Article I. On the Nature, Division, and Conditions of Censures

932. • A censure is commonly defined thus: It is a spiritual and medicinal penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived through ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods.

It is called: 1. a penalty, because it supposes fault; 2. spiritual, both because it is imposed by spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians and because it immediately takes away spiritual goods; 3. medicinal, because it is imposed for this end, that the soul may return to better conduct ¹; 4. upon a baptized man, because those who are not baptized are not subject to the power of the Church, while power is exercised over subjects; 5. delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only upon one who is delinquent, while medicine ought not to be offered except to those whose contumacy needs so great a remedy; 6. is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely, goods which are subject to the power of the Church, such as public prayers, the Sacraments, etc.

¹ Although the correction of the delinquent is despaired of, a censure can be imposed both in vindication of the offense and lest others be infected by communication with the wicked (Salmanticenses, On Censures, chapter 1, no. 10). Hence, when the end of correction ceases, the other ends do not thereby cease (Coninck, disputation 13, doubt 1, no. 9).

Hence a censure differs: 1. from deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal nor imposed for a time, but only as punishment and permanently; 2. from irregularity, which can be contracted even on account of a defect of mind or body alone, without any fault, and therefore of itself is not a penalty but only a canonical impediment, although, when inflicted on account of certain crimes, it can also have the character of a penalty.

Hence it is also apparent that a censure does not endure perpetually but reaches its end with the amendment of the delinquent; for then he ought to be loosed from the bond of the censure.

Suspension and interdict sometimes assume the nature of a censure and sometimes of a vindicative penalty. But you will recognize them to be a vindicative penalty both if they are imposed on account of a merely past offense and if they are inflicted perpetually or even for a determinate time, for example, for two or three months ².

² Therefore, one who violates interdicts or suspensions of this kind does not incur irregularity.

933. • Various censures are distinguished, namely:

1. Excommunication, suspension, and interdict, concerning which we shall speak specifically.

2. Censures latae sententiae or ferendae sententiae, according as the Superior establishes that they are to be incurred by the very fact by which someone violates the law, or are to be inflicted only after the sentence of an ecclesiastical judge.

3. Censures imposed a iure or ab homine, according as they are imposed after the manner of a judicial mandate or precept, whether upon one or upon several. If a censure affects determinate persons, it is particular; but if it is imposed generally and without determination of persons, it is general ³.

³ These things are somewhat obscure. Suarez speaks more clearly (On Censures, disputation 3, section 1, no. 2): A man can impose a censure in two ways. In one way, by making a stable and permanent law which obliges under this penalty, which its transgressors incur by the very fact. In another way, a man can impose a censure by pronouncing a sentence or by commanding something in a singular action or business, in which no right or permanent statute is established, but a transitory mandate. Therefore, when a censure is imposed in the first manner, it is said to be a iure, because ... such a censure is now contained in the law itself. But when a censure is imposed in the latter manner, it retains, as it were, the common name and, almost by antonomasia or accommodation, is called a censure ab homine. And in this sense that division is common among all theologians and canonists.

But they differ from one another in two ways. For: 1. a censure imposed a iure, when the author who imposed it dies, persists after the manner of all laws. But one imposed ab homine, since it depends upon his jurisdiction and authority, ceases when these cease through his death or removal from office. Understand this to mean that it is no longer incurred; for if someone has incurred it, the bond is removed only by absolution. 2. A censure imposed a iure can never be imposed for past offenses; but a censure ab homine is imposed not only for future offenses but also for past ones, for their satisfaction and correction (Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, no. 9).

Moreover, a twofold mode of censures ab homine is usually distinguished, namely: 1. by way of mandate, when a Prelate mandates or commands something; or prohibit something with the sanction of a censure annexed; and this mode regards future actions, as is apparent; 2. by way of sentence, when a judgment is instituted concerning some fact and a sentence is pronounced judicially, namely by imposing a censure, etc.; and this mode regards a past fact.

But either mode can be such that the censure is particular, namely, concerning some particular fact or certain persons, or general, which is imposed without determination of any singular fact or at least of a person.

St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 6) thinks that the censures which a Bishop imposes in a diocesan Synod are to be held as imposed by way of statute, and therefore, as imposed a iure, persist after the death of the Bishop; but those imposed outside the Synod are imposed ab homine and therefore cease through the death of the one imposing them.

4. Reserved or non-reserved censures, according as the Superior has reserved absolution from them to himself or has permitted ordinary Ministers to absolve from them. Some are reserved to the Pope, while others are reserved to Bishops. Censures ab homine are always judged reserved unless they have been imposed by a general sentence.

5. Notorious or occult censures, according as it is publicly established that someone has incurred them on account of a fact which is so known that it can no longer be concealed, or otherwise.

6. Just or unjust, valid or invalid censures, according as the Superior has or has not consulted justice, truth, and law in imposing the censure.

934. • For the validity of a censure it is required that the sin upon which it is inflicted be mortal, external, consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1. Mortal; for a censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault ⁴.

⁴ It is the common opinion of the Doctors, as can be seen in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 30) and Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 59), that some light censure, for example, minor excommunication, some light suspension, or some light personal interdict, can be imposed on account of light fault. St. Alphonsus adds, if the censure is imposed for a brief time; but then it will not properly be a censure, but a certain disqualification, as was said above, no. 932. Moreover, the Author speaks of major excommunication and of suspension and interdict as they are commonly imposed, namely, from every use; these, according to the common opinion of all, cannot be imposed on account of light fault. Nevertheless, a fault must be understood as light when it is such both in itself and by reason of the end; for the character or end gravely intended, or scandal or danger, can cause a thing light of itself nevertheless to be capable of a grave precept. See Suarez (On Censures, disputation 4, section 6, no. 12), Lugo (On Justice and Right, disputation 16, no. 61), Lessius (book 2, chapter 12, no. 54), Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 7, chapter 21, nos. 28, 29).

2. External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, and not concerning merely internal things ⁵.

⁵ Not only must the sin be external, but also grave by reason of the external act.

3. Consummated in deed, in its own genus ⁶; because penal laws are to be interpreted strictly according to the rule of Law: It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified. - Except where the legislator expresses the contrary. external sin on account of which the censure is to be contracted must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. To this pertains the rule that, for a censure to be incurred, that effect which the legislator intends to prohibit under censure must be complete. Therefore, if the words, carefully inspected, signify that the ultimate effect is prohibited, for example, homicide, the censure is not incurred unless that final effect follows, namely, death. But when the action itself or the attempt is principally prohibited under censure, then, when it has been posited, the censure is immediately incurred even if the effect does not follow. See Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 1, point 4, nos. 12, 13) and Croix (book 7, no. 59).

⁶ Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 64) proposes this condition more clearly, so that it needs no exceptions: In order that a censure be incurred, the sin

But according to the more probable opinion, one who has revoked counsel or a mandate before execution does not incur the censure (Suarez, On Censures, disputation 44, section 5, no. 13; St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 40). But regarding one who, although he wished and attempted, was unable to signify the revocation of the counsel or mandate to the mandatary or executor, or who repents after the cause, for example of death, has been posited but before the effect which he could not impede has followed, according to the opinion of Cardinal de Lugo (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 453) and Suarez (On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, nos. 3, 7, 8), it is certain that he incurs the censure; nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 40, and book 4, no. 149) brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses.

** 1. Against this Note the VV. write fourteen columns (pages 841-848), and they contend two things (pages 846, 847), namely: 1. that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way opposed to St. Alphonsus; 2. that Lugo hands down an entirely singular doctrine.

