Fulfillment of Law

We inquire what things are required in order that the obligation of law be fulfilled, not what things are necessary in order that the act by which the obligation is fulfilled be good and meritorious in every respect.

Furthermore, in order that satisfaction be made to the obligation of law, this one thing is required: that what is commanded by the law be placed, or that what is prohibited by it be omitted. Hence:

I. To fulfill a negative law, even the involuntary omission of the prohibited work suffices. Hence, for example, one who is sleeping fulfills the precept of not stealing. Nevertheless one who abstained from the prohibited work only from inability, fear, or coercion would sin because of a wicked affection.

II. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a real debt, even the involuntary payment of the debt suffices. The reason is that the law commands only the placing of the effect. Hence he is immune from the obligation of restitution who makes restitution while drunk.

III. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a personal act, the voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required and suffices. It is said:

1. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required. That the placing of the work is required is clear; that a voluntary or free placing is required follows from the fact that in the case the legislator intends and imposes an act placed in a human manner, that is, voluntarily or freely. Therefore in this sense the intention or will of doing what the law prescribes is required. Hence one who, being wholly drunk, assists at Mass does not fulfill the precept. Otherwise it must be said about one who, compelled by fear, hears Mass, because fear does not remove liberty (St. Alphonsus, I, 165).

2. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work suffices. The reason is that the legislator commands only these things. Therefore it is not required:

a) That the prescribed act be placed from the motive of charity, in the state of grace, unless these pertain to the substance of the prescribed work, as in a law which commands an act of the virtue of charity or Paschal communion (St. Alphonsus, I, 162). Hence proposition 16 among the Baian propositions was condemned: "There is no true obedience to the law which is done without charity."

b) That the act be placed without concomitant sin. Except if the sin destroys the substance of the prescribed work. Hence he fulfills the precept who, for example, fasts from avarice or assists at Mass from vanity; but not he who confesses or communicates sacrilegiously. Therefore proposition 14 was rightly condemned by Alexander VII: "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

c) That the act be placed with the intention of satisfying the law. For this intention is not commanded. Indeed even the very intention of not satisfying the law does not prevent satisfaction from being made to the law, since the subject cannot bring it about that the obligation of law, that is, an obligation which depends on the will of the legislator alone, persists after satisfaction has been made to the will of the legislator. Otherwise it must be said if there is question of the obligation of a vow or promise; this obligation, just as from the beginning it depends on the will, so also, if the will thus wishes, continues to persist (St. Alphonsus, I, 163, 164; IV, 176).

d) That the end of the law be intended, or that the act be referred to the end of the legislator. This intention or relation is not commanded, according to that saying: the end does not fall under the precept. Hence satisfaction is made to the law of fasting, even if the mortification of the flesh and its subjection to the spirit are not intended. Observe, however: that the end of the law does not fall under the precept does not prevent one who acts against the end of the law from sinning venially, "because to act contrary to the end of the law is a certain disorder, which does not seem to be excused from every fault" (St. Alphonsus, III, 1030, qu. 1); suppose if someone, after breaking the fast, ate two or three times (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Someone can satisfy diverse precepts at the same time, provided the diverse prescribed acts do not impede one another and the intention of the one commanding does not stand in the way. Hence one can at the same time satisfy the precepts of hearing Mass and reciting the Breviary, or of fulfilling sacramental satisfaction. But a penitent to whom the confessor imposed two Masses to be heard would not satisfy by assisting at two Masses at the same time. For the intention of the confessor would stand in the way (St. Alphonsus, III, 309; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 30, and tr. 16, n. 57).

Corollary II. Someone can fulfill several precepts by one single act, unless the one commanding, or those commanding, intended distinct acts. Hence, by one single act of restoring, he satisfies who is held to restitution both from justice and from a vow. He does not satisfy by hearing one Mass who is held to assist at Mass both from the precept of the Church and from the precept of the confessor, unless the latter signifies that he does not intend a distinct Mass. Nevertheless, a penitent to whom the confessor imposed hearing Mass on each day through the week is not held to assist at Mass twice on Sunday; for the confessor is not presumed to intend that (St. Alphonsus, I, 166; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 31 sq.).

IV. As regards the time of fulfilling an obligation, take these points: If the legislator has determined the time, this must be observed. If the time was not determined, the obligation must be fulfilled as soon as can morally be done. In the case, delay is grave: first, if there accedes a grave danger of not fulfilling a grave law; second, if the matter from the delay becomes notably worse, as if someone vowed religion and, without just cause, long delayed entrance; these things, however, must be explained and completed more in their own place. Besides, observe:

1. In the private celebration of Mass, in the private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving Holy Communion, and in observing the law of fasting or abstinence, although there may be another usual reckoning of the place, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, either true or mean, or legal, whether regional or some other extraordinary time (can. 33, § 1). Therefore, in observing the stated laws, it is licit to follow: first, usual time;¹ second, local time,² both true and mean; third, legal time,³ both regional and some other extraordinary time.

2. No one is held to anticipate, that is, to fulfill a law before the useful time of the obligation has begun, even if he foresees that afterward he will be impeded from fulfilling the law; indeed, by anticipating he does not even fulfill the law. But one who, once the useful time of the obligation has begun, foresees that afterward he will not be able to satisfy the law, is held to fulfill it in due time (St. Alphonsus, I, 157; IV, 155; VI, 294, 297, 298).

3. One who did not satisfy the obligation at the time determined by law is not held afterward to supply, if the time was assigned for ending the obligation. Otherwise it must be said if it was assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation. Furthermore, the time is considered assigned for ending the obligation if the obligation is affixed to a certain day, as obtains in the laws of fasting, abstinence, hearing Mass, and reciting the Breviary. It is considered assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation if something is imposed to be performed within three days, within a year (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). If the time has been determined in some other way, it should be gathered from the nature and end of the law, or from custom, whether the time has been determined for ending or for urging the obligation.⁴

¹ That is, the time which the public and customary clocks of the place in which one is staying are accustomed to use. Commonly, but not always, it coincides with legal time.

² Local time is the time which is measured by the putative daily motion of the sun around the point of earth in which one is staying. It is distinguished into true and mean. True local time is the time which indicates the aforesaid motion of the sun exactly; it is indicated by a sundial. Mean local time is that which indicates the stated motion of the sun according to the mean duration of the day computed through the year.

³ Legal or public time is the time which has been prescribed by law or adopted by common civil usage. Generally the mean local time of some principal city is established as legal time for the whole kingdom. Legal time is called regional when it has been stably established for a whole region; it is called extraordinary when, for a passing cause, it is established in an extraordinary way, as summer time.

⁴ As regards annual communion, the law itself adds the clause: the precept of Paschal communion still urges if someone, for any cause, has not fulfilled it at the prescribed time (can. 859, § 4).

Fulfillment of Law.—With reference to the manner of fulfilling a law there are a number of questions to be considered: (a) as to the external acts, whether or not one can fulfill the law for another, whether or not the omission of some slight detail renders compliance insufficient, whether or not he who cannot fulfill the whole law is bound to fulfill a part of it, whether or not several obligations can be satisfied at the same time or by the same act, etc.; (b) as to the internal acts, whether or not one must have the intention of meeting the wishes of the lawgiver, whether or not one must be in the state of grace, etc.

Personal fulfillment is not always necessary; for an affirmative law requires either that some thing be given, or that some personal act be performed. (a) When the law requires that some thing be given (e.g., that taxes be paid), the obligation can be satisfied through another, since a thing can be transferred from one person to another, who agrees at least interpretatively; (b) when the law requires that a personal act be performed (e.g., that Mass be heard on Sunday), the obligation cannot be satisfied through another, for actions cannot be transferred from one to another.

Minute fulfillment is not always necessary; for sometimes the minor details of the fulfillment of a law are expressly prescribed, sometimes they are not.

(a) If these details are required by the law itself or by the nature of the case, the law is not satisfied if they are neglected. Example: Friday abstinence ends exactly at midnight, and hence to eat meat even one minute before midnight is to break that abstinence.

(b) If the law does not prescribe minute details, these are not required for the fulfillment of the obligation; for laws should not be unduly burdensome. Example: One who is a few minutes late for Mass does not miss Mass, if he is present for the essential parts of the Mass.

Partial fulfillment is required of him who cannot make complete fulfillment, only when the part is commanded for its own sake; for that which is commanded by a law is considered by the lawgiver as either an indivisible unit, or as a whole composed of parts that have singly an independent moral value and obligation.

