111. What eternal law is. Eternal law is the divine will, which necessarily and from eternity wills that creatures to be created preserve the order constituted by divine wisdom, or that creatures to be created fittingly strive toward their proper ends.

a. From eternity God by His wisdom saw all things to be created in time; likewise from eternity by His most free will He decreed to create the world in time for His own glory. By this act of the intellect God knew the universal end to be assigned to the world and the particular ends to be assigned to individual things; and at the same time He knew the operations by which the things to be created could attain both the universal and the particular end. But by the decree of the will He established that the things to be created should strive toward their ends by fitting operations. The operations by which the things to be created strive toward their ends constitute the order of the universe, the order of nature. But eternal law consists in that act of the divine will by which the operations of creatures are ordered to their ends.

b. Eternal law of itself is universal, so that its object is constituted not only by the moral order, or the operations by which rational beings strive toward the end, but also by the physical order, or the operations of beings lacking reason, indeed even by the supernatural order, or the operations by which man, elevated into a son of God, strives toward the end of eternal life. Therefore according to St. Thomas, eternal law is the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all acts and motions.² Yet for the most part eternal law is customarily considered only in relation to the moral order, and that the natural order.

c. It is clear that eternal law as such differs from other laws in two ways: a. because it has no subjects whom it obliges, nor operations which it directs, since from eternity there are none capable of obligation and direction; b. because eternal law as such, or antecedently to natural law, produces no obligation in men, since it has not been promulgated to them.

¹ Suarez, De legibus, l. 1, c. 1-4. Seydl, Das ewige Gesetz (Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, Vienna: Mayer, 1902). Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., p. 332 ff. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis, 2nd ed., n. 238 ff.

² Summa I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

112. What natural law is. 1. Natural law subjectively is the obligation necessarily imposed upon men of tending by fitting acts toward their proper end. Therefore it is eternal law itself imposed upon men by the command of the divine will.

a. The end to which man is ordered, together with the actions by which he can attain it, constitutes the moral order. Hence natural law can also be called the obligation imposed upon men of preserving the moral order.

b. Since acts fitting to the order are good, but acts unfitting to it are evil, natural law can be called the obligation imposed upon men of doing good and avoiding evil.

c. Once the decree of creating a rational creature has been supposed, God cannot but will those things which are good and necessary for preserving the order, and He cannot but not will those things which are evil. Therefore, once the existence of a rational creature has been supposed, God necessarily commands and prohibits those things which belong to natural law.

2. Natural law objectively is the moral order constituted by God, consisting in operations which, with consideration of man's relation to God, to himself, and to neighbors, must necessarily be done or omitted. These operations considered objectively are just so many norms by which all human activity is ruled.

Therefore the matter of natural law is constituted by all those things which by their nature are honorable and necessary for the end, and by those things which by their nature are evil. And since those things which by their nature are evil disturb the order of nature, but those things which by their nature are honorable conduce to preserving the order of nature, the law of nature is rightly defined by St. Augustine: the reason and will of God commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed.¹

3. God promulgated natural law through the light of reason. For God placed in human reason a power by which, with great facility, it can form moral ideas and moral principles, and by reasoning can deduce conclusions or first moral precepts from the supreme principles. Therefore St. Thomas most beautifully calls natural law a participation of eternal law in the rational creature.²

a. Therefore the act by which God promulgated the law of nature is creation itself, by which He placed the natural light of reason in men. For this reason an absolutely obliging law has been imposed upon all men by force of rational nature, which all can know by their reason, and which all are held to observe by their operations. Hence St. Paul: "For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do those things which are of the law, such persons, not having the law, are a law to themselves. They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them."³ The arguments of reason by which the existence of natural law is proved can be compared among the moral philosophers.⁴

b. Therefore natural law differs from eternal law as a law which is at once in the legislator and in the subjects differs from a law which is only in the mind of the legislator.

4. The subject of the law of nature is every man of all times and places: for the foundation of natural law is rational nature; besides this, it is itself the means by which man is ordered and directed to his end. But rational nature is the same in all, and all have been destined to the same end.

Therefore not even those who lack the use of reason, such as infants and the perpetually insane, are exempt from the obligation of natural law, since they too have rational nature. Nevertheless these are obliged by the law only in first act, and therefore in violating the law they sin only materially.

5. Natural law is the foundation of any positive law, and this in a twofold way: first, because the obligation of obeying a legitimate superior, whether God or man, is had from the law of nature; then, because a law which is contrary to the law of nature has no force. For that is not a law which contains what is unfitting to human nature and to the end to which man has been destined.

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27.

² Summa I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

³ Rom. 2:14-15.

⁴ Cathrein, l.c. Meyer, l.c. Schindler, p. 144 ff.

113. On the precepts of natural law. 1. The precepts of natural law by reason of knowledge are of three kinds:

a. To the first belong certain most universal principles of morals, such as: good is to be done, evil is to be fled; the supreme deity is to be worshiped; the highest good is to be loved; benefactors are to be honored; what you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another, etc. These principles are not derived from others, but from them all and each of the precepts of the law are deduced by the discourse of reason.

b. To the second belong those precepts which are deduced from universal principles immediately and by an obvious and easy discourse, of this kind: honor father and mother; you shall not steal; and the rest which are contained in the Decalogue (except the determination of the Sabbath).

Therefore not only the supreme moral principles but also the precepts of the Decalogue, as universal norms of human actions, are known to all peoples, even uncultivated ones, of all times and places, as is established from ethnology.¹

c. To the third belong those precepts which are inferred only mediately and remotely from the first principles or from the precepts of the Decalogue, after diligent study has been premised and by a more subtle discourse, as: an injury inflicted on someone is not to be avenged by one's own authority; found things must be restored.

Even precepts of the third kind are necessarily commanded or prohibited; nevertheless, since they are often indeterminate and ambiguous, they furnish a foundation for positive laws, by which they are more accurately determined and firmly constituted.