2. And as regards the first point, the VV. restrict the question to those things which Suarez discusses (On I-II, tract 5, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4), where he asks at what time someone is judged to sin by a sin of omission; and the VV. transcribe almost that entire disputation throughout four columns (pages 844-846). But there are two things upon which they insist. First, when Suarez (no. 7) premises: You will ask whether it can happen that the will which is the cause of the omission as such is a fault, and yet the omission which afterward follows is in no way a sin; for example, if someone, before the omission follows, repents of the prior fault and of the cause given, but nevertheless cannot impede the effect; he replies to this question (no. 8) that each manner of speaking is probable. Hence the VV. (page 846) conclude, as it appears, that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was probable to Suarez. Second, the VV. observe (page 846) that although Suarez affirms that the guilty person, however penitent, can justly be punished, nevertheless this is said only concerning irregularity and not concerning excommunication. For thus Suarez says (loc. cit., no. 7): However much that man afterward repents, he is justly punished on account of that act and remains irregular; therefore that exterior act has the character of sin. But the VV. there give this reason for the distinction which they devise for the present matter between irregularity and censure: that irregularity is a vindicative penalty ..., but the penalty of excommunication is medicinal. And concerning this latter they subjoin: If (the penitent guilty person) did what he could and was unable to impede the execution, he does not incur excommunication, because contumacy, which is necessarily required for incurring every censure, is absent.

3. Reply to the first. That Suarez says each manner of speaking is probable concludes nothing at all for the case of the VV. For the question concerns a mere denomination; and, as the same Suarez (no. 3) had said, perhaps the disagreement concerns the name. But otherwise, as the VV. themselves acknowledge, whether that omission of which there is question is called a sin or is not called a sin, the opinion of Suarez is certain that the guilty person is justly punished for that omission. Therefore, the VV. insist in vain upon these probable manners of speaking when the penalty is inflicted not probably but certainly.

4. Reply to the second. That Suarez, when he says that the guilty person is nevertheless justly punished, ought to be understood concerning irregularity alone and not concerning the penalty of excommunication is manifestly false. For in the preceding things (no. 3) Suarez openly indicates that, in the case, if the omission had truly followed and if the penalty of excommunication or irregularity had been imposed upon such omission, the guilty person would incur it. Therefore, when he afterward (no. 7) names only irregularity, he does this merely by way of example and not to the exclusion of other penalties and consequently of censures, if any have been imposed upon an omission of this kind.

5. But the reason on account of which the VV. say that in the case the guilty person, if he repents of the cause posited, indeed incurs irregularity but not excommunication, finally rests only upon a preposterous notion of the contumacy necessary for incurring censures, which notion they then gratuitously fasten upon Suarez. For contumacy in the present question does not consist in this, that after violating a law commanding under censure someone perseveres in the same evil will, but entirely in this, that someone knowingly and willingly has contemned the law and the censure by disobeying. Reiffenstuel aptly says (book 5, title 39, no. 14): When it is said that contumacy is required for incurring a censure, it is not to be understood as though express and formal contumacy were required; for virtual contumacy and interpretative contempt of the Church suffice, CONSISTING IN THIS: THAT SOMEONE KNOWS THAT SOMETHING IS PROHIBITED UNDER CENSURE BY A LAW OR BY A LEGITIMATE ECCLESIASTICAL SUPERIOR, AND NEVERTHELESS PRESUMES TO DO IT. Nor does Suarez speak otherwise (On Censures, disputation 4, section 3, no. 10): If the law commands absolutely and imposes a censure against transgressors, then that voluntariness which suffices for sinning deliberately and in a human manner against that law and for contumacy toward the censure is sufficient for incurring such a penalty imposed by the law itself. This rule appears manifest from the terms; because just as that law absolutely prohibits such an offense, so it absolutely pronounces the censure; therefore by force of such a law no more, nor another mode, of voluntariness is required for incurring the censure than for sinning against the law itself. Therefore, just as it does not pertain to the character of sin that the sinner afterward persevere in the evil will, so neither is anything more required for incurring the censure than contumacious disobedience in transgressing the law itself.

6. But there is no need to dwell upon more things when we have the present question resolved by Suarez no less than by Lugo and others. For, discussing (On Censures, disputation 20, section 3, no. 16) one who has an obligation to pay a pension within a month, and is now at the beginning of the month able to pay but, caring nothing about payment of the pension, spends everything and thus becomes unable to pay, he establishes these things: I say, therefore, that this man is not excused from incurring excommunication if, after the prescribed term has elapsed, he does not pay the required pension. The reason a priori is that he truly acts against the precept and consequently is contumacious; just as one who renders himself unable to recite acts against the precept concerning reciting the office.

7. But that he is not excused from incurring the censure however much he repents, Suarez continues and explains thus (no. 17): But it must be recalled that in cases of this kind one time is that at which the offense is committed before God, and another that at which excommunication is incurred. For someone commits the offense at the

time at which he becomes unable to pay according to the appointed term; but he does not incur excommunication until that term itself actually ends with the obligation unfulfilled, because the censure is not contracted until the omission of the precept has been externally consummated. But although the cause of the omission was posited earlier, and therefore the offense was then especially committed, nevertheless the omission itself was not consummated until the appointed term; and therefore until that time excommunication is not incurred, from which inability cannot then excuse him; because, since this inability was voluntary, it does not render the omission involuntary, but LEAVES IT SINFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS BY FORCE OF THE PRIOR CAUSE, EVEN IF PERHAPS IT NOW DISPLEASES HIM, WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO IMPEDE EXCOMMUNICATION.

8. But Suarez had explained in the place cited above (On I-II, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, no. 8) how it can happen that even by the penalty of excommunication one is punished as guilty who has already been touched by sorrow for his sin, where he establishes that an omission culpable in its cause is better called a sin, even if the guilty person, before the omission itself follows, has so repented that he is now constituted in grace, as certain persons (ibid., no. 7) objected to the contrary: It ought to be said, says Suarez, that the PENALTY is imposed upon the external action not only because it is a sin when it occurs, but because it is culpable of itself and has an evil will as its cause, even if accidentally it should happen not to be a sin on account of a change of will; but perhaps those things would more properly be called sins because they proceed from a free and defective cause insofar as one is bound to avoid them. Nor does the subsequent will matter, because it is not the principle of the omission which follows, but another prior will which preceded. But the external action or omission is denominated a sin from the will from which it proceeds; hence at the same time the same omission both is willed as an effect by the will which is its cause and is unwilled after the manner of an object; and the first will is "I will"; the second is "I would not will the effect to follow." To the confirmation I reply that this omission has a twofold relation: one to the preceding depraved will, of which it is the effect; the other to the present circumstances and will; and as such it receives diverse denominations. Nor is it unfitting that the same external act be denominated good and evil from diverse wills. But the penalty concerning which Suarez speaks here is not irregularity alone, as the VV. said, but also censure, as was shown above.

9. Therefore, let it be concluded that the VV. did not rightly assert that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way contrary to St. Alphonsus. Let us come to Cardinal de Lugo.

How consonant his doctrine is with those things which we have just reported from Suarez is apparent from the things which he replies (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 445) to those objecting (no. 442) that it can happen that a man is already justified through contrition or confession when the effect of the prior evil will is posited DE NOVO; therefore that effect does not suffice for giving a new denomination of sinner. Lugo therefore replies thus: However much the past will is in fact retracted, nevertheless, if the effect of death afterward follows, he who gave the poison will no less incur irregularity or excommunication, ACCORDING TO THE COMMON OPINION OF ALMOST ALL, than if the will had not been retracted; because through that retraction it is not removed that the effect which followed was voluntary, as proceeding from the will.

10. And a little afterward (no. 446) he adds a clearer explanation thus: That effect (namely, the death which followed from the poison) is voluntary and free denominatively insofar as it had its origin from a prior free will, not insofar as it now depends upon a will not retracted. And the reason is clear:

because denial of retraction does not cause the will now to influence the effect more, nor does retraction cause the will to influence less; for the whole influence on the part of the will was to posit the cause, which it now cannot remove. Therefore, since retraction does not diminish the positing of the cause, nor does the absence of retraction add strength to the cause already posited, it follows that the will influences the subsequent effect in the same manner whether it retracts or does not retract; because it influences in no way according to the present state, but only according to the past state, as it is past.

