Gratitude

The potential parts of justice are several. For justice is a virtue toward another, rendering to him what is owed according to equality. Therefore every virtue which by its nature is toward another, but falls short of justice by reason either of debt or of equality, must be joined to justice as a potential part. Now the virtues which fall short by reason of debt, or in other words which regard not a juridical debt but only a moral debt, that is, one to be rendered from the moral goodness of virtue alone, are of two species. For some regard a debt "so necessary that without it moral goodness of conduct cannot be preserved" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article); and these are truth, gratitude, and vindication. Others regard a debt which "is necessary as contributing to greater moral goodness, without which nevertheless moral goodness can be preserved" (St. Thomas, cited place); and these are liberality and affability. By reason of equality those virtues fall short, or in other words regard a debt which can in no way be rendered according to equality: religion, penance, piety, and observance.

Therefore there are nine virtues which are referred to justice as potential parts; two of them regard a debt toward God, namely religion and penance; the remaining seven have as their object a debt toward the neighbor.

I. Notion of Gratitude. Gratitude or thanks can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to acts by which thanks are shown to one's benefactor as such. It is said:

1. To acts by which thanks are shown. By these words is indicated the material object of gratitude.

2. To one's benefactor as such. By this the formal object is assigned; for by this reason gratitude is distinguished both from piety, by which we honor parents, and from observance, by which we honor persons excelling in dignity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2).

II. Object of Gratitude. 1. The material object is all actions by which this debt is rendered, and these can be reduced to three: 1. to acknowledge the received benefit; 2. to praise the benefactor and give him thanks; 3. to repay according to place and time, according to one's ability (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 107, a. 2, and q. 106, aa. 4-6 inclusive).¹

2. The remote formal object is the special reason of debt, not indeed strict, but honorable, toward the benefactor as such, arising from the benefit received (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2). For by this reason gratitude is distinguished both from piety, by which we honor parents, and from observance, by which we honor persons excelling in dignity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1), and it is clear that it is a virtue specifically distinct from them. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 81; Pesch, nn. 282-284 inclusive.

III. Opposed Vices. To gratitude is opposed ingratitude; but this is had only when the placed act, or the omission of some act, is prohibited by the motive of gratitude.

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

The Virtue of Gratitude.—Religion, piety, reverence and obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to repay with gladness the favors one has received.”

(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus, gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony) or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed), though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives, even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

Two Kinds of Gratitude.—(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense, gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and follows in order after reverence.

Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, per se and other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

Circumstances of Gratitude.—(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.—Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible (e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.—Every person who is favored should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his benefactors.

(c) The Time for Gratitude.—Internal gratitude should be immediate, and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received; but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.—If the favor was bestowed by reason of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.—It is suitable that one repay benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.

The Sins against Gratitude.—(a) Since gratitude is a moral virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal. Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor without contempt for him or his favor.

(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem., xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

The Moral Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Material ingratitude is not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

The Theological Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Formal ingratitude from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity, which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter. Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?—(a) If the favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.

How does the obligation of an accepted promise cease? - It ceases on account of the following causes: 1. On account of condonation by the promisee; for anyone can renounce his own right. - 2. On account of change of the object, namely if the thing promised meanwhile became impossible, illicit by laws, or harmful or useless to the promisee, for whose utility and advantage it was made. C. A. 936. - 3. On account of a supervening change of state of the promisor or of the promisee, so that the promisor would not have promised if he had foreseen this change; as, for example, if someone promised one hundred florins to a poor person, and meanwhile he himself falls into poverty, and needs them for sustaining himself or his family honorably; or, if someone promised marriage to a girl who afterward becomes poor, very deformed, or is corrupted by another. - 4.

On account of ingratitude of the promisee; for this not only takes away the obligation of the promise, but also, if it is grave, makes a donation revocable, as is had in C. ult. de Donat. 5. Through compensation, namely when two persons promised something to each other, and one does not wish to stand by the promises; for, as is said in R. 75 of Law in the Sixth, In vain does someone ask faith to be kept to himself by him to whom he refuses to keep the faith furnished by himself. 6. On account of defect of the condition, or of the principal cause of the promise itself; as if someone promised something to another on account of poverty, whom afterward he finds not to be poor. For a promise is always considered made under such tacit conditions. Struggl 23; L. 720; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 110. a. 3 ad 5; Gousset 784.