2. Considered according to force and efficacy, the precepts of nature are of two kinds: some are called primary, which nature absolutely demands, because without them the moral order is rendered impossible; others secondary, to which nature indeed strongly inclines, because without them the moral order is less perfect, but which nevertheless it does not absolutely demand.

Thus nature absolutely demands the unity of marriage insofar as it excludes polyandry; but it does not absolutely demand the unity of marriage insofar as it excludes polygyny. Hence polyandry is absolutely prohibited by the law of nature, but polygyny, though less conformable to the same law, is not absolutely prohibited. The same must be said of the dissolution of marriage.

3. Considered according to the mode of obliging, some precepts of the law of nature are absolute, or independent of every condition, as: God is to be worshiped; others are conditioned, which suppose some fact on which they depend, as: a vow or oath is to be observed. From this arises the division of the law of nature into absolute and conditioned.

¹ V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., I, p. 344 ff. W. Schneider, Allgemeinheit und Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1895).

114. Whether the precepts of natural law can be invincibly unknown. Because the precepts of natural law are of three kinds, a distinction is needed in solving this question.

1. The first principles of natural law cannot be invincibly unknown by an adult who is fully self-possessed in reason: for the first moral principles are immediately evident to one who understands their terms; but truths of this kind cannot be unknown by one who uses reason sufficiently cultivated.

2. The second principles of natural law, which are contained in the Decalogue, cannot be invincibly unknown for a long time: for those things which are evidently deduced from known principles by an obvious and easy inference cannot long lie hidden from a man possessed of cultivated reason. If he does not know them clearly, he is at least incited through remorse of conscience to investigating the truth.

Therefore if some labor for a longer time under ignorance of these precepts, it must be called vincible and culpable, as having arisen not from defect of intellectual light, but from malice of the will. For with the Apostle as witness, because of depraved customs the law of nature can be erased from the hearts of men, who nevertheless are not excused from sin because of this ignorance.¹

3. The more remote precepts of natural law, which are deduced from their principles only with great difficulty and after diligent study has been premised, can be invincibly unknown even for a long time by those who have never devoted themselves to studies, and often in fact are unknown. This is shown by the disagreement of theologians and even of the holy Fathers themselves concerning these precepts.²

All indeed concede that theoretically there is invincible ignorance of natural law; but the probabiliorists, tutiorists, and Jansenists denied that practically there can be ignorance of this kind and that the one operating is therefore excused from sin. But since this opinion has not only been proscribed by the Church,³ but today is also obsolete, it is enough to have indicated it.⁴

¹ Cf. Rom. 1:20 ff.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 48.

³ "Although invincible ignorance of natural law may be granted, in the state of fallen nature this does not excuse the one operating from formal sin from it." Proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VIII (December 7, 1690).

⁴ Cf. Lacroix, l. 1, n. 720 ff. Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum, diss. 11, c. 5. St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 170-174.

115. Concerning ignorance of the Decalogue, for practice it must be noted what authors commonly teach after consulting experience.

a. The malice of internal acts, namely of depraved thoughts and desires, especially inefficacious ones, can be invincibly unknown.

b. The malice of external acts can also be invincibly unknown, especially by children and the uneducated, indeed also by others in extraordinary circumstances, as where human law tolerates what is morally evil. Thus it can happen that someone is ignorant of the malice of pollution; that he thinks it licit to lie in order to save his own life or another's, to steal from evil rich persons in order to succor good poor persons, to perjure himself in order to protect life. Indeed there are some who affirm that it can happen that even Christians think fornication licit in places where public prostitutes are permitted.¹

c. Whether the malice of an internal act can invincibly be unknown even when the malice of the external act is known, and therefore whether someone can invincibly think that a serious will of sinning (stealing) is not sin if the external act (theft), which he knows to be evil, has not followed, is not one opinion among authors. For while some affirm this, St. Alphonsus with others denies it in these words: "I have never been able to judge this opinion probable."² In practice penitents in these cases will have to be prudently questioned as to whether they had some, at least confused, knowledge of the malice, and their assertion must be believed.

¹ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis sacramentalis (Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1901), III, pr. IV, n. 572.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, De conscientia, n. 9. Lacroix, l. 1, n. 35.

116. On the immutability of natural law. A twofold change of the law of nature is distinguished: internal, by which the law itself is abrogated or changed into another; and external, by which dispensation is made in the law through either human or divine power.

1. The law of nature cannot be changed intrinsically: for since the law of nature contains that which is fitting to human nature, with account taken of its religious, sensitive-rational, and social character, it cannot be changed unless human nature is changed.

2. Natural law cannot be changed extrinsically even by divine power. Nevertheless: a. in secondary precepts God can permit an exception for a time for obtaining a higher end; and b. in those actions which are not absolutely base, He can dispense improperly.

a. The law of nature, once creation has been supposed, is necessary and independent of the will of God; therefore it also necessarily endures unchanged so long as human nature remains the same. And indeed God must always will that man worship his creator, that he subject the sensitive appetite to reason, and that he observe charity and justice toward his neighbor.

b. Since the order of nature does not absolutely demand secondary precepts, but demands them only so that it may be perfect, nothing prevents God from permitting an exception for a time for obtaining a higher end. Thus God permitted the children of the first parents to take sisters as spouses in order to preserve the unity of the human race; thus also He permitted the dissolution of marriage and servitude to the Israelite people for a time.

c. A law is said to be changed properly if the obligation of the law ceases while the same matter of the law remains; but a law is said to be changed improperly if the obligation of the law ceases when the matter of the law has become another. In order to understand how it can happen that the matter of the law is changed, it must be noted that sometimes the matter of natural law is evil simply in itself; thus speech injurious to God is evil in itself and on account of itself. But sometimes it is evil in itself for this reason, that another's right is annexed to it. Now one who exercises dominion over that right, by taking away that right, can bring it about that an action which was formerly illicit now becomes licit. It is clear that the natural law which prohibits another's right from being injured is not changed in this case, but the matter of the law, with some circumstance removed from it, has been changed.¹

Thus natural law prohibits killing oneself or an innocent person; likewise it prohibits taking another's thing. If, however, God, who is lord of life and death and of all things, permits or commands this, it can licitly be done.²

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl I, n. 190.