Hence it is permissible to conclude two things. For: 1. Lugo, as is apparent, testifies that in the case excommunication is incurred according to the common opinion of almost all. What, then, is this which the VV. affirm (page 847), that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular doctrine? 2. Therefore empty is the reason of those who excuse the penitent guilty person from incurring a censure because the effect is not imputable after the cause has been retracted. This reason would indeed prove, contrary to what even St. Alphonsus after others teaches, that not even irregularity is incurred.

11. And this is what Lessius also observes, where he writes (book 2, chapter 13, no. 17): If the revocation of the mandate does not become known to the mandatary, the one mandating is bound, when the effect follows, no less than if he had not revoked; because by force of the mandate the harm was done. Hence he also incurs censures and irregularity if perhaps these have been imposed upon the one mandating. Nor does it matter that he is now in the state of grace; because although such a censure is not contracted except through mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault of that sin then be committed, but it suffices that it has been committed and that its effect or the external work then occur by force of it, as happens in the proposed case.

12. But Coninck (disputation 14, no. 183) had already answered the little reason which the VV. appear to esteem greatly, namely, that the guilty person, employing every diligence to impede the effect, has put off contumacy. Even when, says Coninck, after all diligence of this kind has been employed it nevertheless remains established that the other (the mandatary) was still truly moved by the authority or reasons of the one mandating or counseling to perpetrate the crime ..., in that case, I say, he would truly incur the penalties established for those mandating or counseling such a work; because such penalties are generally established for those who mandate or counsel such a crime when the effect follows; but in this case such persons would truly have done this; therefore they would incur those penalties. Nor does it matter that the one mandating is now truly penitent for having mandated this, or that through contrition or confession he is in the state of grace ...; because, notwithstanding all these things, just as in that case he will truly be the cause of the injury, so he will incur those penalties; just as one who had mandated that a cleric existing elsewhere be mutilated, and afterward, penitent for the deed, contrite and confessed, seasonably sent even twenty messengers to revoke the mandate and impede the crime by any means, however much diligence he employed for this, if nevertheless those messengers, even from pure malice and fraud, failed to notify the revocation to the mandatary, when the effect followed the one mandating would incur excommunication, irregularity, and the obligation of restoring the harm which the cleric suffered, as all acknowledge. Note this: AS ALL ACKNOWLEDGE. How, then, do the VV. write that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular opinion?

13. But the VV. appear to have wished by these words not indeed to deny that the doctrine of Lugo set forth thus far was common to others, but to have ascribed to Lugo another certain portent of doctrine which everyone would truly call altogether singular and at the same time would vehemently marvel at. For they attribute to Lugo that he asserts that excommunication is incurred when the mandate is given; but that the one mandating is freed from excommunication when he repents before the effect follows, and then afterward falls again into excommunication when the effect follows!!! Thus they write (page 847): According to his

(Lugo's) opinion, the one mandating or counseling homicide, at the time at which he gives the mandate or counsel, would incur excommunication but not the penalties annexed to excommunication, because the Church does not will to punish him unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. But if meanwhile he performed true penance for the offense committed, he would be freed from the bond of excommunication; nevertheless, when the effect followed, he would incur excommunication DE NOVO, and indeed this time with the annexed penalties. Thus they write.

14. But indeed you will ask: where in Lugo's books did the VV. espy this new monster of doctrine? Yet at hand is the passage of Lugo which the VV. themselves report from disputation 16, On Penance, no. 453. Thus Lugo there: They object secondly: Because the censure is incurred now when the effect is posited, and not before; but this is not incurred except on account of sin; therefore a sin is also posited now. - It is replied by denying the consequent; for the censure is incurred now on account of a past sin which the Church nevertheless does not will to punish unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. Hence it can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition or through attrition with the Sacrament, because a censure is a penalty by which the Church can still justly punish a man on account of a past sin. And just as one excommunicated, although justified through contrition, still remains excommunicated until he is absolved, so one who is now contrite can incur excommunication DE NOVO on account of a past sin. And indeed, on account of the censure or reservation, it will sometimes be necessary in confession, only after the effect has followed, to explain also the effect which followed. Thus far Lugo.

How the VV. saw those portents in these words can scarcely be divined. For: 1. Lugo, when he concedes the antecedent of the objection and denies the consequent, thereby affirms that excommunication is not incurred before the effect has followed; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that the censure is incurred when the mandate is given? 2. Lugo expressly says here that excommunication is not removed except through absolution, however much the guilty person has already been justified through contrition; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that through penance the guilty person is freed from that imaginary excommunication and afterward incurs another excommunication when the effect follows? 3. Lugo recalls no other penalty here by which the guilty person is justly punished by the Church except the penalty of censure; how then do the VV. invent penalties annexed to excommunication which Lugo asserts are not incurred when the mandate is given but only after the effect has followed?

But the VV. themselves candidly disclose the origin of these phantasms. For after premising the words above (no. 13), they subjoin: We do not see how this opinion (of Lugo) can be explained otherwise, since he expressly says DE NOVO; namely, the VV. explain that phrase de novo as though it there signifies again. But everyone knows that de novo is also used for newly or anew (see the lexicon under Nove), that is, to designate that which had not occurred before. And indeed one could see that this phrase de novo was employed in this sense in Lugo himself a little before the text adduced (see above, no. 9), where he writes: When the effect of the prior will is posited DE NOVO; for it cannot be understood of an effect posited again, but of an effect newly or only now finally posited. Against these portentous phantasms let it suffice to remember that saying: What can excessive fervor in disputing not do?

15. I would not wish to omit here that those words of the Note under discussion, nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses, are not, I say, our words, but those of John de Dicastillo. He himself wrote thus concerning this question (On Censures, disputation 1, no. 291): But if, before (the revocation by the one mandating) comes to the knowledge of the mandatary, the latter perpetrates the offense, the one mandating incurs the censures.... Nor does it matter that perhaps he is now

in the state of grace; because although a censure and irregularity are not contracted except on account of mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault endure when they are contracted; but it suffices that it has been committed and that the effect or external work then occur by force of that fault, as we said concerning one who wounds unto death, etc. And again (disputation 2, no. 344), where he recalls the opposite opinion: Filliuccius adds that one is excused from a censure to be imposed who, when the appointed term arrives, is sorry for the fault committed. This limitation rightly displeases others; for it matters little that someone is now sorry, provided that he previously gave a sufficient voluntary cause for the omission. For a censure is often incurred even if, at the time of incurring it, someone has already been contrite for the sin and constituted in grace. Thus one who cast a missile at a cleric or administered poison to him, even if he becomes contrite for the sin before the effect follows, incurs excommunication and irregularity, because he voluntarily gave cause for such killing and striking. Let Suarez, etc., be read. But concerning the opposite opinion of Filliuccius, at the end he says most expressly that IT IS PROVED BY NO SUITABLE FOUNDATION.

4. Not merely past; because a censure is a medicinal penalty and therefore cannot be imposed upon those who have already returned to better conduct. Therefore, for a sin to be called merely past in the case, it is necessary that it cease so entirely that it is in no way joined with any present disobedience and contumacy. See St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 54).

5. Joined with contumacy against a law or precept. The reason is that the principal end of a censure is to break obstinacy. - See St. Alphonsus, no. 30 and following ⁷.

⁷ Therefore, it is not sufficient that the sin be contrary to natural or divine law unless it is also contrary to some law of the Church. For through censures contumacy against a law of the Church is punished, and indeed against a Church threatening a censure upon the contumacious.

