminary. Nevertheless it is supposed that he acted sincerely from true love of the more perfect state; for if he had deceitfully only affected the intention of a more perfect life, he certainly is not freed from the obligation of betrothals.³

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 870 ff.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 185.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 174 ff.; Gasparri I, n. 92 f.; De Becker, p. 14; Wernz IV, n. 113.

When a cause exists which grants one party the faculty of rescinding the betrothals, this party can dissolve the betrothals at pleasure; but if that party does not wish to withdraw from the betrothals, it is not licit for the other party, who had given the occasion of dissolving them, to withdraw, unless perhaps matrimony exists as notably more burdensome to that party. Three causes of this kind can be numbered: a. breaking of betrothal faith; b. a state of things different from what was known; c. notable change.

545. Violation of Betrothal Faith; for faith is not to be kept with one not keeping faith. But the actions through which betrothal faith is judged to be violated are chiefly the following:

a. To delay excessively the matrimony to be contracted. For either a term for contracting matrimony was fixed in the betrothals, or none was fixed. If the first, either the fixed term was set for ending the obligation, in which case, after the term has elapsed, the betrothals are dissolved by law itself on each side; or the term was fixed for urging the obligation, in which case, whether by culpable or inculpable delay of one party, the time has elapsed, the innocent party can withdraw from the betrothals. But if no term for contracting matrimony was fixed, that party which draws out the delays for too long is judged to give the other party power of withdrawing from the contract. But how much time the latter ought to wait so that it can withdraw by right from the betrothals must be determined by the judgment of prudent persons after considering the circumstances.

b. To betake oneself to another place without the consent of the other party. If one party migrates to another place while the other party does not know or is unwilling, and there is no hope that the migrant will return shortly, the party remaining can at once withdraw from the betrothals, whether the cause of migration was necessary or voluntary; for he who migrates elsewhere is judged by this very fact to renounce the betrothals, but the other party acquires freedom of contracting with another.

If the remaining party had notice of the migration and consented, he or she must wait for the return. But if the other party has gone to a nearby place or there is hope that he or she will return shortly, that party's return must be awaited, or the party must be warned to return within a certain time for celebrating the promised matrimony, and if he or she does not return, the remaining party is free.

c. To enter other betrothals. And betrothals contracted against the faith of prior betrothals are invalid, even if they had been confirmed by oath, as illicit; and the party which violated betrothal faith is held to the first betrothals, but the other innocent party is freed from the obligation.

d. To commit fornication with another person. Fornication committed before the betrothals and after the betrothals must be distinguished; besides, in fornication which the betrothed commit, two things must be attended to: first, one who fornicates with an extraneous person breaks betrothal faith; and then because of fornication is rendered of less value; this effect, however, affects the bride more than the bridegroom.

Because of fornication committed before the betrothals and known after the betrothals, both the bridegroom and also the bride have the right of withdrawing from the betrothals, although some deny this right to the bride.¹

Because of fornication committed after the betrothals, the innocent party, both bridegroom and bride, can withdraw from the betrothals, because the other party has broken faith.

If fornication has been committed on each side, there is indeed a mutual compensation of delict; nevertheless the bridegroom can withdraw, because the bride, who has been made notably of less value, has gravely injured the right of the bridegroom. But according to the common opinion the bride cannot withdraw, unless the bridegroom has had offspring from another or has contracted a habit of fornicating;² for the bridegroom is not judged to have been made notably worse from fornication, and therefore has not gravely injured the right of the bride. Yet there are those who rightly say that the bride's obligation of entering matrimony with a fornicating bridegroom is not certain, and that she therefore cannot be compelled to matrimony.³

If one of the betrothed commits immodest acts with a third person, the bridegroom can withdraw from the betrothals, indeed also the bride if disgraceful acts of this kind are admitted so frequently that it must rightly be feared that the bridegroom will violate conjugal faith.

¹ Lehmkuhl, Casus consc. II, 848.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 862.

³ Lehmkuhl, Casus consc. II, n. 849; Matharan, Genicot, and Wernz consent.

546. A State of Things Notably Different from that which had been known before. Namely, if after betrothals have already been contracted, one party comes to knowledge of a circumstance already existing at the time of the betrothals which, if that party had known before, he or she would not have made the betrothals, this party has a just cause of withdrawing from the betrothals; for betrothals do not oblige beyond the will of the contracting parties, and the contracting parties are not judged to have wished to oblige themselves to a future matrimony so grave and difficult. Now it is asked:

Whether the bride is held to manifest to the bridegroom the defects under which she labors, and conversely the bridegroom to the bride.

1. In general it must be said:

a. Each betrothed has the right of knowing notable defects of the other party, so that full freedom may be preserved for the matrimonial contract. Therefore one who conceals defects of this kind sins gravely against justice, just as one acts against justice who sells useless merchandise to him who is ignorant of the defects of the merchandise.

b. Not every defect which, when known, grants the betrothed the right of withdrawing from the betrothals must be manifested under grave obligation; for sometimes defects of this kind are such that they do not render matrimony more difficult for the other party because they are unknown, but when known they grant the right of withdrawing. Now in this case the right of the other party is not gravely injured if the defects are wholly concealed.

2. In species these things must be noted:

a. Defects which render matrimony invalid, however disgraceful, must be manifested, or matrimony must be abstained from.

A defect of this kind is of a twofold kind: either it is a defect whose absence the betrothed requires as a condition without which not, e.g., if you are a virgin, if you have not committed that crime; or it is a defect which contains a hidden diriment impediment.

b. Defects which will render matrimony either harmful or notably more difficult for the other party, although disgraceful, must be manifested under grave obligation, both before and after betrothals if they have supervened after these have already been entered.

Defects of this kind are: a disease, especially a contagious one, grave infamy of person or family, offspring left from another man, sterility, state of widowhood, another religion, grave moral defects, etc.

As regards fornication, it must be distinguished thus: if the bridegroom has had offspring from it, this must be manifested to the bride, unless the circumstances are such that the bridegroom will never come to knowledge of the thing. If the bride has become pregnant from it, she must reveal the matter to the bridegroom; if, however, before matrimony she can give birth and wholly conceal the birth from the man, the defect can be judged as if it were simple fornication.

The bridegroom is not held to reveal simple fornication, because that defect is not judged notable in the bridegroom; but the bride must reveal fornication, because this defect in the bride is judged notable, unless by artifice she can wholly conceal the matter, or unless from the known character of the bridegroom it can prudently be judged that he would not value this defect greatly.

c. There is no obligation, at least no grave one, of manifesting either before or after betrothals defects which do not render matrimony notably more difficult, although they render it less desirable and bring some sadness to the other party, just as there is no obligation in contracts of manifesting lighter defects of merchandise. For no one is held to defame himself or herself and deprive himself or herself of the hope of marrying where by silence no right of another is injured. But if it were to be feared that after matrimony the matter would become known and from this there would arise an unhappy matrimony, at least from charity they would be held to manifest the defect or abstain from the union.

Defects of this kind are: deformity, ignobility, poverty, harsh and irascible character, incapacity for conducting affairs, for administering the home, etc.

547. Notable Change which supervenes upon the betrothals; for betrothals are judged to have been entered under this tacit condition: if things remain in the same state, and that lest the matrimony be going to have an unhappy outcome.

Notable change is judged to be induced by any circumstance which, if it had existed or been known before the betrothals were entered, would have drawn one back from contracting the betrothals; but of this kind is any circumstance by which the promised matrimony is truly rendered much more burdensome, difficult, and troublesome. This change can happen either in goods of soul, or in goods of body, or in goods of fortune.

a. In goods of soul: grave harshness of morals, inclination to drunkenness, gambling, impiety; if someone commits an atrocious crime: that crime is judged atrocious which brings grave harm or infamy, such as heresy, homicide, grave theft.

b. In goods of body: incurable or contagious disease, loss of beauty especially in the bride, blindness, cutting off of a member. It is asked whether there is a just cause of abandoning the bride if she has been corrupted against her will. This indeed must be affirmed, because she has been made notably of less value; for that which is valued greatly in a bride is bodily integrity, and when this has been lost, even without fault of the bride, the condition of things has notably changed. The same must be said if she had been corrupted before the betrothals and afterward at length this defect was discovered.

c. In goods of fortune: supervening poverty in each betrothed grants each the faculty of withdrawing, because on each side a notable change happens and matrimony is rendered more burdensome to each; if either one loses a notable part of goods, the other party, whose goods remain unchanged, can withdraw; if the bride is discovered not to have a dowry; if a rich inheritance comes to the bridegroom. But if the goods of the bridegroom remain unchanged and only a rich inheritance comes to the bride, commonly the right of withdrawing from the betrothals is not granted to her; but the opinion which also attributes to the bride in this case the right of withdrawing does not seem improbable, because if she had foreseen the future change, she would not have contracted the betrothals; if either is burdened by excessive debt and there is no hope that he or she will be able to pay; if the bridegroom becomes inept for acquiring an office necessary for the sustenance of the family.

Note. Betrothals can be rescinded if, with all circumstances considered, it is rightly feared that the matrimony to be celebrated will have an unhappy outcome. But for this reason betrothals can in no way be dissolved because another and better occasion of entering matrimony offers itself. Indeed ordinarily the rescission of betrothals must at least be dissuaded, not to say prohibited, although another bride much richer and not inferior as to other qualities offers herself to the bridegroom.

548. Whether, When a Just Cause of Dissolving Betrothals Exists, These Can Be Dissolved by One's Own Authority. If a just cause of dissolving betrothals certainly exists, the sentence of a judge is not required for dissolving them, but by one's own authority they can be dissolved or rescinded by mutual consent; for it is prescribed neither by natural law nor by positive common law that betrothals not be dissolved unless the authority of a judge intervenes.

Per se: for from a threefold cause it can happen that the authority of a judge is required for dissolving betrothals: a. by natural law for averting scandal, if the betrothals are publicly known but the cause of dissolution is unknown; b. from a particular statute of many dioceses, by which it is not permitted that betrothals which were celebrated publicly or afterward became publicly known be dissolved without the cause being referred to the bishop; c. finally where there is doubt about the existence or sufficiency of the cause, dissolution of betrothals is not to be permitted without the authority of a judge, so that the danger of injustice or enmity between the betrothed may be guarded against.

549. To What Is One Held Who Withdraws from Betrothals Without Just Cause?

a. Not only one who withdraws from betrothals without a just cause, but also one who either concealed a just cause of withdrawing or brought it about by his or her fault, is held to repair the harm which is inflicted on the other party withdrawing.

b. Full reparation of harm includes both positive harm and negative harm. The former consists in gifts and expenses made by the other party with a view to the future matrimony; the latter arises both where the bride for this reason cannot find another man, or has conceived offspring from the bridegroom.

c. If the bride withdraws, ordinarily it suffices that the positive harm inflicted be repaired to the bridegroom, because a man more easily finds another bride; but if the bridegroom withdraws, full reparation of harm is usually had only if the bride is also suitably endowed.

Question Four.. On the Requisites Before the Celebration of Matrimony.

Before the celebration of matrimony, it must be established for the parish priest that nothing stands in the way of its validity and liceity. In order that he may be made more certain concerning this matter, from office he must a. institute the examination of the betrothed, b. publicly announce the matrimony.¹

¹ Cn. 1020, 3.

Betrothal, like other contracts, can be dissolved in various ways. The parties may both agree to release each other and then they will be free, for by a rule of law all things are dissolved by the same causes which gave them birth. If children under age have been betrothed, they cannot release the contract even by mutual consent until the age of puberty, and then within three days either may resile from the contract without waiting for the consent of the other party; but if they do not use this privilege granted by canon law they are presumed to ratify the contract.

One of the betrothed may resile if a circumstance of importance be detected or happen which if it had been known before would have prevented the contract being entered into, This rule is commonly admitted by divines, who explain it by saying that betrothal is of its nature conditional, and has such a condition as the above annexed to it. If, then, one of the parties finds that the other has an ungovernable temper, or great debts, or is given to drink, or if the other becomes afflicted with a disease like consumption or paralysis, he will be free to rescind the contract. The innocent party may resile if the other commit fornication with someone else, and certainly the man is free if he find out that the woman was corrupted even . before betrothal. The same rule may be applied in favour of the woman when she finds out that the man committed fornication before betrothal, at least if in the particular case it is a sign of inconstancy or is very much resented.

Betrothal is annulled if an impediment of marriage come to exist between the parties unless it had its origin in the culpable fraud of one of them, for then he must do what he can to obtain a dispensation or at least compensate the other, as no one should reap advantage from his own fraud.

One who is betrothed may resile in order to enter a religious order, or to take sacred orders, or even with a view of living in the world under a perpetual vow of chastity, for in all these cases a higher life is embraced, and betrothal has also the condition annexed, “ Unless afterward I am called to a higher life.”

The Pope may for a just cause grant a dispensation from betrothal. Some authors maintained that the Pope had not the power to grant such a dispensation, inasmuch as it would violate the rights of the other party. However, if an individual is unreasonably obstinate in the maintenance of his rights, the head of the society to which he belongs should have the power of granting relief to others whom that obstinacy places in difficulties. This is what the Pope sometimes does; when a civil marriage contracted in violation of betrothal to another, though null and void in the eyes of the Church, makes it impossible for the married party to return to his former betrothed, the Pope will grant a dispensation even if the other party refuses to forego his rights.

When one of the parties labours under a secret defect which, if known, would furnish sufficient ground for resiling from the engagement, there is no strict obligation to make . it known to the other party, unless it will be to his detriment. Past sin, then, need not be declared, but if the woman has undergone an operation which makes her incapable of bearing children, she should not contract marriage with a man who is ignorant of the defect and hopes to have children.

Whether marriage with a woman contracted in violation of a promise of marriage made to another annuls the former betrothal altogether, or whether the obligation to marry the first is only suspended and revives again if the wife die before the husband, is a disputed question among divines. Of course, such a breach of faith makes the other party free to marry someone else if she choose, and the opinion is at least probable that by such a radical change in circumstances as marriage with another the former engagement is altogether dissolved and cannot revive. There is something incongruous in the idea of a person who is married to one, being nevertheless still under the obligation to marry someone else.

If a man after betrothal without the knowledge or consent of his betrothed goes to live elsewhere at a distance so that personal intercourse between them is impossible, the woman may consider herself free to break off the engagement. A short absence makes no difference in the mutual obligations of the parties. If it is uncertain with what intention and for how long a time a betrothed person has absented himself, information as to his intentions should be sought by letter before breaking off the engagement. If a time was fixed for the marriage, the obligation is not extinguished by failure to keep to the time, unless it is certain that the intention of the parties was to break off the engagement if the marriage were not contracted at the appointed time. Presents made to the betrothed in view of marriage are forfeited if the engagement is broken off through the fault of him who made the presents, otherwise, if the fault is on the other side.

If it is certain that there is good cause for breaking off an engagement, this may be done by private authority; it will only be necessary to have recourse to the ecclesiastical judge when the cause is doubtful, or when scandal would arise if the engagement were broken off by private authority on account of the cause being unknown.

When valid betrothal has been broken off by one of the parties without good reason, the other has no right of action in the ecclesiastical court to compel the defaulting party to fulfil the contract, he has only a right to an action for damages (Can. 1017, sec. 3). This action is mixti fori (A.A.S., xx, 345).

People who are only engaged to be married have not the rights of married people, and if they attempt to use them they are guilty of sin against the sixth commandment. It is, however, as a rule, morally necessary for them to become acquainted with each other, and they are justified in showing to each other those marks of affection which are not wrong in themselves and which are usual in the circumstances, It is to be desired that they should not be much together alone, especially at night, and if they are left alone they should not show greater familiarity toward each other than they do when a mother or sister is with them.

Preliminary note. Of the causes for dissolving betrothals, some by their own force dissolve or extinguish them; others furnish to both parties, or to one party, the right of dissolving or rescinding them. In addition, the causes have force even if the betrothals have been confirmed by oath. They are:

I. Mutual consent, sufficiently free from error, fraud, and fear (St. Alphonsus VI, 855, 856).

II. A notable defect pre-existing the betrothals and afterwards detected; likewise a notable change supervening upon the betrothals, which render matrimony more burdensome, and, if they had been known or foreseen, would have deterred from the betrothals. The reason is drawn from this, that betrothals, as ordered to matrimony, which carries with it a perpetual society of life, are judged to have been contracted under the condition: "provided the matter is as it appears, and is not changed for the worse"; or at least with the right retained of dissolving them if the aforesaid condition is not fulfilled (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 43, a. 3, ad 3; St. Alphonsus VI, 86). Indeed, even a prudent and persistent suspicion of a notable defect or change suffices, because it is a grave inconvenience to contract with such a suspicion.

In the cases set forth, the dissolution of betrothals can be made by one party or by both, according as one or both would suffer inconvenience if, notwithstanding the change, matrimony were contracted. Commonly, however, the inconvenience will not follow for the party who has suffered the change, but for the other alone.

The defect and change can concern goods: 1° of the body, as if there is detected or supervenes a grave and incurable disease, or stinking breath, notable deformity, loss of sight or hearing, etc.; 2° of the soul, as if the bridegroom is detected to be, or becomes, irreligious, drunken, a gambler, prodigal, harsh in morals, etc.; 3° of fortune, as if the bridegroom or bride is detected to be, or becomes, poor, or is frustrated of a great inheritance or expected lucrative office, etc. And these things indeed are admitted by all, because in the cases set forth the detected defect and the supervening change render matrimony more burdensome. But:

It is disputed whether a notable supervening change furnishes the right of withdrawing when, if it had been foreseen, it indeed would have impeded the betrothals, but nevertheless does not render matrimony more burdensome; for example, if an unexpected and rich inheritance comes to someone. Now a sufficiently probable opinion affirms, because each person is presumed to have contracted betrothals under the condition: "provided no notable change supervenes." Add that, according to common estimation, the neglect of great gain is equated with grave damage; and this being posited, from the acceptance of men the change of which we speak is morally the same as that which renders matrimony more difficult. Finally, in the case in which a rich inheritance comes to someone, there enters a disparity of condition, which, as will be said under III, involves a cause for dissolving betrothals. St. Alphonsus would not indeed praise, but neither would he condemn, the one who, when marriage with an exceedingly better bride has been offered, should choose this bride (VI, 876).

Note. A party laboring under an occult defect is bound to manifest this to the other party before the betrothals or, once the betrothals have been contracted, before the nuptials, as follows: 1° "If the defect would render the nuptials pernicious, as if it were infamy, leprosy, the French disease, or another contagious disease, he is bound to manifest it or to withdraw from the nuptials, unless the other party labors under the same defect. The reason is that, just as one sins against justice who sells harmful merchandise to another who believes it good, so a fortiori one does who wishes to contract matrimony with a pernicious defect. 2° But if the defect would not render the nuptials harmful, but only less desirable, namely if the bride were poor though she is thought rich, ignoble though noble, deformed though beautiful, corrupted though a virgin, then, although she herself cannot deceive the man by pretending that she is immune from such a defect, nevertheless she is not bound to manifest the defect; but even when questioned she can dissemble by answering equivocally" (St. Alphonsus VI, 864-865). Thus custom has it. If, however, there is grave danger that the defect may afterwards be detected and provoke grave discords, it is to be advised that it be manifested (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

Disparity of condition and the dissent of parents are partly referred to the cause set forth.

