Fear and ignorance as excuses from censures

For incurring censure contumacy is required; therefore whatever either notably diminishes or completely removes contumacy excuses from incurring censure. Now there are chiefly two causes numbered which for this reason excuse from incurring censure: grave fear and ignorance.

23. Fear. a. Grave fear excuses from censure whenever it excuses from observing an ecclesiastical law: for an act which proceeds from grave fear is not committed from contumacy, but rather from the weakness of nature. Moreover, fear of grave harm of itself excuses from the very precept of the Church; but where no sin is committed against the precept of the Church, censure is not incurred, which of itself and primarily is established against injury of an ecclesiastical precept.

a. Namely, an act prohibited under censure is prohibited either by ecclesiastical law alone or at the same time by divine law (natural or positive). If the first, an act posited from fear is not a sin; if the other, an act posited from fear can be a sin against divine law, but is not a sin against the law of the Church, which does not oblige with grave inconvenience.

b. There are a few certain cases in which fear, however grave, does not excuse from observation of ecclesiastical law, especially where violation of the law causes common harm. In these cases, therefore, grave fear, just as it does not excuse from observing ecclesiastical law, so also does not excuse from incurring censure.¹

c. Just as grave fear excuses from incurring censure, so it also excuses from observing it: for ecclesiastical laws do not oblige with grave inconvenience. Therefore when observation of censure, e.g. of occult excommunication, is joined with fear of grave harm or with grave inconvenience, the excommunicated person can conduct himself as immune from censure.

b. Even light fear excuses from incurring censure, provided the fear is the cause of the prohibited action, if the censure is imposed on those doing it rashly, with rash daring, spontaneously: for in these cases it is required that the prohibited action be posited altogether by one's own movement, not for escaping any evil whatever.

¹ Cf. De principiis n. 176, where it is explained when grave fear, or grave inconvenience, excuses from the obligation of an affirmative law.

24. Ignorance. a. Ignorance which is not crass always excuses from incurring censure, whether the ignorance is of fact or of law, not only when it is not known that the act is prohibited, but also when only this is not known, that it is prohibited under censure.¹ The reason for the first is that censure supposes fault; but this ignorance (whether antecedent or concomitant) excuses from fault, therefore also from incurring censure. The reason for the second is that one ignorant that a censure is attached to a sinful act is not contumacious against the coercive power of the Church; but censure is inflicted for breaking the contumacy of the delinquent.²

a. Several authors (Sanchez, Pirhing, Reuter, Mazzotta, Ballerini) do not call every gravely culpable ignorance crass, but admit gravely culpable ignorance which is not crass: for crass ignorance, so they say, arises not simply from gravely culpable negligence, but from negligence with grave excess. This opinion is probable and therefore licit in practice. But since it is very difficult to distinguish between culpable ignorance from grave negligence and culpable ignorance from grave negligence with excess, practically it can be established that only ignorance which is not gravely culpable always excuses from incurring censure.

b. Therefore ignorance both of law and of fact excuses from incurring censure, and it also excuses when the delinquent indeed knows that the action is prohibited by divine law, whether natural or positive, but does not know that the same is prohibited under ecclesiastical censure.

c. Ignorance is gravely culpable in him who does not know what he ought to know by reason of office; therefore lay persons are always excused from incurring censures which they do not know; not likewise clerics, who ought to know them by reason of office, unless it can be affirmed that their negligence in learning censures was not grave, or at least was not grave with excess.

b. Sometimes even crass ignorance excuses from incurring censure, namely if the law imposing censure does not speak absolutely and simply (whoever shall have committed this, let him be excommunicated), but if the censure is carried against those who have sinned rashly, with rash daring, by presumption, knowingly, deliberately.

c. Indeed if the law for incurring censure requires that the sin have been committed knowingly or deliberately, even affected ignorance excuses from incurring censure: for one who acts with any ignorance whatever certainly does not act knowingly. Therefore, although one who acts with such ignorance sins gravely against the precept, nevertheless he does not incur censure, since the law itself requires certain and formal knowledge for incurring censure.