(a) If the thing commanded is morally an indivisible unit (e.g., a pilgrimage to a shrine), he who is not able to fulfill the whole law is bound to nothing. Example: One who has made a vow to go on pilgrimage to a distant sanctuary, is not bound to go part of the way, if he is unable to make the entire journey.

(b) If the thing commanded has parts that contribute to the end of the law, he who is able to fulfill only one or more such parts is obliged according to his ability; if it is certain that he can perform even a part, he is bound to that; if it is not certain that he can perform even a part, it would seem that generally he is excused from all. Examples: A cleric who can say some but not all the Hours of his Office, is obliged to say what he can. A person who can certainly abstain, but who cannot fast, is bound during Lent to abstain.

Simultaneous fulfillment by one act of several obligations is lawful, if the obligations differ only materially. They are said to differ only materially, if the motive of the legislator in giving different commands about the same thing is the same in each instance; they differ formally, if the legislator has a different motive in each instance. The motive is recognized either from the express declaration of the lawgiver, or from interpretation given through authority or custom.

(a) When two commands differ only materially, it can be presumed that the legislator is not unwilling that they be fulfilled by one and the same act, unless it is clear that he wishes them to be fulfilled by distinct acts. Example: If one falls sick at Easter time and receives the Viaticum, it is not necessary for him to receive Communion again in order to make his Easter duty; for the divine law of Viaticum and the church law of Easter Communion have the same motive, and hence can be fulfilled by one and the same Communion.

(b) When two commands differ formally, it can be presumed, unless the opposite is manifest, that the legislator wishes them to be complied with by distinct acts. Example: If a confessor imposes a fast as a penance, this penance cannot be performed on a fast day; for the motive of the law of fast is general, that of the sacramental penance is particular.

Simultaneous fulfillment by several acts of several obligations is sometimes possible, sometimes impossible. For the acts prescribed by different laws are either capable or incapable of being done at the same time. Thus, it is possible to hear a Mass and to say a penance of some Hail Marys at the same time. But it does not seem easy for an ordinary person to give attention to four or more Masses at the same time.

(a) If the acts do not impede one another and the legislator is not unwilling, several laws can be fulfilled at the same time. Example: If two Masses are being said on adjoining altars, one can hear both—the one to satisfy the Sunday obligation, the other to perform a penance received.

(b) If the acts impede one another, or if the legislator wishes his laws to be fulfilled at distinct times, the different obligations cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Examples: If a distracted person has received a penance to hear six Masses, he cannot hear them all at once, on account of the division of attention necessary. If the confessor told a person to hear Mass “three times,” the latter cannot satisfy by hearing three Masses at one time.

When a law prescribes not only what is to be done, but when it is to be done, the time must be observed. But the obligation does not always cease with the expiration of the time.

(a) If the time set by the law is a limit beyond which the obligation ceases, he who has not complied within that time has no further obligation. Examples: He who did not fast on Christmas Eve, would not be obliged to fast on Christmas Day. He who did not hear Mass on Sunday, would not be obliged to hear Mass on Monday.

(b) If the time set by the law is not a limit to terminate the obligation, but a date fixed in order to insist on the obligation, he who has not complied within the prescribed period, is nevertheless still obliged. Examples: He who has not made the Easter duty by Trinity Sunday, is obliged to receive Communion after Trinity. He who has not paid a debt on the day required by law, is bound to pay it after that day.

It depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether the time he prescribes for fulfillment is a limitation of the obligation or not. The intention of the lawgiver is known either from the words or purpose of the law, or from custom.

If the law declares that some duty must be performed within a determined period, allowing freedom for earlier or later performance within the period, the following points must be considered. (a) A person is not obliged to comply early, if he intends to comply before the period has ended. (b) He is obliged to comply early, if he foresees that later he will not be able to do what is required. Examples: If a person who has not made his Easter duty has the opportunity to receive Communion on Easter Sunday, and will not have another such opportunity till Christmas, he is obliged to receive on Easter Sunday. But, if he can communicate any Sunday during the Paschal time, he is not bound to do so on one of the early Sundays. If one can hear an early Mass, but not another Mass, on a holyday, one must hear the early Mass.

Just as one may not delay fulfillment until after the time set by law, so neither may one anticipate fulfillment before the time determined, unless the law may be considered to allow this. Examples: If a person has heard Mass on Saturday, he has no right to make this count for the following day. A rosary said before confession cannot be considered as performance of the penance, if in confession one is given the rosary to say.

It is held that a cleric who said the Breviary in the morning, just before he was ordained subdeacon and undertook the obligation of the Office, satisfied by that anticipated recitation; likewise, that a traveller who heard Mass in a place where a holyday of obligation of the general law was not in force, has satisfied by anticipation, if later in the morning he reaches as his destination a place where the holyday is observed. For in both these cases the law intends that the Office be said, or the Mass be heard within the day.

If a person who is now able to do what the law requires, foresees that he will not be able to do this when the time set by the law arrives, he is not obliged to anticipate fulfillment, even when he has the privilege of anticipation. Examples: A cleric who at 2 p.m. is able to anticipate Matins for tomorrow, and who knows that later, on account of an operation, he will not be able to say his Office, is not bound to anticipate; for no one is obliged to use a privilege. A person who is able to hear Mass on Saturday, and who knows that all of Sunday must be spent on the train, is not obliged to hear Mass on Saturday, though of course this is the better thing to do.

The internal acts concerned in the fulfillment of a law are: (a) those in the intellect, such as knowledge; (b) those in the will, such as consent, motive.

Knowledge of what one is doing is sometimes necessary, sometimes unnecessary for the fulfillment of a law.

(a) If the law is prohibitive, knowledge is not necessary, since nothing more is required by the law than the omission of what is forbidden. Example: He who ate no meat on a day of abstinence has fulfilled the law, even though he was unconscious all day.

(b) If the law is preceptive of a payment to be made, knowledge is not necessary, since the law requires nothing more than the effect of an external act. Example: He who pays his taxes while intoxicated fulfills his obligation, even though he does not know what he is doing.

(c) If the law is preceptive of an act to be performed, knowledge is required, for it is supposed that the act will be exercised in a human manner. Example: He who sleeps all during Mass on Sunday does not fulfill his duty, for the law intends that one assist at Mass in a human way (i.e., with consciousness of what is being done).

Fulfillment of a law is not morally good and meritorious, unless it is voluntary (see 97 sqq.); but the legal obligation is sometimes satisfied even by an unwilling fulfillment.

(a) When the law commands a payment to be made, one may will the contrary of what is commanded and yet fulfill one’s obligation. Example: He who pays his taxes unwillingly and under compulsion satisfies the law, which requires not an act, but its effect.

(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not will the omission commanded and yet fulfills one’s obligation. Example: He who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is a meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat, satisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden and have no will to violate the law.

(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform the act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that fulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged to church and forcibly detained there during Mass, does not satisfy the law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his assistance at Mass involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to escape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it really intends to hear Mass, for fear does not necessarily make an act involuntary (see 41 sqq.).

As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be noted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing what the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of the preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while Mass is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music or of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he does not at all intend to hear Mass.

The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are not necessary for the fulfillment of a law.

(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one’s obligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the intention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426). Examples: He who hears Mass on a holyday not intending to perform his duty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law. He who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has an obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance received, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.

(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in mind as the purpose of the law; for “the end of the law is not a part of the law.” Example: A person who takes only one full meal during Lent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he eats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the mortification intended by the law.

If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the same time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance, the obligation imposed, one’s act is sufficient or insufficient for fulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.

(a) If the obligation arises from the will of the lawgiver, the act is a sufficient fulfillment, since the human lawgiver, as said in the previous paragraph, does not concern himself with what is purely internal. Example: If a person hears Mass on Sunday out of devotion, intending to hear another Mass in satisfaction of the Sunday duty, he is not bound to hear a second Mass, as he has already done all that the law requires.

(b) If the obligation arises from one’s own will, as in the case of a promise or a vow, the act above described is not sufficient fulfillment; for, as the obligation arose from the will, so also the mode of fulfillment is to be determined by the will. Example: One who has vowed to hear Mass, and who now while hearing Mass expressly determines that not this but another Mass will be in satisfaction of his vow, is bound by his vow to hear another Mass.

As to virtuous dispositions in fulfilling a law, it is to be observed that, while a good lawgiver always wishes them, he does not always require them as a duty of obedience. The virtuous dispositions referred to are of two kinds: (a) habitual, that is, the permanent spiritual condition of the soul, such as the state of grace, the habit of charity, etc.; (b) actual, that is, the good manner in which the commanded act is done, such as devout attention in hearing Mass, heartfelt contrition in making confession, freedom from vain-glory in fasting, etc.