935. • Resolutions. - 1. One who is excused from grave fault on account of some circumstance is also excused from a censure, although the matter is grave in itself.

2. If something altogether light is commanded under censure, the censure is not incurred, provided that the thing which appears light under some respect does not become grave from another source.

3. A Superior who imposed a censure on account of any grave fault whatever would act imprudently and illicitly, but nevertheless validly; for the end of the Church is to punish only the graver crimes ⁸.

⁸ The Council of Trent (session 25, chapter 3, On Reformation) has these words: Although the sword of excommunication is the sinew of ecclesiastical discipline and very salutary for keeping peoples in their duty, nevertheless it must be exercised soberly and with great circumspection; since experience teaches that, if it is inflicted rashly or for light causes, it is more despised than feared and produces ruin rather than salvation.

4. The excommunication which is said to be imposed upon harmful animals, for example, upon locusts, is not excommunication properly so called, but an adjuration or a prayer made for their destruction, lest they do harm.

5. Likewise, when the dead are said to be excommunicated, this must be understood of a certain execration or declaration of the excommunication which they incurred before death and in which they died ⁹.

⁹ Therefore, absolution imparted to excommunicated persons who have died with signs of repentance is extended directly not to them but to the living, insofar as the latter are released from the obligation not to communicate with the deceased in burial and public prayers. See Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 39).

936. • Questions. - QUESTION 1. How is a censure latae sententiae distinguished from a censure ferendae sententiae?

Reply 1. Generally, a censure will be latae sententiae: 1. if the words by which it is expressed exclude the action or ministry of anyone else, for example, if it is imposed with these words: by the fact itself, by the law itself, by that very fact, without another sentence;

2. if the words are in the present or past tense, for example, we excommunicate, we have excommunicated, etc.; 3. if the words are in the imperative mood, for example, let him fall under excommunication, let him remain suspended, interdicted, etc. - St. Alphonsus, no. 7.

Reply 2. But a censure is to be held as ferendae sententiae: 1. if the words by which it is imposed demand the work and ministry of another, for example, let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; 2. if they are only comminatory, for example, we command under threat of anathema, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances; 3. if they express the future tense, for example, he will be excommunicated, he will be an excommunicated person, etc. ¹⁰.

¹⁰ If the words are ambiguous, rule 49 of the Law in the Sext can be followed: in doubt concerning penalties, the more benign interpretation is to be made. Common opinion.

937. • QUESTION 2. Is one who doubts whether he has incurred a censure to be judged to have incurred it?

Reply. Negatively, whether you doubt that you sinned gravely or that the case falls under the censure. The reason is that, according to the commonly received axiom and the very rule of Law, odious things are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Nevertheless, you incur the censure if the doubt concerns the gravity of the matter itself, both considered in itself and in view of the end, etc. For then this matter is to be regarded as grave, since it is such in the judgment of the Superior who imposed the censure and, moreover, in doubt the presumption favors the Superior. - St. Alphonsus, no. 32; Salmanticenses, chapter 1, no. 207, etc. ¹¹.

¹¹ For other resolutions according to the diversity of the doubt, see St. Alphonsus (book 7, nos. 67, 68).

QUESTION 3. Is someone bound by a censure which he knows to be manifestly unjust?

Reply. Negatively, whether the Superior, relying upon a false presumption, condemned an innocent person as guilty, or omitted the legal forms, or exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction. - St. Alphonsus, no. 68. - Nevertheless, the danger of error in one's own cause must be carefully avoided ¹².

¹² Nevertheless, if it is not publicly established that the censure is null, it must be observed on account of scandal (see St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 68).

938. • QUESTION 4. Does ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely, when someone does not know that he is positing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest whom he thinks to be a layman, he does not incur the censure imposed upon those who strike clerics. The reason is that the censure must be known to the sinner in order that he be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law, chapter Si vero aliquis, On the Sentence of Excommunication. - St. Alphonsus, no. 43.

Reply 2. Ignorance of an ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is evident from the same reasons just given; for one who is ignorant of the law of the Church cannot be called contumacious against the Church, as is apparent from Canon Law, Sext, book 1, title 2, On Constitutions, chapter 2, where it is said: We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided, however, that the ignorance was not crass or supine. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

939. • QUESTION 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Affirmatively, if it is not gravely culpable; because then the ignorant person cannot be called contumacious against the Church. Thus all.

Reply 2. Negatively, however, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then it can be called crass; moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from a censure, as is evident from the cited Canon Law. - St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 43, and others commonly ¹³. Otherwise, however, ignorance does not prevent someone from being contumacious against a law of which he is culpably ignorant. Except, however, if it is said in the decree of censure: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly ¹⁴, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act and certain knowledge of the censure. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46. Many nevertheless contend that gravely culpable ignorance excuses from a censure, although it does not excuse from mortal sin; because gravely culpable ignorance can exist without therefore having to be called crass.

¹³ It is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 45) called this opinion common, when the Salmanticenses, from whom he borrowed this opinion, cite more Authors for the opposite than for it (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196); indeed Suarez himself (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12) admits that other modern authors departed into another opinion. But the reason given by Suarez, if it is to be called a reason, is of no weight. Therefore, nothing ought to prevent someone from safely following the opposite opinion, which the Author presently subjoins.

** Against this little Note the VV. write (page 849): A marvelous argument! As though the Salmanticenses had intended to compile an exact catalogue of Authors! And then, besides the four cited by the Salmanticenses for the opinion of St. Alphonsus, they add Laymann, Bonacina, Bossius, Molina, Salas, Filliuccius, Reginaldus, and Alterius.

Reply. Let the antecedent pass; and I deny the consequent. For the question is whether the opinion of St. Alphonsus is to be called common. Moreover, even after those eight are added, would this opinion be called common? For the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196) cite eight for the opposite, namely, Tanner, Caelestinus, Diana, Henriquez, Peter de Ledesma, Palaus, Sanchez, and Avila. Add also that, among those cited by the VV., Filliuccius (On Censures, chapter 8, no. 262), contrary to what St. Alphonsus holds, supposes ignorance mortally culpable which nevertheless is not crass or supine; add that Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, point 1, no. 10) calls the opinion of Sanchez not improbable, whom St. Alphonsus admits to be opposed to himself. Therefore, even if we insist upon these citations alone, is not number now balanced by number?

But other Authors can easily be added to those cited by the Salmanticenses against the opinion of St. Alphonsus. Thus, for example, Pirhing (book 5, title 39, no. 46), Dicastillo (On Censures, disputation 2, no. 298), Babenstuber (tract 4, disputation 1, article 3, no. 10), Tamburini (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 22), Mazzotta (tract 8, disputation 1, question 2, chapter 3, section 2), Reuter (part 1, nos. 22 and 267), and, lest we seek others, Portellus, Serra, Quintanadvenas, Praepositus, and Barbosa in Diana (volume 5, tract 1, resolutions 33 and 35). Let us conclude, therefore, that the foundation is weak upon which the opinion of St. Alphonsus is called common. But let us come to the reason.

Since it is said in the little Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight, the VV. subjoin (page 850): If someone judges the reasons brought by Suarez and other Authors to be of no weight, there is surely nothing by which he would be prevented from embracing the opposite. But the authority alone of Father B., who does not even adduce those reasons and nevertheless condemns them, is by no means sufficient; for no title is known to us by which he could claim this prerogative for himself.

Reply. Father B. claims no other prerogative for himself except that he advance nothing on his own authority, as he has professed more than once. Accordingly, behold Laymann, who writes concerning this question (book 1, tract 2, chapter 4, no. 5): But it appears to be a question of name. Namely, the entire controversy depends upon the sense in which crass or supine ignorance is taken. On this matter, behold Sanchez (Decalogue, book 1, chapter 16, no. 7), who writes: Vincible ignorance which is not affected is one thing when only mortally culpable, but another when crass or supine. Suarez, on the contrary (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12): Every ignorance which suffices for mortal transgression or disobedience is to be called crass or supine.