III. Disparity of condition, whether arising from disparity of status, or from nobility, or from disparity of fortune:

a) If it is so great that the matrimony is illicit because of dishonor to the family, the betrothals are null from the beginning.

b) If it is not so great, but nevertheless notable, the betrothals are valid and of themselves irrescindable, if the parties contracted them with knowledge of the disparity. If it is afterwards detected, or supervenes after the betrothals have been contracted, these can commonly be rescinded.

IV. The dissent of parents operates thus:

1. Due dissent, namely because the matrimony is illicit, argues that the betrothals were null from the beginning (St. Alphonsus III, 644; VI, 851, 877).

Here it is customary to ask whether a prodigal promise of matrimony as such, that is, one made to a bridegroom or bride of much inferior condition or fortune, but without dishonor to the family, is illicit and invalid, as being about an illicit thing. To this question we respond with St. Alphonsus (VI, 851): If no reason honors a promise of this kind, it regards a venially evil thing, and therefore is null. "Nevertheless, since the fault of prodigality is not more than venial, any middling just cause can remove the vice of prodigality. Hence the bridegroom who marries an unequal woman will be sufficiently excused if he knows in her some special prerogative, namely of providence, devotion, great honesty, or even of some natural endowment, on account of which the bridegroom judges that he will lead a quiet life with her. Hence it is inferred that scarcely can a case occur in which the bridegroom would not be bound to marry her, because very rarely will there be lacking some one of these causes which will excuse the fault of prodigality."

2. Reasonable dissent, although not due, will often be a reason why it is licit to rescind betrothals. Almost the same must be said about less reasonable and continuing dissent, so that hope of removing it is lacking; in which case children often will be able, especially if the dissent was not foreseen, to withdraw from the betrothals, namely on account of the inconveniences joined to their execution and the evils to be feared. Nevertheless, commonly they are not bound to this, the more so because, once matrimony has been contracted, the inconveniences not so rarely vanish.

V. Violation of fidelity furnishes to the innocent party the right of withdrawing, while the guilty party remains bound until the innocent party has used his or her right. To this are referred:

1. Courtship with a third person, or frequenting with a view to matrimony. A fortiori:

2. Betrothals attempted with a third person, or even a gratuitous promise of matrimony made to a third person.

3. Matrimony entered with a third person. Here, however, it is disputed whether by matrimony of this kind the betrothal obligation is extinguished on both sides, or whether for the unfaithful betrothed the obligation is only suspended, namely during the matrimony. Now with St. Alphonsus (VI, 875) and others, against many, it seems that one must say that for the unfaithful party the obligation is only suspended. The reason is that an obligation contracted, if an impediment is placed illegitimately, is not extinguished except by an impediment which by its nature is simply indissoluble. But matrimony is not by its nature simply indissoluble. Indeed, by its proper nature it cannot be dissolved by the authority of the spouses, but it can be dissolved in another way, for example by the death of a spouse. This is confirmed from the fact that matrimony does not extinguish, but only suspends, the obligation of a vow of religion, so that the one vowing, when the spouse has died, is bound to fulfill the vow (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

Objection. In the case of a vow, the supervening bond is of a different nature, while the bond of matrimony is of the same nature as the bond of betrothals.

Response. This seems to make no difference; in other words, only this must be considered, whether or not the subsequent bond is by its nature simply indissoluble; because the nature of an obligation as such carries with it that it must always be fulfilled as long as it can be fulfilled. Hence if the subsequent bond is temporal, the obligation is only suspended.

4. Fornication; concerning which several things must be noted.

a) Antecedent fornication of the bride, afterwards detected, gives to the bridegroom the right of withdrawing; and this holds even if the bride was oppressed by force, because according to common estimation she is of less worth than she was thought to be. Antecedent fornication of the bridegroom, detected after the betrothals, confers on the bride the right of withdrawing: 1° if the bridegroom is detected to have acted thus frequently; 2° if he has received offspring from another; 3° if it is hard for the particular bride to marry a man who has fornicated even once (St. Alphonsus VI, 861). I said "for the particular bride"; namely, it must be considered in what manner the bride is to be judged to have contracted the betrothals. Now a bride to whom it matters little whether or not the bridegroom had previously fornicated is not judged to have entered betrothals under the condition: "provided the bridegroom is not detected to have committed fornication."

b) Subsequent fornication of either party gives to the other party the right of withdrawing. This holds even if the bride was oppressed by force, since according to common estimation she has been made of less worth, so that a notable change has supervened which renders matrimony more burdensome. If both parties have fornicated, the bridegroom, as is now commonly admitted, can withdraw. But it is disputed whether of itself the same is licit for the bride. Most of the older authors deny, relying on this reason: the fornication of the bride is judged both far more shameful and consequently also a graver delict than the fornication of the bridegroom, so that an uncompensated excess favors only the bridegroom. There are, however, those who judge that in many regions, according to common estimation, the bridegroom is rendered almost as contemptible by fornication as the bride, perhaps the lowest common populace excepted; and if this is admitted, the subsequent fornication of both also furnishes to the bride the right of withdrawing.

Corollary. The things said about fornication hold almost also for immodest touches with a third person, especially if they are more frequent or are done with several persons. Indeed, familiarity with a third person can be such that it furnishes to the other party the right of withdrawing, the more so because in this whole matter attention must also be given to a founded fear that fidelity may afterwards be violated. Finally, the aforesaid things are also to be applied to other graver crimes perpetrated by the bridegroom or bride, for example homicide, bestiality, heresy (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 43, a. 3, ad 6; St. Alphonsus VI, 860).

5. The departure of either party into a distant region, from which return cannot be hoped for soon, if it happens while the other party is unaware or unwilling, gives to this party the right of marrying another. The reason is that the long expectation of some good involves a notable diminution of happiness (St. Alphonsus VI, 860).

6. Delay of matrimony produces these effects:

a) If the term is prefixed solely for urging the obligation, the party prepared can withdraw: 1° if the other party delays matrimony without a just cause, because by acting thus he or she violates fidelity; 2° if he or she delays justly, but with grave inconvenience to the prepared party, which can be prevented by withdrawing.

b) If the term is prefixed for ending the obligation: 1° if both parties have been at fault, each party is free, both because of the stipulation added to the contract and because each party seems to have yielded his or her right; 2° if neither party has been at fault, each seems free, namely with the stipulation added to the contract considered; 3° if one party has been at fault, certainly the other party is freed; but it is disputed whether the prior party also is free if the other urges matrimony. Now commonly it seems to have to be denied, because no one is judged to have bound himself in such a way that the obligation ceases even if he himself is the cause why it was not fulfilled (St. Alphonsus VI, 867, 868).

The term is commonly prefixed for urging the obligation; yet sometimes the contrary can be drawn from the tenor or from the circumstances.

VI. Election of a more perfect state; concerning which both the liceity of choosing a more perfect state and the effect of the election made must be explained.

1. Liceity of choosing a more perfect state. Notwithstanding betrothals, it is licit to choose a more perfect state, as follows:

a) It is licit to choose the religious state. The reason is drawn from the fact that in betrothals there is a tacit condition: "Unless I shall have chosen the religious state"¹ (St. Alphonsus VI, 870, dub. 1). Likewise it is licit to emit a vow of choosing the religious state; for it is licit to vow what it is licit to perform.

b) It is disputed whether it is licit: 1° to choose the clerical state; 2° to emit a private vow of perpetual chastity. It is affirmed with sufficient probability, because there is probably in betrothals the tacit condition: "Unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state" (St. Alphonsus VI, 873). It is illicit to choose mere celibacy without a vow of perpetual chastity; for one who has promised matrimony is not judged to have retained the right of not marrying.

Furthermore, the election, of itself licit, of a more perfect state is illicit: 1° if someone obtained intercourse under the promise of matrimony; 2° if someone is bound to repair damage which can be repaired by matrimony alone; 3° if someone does not proceed sincerely, namely from desire of a more perfect state, but fraudulently, for example so that he or she may be freed from the betrothals and, after obtaining a dispensation, may marry another (St. Alphonsus VI, 873; III, 649).

2. Effects of the election made. a) The election of any more perfect state, even of mere celibacy, frees the other party; both because the one choosing the more perfect state renounces the betrothals, and because, when one party withdraws voluntarily, the other party by that very fact recovers liberty (St. Alphonsus VI, 873).

b) Religious profession itself and the reception itself of major Order extinguish the betrothals, or free both parties. The reason is that they constitute a state which cannot be composed with the execution of the betrothals and is of itself perpetual. It is disputed whether the same effects are produced, or whether for the receding party they only suspend the obligation, by: 1° the emission of a vow of chastity to be observed perpetually in the world; 2° mere entrance into Religion; 3° mere entrance into a seminary; 4° reception of minor Order; 5° vows alone of entering Religion, or of embracing major Order, or of emitting a private vow of perpetual chastity. Nevertheless it seems one must say that at least entrance into Religion or a seminary, likewise the reception of minor Order and vows alone of entering Religion, of receiving Sacred Orders, or of emitting a vow of chastity, only suspend the betrothals for the one entering or vowing, because through those things a state of itself perpetual is not yet undertaken (St. Alphonsus VI, 870-873).

¹ Cf. chapters 2 and 7, De conversione coniugatorum.

VII. A supervening diriment impediment. 1. If an indispensable and perpetual impediment supervenes, that is, one in which a dispensation cannot be given or hoped for, for example impotence, the betrothals fall for both parties. Nevertheless the party who, conscious that the impediment would arise, caused it, must compensate the damage that will follow for the other party.

2. If an impediment supervenes which indeed is indispensable but temporal, namely the impediment of bond, the betrothals are dissolved for the party to whom fidelity has been violated; for the other party they are more probably only suspended, as was said in n. 677. Meanwhile this party is bound to reparation of the damage inflicted on the other party.

3. If a dispensable impediment supervenes, the party who did not induce the impediment is freed. The party who gave cause to the impediment, if indeed he or she acted conscious that the impediment would arise, must procure a dispensation, even with grave inconvenience; but if he or she was ignorant of the impediment, after the manner of an inculpable debtor from contract, more probably he or she is bound to ask for a dispensation if it can conveniently be obtained; indeed even with grave inconvenience, if the damage of defloration must be repaired or infamy prevented (St. Alphonsus VI, 857, 858).

Concerning a supervening prohibitive impediment, for example a vow, etc., enough has been said in n. 678.

VIII. Founded fear that the matrimony will be unhappy. For no one is judged to have bound himself to a burden of this kind.¹

¹ Austrian Instruction, February 2, 1856.

IX. Dispensation can be granted by the Supreme Pontiff, as is clear both from the fact that he can dissolve the firmer bond of ratified matrimony (canon 1119), and from the practice of the Holy See. Inferior Prelates lack this power; nevertheless, when the cause has been examined and is manifest, they can declare or judge that betrothals are invalid, dissolved, or rescindable. For dispensation a just cause is required; and in general this can be said to be present if from the dispensation greater goods are foreseen than from the execution of the betrothals.

Note. One who without a just cause withdraws, or unjustly has introduced a cause for withdrawing, is bound to compensate damage arising from his or her unjust action; but not the gain to which the other party would have acquired a right only after the nuptials had been contracted.

According to the opinion of all, betrothals can be dissolved for just causes. The principal causes are: mutual consent; a supervening impediment ¹; the choice of a more perfect state, for example, religious profession, etc.; a grave crime of the other party, for example, fornication; a notable change of status, namely, a circumstance which, had it been known or foreseen, would, in the judgment of prudent persons, have deterred one from the betrothal; ². Betrothals can also be dissolved through an excessive delay of matrimony, especially if a time for contracting matrimony had been determined.

¹ Understand a diriment impediment, and indeed one by natural law. For if the impediment is diriment only by ecclesiastical law, although the obligation ceases on the part of the innocent party, it does not likewise cease on the part of the one who by his own fault placed the cause of the impediment, but is only suspended; so that the latter (unless he would thereby incur harm much graver than the injured party would incur from omission of the nuptials) is bound to seek a dispensation from the impediment and, when it has been removed, if the injured party still wishes, to fulfill the pledge given to that party. Nor do the Doctors in fact disagree concerning this matter. For the discrepancy which someone might suspect from those things which St. Alphonsus (book 6, nos. 857-858) reports is owed entirely to the drowsiness and negligence of the Salmanticenses (On Matrimony, chapter 2, from no. 70) in describing the opinions of the Doctors.

** The VV. turn the excuse of St. Alphonsus which the final words of this brief Note present into a reproach against me, and therefore do not hesitate to write these things (p. 794): The reproach of inexcusable drowsiness and negligence redounds upon Father Ballerini rather than upon the Salmanticenses; in reviewing the cited texts he appears not only to have dozed but to have slept. Since, therefore, as is evident, no texts are cited in the Note except those of St. Alphonsus and the Salmanticenses, let us inquire concerning these.

St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 857) has these things: It is doubtful whether the betrothals are then dissolved on the part of the guilty party. Dicastillus affirms it, and the Salmanticenses think it probable, because, such an impediment being supposed, matrimony has now been rendered impossible. But Sanchez and Palaus, with Coninck and Guttierez, more commonly and more probably deny it; they say that the obligation of the betrothal is then suspended until the impediment is removed, because it is not equitable that the delinquent should derive advantage from his crime. In these words, as is manifest, the more common opinion of Sanchez with others is opposed by St. Alphonsus to the assertion of Dicastillus. Let us therefore inquire whether the assertion of Dicastillus truly disagrees with the more common opinion of the others there expounded, or whether, as is said in the Note, they can be reconciled; and thence it will be evident whether a discrepancy of this kind must be derived from elsewhere than from opinions of the Doctors not rightly described.

The text of Dicastillus (On the Sacraments, treatise 10, disputation 1, no. 554), cited by the Salmanticenses, has thus: It can be proved by a general reason that neither of them (namely, the contracting parties), once an impediment has been introduced either culpably or inculpably, remains obligated IMMEDIATELY AND PROXIMATELY to matrimony; for no one can be obligated to that which cannot be done. Thus the VV. also report the text of Dicastillus (p. 794).

And here indeed it could be asked how it can be called merely probable that, after a diriment impediment has been introduced, the contracting parties are not proximately and immediately obligated to matrimony, when to contract it is then unlawful for them and, in addition, matrimony entered into with a diriment impediment would now be invalid. Is not a matter of this kind rather evident and clear in itself? Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus, as is evident from his words cited above, writes: Dicastillus affirms it, and the Salmanticenses think it PROBABLE, and adds the same reason as Dicastillus: because, such an impediment being supposed, matrimony has now been rendered impossible. And in fact the Salmanticenses also have it thus, adding the same reason (On Matrimony, chapter 2, no. 70): Dicastillus PROBABLY adds.... And the reason is that no one is bound to that which he cannot do, and, such an impediment being supposed, matrimony has now been rendered impossible on the part of each!

But this being omitted, let us now ask whether anyone rightly opposes Sanchez, Palaus, etc., and the more common opinion to the cited assertion of Dicastillus. For there is reason to doubt, because Sanchez also (book 1, disputation 56, no. 1), to the Question, Are betrothals dissolved because of a supervening impediment of law?, replies no differently from Dicastillus: When the impediment is diriment, ALL ADMIT that the betrothals are dissolved..., because matrimony can no longer subsist between them. Since, therefore, according to Sanchez, all Theologians unanimously profess this doctrine, and indeed for the same reason, that matrimony is then impossible, why is it that St. Alphonsus presents Sanchez, Palaus..., and the more common opinion as opposed to Dicastillus and at the same time to Sanchez and the unanimous opinion of the Doctors? Whence this, unless from the opinion of Dicastillus having been wrongly described or proposed by the Salmanticenses?

But again, Sanchez, although with Dicastillus, indeed with all Theologians, he established that in the case betrothals are dissolved because matrimony has now been rendered impossible, nevertheless (l.c., no. 4) adds the question: Is he through whose fault the diriment impediment is contracted bound to obtain a dispensation in order that he may fulfill the betrothal? And then he resolves this question, establishing when he is to be said to be bound to this and when not. Therefore, unless someone wishes gratuitously to contend that Sanchez speaks contradictory things, it must be concluded that that suspension of the betrothals for which St. Alphonsus, as we saw above, cites Sanchez is in no way repugnant to the general doctrine both of Sanchez, Dicastillus, and all Theologians, namely, that because of the induced diriment impediment the betrothals are dissolved, or, as Dicastillus says, neither contracting party remains immediately and proximately obligated to matrimony. It must therefore be said again that the discrepancy which is imagined between the two doctrines is due solely to an inexact exposition of the opinions.

But neither is this enough. For Dicastillus himself (l.c., no. 555), in support of his opinion which we presented above, cites Sanchez, Guttierez, and, besides others, even Coninck, namely, those whom St. Alphonsus, as we have seen, opposes to him as adversaries. Whence is this, unless from the opinions of the Doctors having been proposed less exactly? For we have already seen that Sanchez agrees with Dicastillus in that general assertion.

But again, Dicastillus (l.c., no. 556) adds: I said that he does not remain immediately and proximately obligated; for, as regards the obligation of asking for or procuring a dispensation from the impediment, there is controversy among the Authors whether at least he who gave cause to the impediment is bound to ask for and procure the dispensation. He himself also resolves this question by determining when the man is bound to this and when not. Therefore Dicastillus, no differently from Sanchez, so holds that the obligation of betrothal is dissolved by the introduced impediment that, nevertheless, the obligation of procuring a dispensation remains for him who placed the cause of the impediment. But this is what St. Alphonsus, citing Sanchez, calls the obligation of betrothal being suspended. What, then, causes the Holy Doctor to oppose to Dicastillus Sanchez, Palaus, and Coninck, who with the more common opinion say that the obligation of betrothal is suspended, unless the opinions of the Doctors are not presented exactly?

The VV. object (p. 795): Dicastillus derives the obligation of sometimes asking for a dispensation, not from the betrothals, whose obligation he considers entirely extinguished on both sides, but solely from the harm inflicted.

Reply. The VV. do not report the opinion of Dicastillus here with sufficient exactness, or certainly not with sufficient clarity. The words of Dicastillus (l.c., no. 559) are these: He is not bound FORMALLY from the betrothal promise, but from the harm inflicted, or arising from the impediment freely placed. Attention, therefore, must be given to that word, FORMALLY; but Dicastillus himself had already sufficiently explained what a betrothal promise formally imports according to him when he said (ibid., no. 554) that neither remains obligated IMMEDIATELY AND PROXIMATELY to matrimony. And since the terms mediately and remotely correspond on the opposite side to the terms immediately and proximately, by that very fact they do not exclude that someone may remain obligated to matrimony mediately and remotely by force of the promise, that is, to remove (unless something prevents it) the impediment which he freely placed against the matrimony. Therefore, this obligation of asking for a dispensation indeed arises proximately from the harm unjustly inflicted; but why is the harm held to have been inflicted unjustly? Because the harm arises, namely, from the violation of a right acquired by the other through the former promise. Therefore, that promise is ultimately the root of why he is bound to repair the harm and, consequently, unless something prevents it, to procure the dispensation.