What are the exceptions to the irrevocability of donation inter vivos? - A donation 1. is resolved, but not by full right, if the attached conditions are not fulfilled. Cf. C. I. 1078, 1079, 1080; C. G. 953, 954, 956; C. H. 647, 651, 1333; C. B. 525 ff. 2. It can be revoked if the donee shows himself ungrateful toward the donor in the cases and time determined by law. Inst. 1. 2. t. 7. § 2; C. B. 530; C. I. 1081, 1082; C. G. 955, 956, 957; C. H. 648-650, 653; C. L. 1482, 1488 ff.; C. A. 948, 949; unless, however, they are donations on account of marriage, and also according to C. I. unless they are purely remunerative donations. C. I. 1087; C. G. 959. 3. But it is revoked by full right according to C. G. and C. H., but not by the law itself according to C. I., because of offspring supervening, even if that offspring had already been conceived at the time of the donation, even also if it was born posthumously, or if the donor has legitimated a natural son born after the donation; excepting according to C. G. mutual donations of spouses, or of ascendants in favor of spouses, made on account of marriage; excepting according to C. I. remunerative donations and those made on account of marriage. According to C. H. 1333, donations on account of marriage are not revoked unless the marriage does not follow. According to C. L. 1482, 1483, 1486, the donor can revoke the donation because of the supervening of children, unless at the time of the donation the donor already had a legitimate descendant, or unless it was made on account of marriage. Nor can he renounce this right. Certainly just and pious is the presumption of law, that a donor lacking offspring made the donation with this virtual or tacit condition: Unless I acquire children; for everyone is judged tacitly to wish to prefer his own to outsiders. Hence every contrary agreement is also regarded as null. But since in this case the donation is revoked by the law itself, it does not revive through the death of the offspring. C. I. 1083-1087, 1090; C. G. 960, 961-966; C. H. 644-646. - According to C. A. 954, by the reception of children, donations do not vanish. 4. All donations inter vivos made by either spouse to the other can always be revoked. Nor indeed does the wife need the consent of the husband or the authority of the judge. C. G. 1096. According to C. B. 519, 528, the donor can fail to execute a donation if he is in need, or if he cannot fulfill the obligation of supporting others, and he can revoke a completed donation. According to C. A. 947, 954, if the donor suffers need, he can demand the fruits of the donated thing. The same right belongs to the donor's children born after the donation in a case of need. - According to C. B. 534, a donation which has as its cause a moral duty or a motive of propriety is not subject to restitution or revocation.

L. 738, 739.

605. Notion. Gratitude is a virtue which inclines a man to acknowledge benefits received, in mind and in speech, and at least in some measure to repay them; or, as St. Augustine says:¹⁰⁵⁶ "Gratitude is the virtue in which are contained the remembrance of the friendship and benefits of another, and the will to recompense the other."

Explanation. Gratitude arises only from a benefit received. A benefit is an undebted and useful service, gratuitously done for someone from an affection of benevolence. It is said: a benefit is an undebted and useful service, for those things which are owed or which are useless cannot be called a benefit. Therefore "he who assists someone in sinning does not confer a benefit but rather an injury, and consequently thanksgiving is not owed to him."¹⁰⁵⁷ Next, for a benefit properly so called it is required that it be done gratuitously and from benevolence, for "a favor is that which is given gratuitously";¹⁰⁵⁸ and what is furnished not from benevolence but from some other good or bad motive cannot claim for itself the name of a benefit properly so called. Especially, that which is done from pure egoism is not a benefit. Sometimes, however, benefit is taken in a broader sense for every good work furnished, even though it is owed from commutative justice. Hence, for example, a master gives thanks to workers for good services furnished, although the workers were obliged to those services by the contract entered into.