But if someone knows the law and the penalty imposed, but does not know that the penalty is reserved, there are a few certain doctors who think that the reservation of the censure ceases because of this ignorance: for reservation is added to censure in the manner of a penalty; but ignorance excuses from incurring a penalty and therefore from incurring a reservation. But authors commonly teach that this ignorance does not bring it about that the censure is not reserved. For ignorance would excuse because the Church does not wish to subject the ignorant to an extraordinary penalty; but reservation, once the censure has been contracted, is not something extraordinary which is added to the censure, but rather that which naturally follows it, unless the legislator from kindness has made absolution easier.³

Note. a. Forgetfulness and inadvertence of the censure are equivalent to ignorance, because one who in no way adverts to the law cannot be called contumacious against it.

b. Censures, especially by the more unlearned, are rarely incurred because of ignorance until they have been admonished about the matter.

¹ C. Ut animarum 2. De constit. (I. 2) in 6°. Although in this chapter there is speech only about censures of ordinaries, nevertheless by right and deservedly the principle established in it is extended also to papal censures.

² In the external forum knowledge of the censure is presumed; therefore, in order that ignorance excuse from incurring censure in the external forum, it must be proved.

³ Lehmkuhl II, n. 866.

25. Whether ignorance excuses from incurring a vindicative penalty. A vindicative penalty, since it is not inflicted for correcting the contumacy of the guilty person, but for punishing his crime, is incurred even by those ignorant, not indeed of the law, but of the annexed penalty, unless this penalty is extraordinary.

For incurring a vindicative penalty knowledge of the penalty is not required if this is ordinary: for natural reason understands that a delict by its nature is to be punished. But if the penalty is extraordinary and exorbitant, knowledge of the penalty is required in order that it be incurred. Namely, for incurring a penalty there is not indeed required consent to the penalty, but nevertheless consent to the cause of the penalty is required; now, one committing a delict by this very fact implicitly consents to the cause of the ordinary penalty, but does not consent even implicitly to the cause of an extraordinary penalty, since he in no way knows it. Now all vindicative penalties of a sentence already passed are judged extraordinary and exorbitant.

Grave fear and ignorance prevent contumacy, and therefore hinder one who commits a crime under their influence from incurring any censure by which such crime is punished. Grave fear, however, does not excuse from censures inflicted for crimes which produce contempt for the faith, or for ecclesiastical authority, or public harm to souls (Can. 2229, sec. 3, iii). If, however, the ignorance be crass or supine, it will not excuse from grave sin or contumacy, and so the censure will be incurred. But if the censure is inflicted on those who knowingly, rashly, with rash daring, or presumption, commit a crime, full knowledge is required in order to incur the censure, but merely affected ignorance will not prevent its being incurred (Can. 2229).

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

Does an appeal legitimately interposed excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, namely if it was interposed before the sentence, or after it indeed had been issued, but while the day from which, or the condition under which, it was issued, is pending. Likewise it ceases if, while the day or condition is pending, one ceases to be superior and the other ceases to be subject. But if the censure has already been issued absolutely, appeal does not suspend it, whence canonists say that the appeal is devolutive, not suspensive. Yet recourse to the Holy See is always given against its injustice. L. 63-65; Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 4, n. 10 ff.; sec. 5, n. 2; sec. 15, n. 18 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 6.

937. • QUESTION 2. Is one who doubts whether he has incurred a censure to be judged to have incurred it?

Reply. Negatively, whether you doubt that you sinned gravely or that the case falls under the censure. The reason is that, according to the commonly received axiom and the very rule of Law, odious things are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Nevertheless, you incur the censure if the doubt concerns the gravity of the matter itself, both considered in itself and in view of the end, etc. For then this matter is to be regarded as grave, since it is such in the judgment of the Superior who imposed the censure and, moreover, in doubt the presumption favors the Superior. - St. Alphonsus, no. 32; Salmanticenses, chapter 1, no. 207, etc. ¹¹.

¹¹ For other resolutions according to the diversity of the doubt, see St. Alphonsus (book 7, nos. 67, 68).

QUESTION 3. Is someone bound by a censure which he knows to be manifestly unjust?

Reply. Negatively, whether the Superior, relying upon a false presumption, condemned an innocent person as guilty, or omitted the legal forms, or exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction. - St. Alphonsus, no. 68. - Nevertheless, the danger of error in one's own cause must be carefully avoided ¹².

¹² Nevertheless, if it is not publicly established that the censure is null, it must be observed on account of scandal (see St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 68).

