Section 1. Causes on Account of Which Betrothals Are Dissolved by Law Itself.

When a cause exists which dissolves betrothals by law itself on each side, liberty of entering another matrimony is granted to each party. Three causes of this kind are numbered: mutual consent, a supervening impediment, and choice of a more perfect state.

542. Mutual Consent, by which the betrothed can remit to each other the obligation of the betrothals, even if they had been confirmed by oath; for every contract can be dissolved by mutual consent, just as it arose by mutual consent, unless its dissolution is resisted by right; but right does not resist the dissolution of the betrothal contract.

a. This has force even in the case in which the betrothed after the betrothals have had carnal copula; for by copula the betrothals do not acquire greater firmness. Yet other obligations must be fulfilled if the bride has become pregnant.

b. He who adds an oath to betrothals obliges himself before God to contracting the promised matrimony; but God accepts the obligation in favor of him or her to whom the matrimony was promised; therefore if that person remits the obligation, God also is judged to remit it. Hence even betrothals confirmed by oath are dissolved by mutual consent. Therefore an oath which is added to betrothals is made with this tacit condition: unless it is remitted by the other party.

543. A Supervening Impediment, by which the promised matrimony is rendered impossible: for what renders the betrothed altogether incapable of entering the promised matrimony entirely removes the obligation of the betrothals. Supervening impediments can be:

a. Indispensable impediments either of natural law, such as insanity, impotence, or of ecclesiastical law in which one is not accustomed to be dispensed.

Supervening impediments in which dispensation cannot be given are, besides insanity of one party and impotence, validly entered matrimony, solemn vow, sacred order. Two supervening impediments in which dispensation could be given and concerning which authors used to treat in this place, namely spiritual relationship and affinity from illicit copula, after the dispositions of the new Code can no longer supervene.

b. Religious profession, whether solemn or simple, and reception of sacred order; for he who emits profession or receives sacred order is rendered incapable of contracting, since religious profession and sacred order constitute an impediment perpetually diriment of matrimony. As regards solemn religious profession, another reason is added: for if by disposition of law betrothals de praesenti are dissolved through profession, a fortiori betrothals de futuro are dissolved, so that they no longer revive.

c. Matrimony contracted with another person, which nevertheless does not certainly but only probably dissolve betrothals.

All concede that the other betrothed party has the right at once of entering another matrimony; but the question whether the obligation of betrothals is entirely extinguished through a subsequent matrimony entered with another person, or only suspended during the matrimony, so that when the matrimony has been dissolved it revives again, is controverted. Those who teach that betrothals are altogether dissolved bring forward this reason: the firmer obligation of matrimony extinguishes the less firm obligation of betrothals. Moreover one who contracts matrimony is rendered per se incapable of entering the promised matrimony, since he assumes a state perpetual of itself, which is repugnant to the promised matrimony. But if the matrimony is dissolved by the death of the other party, this happens per accidens and does not change the nature of the thing. But those who with St. Alphonsus, n. 875, teach that betrothals are only suspended argue in this way: he who contracts matrimony is not rendered absolutely incapable, since the contracted matrimony is not repugnant to the promised matrimony for the time at which the prior matrimony will have been dissolved by the death of the other party. Moreover he who after emitting a vow of chastity contracted matrimony is held, once the matrimony has been dissolved, to fulfill the vow; therefore also he who after entering betrothals contracted matrimony is held, once the matrimony has been dissolved, to fulfill the betrothals, if the other party wishes. Finally, one's own fraud ought to patronize no one. Since each opinion is truly probable, Ballerini rightly writes: a confessor cannot compel a widow to fulfill that former promise.¹

¹ Gury-Ballerini II, n. 733.

544. Choice of a More Perfect State. 1. For betrothals are always made with this tacit condition: unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state;¹ therefore each betrothed reserves to himself or herself the right of passing freely and licitly to a more perfect state, the matrimonial state having been left.

There are indeed those who do not attribute this force of dissolving betrothals to the choice of any more perfect state, but only to the choice of the religious state or to the will and vow of professing religion; for they say that the choice of another state and consequently the vow of assuming a more perfect state is illicit and therefore invalid, because God does not accept what has already been promised to another. But since the same reason militates for every more perfect state, it must be extended equally to all. But the reason is the tacit condition under which betrothals are made. For betrothals are dissolved because of a notable supervening change, such that, if foreseen, betrothals would not have been entered; but a change of this kind is vocation to a more perfect state and the will of assuming it.²

2. A more perfect state of this kind is: a. the state of virginity, which one chooses who emits a vow of perpetual chastity.

In the external forum indeed betrothals because of a private vow of perpetual chastity are not judged dissolved; but in the internal forum this vow renders one immune from the obligation of betrothals, provided it was emitted from a true and sincere will.

b. The clerical state in sacred order, which is chosen both by one who makes a vow of receiving sacred orders and by one who receives minor orders or enters a clerical seminary with a true and sincere will of receiving sacred orders.

c. The regular state in an order or congregation with perpetual vows, which is chosen both by one who makes a vow of entering religion and by one who enters religion with a true and serious will of emitting profession in it.

Authors dispute whether by the choice of a more perfect state betrothals are dissolved on the part of each party, or whether only the right of withdrawing from the betrothals is given to the other party, if that party wishes. According to the first opinion, betrothals, in the internal forum, are dissolved through the very act of the will by which one of the betrothed sincerely dedicates himself or herself to divine service in a more perfect state. According to the second opinion, through the will of choosing a more perfect state the other party becomes free, because the one choosing a more perfect state yields his or her right; but that one becomes free only after taking up the more perfect state, that is, after receiving sacred order or emitting religious profession.

Since the opinion affirming the dissolution of betrothals on each side is truly probable, the confessor does not have the right of compelling to fulfilling the betrothals one who does not execute the conceived will of embracing a more perfect state, but, e.g., after some time leaves the novitiate or the seminary. Nevertheless it is supposed that he acted sincerely from true love of the more perfect state; for if he had deceitfully only affected the intention of a more perfect life, he certainly is not freed from the obligation of betrothals.³

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 870 ff.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 185.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 174 ff.; Gasparri I, n. 92 f.; De Becker, p. 14; Wernz IV, n. 113.