First Article. On Eternal And Natural Law

111. What eternal law is. Eternal law is the divine will, which necessarily and from eternity wills that creatures to be created preserve the order constituted by divine wisdom, or that creatures to be created fittingly strive toward their proper ends.

a. From eternity God by His wisdom saw all things to be created in time; likewise from eternity by His most free will He decreed to create the world in time for His own glory. By this act of the intellect God knew the universal end to be assigned to the world and the particular ends to be assigned to individual things; and at the same time He knew the operations by which the things to be created could attain both the universal and the particular end. But by the decree of the will He established that the things to be created should strive toward their ends by fitting operations. The operations by which the things to be created strive toward their ends constitute the order of the universe, the order of nature. But eternal law consists in that act of the divine will by which the operations of creatures are ordered to their ends.

b. Eternal law of itself is universal, so that its object is constituted not only by the moral order, or the operations by which rational beings strive toward the end, but also by the physical order, or the operations of beings lacking reason, indeed even by the supernatural order, or the operations by which man, elevated into a son of God, strives toward the end of eternal life. Therefore according to St. Thomas, eternal law is the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all acts and motions.² Yet for the most part eternal law is customarily considered only in relation to the moral order, and that the natural order.

c. It is clear that eternal law as such differs from other laws in two ways: a. because it has no subjects whom it obliges, nor operations which it directs, since from eternity there are none capable of obligation and direction; b. because eternal law as such, or antecedently to natural law, produces no obligation in men, since it has not been promulgated to them.

¹ Suarez, De legibus, l. 1, c. 1-4. Seydl, Das ewige Gesetz (Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, Vienna: Mayer, 1902). Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., p. 332 ff. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis, 2nd ed., n. 238 ff.

² Summa I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

112. What natural law is. 1. Natural law subjectively is the obligation necessarily imposed upon men of tending by fitting acts toward their proper end. Therefore it is eternal law itself imposed upon men by the command of the divine will.

a. The end to which man is ordered, together with the actions by which he can attain it, constitutes the moral order. Hence natural law can also be called the obligation imposed upon men of preserving the moral order.

b. Since acts fitting to the order are good, but acts unfitting to it are evil, natural law can be called the obligation imposed upon men of doing good and avoiding evil.

c. Once the decree of creating a rational creature has been supposed, God cannot but will those things which are good and necessary for preserving the order, and He cannot but not will those things which are evil. Therefore, once the existence of a rational creature has been supposed, God necessarily commands and prohibits those things which belong to natural law.

2. Natural law objectively is the moral order constituted by God, consisting in operations which, with consideration of man's relation to God, to himself, and to neighbors, must necessarily be done or omitted. These operations considered objectively are just so many norms by which all human activity is ruled.

Therefore the matter of natural law is constituted by all those things which by their nature are honorable and necessary for the end, and by those things which by their nature are evil. And since those things which by their nature are evil disturb the order of nature, but those things which by their nature are honorable conduce to preserving the order of nature, the law of nature is rightly defined by St. Augustine: the reason and will of God commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed.¹

3. God promulgated natural law through the light of reason. For God placed in human reason a power by which, with great facility, it can form moral ideas and moral principles, and by reasoning can deduce conclusions or first moral precepts from the supreme principles. Therefore St. Thomas most beautifully calls natural law a participation of eternal law in the rational creature.²

a. Therefore the act by which God promulgated the law of nature is creation itself, by which He placed the natural light of reason in men. For this reason an absolutely obliging law has been imposed upon all men by force of rational nature, which all can know by their reason, and which all are held to observe by their operations. Hence St. Paul: "For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do those things which are of the law, such persons, not having the law, are a law to themselves. They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them."³ The arguments of reason by which the existence of natural law is proved can be compared among the moral philosophers.⁴

b. Therefore natural law differs from eternal law as a law which is at once in the legislator and in the subjects differs from a law which is only in the mind of the legislator.

4. The subject of the law of nature is every man of all times and places: for the foundation of natural law is rational nature; besides this, it is itself the means by which man is ordered and directed to his end. But rational nature is the same in all, and all have been destined to the same end.

Therefore not even those who lack the use of reason, such as infants and the perpetually insane, are exempt from the obligation of natural law, since they too have rational nature. Nevertheless these are obliged by the law only in first act, and therefore in violating the law they sin only materially.

5. Natural law is the foundation of any positive law, and this in a twofold way: first, because the obligation of obeying a legitimate superior, whether God or man, is had from the law of nature; then, because a law which is contrary to the law of nature has no force. For that is not a law which contains what is unfitting to human nature and to the end to which man has been destined.

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27.

² Summa I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

³ Rom. 2:14-15.