Virtuous dispositions are or are not commanded according as that which is prescribed is or is not a mixed, or a purely external act (see above, 426).

(a) When a mixed act is commanded by law, the virtuous disposition that the nature of the case calls for, but nothing further, is strictly prescribed. Hence, the law of Easter Communion requires that Communion be received in the state of grace, the law of yearly confession that the penitent be truly contrite, the law of Sunday Mass that there be sufficient attention to the Mass; but more perfect dispositions (such as freedom from venial sin in the communicant, perfect contrition in the penitent, the state of grace in him who hears Mass) are not required for the fulfillment of the laws we are considering.

(b) When a purely external thing is commanded, the law does not require internal dispositions, and hence one who performs what is required is not obliged to repeat it on account of the imperfect way he obeyed. Example: He who fasts while he is not in the state of grace is not obliged to fast again to make good what was lacking in his previous disposition.

Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only with single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment of the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he fulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly, though not entirely, distracted at Mass, obeys the church law of assistance at Mass on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he worship God devoutly);

(b) he who has less devotion in obeying a law than he might have had, does not deserve reprehension as a transgressor, but his conduct is less praiseworthy.

To n. 213. ON OBSERVANCE OF LAW As to substance and as to mode

1. Since among precepts of law some are affirmative, which command what is honorable, and others are negative, which prohibit evil, the question concerning observance of law, as to substance and as to the mode of virtue, indeed has place in affirmative precepts; but in negative ones it scarcely has place.

For positive precepts must be fulfilled by a positive act. But negative precepts, without any act, can of themselves be fulfilled, as far as is from the form of the precept, because through the mere negation of the prohibited act a man is conformed to the law. Yet they can further be positively fulfilled through the will of not doing what is prohibited. But in omission as such, the mode of virtue is not found, although it can be in the positive will of abstaining from a depraved act. But of itself this positive will is not necessary for fulfilling a negative precept, or for not sinning against it. Decline from evil.

2. Therefore it is one thing to observe the law, another thing not to transgress the law. For he who does not transgress the law does not always observe the law, as is clear also in him who acts against an affirmative law from invincible ignorance, or from impeded use of reason.

3. Now the observance of law is distinguished in two ways, as to substance and as to mode. This mode generally is nothing other than the mode of virtue.

4. Any law, whether human or natural, is to be observed as to substance. For any law commanding an act obliges to the substance of the act. Yet law does not always oblige also to the mode of the act. For human laws regularly command only the substance of the act, not also the mode, unless the mode is intrinsic to the act commanded. And thus he who, on a day of fast and abstinence, fasts and observes abstinence not for mortification and penance, or for temperance and restraint of gluttony, but on the contrary from gluttony, so that on the following day he can eat more, and because fish please him more than flesh, observes the law, and certainly does not violate it. "It must be said," says Suarez de Leg. l. 3, C. 29, n. 6, "that human law is sufficiently fulfilled through the act commanded, according to its substance, even if it is not simply morally good, nor done with an honorable intention."

5. The added limitation is: unless the mode is intrinsic to the act commanded; for evidently, if it is intrinsic to that act, it enters its substance, and consequently the law is to be observed as to substance and mode; as is to be seen in the precept of prayer, in the precepts of annual Confession and Easter Communion. For in the former there enters intention and at least some attention implicit in it; in the latter true interior sorrow for sins is required as regards Confession, and the state of grace and right intention as regards Communion.

6. The restriction likewise was made as regards human laws. For evidently natural law commands an act simply good, and therefore its observance embraces substance and mode of the act. Wherefore natural law also embraces the mode of virtue to be observed, wherever it broadly extends; for from natural law, good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever. Fittingly Suarez: "Natural right differs from human right; for human right can be observed through an evil act in such a way that it is violated in no part; because that malice which is joined to such an act often is not against any human precept, but against the natural: but truly natural right itself, which commands one to make an honorable act, also commands that it be done studiously, because this very thing is from natural reason... and therefore as often as a natural precept is fulfilled through an evil act, natural right itself is violated." De Leg. l. 2, C. 10, n. 13.

7. Nor does it avail to object that even human law commands only a good act and an act of virtue. -

For human law indeed commands an act good of itself, or one which of itself can be done well, yet it does not command all the modes necessary that it be done well. Wherefore he who does all that human law commands, and with all the external circumstances which it commands, although he does it with a depraved intention, does not do otherwise than he ought to do by force of that human law, although he does otherwise than another divine law commands, and therefore he sins not against human law, but against divine and natural law. Likewise human law commanding an act determines the act in a certain species of virtues. But this does not import that that species of virtue ought to be intended by the one operating, or that that act be done without any admixture of malice; but it imports only that the law commands an act of some singular virtue, because laws intend to make men honorable in the genus of all virtues. But this motive of the precept of the law is not the precept itself or that which is commanded, and for observing the law it suffices to do what is commanded.

8. But although natural right commands each, substance and mode, good and well, yet this is not so to be understood that he who does not observe the mode also does not observe the substance of the law. For this is true only when an evil mode corrupts the whole substance of the act. And thus he who gives alms to a poor man impelled by vain glory, or with some interior displeasure, observes the precept of almsgiving as to substance, although he sins as to mode. But he who gives alms to a poor man moved only from the depraved end of attracting him to evil, e.g., to denying the Catholic faith and professing the false faith of Protestants, does not observe the natural precept of charity and almsgiving, neither as to mode nor as to the substance itself; on the contrary he sins gravely by that alms given against charity, by the sin of scandal and cooperation toward grave sin against faith. Although in this case he now does not transgress the precept of almsgiving, nevertheless he does not observe the precept of almsgiving. Cf. Salmant. de Leg. C. 2, n. 148.

9. From these things which precede it is clear what mode is in the observance of law. It is namely, as was said at the beginning, the mode of virtue. -

Let us now declare this mode of virtue, and see the various modes of virtue in the observance of law; whether at least some one of them is required for the observance of any law, and what sort.

10. Moreover the modes of virtue of which we speak are either the mode of some special virtue, or the modes of virtue in general. That special virtue here can be no other than either that virtue to which all other virtues are ordered, and which is the end of the whole law, which is charity, or that virtue which enters by its nature the precept of any virtue, and which is obedience.

11. As regards charity, the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 10, raises the question: "whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of divine law"; and responds: "It must be said... Some have said absolutely that the mode of charity is under precept.... But others have said that the mode of charity altogether does not fall under precept. Each has said what is true in some respect. -

For an act of charity can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it is a certain act per se. And in this way it falls under the precept of the law which is specially given concerning this: You shall love your Lord, and You shall love your neighbor. And as regards this the first have said what is true.... In another way the act of charity can be considered according as it is the mode of the acts of other virtues, that is, according as the acts of other virtues are ordered to charity, which is the end of the precept.... And in this way what the second have said is true, that the mode of charity does not fall under precept: this is said, that in this precept: Honor your father, it is not included that the father be honored from charity, but only that the father be honored. Hence he who honors his father, although he does not have charity, is not made a transgressor of this precept, although he is a transgressor of the precept which concerns the act of charity, on account of which transgression he merits punishment."

12. But as the mode of charity is not required for the observance of law, so also the mode of obedience is not required, as will soon be explained more by declaring first the general mode of virtue.

13. And these things concerning the mode of special virtue. Let us now come to the mode of virtue in general. The Angelic Doctor, according to Aristotle, numbers only a threefold mode of virtue, namely 1. that someone operate knowingly; 2. that someone operate willingly or choosing, and choosing on account of this;

3. that he have and operate firmly and immovably, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9, namely from a rooted habit. We can immediately omit this last mode of operating from habit. For no law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, commands this mode, and law obliges only to that which it commands. Besides, every law obliges from the beginning, namely before a habit is had. And thus the Angelic Doctor says: "as regards this, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of divine law or of human law; for neither by man nor by God is he punished as a transgressor of the precept who furnishes the honor due to parents, although he does not have the habit of piety."

14. Hence it follows that it is not necessary for the observance of law to act delightfully, according as delight follows habit. For delight can regard the very observance of law, insofar as, e.g., notwithstanding the obliging law, someone would wish not to observe the law if he did not fear penalty or another harm; this mode includes intrinsic repugnance with the precept, and therefore is intrinsically evil and against natural law: for it excludes the will of observing the law, and on the contrary includes the will of not observing it. St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9 ad 3.

