Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether concupiscence causes the involuntary?
I say 1°: Antecedent concupiscence rather causes a thing to be voluntary than involuntary1. For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what concupiscence desires. Therefore concupiscence contributes more to making a thing voluntary than involuntary. 1 Here q. 7, a. 4, c.
Dico 1° : Concupiscentia antecedens potius causat voluntarium, quam involuntarium1. Quia aliquid dicitur voluntarium, ex eo quod voluntas in id fertur. Atqui per concupiscentiam voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod appetit concupiscentia. Ergo concupiscentia potius facit ad hoc quod aliquid sit voluntarium, quam involuntarium. 1 Hic q. 7, a. 4, c.
I say 2°: Antecedent concupiscence increases absolute voluntariness, and diminishes perfect and free voluntariness.
Dico 2° : Concupiscentia antecedens auget voluntarium absolutum, minuit perfectum et liberum.
The first part is proved. Absolute voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end materially, such as belongs to brutes. But antecedent concupiscence causes the will, with prior knowledge of the end materially, to be borne toward the object with greater force and inclination than if there were no concupiscence. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° By reason; for, concupiscence impelling, the intellect proposes to the will the object as more desirable, and therefore to be pursued with greater efficacy. 2° By experience; for we see that those who pursue an object with love are carried toward it with greater force than if they were not affected by this passion. Therefore.
Probatur prima pars. Voluntarium absolutum est quod procedit a principio intrinseco cum cognitione finis materialiter, quale competit brutis. Atqui concupiscentia antecedens facit quod voluntas, praevia cognitione finis materialiter, feratur in objectum majori impetu et inclinatione quam si non esset concupiscentia. Ergo. — Prob. min. 1° Ratione; quia, impellente concupiscentia, intellectus proponit voluntati objectum ut magis concupiscibile, ideoque majori efficacia prosequendum. 2° Experientia; videmus enim eos qui amore aliquod objectum prosequuntur, majori impetu in illud ferri, quam si haec passione non afficerentur. Ergo.
The second part is proved. Perfect voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end formally as end, that is, with knowledge of the dignity of the end and of the proportion of the means to it. But concupiscence diminishes, nay sometimes takes away this knowledge. Therefore. — The minor is proved. For it diminishes the judgment of reason, nay sometimes destroys it and causes madness, as experience shows. But knowledge of the end formally as end pertains to the judgment of reason. Therefore.
Probatur secunda pars. Voluntarium perfectum est quod procedit a principio intrinseco cum cognitione finis formaliter ut finis, id est cum cognitione dignitatis finis et proportionis mediorum ad illum. Atqui concupiscentia minuit, imo quandoque tollit hanc cognitionem. Ergo. — Prob. min. Quia minuit judicium rationis, imo quandoque tollit et amentiam causat, ut experientia constat. Atqui cognitio finis formaliter ut finis pertinet ad judicium rationis. Ergo.
The third part is proved. Free voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end under indifference concerning the thing proposed. But antecedent concupiscence diminishes this indifference. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° Because it diminishes the judgment of reason, as I was just saying. 2° Because concupiscence causes the intellect to propose to the will, in pursuing the object, all the aspects of the desirable and deficient good, and to attend less to the aspects of the honest good by which the will would be withdrawn from that object. Therefore it diminishes indifference.
Probatur tertia pars. Voluntarium liberum est quod procedit a principio intrinseco cum cognitione finis sub indifferentia propositi. Atqui concupiscentia antecedens minuit hanc indifferentiam. Ergo. — Prob. min. 1° Quia minuit judicium rationis, ut modo dicebam. 2° Quia concupiscentia facit quod intellectus proponat voluntati in objecto prosequendo omnes rationes boni concupiscibilis et defectibilis, et minus attendat ad rationes boni honesti quibus ab illo objecto removeretur voluntas. Ergo minuit indifferentiam.
Hence you will infer that antecedent concupiscence diminishes sin, insofar as it disturbs the judgment and diminishes liberty, nay sometimes exempts from all sin, when it is so violent that it altogether takes away the judgment of reason and indifference, and renders one mad.
Hinc inferes, concupiscentiam antecedentem minuere peccatum, quatenus turbat judicium et minuit liberum, imo quandoque eximere a toto peccato, quando ita est vehemens, ut tollat omnino judicium rationis et indifferentiam, atque amentem reddat.