² Cf. Gen. 22:2; Ex. 3:22; 11:2; 12:35.

117. 3. A fortiori the Church cannot change the law of nature. Nevertheless she can infallibly declare and interpret it, indeed in those precepts whose particular obligation depends upon an act of the human will, she can improperly dispense. Thus in fact she dispenses in vows and oaths, in ratified marriage, and in religious profession.

In order that this may be explained, the following things must be noted:

1. Obligations of the law of nature are of two kinds: some affect individuals independently of an act of the human will, as God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, one must not lie, etc.; others affect individuals only dependently upon an act of the human will. Of this kind are obligations which arise from contracts, vows, and oaths.

2. In obligations of the first kind the supreme pontiff cannot dispense; in obligations of the second kind he does not properly dispense, because he does not relax the obligation of natural law (that a vow is to be fulfilled, that a promise is to be kept), but according to the power which he uses over the human will, he permits the act of the will by which the obligation of the law of nature was induced in a particular case to be changed or retracted. When this has been done, the obligation itself ceases in this individual. But because the obligation has been contracted toward God, the act of the human will inducing the obligation can be changed and retracted not at will, but only with God consenting (that is, with a just cause existing). Therefore when the supreme pontiff dispenses from a just cause, he himself declares that God consents to the change of the will.

3. From these things it is clear that the supreme pontiff has the power of dispensing in divine natural law signifies nothing other than that the supreme pontiff can declare when God consents to a change of the will from which the obligation of the law arose. But God willed that the supreme pontiff be furnished with this power because it is not only expedient for the faithful, but sometimes plainly necessary. For when the inconstancy of worldly things is considered on the one hand, and the imprudence and inconsideration of men on the other, it not rarely happens that obligations contracted from the human will are more harmful than useful to men.¹

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 406 ff.

210. 1. Eternal law, according to St. Thomas,¹ is "the reason of divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." Namely, God from eternity decreed to create creatures from nothing, and to order and direct them, according to His infinite wisdom, to the end. But He willed to direct them according to the proper nature of each: inanimate things, through the powers and properties impressed upon them; sentient things, through the instincts and tendencies placed in them; intellectual things, through the illumination of the intellect, and the motion by which He directs the will without harming its liberty. Now that ordination of all things to the ultimate end, insofar as it is considered as existing from eternity in the divine mind, is called the eternal law. Its existence is logically inferred from the dogmas of creation and providence.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 93, a. 1. - Eternal law, concerning which the pagans spoke only obscurely, is described by the Scriptures especially under the name of the wisdom or word of God: Job, XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov., VIII-IX; Wisd., VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII. Cf. Corluy, La sagesse dans l'Anc. Testament, Congrès scient. catholique, 1888, t. I, p. 61-91.

It can indeed be called law in a broad sense, insofar as it is an ordination of reason, for the common good, willed by him who has care of the community; but it is not law in the strict sense set forth above; for from eternity the community upon which that ordination is imposed is lacking, and likewise promulgation is lacking.¹ From this head the eternal law already differs from the other laws: for it is not properly law, but the fountain of all laws.

¹ For that cannot be called a true promulgation which, according to Billuart, is made through the eternal Word and the book of life written from eternity; for this, unless we are mistaken, is a metaphorical manner of speaking.

211. 2. Laws properly so called are derived from the eternal law, insofar as they manifest to us this ordination which from the beginning exists in the divine mind. This is indeed clear as regards divine laws, which signify to us the will of God. But human laws are derived from the eternal law by a threefold reason: (a) as from an exemplary cause, because laws, that they may be just, ought to be conformable to the eternal law; (b) as from an efficient cause, insofar as every legislative power comes forth from God; (c) as from a directing cause, in the sense that divine reason, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, directs legislators so that they may see what laws are to be established and when, according to the diversity of persons, times, places, and circumstances. Wherefore divine Wisdom deservedly says: "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things; by me princes command, and the powerful decree justice."²

² Prov., VIII, 15-16.

— I. Notion of eternal law. Eternal law is "the very reason of the government of things existing in God as in the prince of the universe" ¹. It is the eternal determination of creative wisdom, which coheres by an undivided bond with the creative reason itself. Through it, all creatures, according to their nature, are ordered to their end. According to their nature: and therefore by physical necessity, if they are irrational; by moral necessity, if they are rational.

Insofar as it regards rational creatures, law places in God not only an ordering to the common good but also the decree of promulgating it, so that all the elements of law are present in God as in a legislator. Yet because law connotates an accomplished promulgation, and this supposes creatures, that law, before creation, is indeed causally complete, but terminatively incomplete. For more, cf. moral philosophy.

¹ St. Th. 1, 2, q. 91 art. 1, c.

— What it comprises. That eternal ordering comprises both that hypothetical order congruent with the nature of things, which divine Wisdom necessarily conceives: the order of pure nature; and the higher and more perfect order by which divine Goodness, beyond the due of nature, decreed from eternity to order rational creatures to Himself: the order of elevated nature; and the most excellent order of all, by which divine mercy willed to repair in Christ the nature fallen in Adam: the order of repaired nature.

148. Existence. Already the ancient pagans spoke of the eternal law, insofar as they knew that the world was made by the gods.¹ Especially Cicero² proclaimed the eternal law with great eloquence, saying: "This, therefore, I see to have been the opinion of the wisest men, that law is neither a thing devised by the genius of men, nor some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which would rule the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. Thus they said that that first and last law was the mind of God commanding or forbidding all things by reason; from which that law which the gods gave to the human race is rightly praised.... Therefore true and chief law, apt for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove." - But all Christians, who believe in one God, creator and governor of the whole world, must consequently admit the eternal law, which is nothing else than the reason of the government of the whole world existing in the divine mind. Among the Holy Fathers St. Augustine³ stands out, treating this matter in many places and almost following the footsteps of Cicero. - On the contrary, all who deny one personal God, creator and governor of the whole world, such as Atheists, Pantheists, Materialists, Monists, etc., utterly reject the eternal law as a true moral law.