15. But the two preceding modes of Aristotle and St. Thomas, for the sake of clarity, we distinguish into various conditions which they contain, required for the honesty of the act. Hence we say that the mode of virtue in the observance of law is only fourfold, namely that the law be observed: 1. from knowledge, will, liberty; 2. from intention of intrinsic honesty; 3. from intention of the end; 4. from all other circumstances. Another possible mode of virtue is not given. For the mode of virtue can be only on the part of the agent and on the part of the act; from these two heads no other assignable modes of virtue exist. The state of grace, which perhaps can be objected, pertains not to the observance of law, of which we are treating, but to merit and to supernatural merit. Likewise faith regards not the observance of law, but the supernaturality of the act.

16. Now as regards the first mode: to act from knowledge, will, liberty, that is, knowingly, willingly, freely to act, this pertains to the observance of both human and divine law. For this mode, that is, to act with knowledge of the work voluntarily and freely, pertains to the very essence and substance of a human act; and therefore that mode regards the very substance of the precept of law to be fulfilled. "The reason is," says Busembaum and after him St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 165, "because since law is given to men, not to beasts, and therefore is to be fulfilled in a human mode, hence the fulfillment of every precept, whether human or divine, ought to be a human act joined with liberty and will of the one operating, that is, that he will or intend to do this which is commanded, e.g., to hear Mass, to fast, etc.... Hence he who heard Mass, fasted, etc., compelled altogether violently, did not satisfy; for it was not a human act by defect of the voluntary.... Nor does he satisfy who goes to Mass only to feed his eyes, to speak with another, or to wait for a friend." The opinion of the Angelic Doctor is the same; he says, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9, that the first mode of virtue, namely that someone operate knowingly, according to the Philosopher, "is judged both by divine law and by human law." Hence the same Angelic Doctor concludes, "according to ignorance some things are judged toward punishment or toward pardon both according to human law and according to divine law." For ignorance removes the voluntary and sin.

17. That knowingly evidently also includes willingly, namely knowing and willing that which someone operates. Knowing and willing that, not only according to itself, but knowing and willing it as commanded. Otherwise there is not truly observance of law, which ought to be moral and an effect of law, but only material and per accidens conformity of the act with the law, as if someone knowingly and willingly gives alms, ignorant of the precept concerning it. This ignorance of the precept indeed suffices for not sinning directly against the precept, if it is invincible. Yet with it existing, there is not had moral and formal observance of the law. From the precept there arises an obligation of knowing it, because otherwise it cannot be morally observed. Hence the Angelic Doctor says that he who, ignorant, does an act which is ordered by law, does the commanded work by chance and per accidens. But the precept obliges that it be done per se and from intention, and therefore obliges one to have knowledge of it and to will its observance.

18. But there is need to will to do what is commanded; but not because it is commanded, namely from the motive of obedience. For this is not necessary for fulfilling the precept, because neither is this commanded in the law itself, nor is there any reason which obliges to this. - But it is objected that he who unwillingly does the commanded act is not held to do it again. And thus, after restitution has been made by a debtor altogether unwilling, the debtor is not held to restore again, which is a sign that he fulfilled the law. But in this example and in similar others, that natural precept of restitution is not observed; rather, he sins gravely against it; and the precept no longer obliges, not because it was observed, but because the matter was removed by the thing itself, with the debt extinguished.

19. A graver difficulty is in him who knowingly and willingly hears Mass and hears it attentively and devoutly, yet is ignorant of its precept. He indeed truly hears Mass, and thus sufficiently observes the precept, and is excused from hearing another Mass. It can indeed be said, and in fact is said by Suarez, that that pious will "virtually is the will of fulfilling the precept, which concerns the act itself commanded, and is judged to arise from the general will which each one has of satisfying his obligations: for morally any prudent man is judged to will this first in his honorable and religious actions. For this reason, one ignorant or not adverting that it is a feast day, voluntarily hearing Mass as he is accustomed, fulfills the precept, so that he is not held to hear Mass again when he understands or remembers that it is a feast day." de Relig. t. 2, l. 4, C. 26, n. 6.

20. But another difficulty is far graver in him who on a feast day knowingly and willingly hears Mass devoutly, with the purpose of hearing it from devotion and not from precept. - There are several who hold that this one does not satisfy the precept, and ought to hear another Mass. For that will is not the will of fulfilling the precept, and therefore through that action the precept is not fulfilled. For fulfillment of the precept ought to be voluntary. Yet the common opinion holds altogether the contrary. The reason is that in reality he voluntarily did all that which was commanded in a human mode. And although the fulfillment itself of the precept, as it is a certain quasi-relation or adequation between the action and the precept, is not willed, but follows materially, nevertheless it cannot be impeded by the will of the one operating, even if he does not wish by that action to fulfill the precept.

But if in reality he does not hear another Mass, he is held to conform his will explicitly or implicitly with the precept, namely by willing to satisfy it by the prior hearing. For he is held not to resist the precept. Hence when afterward he wills not to hear another Mass, in order not to incur fault, it is necessary that he at least understand that he has satisfied the precept, so that he wills to be content with that satisfaction; because the natural law itself obliges one not to have affection contrary to the precept of a superior.

21. Wherefore it is necessary to distinguish the observance of a precept as to the substance of the exterior human act and as to the mode of interior affection, due by the nature of the thing to such action, with the precept supposed. As to the substance of the exterior act of the precept, it is true that someone fulfills a human precept by the very fact that, e.g., in a human mode and attentively he hears Mass, however much he then may not wish to fulfill the precept. But with that resistance of the will standing concerning the fulfillment of the precept, the precept is not completely fulfilled as regards the affection due by natural right to the precept, which at least requires that the subject not have affection contrary to the obligation of the precept. This mode indeed does not fall directly under the human precept, nor is it its matter, but follows from natural law and the general obligation of obedience. Hence, if afterward someone did not wish to hear Mass again, and at the same time persevered in the will of not fulfilling the precept through the prior hearing of Mass, he would sin by internal affection against that precept, but not by an exterior transgression of it. Hence he would not be held to hear another Mass, but only the obligation would be present that that prior hearing, as fulfilling the precept, not remain involuntary, but become voluntary, at least by judging now that he has satisfied the precept. And thus Busembaum and St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 164, say: "One hearing the sacred liturgy on a feast day which he knows to be the last, or, if it is not the last, intending to hear no other, although he intended not to satisfy, nevertheless truly satisfies the precept concerning hearing Mass; although he sinned against another precept, by which one is held to be subject to the legislator." - And in this sense observance of law, not only natural but also human, in order that it be complete, needs someone knowingly and willingly to operate that which is commanded.

22. As regards the second mode of observance of law, from intention of intrinsic honesty, St. Thomas, l. c., openly excludes this from observance of human law and says that it pertains only to divine law. Hence from the Angelic Doctor, only to divine law does it pertain to will to do evil and not do it, to do good but not on account of good. Behold the reason from which the Angelic Doctor proceeds to the said conclusion: "It must be said that a precept of law has coercive force. Therefore that falls directly under the precept of law to which the law coerces. But the coercion of law is through fear of penalty.... For that properly falls under the precept of law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But divine law and human law stand differently for establishing penalty. For the penalty of law is inflicted only for those things concerning which the legislator has to judge; because law punishes from judgment. But man, who is the legislator of human law, has to judge only concerning exterior acts, because men see those things which appear...; but it belongs to God alone, who is the bearer of divine law, to judge concerning the interior movements of wills, according to that saying: God searching hearts and reins." With this fundamental doctrine established, the holy Doctor, then speaking concerning the second mode of virtue in the observance of law, namely that, according to the Philosopher, someone operate willingly or choosing and choosing on account of this, that is, that someone will and choose good, and operate it on account of good, says that in this "a double interior movement is imported, namely of will and of intention," of will, WILLINGLY, of intention, CHOOSING. "And human law does not judge these two, but only divine law; for human law does not punish him who wills to kill and does not kill; but divine law punishes, according to that saying: He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment." And consequently the same is true of the will which wills good and operates, but not on account of good, on account of its honesty. And thus a soldier who fights bravely in war, and kills the enemy only from hatred, indeed observes human law as to substance, but does not observe natural and divine law as to mode. Hence while he receives reward from the Prince, he is condemned by God to eternal fire.

23. Wherefore in this mode the precept is not truly fulfilled in the internal forum before God; but before men, and in the external forum, it is fulfilled for escaping penalty, provided the act commanded is done as to substance. If excommunication were present against one not fasting, he who fasts by force and compulsion alone, who is violently deprived of food, since he does not abstain from food voluntarily, does not fulfill the law; yet he would not incur excommunication, because this would not be incurred, in the case, unless the effect followed. But the law in the case as regards the external effect or substance is fulfilled, or at least is not violated. But it would be otherwise if the excommunication were against one not praying and not reciting the canonical hours, if someone read them only for learning the Latin language; for then he would not pray, and the precept concerns praying, and therefore in that case he would not fulfill the precept and would incur excommunication.