Otherwise, do others give a reason for this obligation different from that of Dicastillus? Behold Sanchez giving the same reason (l.c., no. 4) thus: The bridegroom who has unjustly created the impediment is bound in justice to remove the impediment in a manner possible to him. And Palaus (treatise 28, disputation 1, point 26, no. 4): He who voluntarily places an impediment against contracting matrimony violates the right of the other party; therefore he is bound to repair it. But no other mode of reparation is more apt than that he remove the impediment; therefore he is bound to remove it if he can. Indeed, see in Palaus (ibid., no. 5) the opinion of Dicastillus repeated nearly word for word. I reply (he says) that by the law of betrothals no one is obligated to procure a dispensation from a diriment impediment; nevertheless, he is so obligated from the unjust and inequitable placement of the impediment against the other party, for whom a dispensation is not an extraordinary means, but one ordinary and required per se. Therefore, since even those Authors whom St. Alphonsus opposes to Dicastillus give the same reason for the obligation as he does, the VV. here too seek in vain a discrepancy between the opinions of those whom the Holy Doctor presents as disagreeing.

Again the VV. object (p. 795) that Dicastillus, if the harm can be sufficiently compensated in another way, exempts the bridegroom from asking for a dispensation; by this they wish to confirm that Dicastillus derives the obligation of asking for a dispensation solely from the harm inflicted.

Reply. Herincx explains the opinion of Dicastillus better; the VV. themselves (l.c.) report his words thus: It can nevertheless happen that one who deliberately placed an impediment of this kind is obligated to ask for a dispensation or otherwise to repair the harm inflicted upon the bride. See Dicastillus.

Moreover, in order that the reason for this doctrine may be understood, it must be carefully observed that those Authors whom St. Alphonsus adduces for his opinion also do not always and in every case obligate the bridegroom to ask for a dispensation from an impediment introduced by him. Hence, in the texts just cited Sanchez and Palaus add a limitation: the former, in a manner possible to him; the latter, if he can. Hence Sanchez (l.c.) exempts him from an obligation of this kind if (in the absence of some graver reason) the dispensation requires great expense and a long delay; for a promise is understood while things remain in the same state. Indeed, St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 858) writes: Others say more probably that he is indeed bound (to ask for a dispensation), even apart from harm inflicted, if the dispensation could easily be obtained; otherwise, if great expenses and a long delay were required for it, because the obligation arising from the betrothals urges the bridegroom to employ only ordinary and easy means, not difficult and extraordinary ones. Sporer, however, with Tamburini, excepts the case in which harm from the loss of virginity or of reputation must be repaired, as above; because then he would be bound even to expend a great sum, but not so great that he would be compelled to fall from his state.

Again, it must be observed that St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 857), with all Theologians, writes thus concerning the innocent party: If the impediment is diriment, it is certain among all that (the betrothals) are dissolved on the part of the innocent party, so that the latter is not bound to admit the dispensation.

From this, however, another question arises: whether in such a case the injured bride is given the choice that, if she does not wish to use or admit the dispensation, she may choose to be compensated in another way. This question also has its place in the preceding hypothesis, namely, when either the dispensation can in no way be obtained, or at least its procurement would impose upon the bridegroom an inconvenience or harm much graver than that which the bride would suffer from the want of the nuptials. Therefore, there was a proper and grave reason why Dicastillus should treat this further question, concerning which he writes (l.c., no. 561): I do not remember having read anything in the Authors. And since he determines that the bridegroom does not remain exempt from every obligation, both when the dispensation cannot be obtained, when its procurement would impose a graver burden upon him, and when the bride is unwilling to admit the offered dispensation, he consequently concludes with reason (l.c., no. 559) that the aforesaid bridegroom is bound either to ask for a dispensation or otherwise to compensate for the harm.

Dicastillus himself applies this conclusion to a twofold hypothesis, namely: 1. when the harm inflicted is nothing other than the harm of the impediment culpably introduced, and consequently of the promise not faithfully kept, by which he was obligated to fulfill it and therefore not to place an impediment; 2. when the bride suffers some other grave harm in addition.

And concerning the first hypothesis he writes (l.c., no. 561): He will then be bound to compensate or satisfy the bride only to the extent to which, in the judgment of a prudent person,

it was in her interest that the betrothals should have continued in their rigor and should have been fulfilled at the proper time; if this compensation CAN BE MADE APART FROM MATRIMONY, the bridegroom cannot be compelled to matrimony. This conclusion discloses the meaning of the words which thus precede it: Nor is the bridegroom himself bound by the obligation of betrothal..., and therefore he cannot be compelled by it PRECISELY because of that obligation, but he will only be bound to repair the harm inflicted. For the condition is then added, IF the compensation CAN BE MADE APART FROM MATRIMONY. Therefore, the matter is not left to the free choice of the bridegroom, but the question remains to be decided from the general principles commonly handed down concerning restitution for harm inflicted.

Concerning the other hypothesis, however, Dicastillus holds (l.c., no. 562): If the bride suffers grave harm which can be repaired in two ways, namely, either by marrying her or by satisfying her in another way, the bridegroom must satisfy her in another way if she so wishes.... Wherefore, if the harm which she would suffer to her own reputation or in contracting another SIMILAR matrimony can be repaired by the bridegroom through the establishment of a fitting dowry, AND SHE HAS CHOSEN THIS, it appears that she can compel the bridegroom to this and reject those nuptials; for it is not equitable that, in order to repair the harm received, she should be compelled to unite herself to and marry the man from whom she received so great a harm of disgrace and infamy, if not now inflicted upon herself (for this is compensated through matrimony), at least upon her sister and family, and by participation also upon herself in her sister.

Therefore the doctrine of Dicastillus is by no means singular or repugnant to the common doctrine of the others. But if other authors in this place scarcely, or scarcely at all, touch upon this latter question, namely, concerning satisfaction or reparation of harm to be made otherwise when the dispensation from the impediment appears to be set aside, either because a burden graver than is equitable would thus be imposed upon the bridegroom, or because the bride has just cause for refusing the dispensation and the nuptials, and they leave the solution of this question to be sought from the general principles handed down in the Treatise on Restitution, this by no means brings about a discrepancy or disagreement among the Doctors.

Moreover, the merely apparent discrepancy among the Doctors, concerning which the Note speaks, does not concern merely the opinion of Dicastillus. But since the VV. raised difficulties concerning this one point alone, we too refrain from speaking of the others.

² St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 865) explains this rule, thus divided into two parts: For supervening causes, that one suffices which, if it had been foreseen, would have prevented the betrothals from being contracted.... But for prior yet unknown causes, that one suffices which, if it supervened, would already suffice for rescinding the betrothals, or even one which would have deterred from contracting if it had previously been known. And indeed, according to Sanchez (On Matrimony, book 1, disputation 62, no. 6), Pirhing (book 4, title 1, no. 63), and Schmalzgrueber (same title, no. 188), one who asserts that he would not have contracted betrothals if such a circumstance had existed from the beginning or had been known must be believed not only in the forum of conscience but also in the external forum, if, in the judgment of prudent persons and after the circumstances have been considered, it appears likely that he would by no means have made the promise had he forethought that cause. The reason is that things which consist in the mind, such as ignorance, knowledge, intention, etc., since they cannot become known to men, cannot be proved by witnesses, and therefore one must stand by each person's oath if nothing to the contrary can be proved from elsewhere.

731. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is the arrival of a rich inheritance to the bridegroom a sufficient cause for dissolving betrothals?

Reply. It is disputed ³. Some deny it, because absolutely nothing on the part of the bride has changed. Others, however, affirm it, because between the two betrothed persons there no longer exists the same condition of things; and if the bridegroom had foreseen this change of fortune, he would in no way have wished to contract with such a person. This opinion St. Ligorius, no. 876, appears sufficiently to approve.

³ Since this opinion is sufficiently probable, as even those who prefer the opposite opinion concede, the Confessor therefore cannot obligate the man to matrimony. It seems that it must be attributed to a typographical error that in St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 876) the first opinion is called the most common, since several can be adduced also for the second.

** These four lines furnished the VV. an argument for writing eight columns (pp. 798-800)! Behold their first objection (pp. 799-800): Even if the affirmative opinion, that the betrothals can be dissolved, is truly probable, nevertheless, if a cause of this kind were treated in the external forum, could the judge pronounce in favor of the bridegroom, who has a doubtful right? The Holy Doctor, book 1, no. 47, writes: The judge is bound to judge according to the more probable opinion.... Therefore, if the judge cannot pronounce judgment in favor of the bridegroom, how could the Confessor do so in the internal forum? Is he not himself also a judge?

Reply. St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 604) had already replied to this difficulty. For he writes thus: You will say: A judge of the external forum ought to judge according to the more probable opinion of one party, although the other party has a probable opinion in his favor; therefore the Confessor cannot absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion against his own more probable opinion. Is this not the objection of the VV.? The Holy Doctor then continues: Reply. The reasoning of the external and sacramental forum is far different; for in the external forum, since the truth of the matter is treated, namely, whether the field belongs to one party or the other, the judge, who is bound to render to each his right, ought indeed to adjudge the thing to the one who has the more probable right, and certainly cannot adjudge it to the other, who has the less probable opinion in his favor; for the probability of the latter cannot make the thing not more probably belong to him who has the more probable right, and consequently the judge would act unjustly if he did not adjudge the thing to him. But the Confessor, WHENEVER HIS OPINION IS NOT EVIDENTLY CERTAIN, cannot obligate the penitent to follow it; hence he then not only can, but is bound to absolve him, PERMITTING HIM TO FOLLOW HIS OWN OPINION. Therefore, if the Confessor must permit the penitent to follow a probable opinion, even according to St. Alphonsus in the present case he cannot (as is said in the Note) obligate him to matrimony.

The VV. press the point by asking: Is not he (the Confessor) also a judge? Behold the reply of St. Alphonsus (l.c.) to a question of this kind: Reply. The Confessor is not the judge of the opinions which the penitent is bound to follow, but only of the disposition of his penitent.... As regards other opinions which concern the obligation of the penitent, namely, those things which the penitent must do or avoid, the Confessor is not a judge, nor can he obligate a penitent who wishes to follow the contrary opinion to follow his own.... Hence, when... the Confessor does not have evident certainty of the falsity of that (opinion), he can, indeed is bound, to permit the penitent to follow his own opinion..., because the Confessor is not the judge of controversies. Therefore, since the Confessor is bound to permit the penitent to follow a probable opinion in things to be done or avoided, and since it is probable that in the present case the bridegroom can withdraw from the betrothals, it is manifest, also from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, that the Confessor cannot obligate the penitent to matrimony.

2. The VV. object (p. 800): From a special Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, all Confessors in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance can safely follow all the opinions of St. Alphonsus without having to weigh the grounds and reasons upon which the various opinions rest. Therefore, this opinion (namely, what is said in the Note, that the Confessor cannot in the case obligate the man to matrimony) must be altogether rejected; for by force of the cited Declaration the Confessor can follow the opposite opinion of St. Alphonsus, who holds that the bridegroom

cannot in the case withdraw from the betrothals and therefore can be obligated to matrimony.

Reply. St. Alphonsus, as is evident from the words cited above, expressly affirms that the Confessor is bound to permit the penitent to follow his own opinion. Therefore, according to St. Alphonsus, in the present case the Confessor cannot obligate the man to matrimony. How, then, because of the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, will the Confessor be able with St. Alphonsus to obligate him to matrimony, if according to St. Alphonsus himself he is bound not to obligate him?

Again, the Sacred Penitentiary adds in the Declaration itself: Without, however, those being considered reprehensible who follow opinions handed down by other approved Authors. Therefore, from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, one may follow approved Authors who teach that in the present case the bridegroom is not obligated to matrimony. And if this is permitted by the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, how do the VV. contend that this opinion must be altogether rejected by force of this Declaration? Moreover, when the Confessor knows that the penitent may licitly use an opinion which exempts him from an obligation, according to the opinion of all, including St. Alphonsus, he cannot impose the obligation. Therefore, even according to the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, the Confessor cannot in the present case obligate the man to matrimony. Again, therefore, one may ask: how, by force of the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, as the VV. contend, can the Confessor in the present case obligate the man to matrimony with St. Alphonsus?

Therefore, in order to avoid consequences of this kind which conflict with one another, one must keep wholly before one's eyes those things which are learnedly noted concerning these judgments of the Apostolic Penitentiary in the Acts Extracted from Those Things Which Are Done at the Holy See, etc., volume 1, appendix 17, pp. 497-501. Some appear to attribute to this judgment of the Holy See (thus there, p. 498) much more than the judgment itself bears. For they appear to think that the Holy See judged all the opinions of St. Alphonsus to be true, or they even appear to infer from the judgment of the Holy See that anyone acts prudently if he accommodates himself to any opinion of St. Alphonsus whatsoever, even if he knows, whether from his own knowledge or from competent authority, that the opinion which he follows is evidently false.

The learned Author of the Appendix then speaks thus concerning these things (p. 500): This judgment in no way concerns opinions which enjoy some probability and which are disputed, or can be disputed, among the Doctors. Hence he infers: What can be inferred from this judgment of the Holy See is this, namely, that every Catholic WHO IS UNABLE TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE TRUTH OF THE OPINIONS can prudently follow that master and doctor who wrote nothing worthy of that censure which would have stood in the way of the Acts of Canonization. And below (p. 501): From the response by which St. Alphonsus was declared to be one of the approved Authors, whose opinions one who follows acts SAFELY, one would not rightly infer from the particle SAFELY expressed in the proposed doubt that all the opinions and judgments of the Holy Prelate were declared true; this is recognized from the other part of the Response, according to which those who follow opinions handed down by other approved Authors are not to be reprehended. For no one is ignorant that Authors approved in the Church and received by usage sometimes hand down diverse and contrary opinions, which, since they enjoy probability, no one who follows them is worthy of reproach.

And below: The Response of the Sacred Penitentiary does not rest upon a principle of knowledge, as though whatever St. Alphonsus taught were true; but it rests upon other extrinsic prudential reasons, because of which one who follows his opinions acts prudently, and therefore safely. These reasons are those which we indicated shortly above and which are substituted in the absence of knowledge; namely, anyone acts prudently, and therefore safely, if he makes his own a doctrine received by usage in the Church which a learned and prudent man, especially if he is recent and resplendent in sanctity, has taught. But since this principle of prudence

is substituted for the absence of knowledge, it must be said to admit an exception whenever it is evidently established for us that some opinion of the author whom we follow is false and enjoys no probability.

Therefore, to conclude: since it is a common principle, and one also handed down as certain by the Holy Doctor Alphonsus, that a Confessor cannot impose an obligation upon a penitent when, according to the opinion of approved Doctors, it is probable that such an obligation does not exist; and since in the present case it is probable that the bridegroom is not obligated to matrimony; it plainly follows that the opinion of St. Alphonsus, where he denies that the bridegroom can withdraw in the present case, is indeed among those opinions which one who follows in the absence of knowledge and relying merely upon the aforesaid judgment of prudence cannot be reproached for following; but by no means can it be inferred from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary that this opinion can safely be employed in practice by a Confessor endowed with some knowledge who sufficiently recognizes those two premises, namely, both that it is probable that the bridegroom can in the case withdraw from the betrothals, and that the Confessor cannot licitly impose an obligation when it is probable that the obligation does not exist.

3. But the VV. (p. 799) appear also to have wished to cast doubt upon whether it is truly probable that the bridegroom can withdraw in the present case. For they write: From the foregoing it is evident that this probability rests upon only a weaker foundation.

Reply. If by this obscure phrase the VV. wish merely to signify that, in their judgment, this opinion possesses less probability than the opposite, which they consider more probable, someone will reply: Let the Antecedent pass; and I deny the Consequent. For even lesser probability (as St. Alphonsus says) serves to show... that the law in that case, since it is doubtful, does not bind. (See several texts of the Holy Doctor Alphonsus on this matter in volume 1, pp. 60 and 65.) It therefore remains that in the present case the Confessor cannot obligate the bridegroom to matrimony.

But if by that phrase they wish to infer that the probability of this opinion is doubtful, I indeed do not see what they have brought forward in the foregoing (as they say) from which this is evident. And first, among the foregoing things I find no reason adduced by them for the thesis of St. Alphonsus, just as the Holy Doctor (book 6, no. 876) had adduced no reason. Did they themselves perhaps perceive that the reasons which patrons of that opinion are accustomed to advance are such that it is especially useful for their cause to suppress them altogether in silence? They indeed employed in what followed those two reasons related above, the one drawn from the office of the Confessor as judge, the other from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary. But we have already sufficiently seen whether these have any force.

4. Therefore, in the foregoing the VV. merely heap up many names of Authors; by this heap they endeavor at the same time to prove that St. Alphonsus rightly called his opinion the most common. Nevertheless, let that now have force which they themselves observe (p. 798), that Authors are to be weighed rather than counted; and we shall add that weighing must also, and indeed especially, be employed concerning the arguments which perhaps are adduced by them for the thesis.

This opinion (says Diana, volume 2, treatise 6, resolution 18, no. 3) previously had Sanchez alone as its author. But I ask: what reason did Sanchez (book 1, disputation 39, no. 7) adduce? Because, he says, the other has not been rendered of a worse condition, just as if I promised to sell a horse at a price which was then just, the greatly increased value at the time of delivery will cause no difficulty. But this reasoning is neither always firm, nor does the alleged parity have any force. First, the reasoning is not generally firm, because if, for example, the bridegroom should afterward lose his office or for some other cause become unequal to bearing the burdens of matrimony, he can withdraw from the betrothals even though the condition of the bride has not been made worse. A promise of matrimony, says Palaus (On Betrothals, disputation 1, point 28, no. 3), is implicitly made under that state of riches; hence, if he falls from it, the obligation

ceases. Second, the alleged parity has no force and, moreover, labors under an equivocation. For those words of Sanchez, If I promised to sell, signify either a mere promise to sell or a completed sale. If it was a mere promise to sell, even at some fixed price, it is denied that the promisor is bound to that price if the prior state of things is changed into another far different one; for, as the same Sanchez says (ibid., no. 4), a promise is understood while things remain in the same state. Accordingly, if that promise, for example, concerned grapes to be sold at a fixed price at a time when the vineyards promised a most abundant vintage, and hail afterward dreadfully devastated all the vineyards of the province, surely the promisor would not be bound to sell the grapes at that price. But if the discussion concerns a sale and not merely a promise to sell, the parity, as is evident, must altogether be denied; for the conditions inherent in a contract of promise cannot be transferred to a contract of sale. Do the other Authors, then, adduce any arguments besides these petty reasons of Sanchez, which are truly of no weight?

5. But let us consider further what can be concluded from the heap of names which the VV., as we have said, collected.

Sporer, as the VV. (p. 799) acknowledge, repeats in as many words (On Matrimony, no. 282) what Tamburini (book 8, chapter 5, section 8, no. 15) had copied literally from Gobat (treatise 10, no. 340), namely: Concerning these opinions, let one wiser than I interpose his judgment. Therefore, if the judgment of these three is considered, the Confessor cannot obligate the man to matrimony, for they leave the obligation uncertain. But an uncertain obligation is not an obligation and cannot be prescribed by the Confessor as a true obligation. Therefore. And here one is moved to ask: why do the VV. (p. 798) reckon Sporer among those who with St. Alphonsus deny that the bridegroom can withdraw?

