Section — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
On Observance of Law
To n. 213. ON OBSERVANCE OF LAW As to substance and as to mode
- Since among precepts of law some are affirmative, which command what is honorable, and others are negative, which prohibit evil, the question concerning observance of law, as to substance and as to the mode of virtue, indeed has place in affirmative precepts; but in negative ones it scarcely has place.
For positive precepts must be fulfilled by a positive act. But negative precepts, without any act, can of themselves be fulfilled, as far as is from the form of the precept, because through the mere negation of the prohibited act a man is conformed to the law. Yet they can further be positively fulfilled through the will of not doing what is prohibited. But in omission as such, the mode of virtue is not found, although it can be in the positive will of abstaining from a depraved act. But of itself this positive will is not necessary for fulfilling a negative precept, or for not sinning against it. Decline from evil.
- Therefore it is one thing to observe the law, another thing not to transgress the law. For he who does not transgress the law does not always observe the law, as is clear also in him who acts against an affirmative law from invincible ignorance, or from impeded use of reason.
Now the observance of law is distinguished in two ways, as to substance and as to mode. This mode generally is nothing other than the mode of virtue.
Any law, whether human or natural, is to be observed as to substance. For any law commanding an act obliges to the substance of the act. Yet law does not always oblige also to the mode of the act. For human laws regularly command only the substance of the act, not also the mode, unless the mode is intrinsic to the act commanded. And thus he who, on a day of fast and abstinence, fasts and observes abstinence not for mortification and penance, or for temperance and restraint of gluttony, but on the contrary from gluttony, so that on the following day he can eat more, and because fish please him more than flesh, observes the law, and certainly does not violate it. "It must be said," says Suarez de Leg. l. 3, C. 29, n. 6, "that human law is sufficiently fulfilled through the act commanded, according to its substance, even if it is not simply morally good, nor done with an honorable intention."
The added limitation is: unless the mode is intrinsic to the act commanded; for evidently, if it is intrinsic to that act, it enters its substance, and consequently the law is to be observed as to substance and mode; as is to be seen in the precept of prayer, in the precepts of annual Confession and Easter Communion. For in the former there enters intention and at least some attention implicit in it; in the latter true interior sorrow for sins is required as regards Confession, and the state of grace and right intention as regards Communion.
The restriction likewise was made as regards human laws. For evidently natural law commands an act simply good, and therefore its observance embraces substance and mode of the act. Wherefore natural law also embraces the mode of virtue to be observed, wherever it broadly extends; for from natural law, good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever. Fittingly Suarez: "Natural right differs from human right; for human right can be observed through an evil act in such a way that it is violated in no part; because that malice which is joined to such an act often is not against any human precept, but against the natural: but truly natural right itself, which commands one to make an honorable act, also commands that it be done studiously, because this very thing is from natural reason... and therefore as often as a natural precept is fulfilled through an evil act, natural right itself is violated." De Leg. l. 2, C. 10, n. 13.
Nor does it avail to object that even human law commands only a good act and an act of virtue. -
For human law indeed commands an act good of itself, or one which of itself can be done well, yet it does not command all the modes necessary that it be done well. Wherefore he who does all that human law commands, and with all the external circumstances which it commands, although he does it with a depraved intention, does not do otherwise than he ought to do by force of that human law, although he does otherwise than another divine law commands, and therefore he sins not against human law, but against divine and natural law. Likewise human law commanding an act determines the act in a certain species of virtues. But this does not import that that species of virtue ought to be intended by the one operating, or that that act be done without any admixture of malice; but it imports only that the law commands an act of some singular virtue, because laws intend to make men honorable in the genus of all virtues. But this motive of the precept of the law is not the precept itself or that which is commanded, and for observing the law it suffices to do what is commanded.
But although natural right commands each, substance and mode, good and well, yet this is not so to be understood that he who does not observe the mode also does not observe the substance of the law. For this is true only when an evil mode corrupts the whole substance of the act. And thus he who gives alms to a poor man impelled by vain glory, or with some interior displeasure, observes the precept of almsgiving as to substance, although he sins as to mode. But he who gives alms to a poor man moved only from the depraved end of attracting him to evil, e.g., to denying the Catholic faith and professing the false faith of Protestants, does not observe the natural precept of charity and almsgiving, neither as to mode nor as to the substance itself; on the contrary he sins gravely by that alms given against charity, by the sin of scandal and cooperation toward grave sin against faith. Although in this case he now does not transgress the precept of almsgiving, nevertheless he does not observe the precept of almsgiving. Cf. Salmant. de Leg. C. 2, n. 148.