⁴ Cathrein, l.c. Meyer, l.c. Schindler, p. 144 ff.

113. On the precepts of natural law. 1. The precepts of natural law by reason of knowledge are of three kinds:

a. To the first belong certain most universal principles of morals, such as: good is to be done, evil is to be fled; the supreme deity is to be worshiped; the highest good is to be loved; benefactors are to be honored; what you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another, etc. These principles are not derived from others, but from them all and each of the precepts of the law are deduced by the discourse of reason.

b. To the second belong those precepts which are deduced from universal principles immediately and by an obvious and easy discourse, of this kind: honor father and mother; you shall not steal; and the rest which are contained in the Decalogue (except the determination of the Sabbath).

Therefore not only the supreme moral principles but also the precepts of the Decalogue, as universal norms of human actions, are known to all peoples, even uncultivated ones, of all times and places, as is established from ethnology.¹

c. To the third belong those precepts which are inferred only mediately and remotely from the first principles or from the precepts of the Decalogue, after diligent study has been premised and by a more subtle discourse, as: an injury inflicted on someone is not to be avenged by one's own authority; found things must be restored.

Even precepts of the third kind are necessarily commanded or prohibited; nevertheless, since they are often indeterminate and ambiguous, they furnish a foundation for positive laws, by which they are more accurately determined and firmly constituted.

2. Considered according to force and efficacy, the precepts of nature are of two kinds: some are called primary, which nature absolutely demands, because without them the moral order is rendered impossible; others secondary, to which nature indeed strongly inclines, because without them the moral order is less perfect, but which nevertheless it does not absolutely demand.

Thus nature absolutely demands the unity of marriage insofar as it excludes polyandry; but it does not absolutely demand the unity of marriage insofar as it excludes polygyny. Hence polyandry is absolutely prohibited by the law of nature, but polygyny, though less conformable to the same law, is not absolutely prohibited. The same must be said of the dissolution of marriage.

3. Considered according to the mode of obliging, some precepts of the law of nature are absolute, or independent of every condition, as: God is to be worshiped; others are conditioned, which suppose some fact on which they depend, as: a vow or oath is to be observed. From this arises the division of the law of nature into absolute and conditioned.

¹ V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., I, p. 344 ff. W. Schneider, Allgemeinheit und Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1895).

114. Whether the precepts of natural law can be invincibly unknown. Because the precepts of natural law are of three kinds, a distinction is needed in solving this question.

1. The first principles of natural law cannot be invincibly unknown by an adult who is fully self-possessed in reason: for the first moral principles are immediately evident to one who understands their terms; but truths of this kind cannot be unknown by one who uses reason sufficiently cultivated.

2. The second principles of natural law, which are contained in the Decalogue, cannot be invincibly unknown for a long time: for those things which are evidently deduced from known principles by an obvious and easy inference cannot long lie hidden from a man possessed of cultivated reason. If he does not know them clearly, he is at least incited through remorse of conscience to investigating the truth.

Therefore if some labor for a longer time under ignorance of these precepts, it must be called vincible and culpable, as having arisen not from defect of intellectual light, but from malice of the will. For with the Apostle as witness, because of depraved customs the law of nature can be erased from the hearts of men, who nevertheless are not excused from sin because of this ignorance.¹

3. The more remote precepts of natural law, which are deduced from their principles only with great difficulty and after diligent study has been premised, can be invincibly unknown even for a long time by those who have never devoted themselves to studies, and often in fact are unknown. This is shown by the disagreement of theologians and even of the holy Fathers themselves concerning these precepts.²

All indeed concede that theoretically there is invincible ignorance of natural law; but the probabiliorists, tutiorists, and Jansenists denied that practically there can be ignorance of this kind and that the one operating is therefore excused from sin. But since this opinion has not only been proscribed by the Church,³ but today is also obsolete, it is enough to have indicated it.⁴

¹ Cf. Rom. 1:20 ff.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 48.

³ "Although invincible ignorance of natural law may be granted, in the state of fallen nature this does not excuse the one operating from formal sin from it." Proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VIII (December 7, 1690).

⁴ Cf. Lacroix, l. 1, n. 720 ff. Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum, diss. 11, c. 5. St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 170-174.