6. The VV. mention (p. 799) how Sporer (l.c.) reports, while Ferraris (entry Betrothals, no. 117) praises, the distinction of Martin Perez, who says (Ferraris says) that one can withdraw if, in entering the betrothals, he had regard to the equality of riches or goods (read better, honors); and, on the contrary, that he cannot withdraw if he contracted without regard to the aforesaid because of another cause which persists, for example, because of special beauty. Therefore Ferraris, however less exactly he may report the opinion of Perez, nevertheless denies that the bridegroom is bound to matrimony unless perhaps he contracted the betrothals merely because of the beauty of the bride. Moreover, by this very thing he overthrows both the thesis and the petty reasons of Sanchez. Why, therefore, do the VV. (p. 798) number him also among those who defend the doctrine of Sanchez and St. Alphonsus?

I said that Ferraris reports the opinion of Perez less exactly. For the latter (On Betrothals, disputation 9, section 11, nos. 10-11) has it thus: Sanchez... and others hold that a very rich man is bound to stand by the betrothals, because he himself has not been rendered of a worse condition, nor is he said to have been deceived concerning the condition of the bride or to have erred concerning the condition of the bride, but concerning his own condition, toward which consent is not directed. Thus Perez, who in these words actually proposes all the petty reasons of this opinion. He then continues thus: I prove the opposite more with Hurtado, because that change thus made is notably graver, so that if it had been foreseen at the time of the betrothals by him who became richer, he would not have contracted them; this is the principal and efficacious reason for which betrothals can be dissolved in the other aforesaid cases. Since Perez therefore manifestly departs from the opinion of Sanchez, why do the VV. (p. 798) sell this man also as a patron of that same opinion of Sanchez?

Perez then resolves the petty reasons of the opposite opinion thus (ibid., no. 11): To the opposite argument I say that the other has been rendered of a worse condition as related to the present state of this one, just as if the latter had ascended to a higher grade of dignity, that of Count, Marquis, or Duke. Oberrauch (treatise 20, no. 2373) expresses this reply more clearly thus: I judge that it pertains here

(namely, that the betrothals can be dissolved) if the condition of one party is greatly increased by nobility or wealth; for the other party is rendered much worse, not indeed in herself, but with respect to the fortunate bridegroom, and the matter is brought to that case in which the betrothals would never have been entered. Does not that petty reason, that the bride was not rendered of an inferior condition, fall by these words?

Behold, finally, the words of Perez (l.c.) from which Ferraris and Sporer argued that Perez speaks with a distinction: I understand the aforesaid doctrine morally and regularly speaking; for if someone had contracted betrothals ON ACCOUNT OF NOBILITY OR BEAUTY ALONE, a vast abundance of riches would not make their fulfillment notably graver for him after he had become richer, nor would it, had it existed from the beginning, have deterred him from the betrothals in that event. Perez therefore merely excepts the case in which a foreseen increase of fortune would not have deterred one from contracting those betrothals. But this exception of a singular case can in no way be drawn into a general rule.

7. But let us return to the names heaped up by the VV. in favor of the opinion of St. Alphonsus. Therefore, besides Sporer, Ferraris, and Perez, vainly cited by them, there occur there the names of Struggl, Leonardelli, Schmalzgrueber, and the Salmanticenses. Moreover, the VV. themselves (p. 799) acknowledge that these authors, either in express words or equivalently, also admit the opposite opinion as probable. But if this is so, these authors can certainly be cited effectively for denying the obligation, but by no means for urging the obligation in practice. And the reason is manifest, because, from the principle so greatly inculcated by the Holy Doctor Alphonsus, the probability of the negative opinion suffices for denying the obligation, while the probability of the affirmative opinion does not suffice for producing an obligation, which is none if it is uncertain. Therefore these too must be said to stand rather against the conclusion of St. Alphonsus. Why, then, do the VV. thrust in those authors also, from whom the opposite is concluded, in order to increase the number of names?

8. The VV. add (l.c.) that the opinion rejected by the Holy Doctor is also held probable by Concina. Therefore, even according to Concina, otherwise a rigorist, the bridegroom cannot be obligated to matrimony by the Confessor, although St. Alphonsus cites him on his own behalf.

And the VV. would surely have deserved more abundant praise for fidelity if they had added that Escobar also, whom the Holy Doctor adduces for himself, called the opposite opinion probable. Therefore, he too could deservedly have seemed fit to be deleted from that catalogue of names, since he already overthrows the conclusion of the Holy Doctor.

But, further, the same fidelity demanded of the VV. that, since they were expounding the state of the question solely by the support of authority, they should not have suppressed in silence that Leander also (treatise 9, disputation 2, question 47), in the Salmanticenses (treatise 9, chapter 2, no. 77), called the negative opinion probable. With Leander could be associated Giribaldi (treatise 10, chapter 2, no. 78), Voit (volume 2, no. 1166), Croix (book 6, part 3, no. 173), and Maschat (book 4, title 1, no. 29), who report the same opinion in such a way that they at least by no means reject it.

To these must be added Baumgartner, who writes (book 4, title 1, conclusion 14): Whether one party can withdraw if, for example, he has become notably richer from an unexpected inheritance, the Authors dispute probably on both sides.

Likewise Scarpazza (Decisions of Cases of Conscience, Betrothals, case 14, volume 9, p. 50): Between the two opposite opinions, the one affirmative and the other negative, it appears to me that, speaking generally, the negative should be preferred as more probable. By these words he surely admits both to be probable.

9. Therefore we now have eighteen Authors from whose suffrage the Confessor cannot obligate the bridegroom to matrimony. But others must be added to these; for, as Voit says (l.c.), many hold that a party who has become notably richer or more noble can licitly withdraw from the other party, who is now unequal.

Therefore, to indicate some who have come to our attention, besides Ochagavia and Trullench, whom all, and even St. Alphonsus, cite for this opinion, and besides Oberrauch, related above, already in Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, no. 192) Schmier and Wes hold this opinion.

Likewise Anthony of St. Joseph (treatise 34, no. 42) teaches that betrothals can be dissolved if one of the betrothed, together with riches, should unexpectedly be elevated to a higher state or rank.

To this pertains what Wagemann has thus (part 3, treatise 3, no. 123): Between the two opinions I use a distinction: if the riches and nobility should introduce an enormous disparity between the betrothed persons, they dissolve the betrothals; otherwise not. Hence all the petty reasons are exploded which, after Sanchez, are customarily brought forward to the contrary.

And Viva (On Matrimony, question 2, article 6, no. 2): If very great riches should come to one party after the betrothals, I also judge with Hurtado, against Sanchez and Bonacina, that he can likewise withdraw; since this is a notable change, which, had it been foreseen, would have prevented him from consenting, even though it be true that he was not deceived concerning the condition of the other party. These last words set forth the petty reason employed by most of the adversaries.

And in fact Hurtado speaks thus (disputation 2, On Matrimony, disputation 14, no. 25): We consider the opinion of Sanchez and Coninck difficult, because the aforesaid change is so notable that of itself it renders fulfillment notably burdensome after the bridegroom has become richer, and, had it existed from the beginning, it would also have deterred a prudent man from the betrothals.

To these must be added Babenstuber, who writes thus concerning this controversy (treatise 8, part 7, disputation 1, article 4, no. 37): The affirmative opinion (that the bridegroom can withdraw from the betrothals) pleases me, which Illsung and the great Schmier hold.... The reason is that, in the judgment of prudent persons, the bridegroom not only could but also would have provided for himself a far more excellent matrimony if he had foreseen this change of his state. Although the bride... is not made worse, nevertheless she is rendered of a notably inferior condition, and consequently worse; by which the argument for the opposite is resolved.

And on the same matter Illsung, cited by Babenstuber, reasons well thus (treatise 6, disputation 9, question 1, no. 29): A contract so difficult, namely, of entering a matrimony which can never again be dissolved, according to the common rule reported in Palaus, by its nature excepts all notably prejudicial changes upon knowledge of which the betrothals would not have been contracted. Hence Amicus, disputation 32, from no. 66, also infers that not only is a right of renouncing the betrothals given from a supervening... deterioration of the other contracting party, but by equal reasoning he can withdraw to whom, from supervening nobility or great riches, for example, a rich inheritance, a notably better state has come, so that, in the judgment of prudent persons, he would be considered able and willing to enter a far more excellent matrimony if he had foreseen that state; and thus the other contracting party, through the elevation of the one, is rendered notably inferior and comparatively worse.

Dicastillus also touches this question excellently thus (treatise 10, disputation 1, no. 599): This doctrine (of Sanchez, Reginald, etc.) appears to me not a little difficult. For that change on the part of him who has become rich appears sufficient to render the contract of matrimony far more difficult on his part; because by the very fact that he has greatly increased in riches, the considerable proportion between the two contracting parties, who previously contracted with each other after account had been taken of the goods and condition of each, is removed. But by the very fact that there is so great an excess on the part of one, the proportion which was previously considered is removed; and therefore, although no change has been made on the part of the other, the alteration of the goods on the part of one suffices for that notable excess

to introduce a change of proportion; if he who became rich had known this, he would not at the beginning have contracted with a woman whose dowry is not proportionate to him. From this doctrine the foundation of the opposite opinion collapses, and she is of a worse condition, not by a change of herself, but of the other. Hurtado also approves this, and Perez after him.

No less clear are the things by which Francis Amicus (On Matrimony, disputation 32, section 11, nos. 66-67) confirms the same doctrine. When things have been notably changed, the betrothed persons are not bound to fulfill the betrothals; nor understand this only of a change of the other betrothed person for the worse, but also of one's own change to a notably better condition: both because the Doctors pronounce it without limitation, and although they give examples concerning a change of the other to a worse state, they do so because this is regular and examples are customarily given only concerning cases which regularly occur; and because that same notable change for the better on the part of one places the other in a state of notably worse condition with respect to the former, for the more the state of one is elevated, the more the state of the other is comparatively lowered in relation to him; for these things are correlative, one of which is varied without a change of itself through the change of the other alone; and from that common rule: Whenever some new cause emerges after betrothals have been contracted which, if it had been present from the beginning, would have prevented the betrothals from being contracted, it furnishes a just occasion for dissolving the betrothals. But who will deny that if from the beginning there had been so great an abundance of riches that through it his state would have been elevated so notably that he could have entered another far more noble marriage, he would not have contracted these betrothals which he in fact contracted? Finally, if the bridegroom or bride were asked what he or she would have done in that case, who will deny that the answer would be that he or she would have contracted other betrothals than those in fact contracted, by which his or her state would have been elevated? But Sanchez says, disputation 62, no. 6, that a bridegroom or bride asserting that he or she would by no means have promised if such a cause had been present from the beginning must be believed in both forums if, in the judgment of a prudent person and after the circumstances have been weighed, it is likely that the person would not have promised. The reason: since in this contract, which is special above the rest, regard is had not so much to the utility of the contracting parties as to the indissoluble union of their minds, any cause whatsoever which can notably change the minds of the contracting parties in regard to contracting matrimony suffices for dissolving the betrothals, lest the matrimony have an unhappy outcome.

10. Let the conclusion therefore be this: even if the matter is to be decided by considering only the weight of authority, nevertheless, since we have nearly thirty Authors from whose suffrage the obligation of standing by the betrothals must be called uncertain, and since it is a certain principle to be held by all that an obligation cannot be imposed by a Confessor where it is uncertain, it is manifest that in the present case the Confessor cannot obligate the man to matrimony.

But this is much more evident if the intrinsic reasons are weighed. For Amicus spoke most truly in the text cited, that IT IS A COMMON RULE: whenever some new cause emerges which, if it had been present from the beginning, would have prevented the betrothals from being contracted, it furnishes a just occasion for dissolving the betrothals.

Let Laymann be heard in place of all (book 5, treatise 10, part 1, chapter 2, no. 18): Betrothals are dissolved if a notable change occurs, or if some grave thing supervenes which, had it existed from the beginning, would deservedly have deterred one from the contract of betrothal, as Abbas, Angelus, Sylvester, Navarrus, etc., commonly teach, and as is gathered from chapter Quemadmodum, On Oaths. The reason is that the intention of the one promising is not presumed to have extended itself to such a very difficult case, which would have deterred any prudent man from a promise of matrimony. Moreover, to know whether the intention of the one promising, at least virtually, extended itself to such a case or not, the bridegroom must be examined,

for example, whether, if at the time when he had promised the bride someone had proposed to him: But what if such a thing should afterward happen? he would have replied that it was not his mind to extend his obligation to this case. His assertion must be believed even in the external forum, especially if sworn, if, after the circumstances and the principal nature of the thing promised have been considered, probable credibility can be given to him, as Navarrus, Sanchez, etc., teach. What force, then, can the petty reasons of the opposite opinion now have against this principle received by all, which are ultimately reduced to these: 1. that the bride has not been rendered of a worse condition; 2. that the bridegroom was not deceived concerning the condition of the bride in giving consent?

11. Finally, I shall not omit that it is by no means certain concerning the opinion of the Holy Doctor Alphonsus whether in fact he fully adhered to that opinion which denies that the betrothals can be dissolved in the present case. Indeed, he calls this opinion the most common; in what sense this can be accepted may be gathered from the foregoing; nevertheless, he in fact interposes no judgment of his own.

Moreover, he himself also adopts the common rule which we have stated thus (Apostolic Man, treatise 18, chapter 1, no. 19): In order to judge what cause avails to dissolve betrothals, these two rules must be considered. The first is that, for causes supervening upon the betrothals, that one suffices which, if it had been foreseen, would certainly have prevented them from being contracted; hence the party immune from such a defect then remains free, who is presumed always to have contracted under the condition that there should not be such a change of things which, had it been foreseen, would have removed that party from contracting. The second rule is this, etc.

On the other hand, the Holy Doctor does not appear to have attributed very much to the reasons customarily brought forward for that opinion which he called the most common. He himself (l.c.) sets forth the question thus: It is asked whether, when a rich inheritance supervenes to either of the betrothed persons, that person can withdraw from the betrothals. Hurtado, Trullench, Leander, etc., affirm it, saying that then the condition of the betrothed persons is notably changed. But others most commonly... deny it, because that person is then not deceived concerning the condition of the other party, in which no change has occurred.

What he himself thinks concerning this argument is gathered without difficulty from the special question which he adds. For he writes (both l.c. and book 3, no. 876): According to this opinion Croix says that if someone contracted with one woman and afterward a marriage with another richer woman is offered to him, he cannot leave the first, because no change has then been made in her. But what does the Holy Doctor say to these things? Behold his judgment: If the quality of the second bride were exceedingly better, I would not dare altogether to condemn the bridegroom if he wished to contract with her. But (I say) this man was not deceived concerning the condition of the first bride, nor did any change occur in her; and this is the very argument which the Holy Doctor himself reports for the most common opinion, as he says. Therefore the Holy Doctor manifestly sets little value upon this argument.

And the things which the Holy Doctor soon adds thus confirm this: For although in this case the state of the bride, or of the betrothals, is not changed, nevertheless, as the Doctors commonly say, betrothals do not bind unless things remain in the same state; hence, just as the bridegroom would not be bound to fulfill them with great harm to himself, so it could appear to someone that he is not bound with the loss of great gain; for such a loss is equated with grave harm from the sole law, Code, On a Judgment Rendered for Him, etc., according to what was said in book 3, no. 301. In these words you may see that argument rejected for the same reason used by the Authors whom we have seen not acquiescing in that opinion.

But it is also plainly worthy of notice that by this judgment the Holy Doctor shows not only that the reason upon which the opinion of Sanchez rests appeared plainly weak to him, but he also overthrows another argument by which others endeavored to confirm the same opinion. There were some, namely, who, in order to prove that someone cannot withdraw from betrothals even if a notable change of status has supervened for him, draw an argument from the fact that someone cannot do so in the hypothesis of a far richer marriage offered to him. And indeed Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, no. 192), against those asserting that betrothals can be dissolved if unexpected riches, nobility, dignity, etc., should supervene to one party, urges this reason also: because otherwise, whenever richer betrothals were offered, less rich betrothals could be dissolved, which must not be said. Likewise Catalani (part 3, question 10, chapter 7, no. 14): Otherwise, when richer betrothals were obtained, a broad faculty of withdrawing from less rich ones already celebrated would be given, which is absurd. And, to omit others, Reiffenstuel also (Canon Law, book 4, title 1, no. 262) reasons in the same manner thus: Nor is a suddenly supervening fortune an obstacle; both because otherwise someone could also dissolve betrothals because another far more beautiful or richer woman wished to marry him, which is against the most common opinion of the Doctors. Therefore St. Alphonsus, when he says concerning this hypothesis, I would not dare to condemn the bridegroom, etc., already destroys this argument of theirs also. Moreover, since an argument of this kind appears to be drawn a fortiori rather than from parity, because he who does not yet have a better state and seeks it by breaking the betrothals appears altogether to have less cause for withdrawing from the prior betrothals than one who, through an unexpected fortune acquired, has already attained a far better state and therefore seeks, as by a certain right of his own, betrothals more fitting to himself and his new state, it is now sufficiently evident that the Holy Doctor Alphonsus, who does not dare to condemn a bridegroom because he withdraws from the betrothals if marriage with a richer woman is offered to him, a fortiori does not condemn him who, since he has already changed his state, seeks another matrimony fitting for himself.

And indeed the Holy Doctor (book 6, no. 876) concludes: And thus I find in the Life of St. John of Capistrano that several Theologians thought in a case of this kind (namely, of a richer marriage offered), although St. John himself was of the contrary opinion, from which I truly would not dare to depart nor ever to counsel departure. But here the matter concerns mere counsel; and the Holy Doctor omits these words in his other work (Apostolic Man, l.c.) and merely writes: And thus I find that many Theologians said in the Life of St. John of Capistrano. And let these things suffice concerning this special question; from them the VV. could also gather why Father Gury wrote: St. Alphonsus appears sufficiently to approve this opinion, namely, that betrothals can be dissolved if an unexpected inheritance comes to the bridegroom.

QUESTION 2. Are betrothals dissolved by a vow of chastity or a vow of receiving sacred Orders?

Reply 1. If the vow precedes the betrothals, it is certain that they are invalid. The reason is that the promise of matrimony concerns an illicit thing and therefore does not bind. - Thus commonly.

Reply 2. If the vow follows the betrothals, the betrothals are likewise more probably dissolved. The reason is that the promise of betrothal is always considered to have been made under the tacit condition, unless a better state is chosen. - St. Ligorius, no. 873 ⁴.

⁴ A judge is accustomed to compel one who withdraws from betrothals because of a vow of chastity made either to keep faith with the betrothal or to enter some Religion. For since the internal will of the one vowing is not known to the judge, while the obligation of the betrothal is otherwise certainly known, he does not unjustly require this sign of a more perfect choice, all the more because it can deservedly appear necessary for preventing the frauds of those who, in order to exempt themselves from an inconvenient obligation of betrothal, could easily feign these vows.

732. • QUESTION 3. Is the dissent of parents a sufficient cause for withdrawing from betrothals ⁵?

