Eutrapelia (Recreation and Jesting)

I. Notion of Eutrapely. Eutrapely is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate actions and words in playful matters and jokes, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 168, a. 4).

II. Object of Eutrapely. 1. The remote material object is formed by playful actions and joking words; the proximate object is the passions which are occupied around these actions and words.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of preserving the right measure in playful and joking things; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in preserving the aforesaid measure.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess, scurrility is opposed to eutrapely, by which someone uses playful things and jokes beyond the measure of right reason (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 168, a. 3); by defect, moroseness, by which someone abstains from playful things and jokes against the prescription of right reason (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 168, a. 4).¹

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 157 (p. 502).

VI. Particular resolutions. The following are guilty of grave scandal:

1. Those who have a custom of blaspheming.

2. Those who speak very filthy things, especially if this happens before younger persons or persons of a different sex. A milder judgment must be made about immodest jokes among married persons and ruder persons (St. Alphonsus, III, 426).

3. Those who compose, print, circulate, or sing truly filthy songs.

4. Those who compose, print, etc., notably filthy or impious plays; likewise actors and actresses and others who cooperate in such plays (St. Alphonsus, III, 428); likewise dancers of scenic dances in which, on account of the dancers' dress, obscene manners of dancing, or lascivious gestures, the greatest turpitude appears.

5. Those who sculpt, paint, or represent by photograph very filthy statues or images; likewise those who represent obscene things by the help of a lifelike instrument, such as a stereoscope, cinematograph, or bioscope; likewise those who expose things of this kind in gardens, a workshop, a house, to the sight of all (St. Alphonsus, II, 56; Hom. Ap., tr. 4, n. 8); likewise makers and sellers of women's clothing or adornment who publicly expose models adorned in such a way that they are gravely offensive.

6. Those who compose, publish, print, circulate books, newspapers, or other writings notably opposed to religion or good morals; likewise booksellers, or any others, who sell books or newspapers of this kind to anyone, or procure them to be read, and thus spread the poison of souls; likewise those who in libraries erected for lending books expose poisonous works for the use of all; likewise those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books; likewise those who hand over to children books which, although not evil in themselves, treat of matter whose knowledge for them, on account of their natural innocence and sensitivity, is thought to be gravely offensive.¹

7. Husbands who retain at home a maidservant suspected by the wife not without reason; likewise wives who, by admitting their pretty lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; likewise clerics who, by visiting or not dismissing a person suspected by the people, give an occasion of sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, at least if the suspicion of the people is founded on the morals of the person retained or on known excessive familiarity.²

8. Parents and other superiors who blaspheme before their children or commit other grave sins, or neglect grave duties of a Christian person; likewise those who, without grave cause and without precautions having been applied, send them to dangerous schools or permit them other occasions and dangers, such as solitary conversations with lovers and betrothed persons.

9. Daughters and maidservants of tavern-keepers who behave rather loosely before everyone, commonly permitting kisses and embraces.

10. Women and girls who use truly dishonorable dress. But this - since indeed the question is very current - let us explain more fully. Now:

a) Dress, with our matter considered, can be distinguished as threefold: honorable, indecent, and dishonorable or lascivious.

Honorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, in no way or scarcely excites to lust; as if nothing or only a small part of the breast is bared, and the garments are lowered at least below the knees.

Indecent dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, lightly or moderately excites to lust; as if the whole upper part of the breast, or a notable part of it, is bared, or the garments reach only to the knees.

Dishonorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, gravely provokes to lust; as if the breasts are wholly or partly bared, or are covered only with a transparent covering, or the garments do not even reach to the knees,³ or are fitted to the body in such a way that almost the entire form of the body is displayed.

b) Not only those who use dishonorable dress, but also those who introduce indecent dress, are guilty of grave scandal, if from a custom of this kind introduced the spiritual ruin of many is imminent.

c) Women, in church or outside church, while they assist at sacred rites, should be with the head covered and modestly dressed, especially when they approach the Lord's table (can. 1262, § 2); these things should be extended to Catholic gatherings, whether religious or social.

d) Dress not only dishonorable, but even indecent, must be earnestly restrained and uprooted by preachers and confessors, as far as this can be done. This also holds with respect to boys and girls, who thus lose natural modesty; and this must be urged all the more because indecent and dishonorable dress is today promoted by deliberate effort.