From these things which precede it is clear what mode is in the observance of law. It is namely, as was said at the beginning, the mode of virtue. -
Let us now declare this mode of virtue, and see the various modes of virtue in the observance of law; whether at least some one of them is required for the observance of any law, and what sort.
Moreover the modes of virtue of which we speak are either the mode of some special virtue, or the modes of virtue in general. That special virtue here can be no other than either that virtue to which all other virtues are ordered, and which is the end of the whole law, which is charity, or that virtue which enters by its nature the precept of any virtue, and which is obedience.
As regards charity, the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 10, raises the question: "whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of divine law"; and responds: "It must be said... Some have said absolutely that the mode of charity is under precept.... But others have said that the mode of charity altogether does not fall under precept. Each has said what is true in some respect. -
For an act of charity can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it is a certain act per se. And in this way it falls under the precept of the law which is specially given concerning this: You shall love your Lord, and You shall love your neighbor. And as regards this the first have said what is true.... In another way the act of charity can be considered according as it is the mode of the acts of other virtues, that is, according as the acts of other virtues are ordered to charity, which is the end of the precept.... And in this way what the second have said is true, that the mode of charity does not fall under precept: this is said, that in this precept: Honor your father, it is not included that the father be honored from charity, but only that the father be honored. Hence he who honors his father, although he does not have charity, is not made a transgressor of this precept, although he is a transgressor of the precept which concerns the act of charity, on account of which transgression he merits punishment."
But as the mode of charity is not required for the observance of law, so also the mode of obedience is not required, as will soon be explained more by declaring first the general mode of virtue.
And these things concerning the mode of special virtue. Let us now come to the mode of virtue in general. The Angelic Doctor, according to Aristotle, numbers only a threefold mode of virtue, namely 1. that someone operate knowingly; 2. that someone operate willingly or choosing, and choosing on account of this;
- that he have and operate firmly and immovably, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9, namely from a rooted habit. We can immediately omit this last mode of operating from habit. For no law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, commands this mode, and law obliges only to that which it commands. Besides, every law obliges from the beginning, namely before a habit is had. And thus the Angelic Doctor says: "as regards this, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of divine law or of human law; for neither by man nor by God is he punished as a transgressor of the precept who furnishes the honor due to parents, although he does not have the habit of piety."
- Hence it follows that it is not necessary for the observance of law to act delightfully, according as delight follows habit. For delight can regard the very observance of law, insofar as, e.g., notwithstanding the obliging law, someone would wish not to observe the law if he did not fear penalty or another harm; this mode includes intrinsic repugnance with the precept, and therefore is intrinsically evil and against natural law: for it excludes the will of observing the law, and on the contrary includes the will of not observing it. St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9 ad 3.
But the two preceding modes of Aristotle and St. Thomas, for the sake of clarity, we distinguish into various conditions which they contain, required for the honesty of the act. Hence we say that the mode of virtue in the observance of law is only fourfold, namely that the law be observed: 1. from knowledge, will, liberty; 2. from intention of intrinsic honesty; 3. from intention of the end; 4. from all other circumstances. Another possible mode of virtue is not given. For the mode of virtue can be only on the part of the agent and on the part of the act; from these two heads no other assignable modes of virtue exist. The state of grace, which perhaps can be objected, pertains not to the observance of law, of which we are treating, but to merit and to supernatural merit. Likewise faith regards not the observance of law, but the supernaturality of the act.