⁵ Take care not to confuse this question, with some persons (see the Salmanticenses, On Matrimony, chapter 6, no. 19 and following, and St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 849), with the other question whether children who contract without the knowledge of their parents sin. For although children may thus offend their parents more or less gravely according to varying circumstances and according to the varying manner of conducting the matter, nevertheless this of itself does not necessarily infer that the contract is also of such a kind in its substance that the parents can rightly oppose it, and consequently that the promise is invalid. And indeed, in general it must be determined with the common opinion that for the validity of betrothals not only the consent, but not even the knowledge, of the parents is necessary per se.

Reply. No, if the parents dissent unjustly, because the right of the children would be injured ⁶. But it is otherwise if the dissent of the parents is just, for example, if the other party is not fitting for the family by reason of condition, honor, etc. - St. Ligorius, no. 877.

⁶ Sometimes, however, even the unjust dissent of the parents can furnish a sufficient cause for withdrawing from the betrothals, not because the child then sins by not obeying the unjust will of the parents, but because this dissent for many causes can carry with it such grave consequences, inconveniences, and troubles that they deservedly excuse from fulfilling the obligation.

QUESTION 4. Is a party laboring under a hidden defect bound to disclose it before the betrothals, or, after they have been contracted, before matrimony?

Reply 1. Yes, if that defect would be pernicious or injurious to the other party; for example, if the girl is pregnant, if the bridegroom labors under venereal disease, or is burdened by debt, etc. The reason is that, just as one sins against justice who sells harmful goods to one who believes that he is buying good goods, so a fortiori does one who wishes to contract matrimony with a pernicious defect. Therefore, if he is unwilling to disclose the defect, he must abstain from contracting. - St. Ligorius, no. 864.

Reply 2. No, however, if the defect does not render the nuptials harmful but only less desirable; for example, if a girl who is believed to be a virgin has been corrupted. The reason is that it has been received by custom that no one is bound to manifest defects of this kind to the other party. Furthermore, no one is bound to manifest his own defect with his own infamy when the defect does not injure a grave right of the other. - St. Ligorius, ibid., and others commonly.

733. • QUESTION 5. Are betrothals dissolved by a subsequent matrimony, so that when the matrimony has been dissolved they do not revive?

Reply. No, with the more common opinion. - St. Ligorius, no. 875. The reason is that it is proved by no law that betrothals are altogether dissolved by a subsequent matrimony; hence only the obligation of the betrothals appears to be suspended during such matrimony, as happens in one who contracts matrimony with a vow of chastity. Several nevertheless contradict this, relying upon reasons not to be despised ⁷. Moreover, in practice the bridegroom unjustly deserted will rarely seek such an unfaithful person, nor could a happy outcome of a matrimony of this kind be expected.

⁷ In this question both Theologians and Canonists, even of great name, both older and more recent, disagree; and each party, as is easily understood, holds its own opinion and calls it more probable, while many also concede that the opposite is probable. See Sanchez (book 1, disputation 48, no. 2) and the Salmanticenses (On Matrimony, chapter 2, no. 38). Therefore, the Confessor can neither compel the widower to fulfill that former promise nor prevent the other party from pursuing and urging his or her right before a judge, whose judgment each will be bound to accept.

As regards the force of the reasons, it is easily evident that the example of one contracting with a vow of chastity is not to the point; and, on the contrary, there can be urged the example of one vowing religion or chastity, whom the Doctors so release from the obligation of preceding betrothals that they deny it revives even if the one who vowed afterward obtains a dispensation from the vow, as may be seen in St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 873, at the end). This resolution is altogether consonant with the general principle which Cujacius, with others, derives from law Si stipulantem 83, section 5, Digest, On Verbal Obligations (commentary on this law), namely, that when a thing previously subject to servitude or obligation passes into another state which does not have an excuse from accidental impossibility but by its own nature is repugnant to that obligation or servitude, the latter is not suspended but altogether extinguished. It must be denied (says Cujacius) that the obligation (for example, a usufruct) is extinguished when a ship is taken apart with the intention that it be repaired; it ceases rather than is extinguished, because the same ship can be restored with the same timbers and does not appear to have altogether perished.... If, however, the ship is taken apart with the intention that it be converted to other uses, it appears to have been extinguished; and therefore, even if it is afterward put together from the same timbers, it appears to be another ship, and an obligation once extinguished is not restored.... The obligation from a promise is extinguished in perpetuity when a slave has been manumitted, because he is manumitted with the intention that he be free perpetually.... This is the sum: the obligation is extinguished when the thing is consecrated or made public, or the slave manumitted, or the ship taken apart, provided it was taken apart with the intention that it be converted to other uses. Moreover, the reasoning of matrimony is altogether the same; for the contract is indissoluble by its nature, and through it a spouse hands himself or herself over in perpetuity to the power of the other. Therefore, just as a slave who has obtained liberty is not subjected to an obligation which bound him in servitude (because, for example, he had been promised by his master to someone), even if he falls back into servitude, nor is a ship bound by its former obligation, for example, of usufruct, if it was destroyed with the intention that it not be repaired, even if afterward it happens to be restored per accidens; so too must it be determined concerning the accidental liberty which a spouse acquires through the death of the other spouse.

** The VV. object to two things here (p. 946, note 3). First, against the former part of the Note they write: From the diversity of opinions Father Ballerini infers that there is no obligation by which a widower must return to the prior betrothals. But from the rules of probabilism the contrary conclusion should rather be drawn. For here an obligation was certainly contracted which was only doubtfully extinguished. Therefore it always urges.

Reply. I deny the Minor and the proof added to it. The reason is that, as St. Alphonsus says (book 3, no. 112), here we are not dealing with a doubt but with a probable opinion. Cardinal De Lugo writes aptly concerning that maxim, IN DOUBT THE CONDITION OF THE POSSESSOR IS BETTER (On Justice and Right, disputation 23, no. 110): The Doctors rightly observe that this proceeds when there is a merely negative doubt; for if there were a positive doubt and probable reasons for each side, then the rules which are commonly given concerning a probable conscience would have to be observed, and regularly the debtor can embrace the probable judgment. St. Alphonsus on the same matter (l.c.): When it is probable that... the law has been abrogated, then the presumption in favor of the law ceases and liberty possesses. Therefore, the Consequent also is denied, namely, that the obligation still urges in the present case; for an uncertain obligation, which it is probable does not exist, cannot urge.

The VV. then attack the argument which in the Note is drawn both from the example of vows, either of religion or of chastity, by which betrothals are dissolved in perpetuity, and from the nature of matrimony, which is a contract indissoluble by its nature and through which a spouse hands himself or herself over in perpetuity to the power of the other; and they rejoin: These things do not pertain to the matter. For matrimony is not a bond of itself perpetual, as is a vow of religion or of perpetual chastity, but it is essentially temporal according to that saying of the Apostle: A woman is bound to the law as long as her husband lives.

Reply. The force of the argument does not reside in this, that the bond of matrimony is so perpetual that it cannot cease per accidens, namely, by the death of the other spouse; but in this, that since through a contract indissoluble by its own nature a spouse hands himself or herself over, so far as concerns the spouse, perpetually to the power of the other, from which it is not in the spouse's power to exempt himself or herself, by that very fact the spouse passes into a state which is repugnant, not from accidental impossibility but by its nature, to that obligation and servitude to which the spouse was previously subject. But the Note concludes through the citation of the law, to which the VV. reply nothing, that then the obligation is not merely suspended but altogether extinguished.

For the law cited in the Note speaks thus: I stipulate uselessly for a sacred or religious thing, or a thing left IN PERPETUITY for public uses, such as a forum or basilica, or a free man, although a sacred thing can be made profane, and things left for public uses can revert to private uses, and from a free man a slave can be made. Behold, then, first, in what sense a certain thing is said to be obligated in perpetuity, namely, from the nature of its state, although per accidens it can pass into another state. But from the fact that someone stipulates for it uselessly, this consequence is there deduced: For even when someone has promised to give a profane thing or Stichus, HE IS FREED if, without his act, the thing begins to be sacred or Stichus attains liberty. What force the word is freed has is manifest from the things which follow: Nor are they recalled into obligation if by some law the sacred thing again begins to be profane and Stichus, from being free, is made a slave. But why are they not recalled into obligation unless because the obligation contracted by the former promise had not merely been suspended but altogether extinguished? But why had it been extinguished unless because the thing had passed into that state to which the former servitude or obligation is repugnant, not from accidental impossibility but from its nature? And again, why is this state by its nature repugnant to servitude or an obligation of this kind, unless because, as is premised there, I stipulate uselessly for a thing existing in that state? Cujacius (l.c. in the Note) therefore rightly refers to this that rule: Those things which stood at the beginning are afterward extinguished if they fall into that case from which they could not have begun.

And indeed, the same law most clearly excludes from this the hypothesis of accidental impossibility, because of which an obligation remains suspended but is not extinguished and consequently revives and urges when the ability returns; it rejects this as absurd, namely, as though one and the same cause both freed and obligated, namely, that a thing either cannot be given or can be given.

And from these things a reason is aptly given why a vow either of chastity or of Religion, made after betrothals, so extinguishes the obligation of those betrothals that, although the obligation of the vow afterward ceases through dispensation, the obligation of those betrothals nevertheless does not revive. The reason is that through a vow of this kind the one vowing transfers himself into a state which by its own nature is repugnant to the obligation and servitude of the betrothals. And again, a reason is given why matrimony contracted after a vow of chastity has been made suspends the obligation of that same vow but does not altogether extinguish it. The reason is that the state of matrimony is not so repugnant to the obligation of preserving chastity that it altogether destroys it, although it impedes it to some extent.

From the things said thus far it is also gathered what must be replied to the following words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 875, at the end), which the VV. object: Only the condition of the subsequent bond must be considered (says the Holy Doctor): if it is perpetual, the first obligation is certainly extinguished; but if it is temporal, the first obligation is suspended until it can be fulfilled when the bond ceases, just as if someone sold a horse to one person and afterward sold and delivered it to another, in the event that the horse returned into his ownership, he would certainly be bound to deliver it to the first buyer, as is gathered from law 15, Code, On Vindication of a Thing. We shall add this one thing here: from the cited law of the Code it is indeed gathered that the horse remains the property of him who through delivery

possesses the horse; but it is by no means gathered that the horse must be delivered to the first buyer if it falls back into the ownership of the seller, for not even a word concerning this is found in that text. Behold the words of the cited law (Code, book 3, title 32, law 15): Whenever an estate is lawfully sold in its entirety to two persons, it is manifest law that he to whom it was first delivered is stronger in retaining ownership. Therefore, if you prove before the Governor of the Province that at an earlier time you bought the possession and paid the price, he will not permit you to be expelled from the possession on the pretext that the instruments were not given. It will indeed be within your choice to recover the price which you gave, with interest, yet so that account be taken of fruits received and expenses; since even if each of you claims ownership of the thing by reason of donation, it is fitting that he to whom sole possession was first delivered be held the stronger.

QUESTION 6. Can the bridegroom withdraw if the bride was forcibly violated after the betrothals?

Reply. Yes, with the common opinion. The reason is that the bride, through such oppression, although without her fault, is rendered notably less worthy; hence the condition of things is notably changed ⁸. - St. Ligorius, no. 861, etc. - The same must be said even if she was deflowered by force before the betrothals and only afterward was that defect discovered. - Thus commonly. - See Cases, no. 859.

⁸ A fortiori, this must be said concerning the fornication of the bride, whether it preceded the betrothals or followed them; in the latter case the bride sins doubly, namely, by the added injustice by which she so corrupts a thing promised to another that she unjustly compels the bridegroom either to omit the matrimony promised to him or to receive a notably corrupted thing. But, from the common opinion, it must be determined otherwise concerning the fornication of the bridegroom. For although this, if it follows the betrothals, furnishes a just cause for the bride to withdraw, it does not do so if it preceded them. The reason is that through this the bridegroom is not rendered notably less worthy in the common estimation, nor is the bride affected by any grave stain because she marries him. Except, with the Doctors (see St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 861): 1. if the fornication was frequent, so that the bride deservedly doubts the inclination of the bridegroom toward other women and his future inconstancy in preserving the fidelity of the marriage bed; 2. if the bridegroom has begotten offspring from the preceding fornication, for this also is deservedly accustomed to be both a disgrace and a grief to the bride; 3. some also except the case in which the bride, who is a virgin of great honor, would never have consented if she had known the bridegroom to be a fornicator. In this case the Confessor appears unable to obligate her, if she refuses, to the nuptials. See Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, no. 176).

838. 1° Mutual consent of the betrothed; for in contracts which depend on the will alone, the rule of law is applied: by whatever causes a thing is born, by the same it is also dissolved. This is true also of espousals confirmed by an oath; for the oath which is annexed to them is emitted under this tacit condition: unless it is remitted by the other party. Yet the consent ought to be free, just as the espousal consent itself, and therefore extorted neither by deceit, nor by force, nor by fear.

If espousals were entered before puberty, they are prohibited from being dissolved before the years of puberty, lest they be contracted and dissolved rashly; but as soon as either betrothed person has attained puberty, he or she can withdraw from the espousals, without waiting for the other, because a contract entered in tender age lacks firmness. But if within three days after attaining puberty and knowledge of the aforesaid privilege, the betrothed person does not declare before a judge or witnesses that he or she rejects the contract, by that very fact he or she is judged to ratify the same.

839. 2° Violation of espousal fidelity through subsequent fornication, or a grave immodest act by which either betrothed person has become more vile in common estimation; then the innocent party, but not the other, can withdraw from the espousals. The reason is that fidelity is broken without penalty toward the same one who breaks fidelity.

Hence if the betrothed woman fornicates with another man, the betrothed man is no longer bound, for a double reason: because the betrothed woman broke fidelity, and has become notably more vile. Say the same if she has freely suffered herself to be touched shamefully by another man, at least frequently. - If the betrothed man fornicates, the betrothed woman is free to pass to other vows; but if he has committed immodest touches with a third person, only rarely and occasionally, the espousals are not dissolved, because from this he has not become much more vile in common estimation; otherwise, if frequently, so that it can deservedly be feared that he will violate conjugal fidelity. - If each fornicates, according to some, the espousal obligation remains, because a mutual compensation of the delict is had; according to others, the espousals are dissolved for each party; finally, according to a few, the betrothed man is freed from obligation, but not the betrothed woman, because the sin of the betrothed woman is more shameful than that of the betrothed man, and her condition has become more vile. - Therefore, as concerns practice, in these various cases the espousal obligation cannot be urged.

Spiritual fornication also is equated with carnal sin, namely apostasy and heresy, which suffice for freeing the innocent person from the obligation undertaken.

840. 3° The choice of a more perfect state, namely the reception of sacred order, religious profession even without a solemn vow, indeed very probably a simple vow of perpetual chastity in the world. For espousals are entered under the tacit condition "unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state." Yet the case is excepted in which the betrothed man had intercourse with the betrothed woman under a formal promise of nuptials, or inflicted on her damage which can be repaired only by marriage.

(a) As soon as one party has manifested the purpose of entering religion, or sacred orders, or a seminary so as to prepare himself for sacred orders, the other party can pass to other vows. If the former changes his mind and does not enter religion or orders, more probably his obligation, which was only suspended, now revives, provided that the latter has not contracted new espousals;¹ probably, however, this obligation does not urge, because it was extinguished by the sincere intention of choosing a more perfect state; hence if he had deceitfully affected this intention, he would not be freed from the obligation. - Certainly, however, one is freed who, having undertaken a more perfect state, has been legitimately dispensed from it.²

¹ Thus the Salmanticenses, cap. II, n. 21; St. Alphonsus, n. 870; Gasparri, n. 92, etc.

² Thus Bonacina, quest. I, punct. 5, n. 2; Ballerini P., n. 186, ed. 3.

(b) Although a vow of perpetual chastity emitted in the world more probably dissolves espousals in the internal forum, the ecclesiastical judge deservedly is accustomed to compel the one vowing to keep espousal fidelity, or to enter some religion; otherwise someone could easily feign a vow of chastity in order to exempt himself from the obligation undertaken.

841. 4° A notable change supervening, or antecedent though not known.

(A) The general principle is that espousals are dissolved by that change which, if known from the beginning, would have prohibited them; or which would render the marriage unhappy. The reason is that those entering espousals are judged to contract under the clause: things remaining in the same state; otherwise marriage would beget displeasure and would obtain unhappy effects.³

³ St. Thomas, Sentent. IV, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

(B) But this notable change can occur in goods of the body, of fortune, of the soul, or in external circumstances.

(a) In goods of the body, for example if a permanent chronic disease supervenes upon either party, as syphilis, paralysis, blindness; or a grave mutilation or deformity (especially in the betrothed woman); or if the betrothed woman, even unwillingly, has suffered intercourse, because from this she has become more vile.

(b) In goods of fortune: if each has become poorer, so that they cannot sustain the burdens of marriage; if only one has become much poorer, whether because he or she lost part of the goods or disinheritance is seriously feared, the other party can withdraw. But if each has become richer, the espousals are not dissolved. If one unexpectedly has become much richer, of itself the contract subsists; nevertheless if because of this other nuptials, much more opulent, offer themselves, it is probable that the party made richer is not held to stand by the espousals with the loss of a great gain; therefore in practice the obligation is not to be urged.

(c) In goods of the soul, if either party becomes prone to drunkenness, gambling, pleasure, impiety; or has committed an infamous crime, as homicide, grave theft, etc.

(d) In external circumstances, if enmities have arisen between the families; or if parents obstinately oppose the marriage; or if discord of minds exists between the parties; or if one party transfers domicile to a distant region, without the knowledge or against the will of the other party, and there is no hope that he or she will return shortly.

842. 5° Impossibility of entering marriage, namely when an impediment supervenes, whether diriment or impeding: for no one is held to the impossible.

(a) Marriage validly, although illicitly, contracted with a third person certainly frees the innocent party from every obligation. But it is disputed whether, as regards the other party, the espousals are dissolved or only suspended. St. Alphonsus (n. 875) holds as more probable that the espousals are only suspended; for he who contracts marriage does not become absolutely unable to fulfill the promise, but only for a time; hence, when the spouse has died, the obligation revives, if the innocent party is still free. Yet not a few probably judge the obligation to be wholly extinguished, since the marriage entered is of itself a permanent impediment lest the first promise be fulfilled. - Hence in practice the confessor cannot compel the widower or widow to stand by the promises, nor prohibit the other party from pursuing his or her right before an ecclesiastical judge.¹

¹ Thus Gury-Ballerini, n. 733, note (b).

(b) When an impediment supervenes without the fault of either party, the espousals are dissolved for each party, unless the betrothed man had inflicted on the other party damage which cannot be repaired except by marriage: for then he would be held to seek a dispensation from the impediment. - If the impediment is culpable on the part of each, the espousals are dissolved, and neither is held to ask for or accept a dispensation. - But if the impediment arises from the fault of only one, the innocent party indeed is freed from the obligation, but not the other, lest he or she derive advantage from his or her own iniquity; hence this party is held to seek a dispensation, if the other insists upon his or her right.

843. Corollary. On the obligation of manifesting defects which can stand in the way of marriage. (a) Defects which would render marriage invalid must be manifested to the other party, unless they are such that they can be corrected before the nuptials; otherwise injury would be done both to the sacrament and to the other party. Thus it is if someone labors under an indispensable diriment impediment, or under a defect the absence of which the other party exacts as a condition without which not, for example if the betrothed man expressly said: I contract with you, if you are a virgin, or the first-born of Peter.