But how does Suarez prove his thesis? Entirely by this argument (loc. cit.): Other modern Authors ... appear to distinguish degrees in that very ignorance which suffices for mortal sin, so that below a certain degree it is not crass or supine but only vincible, although mortal, and therefore excuses; but beyond that degree it is now crass or supine and does not excuse. But certainly the distinction of such degrees is founded upon no law and can be explained by no reason.

Therefore, the entire force of the argument resides in this: that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained. But does not Suarez himself admit this distinction of degrees? For he himself writes thus (On I-II, tract 2, disputation 4, section 1, no. 14): Because there can be more and less in this negligence, according to this various degrees of this ignorance are customarily distinguished. Hence Laymann also (loc. cit.): I admit this, he says, that among ignorances crass in the mind of Suarez there is a certain latitude, namely, one very crass and altogether supine, another less crass, all of which nevertheless can be mortal. Therefore, since, by Suarez's own admission, various degrees are distinguished among gravely culpable ignorances, to what does his argument finally amount, that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained?

Suarez insists: For who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally is crass in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned?

Reply. Another will answer ad hominem: Who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally exists in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned? Certainly, if it can sometimes be determined when ignorance is grave, and therefore, according to his opinion, crass, it will be possible to determine in the same manner when, among mortal ignorances, as Laymann says, ignorance is very grave and when less grave.

And behold the reason why it was said in the Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight. For, finally, as Laymann says, it is a question of name. And just as it pleased Suarez, on account of that very slight little reason, to define as crass any ignorance however grave, so it seemed to others that only that ignorance should be called crass or supine which was distinguished by some greater gravity. Crass and supine ignorance, says Barbosa (Collections, volume 4, on book 1 of the Sext of the Decretals, title 2, chapter 2, no. 7), is called that which proceeds from THE GREATEST NEGLIGENCE, as happens when someone has employed no diligence or only slight diligence, etc. And from this he proves that Bonacina called the opinion of Sanchez and Navarre not improbable. And as to what Suarez cites for his own purpose from law 15, ff. On Contracting a Purchase, where a supine man is named, as though, namely, every ignorance which does not excuse from a grave obligation, for example, of restitution, were now to be called supine, the gloss explains it thus from other texts of Law: A supine man is one MOST negligent; which is apparent from law 9, ff. On Ignorance of Law and Fact, where it is read (section 2): But ignorance of fact only then does not harm anyone if THE GREATEST negligence is not charged against him. Moreover, does Suarez himself think that it is necessary for grave fault of ignorance that the negligence be the greatest? Hence Sanchez (loc. cit.), after distinguishing mortally culpable ignorance from crass and supine ignorance, well adds: Suarez denies this division, saying that every mortally culpable ignorance is crass or supine.... But I believe this division to be true.

I am led first because crass or supine ignorance is that which proceeds from the extensive fault of the ignorant person, namely, one who has employed no diligence or very slight diligence for knowing. And thus not every negligence, but the greatest, is what can constitute crass ignorance, as I proved from many sources in book 9, On Matrimony, disputation 32, nos. 32 and 33. Hence Valentia very well says that this ignorance exists when the ignorant person, although he could very easily overcome it, employed no diligence. But in order that ignorance be vincible and not excuse from mortal sin, such great negligence is not required; rather, as we shall say according to the mind of all in nos. 34 and 36, it is required that the moral diligence necessary according to the quality of the business was not employed. Secondly, because, in the matter of an unformed confession, the Doctors not to be condemned (Canus, Soto, Henriquez, Bartholomew de Ledesma, Peter de Ledesma, and many others) think that it will be valid when a sin has been tacitly omitted or when a sufficient examination was not previously made from mortal negligence or ignorance, provided that it was not excessively crass or supine. And Soto explains this crass ignorance, from which an unformed confession is rendered altogether invalid, as existing when almost no diligence was employed for recalling sins, which is the definition of crass ignorance. Sanchez draws a third argument from the Doctors, where they say that culpable ignorance perhaps excuses from the excommunication of particular Prelates, provided that it is not crass or supine, but not from censures of the common law. There they plainly speak in the former member of mortally culpable ignorance. For otherwise they would ineptly say that it does not excuse from excommunication of the common law; and still more ineptly would they use the particle perhaps, as though doubting whether it excuses from excommunication by particular Bishops, when it is clearer than the midday light that no excommunication is contracted except on account of mortal fault.

And let these things suffice so that it may be evident that it was not without cause said in the little Note: 1. that it is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus called his opinion common; 2. that the reason brought for it by Suarez is of no weight.

¹⁴ Sanchez rightly notes (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38) that Suarez, who (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 3) here takes temerity for imprudence by which an ignorant person exposes himself to the danger of acting against the law; for temerity in reality designates an act posited against express knowledge of the law.

And indeed this observation of Sanchez appears to apply equally to affected ignorance; which nevertheless the same Sanchez, less consistently with himself, teaches to excuse in On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 10, no. 38, but denies to excuse in On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, nos. 39, 40. The Doctors also differ on this question, as may be seen also in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 48), who says that he adheres to the negative opinion as though it were more common; but if you count the Authors cited for each opinion by the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 199), you will find more in reality for the affirmative. Hence, whether you consider authority or reasons, concerning which see Roncaglia (On Censures, question 5, chapter 5, question 1, reply 4), Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, part 1, no. 11), and the Salmanticenses (loc. cit.), you conclude that in an uncertain matter the general principle is to be employed, and that one is in possession of the right to enjoy spiritual goods where the opposite is not demonstrated.

** The VV. censure two things in this Note (pages 850-855). First (page 853), just as concerning the preceding Note, they complain that it is said that more Authors are cited by the Salmanticenses for the affirmative opinion than for the negative opinion.

Reply. Do the VV. perhaps think it wrong that readers be warned if at some time a doubt arises whether an argument drawn from authority may perhaps need some critical examination? Indeed, the Salmanticenses expressly cite only ten, and tacitly others in Diana, for the affirmative; but for the negative, seventeen are expressly recalled in St. Alphonsus, and tacitly others in Bossius and the Salmanticenses. But, for example: 1. Kazenberger, namely, the Author of the additions to Sporer, whom St. Alphonsus cites for the negative, writes thus (On Censures, chapter 3, no. 39): It is probable and safe that even affected ignorance in such a case excuses from incurring a censure, as Sporer teaches with Sanchez, Bonacina, and Tamburini, tract 2 on the First Precept of the Decalogue, chapter 5, no. 42. And since Palaus actually holds thus (tract 2, disputation 1, point 18, no. 1), whom St. Alphonsus nevertheless cites for himself, there now accede to the affirmative, besides the Salmanticenses themselves, as St. Alphonsus testifies, Sporer, Kazenberger, Palaus, and in addition Tamburinus (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 27), who are not named by the Salmanticenses. 2. To these must also be added Filliuccius (tract 22, chapter 7, no. 205), who is not well cited by St. Alphonsus for the negative, and with Filliuccius also Tanner and Roncaglia, whom St. Alphonsus rightly numbers among those affirming; and Merolla must also be numbered with these (disputation 1, chapter 2, from no. 645), who treats this controversy more fully and solidly. And this light specimen, without our dwelling longer upon these things, sufficiently shows that it is not futile for Arguments sought from authority to be recalled to some weighing, especially since St. Alphonsus himself indicates that he was moved to prefer the negative opinion by authority rather than by reason, saying: I do not dare call this second opinion (the affirmative) improbable; but I adhere more to the first, at least as the more common.