938. • QUESTION 4. Does ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely, when someone does not know that he is positing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest whom he thinks to be a layman, he does not incur the censure imposed upon those who strike clerics. The reason is that the censure must be known to the sinner in order that he be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law, chapter Si vero aliquis, On the Sentence of Excommunication. - St. Alphonsus, no. 43.

Reply 2. Ignorance of an ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is evident from the same reasons just given; for one who is ignorant of the law of the Church cannot be called contumacious against the Church, as is apparent from Canon Law, Sext, book 1, title 2, On Constitutions, chapter 2, where it is said: We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided, however, that the ignorance was not crass or supine. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

939. • QUESTION 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Affirmatively, if it is not gravely culpable; because then the ignorant person cannot be called contumacious against the Church. Thus all.

Reply 2. Negatively, however, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then it can be called crass; moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from a censure, as is evident from the cited Canon Law. - St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 43, and others commonly ¹³. Otherwise, however, ignorance does not prevent someone from being contumacious against a law of which he is culpably ignorant. Except, however, if it is said in the decree of censure: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly ¹⁴, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act and certain knowledge of the censure. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46. Many nevertheless contend that gravely culpable ignorance excuses from a censure, although it does not excuse from mortal sin; because gravely culpable ignorance can exist without therefore having to be called crass.

¹³ It is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 45) called this opinion common, when the Salmanticenses, from whom he borrowed this opinion, cite more Authors for the opposite than for it (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196); indeed Suarez himself (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12) admits that other modern authors departed into another opinion. But the reason given by Suarez, if it is to be called a reason, is of no weight. Therefore, nothing ought to prevent someone from safely following the opposite opinion, which the Author presently subjoins.

** Against this little Note the VV. write (page 849): A marvelous argument! As though the Salmanticenses had intended to compile an exact catalogue of Authors! And then, besides the four cited by the Salmanticenses for the opinion of St. Alphonsus, they add Laymann, Bonacina, Bossius, Molina, Salas, Filliuccius, Reginaldus, and Alterius.

Reply. Let the antecedent pass; and I deny the consequent. For the question is whether the opinion of St. Alphonsus is to be called common. Moreover, even after those eight are added, would this opinion be called common? For the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196) cite eight for the opposite, namely, Tanner, Caelestinus, Diana, Henriquez, Peter de Ledesma, Palaus, Sanchez, and Avila. Add also that, among those cited by the VV., Filliuccius (On Censures, chapter 8, no. 262), contrary to what St. Alphonsus holds, supposes ignorance mortally culpable which nevertheless is not crass or supine; add that Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, point 1, no. 10) calls the opinion of Sanchez not improbable, whom St. Alphonsus admits to be opposed to himself. Therefore, even if we insist upon these citations alone, is not number now balanced by number?

But other Authors can easily be added to those cited by the Salmanticenses against the opinion of St. Alphonsus. Thus, for example, Pirhing (book 5, title 39, no. 46), Dicastillo (On Censures, disputation 2, no. 298), Babenstuber (tract 4, disputation 1, article 3, no. 10), Tamburini (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 22), Mazzotta (tract 8, disputation 1, question 2, chapter 3, section 2), Reuter (part 1, nos. 22 and 267), and, lest we seek others, Portellus, Serra, Quintanadvenas, Praepositus, and Barbosa in Diana (volume 5, tract 1, resolutions 33 and 35). Let us conclude, therefore, that the foundation is weak upon which the opinion of St. Alphonsus is called common. But let us come to the reason.

Since it is said in the little Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight, the VV. subjoin (page 850): If someone judges the reasons brought by Suarez and other Authors to be of no weight, there is surely nothing by which he would be prevented from embracing the opposite. But the authority alone of Father B., who does not even adduce those reasons and nevertheless condemns them, is by no means sufficient; for no title is known to us by which he could claim this prerogative for himself.

Reply. Father B. claims no other prerogative for himself except that he advance nothing on his own authority, as he has professed more than once. Accordingly, behold Laymann, who writes concerning this question (book 1, tract 2, chapter 4, no. 5): But it appears to be a question of name. Namely, the entire controversy depends upon the sense in which crass or supine ignorance is taken. On this matter, behold Sanchez (Decalogue, book 1, chapter 16, no. 7), who writes: Vincible ignorance which is not affected is one thing when only mortally culpable, but another when crass or supine. Suarez, on the contrary (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12): Every ignorance which suffices for mortal transgression or disobedience is to be called crass or supine.