24. As regards the third mode: acting from intention of the end of the law, this mode likewise is not necessary as regards observance of human law. "Law," says Suarez de Leg. l. 3, C. 29, n. 7, "obliges only to that which it commands; but it commands only the matter into which it falls and not the end; therefore it obliges to the matter and not to the end. Therefore, if the matter is given to execution, the law is observed, whatever may be sinned from another source. The last antecedent is proved, because only that is commanded which in the law is expressed in the mode of command; but human law does not command that this be done for that, but that this be done. But if sometimes the end of the law is expressed in the law, it is not in the mode of the object of the law, but only in the mode of reason or motive on account of which the mode is commanded, etc." Hence the saying: the end of the law does not fall under the law, the reason of the law is not law. And the law will still have to be observed, although that end in the particular case is not obtained, or its reason does not exist.

25. But as regards natural law, this obliges altogether to the end, to the ultimate end, since its foundation and reason is the end itself to which all human actions are to be directed, namely God. To the point, the Angelic Doctor: "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." 1. 2, q. 19, a. 9.

"The whole that man is, and that he can and has, is to be ordered to God." 1. 2, q. 22, a. 4 ad 3. But it is enough to direct those human actions to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting on account of the end of some virtue, or what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act from its intrinsic nature tends to the glory of God. Fittingly again St. Thomas: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; yet not conversely." 1. 2, q. 8, a. 3 ad 2. "He who, on the contrary, does an evil act not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God which is owed to the ultimate end." 1. 2, q. 21, a. 4.

26. As regards the fourth mode of virtue, from all other circumstances of the act, the same must be said as concerning the end of the law: human law and generally positive law does not oblige to this mode of virtue, but natural law does oblige. And thus he satisfies the law who, while he hears Mass, consents to a thought of vain complacency, and he who, while confessing his sins, lies about something altogether impertinent to Confession. But natural law altogether obliges also to this mode of virtue. For natural law obliges to an act simply good, namely that it be good from its whole formal object, on account of an honorable motive. Moreover under the material object all circumstances of the object and act and also of the agent are comprehended. But no one operates intending toward honesty unless he operates with due circumstances. Wherefore the mode of virtue comprehends also all due circumstances. Therefore natural law not only obliges that someone simply, i.e., as regards all things, knowingly and willingly operate good, but also that he operate that good on account of honesty; in which mode of operating the mode of virtue is simply contained. And although even a natural precept can be observed through an act good from its genus and evil from some circumstance, nevertheless the whole natural right is not then observed; for this also prohibits that evil, whether it prohibits that evil circumstance by the same precept, as if someone prays attentively and devoutly but not with due exterior reverence; or whether it prohibits the aforesaid evil circumstance by another precept, as if someone fulfills the precept of almsgiving not without vain glory, which is not against charity and mercy, but against humility. Cf. Suarez de Legibus l. 2, C. 10.; l. 3, C. 29.

27. Therefore the general natural law, or as regards the whole natural right, is to be observed both as to substance and as to mode, because from natural law good is to be done and evil avoided. But the former is from an integral cause, the latter from any defect whatever, and therefore also from evil in any mode whatever. Human law, on the contrary, is regularly to be observed only as to the substance of the act commanded, not also as to mode, since it is not commanded; unless the mode is intrinsic to the act itself commanded. Moreover to observe the law as to substance is to fulfill by a human act the very thing commanded by the law, although without attending to any intrinsic honesty of the act, nor consequently by willing or intending it; but to observe the law as to mode is to do the good commanded by the law and to do this good well simply.

28. The common doctrine concerning the observance of law has been set forth, with the Angelic and Eximious doctors and also St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori going before. But, as is not rare, in a moral matter contradictors are not lacking. Among others La-Croix openly denies, l. 1, n. 695, that it is universally true that the observance of law ought to proceed from knowledge, will, liberty. To prove his opinion he brings forward the example of a drunk man. "A drunk man," he says, "is held by the precept of fast.... Therefore by not eating in reality he fulfills it, since in reality he fasts." - The drunk man, although destitute of the use of reason and liberty, is indeed held by the precept of fast; because that law subjects to itself all habitually possessed of reason. Therefore by not eating in reality he fulfills it, since in reality he fasts; indeed he fulfills. But what does he fulfill? He indeed fulfills fast. But certainly he does not fulfill the law of fast, from which he is also excused through that state of perfect drunkenness, so that even by eating he does not sin. Wherefore just as by eating he does not properly and formally transgress the law, so also by not eating he does not properly and formally observe the law.

29. La-Croix adds another example of a thief, who even in drunkenness is held to restore. Therefore if he restores in drunkenness, he observes the law of justice. For justice commanded this. It is indeed most true that a thief even drunk is obliged to restitution. Yet one restoring in the state of perfect drunkenness indeed gives to another what he owes to him and what justice commanded, but he does not properly and formally fulfill the precept of the virtue of justice, just as he would not properly and formally transgress if, instead of giving what he owes, he himself took another's thing.

30. Then passing to reasons, La-Croix insists, saying: The virtue from whose motive the precept is placed does not oblige to an act proceeding from the motive of its own honesty. -

It is indeed so; it does not oblige to an act proceeding from the motive of its own honesty, but it does oblige to a human act. This is the object of virtue and of precept; without a human act, and consequently without knowledge, will, and liberty, neither can virtue be exercised, nor can the precept of virtue be observed.

31. Aptly Aristotle, Magna Moralia, l. 1, c. 34, § 23: "When, therefore, is a thing just, and when not? Namely, to put it briefly, when someone has performed it purposely and spontaneously, and when he has known both against whom, and to whom, and for what cause, then he does just things.

Likewise and similarly he also will be unjust, who has known both against whom, and to whom, and for what cause he has offended. But when, knowing none of these things, he nevertheless has committed something unjust, then he is not unjust, but unfortunate. For if he has killed his father, thinking himself to kill an enemy, he indeed committed something unjust, and although he has inflicted injury on no one, nevertheless he acted unhappily."

32. La-Croix still presses, saying: it is not necessary that the observance of law be a good act; therefore neither is it necessary, speaking per se, that it be a voluntary and free act. We concede that it is not necessary that the observance of law be a good act, i.e., simply good; but it is altogether necessary per se that the observance of law be a human act, and therefore from knowledge, from will, from liberty. Otherwise neither observance of law, nor the law itself, could exist; unless we wish to say not only that a drunken man, by not eating, observes the law of fasting, but also that a little ass, from which food is withdrawn, observes the law of fasting.

33. La-Croix evades this response, explicitly affirming that for the observance of law a human act is not indeed required, but that an act of a man, who is bound by such a law, is sufficient. But the contrary is true; for then it would certainly follow that a sick man observes the law of fasting, who, so long as compelled by sickness he does not eat, nevertheless with his whole will resists that law of fasting. But this, a little before, is affirmed by La-Croix himself altogether to remove observance of law from the middle. These are his words: "That a precept may be fulfilled, there ought not to be present a will positively contrary to the precept and coerced." Therefore it is not true to say: for observing a law "an act of a man, who is bound by such a law, is sufficient."

34. And La-Croix affirms this again and again, putting an end to the question by the repeated assertion: For the observance of law a free act is not required. Once that which is commanded has been posited, the observance of the precept is had. And he adds the reason: since a will of fulfilling or satisfying is not required; and he refers himself to the preceding number, saying: as was said in n. 692. But one thing is that a will of satisfying the law is not required; another thing is that a will of doing what the law commands is not required. And this is expressly affirmed in that same cited number 692, in which there is nothing except the doctrine of Busembaum, who says that law commands the free execution of the work. Free: therefore from knowledge, from will, from liberty.

35. With these points premised, it is easy to resolve the following case. Sabbas, Abbot of the monastery, on a certain day commands, in virtue of holy obedience, that from the ninth hour until midday rigorous silence be observed by all the monks, and that all remain in their own cell during that time, with permission afterward granted to go out freely from the cell, without any other leave, and to converse among themselves until night. Anastasius the monk was not present at the Abbot's precept, but out of laziness was sleeping, and he slept until midday. Anastasius did not transgress the Abbot's precept. But he did not observe the precept, because on account of ignorance of the precept he could not conform himself to it in a human mode, i.e., by a voluntary act. Nothing ought to be more voluntary than the observance of law, which is imposed on a free will. When the time of the precept of silence had passed, he could freely go out from the cell and converse with others. For the Abbot's precept concerned only the silence to be kept; once this had been kept, the aforesaid permission was given to all to go out from the cell and converse. But Anastasius, while sleeping, did not speak, and certainly did not disturb the monastery in those three hours by his shouts and conversations. And this indeed was altogether sufficient in the case, not for escaping a penalty, which was not in question, but for enjoying the permission made by the Abbot to the monks.