The other thing which the VV. censure is that it is said in the Note that Suarez is noted by Sanchez because he takes temerity for imprudence; consequently they observe (page 852) that mere imprudence OF ITSELF never induces mortal fault.

Reply. The VV. rightly say, mere imprudence OF ITSELF. But it is not so understood by Suarez, who derives the gravity of this lack of consideration in acting from the dangers into which one acting without consideration casts himself. Hence Sanchez writes thus concerning this matter (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38): I do not approve what Suarez says ..., where he thinks that one is called a rash violator if, when he has a suspicion or doubt concerning such a law, he employs no diligence to know whether that law exists; because otherwise he rashly exposes himself to the danger of transgressing it, and if it happens that he violates it in reality, he will be called a rash violator. But this does not please me; because although he is called rash, by reason of the danger to which he exposes himself, for contracting mortal fault, nevertheless laws punishing a rash violator demand something more, as I proved. Otherwise every person culpably ignorant of law would then be punished; because every culpable ignorance of law or fact necessarily supposes that some doubt concerning it preceded.

Namely, temerity is sometimes taken for an inconsiderate facility in acting, but sometimes temerity is said to exist when we do something by our own will and apart from the authority of the one commanding. To this pertain the things contained in chapter Eum qui 18, On Prebends, in the Sext: Moreover, so that violent men who by their own authority (or, more truly, temerity) do not fear to occupy ... any ecclesiastical benefices whatever, even if they are not restrained by love of virtue, may at least be restrained by fear of penalty from THE AUDACITY OF THEIR TEMERITY; by that very fact, etc. And this is what Sanchez intends to intimate when he says that laws punishing a rash violator demand something more. Hence Merolla (disputation 1, chapter 2, no. 235) well adds against that interpretation of Suarez: Temerity properly, beyond precipitation and imprudence, requires contempt; for the word rashly properly imports doing something with contempt of the law, and thus it proceeds from that root of pride

which refuses to be subject to rule, as St. Thomas, II-II, question 55, article 3, reply to objection 2, and Cajetan there very well teach; he says that this is very much to be noted for interpreting Canons which inflict penalties upon those rashly doing something, and that these are to be understood of this proper temerity. Finally, the VV. by no means ought to despise the words of St. Alphonsus, where he expressly says (book 7, no. 61): TEMERITY REQUIRES TRUE KNOWLEDGE, according to the things said in book 1, no. 174. That citation, however, became fallacious when, after the edition of the year 1757, the order of numbers in book I was changed.

940. • QUESTION 6. Does grave fear excuse from a censure?

Reply. Affirmatively, generally speaking. The reason is that ecclesiastical penal laws do not appear to press with so great a rigor. For since ecclesiastical laws themselves cease to oblige where very grave fear presses, the penalty annexed to them must also fall ¹⁵. The difficulty is greater where there is question of precepts of natural law, from fulfilling which grave fear cannot excuse. But even in this case contumacy against the Church is absent. For a censure is not incurred on account of a violation of divine law, but on account of a culpable transgression of ecclesiastical law ¹⁶. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46.

¹⁵ Schmalzgrueber well adds the reason (book 5, title 39, no. 79), that the delinquent thus cannot be held as contumacious and a contemner of ecclesiastical power, since he sins from the infirmity of nature rather than from the malice of an obstinate will.

¹⁶ This doctrine nevertheless has exceptions. Reiffenstuel writes thus concerning the matter (book 5, title 39, no. 34): When observance of a human law appears morally necessary for conserving the public good, or if its violation tends toward contempt of the faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one who, from grave fear even of life, transgresses a law placed under censure is not excused from it ...; because, since in such cases no fear excuses from observance of ecclesiastical law ..., so neither does it excuse from the censure.

941. • QUESTION 7. Is it required that an admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Reply 1. No admonition is required for censures imposed a iure, because the law itself, promulgated and known, sufficiently admonishes the subjects. Thus all ¹⁷.

¹⁷ Although a censure a iure is latae sententiae, nevertheless, if the offense is occult, some juridical admonition or citation is prerequisite for denouncing or declaring someone contumacious as bound by the censure. Otherwise the declaration will be neither licit nor valid.

But when a censure a iure is ferendae sententiae, St. Alphonsus indeed holds as more probable against several others (book 7, no. 55) that no admonition is prerequisite. But it must be said candidly both that the Authors cited by him are adduced beside the point and that his opinion is fortified by no solid reason.

** Against the second part of this little Note the VV. oppose eighteen full columns (pages 853-863). They contend that St. Alphonsus both rightly cited for his opinion the Authors whom he adduces and fortified it with most weighty reasons. For clarity of the matter, please retain the state of the question treated in the little Note, namely, when a censure A IURE IS FERENDAE SENTENTIAE; and thus let us come at once to the first head.

St. Alphonsus, therefore (book 7, no. 55), denies that an admonition is necessary when a judge executes a sentence imposed by law by inflicting a censure upon the guilty. For this, and nothing else, is intended by the question proposed. But for that negative opinion he cites Busembaum, Sanchez, Filliuccius, and Bonacina; he also adds Palaus as holding it probable.

As regards Busembaum, therefore, the VV. urge these words cited by St. Alphonsus (loc. cit., no. 51): Understand this, however (namely, that an admonition must necessarily be premised), of a censure imposed ab homine by a particular sentence, because one which is imposed a iure, or by a general sentence, or even by a special sentence, YET WITH RESPECT TO A FUTURE ACT, does not need another admonition, since the law or sentence itself sufficiently admonishes. Therefore, let those words be noted: yet with respect to a future act. But in the present case the question is whether a judge, before he executes the sentence established by law by inflicting a censure, ought or ought not to admonish the one who sinned against the law. Therefore, the question concerns not a future act, of which Busembaum speaks, but a past one. Consequently, the cited text of Hermann Busembaum does not pertain to the matter.

As regards Sanchez, St. Alphonsus cites book 2, disputation 24, no. 28. Yet even the Salmanticenses themselves (On Censures, disputation 1, no. 90) warn that Sanchez is wrongly cited here because he does not speak there of a censure imposed a iure, but of one imposed ab homine. We suppose, they say, that if a precept has been imposed BY THE JUDGE HIMSELF under the penalty of a censure to be imposed, he will be able by that very fact to excommunicate its transgressor, with no admonition premised.... In this case Sanchez spoke, book 2, On Matrimony, disputation 24, no. 28, who is customarily cited for the opinion asserting that an admonition is not required WHEN THE LAW THREATENS A CENSURE.... But Sanchez does not speak in this sense, but in the one which we have stated. And in reality this is manifestly apparent from the state of the question proposed there by Sanchez (no. 26), namely, when the judge commanded the bridegroom that within a certain time he either enter religion or consummate the marriage under penalty of excommunication. Therefore, the citation of Sanchez also does not pertain to the matter; wherefore the VV. also (page 856) finally say that this citation must be attributed to inadvertence.

The same must be said of the citation of Palaus, unless perhaps it must be said that this question is treated so confusedly by Palaus that nothing can be drawn from him. St. Alphonsus cites disputation 1, point 5, no. 6. But in this place Palaus writes thus: There is a doubt whether, if some deed is prohibited or commanded to you under an excommunication or suspension to be imposed, the judge can pronounce a sentence of excommunication or suspension upon you when disobedient, with no other admonition. Abbas in chapter Cum sit Romana, no. 28, On Appeals; Sanchez, On Matrimony, book 2, disputation 24, no. 28; Filliuccius, On Censures, chapter 4, no. 95; Bonacina ...; Stephanus Davila, etc., affirm it as sufficiently probable. But if the words by which the question is proposed are inspected, you would more quickly say that Palaus treats of a censure imposed ab homine than of one imposed a iure. The citations of Abbas and Sanchez also confirm the same. Therefore, either these things do not pertain to the matter, or nothing can be gathered from this confused manner of disputing. But whatever the question is finally understood to mean, what the opinion of Palaus is appears from the following words (ibid., no. 7): But it is far truer that the aforesaid censure threatened against you cannot be inflicted without a new admonition.