But how does Suarez prove his thesis? Entirely by this argument (loc. cit.): Other modern Authors ... appear to distinguish degrees in that very ignorance which suffices for mortal sin, so that below a certain degree it is not crass or supine but only vincible, although mortal, and therefore excuses; but beyond that degree it is now crass or supine and does not excuse. But certainly the distinction of such degrees is founded upon no law and can be explained by no reason.

Therefore, the entire force of the argument resides in this: that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained. But does not Suarez himself admit this distinction of degrees? For he himself writes thus (On I-II, tract 2, disputation 4, section 1, no. 14): Because there can be more and less in this negligence, according to this various degrees of this ignorance are customarily distinguished. Hence Laymann also (loc. cit.): I admit this, he says, that among ignorances crass in the mind of Suarez there is a certain latitude, namely, one very crass and altogether supine, another less crass, all of which nevertheless can be mortal. Therefore, since, by Suarez's own admission, various degrees are distinguished among gravely culpable ignorances, to what does his argument finally amount, that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained?

Suarez insists: For who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally is crass in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned?

Reply. Another will answer ad hominem: Who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally exists in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned? Certainly, if it can sometimes be determined when ignorance is grave, and therefore, according to his opinion, crass, it will be possible to determine in the same manner when, among mortal ignorances, as Laymann says, ignorance is very grave and when less grave.

And behold the reason why it was said in the Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight. For, finally, as Laymann says, it is a question of name. And just as it pleased Suarez, on account of that very slight little reason, to define as crass any ignorance however grave, so it seemed to others that only that ignorance should be called crass or supine which was distinguished by some greater gravity. Crass and supine ignorance, says Barbosa (Collections, volume 4, on book 1 of the Sext of the Decretals, title 2, chapter 2, no. 7), is called that which proceeds from THE GREATEST NEGLIGENCE, as happens when someone has employed no diligence or only slight diligence, etc. And from this he proves that Bonacina called the opinion of Sanchez and Navarre not improbable. And as to what Suarez cites for his own purpose from law 15, ff. On Contracting a Purchase, where a supine man is named, as though, namely, every ignorance which does not excuse from a grave obligation, for example, of restitution, were now to be called supine, the gloss explains it thus from other texts of Law: A supine man is one MOST negligent; which is apparent from law 9, ff. On Ignorance of Law and Fact, where it is read (section 2): But ignorance of fact only then does not harm anyone if THE GREATEST negligence is not charged against him. Moreover, does Suarez himself think that it is necessary for grave fault of ignorance that the negligence be the greatest? Hence Sanchez (loc. cit.), after distinguishing mortally culpable ignorance from crass and supine ignorance, well adds: Suarez denies this division, saying that every mortally culpable ignorance is crass or supine.... But I believe this division to be true.

I am led first because crass or supine ignorance is that which proceeds from the extensive fault of the ignorant person, namely, one who has employed no diligence or very slight diligence for knowing. And thus not every negligence, but the greatest, is what can constitute crass ignorance, as I proved from many sources in book 9, On Matrimony, disputation 32, nos. 32 and 33. Hence Valentia very well says that this ignorance exists when the ignorant person, although he could very easily overcome it, employed no diligence. But in order that ignorance be vincible and not excuse from mortal sin, such great negligence is not required; rather, as we shall say according to the mind of all in nos. 34 and 36, it is required that the moral diligence necessary according to the quality of the business was not employed. Secondly, because, in the matter of an unformed confession, the Doctors not to be condemned (Canus, Soto, Henriquez, Bartholomew de Ledesma, Peter de Ledesma, and many others) think that it will be valid when a sin has been tacitly omitted or when a sufficient examination was not previously made from mortal negligence or ignorance, provided that it was not excessively crass or supine. And Soto explains this crass ignorance, from which an unformed confession is rendered altogether invalid, as existing when almost no diligence was employed for recalling sins, which is the definition of crass ignorance. Sanchez draws a third argument from the Doctors, where they say that culpable ignorance perhaps excuses from the excommunication of particular Prelates, provided that it is not crass or supine, but not from censures of the common law. There they plainly speak in the former member of mortally culpable ignorance. For otherwise they would ineptly say that it does not excuse from excommunication of the common law; and still more ineptly would they use the particle perhaps, as though doubting whether it excuses from excommunication by particular Bishops, when it is clearer than the midday light that no excommunication is contracted except on account of mortal fault.