¹ Cf. many testimonies brought forward by Ernst Seydl, Das ewige Gesetz in seiner Bedeutung für die physische und sittliche Weltordnung (Vienna 1902).

² De leg. l. 2, c. 4, § 8.

³ De ordine 2, 4, 11; De libero arb. 1, 6, 15; De civ. Dei 19, 12-13; Contra Faustum 22, 27.

149. Essence. Commonly two definitions of the eternal law are adduced: one of St. Augustine, the other of St. Thomas. The Augustinian definition is this: "The eternal law is the divine reason or will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."⁴ Suarez⁵ rightly notes that in this definition the word "or" is taken for "and." The Thomistic definition is this:⁶ "The eternal law ... is the reason⁷ of divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." - Before God made the world, He had the most perfect idea of the whole order of all creatures. He established that order, and all things whatsoever that have been created in time are subject to this order, which is a most beautiful pre-established harmony. Material and irrational beings, for example, stars, plants, animals, etc., necessarily execute this established order; but rational beings, such as man and angel, freely perform those things which the eternal law has established. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:⁸ "There is a twofold mode by which something is subject to the eternal law: in one mode insofar as the eternal law is participated by way of cognition; in another mode by way of action and passion, insofar as it is participated by way of an interior motive principle. And in this second mode irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law. Rational nature ... according to each mode is subject to the eternal law: because it both has in some way a notion of the eternal law and again [because] in every rational creature there is a natural inclination to that which is consonant with the eternal law." From these words it follows that the eternal law comprehends both the physical and the moral order of the world; but it more principally touches the moral order, both natural and supernatural.

From these things said it is easily understood how the eternal law, the divine idea, and divine providence (which are really the same in God as being most simple and free from every composition) are distinguished according to our mode of conceiving.

The divine idea is the concept of all created beings, indeed also of possible beings, existing in the divine mind. For just as an architect makes a drawing (commonly, a Plan) before he builds a house, so God freely chose some idea from many, according to which He would construct the whole world. The divine ideas are many; the eternal law is one.

The eternal law is the reason of the government of all beings to the end proposed by God, namely, to the glory of God (Weltregierungsplan).

Divine providence is the execution of the eternal law in individual creatures. Hence St. Thomas⁹ says: "In God the eternal law is not providence, but as it were the principle of providence; and hence also the act of providence is fittingly attributed to the eternal law."

The eternal law is law properly so called,¹⁰ since the definition given concerning law belongs to it in a perfect mode. For it is an ordinance of divine reason for the good of the whole universe, by Him who has care of the community, namely, by God Himself, promulgated. The promulgation of the eternal law indeed was not present from all eternity (except in the divine Word), since then creatures did not exist except in the divine mind alone; but actual promulgation is not of the essence of law.¹¹ Moreover, it seems that even in the eternal law sufficient promulgation was present. For promulgation is necessary for inducing the obligation of law. But from eternity God determined through the eternal law all obligations by which creatures in future time would be bound, nor has any change of these obligations ever come, since God is wholly immutable.¹²

⁴ Contra Faustum l. c. (Migne, Patr. lat. 42, 418).

⁵ De leg. l. 2, c. 6, n. 13.

⁶ S. theol. I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

⁷ Reason is the same as: Plan.

⁸ S. theol. I-II, q. 93, a. 6.

⁹ De verit. q. 5, a. 1 ad 6; cf. Contra Gent. III, 97, 115, 121.

¹⁰ That the eternal law is not law properly so called is taught by St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. I, de conscientia 75), Cl. Marc-Raus (Instit. Alphons. I, 116), and others.

¹¹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

¹² Ibid. q. 91, a. 1 ad 2.

150. Derivation of All Other Laws from the Eternal Law. St. Augustine¹³ rightly says: "There is nothing just and legitimate which men have not derived for themselves from the eternal law." But all other laws must be derived from the eternal law in a threefold way:

1. As from an exemplary cause. For no law is just and right unless it is conformable to the eternal law, that is, to the order constituted by the eternal law.

2. As from an efficient cause. For by God's ordination legislative power has been constituted among men. Wherefore it is said:¹⁴ "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things."

3. As from a directing cause. For the eternal law, known by means of faith or even reason, directs legislators, so that they may see what and what sort of laws are to be established according to the diversity of times, places, and persons.¹⁵

¹³ Sermon 81, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 400).

¹⁴ Prov. 8:15.

¹⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 93, a. 3.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 1.

238. Thesis. Eternal law exists. - It is proved: law is an ordination of reason in the prince who governs a community. But, supposing that the world is governed by divine providence, the whole community of the universe is ruled by divine reason. Therefore the very ordering reason of the governance of things, which is in God as in the prince of the universe, has the notion of law. But divine reason conceives nothing in time but from eternity. Therefore such a law is eternal. Cf. Job XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov. VIII-IX; Wis. VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII.

Nor should you say that it is not a law, since it has not been promulgated. For promulgation is not of the essence of law; moreover, although eternal law has not been passively promulgated on the part of the term or of the hearing creature (in second act), nevertheless it has been actively promulgated on the part of God promulgating (in first act), because it has everything which is required on God's part for promulgation, so that, once the creature exists, it is applied to this creature by that very fact. For it is not required for promulgation that the law become known, but that it be able to be known. Whence, just as human law obligates future persons because, by the very fact that they become members of the community, they fall under the law without a new promulgation, so eternal law, by the very fact that a creature exists, can be known by it and obligates it (ad 2). In other words: although promulgation has not been received, nevertheless it has been made.

1. Law, namely, is essentially in the legislator (n. 221).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

239. Thesis. Eternal law is rightly defined by St. Augustine, bk. 22, Against Faustus, c. 29: the reason or will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed; and by St. Thomas: the reason of divine wisdom according as it is directive of all acts and motions in order to the common good of the whole universe.

