First motions of passion

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.

"8. To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided that it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts. - 9. The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, Decree of 2 March 1679.

22. Whether the first motions of depraved concupiscence are always sins, and of what kind? — There can be no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for the matter is grave, if, when they arise, the will in the subsequent time consents to them, and by consenting is morosely delighted in them, whether with a long delay, or a brief and very brief delay. For the act concerns a gravely base matter, and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it may have been stirred up wholly independently of the will, with the consent of the will coming to it, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence. Wherefore that delay is a voluntary delay.

23. Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence naturally stirred up and independently of the will, which then according to its powers dissents from and resists them, are in no way sins. For the acts are wholly involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed merit then belongs to the will resisting. “The first motion,” says St. Thomas, 2. Dist. q. 1. a. 4. ad 3., “does not have the account of fault except according as in some way it is in the power of the will. Whence as long as the will does not resist, it has the account of sin. But when the will now begins to resist, then man merits.”

24. Finally, if the will, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, then a motion of this kind now has the account of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and beyond the will, which indeed does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but slight. For mortal sin consists in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. It is venial sin because it is disordered, with no excusing cause, to cease from all resistance and to do nothing in so dangerous a matter; and since this is not mortal, nevertheless it cannot be exempted from venial fault. “The first motion is a motion of sensuality preceding the deliberation of reason.... But it pertains to the nature of sensuality and of reason that a motion of sensuality which is without deliberation of reason cannot be mortal sin, because mortal sin is that which consists in aversion from God, to whom man cannot be converted except through reason; and consequently aversion from God, which constitutes mortal sin, cannot be except in reason.” St. Thomas, Quodl. 4. a. 22. Moreover the disorder which constitutes mortal sin is in the will, which wills evil. But here the will does not truly will, but permits; and to permit evil per se is not sin, or certainly is not mortal sin. For to will evil is from the perfect dominion of the will; to permit evil is only from its imperfect dominion, since it is only not to prohibit evil. “The will has complete dominion in some things, but incomplete in others. It has complete dominion in those acts which proceed from the command of the will, and these are acts following deliberation, which are ascribed to reason. But it has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed through the command of reason, but nevertheless the will could impede them, so that thus in some way they are subject to the will, as to being impeded or not impeded; and therefore the disorder which happens in these acts causes the account of sin, yet of incomplete sin, and therefore in these acts sin is very slight and venial.” St. Thomas, 2. Dist. 24. q. 3. a. 2.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; De Malo q. 7, a. 6 and 8; De Veritate q. 25, a. 5.

448. Movements of sensuality or concupiscence are called inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite rising up against the order of reason, such as movements of sensible love or aversion, anger, gluttony, delight, sadness, hope, fear, despair, audacity, etc., and especially venereal movements.

They are distinguished by theologians as: 1) first-first movements, which precede every advertence of reason, and these are not formal sins, which is of faith for the baptized, from the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5; and it is certain concerning infidels from the condemnation of propositions 50 and 51 of Baius;

2. second-first movements (so called because they are second after the first-first, and first among moral and free movements), which occur with semiplene or some advertence, and these are venial sins;

3. deliberate movements, which occur with full advertence of the intellect and are deliberately admitted or excited by the will: these are voluntary

either a) directly and in themselves, when the will positively consents to them, and then they are mortal sins if they are gravely inordinate or prohibited under grave matter;

1. We use the received terminology, which it is neither possible nor opportune to change. The terminology of St. Thomas is different, although not of all of his age. According to him, first-first movements are merely natural movements, which depend solely on the disposition of the body, or which are so suddenly aroused at the apprehension of sense that reason could in no way foresee and impede them; second-first movements are those which depend on the sensitive apprehension of imagination or sense. But since the sensitive faculties are born to be moved by reason and to obey it, reason can impede those movements. Concerning these St. Thomas teaches that they are venial sins, and indeed generally and indefinitely, because if reason is watchful, it can foresee and impede individual movements. Nevertheless do not conclude from this that they are always sins. St. Thomas enunciates a general principle: movements of themselves are apt to be foreseen by reason and therefore can and ought to be impeded, and thus they are indirectly voluntary; in fact, sometimes there are excusing causes on account of which they ought not or even cannot be impeded. In this matter more recent authors perhaps admit excuses too easily and more than is fitting, being less solicitous concerning the office of watchful reason; the ancients applied the principle very rigorously and attended less to causes of excuse.

or b) indirectly voluntary, when the will only omits to repress them while it can and ought;

or c) voluntary in a positive cause, when the will only places a cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow.

