Article VI: On the Fulfillment of Ecclesiastical Law

360. A prohibiting law is satisfied either knowingly and voluntarily, by a human act even meritorious, or unknowingly, e.g., by one sleeping, because it suffices to omit that which the law prohibits; but for omission there is not necessarily required a positive will of omitting or abstaining from the work. Hence one who fasts satisfies the law, whether he does it in order to spare money, or by reason of health, or because food is not given to him, or because he is asleep or does not think about food: for it is a negative precept. Yet one who omits unknowingly should rather be said not to transgress the law than to fulfill it.

Nevertheless, the one omitting cannot have a contrary will: for that which the law prohibits is evil, and therefore by that very fact the affection or will of this evil is prohibited; thus he from whom meats are violently taken away against his will, although effectively he does not transgress the law, nevertheless sins affectively against it and is guilty in will of violating it.

361. A preceptive law must be fulfilled by a human act, that is, knowingly and voluntarily: for law is given to men; whence if it prescribes a personal act, it requires that it be done in a human mode. Hence one drunk, or sleeping, or altogether compelled at the sacred rite does not satisfy; but if the law is real, imposing a thing to be furnished, it suffices that it be furnished by another, but by mandate of him who is obligated, or with his ratification.

In order that law be fulfilled in a human mode, intention is required, which the substance of the act demands so that it may be placed in its moral species; whence:

1. on the part of the subject, the intention should be at least virtual, that is, formerly had and here and now influencing the act (e.g., continuing to pray while distracted from the intention had at the beginning), and implicit, contained in another (e.g., the intention of praying in the act of taking up the breviary);

2. on the part of the object, there should be the intention of placing the act prescribed, because without that the act prescribed by law would not be placed.

Nevertheless, there is not required: a) the intention of the extrinsic end intended by the legislator (unless it is specially imposed): for the end intended by the legislator is one thing, the act which he prescribes as a means to this end is another. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) end of a precept does not fall under the precept, and the end of the one acting can be opposed to the end of the legislator; e.g., one who eats fish from gluttony observes the precept of abstinence; therefore the law is not deprived of common utility;

b) nor an explicit intention of satisfying or of fulfilling the law as such, because laws generally do not obligate to formal obedience, that is, to doing something because it is prescribed, but only to doing that which is prescribed; hence one who is ignorant that it is a feast day, or who intends to hear another Mass, nevertheless satisfies the precept;

c) indeed, probably one effectively satisfies the law with a contrary intention of not satisfying (provided the will of doing the prescribed work is predominant), because the legislator ordinarily prescribes only the substance of the work; hence one who wills to pray and not to satisfy the law, although he can sin affectively against the law, nevertheless effectively satisfies. For although it depends on the intention of the agent that an obligation be fulfilled which depends on his will, such as a vow, oath, sacramental penance, nevertheless it depends not on his will but on the will of the legislator that the law obligates to such a work and is fulfilled by such a work; for once the prescribed work is placed, the subject cannot impede that by this work the law is fulfilled. Therefore, once the substance of the work is placed, the law is necessarily fulfilled. Exception is made if someone is bound by several precepts, e.g., law, vow, sacramental penance, to several similar acts: for then it depends on his intention to which one he satisfies.

362. Can law be fulfilled with sin? - Law generally can be fulfilled: 1) without the state of grace or a good habit, joy, delight, etc., because it prescribes the substance of the act, not the mode (prop. 16 of Baius condemned); unless the mode or state of grace is positively and intrinsically required for the substance of the act, e.g., for confession (can. 907; prop. 14 of Alexander VII) or for communion (can. 861; prop. 55 of Innocent XI); indeed 2) law, not indeed universally taken or the law of charity, to which every sin is repugnant, but another law prescribing a particular act, can be fulfilled while sinning, provided that the act of fulfillment as to substance and according to object and species remains good, and its goodness is not totally corrupted (as in a null confession); namely: a) by an act which at the same time is done on account of an extrinsic evil end which is not the sole reason for acting, e.g., to hear Mass also in order to see a woman (n. 156, 4); b) by a good act which is merely accompanied by an evil extrinsic circumstance which does not pass into the object and does not influence the act, e.g., to hear Mass with depraved thoughts or with the intention of stealing (the law is not satisfied by sinning, but the sinner satisfies; n. 154): for law does not prescribe the (extrinsic) mode, but only the substance of the act; unless the mode is of the intrinsic reason of the act according to itself or as it falls under law. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) mode of a precept does not fall under the precept.