And let these things suffice so that it may be evident that it was not without cause said in the little Note: 1. that it is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus called his opinion common; 2. that the reason brought for it by Suarez is of no weight.

¹⁴ Sanchez rightly notes (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38) that Suarez, who (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 3) here takes temerity for imprudence by which an ignorant person exposes himself to the danger of acting against the law; for temerity in reality designates an act posited against express knowledge of the law.

And indeed this observation of Sanchez appears to apply equally to affected ignorance; which nevertheless the same Sanchez, less consistently with himself, teaches to excuse in On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 10, no. 38, but denies to excuse in On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, nos. 39, 40. The Doctors also differ on this question, as may be seen also in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 48), who says that he adheres to the negative opinion as though it were more common; but if you count the Authors cited for each opinion by the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 199), you will find more in reality for the affirmative. Hence, whether you consider authority or reasons, concerning which see Roncaglia (On Censures, question 5, chapter 5, question 1, reply 4), Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, part 1, no. 11), and the Salmanticenses (loc. cit.), you conclude that in an uncertain matter the general principle is to be employed, and that one is in possession of the right to enjoy spiritual goods where the opposite is not demonstrated.

** The VV. censure two things in this Note (pages 850-855). First (page 853), just as concerning the preceding Note, they complain that it is said that more Authors are cited by the Salmanticenses for the affirmative opinion than for the negative opinion.

Reply. Do the VV. perhaps think it wrong that readers be warned if at some time a doubt arises whether an argument drawn from authority may perhaps need some critical examination? Indeed, the Salmanticenses expressly cite only ten, and tacitly others in Diana, for the affirmative; but for the negative, seventeen are expressly recalled in St. Alphonsus, and tacitly others in Bossius and the Salmanticenses. But, for example: 1. Kazenberger, namely, the Author of the additions to Sporer, whom St. Alphonsus cites for the negative, writes thus (On Censures, chapter 3, no. 39): It is probable and safe that even affected ignorance in such a case excuses from incurring a censure, as Sporer teaches with Sanchez, Bonacina, and Tamburini, tract 2 on the First Precept of the Decalogue, chapter 5, no. 42. And since Palaus actually holds thus (tract 2, disputation 1, point 18, no. 1), whom St. Alphonsus nevertheless cites for himself, there now accede to the affirmative, besides the Salmanticenses themselves, as St. Alphonsus testifies, Sporer, Kazenberger, Palaus, and in addition Tamburinus (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 27), who are not named by the Salmanticenses. 2. To these must also be added Filliuccius (tract 22, chapter 7, no. 205), who is not well cited by St. Alphonsus for the negative, and with Filliuccius also Tanner and Roncaglia, whom St. Alphonsus rightly numbers among those affirming; and Merolla must also be numbered with these (disputation 1, chapter 2, from no. 645), who treats this controversy more fully and solidly. And this light specimen, without our dwelling longer upon these things, sufficiently shows that it is not futile for Arguments sought from authority to be recalled to some weighing, especially since St. Alphonsus himself indicates that he was moved to prefer the negative opinion by authority rather than by reason, saying: I do not dare call this second opinion (the affirmative) improbable; but I adhere more to the first, at least as the more common.

The other thing which the VV. censure is that it is said in the Note that Suarez is noted by Sanchez because he takes temerity for imprudence; consequently they observe (page 852) that mere imprudence OF ITSELF never induces mortal fault.

Reply. The VV. rightly say, mere imprudence OF ITSELF. But it is not so understood by Suarez, who derives the gravity of this lack of consideration in acting from the dangers into which one acting without consideration casts himself. Hence Sanchez writes thus concerning this matter (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38): I do not approve what Suarez says ..., where he thinks that one is called a rash violator if, when he has a suspicion or doubt concerning such a law, he employs no diligence to know whether that law exists; because otherwise he rashly exposes himself to the danger of transgressing it, and if it happens that he violates it in reality, he will be called a rash violator. But this does not please me; because although he is called rash, by reason of the danger to which he exposes himself, for contracting mortal fault, nevertheless laws punishing a rash violator demand something more, as I proved. Otherwise every person culpably ignorant of law would then be punished; because every culpable ignorance of law or fact necessarily supposes that some doubt concerning it preceded.