Corollary I. It is lawful for women and girls, provided propriety or honorableness is preserved, to dress themselves and adorn themselves in an elegant manner, whether so that they may please their husband more, or, if there is question of girls of marriageable age, so that they may arrive at an honorable marriage, or so that they may present themselves fittingly according to their condition. If they act thus from vanity, they sin lightly; if with that intention that they provoke men or young men to lust, they sin gravely (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, II, 54, 55; III, 425).

Corollary II. If someone uses the clothing of the other sex, "of itself it is not a grave sin... and sometimes none, if a just cause is present, for example for hiding oneself. But it could be grave from the circumstances of danger of lust or scandal" (St. Alphonsus, II, 52; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2, ad 3). These things you may also apply to the use of masks.

11. Finally, those introducing a manner of acting, for example women's adornment, as has already been noted, or amusements, which although they are not truly dishonorable, are nevertheless going to become for many an occasion of grave sins, are guilty of grave scandal (St. Alphonsus, II, 55).

¹ Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 295.

² Konings, loc. cit.

³ I do not speak of girls of lesser age, although this custom too cannot be approved.

III. Cooperation in dangerous amusements. 1. To perform plays or dances notably dishonorable is gravely illicit, and no excusing cause seems able to be admitted. The same must be said of plays notably contrary to religion (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 428). A somewhat milder judgment seems to have to be made about musicians.

2. To concur in introducing plays of this kind, if the concurrence is necessary, cannot be excused. Nor in practice will an excusing cause be present, even if the concurrence is not necessary. But to favor plays or dances of this kind by applause is formal cooperation.

3. To introduce amusements which indeed are not in themselves dishonorable, but are dangerous to very many, is of itself a grave sin (n. 551).

It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules can be given:

(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures; also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae mulierum.

(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves; or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.

(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned), by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity, or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their language objectionable).

(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls, cabarets, road houses, and night clubs—where there is no supervision and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and boisterousness—are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may be found even in more respectable places.

(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details, sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.

Formal Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—(a) Cases of formal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent plays. (b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows, organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations for these affairs.

Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—Material cooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one’s patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one’s presence or patronage.

(c) Cases of remote material cooperation are those of the owners who rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards, box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused, if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene jokes.

The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.—These two virtues, though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness) is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.

(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is, in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman, according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii, 10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome, makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is indulgent towards opponents.

(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances, suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official, business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).

(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or little affection.

(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of games eutrapelia, which may also be called reasonable relaxation, urbanity, or pleasantness.

Modest Relaxation.—(a) The Virtue.—Just as the body fatigued by manual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation afforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind cannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by some kind of amusement or diversion. The desire for recreation is, therefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special need of its temperate management by right reason. The person who prudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has the virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and which St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.

(b) The Sin of Excess.—Relaxation is excessive in various ways. Sometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies, scandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition of the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the chief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for pleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the circumstances make an amusement unsuitable, such as the person (e.g., when a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a female takes part in sports unsuited to her sex), or the time (e.g., when the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or other Work, are spent in golfing or fishing; when Good Friday or a day of bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place (eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g., when the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or parodied), or the quantity (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres, automobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for duties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by violent games).

(b) The Sin of Defect.—Those persons offend here who deprive themselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a holiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere with the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others miserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those who have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to some extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look pleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

S. Th. II-II, q. 168.

1057. Modesty of manners (zedigheid, bescheidenheid) is the virtue tempering the external motions of the body according to the prescriptions of reason, or the virtue preserving decorum in external motions and gestures.

The matter is bodily motion and exterior gesture, presented to the senses, as gait, standing, sitting, motion of the head, contraction and relaxation of the face, movement of the members, voice, laughter, gaze. In these two things especially are to be avoided: that there be anything effeminate or soft, and that there be anything harsh and rustic.¹

¹ Cicero, De Officiis I, 128.

And indeed: the exterior motions of man are free and orderable by reason: for at the command of reason the exterior members are moved; but that which is subjected to the ordering of reason can be ordered well or badly. Therefore it is manifest that concerning the ordering of these motions a moral virtue is to be constituted (a. 1): insofar namely as they can be corrected by the command of reason (ad 2), and are signs of interior disposition (ad 1), which they presuppose (ad 3).²

² Which St. Ambrose describes splendidly, De Officiis I, c. 18-19.

1058. Various modesty. - Modesty imposes the moderation of congruity according to right reason upon external motions and gestures. But the ordering of these motions is considered as to two things: 1. in one way according to the fittingness of the person according to himself (decentia or adornment; voornaamheid); 2. in another way according to fittingness toward other persons, affairs, times, and places (good ordering; geregeldheid). Hence the office is to moderate gait, voice, speech... in such a way that they fit the person both in himself and as placed in such a place, time, and affair, that is, both with respect to the person acting and with respect to exterior things.

