Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether sin, at least venial, can be in and from the sensitive appetite alone, without any actual influx of the will; and whether all motions of sensuality are sins?
I say 1° : No sin formally taken, even venial, can exist in and from the sensitive appetite alone, without some actual influx at least interpretative of the will.
Dico 1° : Nullum peccatum formaliter sumptum, etiam veniale, potest esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque aliquo actuali influxu saltem interpretativo voluntatis.
It is proved 1°. Aug., lib. de vera Religione, c. 14, n. 27, says: « Either it must be denied that sin is committed, or it must be acknowledged that it is committed by the will. » And lib. de Duabus animabus, cap. 10, n. 14, says: « Sin is committed only by the will. »
Probatur 1°. Aug., lib. de vera Religione, c. 14, n. 27, ait : «Aut negandum est peccatum committi, aut fatendum est voluntate committi. » Et lib. de Duabus animabus, cap. 10, n. 14, ait : « Non nisi voluntate peccatur. »
St. Thomas, here a. 2, ad 1, already cited: « Sin is not committed except by the will, as by the first mover; but sin is committed by the other powers as moved by it. »
S. Thomas, hic a. 2, ad 1 jam citatum : « Non peccatur nisi voluntate, sicut primo movente; aliis autem potentiis peccatur, sicut ab ea motis. »
It is proved 2°. There cannot be sin, even venial, in the sensitive appetite, unless at least the will can impede its motion, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, in II Sentent., dist. 24, q. 3, a. 2, o, and the adversaries themselves also confess, who for that very reason deny that the primo primi motions are sins, because, since they anticipate all reason and are without advertence, the will cannot impede them. But by this very fact that the will can impede and does not impede, it inflows interpretatively and consents. Therefore. Whence the adversaries either speak inconsequently, or dispute about a word.
Probatur 2°. Non potest esse peccatum, etiam veniale, in appetitu sensitivo, nisi saltem voluntas possit ejus motum impedire, ut expresse docet S. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist., 24, q. 3, a. 2, o, et etiam ipsimet fatentur adversarii, qui ideo negant motus primo primos esse peccata, quia, cum praeveniant omnem rationem et sint sine advertentia, voluntas non potest eos impedire. Atqui, hoc ipso quo voluntas potest impedire et non impedit, interpretative influit et consentit. Ergo. Unde adversarii vel inconsequenter loquuntur, vel disputant de nomine.
You will say 1° : St. Thomas, here q. 74, a. 3, ad 3, says: « The motion of sensuality that anticipates reason is a venial sin. » Q. 25 de Veritate, a. 5, ad 5: « It is not said to be sin in sensuality on account of the interpretative consent of reason. »1 1 For thus the Angelic Doctor says here: « It is not said to be sin in sensuality on account of the interpretative consent of reason; for when the motion of sensuality anticipates the judgment of reason, there is neither interpreted nor express consent. But from this very fact that sensuality is subjectible to reason, its act, although it anticipate reason itself, has the character of sin. »
Dices 1º : S. Thomas, hic q. 74, a. 3, ad 3, dicit : «Motus sensualitatis rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale. » Q. 25 de Veritate, a. 5, ad 5 : « Non dicitur esse peccatum in sensualitate propter interpretativum consensum rationis. »1 1 Sic enim ait hic Angelicus : « Non dieitur esse peccatum in sensualitate propter interpretativum consensum rationis; quando enim motus sensualitatis praevenit judicium rationis, non est consensus nec interpretatus nec expressus. Sed ex hoc ipso quod sensualitas est subjicibilis rationi, actus ejus, quamvis rationem ipsum praeveniat, habet rationem peccati. »
I answer. to the first, that St. Thomas speaks of a motion of sensuality that anticipates indeed reason fully deliberating, yet followed by reason half-deliberating, that is, of a secundo primo motion.
Resp. ad primum, quod S. Thomas loquatur de motu sensualitatis praeeveniente quidem rationem plene deliberatam, subsequente tamen semiplenam, hoc est, de motu secundo primo.
To the second. Similarly it does not require the interpretative consent of reason perfectly deliberating, but well of reason deliberating imperfectly and half-way.
Ad secundum. Similiter non requirit interpretativum consensum rationis perfecte deliberatae, bene tamen imperfecte et semiplene deliberantis
You will say 2° : According to the doctrine of the preceding article, the sensitive appetite is free by its habitual conjunction alone, or immediate subordination, to the will. Therefore without actual influx of the will it can sin, at least venially.
