Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On the natural law
It is proved. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., II, 14 and 15: The nations who have not the law, namely the Mosaic or Evangelical law, naturally do those things that are of the law. Such as have not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts. From St. Ambrose, lib. IX, epist. 71: « That law is not written but innate, nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a flowing fountain of nature; » from St. Augustine, lib. II Confess., c. 4, n. 9: « Thy law, O Lord, law written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself erases, » and lib. II de Sermone Domini in monte, c. 9, n. 32: « Who wrote in the hearts of men the natural law, save God? »
Prob. 1° ex Apost., Rom., II, 14 et 15 : Gentes quae legem non habent, scilicet Mosaicam aut Evangelicam, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt. Ejusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis. Ex S. Ambrosio, lib. IX, epist. 71 : « Ea lex non scribitur, sed innascitur, nec aliqua percipitur lec tione, sed profluo quodam naturae fonte in singulis exprimitur; » ex S. Augustino, lib. II Confess., c. 4, n. 9 : « Lex tua, Domine, lex scripta in cordibus hominum, quam ne ipsa quidem delet iniquitas, » et lib. II de Sermone Domini in monte, c. 9, n. 32 : « Quis scripsit in cordibus hominum naturalem legem, nisi Deus ? »
It is proved. 2° by reason1. « Law, says St. Thomas, since it be a rule and measure, can be in someone in a twofold way: in one mode, as in the ruler and measurer; in another mode, as in the ruled and measured, because insofar as it participates something of rule or measure, so is it ruled or measured. Whence, since all things which are subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, it is manifest that all things participate after a manner in the eternal law, namely insofar as from its impression they have inclinations into their proper acts and ends. — But among other things the rational creature is subject to divine providence in an excellent manner, insofar as it itself becomes a partaker of providence, providing for itself and for others. Whence also in it is participated eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. And such participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. » 1 Here q. 91, a. 2, o.
Prob. 2° ratione1. « Lex, inquit S. Thomas, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo : uno modo, sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia in quantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde, cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, in quantum scilicet ex impressione ejus habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. — Inter caetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subjacet, in quantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur. » 1 Hic q. 91, a. 2, o.
It is confirmed by the intimate sense and testimony of everyone. For there is no one who does not experience in himself some dictate intimating and commanding that good must be done, evil avoided, God adored, parents honored, lying not committed, stealing not done, etc., in all of which, as the Apostle says, Rom., II, 15, their conscience rendering testimony to them. But this dictate is called natural law.]
Confirmatur ab intimo cujusque sensu et testimonio. Nemo est enim qui in se non experiatur aliquod dictamen intimans et praecipiens bonum esse faciendum, malum esse fugiendum, Deum esse colendum, parentes esse honorandos, non esse mentiendum, non furandum, etc., in his omnibus, ut ait Apostolus, Rom., II, 15, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum. Hoc autem dictamen dicitur lex naturalis.]
I answer. Among various opinions, it seems truer that natural law is nothing else than the natural light as impressed upon and participated from reason or the eternal law1; because thus are had all things which are wont to be attributed to natural law. 1° It is inborn in us, and found in children and the insane. 2° It is not only demonstrative of good, but also preceptive, because it is impression and participation of the eternal law, consequently empire of superior over inferior. 3° It binds by divine right, because it is immediately from God. 1 Ibid.
Resp. Inter varias opiniones, verius videtur legem naturalem nihil aliud esse quam lumen naturale ut impressum et participatum a ratione seu lege aeterna1; quia sic habentur omnia quae solent tribui legi naturali. 1° Nobis innascitur, reperiturque in pueris et amentibus. 2° Est non solum ostensiva, sed etiam praeceptiva boni, quia est impressio et participatio legis aeternae, consequenter imperium superioris ad inferiorem. 3° Obligat jure divino, quia est immediate a Deo. 1 Ibid.
You will ask 3° whether natural law contain more precepts, or only one.
Petes 3° utrum lex naturalis contineat plura praecepta, vel unum tantum.
I answer. that it contains more precepts, which nevertheless are founded upon this one: « Good must be done, evil must be avoided »2. 2 Here q. 94, a. 2, o.
Resp. continere plura praecepta, quae tamen fundantur in hoc uno : « Bonum est faciendum, malum est fugiendum »2. 2 Hic q. 94, a. 2, o.
[Precepts of a triple kind are natural, according as there is in man a triple grade of inclination: 1° According to common nature with all beings, there is in him inclination toward conservation of his being, according to which the law of nature commands that sleep, food be taken, destructive things resisted. 2° According to common nature with all animals, there is in him inclination toward conservation of species, according to which there pertain to the law of nature the precepts of temperance concerning acts tending to this end and the education of offspring. 3° According to the nature of reason, which is proper to man, there is in him inclination to truth about God to be known, to immortality, to communication with other intellectual beings: and to this respond the precepts of adoring God, honoring parents, and similar things of religion and justice.]
[Triplicis generis sunt praecepta naturalia, secundum quod est in homine triplex inclinationis gradus : 1° Secundum naturam communem omnibus entibus, inest ipsi inclinatio ad conservationem sui esse, juxta quam lex naturae praecipit esse dormiendum, comedendum, destructivis resistendum. 2° Secundum naturam communem omnibus animalibus, inest ipsi inclinatio ad conservationem speciei, juxta quam pertinent ad legem naturae praecepta temperantiae circa actus tendentes ad hunc finem et educationem prolium. 3° Secundum naturam rationis, quae est homini propria, inest illi inclinatio ad veritatem de Deo cognoscendam, ad immortalitatem, ad communicationem cum aliis entibus intellectualibus : et huic respondent praecepta Deum colendi, parentes honorandi, et similia religionis et justitiae.]