(b) Likewise an occult defect must be manifested, if it suffices for dissolving espousals, or is such that it renders marriage harmful or disgraceful; for example an incurable contagious disease; pregnancy of the betrothed woman; defamation which, although now occult, shortly will become public. Say the same very probably, if it is prudently feared that, when the defect is detected, grave enmities and perpetual quarrels will arise, for example if the betrothed woman a little before had intercourse with another, although she is not pregnant. The reason is that he sins against justice who, by voluntary deception, inflicts grave damage on another.

(c) But if the defect does not render the nuptials harmful, but only less desirable (for example if the betrothed woman is falsely thought rich, noble, a virgin), it is not necessary to manifest it, because no one is held to defame himself or herself and deprive himself or herself of hope of marrying, when by silence he or she does not inflict grave damage on another.

844. 6° Dispensation granted by the Supreme Pontiff. If espousals are valid, and not dissolved by any of the causes mentioned above, the Roman Pontiff can dispense from the obligation of contracting marriage for a just cause, namely if, after all things have been diligently weighed, greater goods are expected from dispensation than from the fulfillment of the promise. This he can do as interpreter of divine law, insofar as the public good demands that an obligation not be urged which would obtain unhappy outcomes; nevertheless he is not accustomed to do this except after admonitions and threats that the espousal obligation be fulfilled, and when a grave cause urges, for example when a civil marriage has been contracted with a third person and the first betrothed woman does not wish to renounce her right.

But the Bishop does not enjoy this faculty, but only can judge whether the espousals are valid or not, whether there is a just cause of dissolving them or not.

A matrimonial engagement may be justly cancelled for valid personal reasons, for instance, (a) if one of the parties absents himself from the other for a long time without giving notice; (b) if the moral character of one of the parties has considerably deteriorated, e. g., if the man has become a spendthrift or a roué, or has to face an accusation in a criminal court; (c) if a notable physical or mental change has taken place in either or both of the parties, such as mental derangement; (d) if a change of fortune or social condition has occurred on one side. This would be a reason for breaking the engagement by either, but an indemnity should be paid where an engagement is broken on account of an unexpected social or financial rise. Finally, (e) family reasons may render the dissolution of an engagement advisable, e. g., if serious enmity, hatred, dissension, or aversion are apt to result from the contemplated marriage, or there is strong parental opposition and danger of being disinherited.⁶

⁶ Ibid., pp. 48 sq.

Justice obliges each party to a marriage engagement to acquaint the other with any defects which would probably prove very injurious in case the marriage took place, for instance, pregnancy, contagious disease, etc.⁷

⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

He who breaks a marriage engagement contracted in canonical form, or conceals a valid reason militating against the marriage, or creates such through his own fault, is bound to repair the injury thereby inflicted upon the innocent party.

Full reparation of such an injury comprises both positive and negative indemnification. The former consists in paying the expenses incurred in preparing for the contemplated marriage, the latter in repairing any damage arising to the woman, e. g., because of pregnancy or inability to find another husband. If the bride withdraws from the engagement, it is ordinarily sufficient that the groom be indemnified for any positive losses he may have sustained, because a man can nearly always find another partner. If the groom withdraws, he will in many cases be able to make full reparation of the damage done to the bride by bestowing a dowry upon her.⁸

⁸ H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, p. 606.

Even when there is no canonically binding engagement, the betrayed party has a claim to indemnification for the damage sustained. If the woman has been seduced to a gross sin of unchastity under promise of marriage, and was not able to perceive the fraudulent character of the promise, the seducer is in justice bound to marry her, and if he cannot do so, must repair the damage in such a way that she can marry another.⁹ wholly grave reasons against the marriage are present. . . . But other reparation is not thereby excluded merely because the obligation or ability to enter marriage is absent.”

⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 46, art. 2, ad 4.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 642 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 119 sqq.).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 700: “If, however, the girl had become pregnant through fornication, the seducer should be pressed to marry her, unless too great a disparity between the condition of the two intervened or some other very grave disadvantage stood in the way.”—Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 997: “If a girl has been induced to sin under a promise of marriage, whether genuine or feigned, the very common doctrine holds that the young man is obliged to marry the girl, not only when she has become pregnant, but even if she has not conceived; otherwise there is an unjust deception, which is repaired only by entering into marriage. Yet this obligation ceases if

Many causes are assigned on account of which betrothals can be licitly dissolved. They are reduced to the following, which are the principal ones.

717. 1. Mutual consent.⁴⁵⁸

The reason is that betrothals are a voluntary contract, which unlike the matrimonial contract was not instituted directly by God and which a fortiori is not a sacrament. But every voluntary contract can be dissolved by the free consent of the contracting parties. This dissolution or consent, however, ought truly to be free, and therefore not extorted by fraud, force, or fear. - Even if the betrothals were confirmed by an oath, nevertheless they can be licitly dissolved by mutual consent. For that oath is considered something accessory to the betrothals. But the accessory dies with the principal.

⁴⁵⁸ C. 2, X 4, 1.

718. 2. A notable change supervening upon the betrothals.

It matters little whether this change has its origin after the betrothals or is then first discovered by one of the contracting parties. That change is considered notable which would have deterred one from entering into the betrothals if it had been known beforehand.⁴⁵⁹ A change of this kind can occur:

a) in goods of the body, for example, if either contracting party falls into a grave disease whose cure cannot be foreseen, or if that party becomes blind, mute, deaf, and so forth;⁴⁶⁰

b) in goods of fortune, for example, if either party has lost a great part of his or her fortune. It is disputed whether betrothals can also be licitly dissolved if great riches supervene to the other party, or if a much richer marriage is offered. All teach that dissolution for this reason is almost always unbecoming, but St. Alphonsus,⁴⁶¹ Lehmkuhl,⁴⁶² Tanquerey,⁴⁶³ and several others think that the obligation of the betrothals is not to be urged. The reason is twofold, namely: a) if the other contracting party had foreseen this change, he or she would never have contracted the betrothals; b) if that party were now compelled unwillingly to enter matrimony, a bad outcome would be feared.

c) in goods of the soul, for example, if the betrothed man becomes a heretic, if he is discovered to be a drunkard, a spendthrift, contaminated by evil morals, and so forth;

d) in external circumstances, for example, if one party has committed a crime which now becomes public, if that party is cast into prison, or if great enmities have arisen between the families of the betrothed man and woman. The disagreement of the parents can be reduced to this cause. The reverence owed to parents requires that children seek their counsel and consent before they embrace some state of life. If the petition was reasonable, the parents cannot licitly deny consent, because children are free in the choice of a state. When children have contracted betrothals without the knowledge of their parents, and the latter, now knowing the truth of the matter, show themselves gravely unwilling, for example, because the matrimony would tend to the disgrace of the family, all the circumstances are to be diligently considered. If, after all the circumstances have been weighed, the parents are reasonably unwilling, the betrothals can certainly be rescinded, because the rule already adduced above then holds: if the betrothed man or woman had foreseen such disagreement, he or she would not have contracted the betrothals. But if the parents are unreasonably unwilling, it is not lawful by one's own authority to rescind the betrothals when the consort resists; it is lawful, however, to seek a dispensation if grave inconveniences are feared from the subsequent matrimony.

⁴⁵⁹ Cf. Reiffenstuel, Ius can., tit. 1, l. 4, n. 255 ff.

⁴⁶⁰ C. 3, X 4, 8.

⁴⁶¹ Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 876.

⁴⁶² Theol. mor. II, n. 888.

⁴⁶³ De sacr., n. 841.

719. 3. Violation of betrothal fidelity.

a) Through fornication and other gravely immodest acts committed with another person. The reason is that by these acts either betrothed party is rendered notably less worthy and has gravely violated betrothal fidelity. But if the betrothed woman was oppressed by force, fault is indeed absent, but she has truly been rendered less worthy in body, and therefore several theologians do not oblige the betrothed man under grave sin to marry the deflowered woman, although they admonish him not to add affliction to the afflicted woman.⁴⁶⁴ But if each betrothed party has fornicated, the mutual obligation of the betrothals remains, at least speaking per se; for there is a mutual compensation of the offense. In practice, however, it is almost always expedient that such betrothals be dissolved, since a matrimony between unfaithful betrothed persons of this kind will scarcely be happy; indeed, quarrels and adulteries are likely to follow.

b) Through matrimony with another person. Although a matrimony which someone has contracted with another person notwithstanding prior legitimate betrothals is valid, nevertheless it is gravely illicit, as is self-evident. The betrothed man or woman who has been abandoned immediately acquires liberty according to the old adage: "Let faith be broken in return with one who breaks faith." Some writers indeed teach that through the subsequent valid matrimony the unfaithful party does not acquire liberty, and therefore, if that matrimony is dissolved by dispensation or the death of the consort, is bound again by the prior betrothals.⁴⁶⁵ And in truth it cannot be proved from either positive or natural law that valid betrothals are dissolved through a subsequent other matrimony illicitly contracted. Hence, at least theoretically, it is truer that through the subsequent matrimony the prior betrothals are indeed suspended, but revive when the obstructing matrimony has been dissolved. In practice, however, the obligation of reassuming the prior betrothals is not to be urged excessively, since several probably teach that betrothals through a subsequent matrimony are not only suspended but also extinguished.⁴⁶⁶ - With all writers consenting, the matter is otherwise if one party, having left the other, begins a courtship, attempts other betrothals, or attempts only a civil matrimony. For this infidelity does not dissolve the betrothals on the part of the one leaving, but only on the part of the one abandoned, who therefore can either freely withdraw or induce the unfaithful party to return.

c) Through an undue delay of matrimony or through the departure of one betrothed party to distant lands without sufficient reason. For in the betrothal contract there is understood the condition of celebrating matrimony at a time not so remote. But if an urgent cause for deferring the celebration of matrimony or migrating to distant regions is present, it is not lawful on this account to dissolve the betrothals. It is expedient, however, that then by mutual consent either the matrimony be deferred or the betrothals be dissolved.

⁴⁶⁴ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 862.

⁴⁶⁵ St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 875; Aertnys, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 437.

⁴⁶⁶ Thus Lehmkuhl, loc. cit., n. 853, and especially Ballerini in the notes to Gury II, n. 733.

720. 4. The choice of a more perfect state.

A state more perfect than matrimony is certainly the religious state, and indeed not only religious life in the strict sense, that is, with solemn vows, but also that of any religious congregation (provided, however, that it is legitimately approved). It is certain that betrothals are dissolved by solemn profession; for since by this profession even ratified matrimony itself is dissolved, as was proved above from the Council of Trent, a fortiori betrothals are dissolved. Theologians most commonly teach that betrothals are also dissolved by vows emitted in other legitimately approved congregations, because in the betrothal contract there is understood the tacit condition: "unless I choose a more perfect state."⁴⁶⁷ Now the state in these congregations is also more perfect than the matrimonial state. Likewise, the clerical state is more perfect. Therefore betrothals are also dissolved through the reception of orders, or even through entrance into a seminary with the sincere will of receiving clerical orders.

There are writers who teach that even the state of virginity confirmed by a private vow of perpetual chastity dissolves betrothals entered into. St. Thomas⁴⁶⁸ is cited for this opinion, saying: "On account of a simple vow, betrothals are to be broken"; but the mind of the Angelic Doctor is not so clearly known from this text, since certain commentators think (and indeed not without foundation) that he speaks only of a vow which preceded the betrothals. - For the opposite opinion, St. Alphonsus⁴⁶⁹ cites St. Antoninus, Laymann, Holzmann, Sanchez, Sporer, and others. But St. Alphonsus himself calls each opinion probable. Billuart⁴⁷⁰ says hesitantly: "Although I incline somewhat to the second [that is, that betrothals are licitly dissolved through a simple vow], I would not wish to define which is true." In practice several circumstances are to be attended to, namely, what is the primary intention of the one vowing, how great are the damages arising for the other party from the dissolution of the betrothals, whether these damages can be sufficiently compensated, and so forth.

It is to be noted that the party who is left, as soon as the other party enters a religious order or seminary, obtains liberty and therefore can enter into other betrothals; on the contrary, the party leaving remains bound until he or she has truly emitted profession or received orders. Hence more probably that party's obligation will revive if he or she has again left the religious order or seminary, at least if the more perfect state was embraced fraudulently for the purpose of freeing himself or herself from the obligation of betrothal. But if that party has been legitimately and without fraud dispensed from a more perfect state seriously undertaken, the obligation probably does not revive.⁴⁷¹ - Moreover, if from the dissolution of betrothals for the sake of embracing a more perfect state notable damage arises for the abandoned party, natural law itself requires that this damage be repaired.

⁴⁶⁷ Cf. Billuart, De matrim., diss. 2, a. 5; Tanquerey, De sacr., n. 840.

⁴⁶⁸ Suppl., q. 53, a. 1, ad 1.

⁴⁶⁹ Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 873.

⁴⁷⁰ Loc. cit., at the end.

⁴⁷¹ Tanquerey, loc. cit.; Cappello, De sacram., n. 118.

721. 5. Pontifical dispensation.

Authors commonly teach that the Supreme Pontiff, but not a bishop (unless he has special delegated faculties), can for a grave cause dissolve valid betrothals, even when either betrothed party is unwilling.⁴⁷² In fact, the Holy See has sometimes exercised this faculty.⁴⁷³ The reason is: a) because the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in ratified matrimony, as was said above, n. 681. Therefore a fortiori he can dispense in betrothals, which do not cause so firm a bond as ratified matrimony; b) because, although from betrothals there arises for each betrothed party a natural right that the other not withdraw from the promise made, nevertheless, on the other hand, the worst effects are accustomed to flow from coerced marriages, both for the contracting parties themselves and for the Church herself. But the Pope has the right of preventing harms to the Church, and therefore by force of the high dominion which he has over all Christians, he can limit the right of some individual person. For example, Peter contracted valid betrothals with Bertha, whom he abandoned. Under a promise of matrimony he renders Caia pregnant, whom he now wishes to marry and with whom he has already contracted a civil matrimony. Bertha opposes this matrimony with all her strength; but Peter with all his strength refuses to leave Caia and marry Bertha. If the Church in this case did not dispense in the prior betrothals and did not permit matrimony between Peter and Caia, concubinage would be present with great scandal of the people and the spiritual ruin of Peter and Caia, without Bertha's cause being changed thereby even in the least for the better. - Sometimes the Church, in dissolving valid betrothals, imposes an indemnification to be paid by the party withdrawing unjustly;⁴⁷⁴ but sometimes it leaves the judgment concerning the payment of this indemnification to the civil tribunal. For an action for the reparation of damages which arise from the dissolution of betrothals belongs to the mixed forum.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷² Cf. Aertnys, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 442; Tanquerey, loc. cit., n. 844.

⁴⁷³ Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, July 25, 1896 (Analecta eccl. IV [1896], 294).

⁴⁷⁴ Caus. Ravennat., December 15, 1900 (Analecta eccl. IX [1901], 102).

⁴⁷⁵ Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Council, July 25, 1896; cf. Pontifical Commission, June 2-3, 1918, dub. IV.

722. Scholion. On the private or authoritative dissolution of betrothals. Since according to ecclesiastical law betrothals are no longer valid unless they are public, that is, confirmed by witnesses and set down in writing, hence the dissolution of betrothals will hereafter be more difficult and much rarer, since the betrothal contract can no longer be entered into so precipitously and rashly as formerly not rarely happened. But whether the dissolution of betrothals can be made by one's own authority, or whether an authentic dissolution is required, is not so certain. Nothing concerning this matter has thus far been determined by the Roman Curia. Knecht⁴⁷⁶ confidently affirms that a private dissolution suffices and calls this opinion certain. Whatever may be said of this opinion, an authentic dissolution seems to be required at least in the following cases, namely: a) if it has thus been established by the particular law of some diocese; b) if the existence and sufficiency of the cause of dissolution is seriously doubted, for it is not lawful by private authority to violate the certain right of another with a doubtfully sufficient motive; c) if scandal arises from the private dissolution of the betrothals. - Even in the case of a private dissolution of betrothals, the dissolution is to be announced to the witnesses before whom they were contracted.

⁴⁷⁶ Die neuen eherechtl. Dekrete, § 53. Cappello, De sacram., n. 136, speaks in almost the same manner.

1956. Betrothals, which consist in a contract soluble by its nature, are dissolved not only by the death of the other party, as matrimony is, but by various other causes.

Principles. I. Betrothals are dissolved among the pubescent BY MUTUAL CONSENT. - For with no law standing in the way, the parties can mutually remit to each other the reciprocal obligation by which they are held. But the same consent which was required for contracting is required for dissolving: namely voluntary and free consent, such that it is extorted neither by fraud, nor force, nor fear. If this has been given on both sides, the betrothals are immediately dissolved, although they had been confirmed by oath; and this not only validly, but also licitly, if a reasonable cause is present; otherwise it would be at least venial. Thus commonly.¹³

It is said among the pubescent; for as to impubescents there is present a special disposition of law,¹⁴ by which the dissolution of their betrothals is forbidden before they have arrived at the years of puberty, namely lest on account of unstable judgment, they easily and often rashly contract betrothals, and again dissolve them. But once the age of puberty has been reached, either spouse will be able, without waiting for the other, to recede from the betrothals, provided he protests before a judge or witnesses within three days, which begin not indeed from the time puberty is reached, but from the day when knowledge was obtained of the privilege of receding. But if the spouse dissents already before puberty, and perseveres in the manifested dissent, the betrothals are dissolved as soon as he arrives at the years of puberty.¹⁵

But mutual consent of receding is had: either 1. because a change of wills has intervened; or 2. because the betrothals had been entered under some resolutory condition, which was then verified; or 3. because they had been entered with the condition of contracting matrimony at a determined time, which has now elapsed. - But concerning this last cause of receding, some things are to be NOTED.

A term is added to betrothals either to urge the obligation of contracting matrimony, or to end it. "Then it is added to urge, when the parties therefore set a term, so that neither before it can compel the other to fulfill the contract. But then to end, when the term is added so that, when it has elapsed, no obligation remains."¹⁶ Hence, if the term added for ending the obligation has elapsed by the fault of both or of neither, the betrothals are dissolved on both sides; if by the fault of either, the innocent party remains free; but not the other party, who was in cause why the matrimony was not contracted.¹⁷

1957. II. Betrothals are dissolved BY ELECTION of a more perfect state. The reason is, because betrothals are judged to have been entered under the tacit condition: unless a more perfect state is chosen.¹⁸ Wherefore one party can also choose this without the consent of the other.

But concerning this it must be NOTED: 1. Through religious profession or reception of sacred Order the obligation of betrothals is so totally extinguished that it no longer revives.¹⁹

2. Through entrance into Religion, likewise through a vow, and even through a simple purpose, but duly manifested, of entering Religion or receiving sacred Order, the obligation of betrothals is similarly extinguished, but only for the party dismissed. But for the other party, the obligation remains only suspended, until the more perfect state has been immutably entered. Whence, if he recedes from the purpose, the obligation so revives, that he is bound to stand by the betrothals, if the dismissed party demands this.²⁰

3. Through reception of minor Orders, according to the more common and truer opinion, betrothals are not dissolved; "because in truth the state of minor Orders is not incompossible with matrimony, since someone can well become a married cleric."²¹ Nevertheless, if the reception is made with the will of progressing further, the bride is freed; indeed it can happen that she is freed on account of only the minor Orders received by the bridegroom, namely if she were so averse to matrimony with a cleric that, the change of state having been foreseen, she never would have contracted.

