§ III. On Fulfilling the Obligation of Law

We inquire what things are required in order that the obligation of law be fulfilled, not what things are necessary in order that the act by which the obligation is fulfilled be good and meritorious in every respect.

Furthermore, in order that satisfaction be made to the obligation of law, this one thing is required: that what is commanded by the law be placed, or that what is prohibited by it be omitted. Hence:

I. To fulfill a negative law, even the involuntary omission of the prohibited work suffices. Hence, for example, one who is sleeping fulfills the precept of not stealing. Nevertheless one who abstained from the prohibited work only from inability, fear, or coercion would sin because of a wicked affection.

II. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a real debt, even the involuntary payment of the debt suffices. The reason is that the law commands only the placing of the effect. Hence he is immune from the obligation of restitution who makes restitution while drunk.

III. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a personal act, the voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required and suffices. It is said:

1. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required. That the placing of the work is required is clear; that a voluntary or free placing is required follows from the fact that in the case the legislator intends and imposes an act placed in a human manner, that is, voluntarily or freely. Therefore in this sense the intention or will of doing what the law prescribes is required. Hence one who, being wholly drunk, assists at Mass does not fulfill the precept. Otherwise it must be said about one who, compelled by fear, hears Mass, because fear does not remove liberty (St. Alphonsus, I, 165).

2. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work suffices. The reason is that the legislator commands only these things. Therefore it is not required:

a) That the prescribed act be placed from the motive of charity, in the state of grace, unless these pertain to the substance of the prescribed work, as in a law which commands an act of the virtue of charity or Paschal communion (St. Alphonsus, I, 162). Hence proposition 16 among the Baian propositions was condemned: "There is no true obedience to the law which is done without charity."

b) That the act be placed without concomitant sin. Except if the sin destroys the substance of the prescribed work. Hence he fulfills the precept who, for example, fasts from avarice or assists at Mass from vanity; but not he who confesses or communicates sacrilegiously. Therefore proposition 14 was rightly condemned by Alexander VII: "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

c) That the act be placed with the intention of satisfying the law. For this intention is not commanded. Indeed even the very intention of not satisfying the law does not prevent satisfaction from being made to the law, since the subject cannot bring it about that the obligation of law, that is, an obligation which depends on the will of the legislator alone, persists after satisfaction has been made to the will of the legislator. Otherwise it must be said if there is question of the obligation of a vow or promise; this obligation, just as from the beginning it depends on the will, so also, if the will thus wishes, continues to persist (St. Alphonsus, I, 163, 164; IV, 176).

d) That the end of the law be intended, or that the act be referred to the end of the legislator. This intention or relation is not commanded, according to that saying: the end does not fall under the precept. Hence satisfaction is made to the law of fasting, even if the mortification of the flesh and its subjection to the spirit are not intended. Observe, however: that the end of the law does not fall under the precept does not prevent one who acts against the end of the law from sinning venially, "because to act contrary to the end of the law is a certain disorder, which does not seem to be excused from every fault" (St. Alphonsus, III, 1030, qu. 1); suppose if someone, after breaking the fast, ate two or three times (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Someone can satisfy diverse precepts at the same time, provided the diverse prescribed acts do not impede one another and the intention of the one commanding does not stand in the way. Hence one can at the same time satisfy the precepts of hearing Mass and reciting the Breviary, or of fulfilling sacramental satisfaction. But a penitent to whom the confessor imposed two Masses to be heard would not satisfy by assisting at two Masses at the same time. For the intention of the confessor would stand in the way (St. Alphonsus, III, 309; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 30, and tr. 16, n. 57).

Corollary II. Someone can fulfill several precepts by one single act, unless the one commanding, or those commanding, intended distinct acts. Hence, by one single act of restoring, he satisfies who is held to restitution both from justice and from a vow. He does not satisfy by hearing one Mass who is held to assist at Mass both from the precept of the Church and from the precept of the confessor, unless the latter signifies that he does not intend a distinct Mass. Nevertheless, a penitent to whom the confessor imposed hearing Mass on each day through the week is not held to assist at Mass twice on Sunday; for the confessor is not presumed to intend that (St. Alphonsus, I, 166; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 31 sq.).

IV. As regards the time of fulfilling an obligation, take these points: If the legislator has determined the time, this must be observed. If the time was not determined, the obligation must be fulfilled as soon as can morally be done. In the case, delay is grave: first, if there accedes a grave danger of not fulfilling a grave law; second, if the matter from the delay becomes notably worse, as if someone vowed religion and, without just cause, long delayed entrance; these things, however, must be explained and completed more in their own place. Besides, observe:

1. In the private celebration of Mass, in the private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving Holy Communion, and in observing the law of fasting or abstinence, although there may be another usual reckoning of the place, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, either true or mean, or legal, whether regional or some other extraordinary time (can. 33, § 1). Therefore, in observing the stated laws, it is licit to follow: first, usual time;¹ second, local time,² both true and mean; third, legal time,³ both regional and some other extraordinary time.

2. No one is held to anticipate, that is, to fulfill a law before the useful time of the obligation has begun, even if he foresees that afterward he will be impeded from fulfilling the law; indeed, by anticipating he does not even fulfill the law. But one who, once the useful time of the obligation has begun, foresees that afterward he will not be able to satisfy the law, is held to fulfill it in due time (St. Alphonsus, I, 157; IV, 155; VI, 294, 297, 298).

3. One who did not satisfy the obligation at the time determined by law is not held afterward to supply, if the time was assigned for ending the obligation. Otherwise it must be said if it was assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation. Furthermore, the time is considered assigned for ending the obligation if the obligation is affixed to a certain day, as obtains in the laws of fasting, abstinence, hearing Mass, and reciting the Breviary. It is considered assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation if something is imposed to be performed within three days, within a year (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). If the time has been determined in some other way, it should be gathered from the nature and end of the law, or from custom, whether the time has been determined for ending or for urging the obligation.⁴

¹ That is, the time which the public and customary clocks of the place in which one is staying are accustomed to use. Commonly, but not always, it coincides with legal time.

² Local time is the time which is measured by the putative daily motion of the sun around the point of earth in which one is staying. It is distinguished into true and mean. True local time is the time which indicates the aforesaid motion of the sun exactly; it is indicated by a sundial. Mean local time is that which indicates the stated motion of the sun according to the mean duration of the day computed through the year.

³ Legal or public time is the time which has been prescribed by law or adopted by common civil usage. Generally the mean local time of some principal city is established as legal time for the whole kingdom. Legal time is called regional when it has been stably established for a whole region; it is called extraordinary when, for a passing cause, it is established in an extraordinary way, as summer time.

⁴ As regards annual communion, the law itself adds the clause: the precept of Paschal communion still urges if someone, for any cause, has not fulfilled it at the prescribed time (can. 859, § 4).