— Principle. "Laws command the substance of the act, not the mode, unless the mode is of its intrinsic nature according to itself, or as it falls under the law" ¹. What the law imposes, this is to be furnished, and that reasonably, yet by understanding it strictly ². From this principle the following rules are gathered, which hold also concerning particular precepts and obligations freely undertaken, for example by vow: once the fact is posited, they are to be observed as quasi particular laws.

¹ Sanchez, In Decal. l. 1, c. 14, n. 1, adducing St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 100 art. 9 and 10.

² Lehmkuhl, I, 244.

— The state of grace, which is required for merit, of itself is not necessary for fulfilling precepts. Wherefore one who, in the state of sin, has heard Mass, recited the breviary, executed a vow or sacramental penance, has done the work owed and is freed from the obligation. Yet one conscious of the state of sin cannot satisfy the precept of paschal communion, because his communion would be sacrilegious; and therefore the commanded work itself would be vitiated according to its species. Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, condemned this 55th proposition: "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord" (Denz., 1205).

— Provided that the very commanded work, good from its object, is furnished, the law can be fulfilled by a sinful act itself.

Thus one satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who goes to church to hear Mass, and at the same time has an evil will of stealing, of seeing things which excite concupiscence, etc. Yet the precept of annual confession is not satisfied by a sacrilegious confession; for this is voluntarily null, so that the sacrament is not received. Wherefore this 14th proposition was reproved by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church" (Denz., 1114).

— The end of the law does not fall under the law. Therefore he satisfies the precept who fulfills the precept for an end diverse from that which the legislator intended. Indeed the end can be in some measure opposed, provided the substance of the work is preserved. Thus one does not fail in the precept of abstinence who has eaten fish from gluttony. The law therefore is not deprived of its common utility.

The same holds concerning precepts. Yet except the case if the intention itself is commanded. But generally the intention on account of which prayers are imposed by a confessor is only an accidental mode, the omission of which does not impede substantial fulfillment.

— The intention of fulfilling the precept reduplicatively is not commanded by law. Wherefore he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who has heard Mass: a) without the intention of fulfilling the precept; b) not knowing that on that day there is an obligation of hearing Mass; c) positively not wishing by the Mass which he hears to satisfy the precept. Yet a contrary prevailing will will be efficacious where the obligation remains from vow. For when obligations draw their origin from the will of the one promising, he can freely remain in the obligation, just as from the beginning he freely constituted himself a debtor. Similar is the case of him who pays Titius the hundred coins promised, saying: I give these to you from a liberal mind, not yet as promised.

But the intention or will which the substance of the act requires must be had so that the precept may be fulfilled. Wherefore he who, without the will of praying but with the sole will of reading things curious or beautiful, recites the breviary; he who goes to the sacred rite solely to hear music; he who, compelled by fear, assists at the sacred rite, yet unwilling to perform the pious work, does not satisfy the precept.

But a prohibiting or negative law, by the very omission of the prohibited act, even if not voluntary, is sufficiently fulfilled so that there is no sin against that law. He, however, who has borne a positively opposed will will have sinned by an internal act. Suppose someone who is physically forced to observe a fast which he had intended to break.

And the same must be said concerning laws or precepts which require the thing, but in no way a personal action. Thus the law of paying taxes can be fulfilled through anyone.

Between divine and human law, however, there is this difference: that the state of sin removes merit, and that an evil intention, a sinful action, always is opposed to some divine precept. But the intention escapes the human legislator. Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 100 art. 9, 10.

— At the same time, by diverse acts, a twofold precept can be satisfied, provided one does not impede the other, nor diversity of times has been commanded. Wherefore he who hears the Mass commanded on a feast day can at the same time recite the canonical hours or pour forth other prayers imposed by vow or as penance. And he who by one vow or by various vows promised the hearing of Mass and several prayers is not forbidden at the same time to hear Mass and recite prayers.

When Masses are celebrated at the same time on several altars, provided the consecrations take place at distinct moments, those assisting, if they have wished, truly hear several Masses. Yet not rarely an imposed obligation of hearing several Masses must reasonably be understood of Masses to be heard at distinct times, as if a confessor should order someone to be present twice or three times at the sacred rite. For it is one thing to be present twice at the sacred rite, another thing to be present once at several sacred rites.

— By one act diverse precepts can be fulfilled at the same time, unless something else is gathered from the mind of the one commanding. Thus use itself demonstrates that a beneficed priest, by one recitation of the breviary, satisfies the twofold title by which he must recite the canonical hours; and that the faithful are held to hear only one sacred rite when a feast day falls on Sunday.

Nevertheless, according to the mind of the one vowing and of the confessor, things which are promised by vow and imposed as penance generally cannot be fulfilled by an act already owed on another ground.

Yet it sometimes happens that confessors impose a work already commanded. And if the vow is concerning a thing to be furnished daily or on a certain recurring day (for instance, a fast on each Friday or Saturday), its reasonable interpretation has this, that when an obligation of the same thing but of another title concurs, the work is not to be repeated. Thus one who is bound by vow to a daily rosary, on a day on which he has to recite the rosary on account of an imposed sacramental satisfaction, will not have to recite two rosaries; nor (what is more manifest) is he held to a second fast if on some Friday a commanded fast occurs. And nothing prevents you from satisfying a private vow or sacramental penance by the same work and gaining an indulgence.

— In what order satisfaction is made for several obligations of the same kind. You ask in what order you satisfy the various titles by which you must repeat the same work in species: for instance, celebrate several Masses.

You satisfy: 1. In the order which you have expressly established.

2. If you have wished to satisfy all the obligations at the same time, and the work or its application can be divided, you satisfy each for its proportionate part. Thus several intentions of Mass can be joined, so that one who must celebrate individual Masses for three deceased persons can either assign individual Masses to each, or offer Mass three times for the three collectively. Yet this must be noted, that the indulgence of a privileged altar can be applied to only one deceased person from the several for whom you offer Mass.

But what if you have wished to satisfy all the obligations at the same time and the matter cannot be divided? Titius must approach confession once from vow, once from sacramental penance. By one act he wished to satisfy each obligation; which he could not do. Which obligation did he satisfy, or perhaps neither, so that he is held by the twofold obligation as before? Ballerini-Palmieri answer that satisfaction was made by Titius for the more urgent obligation or the graver one (if they urge equally) ¹, "from the common principle of law, that a work which is not valid as it is done, is valid at least in that better mode in which it can be valid." But Sanchez (2) thinks that the law of the Church is to be placed before a vow, and a vow before penance.

3. If you have established no order, you will be judged to have fulfilled the more urgent obligation. Ballerini-Palmieri (l. c.) also transfer this to the case in which you have not thought about the obligation. But that rule must be used prudently. It is always supposed that the whole has been done which had to be done. He who merely must celebrate Mass, by every celebration of Mass, even unconscious of the obligation, will fulfill the debt also; but if, besides celebration, application also is required to a definite intention, the Mass will not thus be applied unless either in the celebration itself or beforehand he has formally willed the application.

¹ T. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 381. - (2) In Decal. l. 1, c. 14, n. 8.

— Concerning the due time. An obligation must be fulfilled in its own time. Therefore:

1. If no day has been fixed, it will have to be fulfilled within the time through which opportunity is given, unless by accident the matter is urgent, or the matter is diminished by delay: as if you delay too much entrance into religion.

2. It is not to be fulfilled before the time, even if you foresee an impediment during the time of the obligation. Thus one who on the next day will be impeded ought not to anticipate Matins on the day before. Indeed this could not always be done usefully. Thus by hearing Mass on the day before, the precept of sanctifying Sunday has not been satisfied. Yet where there has been an obligation of justice, of itself he who foresees that afterwards he will be unable to pay will have to pay before the day: because he must positively prevent that damage to the creditor. Cf. d'Annibale, I, 167.

3. While useful time is running, it must be fulfilled. If through a part of that time you foresee a future impediment, you will have to forestall that impediment by satisfying the law. Wherefore on Palm Sunday he will have to approach the holy table for whom afterwards, during the paschal time for communion, opportunity seems about to be lacking.