And so modesty does not consider exterior motions insofar as they express a relation of debt to another, but insofar as they are to be moderated so that man is well disposed in himself according to the condition of the person acting and the affairs to be performed. Yet because through these motions we live outwardly with others (to whom they can be burdensome and unpleasant), and motions also are for them certain signs of interior disposition, therefore if moderation of exterior motions of this sort is furnished so that someone exteriorly displays himself as he is interiorly, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of truth (to which simulation and hypocrisy are opposed); if so that he offend no one but on the contrary displays himself agreeable and suitable in society, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of affability (to which flattery is opposed by excess, quarreling by defect); nevertheless from both sides it is elicited by the virtue of modesty. From this it is clear that this virtue is very useful for social life, for a good name, and for the edification of neighbor.

1059. Sins opposed to modesty. - To modesty of manners by excess is opposed affectation (gezochtheid), petulance (courtly mannerism) or insolence, which exceeds the prescription of reason in exterior motions and gestures, for example, if someone exceeds the common mode too much, or assumes a foreign mode which does not fit his own condition, as a religious assuming courtly manners. By defect is opposed: rusticity of manners (boersheid, onbeschaafdheid).

Per se these are venial; per accidens they can be mortal by reason of the end, scandal, offense, grave harm, etc.

1060. Modesty in games. - Modesty is not only concerned generally with serious exterior motions and gestures, but also specially with playful and jesting matters. In the first case it is the virtue described above, and is called eutaxy (welgevoeglijkheid): a good disposition of the body; in the other case it obtains the name of eutrapely: pleasantness or urbanity which befits the mode of virtuously and holily indulging recreation; by others it is called austerity (deftigheid), because games rather are to be moderated so that excess may be avoided. Eutrapely can be defined: the virtue moderating man in the use of games (by deeds) and jests (by words), or the virtue moderating play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect.

Game generally is whatever saying or deed ordered to delight of soul; if it is a saying, it is called jest; if a deed, it is called game. And although someone alone can play, nevertheless, because it is for the most part exercised among many, it is defined as a contest of two or more undertaken for delight of soul. To this contest, lest it grow slack, a pact can be added that the prize yield to the victor, and this is the contract of game, concerning which it was said in the treatise on justice, n. 600.

Game is licit, indeed necessary. For since the power both of soul and body is finite, it follows that by length or vehemence of labor it is wearied, and as bodily weariness is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal weariness is relieved through rest of the soul. But rest of the soul is delectation, and it does not so much consist in cessation from every work, because the soul of one awake never ceases from every work. Therefore a remedy against weariness of soul must be applied through some delectation, the intention by which one had previously insisted upon the study of reason being interrupted. But the sayings or deeds in which delectation is sought, and through delectation the repair of powers, are called jests and games. Therefore it is licit, indeed necessary, for man sometimes to use jests and games, so that there can be sin in defect of playing.

But for it to be licit three things are required:

1. First and principally, that the aforesaid delectation not be sought in any operations or words shameful, or injurious, or harmful to neighbor, as infamy, unjust detriment of fortune, etc.

2. That through play the gravity of the soul not be totally dissolved, as happens in those who are delighted beyond the limits of reason;

3. That the game fit the person, time, and place, and that all circumstances which are required for a virtuous act be observed.

Hence eutrapely is said to be "from good turning, because namely it turns certain sayings or deeds well into solace" (a. 2).

1061. Vices in games. - The virtue of eutrapely moderates play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect. He sins by excess or superfluity who does not observe the three aforesaid conditions. The sin of itself is venial, as being only excess of a good or indifferent thing; yet per accidens it can be mortal in some joined species.

For game is superfluous in two ways insofar as it exceeds the rule of reason: 1. in one way from the species of actions which are assumed, if they are shameful, or contain irreverence toward God and sacred things (for example, if someone abuses the words of Scripture for jests), or are injurious and harmful to neighbor (infamy, unjust detriment of fortune), and then it is a mortal sin from its genus; 2. in another way according to defect of due circumstances, when someone uses play at undue times or in undue places, or also apart from the fittingness of the affair or person. And this is venial, unless because of the vehemence of affection toward play, whose delectation one prefers to the love of God, so that he does not shrink from using such games against the precept of God or of the Church: for thus he places his ultimate end in the delectation of game, and is ready to transgress a grave precept of God or the Church rather than abstain from play. This sin by excess is reduced to buffoonery or inept mirth (a. 3, and ad 2).