Now as regards the first mode: to act from knowledge, will, liberty, that is, knowingly, willingly, freely to act, this pertains to the observance of both human and divine law. For this mode, that is, to act with knowledge of the work voluntarily and freely, pertains to the very essence and substance of a human act; and therefore that mode regards the very substance of the precept of law to be fulfilled. "The reason is," says Busembaum and after him St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 165, "because since law is given to men, not to beasts, and therefore is to be fulfilled in a human mode, hence the fulfillment of every precept, whether human or divine, ought to be a human act joined with liberty and will of the one operating, that is, that he will or intend to do this which is commanded, e.g., to hear Mass, to fast, etc.... Hence he who heard Mass, fasted, etc., compelled altogether violently, did not satisfy; for it was not a human act by defect of the voluntary.... Nor does he satisfy who goes to Mass only to feed his eyes, to speak with another, or to wait for a friend." The opinion of the Angelic Doctor is the same; he says, 1. 2, q. 100, a. 9, that the first mode of virtue, namely that someone operate knowingly, according to the Philosopher, "is judged both by divine law and by human law." Hence the same Angelic Doctor concludes, "according to ignorance some things are judged toward punishment or toward pardon both according to human law and according to divine law." For ignorance removes the voluntary and sin.
That knowingly evidently also includes willingly, namely knowing and willing that which someone operates. Knowing and willing that, not only according to itself, but knowing and willing it as commanded. Otherwise there is not truly observance of law, which ought to be moral and an effect of law, but only material and per accidens conformity of the act with the law, as if someone knowingly and willingly gives alms, ignorant of the precept concerning it. This ignorance of the precept indeed suffices for not sinning directly against the precept, if it is invincible. Yet with it existing, there is not had moral and formal observance of the law. From the precept there arises an obligation of knowing it, because otherwise it cannot be morally observed. Hence the Angelic Doctor says that he who, ignorant, does an act which is ordered by law, does the commanded work by chance and per accidens. But the precept obliges that it be done per se and from intention, and therefore obliges one to have knowledge of it and to will its observance.
But there is need to will to do what is commanded; but not because it is commanded, namely from the motive of obedience. For this is not necessary for fulfilling the precept, because neither is this commanded in the law itself, nor is there any reason which obliges to this. - But it is objected that he who unwillingly does the commanded act is not held to do it again. And thus, after restitution has been made by a debtor altogether unwilling, the debtor is not held to restore again, which is a sign that he fulfilled the law. But in this example and in similar others, that natural precept of restitution is not observed; rather, he sins gravely against it; and the precept no longer obliges, not because it was observed, but because the matter was removed by the thing itself, with the debt extinguished.
A graver difficulty is in him who knowingly and willingly hears Mass and hears it attentively and devoutly, yet is ignorant of its precept. He indeed truly hears Mass, and thus sufficiently observes the precept, and is excused from hearing another Mass. It can indeed be said, and in fact is said by Suarez, that that pious will "virtually is the will of fulfilling the precept, which concerns the act itself commanded, and is judged to arise from the general will which each one has of satisfying his obligations: for morally any prudent man is judged to will this first in his honorable and religious actions. For this reason, one ignorant or not adverting that it is a feast day, voluntarily hearing Mass as he is accustomed, fulfills the precept, so that he is not held to hear Mass again when he understands or remembers that it is a feast day." de Relig. t. 2, l. 4, C. 26, n. 6.
But another difficulty is far graver in him who on a feast day knowingly and willingly hears Mass devoutly, with the purpose of hearing it from devotion and not from precept. - There are several who hold that this one does not satisfy the precept, and ought to hear another Mass. For that will is not the will of fulfilling the precept, and therefore through that action the precept is not fulfilled. For fulfillment of the precept ought to be voluntary. Yet the common opinion holds altogether the contrary. The reason is that in reality he voluntarily did all that which was commanded in a human mode. And although the fulfillment itself of the precept, as it is a certain quasi-relation or adequation between the action and the precept, is not willed, but follows materially, nevertheless it cannot be impeded by the will of the one operating, even if he does not wish by that action to fulfill the precept.
But if in reality he does not hear another Mass, he is held to conform his will explicitly or implicitly with the precept, namely by willing to satisfy it by the prior hearing. For he is held not to resist the precept. Hence when afterward he wills not to hear another Mass, in order not to incur fault, it is necessary that he at least understand that he has satisfied the precept, so that he wills to be content with that satisfaction; because the natural law itself obliges one not to have affection contrary to the precept of a superior.