It must be noted with the Angelic Doctor¹⁰⁵⁹ that gratitude is a special virtue only when it arises from benefits conferred by another man who is not a superior. For gratitude owed to God for the innumerable benefits conferred is reduced to the virtue of religion; gratitude owed to parents, who are the principle of our generation and discipline, pertains to piety; but gratitude owed to superiors, who are the principles of governance and common goods, is reduced to the virtue of observance.

Gratitude consists more in affection, namely, in a grateful mind, than in effect, that is, in the real recompense of the benefit received. From this it is evident that the virtue of gratitude is possible for all, even for the poor, because all can cultivate an affection of gratitude for benefits received, although not all are able to repay the benefits received.

¹⁰⁵⁶ De diversis quaest. 83, q. 31 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 21).

¹⁰⁵⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 107, a. 1 ad 1.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ib., q. 106, a. 2 (Leonine ed.).

¹⁰⁵⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 106, a. 1.

606. Duties of gratitude. Of gratitude properly so called, which regards benefits conferred by another private person, there are chiefly three duties or three grades: 1. to remember and acknowledge benefits received; 2. to express in words the benefit received, for example, by praising the benefactor, expressing thanks to him, etc.; 3. to repay by deeds the benefit received, insofar as one's means permit.¹⁰⁶⁰

¹⁰⁶⁰ Ib., q. 107, a. 2.

607. Necessity and beauty of gratitude. Gratitude is as necessary as it is a most beautiful virtue. For it fosters charity insofar as it unites the hearts of men; it nourishes social life insofar as one lightens the burdens of another and men assist one another; it nourishes humility insofar as he who shows gratitude shows himself subject to the benefactor. For these reasons, in the education of children it must be strongly insisted that they always acknowledge benefits received and not omit to render the thanks owed. It is also very expedient that every man frequently and fervently give thanks to God for the benefits conferred. Hence it is said most truly in the Preface: "It is truly meet and just, right and salutary, that we should always and everywhere give thanks to thee, O holy Lord, Father almighty, eternal God, through Christ our Lord."

The qualities of gratitude are the following:

608. Gratitude must be: 1. prompt, that is, manifested soon after a benefit is received;¹⁰⁶¹

2. internal and not only external, that is, proceeding from a sincere internal affection and not merely expressed in cold words;

3. humble, that is, with a true acknowledgment of the benefit received as something useful to us; for if someone esteems the benefit received as of little account, he cannot be imbued with true gratitude;

4. free from cupidity, that is, gratitude must not be expressed chiefly for the end that someone may receive greater benefits from the benefactor, as happens among arrogant beggars.

¹⁰⁶¹ The Angelic Doctor aptly observes (l.c., q. 106, a. 4) that recompense for a benefit must be made immediately as regards affection, insofar as a man immediately acknowledges the benefit received and is prepared according to his ability to repay the benefit; but this recompense must not immediately be given in fact, because he who wishes to pay too quickly thereby shows that he wishes to cancel gift with gift and that he does not wish to be bound to the other.

609. Opposed vice. To gratitude is opposed ingratitude, which is accustomed to produce many evils in moral and social life. For by ingratitude charity toward God and men grows cold, social life is weakened, egoism is fostered, etc. Ingratitude is either material or formal.

Formal ingratitude is contempt either of the benefactor or of the benefit; it can be a mortal sin if this contempt gravely offends the benefactor and thus notably injures charity. As grades of this ingratitude are enumerated: a) to return evil for good, concerning which ingratitude Christ complains through the prophet Jeremiah: "Shall evil be rendered for good, because they have dug a pit for my soul?"¹⁰⁶² b) to speak ill of a benefit; in this manner the Israelites were ungrateful when they murmured in the desert concerning their deliverance from Egypt; c) to account a benefit as though it were an evil deed, as the damned do.¹⁰⁶³

Material ingratitude is the omission of due gratitude, but without contempt; ordinarily it is only a venial sin, because it proceeds from a certain negligence and is not accustomed so gravely to offend the benefactor. As grades of this ingratitude are enumerated: a) to repay nothing for a benefit received; b) to conceal a benefit and not give thanks, as certain badly educated children do, who immediately go away after receiving a benefit without any sign of gratitude; c) to refuse to acknowledge a benefit received.