449. Indirectly voluntary movements are those to which the will neither positively consents nor resists, but to which it has itself negatively and which it only permits. Concerning them it must be said:

1. Man certainly sins in them, because reason and will fail in their office of directing and repressing the movements of the inferior powers, nor can man hold himself indifferently toward whether his movements and acts are inordinate or not. But the appetite of evil is deformity and consequently to be expelled. If reason adverts to this, it ought to deliberate concerning it and show displeasure and remove the deformity as far as it can, according to Gen. IV, 7: Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall rule over it. But he who has himself negatively is judged equivalently to consent. But:

a) per se he does not sin gravely, because positive and full consent of the will is lacking;

1. Let it be noted that a man cannot permit another to excite movements in himself, and indeed under grave matter, because this is cooperation in mortal sin and more easily includes danger of consent.

b) per accidens he would sin gravely, if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to gravely prohibited movements, as often happens in more vehement venereal commotions, and in vehement hatred or appetite of revenge.

2. Many say: "if the movements are vehement, one must resist under mortal sin, because proximate danger of consent is present," but this is not always true; "if the movements are slight, one need not resist under mortal sin, because the danger of consent is small," but neither is it always small for all.

2. Man is bound to resist them positively, insofar as it is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the movements:

a) Ordinarily, however, not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, because this is not necessary or is too difficult, or even excites the movements more.

3. Per accidens there can be an obligation of resisting directly, if another resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent, for example, in anger or hatred.

Direct resistance is made by suppressing imagination, by an act of love in place of hatred, of hope in place of despair, by compression of the members, by violent movement of the head, by chastisement of the body through afflictions, vigils, discipline, for example, by throwing oneself naked into thorns or into cold water, etc.

b) But generally he is bound to resist indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompossible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind.

Thus, for example, by interrupting the work, pursuing business, by an external occupation requiring special attention, by praying, meditating, etc.

c) Sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise nor repressing the movement, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices; this act is not to be repeated frequently, since, until it is retracted, it is judged morally to persevere.

1. Displeasure is present implicitly if someone voluntarily does something else, voluntarily does not attend to these things, or contemns them.

Thus if someone has experienced that another resistance is useless for coercing the movements, or excites and increases them more; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as will be indicated in the following number under c), and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example, because of duration; or if the movements are slight and transitory, both because causes exciting such movements are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are better and more efficaciously repressed by contempt: for solicitude to impede them is accustomed to excite the imagination and increase the movements. All these things are easily verified in a scrupulous person, who therefore shows sufficient displeasure by simply contemning the movements.

Nevertheless, in the aforesaid circumstances, man must bring safeguards and care lest he consent to the movements.

450. Movements voluntary in the cause, which are not intended and to which the will does not consent, but which are only willed in a positive cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, are sin only as much as the cause insofar as it influences them. Hence:

a) It is grave sin without sufficient reason to place a cause per se gravely influencing movements prohibited under grave matter, such as venereal movements, movements of great unjust anger, of great hatred, even if they do not follow per accidens.

Thus, for example, reading long continued that is very impious and persuasive against religion, the priesthood, public order, etc., exciting hatred, anger, revenge; very base reading, conversation or reading inducing despair or suicide; frequenting companions who excite to this; duration of touch or sight of a dishonorable part; likewise protracted morose delight of revenge or lust. Hence St. Alphonsus says that even a movement of pollution is not mortal unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust: 1) it must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil (understand: in which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause; but every and only a cause which per se gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, unless there is an excusing reason of a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause); 2) it must be mortal in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example, drunkenness.

b) It is a light sin without a just cause to place an action lightly influencing even vehement movements and movements prohibited under grave matter (indeed, even pollution itself), provided that they do not please and there is no proximate danger of consent. A slight influence into a grave thing, namely, is a light matter.

Such is a not-long conversation with an impious man or with a girl; sight or touch not very base; reading slightly impious or slightly base. A sufficient reason for permitting these things will be any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

c) It is no sin from a just cause to place an action from which inordinate movements are foreseen as going to follow (even pollution), provided that proximate danger of consent is always absent.

In the matter of lust, a just cause for a priest is to hear confessions and study base matters; for a surgeon, to see and touch dishonorable parts, likewise for one serving the sick or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride on horseback for the sake of recreation or utility, to lie down in a more comfortable position, to take hot foods and drinks moderately.

451. Observation. - In the preceding things we have spoken according to natural law alone; for sometimes causes which for someone influence lightly or in no way are prohibited even under grave matter by positive law, for example, by the law of the index of books.

I say 1°: Antecedent concupiscence rather causes a thing to be voluntary than involuntary¹. For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what concupiscence desires. Therefore concupiscence contributes more to making a thing voluntary than involuntary. ¹ Here q. 7, a. 4, c.

I say 2°: Antecedent concupiscence increases absolute voluntariness, and diminishes perfect and free voluntariness.