- Wherefore it is necessary to distinguish the observance of a precept as to the substance of the exterior human act and as to the mode of interior affection, due by the nature of the thing to such action, with the precept supposed. As to the substance of the exterior act of the precept, it is true that someone fulfills a human precept by the very fact that, e.g., in a human mode and attentively he hears Mass, however much he then may not wish to fulfill the precept. But with that resistance of the will standing concerning the fulfillment of the precept, the precept is not completely fulfilled as regards the affection due by natural right to the precept, which at least requires that the subject not have affection contrary to the obligation of the precept. This mode indeed does not fall directly under the human precept, nor is it its matter, but follows from natural law and the general obligation of obedience. Hence, if afterward someone did not wish to hear Mass again, and at the same time persevered in the will of not fulfilling the precept through the prior hearing of Mass, he would sin by internal affection against that precept, but not by an exterior transgression of it. Hence he would not be held to hear another Mass, but only the obligation would be present that that prior hearing, as fulfilling the precept, not remain involuntary, but become voluntary, at least by judging now that he has satisfied the precept. And thus Busembaum and St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 164, say: "One hearing the sacred liturgy on a feast day which he knows to be the last, or, if it is not the last, intending to hear no other, although he intended not to satisfy, nevertheless truly satisfies the precept concerning hearing Mass; although he sinned against another precept, by which one is held to be subject to the legislator." - And in this sense observance of law, not only natural but also human, in order that it be complete, needs someone knowingly and willingly to operate that which is commanded.
- As regards the second mode of observance of law, from intention of intrinsic honesty, St. Thomas, l. c., openly excludes this from observance of human law and says that it pertains only to divine law. Hence from the Angelic Doctor, only to divine law does it pertain to will to do evil and not do it, to do good but not on account of good. Behold the reason from which the Angelic Doctor proceeds to the said conclusion: "It must be said that a precept of law has coercive force. Therefore that falls directly under the precept of law to which the law coerces. But the coercion of law is through fear of penalty.... For that properly falls under the precept of law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But divine law and human law stand differently for establishing penalty. For the penalty of law is inflicted only for those things concerning which the legislator has to judge; because law punishes from judgment. But man, who is the legislator of human law, has to judge only concerning exterior acts, because men see those things which appear...; but it belongs to God alone, who is the bearer of divine law, to judge concerning the interior movements of wills, according to that saying: God searching hearts and reins." With this fundamental doctrine established, the holy Doctor, then speaking concerning the second mode of virtue in the observance of law, namely that, according to the Philosopher, someone operate willingly or choosing and choosing on account of this, that is, that someone will and choose good, and operate it on account of good, says that in this "a double interior movement is imported, namely of will and of intention," of will, WILLINGLY, of intention, CHOOSING. "And human law does not judge these two, but only divine law; for human law does not punish him who wills to kill and does not kill; but divine law punishes, according to that saying: He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment." And consequently the same is true of the will which wills good and operates, but not on account of good, on account of its honesty. And thus a soldier who fights bravely in war, and kills the enemy only from hatred, indeed observes human law as to substance, but does not observe natural and divine law as to mode. Hence while he receives reward from the Prince, he is condemned by God to eternal fire.
Wherefore in this mode the precept is not truly fulfilled in the internal forum before God; but before men, and in the external forum, it is fulfilled for escaping penalty, provided the act commanded is done as to substance. If excommunication were present against one not fasting, he who fasts by force and compulsion alone, who is violently deprived of food, since he does not abstain from food voluntarily, does not fulfill the law; yet he would not incur excommunication, because this would not be incurred, in the case, unless the effect followed. But the law in the case as regards the external effect or substance is fulfilled, or at least is not violated. But it would be otherwise if the excommunication were against one not praying and not reciting the canonical hours, if someone read them only for learning the Latin language; for then he would not pray, and the precept concerns praying, and therefore in that case he would not fulfill the precept and would incur excommunication.
As regards the third mode: acting from intention of the end of the law, this mode likewise is not necessary as regards observance of human law. "Law," says Suarez de Leg. l. 3, C. 29, n. 7, "obliges only to that which it commands; but it commands only the matter into which it falls and not the end; therefore it obliges to the matter and not to the end. Therefore, if the matter is given to execution, the law is observed, whatever may be sinned from another source. The last antecedent is proved, because only that is commanded which in the law is expressed in the mode of command; but human law does not command that this be done for that, but that this be done. But if sometimes the end of the law is expressed in the law, it is not in the mode of the object of the law, but only in the mode of reason or motive on account of which the mode is commanded, etc." Hence the saying: the end of the law does not fall under the law, the reason of the law is not law. And the law will still have to be observed, although that end in the particular case is not obtained, or its reason does not exist.