Besides St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure,¹⁰⁶⁴ Bl. Albert the Great,¹⁰⁶⁵ and, among modern authors, Sebastian von Oer¹⁰⁶⁶ have written well concerning gratitude.

¹⁰⁶² Jer. 18:20.

¹⁰⁶³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 107, a. 2 (Leonine ed.).

¹⁰⁶⁴ Pharetra l. 3, c. 21, De ingratitudine, and l. 4, c. 31, De gratitudine.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Paradisus animae, c. 25.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Unsere Tugenden (Freiburg, 1912), 261ff.

S. Th. II-II, q. 106 and 107.

875. Gratitude (dankbaarheid) is taken: 1. generally for any virtue whatever by which in some way we compensate a debt from a benefit, whether by acknowledgment of a benefit received, by thanksgiving, or by another benefit; taken thus it includes religion toward God, piety toward parents, and observance toward superiors, to whom we also render thanks for benefits received, and indeed from a strict debt, so that these three virtues are eminent gratitude;

2. specially for a distinct and special virtue, which regards only particular benefactors, and which can be defined: the virtue recompensing the gratitude owed to benefactors.

For just as we owe special honor to God because He is the first principle of all goods, just as we owe special honor to parents and superiors because from them special or common benefits proceed, so also special honor is owed to benefactors, from whom we have received particular and private benefits. For where there is a special account of debt, there is a special virtue.

Hence concerning its material and formal object one must speak similarly as concerning piety or observance.

876. Recompense of a benefit can pertain to three things: 1) to justice, when recompense has the account of a legal debt, as in a loan, and then it must be considered according to the quantity of what was given; 2) to friendship, and 3) to gratitude, when recompense has the account of a moral debt, and then it considers more the affection of the giver, who from free and gratuitous choice granted friendship or a benefit, than the effect or gift. And therefore one who has received a benefit is bound to this from a debt of honesty, that he similarly expend something gratuitously.

But he would not seem to expend something gratuitously unless he exceeds the quantity of the benefit received; because so long as he recompenses less or equally, he does not seem to act gratuitously, but to render what he has received. Hence the recompense of gratitude always tends to repay something greater according to one's power.

Moreover, just as in giving a benefit two things are considered, first the affection, then the gift, so also in the recompense of it; hence gratitude is more in the affection or grateful soul than in the effect. Namely, it makes equality of wills. And as regards affection, recompense ought to be made at once; but as regards the gift, the time should be awaited at which the recompense is opportune for the benefactor: for if at once some gift is rendered for a gift, it does not seem to be virtuous recompense but unwilling.

877. Corollaries. - 1. Therefore the debt which gratitude considers is not a strict or legal debt; but to it pertains retribution which is made from the debt of honesty alone, which, namely, someone makes spontaneously. And therefore gratitude falls short of strict justice and is its potential part.

2. The offices of beneficence and gratitude toward a benefactor are: a) of themselves, special love, honor, and reverence, because the benefactor is a principle of benefits; b) accidentally, aid or assistance, if the benefactor is in need.

3. A benefit in the strict sense is an undue and useful furnishing, made gratuitously to someone from the affection of benevolence; hence one who gives help for sinning does not confer a benefit but rather harm; and therefore thanksgiving is not owed to him (q. 107, a. 1, ad 1).

878. Two vices are opposed to gratitude: one by excess, namely, recompense of a benefit made either for those things for which it ought not or sooner than it ought; but more opposed to it is the other by defect, which is called ingratitude, and is twofold:

1. material, when without contempt either the office of gratitude is omitted, or something is committed against the benefactor: this is not a special sin, but ingratitude toward God is a general circumstance of every sin; ingratitude toward man is a circumstance of the sin which is committed against him;

2. formal, when the benefit or the mind of the benefactor is contemned, so that you do not seem bound or a debtor to him by reason of the benefit: this is a special sin, directly opposed to the virtue of gratitude, of itself and ordinarily mortal, as was said concerning formal inobedience (n. 844).