The first part is proved. Absolute voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end materially, such as belongs to brutes. But antecedent concupiscence causes the will, with prior knowledge of the end materially, to be borne toward the object with greater force and inclination than if there were no concupiscence. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° By reason; for, concupiscence impelling, the intellect proposes to the will the object as more desirable, and therefore to be pursued with greater efficacy. 2° By experience; for we see that those who pursue an object with love are carried toward it with greater force than if they were not affected by this passion. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Perfect voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end formally as end, that is, with knowledge of the dignity of the end and of the proportion of the means to it. But concupiscence diminishes, nay sometimes takes away this knowledge. Therefore. — The minor is proved. For it diminishes the judgment of reason, nay sometimes destroys it and causes madness, as experience shows. But knowledge of the end formally as end pertains to the judgment of reason. Therefore.

The third part is proved. Free voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end under indifference concerning the thing proposed. But antecedent concupiscence diminishes this indifference. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° Because it diminishes the judgment of reason, as I was just saying. 2° Because concupiscence causes the intellect to propose to the will, in pursuing the object, all the aspects of the desirable and deficient good, and to attend less to the aspects of the honest good by which the will would be withdrawn from that object. Therefore it diminishes indifference.

Hence you will infer that antecedent concupiscence diminishes sin, insofar as it disturbs the judgment and diminishes liberty, nay sometimes exempts from all sin, when it is so violent that it altogether takes away the judgment of reason and indifference, and renders one mad.

I say 1° : No sin formally taken, even venial, can exist in and from the sensitive appetite alone, without some actual influx at least interpretative of the will.

It is proved 1°. Aug., lib. de vera Religione, c. 14, n. 27, says: « Either it must be denied that sin is committed, or it must be acknowledged that it is committed by the will. » And lib. de Duabus animabus, cap. 10, n. 14, says: « Sin is committed only by the will. »

St. Thomas, here a. 2, ad 1, already cited: « Sin is not committed except by the will, as by the first mover; but sin is committed by the other powers as moved by it. »

It is proved 2°. There cannot be sin, even venial, in the sensitive appetite, unless at least the will can impede its motion, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, in II Sentent., dist. 24, q. 3, a. 2, o, and the adversaries themselves also confess, who for that very reason deny that the primo primi motions are sins, because, since they anticipate all reason and are without advertence, the will cannot impede them. But by this very fact that the will can impede and does not impede, it inflows interpretatively and consents. Therefore. Whence the adversaries either speak inconsequently, or dispute about a word.

You will say 1° : St. Thomas, here q. 74, a. 3, ad 3, says: « The motion of sensuality that anticipates reason is a venial sin. » Q. 25 de Veritate, a. 5, ad 5: « It is not said to be sin in sensuality on account of the interpretative consent of reason. »^{1 1} For thus the Angelic Doctor says here: « It is not said to be sin in sensuality on account of the interpretative consent of reason; for when the motion of sensuality anticipates the judgment of reason, there is neither interpreted nor express consent. But from this very fact that sensuality is subjectible to reason, its act, although it anticipate reason itself, has the character of sin. »

I answer. to the first, that St. Thomas speaks of a motion of sensuality that anticipates indeed reason fully deliberating, yet followed by reason half-deliberating, that is, of a secundo primo motion.

To the second. Similarly it does not require the interpretative consent of reason perfectly deliberating, but well of reason deliberating imperfectly and half-way.

You will say 2° : According to the doctrine of the preceding article, the sensitive appetite is free by its habitual conjunction alone, or immediate subordination, to the will. Therefore without actual influx of the will it can sin, at least venially.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. In act first, I concede; in act second, I deny. For since the liberty of the sensitive appetite is not primary in man, but subordinate and participated from the will, it cannot break forth into act without some influx of the will; just as also the cogitative power does not participate the power of discoursing in act about singulars, except « according to a certain reflux » of universal reason into it, as St. Thomas says, Ia p., q. 78, a. 4, ad 5.

I say 2° : The motions of sensuality that are primo primi, namely those which forestall every advertence of reason, or those which we suffer unwillingly, however much they turn about illicit things, are not sins, not even venial.

Thus it was defined by Trid., sess. V, can. 5, and the opposite was condemned by St. Pius V, propositions 50 and 51 among the Baianian ones.

[Thus the Synod of Trid. defined at the place cited: « That concupiscence, or fomes, remains in the baptized, this holy Synod confesses and holds; which, having been left for the contest, harms not those who do not consent, but manfully resist through the grace of Christ Jesus : nay more, whoever shall have striven lawfully shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church never understood to be called sin because it would truly and properly be sin in those reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. But if anyone shall hold the contrary, let him be anathema. »

Among the 79 propositions condemned first by St. Pius V and afterwards by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII, the following are read :

50. « The wicked desires to which reason does not consent, and which man suffers unwillingly, are forbidden by the precept: Thou shalt not covet. »

51. « Concupiscence, or the law of the members, and its wicked desires which men feel unwillingly, are true disobedience of the law. »

75. « The motions of wicked concupiscence, in the state of vitiated man, are forbidden by the precept: Thou shalt not covet. Whence man, feeling them and not consenting, transgresses the precept: Thou shalt not covet, although the transgression is not reckoned as sin. »

76. « As long as anything of carnal concupiscence is in the diligent man, he does not fulfill the precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. »]

It follows from the preceding conclusion. For if there be no sin without some consent of the will, plainly it follows that motions which forestall all reason, or which we suffer with the will resisting, are not sins, since they are without any consent of the will.