Let us come to Bonacina. His words (On Censures, disputation 1, point 9, nos. 3-4), if the manner in which he establishes the question is inspected, leave the reader uncertain whether there is question of a censure a iure or ab homine. There is a doubt, he says, whether, in censures threatened for future faults, an admonition distinct from the publication of the law or edict enacted under penalty of excommunication is required. These words can be understood both of a censure a iure and of a censure ab homine. But the solution of the question removes the doubt. The opposite seems truer to me, he says, namely, that an admonition is not required. The reason is that there is sufficient admonition on the part of the judge and sufficient contumacy on the part of the delinquent who knows the prohibition under penalty of a censure to be imposed. But those words, sufficient admonition on the part of the judge, in no way agree with a law established a iure by a perpetual statute. This is confirmed because Covarruvias, part 1, section 9, no. 5, is there taken up for refutation. But Covarruvias does not there dispute concerning a censure a iure and ferendae sententiae, but plainly speaks first of a censure ab homine and then of a censure a canone, but latae sententiae.

Of those cited by St. Alphonsus, Filliuccius remains. But, first, it is in no way evident whether he disputes concerning a censure a iure or ab homine. For he asks generally (On Censures, chapter 4, no. 92): Is an admonition required in a censure ferendae sententiae? Then, as Bonacina admits (loc. cit.), Filliuccius would favor that opinion only in part. For he thus defends the opposite (loc. cit., no. 94): I say first that, speaking absolutely and regularly, the second opinion appears truer, namely, that an admonition must be premised. But he would favor the other opinion in that part in which that doctrine labors most, namely, when there is question of a censure to be imposed for a crime which is in no way extended into the future, requires no satisfaction, reparation, or restitution, and, in a word, is a merely and altogether past crime, for example, if entrance into some chapel on a certain day is prohibited to men, as he himself says at no. 92, under penalty of excommunication to be imposed.

I said that this doctrine labors most; for, as Palaus well says (On Censures, disputation 1, part 5, no. 7), it belongs to the nature of a censure that it be imposed for the prevention of an offense, as is a censure latae sententiae, or for correction, because it is a medicinal penalty. But if it could be imposed for an offense already committed, it would be not so much medicine as punishment and vengeance, and would often punish a delinquent already corrected. And to the same purpose Suarez says (disputation 3, section 10, no. 21): From this I infer that, if an offense is such that it is in no way extended into the future but, as soon as it is consummated, passes away altogether, leaving no obligation of restoring or satisfying with respect to men, but only with respect to God, such an offense cannot be prohibited by law under threat of a censure ferendae sententiae, but the censure must either be imposed by the law itself or not at all. And indeed the VV. add (page 857) that St. Alphonsus also agrees with Suarez in this doctrine.

Let these things suffice to establish that it was not gratuitously said in the little Note that the Authors cited by St. Alphonsus are adduced beside the point.

But as regards the reasons, the matter is resolved very briefly by the Doctors, because the text of the Law in chapter Reprehensibilis 26, On Appeals, is manifest. For Alexander III says there: We establish that Prelates also shall not pronounce a sentence of suspension or excommunication upon their subjects unless a canonical admonition has been premised, except perhaps when the fault is of such a kind that by its very nature it induces the penalty of suspension or excommunication. Therefore, since Prelates are generally and strictly forbidden to impose a censure unless a canonical admonition has been premised, and it is merely excepted when there is question of a fault which by its own kind, that is, by the law itself or by the fact itself, induces the penalty of suspension or excommunication, the rule now applies that an exception confirms the rule in the contrary case; and therefore, whenever the censure is not latae sententiae, a canonical admonition is always required.

The VV. reply (page 857): We answer that this assertion, namely, of the little Note, is false, and that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus is fortified not only by solid but by most weighty reasons. For: 1. the Holy Doctor in the case always requires the citation of the guilty party for declaring the censure; and 2. he agrees entirely with Suarez that sentence is not to be pronounced upon a repentant guilty party. but a DECLARATION and a citation FOR DECLARING a censure have place when the guilty party had already incurred the censure by the fact itself.

Reply to 2. For this very reason Suarez, contrary to what St. Alphonsus judged, requires an admonition beforehand. And these things, like certain other things which the VV. heap up in the same place in order to show that St. Alphonsus agrees with Suarez and other Doctors, prove only this: that the general thesis of the Holy Doctor, by which he denies the necessity of an admonition in the case, coheres less well with other doctrines of his.

Reply 2. But an admonition is required for censures to be imposed ab homine. The reason is that one is not contumacious who was not previously admonished concerning the precept and the penalty annexed. Indeed, by Canon Law a triple admonition is required, or at least one in which it is expressed that it is to have the force of three. Except 1. If there is question of a censure ab homine through a general sentence, or even a special one with respect to a future act;

Reply to 1. These things do not pertain to the matter. For here the question concerns a censure ferendae sententiae, namely, when the judge or Superior pronounces a sentence by which he imposes a censure which the guilty party had not yet incurred; for then an admonition is not necessary, since the decree concerning the censure to be imposed takes the place of an admonition ¹⁸.

¹⁸ The resolution will be clearer if, according to the things said in the preceding note, you distinguish censures to be incurred by the fact itself from censures ferendae sententiae. For in this second case, especially if the crime in some way extends into the future, the opinion which judges an admonition necessary is truer. See Suarez (On Censures, disputation 3, section 9, no. 4).

But concerning the solemnities to be observed in an admonition, see Suarez (cited disputation 3, section 9 and following) and Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 1, part 9). Observe this, however: Palaus (On Censures, disputation 1, part 5, no. 9), from whom Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 28) and Reiffenstuel (same title, no. 25) afterward copied, asserted the necessity of making the admonition in writing, as though this were provided in chapter Medicinalis 1, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext; St. Alphonsus likewise, through a slip of the eye, thought that he had found this opinion among the Salmanticenses, who in reality teach the opposite. But in chapter Medicinalis the discussion is not about the admonition but about the sentence of excommunication; therefore the entire foundation of that opinion falls, which in any case is contrary to the common opinion of the other Doctors.

** The VV. attack this little Note in eight columns (pages 863-867). Passing over those things which do not pertain to the matter, we shall pursue those which touch the little Note.

1. First, therefore, the VV. write (page 863): Father Ballerini undeservedly attacks Palaus, Schmalzgrueber, and Reiffenstuel. And they give the reason (page 865), saying: Neither Palaus nor the two most illustrious Canonists cite chapter Cum medicinalis for this purpose.

2. Reply 1. The little Note does not say that the two most illustrious Canonists, Schmalzgrueber and Reiffenstuel, cited that canon for this purpose, but that they copied those things from Palaus. And Reiffenstuel in reality writes thus (book 5, title 39, no. 25): In order that this admonition be made legitimately, it must be made in writing, AS PALAUS WILLS, tract 29, disputation 4, point 5, no. 9.

Reply 2. Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 28) has thus: This admonition must be made in writing, which writing must contain the cause for which the censure is imposed and must be delivered to the guilty party upon whom it is imposed; but if the judge (unless he is a Bishop), without an urgent cause, has inflicted excommunication by word alone and not in writing, he is suspended by the law itself for a month from entrance into the church and from divine offices; and if during that time he intrudes himself into divine things, he becomes irregular, as is contained in chapter Cum medicinalis 1, this title, in the Sext. PALAUS, cited point 5, no. 9.