It is proved: just as in an artisan there preexists the concept or reason of those things which are made through art, and this is called the idea or exemplar of things to be made, so in a governor there must preexist the concept or reason of the order of those things which are to be done by those who are governed; and this reason, ordination, and conception of the one governing the acts of subjects is called law. But God by His wisdom is the maker of all things, of which He is the artisan; He is also the governor of all acts and motions. Whence, just as the reason or conception of divine wisdom, insofar as by it all things have been created, has the notion of idea or exemplar, so the reason of divine wisdom ordering and moving all things to the due end, the good of the whole universe, obtains the notion of law.

240. Therefore eternal law differs:

1. from the divine idea: this is the exemplar of things to be made; that is the order of things to be governed, bringing necessity or obligation to them; whence the idea is supposed to law, because a thing is to be made before it is to be governed;

2. from providence: a) because law has the force of obligating, but not providence; b) because law regards the good of the whole universe, providence also the particular good of each thing; c) providence is, as it were, the conclusion of law and follows it: law hands down rules in general for the governance of the world; providence, as a part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the movements of creatures according to law.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 3-6.

241. Thesis. From eternal law all other laws are derived. - It is proved:

In ordered movers, the power of the second mover is derived from the power of the first mover, because the second does not move except insofar as it is moved by the first; whence in a well-ordered city the reason of governance is derived from the first governor to the secondary governors, and in art the reason of things to be made is derived from the architect to lower artisans. But eternal law is the reason of governance in the first and supreme governor. Therefore all reasons of governance or laws in lower governors are derived from eternal law.

For: a) human reason has from divine reason or eternal law, of which it is a participation, that it be the rule of the will and of human acts (q. 19, a. 4); therefore if law must be conformable to reason, much more must it be conformable to eternal law.

b) For the first is the measure of the others. But eternal law or divine reason precedes every other reason or law as the fountain. Therefore it is the first rule of every reason and law. And therefore honesty must principally be estimated from commensuration to that rule.

Eternal law, namely, is law by essence; all others are laws by participation, which are derived from it, and indeed in three ways:

1. they are derived from eternal law as from an exemplar cause, because all laws, that they be just, must be conformable to right reason and thus to eternal law, as to their norm and measure: thus from eternal law they have that they are a norm of rectitude;

2. they are derived from eternal law as from an efficient cause from which they have the power of obligating, because every inferior legislative power is from God, according to that saying in Rom. XIII, 1: There is no power except from God: thus from eternal law they have that they are a norm of obligation.

Divine wisdom signified both when it said (Prov. VIII, 15-16): "By Me kings reign (as to the second: power), and lawgivers decree just things (as to the first: rectitude); by Me princes rule, and the powerful decree justice." Hence all laws also:

3. depend on and are derived from eternal law as from a directive and actually regulative cause, because eternal law, through the mediation of the light of reason, directs legislators, so that they may see what laws are to be instituted according to diverse circumstances: thus from eternal law they have that they are actually instituted.

242. To eternal law all things are subject which are subjected to divine governance:

1. All natural things, whether necessary or contingent: for God gave not only to intellectual creatures a rule, which is the principle of acting, by impressing upon their mind knowledge of the divine precept, but also to the whole of nature principles and instinct for proper acts; and therefore He is said to command the whole of nature. Thus all movements and actions of the whole of nature are subject to eternal law insofar as all creatures are inclined and moved by divine providence; likewise the defects which occur in nature against the order of one or another particular cause, because these do not occur against the order of the first cause but are also subjected to divine providence, from which nothing escapes.

2. All human affairs: for men are subject to eternal law, not only as to inclination toward that which is conformable to eternal law, but also because they have knowledge of law: the evil imperfectly, in whom the natural inclination to virtue is depraved by a vicious habit and the natural cognition of good is darkened by passions and vices; but the good perfectly, because in them to the natural inclination to good there is added the interior motive of grace and virtue, and to the natural cognition of good there is added the cognition of faith and of the gift of wisdom. Hence the good always act according to law, actually or habitually, but the evil often act against it; yet the more they fall short of it on the part of action, the more they are subject to it on the part of passion, because the more they must be punished according to it.

1. Nothing, namely, can escape the rule of eternal law: for he who acts against one directive precept of eternal law falls into another precept determining penalty, which commands that, insofar as man has failed in action, so much be compensated through passion.

3. But those things which pertain to the divine nature or essence are not subject to it: for these are really eternal law itself. Namely, the act of the mind does not really differ from God Himself; but nothing can be subject to itself.

Nor is it an obstacle that God is bound not to do moral evil, for example, to lie: for He is not bound to this by force of some law prohibiting it, but by reason of the repugnance which arises from His nature and perfection, insofar as if He did evil or lied, He would not be God. Hence it is said that "God is a law to Himself" (I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 2), not properly, because nothing can be subject to itself, but because by Himself He is right without law, as if He were a law to Himself.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 2.

243. Eternal law in itself is immutable, but its knowledge in us is mutable. Eternal law, because it is the essence of God, cannot be known in itself except by God and by the blessed; but all rational creatures are able to know it according to a certain greater or lesser irradiation of it. For every knowledge of truth is an irradiation and participation of divine truth and therefore of eternal law; but all know truth in some way, more or less, at least as to the common principles of natural law, and therefore also eternal law.

Hence although eternal law in itself is immutable, nevertheless its knowledge can be increased or diminished in individuals, according as they know more or less the other laws which are its participation, as will be said below.

DISSERTATION II

ON THE ETERNAL AND NATURAL LAW

St. Thomas, qq. 93 and 94.

[ You will ask 1º whether there is given in God an eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively, and I prove it² . Law is nothing else than the dictate of practical reason in the ruler who governs some perfect community. Yet such a dictate is from eternity in God, as in the ruler governing the whole ² Hic q. 91, a. 1, c.