He sins by defect who shows himself morose and burdensome to others, displaying nothing delightful and impeding or not receiving the delights of others.

"Everything which is against reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is against reason that someone display himself burdensome to others, for example, when he displays nothing delightful, and also impedes the delights of others.... But those who are deficient in play neither themselves say anything laughable, and they are troublesome to those saying such things, because namely they do not receive the moderate games of others. And therefore such persons are vicious, and are called hard and rustic. But because play is useful on account of rest and delectation; and delectation and rest are not sought for themselves in human life, but on account of operation,... therefore defect of play is less vicious than super-excess of play" (a. 4).

1062. Remarks. - 1. Excess in play, insofar as delectation is sought too much in it, is against modesty and temperance; but insofar as it is too much rest from labor, it is a certain softness which is opposed to perseverance and fortitude.

2. From these things it can be inferred: "the office of actors, which is ordered to displaying solace to men, is not according to itself illicit..." (cf. a. 3, ad 3).

3. Concerning spectacles and dances theologians remark that these, according to themselves, that is, with depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable, but morally indifferent, as pertaining to arts, games, and joyful recreations; nevertheless in practice they sometimes provide an occasion of sinning and become gravely dishonorable:

a) from a depraved, impious, or shameful end;

b) from grave danger of sinning mortally, for example, of perversion in faith or morals;

c) from grave scandal, whether direct, or even indirect, such as easily arises from depraved speech or words, gesture and touches, immodesty in clothing and other modes insufficiently honorable.

Concerning these they customarily treat more fully in pastoral theology.³

³ Thus in our little work: Questions on Various Categories of Penitents, c. III, q. 6: on Worldly Things.

AS modesty in keeping measure consists chiefly in externals, as D. August. teaches, de vita beata, disp. 3. cited by D. Bonavent. lib. 2. Pharetra, cap. 41. so in excess, posture, habit, and in all your movements let nothing be done that offends anyone's aspect, as D. August. says, reg. 3. cap. 20. cited by the holy Doctor.

Whence D. Ambrosius loco citato, de offic. cap. 18. cited by the holy Doctor there, says: Nor do I think it becoming to walk in haste, unless the cause of some danger, or just necessity, requires it.

And D. Isidorus in synon, cap. 9. there. Professio nem tuam habitu, et incessu demonstra. Sit in gressu tuo simplicitas, in motu puritas, in gestu gravitas, in incessu honestas. [Show your profession by habit and gait. Let there be simplicity in your step, purity in your movement, gravity in your gesture, honesty in your walking.] The reason is, because as the exterior members pertain to the physical integrity of man, and are moved according to the command of the will; so too to moral perfection it pertains to order rightly the movements of the same, both that they befit the person acting, and that they be suited also to business and places, as Tannerus argues disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 8. num. 211. from D. Bonavent. in speculo disciplinae ad novitios, part. 1. cap. 19. et seq.

Concerning words, sin occurs in foolish talking, in jests, and in jocose words.

This indeed is that ignorance and flux of words which is dangerous, according to Prov. 10. In multiloquio non deerit peccatum. [In much talking sin will not be wanting.] Of this Isidorus in synon. cap. 9. multiloquium non declinat peccatum, sinuosus enim exundans cito colligit lutum, and there: loqui multum, stultitia est, et vox insipientis in multiplicatio ne sermonis.

D. Gregory, homil. 12. in Ezech. It is exceedingly difficult that he who speaks many things should not also lie.

The same in Pastorali, part. 3. admonit. 15. and lib. 7. Moral. cap. 17. Because it has not the wall of silence, the city of the mind lies open to the darts of the enemy; and when by many words it casts itself outside itself, it offers itself wholly open to the adversary, who overcomes it so much the more without labor, as it, though conquered, fights against itself by much talking. In Proverbs it is said, as a city open, and without the circuit of walls, so is a man who cannot restrain his spirit in speaking.

The same lib. 10. Moral. cap. 2. It is certain that a wordy man cannot be justified.

The same lib. 7. cap. 17. The justice of the mind is desolated when no sparing is had of immoderate speech.

These things the holy Doctor has, Pharetrae lib. 3. cap. 3.

Of foolish talking the holy Doctor has much there from the holy Fathers, where he also has that golden sentence of D. Gregory, lib. 2. Moral. cap. 7. Among men the heart is weighed from words, but before God words are weighed from the heart.

