Article III. On the Dissolution of Betrothals

1531. - Betrothals, according to the opinion of all, can be dissolved for just causes. But the principal causes are:

1° Mutual consent, freely emitted (without grave fear and deceit [see n. 1528. q. 1°. 2°]) between persons of puberty. I say: between persons of puberty; for the betrothals of those not of puberty, when puberty has been reached and either one only reclaims within three days before a judge or witnesses, are dissolved, namely from the privilege conceded by Law.¹ But that triduum begins to run from the time not now of puberty, but of the acquired knowledge of the privilege.²

2° A supervening impediment, namely a diriment one, and indeed one diriment by divine law, as e.g. a valid Matrimony contracted with another, at least while it lasts. I say: by divine law; for, if the impediment is diriment only by ecclesiastical law, the obligation indeed ceases on the part of the innocent party, even by the mere report of the impediment; nevertheless it does not cease on the part of him who induced the impediment by his own fault, but is only suspended; so that he, even excluding the damage of the innocent party (cf. n. 810), is held, if the injured party still wishes, to seek dispensation of the impediment, if it can be obtained easily and shortly, and once this has been removed, to fulfill the faith given to her.³

3° The choice of a more perfect state, e.g. religious Profession, reception of Sacred Order, a vow of Religion, and, probably, even of chastity or of receiving Orders. But by the mere entrance into Religion before Profession, betrothals, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls the more common and to which he adheres, are dissolved only on the part of the one remaining in the world.⁴

4° A grave crime of the other, e.g. grave theft, homicide, or the like, which begets grave damage or infamy; likewise fornication of the betrothed woman, whether it preceded the betrothals (provided it was then unknown to the betrothed man, or even known, but the report was afterwards spread), or followed them; whether it was voluntary, or (according to the common and truer opinion) involuntary. I said: of the betrothed woman; for fornication of the betrothed man, even after the betrothals, according to the more common and more probable opinion, does not give the betrothed woman a right of withdrawing. The reason of each is that fornication renders the betrothed woman, but not likewise the betrothed man, more base according to the common estimation of men. - What was said concerning the betrothed woman who committed fornication, say the same of her who after the betrothals so conducts herself that she makes doubtful faith concerning her virtue, permitting herself to be touched immodestly by others, or otherwise acting less cautiously. - For the same reason the betrothed woman can withdraw if, after the betrothals have been celebrated, she learns that the betrothed man "has had offspring from another woman, or has frequently fallen" into fornication, "by having intercourse with many"; or even if, after betrothals, kisses or touches have intervened so frequently between the betrothed man and another "that they indicate a mind of the betrothed man very inclined toward the other," and "it can deservedly be feared that he will not keep faith with the betrothed woman."¹

5° A notable change of state, namely a circumstance which, if it had been known or foreseen, would have deterred from the betrothals.² For the external forum this can be determined by the judgment of prudent persons, or, if that cannot be had, by oath.³ But if ignorance did not give cause to the contract, i.e. if the betrothed man would have contracted even if the cause had been known beforehand, it would by no means be lawful to withdraw from the betrothals.⁴

6° An excessive delay of Matrimony. But delay is made either with a time for celebrating Matrimony having been attached to the betrothals, or without such a time having been attached; and, if a time is attached, it is attached either to end the obligation of the betrothals, or only to urge it.

If: a) to end the obligation, once the term has elapsed through the fault of one, certainly the other party is liberated;⁵ indeed, according to the more common and more probable opinion, even if the term has elapsed without fault of the betrothed man, suppose because he was detained by a just impediment. The reason is because the term is attached precisely for this, lest the party prepared remain long without nuptials. I said: the other party is liberated; for, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls by far the more common and, with attention to the intrinsic reason, by far the more probable (although the opposite, as he says, "is not lacking in its probability, especially from the authority of St. Thomas"), the party who culpably placed the delay does not remain free. The reason is because no one ought to derive advantage from his own fault.

If: b) a time has been added to the betrothals only for urging the obligation, once the term has elapsed the betrothals still oblige. But when, in the case of further delay by one party, it is lawful for the other to withdraw, seems to have to be decided especially from the circumstances.