^{1 1} Hic q. 91. — 2. Hic q. 91, a. 1, c.

community of the universe. Therefore. — Prob. min. The whole community of the universe is governed by divine providence, as stands established 1ª p., q. 22, a. 1 and 2. Yet providence concerning singulars supposes the dictate of practical reason concerning universals, and is inferred from it as conclusion from principles. Moreover the divine reason conceives nothing in time but has an eternal concept, as said of Wisdom, Prov., VIII, 22 and 23 : The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made any thing from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained. Therefore there is given in God from eternity a dictate, etc. ]

You will ask 2° what eternal law is.

Resp¹ . Eternal law is nothing else than the reason of the divine wisdom, according as it is directive of the actions and motions of creatures toward the common good of the whole universe. ¹ Hic q. 93, a. 1, c. — 2. Ibid.

It is proved ² . As in any artisan there preexists the reason of those things constituted by art, so in any governor there preexists the reason of the order of things to be done through those subjected to his governance: and as the reason of things made through art is called art or exemplar of the things crafted, so the reason of the governor governing the acts of subjects obtains the notion of law, other things being preserved which we said above belong to the notion of law. Yet God is not only through his power creator of all things, to which he is compared as artisan to the thing crafted, as said 1ª p., q. 14, a. 8, c. But he is also governor of all acts and motions found in creatures, as had ibidem, q. 103, a. 5, c. Therefore, as the reason of the divine wisdom whereby all things are created has the notion of art or exemplar, or idea; so the reason of the divine wisdom moving and directing all things to their due end obtains the notion of law. ² Ibid.

[ The eternal law therefore differs from the divine idea, insofar

^{1 1} Hic q. 93, a. 1, c. — 2. Ibid.

the divine idea is the exemplar of things to be made, while the eternal law is the order of things to be governed, either inferring necessity upon them, as in natural things, or inducing moral obligation, as in intellectual creatures. They differ with respect to law as conclusion with respect to universal principle; and as in us law hands down rules in general according to which prudence dictates what is to be done here and now, so in God the eternal law hands down rules in general for the government of the whole world, according to which providence, which is part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the motions of creatures. From which it follows that the eternal law has truly and properly the notion of law, at least with respect to intellectual creatures, since it is an ordination of reason toward the common good by him who has care of the community. With respect however to irrational creatures it does not seem to have properly and strictly the notion of law, because these beings are not capable of instruction and moral obligation, which law strictly taken imports. It has therefore respect to them imperfectly and improperly the notion of law, inasmuch as it directs them in their motions through instinct or natural necessity.

Note that positive divine law, as it is in God the legislator, is the very eternal law inadequately taken, both because it does not extend to so many [things] nor under so diverse a connotate, and because it connotes existing creatures to whom it is intimated. As considered truly in those who direct themselves according to it or publish it, it is a participation of the eternal law and derived from it.]

You will ask 3° whether all other laws are derived from the eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively¹ . ¹ Ibid., a. 3, o.

It is proved 1°. Prov., VII, 15: eternal Wisdom, whose reason is the eternal law, says: By me kings reign and lawmakers decree just things. Rom., XIII, 1 : There is no power but from God.

It is proved 2°. In all subordinate movers it is necessary that the virtue of the second mover be derived from the virtue of the first mover, because the second mover moves not unless insofar as it is moved by the first ¹ . Yet to govern is a certain moving. Therefore in governors it is necessary that the reason of governing be derived from the first governor to the second ones. And thus we see that the reason of things done in a city is derived from the prince to inferior administrators, and in artificial things the reason of artificial acts is derived from the architect to inferior artisans. — I subsume. Yet the eternal law is the reason of government in the first and supreme governor. Therefore all reasons of government, consequently all laws which are in inferior governors, are derived from the eternal law. ¹ Ibid., o.

It is confirmed. The eternal law is law by essence, but all other laws are laws by participation. Yet what is such by participation is derived from what is such by essence, as heat in water derived from fire. Therefore.

Laws can be understood to be derived from the eternal law in a threefold manner: 1° As from an exemplar; because all laws, that they be just, must be conformable to the eternal law. 2° As from an efficient cause; because every inferior legislative power is from God, inasmuch as God, instituting human nature as social, conferred upon it governing and legislative power, without which society or community would not subsist, according to that word Prov., XI, 14 : Where there is no governor, the people shall fall. But the community, since it could not easily exercise this power through itself, conferred it upon few or one, as I said in the preceding dissertation. Whence every power is efficiently from God mediately or immediately. 3° Inasmuch as the eternal law, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, dictates and approves which and when laws are to be instituted on account of the diversity of circumstances, persons, places and times.

[Note, for the solution of objections regarding the natural law, that it can be considered in two ways: 1° Taken materially on account of its foundation, which is the relation of convenience or inconvenience of extremes among themselves, precisely as from the nature of the thing, abstracting from existence: as that to worship God is good and convenient, to lie evil and inconvenient. In this sense the natural law is not derived from the eternal law; for even if per impossibile God willed or understood nothing, to worship God would be good in itself, to lie indeed evil; which is called fundamentally good and evil. 2° The natural law can be taken formally for the dictate of reason judging of that honesty and turpitude of objects in themselves, and at the same time deciding conformably to the eternal law that God is to be worshiped, mendacity however avoided. And in this sense the natural law is derived from the eternal law, because it is a dictate impressed by God, conformable to the eternal dictate as to exemplar.]

D. Thomas, q. 94.

[You will ask 1° whether natural law be given in us.

I answer. in the affirmative.

It is proved. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., II, 14 and 15: The nations who have not the law, namely the Mosaic or Evangelical law, naturally do those things that are of the law. Such as have not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts. From St. Ambrose, lib. IX, epist. 71: « That law is not written but innate, nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a flowing fountain of nature; » from St. Augustine, lib. II Confess., c. 4, n. 9: « Thy law, O Lord, law written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself erases, » and lib. II de Sermone Domini in monte, c. 9, n. 32: « Who wrote in the hearts of men the natural law, save God? »

It is proved. 2° by reason¹. « Law, says St. Thomas, since it be a rule and measure, can be in someone in a twofold way: in one mode, as in the ruler and measurer; in another mode, as in the ruled and measured, because insofar as it participates something of rule or measure, so is it ruled or measured. Whence, since all things which are subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, it is manifest that all things participate after a manner in the eternal law, namely insofar as from its impression they have inclinations into their proper acts and ends. — But among other things the rational creature is subject to divine providence in an excellent manner, insofar as it itself becomes a partaker of providence, providing for itself and for others. Whence also in it is participated eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. And such participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. » ¹ Here q. 91, a. 2, o.