Namely, temerity is sometimes taken for an inconsiderate facility in acting, but sometimes temerity is said to exist when we do something by our own will and apart from the authority of the one commanding. To this pertain the things contained in chapter Eum qui 18, On Prebends, in the Sext: Moreover, so that violent men who by their own authority (or, more truly, temerity) do not fear to occupy ... any ecclesiastical benefices whatever, even if they are not restrained by love of virtue, may at least be restrained by fear of penalty from THE AUDACITY OF THEIR TEMERITY; by that very fact, etc. And this is what Sanchez intends to intimate when he says that laws punishing a rash violator demand something more. Hence Merolla (disputation 1, chapter 2, no. 235) well adds against that interpretation of Suarez: Temerity properly, beyond precipitation and imprudence, requires contempt; for the word rashly properly imports doing something with contempt of the law, and thus it proceeds from that root of pride

which refuses to be subject to rule, as St. Thomas, II-II, question 55, article 3, reply to objection 2, and Cajetan there very well teach; he says that this is very much to be noted for interpreting Canons which inflict penalties upon those rashly doing something, and that these are to be understood of this proper temerity. Finally, the VV. by no means ought to despise the words of St. Alphonsus, where he expressly says (book 7, no. 61): TEMERITY REQUIRES TRUE KNOWLEDGE, according to the things said in book 1, no. 174. That citation, however, became fallacious when, after the edition of the year 1757, the order of numbers in book I was changed.

940. • QUESTION 6. Does grave fear excuse from a censure?

Reply. Affirmatively, generally speaking. The reason is that ecclesiastical penal laws do not appear to press with so great a rigor. For since ecclesiastical laws themselves cease to oblige where very grave fear presses, the penalty annexed to them must also fall ¹⁵. The difficulty is greater where there is question of precepts of natural law, from fulfilling which grave fear cannot excuse. But even in this case contumacy against the Church is absent. For a censure is not incurred on account of a violation of divine law, but on account of a culpable transgression of ecclesiastical law ¹⁶. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46.

¹⁵ Schmalzgrueber well adds the reason (book 5, title 39, no. 79), that the delinquent thus cannot be held as contumacious and a contemner of ecclesiastical power, since he sins from the infirmity of nature rather than from the malice of an obstinate will.

¹⁶ This doctrine nevertheless has exceptions. Reiffenstuel writes thus concerning the matter (book 5, title 39, no. 34): When observance of a human law appears morally necessary for conserving the public good, or if its violation tends toward contempt of the faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one who, from grave fear even of life, transgresses a law placed under censure is not excused from it ...; because, since in such cases no fear excuses from observance of ecclesiastical law ..., so neither does it excuse from the censure.

Some causes excuse from the incurrence, others from the effects, of censure.

Five excusing causes are customarily enumerated:

486. 1. Nullity of the censure, which, however, cannot be an excusing cause except in censures imposed ab homine.

Thus, at least, according to modern discipline. For censures imposed by a pontifical law are always valid; other censures imposed by law are customarily just and valid. - A censure imposed ab homine is null: a) from a defect of jurisdiction in the one imposing the censure, for example, if a bishop were illegitimately to impose a censure upon an exempt regular; b) from a defect of the substantial order of judgment; thus, for example, a superior would invalidly impose a censure if the canonical warning had not preceded;⁸⁰ c) from a defect of a just cause. But a just cause is lacking not only when it does not actually exist, but also when it has not been legitimately proved. Thus, for example, an excommunication imposed on account of a false or even a light crime is invalid.

2. A defect on the part of the sin.

Therefore, if the sin is not internally and externally grave, consummated, and joined with contumacy, the censure is not incurred, as was already said in the preceding article.

3. Physical or moral inability.

For censures are imposed by ecclesiastical law. But an ecclesiastical law ceases when inability arises. Hence, for example, one who in good faith usurped ecclesiastical goods and afterward lost them is not bound under censure to restore these goods if this is morally impossible. Thus, at least, in the internal forum.

⁸⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 7, n. 53; Code of Canon Law, c. 2233, § 2.

487. 4. Grave fear excuses from censure whenever it excuses from observing an ecclesiastical law.