They are distinguished. again, the precepts of the law of nature into those per se known to all, such as are the first and universal ones: « Good must be done, evil avoided; what thou wilt not have done to thyself, do thou not to another, etc.; » and into those which are more determined and are drawn immediately from the first, such as the precepts of the Decalogue; at length into remoter ones, which are drawn from the first only mediately, such as many which concern contracts1. 1 Ibid.
Distinguuntur iterum praecepta legis naturae in ea quae sunt per se omnibus nota, qualia sunt prima et universalia : « Bonum est faciendum, malum fugiendum ; quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris, etc.; » et in ea quae sunt magis determinata et immediate deducuntur ex primis, ut sunt praecepta Decalogi; tandem in remotiora, quae mediate tantum deducuntur ex primis, ut sunt plura quae spectant contractus1. 1 Ibid.
[Precepts of the law of nature can moreover be distinguished by order to the persons about whom they are concerned; for some are about God, some about neighbor, some about ourselves.
[Possunt insuper distingui praecepta legis naturae per ordinem ad personas circa quas versantur; quaedam enim sunt circa Deum, quaedam circa proximum, quaedam circa nos.
Therefore the law of nature can be said to be manifold and one: manifold, because it contains many and diverse precepts; one, because all precepts are founded on one, as was said, and are ordered to one last end.]
Itaque lex naturae potest dici multiplex et una : multiplex, quia continet plura et diversa praecepta; una, quia omnia praecepta fundantur in uno, ut dictum est, et ad unum ultimum finem ordinantur.]
You will ask 4° whether natural law bind all men, even children and the insane.
Petes 4° utrum lex natura obliget omnes homines, etiam pueros et amentes.
I answer. in the affirmative. Yet it binds children and the insane only imperfectly and in first act, not perfectly and in second act.
Resp. affirmative. Pueros tamen et amentes obligat imperfecte tantum et in actu primo, non perfecte et in actu secundo.
The reason of the first part, because natural law is innate in all, even children and the insane, from nature itself, as was said, so that what children and the insane do against the law of nature is base and unseemly, as if they blaspheme, defile themselves, or do anything like, and no one may induce them to these; which is an open sign that they are comprehended under natural law and bound by it at least in first act.
Ratio prima partis, quia lex naturalis est omnibus, etiam pueris et amentibus, cum natura indita, ut dictum est, ita ut quae pueri et amentes agunt contra legem naturae sit turpe et indecens, ut si blasphement, se polluant, aut quid simile agant, nec cuiquam licet eos ad haec inducere; quod est signum apertum eos sub lege naturali comprehendi et ea obligari saltem in actu primo.
The reason of the second part is, that children and the insane are not so bound by natural law that, if they transgress it, they sin and incur guilt of punishment, but are excused from sin and punishment, inasmuch as that law is not promulgated to them; for it is promulgated through actual dictate or discourse, whereof they are not capable: consequently it does not bind them perfectly and in second act.
Ratio secundae partis est, quia pueri et amentes non sic obligantur lege naturali, ut si eam transgrediantur, peccent et incurrant reatum poenae, sed a peccato et poena excusantur, quatenus ista lex non est illis promulgata; promulgatur enim per dictamen actuale seu discursus, cujus non sunt capaces : consequenter eos non obligat perfecte et in actu secundo.
You will ask 5° whether every obligation be an effect of natural law.
Petes 5° utrum omnis obligatio sit effectus legis naturalis.
I answer. that not every obligation is a proximate effect of natural law, yet that it is a remote effect.
Resp. non omnem obligationem esse effectum proximum legis naturalis, esse tamen effectum remotum.
The reason of the first part is, that positive laws, divine as well as human, bind per se immediately, nor will anyone say that the obligation of fasting in Lent, confessing annually, communicating at Easter, believing, hoping, etc., arise proximately and per se from natural law.
Ratio primae partis est, quia leges positivae, tam divinae quam humanae, per se immediate obligant, neque ullus dicet obligationem jejunandi in Quadragesima, confitendi annue, communicandi in Paschate, credendi, sperandi, etc., oriri proxime et per se ex lege naturae.
The reason of the second part is: Positive law binds therefore, because natural law dictates and prescribes that obedience be rendered to one legitimately commanding, and hence theologians teach that no one turns away from God as supernatural author without turning away from him as natural author; which cannot be verified except because, transgressing the supernatural law, he at once transgresses natural law.
Ratio secundae partis est : Ideo lex positiva obligat, quia lex naturalis dictat et praescribit esse obtemperandum legitime praecipienti, et ideo docent theologi neminem averti a Deo ut authore supernaturali, quin avertatur ab eo ut authore naturali; quod verificari non potest, nisi quia, transgrediendo legem supernaturalem, simul transgreditur legem naturalem.
Whether and how natural right is distinguished from the right of nations, you have in the tract. on Right, dissert. I, art. 3.
Utrum et quomodo jus naturale distinguatur a jure gentium, habes in tract. de Jure, dissert. I, art. 3.
Again, whether invincible ignorance of natural right could occur? The affirmative solution and ample proof seek in the preceding tract. dissert. V, art. 4.
Iterum, utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae ? Affirmative resolutum et late probatum require in tract. praeced. dissert. V, art. 4.
There remains one question alone, likewise celebrated, although perhaps more of name than of thing is treated in it, namely whether natural law admit dispensation. Whence
Superest unica quaestio etiam celebris, licet forte plus in ea agatur de nomine quam de re, utrum scilicet lex naturalis admittat dispensationem. Unde