4. Through a vow of chastity made by one party, the other party is released from every obligation; because the one vowing chastity yields his right. But the obligation of the one vowing is not altogether extinguished, but only suspended, as long as he remains bound by his vow. Wherefore, if he afterwards obtains dispensation of the vow, and no other cause of dissolution is present, the betrothals revive.²²

1958. III. Betrothals are dissolved THROUGH ANY IMPEDIMENT WHATEVER by which the promised matrimony is rendered ILLICIT or INVALID.¹

For no obligation to contracting such a matrimony can be given. - Now, besides election of the more perfect state, concerning which we have already treated, FOUR impediments of this sort are commonly enumerated, namely: perpetual impotence, matrimony validly although illicitly contracted, affinity from illicit copulation, and dissent of parents.

1. Through perpetual impotence, which supervenes in either of the spouses, betrothals are altogether dissolved, since the promised matrimony becomes absolutely impossible.

2. Through a valid matrimony contracted by the other party, betrothals are dissolved as to the innocent party. But as to the guilty party, the opinion (St. Alphonsus judging) absolutely more probable teaches that the obligation is not extinguished, if the other party waits; but is only suspended, so that, when the marriage has been dissolved, he is bound to fulfill the prior betrothals. "The reason is, because it is proved by no law that betrothals are altogether irritated through a subsequent marriage: not by positive law, because this is nowhere had; not by natural law, because this only demands that while the marriage endures, the prior obligation does not bind."²

3. Through affinity from illicit copulation (concerning this impediment cf. below n. 2027) betrothals are dissolved on the part of the INNOCENT party, so that he or she is not bound to admit dispensation. But the mere fame of an impediment of this sort suffices, i.e., an opinion among the greater part of the neighborhood. But on the part of the GUILTY party, the more common and more probable opinion holds that the obligation of betrothals is not removed, but only suspended, until the impediment is removed; because it is not equitable that the delinquent derive advantage from his crime. Wherefore, he who placed the impediment is also bound, even setting aside the damage inflicted, to obtain dispensation, if this namely can easily be obtained; "otherwise, if great expenses and long delay would be required for it; because the obligation arising from betrothals presses the spouse to apply only ordinary and easy means, but not difficult and extraordinary means. Except nevertheless, unless damage of defloration or fame had to be repaired; because then he would be bound even to expend a great expense."³

4. Through the dissent of parents betrothals are sometimes dissolved, namely as often as they dissent justly: e.g., because the matrimony would verge to the dishonor of the family, since no one can be obliged to execute an unjust thing. - Indeed, they are dissolved through their unjust dissent, if a grave evil, e.g., disinheritance, were to be feared: "because all betrothals are understood to be contracted under this condition: if such a change does not occur, whence it is grave to contract matrimony. - Except, unless this disinheritance had already been foreseen; because then the one contracting is rightly judged to have yielded to his right."⁴

1959. IV. Betrothals are dissolved on the part of the innocent one, through any act whatever by which the other party is judged to have BROKEN betrothal FIDELITY.⁵ For fidelity must not be kept for one breaking fidelity. - Therefore the innocent party is altogether freed: 1. if the other party contracts new betrothals, although invalid (or civil marriage with another); 2. if he delays the celebration of marriage too much, e.g., for three years, or contrary to the judgment of a prudent man; 3. if he transfers his domicile elsewhere: for such things are opposed to betrothal fidelity.⁶

1960. V. Betrothals are dissolved through a NOTABLE CHANGE which supervenes when they have already been contracted, and which would have deterred from contracting them if it had been foreseen from the beginning. And the same must be said, IF THE STATE OF THINGS is found DIFFERENT from that which had been known. The universal reason is, because, as is handed down in law,⁷ the promise of betrothals is understood to have been made while things remain in the same state; and this, as St. Thomas teaches,⁸ lest conjugal union beget perpetual displeasure between the contracting parties, or obtain an unhappy outcome. But if ignorance of the change or defect was merely concomitant, and therefore not the cause of the contract, the betrothals are not dissolved. - But in doubt whether the defect (if it had been known) would have impeded the betrothals, it is presumed that it would have impeded them, if in reality, i.e., in the judgment of prudent men, it is grave in itself and notable.

Moreover, a notable CHANGE from which betrothals can licitly be dissolved can happen in a THREEFOLD way, namely:

1. In GOODS OF SOUL, e.g., when the spouse is discovered to be a drunkard, gambler, blasphemer, impious, a man harsh and hard in morals or savage; when he has committed an atrocious delict, e.g., homicide, grave theft, has fallen into heresy, etc. For the things which commonly suffice so that a marriage already contracted may be dissolved as to cohabitation, much more suffice so that it not be contracted; "for a guest is cast out more shamefully than he is not admitted."

But concerning supervening FORNICATION, or fornication newly detected, these things are to be noted. - If fornication follows betrothals, it effects two things: it breaks the fidelity given, and renders the party who has polluted himself or herself with it more base; if it preceded the betrothals, it produces only the latter effect. Commonly, this crime affects the bride with much greater baseness than the bridegroom. Wherefore it must be said: 1) on account of ANTECEDENT fornication the bridegroom can dismiss the bride; but not vice versa, unless perhaps the bridegroom has had offspring from another, or unless, on account of the frequency of the crime, he is known to be given over to this vice. - 2) On account of SUBSEQUENT fornication the innocent party (whether the bridegroom or bride) can similarly dismiss the guilty party, on account of betrothal fidelity not preserved. If each, by fornicating, has broken fidelity to the other, there is had compensation of delict, and neither can on that account recede. But the bridegroom (not the bride) can step back by another title, namely from this, that the bride has been rendered notably more base from fornication, and this even if she had been oppressed by force, or induced to consent from most grave fear. Likewise the bride can be dismissed who has permitted herself to be touched immodestly by another; but the bridegroom cannot on account of similar things, unless it can rightly be feared that he will not preserve fidelity to the bride.⁹

2. In GOODS OF BODY, e.g., if grave deformity, blindness, cutting off of a member, habitual and contagious disease supervenes on either party; provided at least a prudent suspicion concerning these is had.

3. In GOODS OF FORTUNE, e.g., if it is discovered that the bride does not have a dowry; if the bridegroom has made a loss of goods, or of the office by which he was sustained; if either tends toward want, or is disinherited by parents: provided at least a prudent suspicion concerning these and similar things is had.

Therefore on account of a notable change of this sort in one party, the other party can recede; but if he does not wish to recede, neither is it licit for the party who has suffered the change to depart, unless perhaps the change would render the burden of matrimony notably more grave.¹⁰

These things concerning a change for the worse. - But if the CHANGE had been made FOR THE BETTER, for example if an abundant inheritance unexpectedly comes to either, the very common opinion teaches that this change precisely in itself is not a sufficient cause why the fortunate party may recede from the betrothals, since that party was not deceived in the condition of the other party. - Nevertheless, if a far better marriage, on account of the change made, is offered, the party who has obtained the change does not seem altogether to be condemned, if, the first betrothals being set aside, he should enter new ones; for just as he would not be bound to stand by the betrothals with great damage to himself, so neither does he seem to be bound with the loss of great gain; for such a loss is equated with grave damage.¹¹

And generally it must be NOTED, that the obligation of betrothals CEASES when there is present a probable fear of an unhappy outcome. If the cause of fearing has arisen by the fault of one party, this party is bound to repair the damage inflicted on the other, e.g., on account of expenses already made.

IT IS ASKED. Whether the party laboring under an OCCULT DEFECT, sufficient for dissolving betrothals, is bound to MANIFEST it before betrothals, or when they have already been contracted, before matrimony?

Resp. Dist. 1. If the defect is pernicious, rendering matrimony odious and damaging to the other, such as a contagious, venereal disease, or infamy from delict, if e.g., the bride is pregnant from intercourse with another, if the bridegroom is burdened by debt: it must altogether be manifested, unless the other party also labors under the same defect. "The reason is, because just as he sins against justice who sells noxious wares to another believing them good, so a fortiori does he who wishes to contract matrimony with a pernicious defect." If therefore he does not wish to manifest the defect, he must abstain from contracting.¹²

2. If the defect does not render the nuptials noxious, but only less desirable, e.g., if the bride is falsely thought to be a virgin, rich, beautiful, it is indeed not licit for the bride to pretend that she is immune from defect, but neither is she bound to manifest it. "The reason is, both because it has already been received by custom, that there is no obligation of manifesting such defects to the other; and because no one is bound to reveal his own defect with his own infamy, if he does not injure the right of another." Thus commonly.¹³

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus adverts that the dissimulation of a defect, although it is not illicit, is not expedient, if it is prudently to be feared that after the marriage has been contracted it may be detected, and become a cause of discords.

1961. VI. Betrothals are dissolved THROUGH PONTIFICAL DISPENSATION. - For although through betrothals a strict right has been made for the other party, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff can, on account of most grave reasons, prejudice this right. - Dispensation is customarily granted through the S. Congregation of the Council, after information has been received from the Ordinary, who, in this matter, from common law, possesses no authority.¹⁴

It must be noted: 1. The faculty of receding, concerning which we spoke, is to be taken in such a way that either spouse is able to renounce this right; wherefore, if the innocent party, having known his right, nonetheless ratifies the betrothals by words or deeds, and especially by carnal copulation, he cannot recede any more, because he is to be judged to have renounced his right. - 2. If the cause of receding is altogether certain, each can recede by his own right; but if a doubt either of law or of fact intervenes, the cause is to be referred to the ecclesiastical judge, i.e., to the Bishop.¹⁵

N. B. Concerning those things which regard the external forum, see the Canonists.¹⁶

1531. - Betrothals, according to the opinion of all, can be dissolved for just causes. But the principal causes are:

1° Mutual consent, freely emitted (without grave fear and deceit [see n. 1528. q. 1°. 2°]) between persons of puberty. I say: between persons of puberty; for the betrothals of those not of puberty, when puberty has been reached and either one only reclaims within three days before a judge or witnesses, are dissolved, namely from the privilege conceded by Law.¹ But that triduum begins to run from the time not now of puberty, but of the acquired knowledge of the privilege.²

2° A supervening impediment, namely a diriment one, and indeed one diriment by divine law, as e.g. a valid Matrimony contracted with another, at least while it lasts. I say: by divine law; for, if the impediment is diriment only by ecclesiastical law, the obligation indeed ceases on the part of the innocent party, even by the mere report of the impediment; nevertheless it does not cease on the part of him who induced the impediment by his own fault, but is only suspended; so that he, even excluding the damage of the innocent party (cf. n. 810), is held, if the injured party still wishes, to seek dispensation of the impediment, if it can be obtained easily and shortly, and once this has been removed, to fulfill the faith given to her.³

3° The choice of a more perfect state, e.g. religious Profession, reception of Sacred Order, a vow of Religion, and, probably, even of chastity or of receiving Orders. But by the mere entrance into Religion before Profession, betrothals, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls the more common and to which he adheres, are dissolved only on the part of the one remaining in the world.⁴

4° A grave crime of the other, e.g. grave theft, homicide, or the like, which begets grave damage or infamy; likewise fornication of the betrothed woman, whether it preceded the betrothals (provided it was then unknown to the betrothed man, or even known, but the report was afterwards spread), or followed them; whether it was voluntary, or (according to the common and truer opinion) involuntary. I said: of the betrothed woman; for fornication of the betrothed man, even after the betrothals, according to the more common and more probable opinion, does not give the betrothed woman a right of withdrawing. The reason of each is that fornication renders the betrothed woman, but not likewise the betrothed man, more base according to the common estimation of men. - What was said concerning the betrothed woman who committed fornication, say the same of her who after the betrothals so conducts herself that she makes doubtful faith concerning her virtue, permitting herself to be touched immodestly by others, or otherwise acting less cautiously. - For the same reason the betrothed woman can withdraw if, after the betrothals have been celebrated, she learns that the betrothed man "has had offspring from another woman, or has frequently fallen" into fornication, "by having intercourse with many"; or even if, after betrothals, kisses or touches have intervened so frequently between the betrothed man and another "that they indicate a mind of the betrothed man very inclined toward the other," and "it can deservedly be feared that he will not keep faith with the betrothed woman."¹

5° A notable change of state, namely a circumstance which, if it had been known or foreseen, would have deterred from the betrothals.² For the external forum this can be determined by the judgment of prudent persons, or, if that cannot be had, by oath.³ But if ignorance did not give cause to the contract, i.e. if the betrothed man would have contracted even if the cause had been known beforehand, it would by no means be lawful to withdraw from the betrothals.⁴

6° An excessive delay of Matrimony. But delay is made either with a time for celebrating Matrimony having been attached to the betrothals, or without such a time having been attached; and, if a time is attached, it is attached either to end the obligation of the betrothals, or only to urge it.

If: a) to end the obligation, once the term has elapsed through the fault of one, certainly the other party is liberated;⁵ indeed, according to the more common and more probable opinion, even if the term has elapsed without fault of the betrothed man, suppose because he was detained by a just impediment. The reason is because the term is attached precisely for this, lest the party prepared remain long without nuptials. I said: the other party is liberated; for, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls by far the more common and, with attention to the intrinsic reason, by far the more probable (although the opposite, as he says, "is not lacking in its probability, especially from the authority of St. Thomas"), the party who culpably placed the delay does not remain free. The reason is because no one ought to derive advantage from his own fault.

If: b) a time has been added to the betrothals only for urging the obligation, once the term has elapsed the betrothals still oblige. But when, in the case of further delay by one party, it is lawful for the other to withdraw, seems to have to be decided especially from the circumstances.

If: c) no time has been established, and the nuptials are delayed excessively, nor can dissolution of the betrothals by mutual counsel be obtained, the cause will better be remitted to the ecclesiastical judge, so that he may establish the things which he judges suitable.⁷

Note. - If the Confessor sees that Matrimony has been deliberately delayed without sufficient cause, let him not importunately exact the fulfillment of the faith given, but sometimes according to the circumstances let him rather advise reparation of damage or a free composition, since an unsuccessful Matrimony is to be feared.¹

7° The departure of the betrothed man to a far country, without the other having been consulted; for he who so departs is judged to yield to his right. But if he has gone to a nearby country, a distinction must be made. For either he has thus gone without the intention of returning, or with it. In the former case, it is to be resolved as concerning him who has gone to a far country; but in the latter, either his return must be awaited for a time to be determined by the judgment of a prudent man (or, if it can be done, of a judge), or he is to be admonished, and a certain time, as above, is to be fixed beforehand, within which he should return, and, once it has elapsed, the betrothed woman is liberated.²

1532. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it a sufficient cause of dissolving betrothals if a rich inheritance comes to the betrothed man?

Resp. Some affirm; others most commonly deny, because the betrothed man has not been deceived in the condition of the betrothed woman, in which no change has occurred. But in the case in which a marriage with another richer woman is afterwards offered to the betrothed man, St. Alphonsus would not dare wholly to condemn the betrothed man, if the quality of the other betrothed woman were exceedingly better; but nevertheless he concludes that he would never dare to advise departing from the contrary opinion.³

Quaer. 2° Are betrothals dissolved by a vow of chastity, or a vow of receiving Sacred Orders?

Resp. 1° If the vow precedes the betrothals, it is certain that they are invalid. The reason is because the promise of Matrimony is concerning an illicit thing, and therefore does not oblige. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If the vow follows, likewise the betrothals are probably dissolved. The reason is because the promise of betrothals is always judged to have been made under the tacit condition, unless a better state is chosen. But certainly they are dissolved on the part of the one not vowing.¹

Quaer. 3° Is dissent of parents a sufficient cause of withdrawing from betrothals?

Resp. Negatively, if the parents dissent unjustly, because the right of the children would be injured. But otherwise, if the dissent of the parents is just, e.g. if the other party does not befit the family by reason of condition, honor, etc.²

For our provinces, nevertheless, Kenrick³ notes the following: "Betrothals are for the most part made without the parents knowing, whose rights, according to our customs, can scarcely be said to be gravely infringed; and therefore those promising are excused from grave sin, although not from every fault, if nothing else occurs that is to be reprehended."

But as regards the dissent of parents on account of disparity of condition, the same author remarks:⁴ "In this region indeed, where no noble stock is acknowledged, all are judged to be of the same grade, although in reality they are very much distinguished among themselves either by birth, or by wealth, or by public office. The diversity of conditions having been neglected, for the most part it will be lawful to fulfill betrothals; for the objections of parents and relatives ought not" (here) "easily to obtain force against a certain right arising from betrothals; nevertheless sometimes they will have to be rescinded."

Quaer. 4° Is a party laboring under an occult defect held to disclose it before betrothals, or, these having been contracted, before Matrimony?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if that defect would be harmful or injurious to the other party, e.g. if the girl is pregnant, if the betrothed man labors under venereal disease, or is burdened with debt, etc. The reason is because, just as he sins against justice who, to one believing himself to be buying good wares, sells harmful ones, so a fortiori does he who with a harmful defect wishes to contract Matrimony. Therefore if he does not wish to disclose the defect, he ought to abstain from contracting. Except, unless the other party labors under the same defect.⁵

Resp. 2° But negatively, if the defect does not render the nuptials harmful, but only less desirable, e.g. if a girl who is thought to be a virgin is corrupted. The reason is because it has been received by custom that no one is held to manifest defects of this kind to the other. Besides, no one is held to manifest his own defect with his own infamy, when the defect does not injure the grave right of the other.¹ Nevertheless the other party, once the defect is known, has the right of withdrawing.²

Quaer. 5° Are betrothals dissolved by a subsequent Matrimony, so that, once the Matrimony is dissolved, they do not revive?

Resp. Negatively, with the opinion which St. Alphonsus thinks absolutely more probable.³ - The reason is because it is proved by no law that betrothals are altogether dissolved by a subsequent Matrimony; whence only the obligation of the betrothals is suspended while such Matrimony lasts, as happens in one who contracts Matrimony with a vow of chastity. Moreover in practice the betrothed person unjustly abandoned will rarely seek such an unfaithful one, nor would a happy outcome of a Matrimony of this kind be hoped for.

Concerning the judge in a cause of betrothals, see L. VI. 878.

834. Dissolution of espousals. - Espousals can be dissolved or dirimently ended from a just cause, because they do not induce an indissoluble bond. Various causes are numbered, some of which absolutely, by full right and by the fact itself, dissolve espousals; others only give the faculty of withdrawing from them, either to one or to both parties. Besides fraud and fear, which can permit rescission for the injured party, all the causes can be reduced to six.

1° Mutual consent freely given, and not extorted by fraud, force, or fear. For since the contract is by its nature soluble, just as it is entered by mutual consent, so also it is dissolved.

To this is reduced the fulfillment of a resolutory condition, if the espousals were entered under it.

2° The breaking of espousal faith by subsequent fornication with a third person, or by attempted espousals, or by courting, matrimony entered, or undue delay of matrimony. For to one breaking faith, faith should be broken to the same.

