Whether ignorance excuses from the penalties established by positive laws?

I suppose 1° that invincible ignorance of law or fact, which excuses from all sin, excuses from penalty, because just penalty is decreed only on account of guilt, otherwise it would be

I said: « Which excuse from all sin; » because, if ignorance should excuse from sin against one law only, suppose a human law which is ignored, and not excuse from sin against another law, suppose divine or natural which is not ignored, I judge it more probable that the sinner be not exempted from penalty by human laws enacted, if there be no ecclesiastical censure; because the human legislator intends not only to urge by penalties observance of his own law, but also of natural or divine law, of which he ought to be guardian and protector. Whence a thief who, conscious of natural law, ignores theft to be prohibited by human law, nevertheless incurs the penalty of hanging.

I suppose 2° that vincible ignorance of law or fact which excuses from mortal also excuses from penalty at least so great, because positive laws are not reckoned to decree grave penalties for venial sins. But that vincible ignorance is reckoned as excusing from mortal which is not gross and supine; for thus it is reckoned light.

I suppose 3° that vincible ignorance, even gross and supine, of a law bearing penalty under these or similar formulas: « Whoever knowingly, rashly, with rash daring shall act against, or shall have dared to act against, or presumed, » excuses from penalty; because, as Cajetan says, 2ª 2ae, q. 53, a. 3, « the words of law are not appended in vain nor to be taken improperly; » in vain would they be appended, nor would they be taken with restrictive propriety, if delinquents through ignorance even gross incurred the penalty. Otherwise, more probably, must be said if ignorance be affected; because, according to the laws, affected ignorance is equated with knowledge, and it is not likely that legislators wish to exempt from their laws and penalties those who affect to ignore them, that they may transgress them more freely.

The question therefore remains whether ignorance of penalty excuses from it him who sins gravely against a law he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance. For whose resolution

I say 1°: Ignorance even invincible of penalty does not exempt from it him who sins gravely against a law which either he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance, unless it be an ecclesiastical censure.

It is proved. Laws establish penalties condign to guilts. Ergo whoever commits guilt is liable to penalty, even though invincibly ignorant of it; for it is not of the nature of penalty that it be known or willed, since it has of itself that it be violent and against the will.

I said: « Unless it be an ecclesiastical censure. » For which I say 2°: Invincible ignorance of an ecclesiastical censure exempts from it one sinning knowingly against the law by which it is decreed. This is common opinion.

It is proved. That is special and proper to ecclesiastical censure, that it be not incurred except on account of contumacy against the Church — not in whatsoever manner, but against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure, whose sign is that no one incur censure unless there precede warning of law or judge, not any whatsoever, but with threat of censure. Yet he who invincibly ignores the censure is not contumacious against the Church in this manner. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Ecclesiastical censure is not so much vindicative punishment in vengeance for crime as medicinal punishment deterring from crime. Yet unknown punishment does not deter. Ergo.

I say 3°: It seems more probable that ignorance even vincibile, provided it be not gross and supine, exempts from an ecclesiastical censure one sinning knowingly against the law by which it was established. So Sylvester, under Excommunicatio I, q. 3, Navarrus, Covarruvias, and many others.

It is gathered from Cap. Ut animarum, de Constitutionibus in Sexto, lib. I, tit. 2, c. 2, where we have this: « Lest perils of souls be encountered, we do not will that those ignorant be bound by sentences issued through statutes of whatever Ordinaries, provided however their ignorance be not gross and supine. »

The Reason supports it. He who ignores the censure, even though vincibly, but with lightly culpable ignorance not gross and supine, is not properly called disobedient and contumacious against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure. Yet contumacy of this kind is required for incurring censure, as was said. Ergo. Otherwise, we judge, must be said of irregularity, even from delict, which we do not reckon a censure, as we shall say elsewhere.

You will ask whether, as often as the will sins, some practical error precedes in the will.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. Because insofar the will sins, insofar it prefers useful or delightful good, as ¹ Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

^{1 1} Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

fitting itself, to honest good. Yet the will, since it is a blind potency, born to follow the guidance of intellect, cannot prefer delightful good, as fitting itself, to honest good, unless the intellect judge here and now delightful good to be fitting itself and preferable to honest good: wherein practically it errs. Ergo. And in this sense is verified that Prov., XIV, 22: They err that work evil. And this common saying taken from the Philosopher, I Ethic., c. 3: « Every sinner is ignorant, » namely practically and in particular, not speculatively and in common; otherwise every sinner would be heretic.