Ingratitude is made in a twofold way: a) by omission, by omitting the office which gratitude requires. This is a sin (II Tim. III, 2), because it proceeds from negligence or from another indisposition to virtue; of itself only venial, because the obligation of gratitude does not arise from strict right or debt but from a debt of honesty; accidentally mortal from contempt of the benefactor or of a notable benefit, or if the benefactor is in grave necessity, or even from the omission is to be gravely offended: for then a mortal species against gratitude is added;

b) by commission, by doing something contrary to gratitude. This is a mortal or venial sin according to the condition of the work which is done against the benefactor.

879. There is a threefold grade of gratitude: the first is in the soul, namely, acknowledgment and grateful memory of the benefit; the second is in words, by praising and giving thanks; the third is in deeds, by repaying another benefit according to time and place and according to ability. From this it is clear that the poor can also be grateful, at least in the first and second way, also in the third according to affection.

Similarly there is a threefold grade of ingratitude, yet in inverse order, because what is last in generation is first in dissolution; hence the first is that a man not repay benefits; the second, that he dissimulate, not giving thanks nor showing that he has received benefits; the third and gravest is that he not acknowledge it, whether by voluntary forgetfulness or in another way. And because negation is understood in the opposite affirmation, therefore there are three grades of contrary ingratitude: the first, that someone repay evils for goods; the second, that he disparage benefits; the third, that he reckon a benefit as though it were a wrong.

880. Remark. - St. Thomas notes, q. 106, a. 2, that the innocent man is more bound to give thanks to God if the greatness of the grace conferred is considered according to itself, because, other things being equal, a greater gift is given to him by God, and more continuously; on the contrary, the penitent is more bound if the greatness of grace is considered comparatively to himself, because it is given to him more gratuitously, for when he was worthy of punishment, grace is given to him. Just as also a small gift given to a poor man is greater to him than a great one to a rich man. "And because acts concern singulars, in those things which are to be done that which is such here and now is considered more than that which is such simply"; hence the latter consideration preponderates.

TO RECOGNIZE prosperity, as also to repel adversity, is innate even to inanimate and unarmed things; thus the earth, in which a yet tender sapling thrives, cherishes it when grown larger with its leaves, and enriches it with its seeds: So the dug-up Hellebore, as if sensing the iron, emits a breath, which, by weighing down the digger's head, avenges the injury done to it; but what in these is natural, in man is moral, and free, whence it obtains the character of virtue, if done in a due manner; if not, it degenerates into the opposite vice.

I ASSERT first, that Gratitude is a special virtue, whereby graces are acknowledged and referred to the benefactor. So D. Thom. here, D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. and the opusc. declaratio terminorum Theologiae, which defines it in other words thus: Gratia was instituted to keep the memory of benefits ever in mind, and to repay them where possible. It is gathered from Tullius lib. 2. de Inventione.

THE REASON is, because in it is seen a special debt, not legal, but of honesty, and indeed a peculiar one.

THE VARIOUS DEGREES of gratitude D. Bonav. reviews in de gradibus virtutum, cap. 20. where, according to the dignity of benefits, he assigns an even higher degree of Gratitude, as for gratuitous benefits more than for natural ones, etc. Where note that he there assigns gratitude also in order to God, insofar as He is the author of benefits. But D. Thom. quaest. 106. ad 1. seems here deliberately to omit gratitude toward God, reducing it to Religion. Yet Religion is not formally gratitude, although it commands the acts of this virtue; these however are elicited by the proper virtue of Gratitude, as Tannerus also warns, d. 6. quaest. 1. dub. 3.

S. Thom. ADDS, art. 2. that the innocent is more bound to God than the penitent. But of this it will be said in the Tract. de Poenitentia, disput. 1.

I ASSERT second, that thanks are owed to any benefactor whatever, and at least the affection of recompense, where the means are lacking. So D. Thom. art. 3. Because the formal aspect of this debt is any benefit whatever accepted; even if one benefit be greater than another, not only from the magnitude of the thing given, but also from the affection, and the inconvenience. Of which see Seneca lib. 2. de benef. cap. 6. and 12. where nonetheless he adds a golden saying, truly spoken: It is the height of wickedness not to call a benefit anything but what affects the giver with some inconvenience.

