First Question: On the Essence of Eternal Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

239. Thesis. Eternal law is rightly defined by St. Augustine, bk. 22, Against Faustus, c. 29: the reason or will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed; and by St. Thomas: the reason of divine wisdom according as it is directive of all acts and motions in order to the common good of the whole universe.

It is proved: just as in an artisan there preexists the concept or reason of those things which are made through art, and this is called the idea or exemplar of things to be made, so in a governor there must preexist the concept or reason of the order of those things which are to be done by those who are governed; and this reason, ordination, and conception of the one governing the acts of subjects is called law. But God by His wisdom is the maker of all things, of which He is the artisan; He is also the governor of all acts and motions. Whence, just as the reason or conception of divine wisdom, insofar as by it all things have been created, has the notion of idea or exemplar, so the reason of divine wisdom ordering and moving all things to the due end, the good of the whole universe, obtains the notion of law.

240. Therefore eternal law differs:

1. from the divine idea: this is the exemplar of things to be made; that is the order of things to be governed, bringing necessity or obligation to them; whence the idea is supposed to law, because a thing is to be made before it is to be governed;

2. from providence: a) because law has the force of obligating, but not providence; b) because law regards the good of the whole universe, providence also the particular good of each thing; c) providence is, as it were, the conclusion of law and follows it: law hands down rules in general for the governance of the world; providence, as a part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the movements of creatures according to law.