Thence there belongs to the injured party the right of dissolving the espousals, not to the party breaking faith. Whence during matrimony the obligation arising from espousals is suspended, and when it is dissolved it revives; although in practice it is not to be urged too much. Acts gravely immodest voluntarily admitted or exercised with a third person are equivalent to fornication, if it has frequently happened, so that from this someone becomes gravely suspect of not preserving conjugal fidelity. If fornication has been had by both, the right of dissolving the espousals arises for both, because each becomes suspect.

3° The choice of a more perfect state, because in every promise of matrimony there is implicitly included the condition: unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state, just as each one has the right.

The perfect state is the religious and clerical state, or also, probably, a private vow of perfect chastity or of virginity, provided it is seriously emitted and without deceit or fraud toward the other party or irreparable damage to that party. Espousals are dissolved by religious profession itself or by the reception of sacred Order, which of themselves bring a perpetual impediment; but by entrance into religion or a seminary they are only suspended, so that their obligation revives if the one entering does not persevere and the other party has waited and has not renounced his or her right: yet this party can dissolve the espousals by right.

4° A supervening impediment of matrimony, whether diriment or impeding, because it renders it invalid or at least illicit.

If, however, it was placed by the fault of one, and can be removed by dispensation, it must be removed, if the other party demands it, provided it can be done without a graver inconvenience proportionate to the damage of the other party.

5° A notable change of things which, after espousals have been contracted, supervenes or becomes known, and which, if previously known, would prudently withdraw one from them and impede the contract. For no one is judged to promise beyond his intention; whence in every promise there is implicitly included the condition: things remaining in the same state, or unless a notable change should supervene.

A notable change can be either in goods of the body, such as grave infirmity, incurable disease, great deformity, violation of a betrothed virgin; or in goods of fortune, as a notable loss of goods, defect of dowry, notable elevation to a higher state; or in goods of soul, as heresy, the vice of drunkenness, apostasy, crime, infamy; or in external circumstances, such as grave enmities arising between the families, discord of souls, and whatever renders the union unhappy, departure into a distant region without sufficient reason and without hope of a shorter return.

Hence there is an obligation of manifesting to the other party hidden defects, both those which are substantial or whose absence is intended by the other party as a condition sine qua non, and accidental ones which inflict damage on the other and render the matrimony disgraceful, but not those which only render it less desirable.

6° Pontifical dispensation from a just and urgent cause. For it can dissolve a non-consummated matrimony; a fortiori espousals. Namely, the right arising from espousals is subordinated to the public good of the Church, and therefore can be dissolved for avoiding the greater evils of the Church arising from forced unions.

The Supreme Pontiff alone can dispense, not the bishop; nevertheless the bishop can judge whether there is a sufficient cause for dissolving the espousals.

Moreover, they seem able to be dissolved by private proper authority, if the cause is evident. Yet three cases are excepted: a) if by the particular law of some diocese it is otherwise established; b) if scandal would arise from private dissolution; c) if there is doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, or dispensation is required. Then public ecclesiastical authority should be invoked.

835. Notices. - 1. The new dispositions of canon law do not have retroactive effect, and therefore espousals validly entered before remain valid; but an action is no longer given for them for seeking the celebration of matrimony (com. int., June 2, 1918). Nor is an action given concerning a just cause for dissolving espousals (ibid.).

2. Espousals can be entered under a condition to be expressed in the contract, likewise with the attachment of a conventional penalty to be paid by the party who would unjustly withdraw, and also under earnest-gifts. Earnest-gifts are mutually handed over as a sign of espousals and as a pledge of matrimony to be contracted, under this law, that they can be sought back after matrimony has been contracted, unless there is another custom, and must be restored if the espousals are justly withdrawn from; on the contrary, the one unjustly withdrawing loses what he gave and is bound to return what he received.

Gifts and presents which the betrothed mutually hand over to each other differ from earnest-gifts. If these are of relatively lesser value, they are judged to have been given absolutely; otherwise, if they are of great value, they are regularly to be returned when matrimony does not follow, as having been given under condition and in view of matrimony; but if one unjustly withdraws, they can probably be kept by the faithful other party as compensation for faith not preserved, although this is to be dissuaded.

3. Espousals entered without the knowledge of parents or with parents opposing are regularly illicit, because from piety and reverence children are bound to seek counsel from parents in a matter of such great moment; nevertheless they are not of themselves invalid, because not concerning an illicit thing; - unless, however, the parents are reasonably unwilling toward the matrimony, and the matrimony, all things considered, is illicit: then the espousals are invalid, as concerning an illicit thing, as if the matrimony would be to the disgrace of the family, or scandal or dissensions would arise from it, or it is foreseen that it will be unhappy, yet not on account of mere disparity of condition known to the betrothed.

4. He who without just cause withdraws from espousals, or has concealed or by his own fault brought on the cause for withdrawing from them, is bound to repair the damage which is inflicted on the other party withdrawing: both positive damage from expenses made and debts contracted in view of future matrimony, and privative damage from the fact that the other party can enter matrimony with more difficulty, which easily happens to the betrothed woman and sometimes is not fully compensated unless she is suitably endowed.

5. Practically, concerning visits of the betrothed and courtships of lovers, these pertain more to pastoral theology. Concerning this, see our little work De Variis Poenitentium Categoriis, p. 2, c. 3.

I say. Betrothals, by the opinion of all, can be dissolved on account of just causes. But the principal causes are the following: 1°. mutual consent freely given; 2°. a supervening diriment impediment concerning which a dispensation cannot be given or in fact is never given, for otherwise, even if the innocent party is freed from the obligation of the betrothals, the party who induced the impediment is nevertheless bound to seek the dispensation; 3°. election of a more perfect state, for example, religious profession, reception of sacred Order, a vow of entering Religion, etc.; 4°. grave crime of the other, for example, theft, homicide, fornication, especially if this is done by the woman; 5°. excessive delay of Marriage, especially if the time for contracting was determined: to this cause is added the departure of the betrothed man to a distant land, the betrothed woman not having been consulted; 6°. notable change of state, namely a circumstance which, if it had been known or foreseen, in the judgment of prudent persons would have deterred from the betrothals. Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 846 and following; Kenrick, nn. 17 and following; Baller. note (a), p. 691, and note (a), p. 708; Konings, n. 1531.

You Will Resolve. 1°. According to the common opinion, the betrothed man can withdraw if the betrothed woman has been violated by force after the betrothals. The reason is that the betrothed woman, through such violation, although without her own fault, is rendered notably lower in worth, and therefore the condition of things is notably changed. The same must be said even if she was deflowered by force before the betrothals, and only afterward that defect was detected. - Note, however, that the betrothed woman is not bound to manifest a defect of this kind before the betrothals, nor, once they have been contracted, before Marriage, because it is not substantial; but it would be a substantial defect, and therefore necessarily to be disclosed, if from the defloration she had become pregnant. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 861 and 864.

2°. The dissent of parents is also certainly a sufficient cause of withdrawing from betrothals, if it is just, for example, because the other party does not suit the family by reason of condition, honor, etc. But if it is unjust, then of itself it does not suffice, because otherwise the right of children would be injured. - I said of itself; for since often, even when parents dissent unjustly, great inconveniences would arise if Marriage were made, even unjust dissent could per accidens be a sufficient cause of withdrawing. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 877; Kenrick, nn. 6 and 11.

3°. Probably betrothals are dissolved through subsequent Marriage, so that, once this has been dissolved, or the co-party has died, the betrothed man is not bound to marry her with whom he had first contracted. The reason is that, since Marriage is of itself something stable and affecting the whole life, by this very fact it annuls the preceding obligation made incompossible. Moreover, in practice the party unjustly abandoned will rarely require the unfaithful betrothed man, nor would a happy outcome of Marriage of this kind be hoped for. - Cf. Baller. note (b), p. 705.

4°. The Supreme Pontiff, from a just cause, can dissolve betrothals through dispensation. For he can dissolve the bond of a ratified and non-consummated marriage; therefore also a bond less firm. And in fact he dispenses repeatedly. - Cf. A. S. Sedis, vol. 1, p. 341; vol. 3, p. 461; Wernz, vol. 4, n. 118.

5°. The betrothed man is bound by natural law to manifest to his co-party occult defects injurious to her: such as defects which would render marriage null, a contagious or venereal disease, pregnancy from intercourse with another person, sterility, widowhood, another religion. But he is not likewise bound to disclose lesser defects or those which are not damaging. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 864.

6°. But disease, according as it is in a different degree, will be more or less or perhaps in no way pernicious: thus syphilis has, as it were, different states; and if it would bring grave damages to the betrothed woman herself, the betrothed man would be obliged to manifest his condition to the other. The principles in this question are the following: The Church alone on earth can establish impediments, whether diriment or impeding, of Christian marriage, and when she established these, she consulted excellently both for herself, for her own, and for the human race. Leprosy and any other horrible and contagious infirmity, such as syphilis, epilepsy, which in this matter are equated with leprosy itself, are not impediments. In judging these, one must act according to the norm just brought forward. For either the disease is known to the betrothed parties before the betrothals, or it is not known; whence a known disease which will be injurious to the other is to be manifested to that one by the co-party under grave obligation. If it is known to both, they are not bound to enter the contract, although they can enter it if they wish. The Church does not prohibit it; and therefore, once it has been entered, it must be stood by. If one party did not know, that party can withdraw from the contract. Indeed, if a disease supervenes upon the betrothals, it is licit for each to rescind the pact; or if knowledge of the existence of the disease supervenes for each, the same must be said. And what we say here about disease is to be understood of the personal infirmity of one of the betrothed; for if a disease, say epilepsy, has infected another member of the family, for example, a blood-relative, and the marriageable betrothed woman has remained immune up to this time, it is licit for her to reveal the matter, but she is not bound; indeed it would not even be licit, unless the good name of the infirm blood-relative were preserved. Wernz, vol. 4, n. 254; Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 45, p. 611; Rev. du Clerge Francais, vol. 75, p. 227.

7°. It is evident that wedlock is not of itself to be entered by those who are wholly unfit to bear its burdens, who are so dull in mind or so debilitated in body that they can scarcely beget or conceive, or provide for the education of children. - Cf. DeSmet, p. 418. But here also caution must be used; for if they are not impotent, it is licit for them to contract on account of the imminent danger of incontinence. Likewise it is certain that such persons who long for future nuptials ought to use every aid of medicine to cure the disease; indeed, also to spend so much time on this cure that there is a founded hope that the damage will be much diminished or will disappear entirely; and thus a minimum danger will be created for the co-party.

IX. QUESTION VI. Can betrothals be dissolved by mutual consent? ANSWER. The affirmative opinion is common, when each party freely consents. If one party should extort from the other by guile, fraud, fear, or importunate entreaties a remission of the obligation, it would not remain immune from the contracted obligation. But when the reciprocal consent is sincere and free, betrothals can be dissolved even when confirmed by oath, because that oath follows the nature of the contract. Wherefore, the contract yielding, the oath yields. The under-age cannot dissolve betrothals by mutual consent before they have arrived at the years of puberty. Puberty being acquired, both, or one of them, can protest, and the betrothals are rescinded, although the other party refuse. If, puberty being attained, they have not protested at once, or, as they say, after three days, the betrothals cannot afterwards be dissolved at the protest of one party, but the mutual consent of each party is necessary. If one attains puberty before the other, he can forthwith draw back, the other party's puberty not being awaited. If one of full age contract betrothals with one under age, he cannot recede from the contract; but the under-age party, having attained puberty, can draw back. When the under-age, betrothals being contracted, attain puberty, a new consent is not necessary, but the contract entered upon perseveres, because it was not retracted. A private protest also suffices. If nevertheless the betrothals were contracted before a bishop or parish priest by the under-age, then, for the redeeming of vexation, the protest ought to be made in the exterior forum.

XI. QUESTION VIII. Is it lawful, betrothals having been contracted, to emit a simple vow of chastity? ANSWER. That, this vow being emitted, the betrothals are dissolved in respect of the party which does not vow, is agreed among all, because the one vowing cedes his own right. It is disputed only concerning the vowing party, whether he lawfully vows and becomes free from the burden of the betrothals. The negative opinion, favouring the nuptials, is defended by Lessius, Layman, Castropalao, and Sánchez, who reports several other authors: because, they say, that cannot be promised to God which was owed to man. By force of the betrothals the body was owed to man. Therefore it cannot be promised to God. How robust this reason is, no one does not see.

XIII. A subsequent matrimony dissolves preceding betrothals, as all confess. He nevertheless sins mortally who, betrothals having been entered upon, contracts matrimony with another man or woman. If the matrimony be invalid, the contracting party remains bound, and is held on his own part to fulfil the betrothals; and if he has inflicted loss upon the party, he is bound to repair it.

XIV. A subsequent valid matrimony not only suspends betrothals but dissolves them, so that, the spouse being dead, one is not bound to fulfil the betrothals, as seems to me the more probable. Preceding betrothals are in no way dissolved by later ones, but the later ones are altogether invalid, even if they were confirmed by oath. Always nevertheless the innocent party remains free, so that she can lawfully marry another. What if to the second betrothals carnal copulation should accede, which had not acceded in the first? If the second betrothed woman knew of the prior betrothals, these are not dissolved, because she willed of her own accord to be deceived. If on the contrary she was ignorant of the betrothals, and was in truth deceived under the hope of future matrimony, then that the second betrothals are valid seems to me the more probable, and that this second deflowered virgin would have to be married. Although, as I said above, rare are the virgins who unwilling and deceived are deflowered. And therefore rare is the case in which second betrothals subsist. He who celebrates second betrothals, if the prior ones, which were valid, are on some head rescinded, is not bound to fulfil the second, as being null: because what from the beginning was null does not by the course of time grow valid.

XV. QUESTION IX. Whether betrothals be dissolved either by delay of time, or by the absence of one of the betrothed, or by change of domicile? ANSWER. If the time be predetermined for ending the obligation, the time having elapsed the betrothals can be dissolved by the innocent party, otherwise by the guilty. If the time be indefinite, they are not dissolved by delay of time, unless it be exceedingly excessive, and the other party press. Authors dispute whether one year, or two, or three ought to be reputed a sufficient interval for dissolving betrothals. A certain rule of this dissolution cannot be prescribed. The age, condition, and state of the betrothed, and several other circumstances, are to be regarded.

XVII. QUESTION X. What are the supervening causes which suffice for dissolving betrothals? ANSWER. This is the general rule which is commonly assigned. As often as a grave change, vicissitude, or circumstance emerges which, had it been known or foreseen before the betrothals were contracted, would have been an impediment to the celebration of the contract, it suffices for dissolving the betrothals in respect of the innocent party, who is not the cause. For this condition — if things stand as they now are, unless a notable change happen — is always implanted in the contract of betrothals. Nor hence does it follow that all betrothals are conditioned, but only those to which a condition is appended from the free will of the contracting parties. But the general condition implanted in the contract itself does not hinder the betrothals from being absolute, and from inducing the impediment of public honesty.

XVIII. A notable defect of beauty, with which the betrothed woman was endowed at the time of the contract, and afterwards has been made deformed, is a sufficient cause for dissolving betrothals, because with a notably deformed girl a prudent betrothed man would not have contracted. The crime of heresy, a scandalous deed bearing infamy, grave enmities, quarrels between the betrothed, and the rest which suffice for a separation from bed, much more suffice for dissolving betrothals. Similarly any impediment whatsoever, whether diriment or impedient, which is adverse to the contracting of matrimony, is enough for rescinding betrothals. Similarly grave poverty supervening upon one of the betrothed, who at the time of the contract abounded in riches, is enough for dissolving betrothals. If nevertheless the betrothed woman should have her whole designated dowry, and the betrothed man were rich, although the other goods of the betrothed woman had perished, then it does not seem a sufficient cause for dissolving the betrothals. But if each of the betrothed be made poor, then by a stronger right the betrothals may be dissolved, because the burdens of matrimony could then be more difficultly sustained, teach Pontius, Rebello, Leander, and the Salmanticenses. But this is not absolutely true. When both are poor, the condition of each is equal. Are betrothals not valid among the poor, provided the betrothed be able to earn bread whereby they may feed themselves and their offspring? In practice nevertheless I myself judge that betrothals of this kind ought easily to be dissolved. Because the rich made poor bear poverty too grievously, and are with difficulty induced to labour. And besides, a rich betrothed man made poor perhaps wishes to abstain from matrimony. Wherefore like cases are to be subjected to a prudent parish priest, that, the circumstances being regarded, he may judge what is expedient in the Lord. This is certain, that those sin who contract matrimony unless they probably foresee that they can acquire those things which are necessary for sustaining the burdens of matrimony.

XIX. If one of the betrothed become far richer, the other remaining in the state in which the betrothals were contracted, that the betrothals are not dissolved is to me the more probable. For no deception is then in him who has been made richer. Fornication contracted after betrothals dissolves them, as much in respect of the betrothed man as of the betrothed woman, because each violates the fidelity of the betrothals: although the betrothed woman commits a baser crime, it does not nevertheless take away that the betrothed man's fornication suffices for dissolving the betrothals. If nevertheless the innocent party wish to contract matrimony, the betrothals subsist. When both fornicate, the betrothals can be dissolved, because there is not given a mutual compensation, in that the betrothed woman's fornication is far baser and brings infamy upon the betrothed man. A betrothed woman oppressed by force after betrothals can by right be rejected by the betrothed man, because a grave, nay a most grave, change has happened.

XX. QUESTION XI. What antecedent causes dissolve betrothals? ANSWER. There are several, which, if they be unknown to the contracting parties, can dissolve betrothals, otherwise if they were known to them. 1. If a noble and rich man promise to a poor and ignoble girl, thinking her to be rich, noble, and so forth. 2. Preceding fornication of the betrothed woman, as soon as it becomes known to the betrothed man, dissolves the betrothals. On the contrary the occult fornication of the betrothed man inflicts no infamy upon the betrothed woman, and therefore here does not absolutely dissolve them. 3. An accidental cause unknown, which gave cause to the contract, affords a right to the innocent party that he may be able to draw back from the contract. 4. An ignoble betrothed woman is reputed noble, a poor one is believed rich, a deformed one beautiful, a corrupt one is reckoned a virgin: if she wish to contract betrothals, she is bound to lay open these defects, because if she concealed them, she would deceive the betrothed man in a grave matter. But she is not bound to defame herself. True. But neither can she by right deceive her neighbour. What then? Let her abstain from the contract. For the rest, if she wish to enter upon the contract, she ought to lay open the occult and grave defects. This is observed in the sale of a horse, a cow, or an ass by a man truly Christian.

XXI. QUESTION XII. Who is the lawful judge for dissolving betrothals? ANSWER. The ecclesiastical one, namely the proper bishop, or his delegate. A parish priest in the contentious forum is not a judge. If the cause be occult, the betrothed can by their own authority draw back from the contract. If the betrothed woman be guilty of occult fornication, she ought to be admonished and persuaded by the betrothed man to withdraw; if she refuse, he can call her before a judge: if she be defamed, she herself is the cause.

XXII. The cause which is assigned for dissolving betrothals ought to be morally certain. In the exterior forum the confession of each party suffices. In the interior forum one trustworthy witness suffices. In the exterior forum also, if the cause be a diriment or impedient impediment, one grave witness worthy of credit suffices. But these things pertain to the ministers of the forum.