4. When the prefixed time has elapsed, the obligation ceases, if the day has been appended for ending the obligation. On the contrary, it urges if it was prescribed for pressing the obligation. To discern this, the words, the end, and the circumstances of the law will have to be observed; and often the usual interpretation will give more certain knowledge. Thus, when the day has elapsed, the ecclesiastical obligation of hearing the sacred rite, of reciting the breviary, of fasting, ceases; but the obligation of annual confession and communion does not cease.

5. What is commanded to be done at once, at least in canonical law, is understood moderately, that it must be done within three days. What is ordered to be done as soon as possible can of itself be deferred more. How long: this is less clear. It is in the estimation of a good man (d'Annibale, I, 167).

— What if you cannot do the whole? Of itself the whole which is commanded must be furnished. One who cannot do the whole is held to the part, if the matter is divisible, and the part for which opportunity is had is of sufficient moment and utility. Often it is difficult to define which obligations are to be considered divisible and which not. Cf. d'Annibale, I, 168 (42). Here also the usual interpretation will often have to be consulted, for example concerning the obligation of him who can recite only part of the breviary, or hear only part of Mass.

— Laws impose the substance of the act, not the mode, unless it is of the nature of the act, or the mode is expressly commanded. Wherefore observance does not require the state of grace, nor is it impeded by a sinful act; it does not require the intention of the end of the law, but it does require an intention sufficient for a human act and for the substance of the act, unless it is a prohibiting law, which is observed by the very omission, or it requires the thing, not a personal action.

It is not repugnant of itself that by diverse acts, which do not mutually impede one another, several precepts be satisfied at the same time, or that by one act diverse precepts be fulfilled. If a work must be repeated under diverse titles, satisfaction is made for the various obligations in the order which has expressly been established, unless you have preferred, when the matter can be divided, to satisfy several at once, according to proportion. If the matter cannot be divided, the debtor has satisfied the more urgent obligation; this must also be said if he expressly established no order, provided, however, that he had a positive intention of satisfying. An obligation can and must be fulfilled during the whole useful time; but not before the time, unless it has been an obligation of justice; nor after the time has elapsed, unless the day has been appended for urging the obligation.

What is to be done at once, at least in canonical law, is understood moderately within the space of three days. What must be done as soon as possible of itself allows a greater option, to be estimated by the judgment of a good man.

The whole which is commanded must be furnished. Let one who cannot furnish the whole furnish the divisible part of sufficient utility.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 3, ad 2; II-II, q. 60, a. 5, ad 2; q. 120.

293. In what way law is to be fulfilled. - The human legislator does not directly prescribe the internal mode of virtue, but the conservation of social order; whence he prescribes only the substance of the act commanded and is content with physical or external fulfillment, although he can intend the good of virtue. For the end of a precept does not fall under the precept; nor therefore, per se, does the (extrinsic) mode of fulfilling the precept, unless the mode is of the substance of the precept (intrinsic).

These things will be declared more where there is discussion of ecclesiastical law.

294. In what way law is to be interpreted. - But in order that it be rightly fulfilled as it ought, law often needs interpretation. Namely, human law cannot be so perfectly set forth that it excludes every doubt about its meaning, and therefore it often needs interpretation, either on account of the weakness of human talent, or on account of change of circumstances and morals.

Interpretation is a clearer determination of the mind or words of the legislator. By reason of value or efficacy it is twofold: authoritative, which is imposed with authority, and merely directive, which can also be made by private persons. But by reason of cause or author it is fourfold:

1. Authentic or legal, which is made authoritatively by the ruler of the community himself as such, who is deservedly judged to know the sense of the law better and therefore enjoys authority of interpreting: it is made by the legislator himself, or by his successor or superior, or also by another specially designated for this (as happens in France, by the Council of State), and it has the same force as the law itself.

In our country, art. 28 of the Belgian Constitution has force: "L'interpretation des lois par voie d'autorite n'appartient qu'au pouvoir legislatif."

2. Usual, which is made by general observance of the community, or by the use and custom of the people, which is therefore called the best interpreter of laws. Moreover one custom is antecedent to the law, and this can have force for detecting the sense of a law which is usually borne according to custom; another concomitant is the mode of observing the law, and this has force as a sign and witness for recognizing the mind of the legislator, because it displays the common sense of subjects, which, although it is not authentic, nevertheless has more force than doctrinal interpretation because several agree in it; another subsequent custom, given the conditions, can define or extend a preexisting obligation, just as it can introduce or remove it (as we said in n. 273): then it is authoritative. Nevertheless in present-day civil law the force of custom for interpreting law authoritatively is not admitted, just as neither for introducing or abrogating it.

3. Judicial, which is made authoritatively by judicial power in order to a special cause, namely, by applying law to a particular fact: it is authoritative as to the litigants; as to others it has only the private authority of the judge, so much the greater as he excels in greater knowledge and the interpretation is more often repeated, yet, other things being equal, greater than if it is given by a private doctor.

4. Doctrinal, which is not authoritative and therefore of itself not obligatory, but is supported by science and directive, and is made by private doctors or jurists according to the rules of critical art. It is so much greater as their number, excellence, and arguments are greater; but if all agree in the interpretation, it would be rash to spurn it.

295. How many kinds interpretation is.

By reason of character or of the mode by which it is made, interpretation is simply declarative or comprehensive, which merely declares the words and sense of the law and adds or subtracts nothing, whether it declares more or less clear things, or even elucidates more obscure things: this can be made by all, even private persons; or supplementary, which adds what is lacking to the sense and words of the law, and is either extensive, which adds an obligation previously not expressed or intended, and therefore needs promulgation, or restrictive, which removes either one: this, like the law itself, can be made by the authority of the legislator, and by custom when the consent of the legislator can be presumed.

296. Interpretation by epikeia. - Even a subject of the law, in rare particular cases, can make a certain quasi-restrictive interpretation and licitly act beyond the words of the law, when these, namely, would be harmful to the common good. For law obligates insofar as it is ordered to the common good, and does not obligate if it departs from this. But it happens that something is useful generally and in the greater number of cases, and in certain cases is harmful; but because the legislator cannot foresee all cases (nor can law enumerate all cases, because it would become more obscure), law is proposed according to that which happens in the greater number of cases, for the sake of the common good.

Therefore, in a case in which observance of the law is harmful to the common good, it is not to be observed; for the legislator is rightly judged not to have willed to include that case in the law, just as a law concerning the gates of a town to be closed would not be applied to a citizen who would be very useful for defending the city, and a law which prohibits carrying arms does not obligate him who is sought by an enemy for death.

A right judgment concerning the circumstances in which law does not obligate, and a moral virtue inclining (under the direction of prudence) to acting rightly according to such a prudent judgment (which pertains to legal justice), is called epikeia, that is, equity, kindness, moderation, which interprets and judges and applies laws according to the equitable and good, that is, according as the reason of justice and the common utility demand. "In theological usage it designates a certain explanation of law which is made from equity, a benign interpretation and prudent moderation of law beyond the rigor of the words, by which it is judged that the law does not extend to some particular case on account of its special circumstances, although the legislator's words, as they sound, contain even that case." It can be defined: an equitable and benign interpretation of law, or a prudent moderation and restriction, by which against the words or sense of the law we follow the habitual mind of the legislator.

1. Thus Leroux in Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege VII, n. 4 (January 1901).

It is twofold: one broadly so called does not exceed the limits of simple interpretation drawn from circumstances, and has place not only in positive law but also in natural law (for example, deposits are to be returned); another strictly so called contains an emendation of law and has place in human law alone. And this differs: a) from simple interpretation, which explains obscure words and inquires whether in this or that sense those words are to be taken, so that they comprehend these or those cases: this follows the literal sense of the law and the mind which the legislator had; that departs from the words and the clear literal sense of the law and follows the mind which the legislator would have had, or reasonably ought to have had, if he had foreseen the case; b) from simple cessation of the end: for by this the law ceases universally and indeed negatively or contradictorily because its end is lacking; but by epikeia it does not obligate in a particular case and indeed contrarily because the law is rendered harmful or too burdensome; c) from dispensation: for this is an act of jurisdiction by which the legislator dissolves the bond of the law in a special case to which otherwise the law would be applicable; but epikeia pronounces that such a case was never comprehended in the law, although it is comprehended in the words.

297. Epikeia strictly so called has place whenever the law is 1) harmful or evil, for example, if it cannot be observed without sin; or 2) so impeditious of good or very burdensome and too difficult that it could scarcely be imposed by an equitable legislator; or 3) not so burdensome and difficult that it could not be imposed, but nevertheless, the circumstances being inspected and especially the ordinary mode of commanding with moderation, it is presumed that such was not the mind of the legislator. But ordinarily it is not given in invalidating laws on account of the common good.

