Chapter VIII: The Observance of Law

— Principle. "Laws command the substance of the act, not the mode, unless the mode is of its intrinsic nature according to itself, or as it falls under the law" ¹. What the law imposes, this is to be furnished, and that reasonably, yet by understanding it strictly ². From this principle the following rules are gathered, which hold also concerning particular precepts and obligations freely undertaken, for example by vow: once the fact is posited, they are to be observed as quasi particular laws.

¹ Sanchez, In Decal. l. 1, c. 14, n. 1, adducing St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 100 art. 9 and 10.

² Lehmkuhl, I, 244.

— The state of grace, which is required for merit, of itself is not necessary for fulfilling precepts. Wherefore one who, in the state of sin, has heard Mass, recited the breviary, executed a vow or sacramental penance, has done the work owed and is freed from the obligation. Yet one conscious of the state of sin cannot satisfy the precept of paschal communion, because his communion would be sacrilegious; and therefore the commanded work itself would be vitiated according to its species. Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, condemned this 55th proposition: "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord" (Denz., 1205).

— Provided that the very commanded work, good from its object, is furnished, the law can be fulfilled by a sinful act itself.

Thus one satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who goes to church to hear Mass, and at the same time has an evil will of stealing, of seeing things which excite concupiscence, etc. Yet the precept of annual confession is not satisfied by a sacrilegious confession; for this is voluntarily null, so that the sacrament is not received. Wherefore this 14th proposition was reproved by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church" (Denz., 1114).

— The end of the law does not fall under the law. Therefore he satisfies the precept who fulfills the precept for an end diverse from that which the legislator intended. Indeed the end can be in some measure opposed, provided the substance of the work is preserved. Thus one does not fail in the precept of abstinence who has eaten fish from gluttony. The law therefore is not deprived of its common utility.

The same holds concerning precepts. Yet except the case if the intention itself is commanded. But generally the intention on account of which prayers are imposed by a confessor is only an accidental mode, the omission of which does not impede substantial fulfillment.

— The intention of fulfilling the precept reduplicatively is not commanded by law. Wherefore he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who has heard Mass: a) without the intention of fulfilling the precept; b) not knowing that on that day there is an obligation of hearing Mass; c) positively not wishing by the Mass which he hears to satisfy the precept. Yet a contrary prevailing will will be efficacious where the obligation remains from vow. For when obligations draw their origin from the will of the one promising, he can freely remain in the obligation, just as from the beginning he freely constituted himself a debtor. Similar is the case of him who pays Titius the hundred coins promised, saying: I give these to you from a liberal mind, not yet as promised.

But the intention or will which the substance of the act requires must be had so that the precept may be fulfilled. Wherefore he who, without the will of praying but with the sole will of reading things curious or beautiful, recites the breviary; he who goes to the sacred rite solely to hear music; he who, compelled by fear, assists at the sacred rite, yet unwilling to perform the pious work, does not satisfy the precept.

But a prohibiting or negative law, by the very omission of the prohibited act, even if not voluntary, is sufficiently fulfilled so that there is no sin against that law. He, however, who has borne a positively opposed will will have sinned by an internal act. Suppose someone who is physically forced to observe a fast which he had intended to break.

And the same must be said concerning laws or precepts which require the thing, but in no way a personal action. Thus the law of paying taxes can be fulfilled through anyone.

Between divine and human law, however, there is this difference: that the state of sin removes merit, and that an evil intention, a sinful action, always is opposed to some divine precept. But the intention escapes the human legislator. Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 100 art. 9, 10.

— At the same time, by diverse acts, a twofold precept can be satisfied, provided one does not impede the other, nor diversity of times has been commanded. Wherefore he who hears the Mass commanded on a feast day can at the same time recite the canonical hours or pour forth other prayers imposed by vow or as penance. And he who by one vow or by various vows promised the hearing of Mass and several prayers is not forbidden at the same time to hear Mass and recite prayers.

When Masses are celebrated at the same time on several altars, provided the consecrations take place at distinct moments, those assisting, if they have wished, truly hear several Masses. Yet not rarely an imposed obligation of hearing several Masses must reasonably be understood of Masses to be heard at distinct times, as if a confessor should order someone to be present twice or three times at the sacred rite. For it is one thing to be present twice at the sacred rite, another thing to be present once at several sacred rites.

— By one act diverse precepts can be fulfilled at the same time, unless something else is gathered from the mind of the one commanding. Thus use itself demonstrates that a beneficed priest, by one recitation of the breviary, satisfies the twofold title by which he must recite the canonical hours; and that the faithful are held to hear only one sacred rite when a feast day falls on Sunday.

Nevertheless, according to the mind of the one vowing and of the confessor, things which are promised by vow and imposed as penance generally cannot be fulfilled by an act already owed on another ground.

Yet it sometimes happens that confessors impose a work already commanded. And if the vow is concerning a thing to be furnished daily or on a certain recurring day (for instance, a fast on each Friday or Saturday), its reasonable interpretation has this, that when an obligation of the same thing but of another title concurs, the work is not to be repeated. Thus one who is bound by vow to a daily rosary, on a day on which he has to recite the rosary on account of an imposed sacramental satisfaction, will not have to recite two rosaries; nor (what is more manifest) is he held to a second fast if on some Friday a commanded fast occurs. And nothing prevents you from satisfying a private vow or sacramental penance by the same work and gaining an indulgence.