Whether these things were not copied from Palaus, let the impartial reader judge. Thus, therefore, Palaus (loc. cit.): This admonition must be made in writing containing the cause for which the censure is imposed, which writing must be delivered to the guilty party upon whom the censure is imposed. But if the judge (unless he is a Bishop), without an urgent cause, has pronounced excommunication by word alone and not in writing, he is suspended by the law itself for a month from entrance into the church and from divine offices; and if within that time he intrudes himself into divine things, he becomes irregular. ALL OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED

IN CHAPTER 1, ON THE SENTENCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION, IN THE SEXT. Therefore, what is asserted in the little Note, that Schmalzgrueber copied these things from Palaus, meets the eye, since one repeats the words of the other almost to the letter.

3. But that it is not gratuitously said in the little Note that Palaus asserted the necessity of making the admonition as though it were provided in chapter Medicinalis is apparent from his reported text, when he plainly says: All of which are contained in chapter 1, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext. And indeed whether Palaus cited chapter Cum medicinalis for this purpose, as the VV. say, might perhaps be judged doubtful if nothing were seen in that chapter of those things which Palaus transfers to the manner of making an admonition. But the contrary is true. For all those things, the admonition must be made in writing, which writing must contain the cause for which the censure is imposed and must be delivered to the guilty party, plainly appear to have been taken from the aforesaid chapter, where it is read: let him pronounce the excommunication in writing, and let him expressly write down the cause of the excommunication ...; but let him be bound to deliver a copy of such writing to the excommunicated person, etc. Therefore it is sufficiently manifest that Palaus transferred to the admonition those solemnities which in chapter Cum medicinalis are prescribed for pronouncing excommunication. And this is also confirmed by the fact that Palaus, when he afterward writes in the same place about excommunication, entirely omits the solemnity of delivering the writing to the guilty party, because, namely, he also took this as though it were said of the admonition.

4. Now concerning the other part of the Note, where it is said that it happened through inadvertence that St. Alphonsus attributed to the Salmanticenses the opinion concerning an admonition to be made in writing.

On this argument the Holy Doctor has merely these words (book 7, no. 56, at the end): The admonition must be made by the judge himself or by another in his name. And if the censure is imposed for the benefit of a party, the citation must be made at his instance. Thus Suarez, disputation 3, section 11, no. 1; Bonacina, no. 4; and the Salmanticenses, chapter 1, no. 95, with others. The admonition must also be made in writing unless the judge proceeds by virtue of his office, as he is sometimes bound to do on account of the common good, from chapter Venerabilibus, section Porro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext. For then it suffices if the admonition is made orally, yet in such a manner that it can be proved in court. Thus the Salmanticenses, chapter 1, no. 95, with Gibalinus and Cornelius, from chapter Sacro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, etc.

5. But if you compare these things with the text of the Salmanticenses, from whom St. Alphonsus admits that he took them, you must certainly suspect, if not the inadvertence of one transcribing compendiously, at least a typographical error in the words of St. Alphonsus. Yet no edition is free from this error, since the same thing recurs everywhere from the first edition of the year 1748 down to the latest editions of our age. And indeed, for greater evidence of the matter, we shall join to the text of the Salmanticenses (chapter 1, On Censures, no. 95) the text of Suarez (On Censures, disputation 5, section 11, no. 1), since both the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus cite him, and it will be apparent that the Salmanticenses copied their material from him.

6. Thus, therefore, Suarez (loc. cit., no. 1): From the things which have been said concerning this admonition, it follows that it must be made by the authority and in the name of the judge himself who is to impose the censure. The reason is manifest, because the admonition must be such that, if someone does not obey, he is rendered contumacious and disobedient; which cannot be unless the admonition is made by the authority of the Superior. The Canonists add another reason: that this admonition has the force of a citation; but a citation, in order to be of any moment, requires the authority of the judge.

7. These same things, but a little more obscurely and intricately, the Salmanticenses express thus (loc. cit.): It is answered that the admonition must be made by the judge himself or in his name, because it has the force of a citation, which citation must be made in the name and by the authority of him by whom the censure is imposed; and because a censure is not incurred

except through disobedience and contumacy against the mandate of the Superior, which contumacy does not exist unless the admonition is made in his name. In these words the Salmanticenses, certainly intricately and obscurely, bring from Suarez two reasons why an admonition must be made in the name and by the authority of the judge.

8. But St. Alphonsus, omitting those two reasons, merely has this: The admonition must be made by the judge himself or by another in his name.

9. Suarez continues (loc. cit.): They (the Canonists) also add that, when a censure is to be imposed for the benefit of some private person, then the admonition ought to be made at his instance, because it has the force of a citation; and a citation, in order to be valid, must be made at the instance of the party, because the judge ought not to interpose his office on his own motion for private advantage.... But if the censure is imposed for the common good, in which case the judge can proceed by virtue of his office, then he can also admonish by virtue of his office, just as he can also cite by virtue of his office; and this is taken from chapter Venerabilibus, section Porro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext.

10. The Salmanticenses also present this part, certainly most clear in Suarez, compendiously and very obscurely thus (loc. cit.): And when a censure is imposed for the benefit of some private person, the admonition must be made at his instance. But if a censure is imposed for the common good, the judge on his own motion (perhaps, the judge) can proceed to the admonition, because by virtue of his office he is bound to this, chapter Venerabilibus, section Porro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext.

But what metamorphosis these things underwent in the text of St. Alphonsus will appear a little later.

11. Finally, Suarez adds (loc. cit., no. 2): It is further added in chapter Sacro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, that this admonition must be made in the presence of suitable persons through whom the admonition can be proved if necessary. Hence Abbas infers that it is not necessary for this admonition to be made in writing, for, he says, the presence of persons is required for that reason.

12. But the Salmanticenses present this last part thus (loc. cit.): It is not required that the admonition be made in writing; nevertheless, it must be made before suitable witnesses through whom it can be proved in the external forum: chapter Sacro, On the Sentence of Excommunication; Diana, part 5, tract 9, resolution 19 (in the coordinated edition, volume 5, tract 1, resolution 5, no. 2); Gibalinus, no. 10; Cornejo, doubt 2, question 7.

13. But this last part of the Salmanticenses, mingled by an unfortunate confusion with the preceding one above, no. 10, is seen thus in the text of St. Alphonsus: The admonition must also be made in writing unless the judge proceeds by virtue of his office, as he is sometimes bound to do on account of the common good, from chapter Venerabilibus, section Porro, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext; for then it suffices if the admonition is made orally, yet in such a manner that it can be proved in court. Thus THE SALMANTICENSES, chapter 1, no. 95, with Gibalinus and Cornelius, from chapter Sacro, On the Sentence of Excommunication.

But from the comparison most manifestly made, it appears that those things which the Salmanticenses, above no. 10, after Suarez, above no. 9, had said concerning the judge who ought not to proceed to an admonition on his own motion except when the censure is to be imposed for the common good, these things, I say, were transferred in the text of St. Alphonsus to the judge, who ought not to make the admonition IN WRITING unless he proceeds by virtue of his office on account of the common good; concerning which, certainly, there is neither word nor syllable among the Salmanticenses and Suarez. Consequently, according to the text of St. Alphonsus, the admonition would then have to be made in writing only when the judge did not proceed to admonition except at the instance of some private person, as the VV. themselves explain in reality (page 864), contending that this is drawn from the Salmanticenses. But from the very fact that no trace of such a theory can be found in any Author and that at the same time no reason whatever for such a distinction can be devised, it is permissible to conclude what is intimated in the little Note: that from a mere slip of the eye or through inadvertence St. Alphonsus could have thought that he had found that opinion among the Salmanticenses.

Except 2. If there is question of that suspension and interdict which are not censures properly so called and medicinal, but are imposed only by way of penalty. - St. Alphonsus, no. 52, etc. - See Cases, no. 1419.