363. When law must be fulfilled. - A preceptive law, if it does not determine the time of fulfillment, must be fulfilled as soon as, morally speaking, it conveniently can be done (e.g., within three days, if it must be fulfilled at once), for otherwise someone could elude the law by always deferring. But if it determines the time, it must be fulfilled at that time; but if the time has elapsed, if it had been prefixed for ending the obligation, the obligation ceases, e.g., of Mass, of fasting; but if for urging the obligation, it obligates as soon as possible, e.g., one who has not confessed within the year, or has not made the Paschal communion (can. 859, § 4), or who did not fulfill sacramental penance on a certain day.

Concerning the time of obligation, canons 31-35 are to be noted, especially canon 33, in which it is said: "In computing the hours of the day one must stand by common usage; but in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving holy communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is different, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, true or mean, or legal, whether of the region or some other extraordinary time."

The canon is to be understood according to the Response of the C.I.C., May 29, 1947, in which it is declared that "once one mode of computing time has been chosen here, by force of can. 33, § 1, it can be changed in formally diverse actions."

Formally diverse actions are those which, even perhaps in one materially single action, regard diverse obligations or diverse precepts, which are not intrinsically connected or do not have intrinsic affinity.

Thus:

1. Someone can on the same Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour it is already midnight and the law of abstinence no longer urges, and also satisfy the obligation of reciting the divine office of Friday, because according to the later hour it is not yet midnight and the term for ending the obligation has not yet expired.

2. Indeed someone can on Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour the day of abstinence has already elapsed, and nevertheless on Saturday celebrate Mass or approach the Sacred [rite/Communion], because according to the later hour Saturday has not yet begun. For that action, materially one, is formally manifold, since it is the fulfillment of two obligations which do not have an intrinsic connection or affinity.

3. But he who on the night of the Nativity, in the first Mass, by mistake has taken the ablutions with wine so that he is now no longer fasting, cannot celebrate the second and third Masses by now choosing the later hour for determining the midnight from which he must be fasting. For here there is question of one action formally, corresponding to one and the same precept.

364. To what law obligates. - Law 1) directly and explicitly obligates to its own observance, which is the essential and chief obligation of law, in which the others are contained implicitly and virtually;

2. indirectly and implicitly it obligates to all ordinary means proximately necessary for observance: for he who is bound to the end, by that very fact is bound to the means which are proximately necessary for obtaining the end; namely:

a) to knowledge of the law, which is a prior and immediately necessary means without which it could not be observed, and consequently to applying ordinary means which conduce to knowledge of the law;

b) to other internal and external means without which the law will not be able to be fulfilled, provided they are ordinary and the law is proximately imminent, e.g., to acquiring a breviary for reciting the office;

c) and therefore to avoiding or removing or forestalling impediments which render its observance proximately impossible;

d) to avoiding proximate occasions which frequently expose one to the danger of transgression or are morally conjoined with it.

365. Can several precepts be fulfilled at the same time? - Response: 1) Several laws or precepts can be satisfied by one act if all prescribe a matter or act the same in species and number: thus a canonical or religious priest satisfies by one recitation of the breviary; nevertheless satisfaction is not made if diverse or distinct actions are required, e.g., fasting prescribed and imposed by a confessor or by a superior, unless the same one imposed it; by paying 100 francs once if someone owed it twice. When diverse laws are judged to fall upon the same or diverse actions, we have from the intention of the one commanding, the words, custom, and other circumstances.

2. Satisfaction is also made by several acts placed at the same time, provided they are compossible and diversity of times has not been prescribed, e.g., hearing Mass (or a pilgrimage) and recitation of the hours; satisfaction is not made if they are incompossible, e.g., to hear confession and to read the breviary.

366. Observation.

When several precepts occur at the same time which cannot be fulfilled together:

1. by right, if they are equally urgent, the greater must be observed before the lesser: hence, other things being equal, a negative precept is to be preferred to an affirmative one, a natural precept to a positive one, a divine precept to a human one, an ecclesiastical precept to a civil one, a precept of a primary superior or of a stricter virtue or looking to a common or spiritual good to a precept of a secondary superior, of a less strict virtue, looking to a particular or bodily good;

2. in fact, the agent satisfies that to which he intends to satisfy: for it depends on the intention of the agent to which one he satisfies. But if he has thought determinately of no obligation, he is judged to satisfy the more urgent; if they are equally urgent and the matter is divisible, he satisfies each in part; if indivisible, the greater obligation, as was said under 1).