— In what order satisfaction is made for several obligations of the same kind. You ask in what order you satisfy the various titles by which you must repeat the same work in species: for instance, celebrate several Masses.

You satisfy: 1. In the order which you have expressly established.

2. If you have wished to satisfy all the obligations at the same time, and the work or its application can be divided, you satisfy each for its proportionate part. Thus several intentions of Mass can be joined, so that one who must celebrate individual Masses for three deceased persons can either assign individual Masses to each, or offer Mass three times for the three collectively. Yet this must be noted, that the indulgence of a privileged altar can be applied to only one deceased person from the several for whom you offer Mass.

But what if you have wished to satisfy all the obligations at the same time and the matter cannot be divided? Titius must approach confession once from vow, once from sacramental penance. By one act he wished to satisfy each obligation; which he could not do. Which obligation did he satisfy, or perhaps neither, so that he is held by the twofold obligation as before? Ballerini-Palmieri answer that satisfaction was made by Titius for the more urgent obligation or the graver one (if they urge equally) ¹, "from the common principle of law, that a work which is not valid as it is done, is valid at least in that better mode in which it can be valid." But Sanchez (2) thinks that the law of the Church is to be placed before a vow, and a vow before penance.

3. If you have established no order, you will be judged to have fulfilled the more urgent obligation. Ballerini-Palmieri (l. c.) also transfer this to the case in which you have not thought about the obligation. But that rule must be used prudently. It is always supposed that the whole has been done which had to be done. He who merely must celebrate Mass, by every celebration of Mass, even unconscious of the obligation, will fulfill the debt also; but if, besides celebration, application also is required to a definite intention, the Mass will not thus be applied unless either in the celebration itself or beforehand he has formally willed the application.

¹ T. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 381. - (2) In Decal. l. 1, c. 14, n. 8.

— Concerning the due time. An obligation must be fulfilled in its own time. Therefore:

1. If no day has been fixed, it will have to be fulfilled within the time through which opportunity is given, unless by accident the matter is urgent, or the matter is diminished by delay: as if you delay too much entrance into religion.

2. It is not to be fulfilled before the time, even if you foresee an impediment during the time of the obligation. Thus one who on the next day will be impeded ought not to anticipate Matins on the day before. Indeed this could not always be done usefully. Thus by hearing Mass on the day before, the precept of sanctifying Sunday has not been satisfied. Yet where there has been an obligation of justice, of itself he who foresees that afterwards he will be unable to pay will have to pay before the day: because he must positively prevent that damage to the creditor. Cf. d'Annibale, I, 167.

3. While useful time is running, it must be fulfilled. If through a part of that time you foresee a future impediment, you will have to forestall that impediment by satisfying the law. Wherefore on Palm Sunday he will have to approach the holy table for whom afterwards, during the paschal time for communion, opportunity seems about to be lacking.

4. When the prefixed time has elapsed, the obligation ceases, if the day has been appended for ending the obligation. On the contrary, it urges if it was prescribed for pressing the obligation. To discern this, the words, the end, and the circumstances of the law will have to be observed; and often the usual interpretation will give more certain knowledge. Thus, when the day has elapsed, the ecclesiastical obligation of hearing the sacred rite, of reciting the breviary, of fasting, ceases; but the obligation of annual confession and communion does not cease.

5. What is commanded to be done at once, at least in canonical law, is understood moderately, that it must be done within three days. What is ordered to be done as soon as possible can of itself be deferred more. How long: this is less clear. It is in the estimation of a good man (d'Annibale, I, 167).

— What if you cannot do the whole? Of itself the whole which is commanded must be furnished. One who cannot do the whole is held to the part, if the matter is divisible, and the part for which opportunity is had is of sufficient moment and utility. Often it is difficult to define which obligations are to be considered divisible and which not. Cf. d'Annibale, I, 168 (42). Here also the usual interpretation will often have to be consulted, for example concerning the obligation of him who can recite only part of the breviary, or hear only part of Mass.

— Laws impose the substance of the act, not the mode, unless it is of the nature of the act, or the mode is expressly commanded. Wherefore observance does not require the state of grace, nor is it impeded by a sinful act; it does not require the intention of the end of the law, but it does require an intention sufficient for a human act and for the substance of the act, unless it is a prohibiting law, which is observed by the very omission, or it requires the thing, not a personal action.

It is not repugnant of itself that by diverse acts, which do not mutually impede one another, several precepts be satisfied at the same time, or that by one act diverse precepts be fulfilled. If a work must be repeated under diverse titles, satisfaction is made for the various obligations in the order which has expressly been established, unless you have preferred, when the matter can be divided, to satisfy several at once, according to proportion. If the matter cannot be divided, the debtor has satisfied the more urgent obligation; this must also be said if he expressly established no order, provided, however, that he had a positive intention of satisfying. An obligation can and must be fulfilled during the whole useful time; but not before the time, unless it has been an obligation of justice; nor after the time has elapsed, unless the day has been appended for urging the obligation.

What is to be done at once, at least in canonical law, is understood moderately within the space of three days. What must be done as soon as possible of itself allows a greater option, to be estimated by the judgment of a good man.

The whole which is commanded must be furnished. Let one who cannot furnish the whole furnish the divisible part of sufficient utility.