The same D. Gregory, lib. 16. cap. 1. They who know not how to measure their words, without doubt slip into idle sayings: in which, if they do not at all reprehend themselves, they at once spring forward to harmful and contumelious ones.

The same lib. 3. Dialog. cap. 5. It comes about from speaking with seculars that we pass from idle things to harmful, from light to graver. See the holy Doctor loco citato Pharetrae.

These things are simply venial, as St. Bonavent. notes, in speculo animae, cap. 3. §. Circa inhonestatem in gestu; and they are reprehended by Paul to the Ephesians, saying that such things ought neither to be, nor to be named among us.

These, however, are to be weighed from the affection, he says, according to the rule of D. Gregory cited above, or according to the scandal of the person, insofar as they incite to evil, and are said with such intention, they can be mortal, he says; and thus he asserts of songs, choruses, and plays.

Hence he gravely gathers that actors, dancers, and jesters, who allure to pleasures by dishonest words and deeds, that they may extort money, are not in a state of salvation; and such were also the ancient spectacles, which Chrysostomus homil. 6. in matth. and other Fathers condemn, as Tannerus notes, disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 8. num. 216.

Hence the holy Doctor gathers from D. Augustine, tract. 110. in Ioannem, that it is sin to give money to these men and to be present at their comedies; yet he does not condemn it as mortal, if they are heard out of curiosity without danger of consent, even if the things are base.

Bonacina consents, de Matrim. quaest. 4. puncto 9. num. 22. Squillante, de oblig. Cler. part. 2. num. 45. Sanchez de Matrim. lib. 9. disp. 47. num. 41. Alphonsus de Mendoza, quaest. 9. positio. num. 11. fol. 607. Rodrig. Summa, tom. 3. cap. 71. Salas prim. 2. tom. 2. tract. 13. disp. 6. sect. 24. num. 165. Lorca prim. 2. tom. 2. disp. 28. de peccatis, membro 3. who puts the condition, provided the pleasure stops in the representation, and does not pass over to the thing represented. Azorius subscribes to these parte 3. lib. 5. cap. 27. quaestio. 7.

They hold, consequently, that it holds good even as to Clerics, who do not sin mortally, scandal ceasing, which now has been taken away like rust; for Clerics are frequently present at Comedies. But that they are prohibited C. Clerici 2. de vita, et honest. Cler. Diana says, parte 2. Tract. 27. resol. 35. does not oblige under mortal sin, with Cajetan, verbo Clericorum peccata. Nay, they say this has been abrogated by custom — Sanchez, Rodriguez, Salas, Bonacina, and Squilante, above.

I, however, with Diana assert these things to be dangerous, nor easily to be conceded. Therefore also Comitol. resp. Moral. lib. 5. quaest. 21. condemns it with mortal sin; and the matter reduced to practice, I judge it to be always in danger, as appears from the confession of those who are present, who always retire defiled.

Concerning immodesty in games, the holy Doctor supposes, loco citato Speculi animae, that honest and moderate games are reduced to Eutrapelia with Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 8. The reason is, because relaxation of the mind is necessary to man from labors and occupations, as D. Thom. also teaches, quaest. 168. art. 2. For as the fatigue of the body is recreated by its rest, so also the fatigue of the mind by its rest.

He admonishes, however, that excess in these can be, either from intention, and then such also is the work; or it can be evil by reason of scandal, as if a Religious person, or one placed as an example, should lead choruses and dances; Or perhaps if these were exercised on Parasceve. Three things, therefore, are necessary, that this relaxation be not perverse.

FIRST, that nothing base be sought in games or jests.

SECOND, that the gravity of the mind be not altogether dissolved, nor be poured out too much in jests, as Ambrose admonishes, lib. I. de offic. cap. 20. where he says: Let us beware, lest while we wish to relax the mind, we dissolve all harmony, as it were a certain concord of good works. And Cicero lib. I. de offic. As we do not grant to boys every license of playing, but that which is not alien from honest actions, so in jest itself let some light of a good nature shine forth; not that you be the more dissolved, as the holy Doctor admonishes. loco citato Pharetrae ex Patribus.

THIRD, that it befit the person, place, and time, as Cicero admonishes, loco citato.

THERE is granted, however, also that vice which I call Saturnine, opposed in the other extreme, as the holy Doctor teaches. locis adductis, whereby some are willing neither to speak nor to hear anything urbane.