It is confirmed by the intimate sense and testimony of everyone. For there is no one who does not experience in himself some dictate intimating and commanding that good must be done, evil avoided, God adored, parents honored, lying not committed, stealing not done, etc., in all of which, as the Apostle says, Rom., II, 15, their conscience rendering testimony to them. But this dictate is called natural law.]

You will ask 2° what natural law is.

I answer. Among various opinions, it seems truer that natural law is nothing else than the natural light as impressed upon and participated from reason or the eternal law¹; because thus are had all things which are wont to be attributed to natural law. 1° It is inborn in us, and found in children and the insane. 2° It is not only demonstrative of good, but also preceptive, because it is impression and participation of the eternal law, consequently empire of superior over inferior. 3° It binds by divine right, because it is immediately from God. ¹ Ibid.

You will ask 3° whether natural law contain more precepts, or only one.

I answer. that it contains more precepts, which nevertheless are founded upon this one: « Good must be done, evil must be avoided »². ² Here q. 94, a. 2, o.

[Precepts of a triple kind are natural, according as there is in man a triple grade of inclination: 1° According to common nature with all beings, there is in him inclination toward conservation of his being, according to which the law of nature commands that sleep, food be taken, destructive things resisted. 2° According to common nature with all animals, there is in him inclination toward conservation of species, according to which there pertain to the law of nature the precepts of temperance concerning acts tending to this end and the education of offspring. 3° According to the nature of reason, which is proper to man, there is in him inclination to truth about God to be known, to immortality, to communication with other intellectual beings: and to this respond the precepts of adoring God, honoring parents, and similar things of religion and justice.]

They are distinguished. again, the precepts of the law of nature into those per se known to all, such as are the first and universal ones: « Good must be done, evil avoided; what thou wilt not have done to thyself, do thou not to another, etc.; » and into those which are more determined and are drawn immediately from the first, such as the precepts of the Decalogue; at length into remoter ones, which are drawn from the first only mediately, such as many which concern contracts¹. ¹ Ibid.

[Precepts of the law of nature can moreover be distinguished by order to the persons about whom they are concerned; for some are about God, some about neighbor, some about ourselves.

Therefore the law of nature can be said to be manifold and one: manifold, because it contains many and diverse precepts; one, because all precepts are founded on one, as was said, and are ordered to one last end.]

You will ask 4° whether natural law bind all men, even children and the insane.

I answer. in the affirmative. Yet it binds children and the insane only imperfectly and in first act, not perfectly and in second act.

The reason of the first part, because natural law is innate in all, even children and the insane, from nature itself, as was said, so that what children and the insane do against the law of nature is base and unseemly, as if they blaspheme, defile themselves, or do anything like, and no one may induce them to these; which is an open sign that they are comprehended under natural law and bound by it at least in first act.

The reason of the second part is, that children and the insane are not so bound by natural law that, if they transgress it, they sin and incur guilt of punishment, but are excused from sin and punishment, inasmuch as that law is not promulgated to them; for it is promulgated through actual dictate or discourse, whereof they are not capable: consequently it does not bind them perfectly and in second act.

You will ask 5° whether every obligation be an effect of natural law.

1. A law is defined to be: A precept just and abiding, given for promulgation to a perfect community. A law is primarily a rule of action. The first attribute of a law is that it be just: just to the subject on whom it is imposed, as being no harmful abridgment of his rights: just also to other men, as not moving him to injustice against them. An unjust law is no law at all, for it is not a rule of action. Still, we may sometimes be bound, when only our own rights are infringed, to submit to such an imposition, not as a law, for it is none, but on the score of prudence, to escape direr evils. A law is no fleeting, occasional rule of conduct, suited to meet some passing emergency or superficial disturbance. The reason of a law lies deep down, lasting and widespread in the nature of the governed. A law, then, has these two further attributes of permanence in duration and amplitude in area. Every law is made for all time, and lives on with the life of the community for whom it is enacted, for ever, unless it be either expressly or implicitly repealed. A law in a community is like a habit in an individual, an accretion to nature, which abides as part of the natural being, and guides henceforth the course of natural action. This analogy holds especially of those laws, which are not enacted all of a sudden—and such are rarely the best laws—but grow upon the people with gradual growth unmarked, like a habit by the repetition of acts, in the way of immemorial custom. I have said that a law is for a community, that it requires amplitude and large area. A law is not laid down for an individual, except so far as his action is of importance to the community. The private concerns of one man do not afford scope and room enough for a law. Neither do the domestic affairs of one family. A father is not a legislator. A law aims at a deep, far-reaching, primary good. But the private good of an individual, and the domestic good of a family, are not primary goods, inasmuch as the individual and the family are not primary but subordinate beings: not complete and independent, but dependent and partial; not wholes but parts. The individual is part of the family, and the family is part of a higher community. It is only when we are come to some community which is not part of any higher, that we have found the being, the good of which is primary good, the aim of law. Such a community, not being part of any higher community in the same order, is in its own order a perfect community. Thus, in the temporal order, the individual is part of the State. The State is a perfect community; and the good of the State is of more consequence than the temporal well-being of any individual citizen. The temporal good of the individual, then, is matter of law, in so far as it is subservient to the good of the State. We have, then, to hold that a law is given to the members of a perfect community for the good of the whole. Not every precept, therefore, is a law: nor every superior a lawgiver: for it is not every superior that has charge of the good of a perfect community. Many a precept is given to an individual, either for his private good, as when a father commands his child, or for the private good of him that issues the precept, as when a master commands a servant. But every law is a precept: for a law is an imperative rule of action, in view of a good that is necessary, at least with the necessity of convenience. To every law there are counsels attached. A law may be said to be a nucleus of precept, having an envelope of counsel. Every law has also a pendent called punishment for those who break it: this is called the sanction of the law. A law is also for promulgation, as a birch rod for application. The promulgation, or application, brings the law home to the subject, but is not part of the law itself. So much for the definition of Law.