If: c) no time has been established, and the nuptials are delayed excessively, nor can dissolution of the betrothals by mutual counsel be obtained, the cause will better be remitted to the ecclesiastical judge, so that he may establish the things which he judges suitable.⁷

Note. - If the Confessor sees that Matrimony has been deliberately delayed without sufficient cause, let him not importunately exact the fulfillment of the faith given, but sometimes according to the circumstances let him rather advise reparation of damage or a free composition, since an unsuccessful Matrimony is to be feared.¹

7° The departure of the betrothed man to a far country, without the other having been consulted; for he who so departs is judged to yield to his right. But if he has gone to a nearby country, a distinction must be made. For either he has thus gone without the intention of returning, or with it. In the former case, it is to be resolved as concerning him who has gone to a far country; but in the latter, either his return must be awaited for a time to be determined by the judgment of a prudent man (or, if it can be done, of a judge), or he is to be admonished, and a certain time, as above, is to be fixed beforehand, within which he should return, and, once it has elapsed, the betrothed woman is liberated.²

1532. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it a sufficient cause of dissolving betrothals if a rich inheritance comes to the betrothed man?

Resp. Some affirm; others most commonly deny, because the betrothed man has not been deceived in the condition of the betrothed woman, in which no change has occurred. But in the case in which a marriage with another richer woman is afterwards offered to the betrothed man, St. Alphonsus would not dare wholly to condemn the betrothed man, if the quality of the other betrothed woman were exceedingly better; but nevertheless he concludes that he would never dare to advise departing from the contrary opinion.³

Quaer. 2° Are betrothals dissolved by a vow of chastity, or a vow of receiving Sacred Orders?

Resp. 1° If the vow precedes the betrothals, it is certain that they are invalid. The reason is because the promise of Matrimony is concerning an illicit thing, and therefore does not oblige. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If the vow follows, likewise the betrothals are probably dissolved. The reason is because the promise of betrothals is always judged to have been made under the tacit condition, unless a better state is chosen. But certainly they are dissolved on the part of the one not vowing.¹

Quaer. 3° Is dissent of parents a sufficient cause of withdrawing from betrothals?

Resp. Negatively, if the parents dissent unjustly, because the right of the children would be injured. But otherwise, if the dissent of the parents is just, e.g. if the other party does not befit the family by reason of condition, honor, etc.²

For our provinces, nevertheless, Kenrick³ notes the following: "Betrothals are for the most part made without the parents knowing, whose rights, according to our customs, can scarcely be said to be gravely infringed; and therefore those promising are excused from grave sin, although not from every fault, if nothing else occurs that is to be reprehended."

But as regards the dissent of parents on account of disparity of condition, the same author remarks:⁴ "In this region indeed, where no noble stock is acknowledged, all are judged to be of the same grade, although in reality they are very much distinguished among themselves either by birth, or by wealth, or by public office. The diversity of conditions having been neglected, for the most part it will be lawful to fulfill betrothals; for the objections of parents and relatives ought not" (here) "easily to obtain force against a certain right arising from betrothals; nevertheless sometimes they will have to be rescinded."

Quaer. 4° Is a party laboring under an occult defect held to disclose it before betrothals, or, these having been contracted, before Matrimony?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if that defect would be harmful or injurious to the other party, e.g. if the girl is pregnant, if the betrothed man labors under venereal disease, or is burdened with debt, etc. The reason is because, just as he sins against justice who, to one believing himself to be buying good wares, sells harmful ones, so a fortiori does he who with a harmful defect wishes to contract Matrimony. Therefore if he does not wish to disclose the defect, he ought to abstain from contracting. Except, unless the other party labors under the same defect.⁵

Resp. 2° But negatively, if the defect does not render the nuptials harmful, but only less desirable, e.g. if a girl who is thought to be a virgin is corrupted. The reason is because it has been received by custom that no one is held to manifest defects of this kind to the other. Besides, no one is held to manifest his own defect with his own infamy, when the defect does not injure the grave right of the other.¹ Nevertheless the other party, once the defect is known, has the right of withdrawing.²

Quaer. 5° Are betrothals dissolved by a subsequent Matrimony, so that, once the Matrimony is dissolved, they do not revive?

Resp. Negatively, with the opinion which St. Alphonsus thinks absolutely more probable.³ - The reason is because it is proved by no law that betrothals are altogether dissolved by a subsequent Matrimony; whence only the obligation of the betrothals is suspended while such Matrimony lasts, as happens in one who contracts Matrimony with a vow of chastity. Moreover in practice the betrothed person unjustly abandoned will rarely seek such an unfaithful one, nor would a happy outcome of a Matrimony of this kind be hoped for.

Concerning the judge in a cause of betrothals, see L. VI. 878.