- But as regards natural law, this obliges altogether to the end, to the ultimate end, since its foundation and reason is the end itself to which all human actions are to be directed, namely God. To the point, the Angelic Doctor: "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." 1. 2, q. 19, a. 9.
"The whole that man is, and that he can and has, is to be ordered to God." 1. 2, q. 22, a. 4 ad 3. But it is enough to direct those human actions to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting on account of the end of some virtue, or what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act from its intrinsic nature tends to the glory of God. Fittingly again St. Thomas: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; yet not conversely." 1. 2, q. 8, a. 3 ad 2. "He who, on the contrary, does an evil act not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God which is owed to the ultimate end." 1. 2, q. 21, a. 4.
- As regards the fourth mode of virtue, from all other circumstances of the act, the same must be said as concerning the end of the law: human law and generally positive law does not oblige to this mode of virtue, but natural law does oblige. And thus he satisfies the law who, while he hears Mass, consents to a thought of vain complacency, and he who, while confessing his sins, lies about something altogether impertinent to Confession. But natural law altogether obliges also to this mode of virtue. For natural law obliges to an act simply good, namely that it be good from its whole formal object, on account of an honorable motive. Moreover under the material object all circumstances of the object and act and also of the agent are comprehended. But no one operates intending toward honesty unless he operates with due circumstances. Wherefore the mode of virtue comprehends also all due circumstances. Therefore natural law not only obliges that someone simply, i.e., as regards all things, knowingly and willingly operate good, but also that he operate that good on account of honesty; in which mode of operating the mode of virtue is simply contained. And although even a natural precept can be observed through an act good from its genus and evil from some circumstance, nevertheless the whole natural right is not then observed; for this also prohibits that evil, whether it prohibits that evil circumstance by the same precept, as if someone prays attentively and devoutly but not with due exterior reverence; or whether it prohibits the aforesaid evil circumstance by another precept, as if someone fulfills the precept of almsgiving not without vain glory, which is not against charity and mercy, but against humility. Cf. Suarez de Legibus l. 2, C. 10.; l. 3, C. 29.
Therefore the general natural law, or as regards the whole natural right, is to be observed both as to substance and as to mode, because from natural law good is to be done and evil avoided. But the former is from an integral cause, the latter from any defect whatever, and therefore also from evil in any mode whatever. Human law, on the contrary, is regularly to be observed only as to the substance of the act commanded, not also as to mode, since it is not commanded; unless the mode is intrinsic to the act itself commanded. Moreover to observe the law as to substance is to fulfill by a human act the very thing commanded by the law, although without attending to any intrinsic honesty of the act, nor consequently by willing or intending it; but to observe the law as to mode is to do the good commanded by the law and to do this good well simply.
The common doctrine concerning the observance of law has been set forth, with the Angelic and Eximious doctors and also St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori going before. But, as is not rare, in a moral matter contradictors are not lacking. Among others La-Croix openly denies, l. 1, n. 695, that it is universally true that the observance of law ought to proceed from knowledge, will, liberty. To prove his opinion he brings forward the example of a drunk man. "A drunk man," he says, "is held by the precept of fast.... Therefore by not eating in reality he fulfills it, since in reality he fasts." - The drunk man, although destitute of the use of reason and liberty, is indeed held by the precept of fast; because that law subjects to itself all habitually possessed of reason. Therefore by not eating in reality he fulfills it, since in reality he fasts; indeed he fulfills. But what does he fulfill? He indeed fulfills fast. But certainly he does not fulfill the law of fast, from which he is also excused through that state of perfect drunkenness, so that even by eating he does not sin. Wherefore just as by eating he does not properly and formally transgress the law, so also by not eating he does not properly and formally observe the law.