I ASSERT third, that the affection of gratitude must be shown at once, but compensation at an opportune time. So D. Thom. art. 4. from Seneca lib. 4. de benef. where he says: He who desires to repay too quickly, repays unwillingly; he who repays unwillingly, is ungrateful. The reason is, because as the benefit, so also the compensation of the benefit ought to be opportune for the receiver.

I ASSERT fourth, that recompense ought to regard the affection rather than the effect. So D. Thom. art. 5. after Seneca lib. 1. de benef. cap. 7. The reason is, because gratitude regards the benefit insofar as it is bestowed gratuitously, which indeed pertains to the affection.

I ASSERT fifth, that the aspect of honesty, and the debt, require that the compensation not only equal but even surpass the benefit accepted. So D. Thom. art. 6. according to Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 5.

THE REASON is, because in the benefactor this is especially commendable, that, grateful, and anticipated by no benefit, he bestowed the benefit: Therefore it is fitting that the good conferred be surpassed by the one repaying, because as long as he recompenses, giving less, or equal, he does not seem to act gratuitously, but to render back what he received.

JUST as, however, in justice the equality of things is regarded, so in gratitude chiefly the equality of wills is regarded. See D. Thomam on the arguments.

THE VICE of an ungrateful spirit is the special contrary of gratitude, divided into various degrees, and, according to the diversity of circumstances, sometimes mortal; sometimes venial. So S. Thom. art. 1. 2. and 3. from the common teaching.

THE FIRST part is proved, because it is opposed to a special virtue, when the benefit is formally despised, even though it be exercised in diverse ways, by detracting from and plotting against the benefactor, insofar as he is a benefactor.

THAT it has many degrees is proved, because, just as there are diverse degrees of gratitude, of which the first is to recognize the benefit received: the second, to praise it, is to give thanks: the third, to repay according to place and time; conversely, because what is last in generation is first in resolution and corruption. The first degree of ingratitude is not to repay the benefit: The second, to dissemble it: The third, to forget it, or in some other way not to recognize it. And because in the affirmation of the opposite the negation is understood, therefore to the first degree of ingratitude belongs to repay evils for good: To the second, to disparage the benefit: But to the third, to reckon the benefit as if it were a wrongdoing.

FINALLY I prove that it can be venial, as if from negligence one omits to repay, or omits only what is to be bestowed liberally; but if one omits what he owes, especially if the benefactor is condemned in his necessity, it will be the complete malice of an ungrateful spirit, and mortal, as D. Bonavent. teaches, lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 21. where he reports D. Augustinum de bono viduitatis, cap. 16. where he says: Many have many gifts, and, not knowing God, from whom they have them, boast in impious vanity. But no one is blessed by the gifts of God who has been ungrateful to the giver. And de vera, et falsa poenit. cap. 14. He was ungrateful who, full of virtues, feared God not at all. For in this each one is the more guilty of sin, the more acceptable to God.

D. BERNARDUS on the Ps. Qui habitat: To him who humbly and devoutly confesses and gives thanks, ampler benefits are not undeservedly promised. On the contrary, he who has been ungrateful for what he has received is unworthy to receive.

AND Serm. 2. de septem misericordiis: Ingratitude blocks the ways of grace. And Serm. 51. in Cant. Ingratitude is a burning wind, drying up the fountain of piety, the dew of mercy, and the streams of all grace.

HOWEVER, although the ungrateful man deserves the subtraction of the benefit, it is not immediately fitting to subtract it. For the mark of an ungrateful spirit is not incurred so easily, as Seneca warns, lib. 3. de benef. cap. 7. But the man must be warned, that he may come to his senses. But if he becomes worse because of benefits, then at last one must cease from the bestowal of benefits. So S. Thomas art. 7.

SUCH a one is marked chiefly by Seneca, ep. 73. Whoever always thinks of receiving has forgotten what he has received: And cupidity has no greater evil than that it is ungrateful. Him S. Bonavent. reports, loc. cit. of the Pharetra.