115. Concerning ignorance of the Decalogue, for practice it must be noted what authors commonly teach after consulting experience.

a. The malice of internal acts, namely of depraved thoughts and desires, especially inefficacious ones, can be invincibly unknown.

b. The malice of external acts can also be invincibly unknown, especially by children and the uneducated, indeed also by others in extraordinary circumstances, as where human law tolerates what is morally evil. Thus it can happen that someone is ignorant of the malice of pollution; that he thinks it licit to lie in order to save his own life or another's, to steal from evil rich persons in order to succor good poor persons, to perjure himself in order to protect life. Indeed there are some who affirm that it can happen that even Christians think fornication licit in places where public prostitutes are permitted.¹

c. Whether the malice of an internal act can invincibly be unknown even when the malice of the external act is known, and therefore whether someone can invincibly think that a serious will of sinning (stealing) is not sin if the external act (theft), which he knows to be evil, has not followed, is not one opinion among authors. For while some affirm this, St. Alphonsus with others denies it in these words: "I have never been able to judge this opinion probable."² In practice penitents in these cases will have to be prudently questioned as to whether they had some, at least confused, knowledge of the malice, and their assertion must be believed.

¹ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis sacramentalis (Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1901), III, pr. IV, n. 572.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, De conscientia, n. 9. Lacroix, l. 1, n. 35.

116. On the immutability of natural law. A twofold change of the law of nature is distinguished: internal, by which the law itself is abrogated or changed into another; and external, by which dispensation is made in the law through either human or divine power.

1. The law of nature cannot be changed intrinsically: for since the law of nature contains that which is fitting to human nature, with account taken of its religious, sensitive-rational, and social character, it cannot be changed unless human nature is changed.

2. Natural law cannot be changed extrinsically even by divine power. Nevertheless: a. in secondary precepts God can permit an exception for a time for obtaining a higher end; and b. in those actions which are not absolutely base, He can dispense improperly.

a. The law of nature, once creation has been supposed, is necessary and independent of the will of God; therefore it also necessarily endures unchanged so long as human nature remains the same. And indeed God must always will that man worship his creator, that he subject the sensitive appetite to reason, and that he observe charity and justice toward his neighbor.

b. Since the order of nature does not absolutely demand secondary precepts, but demands them only so that it may be perfect, nothing prevents God from permitting an exception for a time for obtaining a higher end. Thus God permitted the children of the first parents to take sisters as spouses in order to preserve the unity of the human race; thus also He permitted the dissolution of marriage and servitude to the Israelite people for a time.

c. A law is said to be changed properly if the obligation of the law ceases while the same matter of the law remains; but a law is said to be changed improperly if the obligation of the law ceases when the matter of the law has become another. In order to understand how it can happen that the matter of the law is changed, it must be noted that sometimes the matter of natural law is evil simply in itself; thus speech injurious to God is evil in itself and on account of itself. But sometimes it is evil in itself for this reason, that another's right is annexed to it. Now one who exercises dominion over that right, by taking away that right, can bring it about that an action which was formerly illicit now becomes licit. It is clear that the natural law which prohibits another's right from being injured is not changed in this case, but the matter of the law, with some circumstance removed from it, has been changed.¹

Thus natural law prohibits killing oneself or an innocent person; likewise it prohibits taking another's thing. If, however, God, who is lord of life and death and of all things, permits or commands this, it can licitly be done.²

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl I, n. 190.

² Cf. Gen. 22:2; Ex. 3:22; 11:2; 12:35.

117. 3. A fortiori the Church cannot change the law of nature. Nevertheless she can infallibly declare and interpret it, indeed in those precepts whose particular obligation depends upon an act of the human will, she can improperly dispense. Thus in fact she dispenses in vows and oaths, in ratified marriage, and in religious profession.

In order that this may be explained, the following things must be noted:

1. Obligations of the law of nature are of two kinds: some affect individuals independently of an act of the human will, as God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, one must not lie, etc.; others affect individuals only dependently upon an act of the human will. Of this kind are obligations which arise from contracts, vows, and oaths.

2. In obligations of the first kind the supreme pontiff cannot dispense; in obligations of the second kind he does not properly dispense, because he does not relax the obligation of natural law (that a vow is to be fulfilled, that a promise is to be kept), but according to the power which he uses over the human will, he permits the act of the will by which the obligation of the law of nature was induced in a particular case to be changed or retracted. When this has been done, the obligation itself ceases in this individual. But because the obligation has been contracted toward God, the act of the human will inducing the obligation can be changed and retracted not at will, but only with God consenting (that is, with a just cause existing). Therefore when the supreme pontiff dispenses from a just cause, he himself declares that God consents to the change of the will.

3. From these things it is clear that the supreme pontiff has the power of dispensing in divine natural law signifies nothing other than that the supreme pontiff can declare when God consents to a change of the will from which the obligation of the law arose. But God willed that the supreme pontiff be furnished with this power because it is not only expedient for the faithful, but sometimes plainly necessary. For when the inconstancy of worldly things is considered on the one hand, and the imprudence and inconsideration of men on the other, it not rarely happens that obligations contracted from the human will are more harmful than useful to men.¹

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 406 ff.