Dices 2° : Juxta doctrinam articuli praecedentis, appetitus sensitivus ex sola habituali conjunctione seu subordinatione immediata ad voluntatem est liber. Ergo sine actuali voluntatis influxu potest peccare, saltem venialiter.
I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. In act first, I concede; in act second, I deny. For since the liberty of the sensitive appetite is not primary in man, but subordinate and participated from the will, it cannot break forth into act without some influx of the will; just as also the cogitative power does not participate the power of discoursing in act about singulars, except « according to a certain reflux » of universal reason into it, as St. Thomas says, Ia p., q. 78, a. 4, ad 5.
Resp. Dist. ant. Est liber in actu primo, conc.; in actu secundo, nego. Cum enim libertas appetitus sensitivi non sit in homine prima, sed subordinata et a voluntate participata, non potest in actum prorumpere sine aliquo voluntatis influxu; sicut etiam cogitativa non participat vim discurrendi actu circa singularia, nisi « secundum quamdam refluentiam » rationis universalis in illam, ut loquitur S. Thomas, 1° p., q. 78, a. 4, ad 5.
I say 2° : The motions of sensuality that are primo primi, namely those which forestall every advertence of reason, or those which we suffer unwillingly, however much they turn about illicit things, are not sins, not even venial.
Dico 2º : Motus sensualitatis primo primi, nimirum qui omnem rationis advertentiam praevertunt, aut ii quos inviti patimur, quantumvis versentur circa illicita, non sunt peccata, ne quidem venialia.
Thus it was defined by Trid., sess. V, can. 5, and the opposite was condemned by St. Pius V, propositions 50 and 51 among the Baianian ones.
Ita definivit Trid., sess. v, can. 5, et oppositum damnavit S. Pius V, propos. 50 et 51 inter Baianas.
[Thus the Synod of Trid. defined at the place cited: « That concupiscence, or fomes, remains in the baptized, this holy Synod confesses and holds; which, having been left for the contest, harms not those who do not consent, but manfully resist through the grace of Christ Jesus : nay more, whoever shall have striven lawfully shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church never understood to be called sin because it would truly and properly be sin in those reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. But if anyone shall hold the contrary, let him be anathema. »
[Ita definivit synodus Trid., loco citato : « Manere in baptizatis concupiscentiam vel fomitem, haec sancta Synodus fatetur et sentit; quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus, sed viriliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus, non valet : quin imo, qui legitime certaverit, coronabitur. Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit. »
Among the 79 propositions condemned first by St. Pius V and afterwards by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII, the following are read :
Inter propositiones 79 damnatas primum a S. Pio V et postea a Gregorio XIII et Urbano VIII, sequentes leguntur :
- « The wicked desires to which reason does not consent, and which man suffers unwillingly, are forbidden by the precept: Thou shalt not covet. »
- « Prava desideria quibus ratio non consentit et quae homo invitus patitur, sunt prohibita praecepto : Non concupisces. »
- « Concupiscence, or the law of the members, and its wicked desires which men feel unwillingly, are true disobedience of the law. »
- « Concupiscentia, sive lex membrorum, et prava ejus desideria quae inviti sentiunt homines, sunt vera legis inobedientia. »
- « The motions of wicked concupiscence, in the state of vitiated man, are forbidden by the precept: Thou shalt not covet. Whence man, feeling them and not consenting, transgresses the precept: Thou shalt not covet, although the transgression is not reckoned as sin. »
- « Motus pravi concupiscentiae sunt, pro statu hominis vitiati, prohibiti praecepto : Non concupisces. Unde homo eos sentiens, et non consentiens, transgreditur praeceptum : Non concupisces, quamvis transgressio in peccatum non deputetur. »
- « As long as anything of carnal concupiscence is in the diligent man, he does not fulfill the precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. »]
- « Quamdiu aliquid concupiscentiae carnalis in diligente est, non facit praeceptum : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. »]
It follows from the preceding conclusion. For if there be no sin without some consent of the will, plainly it follows that motions which forestall all reason, or which we suffer with the will resisting, are not sins, since they are without any consent of the will.
Sequitur ex praecedenti conclusione. Si enim nullum sit peccatum sine aliquo consensu voluntatis, palam sequitur, motus qui omnem rationem antevertunt, aut quos patimur reluctante voluntate, non esse peccata, cum sint sine ullo voluntatis consensu.