Philip, a seventeen-year-old student in a certain Catholic college, confesses before his confessor that he has suffered depraved motions. The confessor asks whether he consented to them, which Philip denies. Then, when the confessor asks whether perhaps he has posited a cause of them and what cause, he replies that sometimes they arise as if spontaneously, sometimes from the reading of books, sometimes from association with other boys toward whom perhaps he cherishes a carnal affection, and sometimes from the fact that he has kissed them. Hence it is asked:

1. What is concupiscence?

2. Can any order of the acts by which sin is usually committed be distinguished?

3. Is there sin in the motions which are called first-first and second-first?

4. What is to be said concerning the case, and what counsel is to be given to Philip concerning each point?

1. What is concupiscence?

Concupiscence is commonly used in different senses by dogmatic and by moral theologians. Dogmatic theologians use it to signify the inclination to evil and the inordinate motions which we all experience within us, and which, as the Council of Trent teaches, are the effects of original sin.¹ In moral theology concupiscence is used in a wider sense to signify any movement of passion, or any movement of the sensible appetite toward its own proper good. Thus it is a general term used to signify emotions of love, hatred, joy or gladness, desire, sorrow, and anger. Such emotions are not in themselves either good or evil; their moral quality depends on their object, on whether they are voluntary or not, and on whether they are duly moderated. Thus, regulated love of what is good is praiseworthy, love of what is evil is wrong and blameworthy.

1 Sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin.

2. Can any order be traced in the acts by which sin is usually committed?

Yes, the first promptings of sin usually come through the senses. I see a beautiful piece of jewelry; by its beauty and luster it naturally attracts me. I can not help feeling this impulse; it is the necessary movement of the appetite toward an object which promises satisfaction. It is the motus primo-primus of the moralists. When such an emotion is excited, it attracts the notice of the intellect. The intellect begins to consider whether the incipient desire for the jewelry is right or wrong. If I have money to buy it and am willing to pay the price, the intellect sees nothing in the series of acts which conscience can condemn. But if I have not the money or I have no intention of parting with it, then it behooves me to put a curb on my desire. No harm is done if it stops at a mere velleity — “I should like to have that pretty thing if I could afford it.” But such an imperfect desire if not kept under control is apt to issue in a definite purpose — “I like that and I will have it, by theft if need be.” In this deliberate act of the will sin is first committed; the seeking for means and opportunity and the actual execution of the purpose only belonging to the accidental perfection of the sinful act.

3. Is there any sin in the movements of the sensible appetite called by theologians primo-primi and secundo-primi?

Those movements which are called primo-primi are antecedent to the exercise of the deliberative reason and therefore are not free, and so can not be sinful. Those called secundo-primi follow upon imperfect advertence to the morality of the movement in question, and so if the object or circumstances are bad, the movement will be bad also, and inasmuch as to some extent it is voluntary and free, to that extent it will be imputable to the agent. However, as the act is imperfect, and for mortal sin a perfect and consummated act is required, a secundo-primus movement can not be mortally sinful.

4. Philip, a boy of seventeen, confesses that he has had movements of impurity. His confessor asks him whether he consented to them, and he answers “No.” Then the confessor asks him whether he caused them, and the boy answers that sometimes they arose spontaneously, sometimes from reading novels, sometimes from talking with other boys for whom he entertains a feeling of softness, and occasionally he has kissed these. The confessor should tell Philip to pay no attention to the impure movements which arise spontaneously, and to turn his mind away from them by thinking of something else. If the novels are lascivious and obscene, Philip commits a grave sin by reading them, inasmuch as he voluntarily and without justification puts the cause of strong temptations to impurity which will frequently be the cause of sin. If Philip has any such books, he should destroy them. If they are not lascivious, there will not be grave sin in reading them, and they may be permitted even to young people like Philip in moderation, for the sake of cultivating the imagination and style, and gaining a knowledge of literature. The confessor, however, should warn his penitent against wasting too much time in such reading and against the dangers which frequently arise from it.

Philip should be told not to touch, fondle, much less to kiss the boys for whom he feels a sensual attraction. If such acts on his part have not hitherto led to grave disorder and sin, they will certainly do so before long. By such conduct he is developing passions which are very difficult to keep in order. He should be told to act in a manly and Christian manner towards his companions, and to treat them with respect — Great reverence is owed to a boy.