Article I: On Movements or Sins of Sensuality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; De Malo q. 7, a. 6 and 8; De Veritate q. 25, a. 5.

448. Movements of sensuality or concupiscence are called inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite rising up against the order of reason, such as movements of sensible love or aversion, anger, gluttony, delight, sadness, hope, fear, despair, audacity, etc., and especially venereal movements.

They are distinguished by theologians as: 1) first-first movements, which precede every advertence of reason, and these are not formal sins, which is of faith for the baptized, from the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5; and it is certain concerning infidels from the condemnation of propositions 50 and 51 of Baius;

2. second-first movements (so called because they are second after the first-first, and first among moral and free movements), which occur with semiplene or some advertence, and these are venial sins;

3. deliberate movements, which occur with full advertence of the intellect and are deliberately admitted or excited by the will: these are voluntary

either a) directly and in themselves, when the will positively consents to them, and then they are mortal sins if they are gravely inordinate or prohibited under grave matter;

1. We use the received terminology, which it is neither possible nor opportune to change. The terminology of St. Thomas is different, although not of all of his age. According to him, first-first movements are merely natural movements, which depend solely on the disposition of the body, or which are so suddenly aroused at the apprehension of sense that reason could in no way foresee and impede them; second-first movements are those which depend on the sensitive apprehension of imagination or sense. But since the sensitive faculties are born to be moved by reason and to obey it, reason can impede those movements. Concerning these St. Thomas teaches that they are venial sins, and indeed generally and indefinitely, because if reason is watchful, it can foresee and impede individual movements. Nevertheless do not conclude from this that they are always sins. St. Thomas enunciates a general principle: movements of themselves are apt to be foreseen by reason and therefore can and ought to be impeded, and thus they are indirectly voluntary; in fact, sometimes there are excusing causes on account of which they ought not or even cannot be impeded. In this matter more recent authors perhaps admit excuses too easily and more than is fitting, being less solicitous concerning the office of watchful reason; the ancients applied the principle very rigorously and attended less to causes of excuse.

or b) indirectly voluntary, when the will only omits to repress them while it can and ought;

or c) voluntary in a positive cause, when the will only places a cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow.

449. Indirectly voluntary movements are those to which the will neither positively consents nor resists, but to which it has itself negatively and which it only permits. Concerning them it must be said:

1. Man certainly sins in them, because reason and will fail in their office of directing and repressing the movements of the inferior powers, nor can man hold himself indifferently toward whether his movements and acts are inordinate or not. But the appetite of evil is deformity and consequently to be expelled. If reason adverts to this, it ought to deliberate concerning it and show displeasure and remove the deformity as far as it can, according to Gen. IV, 7: Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall rule over it. But he who has himself negatively is judged equivalently to consent. But:

a) per se he does not sin gravely, because positive and full consent of the will is lacking;

1. Let it be noted that a man cannot permit another to excite movements in himself, and indeed under grave matter, because this is cooperation in mortal sin and more easily includes danger of consent.

b) per accidens he would sin gravely, if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to gravely prohibited movements, as often happens in more vehement venereal commotions, and in vehement hatred or appetite of revenge.

2. Many say: "if the movements are vehement, one must resist under mortal sin, because proximate danger of consent is present," but this is not always true; "if the movements are slight, one need not resist under mortal sin, because the danger of consent is small," but neither is it always small for all.

2. Man is bound to resist them positively, insofar as it is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the movements:

a) Ordinarily, however, not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, because this is not necessary or is too difficult, or even excites the movements more.

3. Per accidens there can be an obligation of resisting directly, if another resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent, for example, in anger or hatred.

Direct resistance is made by suppressing imagination, by an act of love in place of hatred, of hope in place of despair, by compression of the members, by violent movement of the head, by chastisement of the body through afflictions, vigils, discipline, for example, by throwing oneself naked into thorns or into cold water, etc.

b) But generally he is bound to resist indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompossible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind.

Thus, for example, by interrupting the work, pursuing business, by an external occupation requiring special attention, by praying, meditating, etc.

c) Sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise nor repressing the movement, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices; this act is not to be repeated frequently, since, until it is retracted, it is judged morally to persevere.

1. Displeasure is present implicitly if someone voluntarily does something else, voluntarily does not attend to these things, or contemns them.

Thus if someone has experienced that another resistance is useless for coercing the movements, or excites and increases them more; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as will be indicated in the following number under c), and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example, because of duration; or if the movements are slight and transitory, both because causes exciting such movements are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are better and more efficaciously repressed by contempt: for solicitude to impede them is accustomed to excite the imagination and increase the movements. All these things are easily verified in a scrupulous person, who therefore shows sufficient displeasure by simply contemning the movements.

Nevertheless, in the aforesaid circumstances, man must bring safeguards and care lest he consent to the movements.

450. Movements voluntary in the cause, which are not intended and to which the will does not consent, but which are only willed in a positive cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, are sin only as much as the cause insofar as it influences them. Hence:

a) It is grave sin without sufficient reason to place a cause per se gravely influencing movements prohibited under grave matter, such as venereal movements, movements of great unjust anger, of great hatred, even if they do not follow per accidens.

Thus, for example, reading long continued that is very impious and persuasive against religion, the priesthood, public order, etc., exciting hatred, anger, revenge; very base reading, conversation or reading inducing despair or suicide; frequenting companions who excite to this; duration of touch or sight of a dishonorable part; likewise protracted morose delight of revenge or lust. Hence St. Alphonsus says that even a movement of pollution is not mortal unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust: 1) it must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil (understand: in which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause; but every and only a cause which per se gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, unless there is an excusing reason of a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause); 2) it must be mortal in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example, drunkenness.

b) It is a light sin without a just cause to place an action lightly influencing even vehement movements and movements prohibited under grave matter (indeed, even pollution itself), provided that they do not please and there is no proximate danger of consent. A slight influence into a grave thing, namely, is a light matter.

Such is a not-long conversation with an impious man or with a girl; sight or touch not very base; reading slightly impious or slightly base. A sufficient reason for permitting these things will be any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

c) It is no sin from a just cause to place an action from which inordinate movements are foreseen as going to follow (even pollution), provided that proximate danger of consent is always absent.

In the matter of lust, a just cause for a priest is to hear confessions and study base matters; for a surgeon, to see and touch dishonorable parts, likewise for one serving the sick or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride on horseback for the sake of recreation or utility, to lie down in a more comfortable position, to take hot foods and drinks moderately.

451. Observation. - In the preceding things we have spoken according to natural law alone; for sometimes causes which for someone influence lightly or in no way are prohibited even under grave matter by positive law, for example, by the law of the index of books.