La-Croix adds another example of a thief, who even in drunkenness is held to restore. Therefore if he restores in drunkenness, he observes the law of justice. For justice commanded this. It is indeed most true that a thief even drunk is obliged to restitution. Yet one restoring in the state of perfect drunkenness indeed gives to another what he owes to him and what justice commanded, but he does not properly and formally fulfill the precept of the virtue of justice, just as he would not properly and formally transgress if, instead of giving what he owes, he himself took another's thing.
Then passing to reasons, La-Croix insists, saying: The virtue from whose motive the precept is placed does not oblige to an act proceeding from the motive of its own honesty. -
It is indeed so; it does not oblige to an act proceeding from the motive of its own honesty, but it does oblige to a human act. This is the object of virtue and of precept; without a human act, and consequently without knowledge, will, and liberty, neither can virtue be exercised, nor can the precept of virtue be observed.
- Aptly Aristotle, Magna Moralia, l. 1, c. 34, § 23: "When, therefore, is a thing just, and when not? Namely, to put it briefly, when someone has performed it purposely and spontaneously, and when he has known both against whom, and to whom, and for what cause, then he does just things.
Likewise and similarly he also will be unjust, who has known both against whom, and to whom, and for what cause he has offended. But when, knowing none of these things, he nevertheless has committed something unjust, then he is not unjust, but unfortunate. For if he has killed his father, thinking himself to kill an enemy, he indeed committed something unjust, and although he has inflicted injury on no one, nevertheless he acted unhappily."
La-Croix still presses, saying: it is not necessary that the observance of law be a good act; therefore neither is it necessary, speaking per se, that it be a voluntary and free act. We concede that it is not necessary that the observance of law be a good act, i.e., simply good; but it is altogether necessary per se that the observance of law be a human act, and therefore from knowledge, from will, from liberty. Otherwise neither observance of law, nor the law itself, could exist; unless we wish to say not only that a drunken man, by not eating, observes the law of fasting, but also that a little ass, from which food is withdrawn, observes the law of fasting.
La-Croix evades this response, explicitly affirming that for the observance of law a human act is not indeed required, but that an act of a man, who is bound by such a law, is sufficient. But the contrary is true; for then it would certainly follow that a sick man observes the law of fasting, who, so long as compelled by sickness he does not eat, nevertheless with his whole will resists that law of fasting. But this, a little before, is affirmed by La-Croix himself altogether to remove observance of law from the middle. These are his words: "That a precept may be fulfilled, there ought not to be present a will positively contrary to the precept and coerced." Therefore it is not true to say: for observing a law "an act of a man, who is bound by such a law, is sufficient."
And La-Croix affirms this again and again, putting an end to the question by the repeated assertion: For the observance of law a free act is not required. Once that which is commanded has been posited, the observance of the precept is had. And he adds the reason: since a will of fulfilling or satisfying is not required; and he refers himself to the preceding number, saying: as was said in n. 692. But one thing is that a will of satisfying the law is not required; another thing is that a will of doing what the law commands is not required. And this is expressly affirmed in that same cited number 692, in which there is nothing except the doctrine of Busembaum, who says that law commands the free execution of the work. Free: therefore from knowledge, from will, from liberty.
With these points premised, it is easy to resolve the following case. Sabbas, Abbot of the monastery, on a certain day commands, in virtue of holy obedience, that from the ninth hour until midday rigorous silence be observed by all the monks, and that all remain in their own cell during that time, with permission afterward granted to go out freely from the cell, without any other leave, and to converse among themselves until night. Anastasius the monk was not present at the Abbot's precept, but out of laziness was sleeping, and he slept until midday. Anastasius did not transgress the Abbot's precept. But he did not observe the precept, because on account of ignorance of the precept he could not conform himself to it in a human mode, i.e., by a voluntary act. Nothing ought to be more voluntary than the observance of law, which is imposed on a free will. When the time of the precept of silence had passed, he could freely go out from the cell and converse with others. For the Abbot's precept concerned only the silence to be kept; once this had been kept, the aforesaid permission was given to all to go out from the cell and converse. But Anastasius, while sleeping, did not speak, and certainly did not disturb the monastery in those three hours by his shouts and conversations. And this indeed was altogether sufficient in the case, not for escaping a penalty, which was not in question, but for enjoying the permission made by the Abbot to the monks.