The interpretation of epikeia can be made by any private person if the cause is evident; if it is doubtful, the superior is to be approached, because it pertains to him to interpret what is useful or useless to the community, whence on account of such cases he has the power of dispensing: for it is disordered to pass beyond the words of the law where the will of the legislator can certainly be known, and in doubt concerning the liceity of an act, we must, insofar as we morally can, arrive at certitude (n. 213 and 214, 4). But if there is a cause which does not allow the delay of recourse to the superior and is sufficiently founded (so that there is positive doubt whether the law still obligates), necessity itself dispenses, which has no law: then, namely, it suffices that probably the law has ceased to obligate.

By present-day civil law, however, epikeia is admitted with difficulty, except in a case in which it would evidently harm the common good directly. Namely, the legislator restricts it to the least possible, and judges it better to observe the law, even if it is burdensome to one or another, on account of the example of others.

360. A prohibiting law is satisfied either knowingly and voluntarily, by a human act even meritorious, or unknowingly, e.g., by one sleeping, because it suffices to omit that which the law prohibits; but for omission there is not necessarily required a positive will of omitting or abstaining from the work. Hence one who fasts satisfies the law, whether he does it in order to spare money, or by reason of health, or because food is not given to him, or because he is asleep or does not think about food: for it is a negative precept. Yet one who omits unknowingly should rather be said not to transgress the law than to fulfill it.

Nevertheless, the one omitting cannot have a contrary will: for that which the law prohibits is evil, and therefore by that very fact the affection or will of this evil is prohibited; thus he from whom meats are violently taken away against his will, although effectively he does not transgress the law, nevertheless sins affectively against it and is guilty in will of violating it.

361. A preceptive law must be fulfilled by a human act, that is, knowingly and voluntarily: for law is given to men; whence if it prescribes a personal act, it requires that it be done in a human mode. Hence one drunk, or sleeping, or altogether compelled at the sacred rite does not satisfy; but if the law is real, imposing a thing to be furnished, it suffices that it be furnished by another, but by mandate of him who is obligated, or with his ratification.

In order that law be fulfilled in a human mode, intention is required, which the substance of the act demands so that it may be placed in its moral species; whence:

1. on the part of the subject, the intention should be at least virtual, that is, formerly had and here and now influencing the act (e.g., continuing to pray while distracted from the intention had at the beginning), and implicit, contained in another (e.g., the intention of praying in the act of taking up the breviary);

2. on the part of the object, there should be the intention of placing the act prescribed, because without that the act prescribed by law would not be placed.

Nevertheless, there is not required: a) the intention of the extrinsic end intended by the legislator (unless it is specially imposed): for the end intended by the legislator is one thing, the act which he prescribes as a means to this end is another. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) end of a precept does not fall under the precept, and the end of the one acting can be opposed to the end of the legislator; e.g., one who eats fish from gluttony observes the precept of abstinence; therefore the law is not deprived of common utility;

b) nor an explicit intention of satisfying or of fulfilling the law as such, because laws generally do not obligate to formal obedience, that is, to doing something because it is prescribed, but only to doing that which is prescribed; hence one who is ignorant that it is a feast day, or who intends to hear another Mass, nevertheless satisfies the precept;

c) indeed, probably one effectively satisfies the law with a contrary intention of not satisfying (provided the will of doing the prescribed work is predominant), because the legislator ordinarily prescribes only the substance of the work; hence one who wills to pray and not to satisfy the law, although he can sin affectively against the law, nevertheless effectively satisfies. For although it depends on the intention of the agent that an obligation be fulfilled which depends on his will, such as a vow, oath, sacramental penance, nevertheless it depends not on his will but on the will of the legislator that the law obligates to such a work and is fulfilled by such a work; for once the prescribed work is placed, the subject cannot impede that by this work the law is fulfilled. Therefore, once the substance of the work is placed, the law is necessarily fulfilled. Exception is made if someone is bound by several precepts, e.g., law, vow, sacramental penance, to several similar acts: for then it depends on his intention to which one he satisfies.

362. Can law be fulfilled with sin? - Law generally can be fulfilled: 1) without the state of grace or a good habit, joy, delight, etc., because it prescribes the substance of the act, not the mode (prop. 16 of Baius condemned); unless the mode or state of grace is positively and intrinsically required for the substance of the act, e.g., for confession (can. 907; prop. 14 of Alexander VII) or for communion (can. 861; prop. 55 of Innocent XI); indeed 2) law, not indeed universally taken or the law of charity, to which every sin is repugnant, but another law prescribing a particular act, can be fulfilled while sinning, provided that the act of fulfillment as to substance and according to object and species remains good, and its goodness is not totally corrupted (as in a null confession); namely: a) by an act which at the same time is done on account of an extrinsic evil end which is not the sole reason for acting, e.g., to hear Mass also in order to see a woman (n. 156, 4); b) by a good act which is merely accompanied by an evil extrinsic circumstance which does not pass into the object and does not influence the act, e.g., to hear Mass with depraved thoughts or with the intention of stealing (the law is not satisfied by sinning, but the sinner satisfies; n. 154): for law does not prescribe the (extrinsic) mode, but only the substance of the act; unless the mode is of the intrinsic reason of the act according to itself or as it falls under law. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) mode of a precept does not fall under the precept.

363. When law must be fulfilled. - A preceptive law, if it does not determine the time of fulfillment, must be fulfilled as soon as, morally speaking, it conveniently can be done (e.g., within three days, if it must be fulfilled at once), for otherwise someone could elude the law by always deferring. But if it determines the time, it must be fulfilled at that time; but if the time has elapsed, if it had been prefixed for ending the obligation, the obligation ceases, e.g., of Mass, of fasting; but if for urging the obligation, it obligates as soon as possible, e.g., one who has not confessed within the year, or has not made the Paschal communion (can. 859, § 4), or who did not fulfill sacramental penance on a certain day.

Concerning the time of obligation, canons 31-35 are to be noted, especially canon 33, in which it is said: "In computing the hours of the day one must stand by common usage; but in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving holy communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is different, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, true or mean, or legal, whether of the region or some other extraordinary time."

The canon is to be understood according to the Response of the C.I.C., May 29, 1947, in which it is declared that "once one mode of computing time has been chosen here, by force of can. 33, § 1, it can be changed in formally diverse actions."

Formally diverse actions are those which, even perhaps in one materially single action, regard diverse obligations or diverse precepts, which are not intrinsically connected or do not have intrinsic affinity.

Thus:

1. Someone can on the same Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour it is already midnight and the law of abstinence no longer urges, and also satisfy the obligation of reciting the divine office of Friday, because according to the later hour it is not yet midnight and the term for ending the obligation has not yet expired.

2. Indeed someone can on Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour the day of abstinence has already elapsed, and nevertheless on Saturday celebrate Mass or approach the Sacred [rite/Communion], because according to the later hour Saturday has not yet begun. For that action, materially one, is formally manifold, since it is the fulfillment of two obligations which do not have an intrinsic connection or affinity.

3. But he who on the night of the Nativity, in the first Mass, by mistake has taken the ablutions with wine so that he is now no longer fasting, cannot celebrate the second and third Masses by now choosing the later hour for determining the midnight from which he must be fasting. For here there is question of one action formally, corresponding to one and the same precept.

364. To what law obligates. - Law 1) directly and explicitly obligates to its own observance, which is the essential and chief obligation of law, in which the others are contained implicitly and virtually;

2. indirectly and implicitly it obligates to all ordinary means proximately necessary for observance: for he who is bound to the end, by that very fact is bound to the means which are proximately necessary for obtaining the end; namely:

Although for satisfying a law the intention of fulfilling the precept is not required, and much less the intention of obtaining the end of the precept, nevertheless the intention of doing that which is commanded is required, if the law is affirmative; but not if it is negative, or indeed affirmative, but of such a kind that through it the simple effect of some action is intended, and not the action itself. The reason for the first is that, for satisfying, material obedience suffices, as theologians speak, namely, to place the action which is commanded. The reason for the second is both because, as the axiom taken from the Angelic Doctor has it: The end of the precept does not fall under the precept; and because by the simple fulfillment of the precept the end intended by the legislator is sufficiently obtained. But the reason for the third is that, since law is imposed upon men, its fulfillment ought to be a human action. Finally, the reason for the fourth and fifth is that then the legislator intends nothing except either the omission of a work, or only the material placing of the effect, for example, restitution, which even one who is sleeping is able to make. - Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 100, art. 9. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 162, 163, 164, and 165.