2. We have to learn to look upon the whole created universe, and the fulness thereof, angels, men, earth, sun, planets, fixed stars, all things visible and invisible, as one great and perfect community, whose King and Lawgiver is God. He is King, because He is Creator and Lord. But lordship and kingship are different things, even in God. It is one thing to be lord and master, owner and proprietor of a chattel, property and domain: it is another thing to be king and governor, lawgiver and judge of political subjects. The former is called power of dominion, or right of ownership, the latter is power of jurisdiction. Power of dominion is for the good of him who wields it: but power of jurisdiction is for the good of the governed. As God is Lord of the universe, He directs all its operations to His own glory. As He is King, He governs as a king should govern, for the good of His subjects. In intellectual creatures, whose will is not set in opposition to God, the subject's good and the glory of the Lord finally coincide. God's power of dominion is the concern of theologians: the moralist is taken up with His power of jurisdiction, from whence emanates the moral law.

3. In the last chapter (s. ii., nn. 9, 10, pp. 120, 121), we stated the moral law in these terms, that God wills to bind His creatures to certain lines of action, not arbitrary lines, as we saw, but the natural lines of each creature's being. The law thus stated takes in manifestly a wider field than that of moral action. There is in fact no action of created things that is not comprehended under this statement. It comprises the laws of physical nature and the action of physical causes, no less than the moral law and human acts. It is the one primeval law of the universe, antecedent to all actual creation, and co-eternal with God. And yet not necessary as God: for had God not decreed from all eternity to create—and He need not have decreed it—neither would He have passed in His own Divine Mind this second decree, necessarily consequent as it is upon the decree of creation, namely, that every creature should act in the mode of action proper of its kind. This decree, supervening from eternity upon the creative decree, is called the Eternal Law.

4. This law does not govern the acts of God Himself. God ever does what is wise and good, not because He binds Himself by the decree of His own will so to act, but because of His all-perfect nature. His own decrees have not for Him the force of a precept: that is impossible in any case: yet He cannot act against them, as His nature allows not of irresolution, change of mind, and inconsistency.

5. Emanating from the will of God, and resting upon the nature of the creature, it would seem that the Eternal Law must be irresistible. "Who resisteth His will?" asks the Apostle. (Rom. ix. 19.) "The streams of sacred rivers are flowing upwards, and justice and the universal order is wrenched back." (Euripides, Medea, 499.) It is only the perversion spoken of by the poet, that can anywise supply the instance asked for by the Apostle. The thing is impossible in the physical order. The rivers cannot flow upwards, under the conditions under which rivers usually flow: but justice and purity, truth and religion may be wrenched back, in violation of nature and of the law eternal. The one thing that breaks this law is sin. Sin alone is properly unnatural. The world is full of physical evils, pain, famine, blindness, disease, decay and death. But herein is nothing against nature: the several agents act up to their nature, so far as it goes: it is the defect of nature that makes the evil. But sin is no mere shortcoming: it is a turning round and going against nature, as though the July sun should freeze a man, or the summer air suffocate him. Physical evil comes by the defect of nature, and by permission of the Eternal Law. But the moral evil of sin is a breach of that law.

6. A great point with modern thinkers is the inviolability of the laws of physical nature, e.g., of gravitation or of electrical induction. If these laws are represented, as J. S. Mill said they should be, as tendencies only, they are truly inviolable. The law of gravitation is equally fulfilled in a falling body, in a body suspended by a string, and in a body borne up by the ministry of an angel. There is no law of nature to the effect that a supernatural force shall never intervene. Even if, as may be done perhaps in the greatest miracles, God suspends His concurrence, so that the creature acts not at all, even that would be no violation of the physical law of the creature's action: for all that such a law provides is, that the creature, if it acts at all, shall act in a certain way, not that God shall always give the concurrence which is the necessary condition of its acting at all. The laws of physical nature then are, strictly speaking, never violated, although the course of nature is occasionally altered by supernatural interference, and continually by free human volition. But the laws of physical nature, in the highest generality, are identified with the moral law. The one Eternal Law embraces all the laws of creation. It has a physical and a moral side. On the former it effects, on the latter it obliges, but on both sides it is imperative; and though in moral matters it be temporarily defeated by sin, still the moral behest must in the end be fulfilled as surely as the physical behest. The defeat of the law must be made good, the sin must be punished. Of the Eternal Law working itself out in the form of punishment, we shall speak presently.

7. It is important to hold this conception of the Eternal Law as embracing physical nature along with rational agents. To confine the law, as modern writers do, to rational agents alone, is sadly to abridge the view of its binding force. The rigid application of physical laws is brought home to us daily by science and by experience: it is a point gained, to come to understand that the moral law, being ultimately one with those physical laws, is no less absolute and indefeasible, though in a different manner, than they.

It is hard for us to conceive of laws being given to senseless things. We cannot ourselves prescribe to iron or to sulphur the manner of its action. As Bacon says (Novum Organum, i., Aphorism 4): "Man can only put natural bodies together or asunder: nature does the rest within." That is, man cannot make the laws of nature: he can only arrange collocations of materials so as to avail himself of those laws. But God makes the law, issuing His command, the warrant without which no creature could do anything, that every creature, rational and irrational, shall act each according to its kind or nature. Such is the Eternal Law.

Readings.—Suarez, De Legibus, I., xii.; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 90, art. 2-4; ib., q. 91, art. 1, in corp., ad 1; ib., q. 93, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 93, art. 4, in corp.; ib., q. 93, art. 5, in corp.; ib., q. 93, art. 6, in corp.; Suarez, De Legibus, II., vi.; Cicero, De Legibus, II., iv.; id., De Republica, iii. 22.