The reason is that one who transgresses a law from grave fear does not act from contempt or contumacy, as is evident. But without contumacy there is no censure properly so called. If, however, the delict tends to contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority, or to public harm of souls, grave fear in no way exempts from censures (and other penalties latae sententiae).⁸¹ It is disputed whether one who from grave fear perpetrates an act gravely evil by the natural law itself incurs a censure; for example, whether a girl who procures an abortion for herself from grave fear of her father is excommunicated. The negative opinion, although it is not certain, as Cappello, De cens., n. 61, for example, maintains, nevertheless appears probable. - Even light fear excuses from a censure which is imposed against those who do something "rashly, with rash audacity, voluntarily," and so forth. For in these cases it is required that the prohibited action be done entirely motu proprio, so that any diminution of imputability excuses.

⁸¹ Code of Canon Law, c. 2229, § 3, n. 3.

488. 5. Ignorance. a) From censures (or other ecclesiastical penalties latae sententiae) which are imposed upon those doing something "knowingly, deliberately, with deliberation, rashly, with rash audacity, with presumption," crass or supine ignorance excuses (but not affected ignorance);⁸² b) from other censures, crass or supine ignorance does not excuse.⁸³

It was said above in the preceding article that a censure is not incurred unless contumacy or contempt is present in the sinner. But contempt of a law is impossible in one who is ignorant of the law. Therefore, for incurring a censure, it is required that the sinner know not only the general prohibition but also the special ecclesiastical law prohibiting the act (at least substantially). It is not necessary, however, that the sinner know all the accidental determinations of the prohibiting law, for example, the reservation of the censure. Thus the far more common and truer opinion.⁸⁴

That crass or supine ignorance excuses in the cases enumerated under letter a) is evident from the fact that in that case, strictly speaking, there is neither rash audacity nor gravely culpable presumption.

That ignorance which is not crass, as being inculpable or lightly culpable, excuses from other censures manifestly follows from what was said about the contumacy or contempt necessary for incurring censures.

⁸² Code of Canon Law, c. 2229, §§ 1 and 2.

⁸³ From vindicative penalties latae sententiae, only inculpable ignorance excuses (Code of Canon Law, cc. 2202 and 2229, § 3, n. 1). Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, and the impulse of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminution of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae (Code of Canon Law, ibid.).

⁸⁴ Cf. Cappello, De censuris², n. 72.

489. Since the effects of censure are nothing other than statutes of merely ecclesiastical law, all those things which excuse from the observance of ecclesiastical statutes also exempt from observing the effects of censure. But any grave inconvenience is customarily to excuse from statutes of this kind, since positive laws as such are not customarily binding with grave inconvenience. Hence the following excuse (before a declaratory or condemnatory sentence) from observing the effects of censure:

1. Grave infamy.

Thus, for example, a layman occultly excommunicated can be a sponsor in baptism if otherwise he would have to manifest his crime with infamy.

2. Scandal.

Therefore a priest occultly suspended can perform the divine offices if otherwise scandal of the faithful would arise.

3. Grave fear, provided, however, that it was not inflicted in hatred of religion.

Hence, for example, a wife who, illegitimately possessing ecclesiastical goods with her husband, is excommunicated, is not bound to abstain from the reception of the sacraments if, from making immediate restitution, she fears most grave evils to be inflicted by her husband.

I suppose 1° that invincible ignorance of law or fact, which excuses from all sin, excuses from penalty, because just penalty is decreed only on account of guilt, otherwise it would be

I said: « Which excuse from all sin; » because, if ignorance should excuse from sin against one law only, suppose a human law which is ignored, and not excuse from sin against another law, suppose divine or natural which is not ignored, I judge it more probable that the sinner be not exempted from penalty by human laws enacted, if there be no ecclesiastical censure; because the human legislator intends not only to urge by penalties observance of his own law, but also of natural or divine law, of which he ought to be guardian and protector. Whence a thief who, conscious of natural law, ignores theft to be prohibited by human law, nevertheless incurs the penalty of hanging.

I suppose 2° that vincible ignorance of law or fact which excuses from mortal also excuses from penalty at least so great, because positive laws are not reckoned to decree grave penalties for venial sins. But that vincible ignorance is reckoned as excusing from mortal which is not gross and supine; for thus it is reckoned light.

I suppose 3° that vincible ignorance, even gross and supine, of a law bearing penalty under these or similar formulas: « Whoever knowingly, rashly, with rash daring shall act against, or shall have dared to act against, or presumed, » excuses from penalty; because, as Cajetan says, 2ª 2ae, q. 53, a. 3, « the words of law are not appended in vain nor to be taken improperly; » in vain would they be appended, nor would they be taken with restrictive propriety, if delinquents through ignorance even gross incurred the penalty. Otherwise, more probably, must be said if ignorance be affected; because, according to the laws, affected ignorance is equated with knowledge, and it is not likely that legislators wish to exempt from their laws and penalties those who affect to ignore them, that they may transgress them more freely.

The question therefore remains whether ignorance of penalty excuses from it him who sins gravely against a law he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance. For whose resolution

I say 1°: Ignorance even invincible of penalty does not exempt from it him who sins gravely against a law which either he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance, unless it be an ecclesiastical censure.

It is proved. Laws establish penalties condign to guilts. Ergo whoever commits guilt is liable to penalty, even though invincibly ignorant of it; for it is not of the nature of penalty that it be known or willed, since it has of itself that it be violent and against the will.

I said: « Unless it be an ecclesiastical censure. » For which I say 2°: Invincible ignorance of an ecclesiastical censure exempts from it one sinning knowingly against the law by which it is decreed. This is common opinion.

It is proved. That is special and proper to ecclesiastical censure, that it be not incurred except on account of contumacy against the Church — not in whatsoever manner, but against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure, whose sign is that no one incur censure unless there precede warning of law or judge, not any whatsoever, but with threat of censure. Yet he who invincibly ignores the censure is not contumacious against the Church in this manner. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Ecclesiastical censure is not so much vindicative punishment in vengeance for crime as medicinal punishment deterring from crime. Yet unknown punishment does not deter. Ergo.

I say 3°: It seems more probable that ignorance even vincibile, provided it be not gross and supine, exempts from an ecclesiastical censure one sinning knowingly against the law by which it was established. So Sylvester, under Excommunicatio I, q. 3, Navarrus, Covarruvias, and many others.

It is gathered from Cap. Ut animarum, de Constitutionibus in Sexto, lib. I, tit. 2, c. 2, where we have this: « Lest perils of souls be encountered, we do not will that those ignorant be bound by sentences issued through statutes of whatever Ordinaries, provided however their ignorance be not gross and supine. »

The Reason supports it. He who ignores the censure, even though vincibly, but with lightly culpable ignorance not gross and supine, is not properly called disobedient and contumacious against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure. Yet contumacy of this kind is required for incurring censure, as was said. Ergo. Otherwise, we judge, must be said of irregularity, even from delict, which we do not reckon a censure, as we shall say elsewhere.

You will ask whether, as often as the will sins, some practical error precedes in the will.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. Because insofar the will sins, insofar it prefers useful or delightful good, as ¹ Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

^{1 1} Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

fitting itself, to honest good. Yet the will, since it is a blind potency, born to follow the guidance of intellect, cannot prefer delightful good, as fitting itself, to honest good, unless the intellect judge here and now delightful good to be fitting itself and preferable to honest good: wherein practically it errs. Ergo. And in this sense is verified that Prov., XIV, 22: They err that work evil. And this common saying taken from the Philosopher, I Ethic., c. 3: « Every sinner is ignorant, » namely practically and in particular, not speculatively and in common; otherwise every sinner would be heretic.

Question 4. Does ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely when someone does not know that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest, thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought against strikers of clerics, and the reason is that the censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. - Ignorance of ecclesiastical law prescribing or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reason just given; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who does not know her law, as is clear from canon law, in VI°, lib. 1, tit. 2, de Constit., cap. 2, where it is said: "We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided nevertheless that the ignorance was not crass or supine." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 43 and following; Can. 2242, § 2.

VII. QUESTION IV. What causes excuse from censures? ANSWER. Several. 1. Necessity of acting against a precept, just as it excuses from sin, so it excuses from a censure. An excommunication has been passed against those labouring on a feast day. That necessity which renders the work lawful on such a day likewise exempts from the censure. 2. The nullity of the censure; 3. The innocence of the man; 4. Ignorance; 5. Impotence; 6. Fear; 7. The injustice of the cause.

XIII. Grave fear falling upon a constant man excuses from a censure, even from a sin forbidden only by ecclesiastical right. If the thing forbidden be of divine right, under an ecclesiastical censure, it does not excuse from the sin, but from the censure only. He who, struck by grave fear, should kill a cleric, would sin against natural and divine right, but would not incur the censure.