Question One: On Gratitude and Ingratitude

S. Th. II-II, q. 106 and 107.

875. Gratitude (dankbaarheid) is taken: 1. generally for any virtue whatever by which in some way we compensate a debt from a benefit, whether by acknowledgment of a benefit received, by thanksgiving, or by another benefit; taken thus it includes religion toward God, piety toward parents, and observance toward superiors, to whom we also render thanks for benefits received, and indeed from a strict debt, so that these three virtues are eminent gratitude;

2. specially for a distinct and special virtue, which regards only particular benefactors, and which can be defined: the virtue recompensing the gratitude owed to benefactors.

For just as we owe special honor to God because He is the first principle of all goods, just as we owe special honor to parents and superiors because from them special or common benefits proceed, so also special honor is owed to benefactors, from whom we have received particular and private benefits. For where there is a special account of debt, there is a special virtue.

Hence concerning its material and formal object one must speak similarly as concerning piety or observance.

876. Recompense of a benefit can pertain to three things: 1) to justice, when recompense has the account of a legal debt, as in a loan, and then it must be considered according to the quantity of what was given; 2) to friendship, and 3) to gratitude, when recompense has the account of a moral debt, and then it considers more the affection of the giver, who from free and gratuitous choice granted friendship or a benefit, than the effect or gift. And therefore one who has received a benefit is bound to this from a debt of honesty, that he similarly expend something gratuitously.

But he would not seem to expend something gratuitously unless he exceeds the quantity of the benefit received; because so long as he recompenses less or equally, he does not seem to act gratuitously, but to render what he has received. Hence the recompense of gratitude always tends to repay something greater according to one's power.

Moreover, just as in giving a benefit two things are considered, first the affection, then the gift, so also in the recompense of it; hence gratitude is more in the affection or grateful soul than in the effect. Namely, it makes equality of wills. And as regards affection, recompense ought to be made at once; but as regards the gift, the time should be awaited at which the recompense is opportune for the benefactor: for if at once some gift is rendered for a gift, it does not seem to be virtuous recompense but unwilling.

877. Corollaries. - 1. Therefore the debt which gratitude considers is not a strict or legal debt; but to it pertains retribution which is made from the debt of honesty alone, which, namely, someone makes spontaneously. And therefore gratitude falls short of strict justice and is its potential part.

2. The offices of beneficence and gratitude toward a benefactor are: a) of themselves, special love, honor, and reverence, because the benefactor is a principle of benefits; b) accidentally, aid or assistance, if the benefactor is in need.

3. A benefit in the strict sense is an undue and useful furnishing, made gratuitously to someone from the affection of benevolence; hence one who gives help for sinning does not confer a benefit but rather harm; and therefore thanksgiving is not owed to him (q. 107, a. 1, ad 1).

878. Two vices are opposed to gratitude: one by excess, namely, recompense of a benefit made either for those things for which it ought not or sooner than it ought; but more opposed to it is the other by defect, which is called ingratitude, and is twofold:

1. material, when without contempt either the office of gratitude is omitted, or something is committed against the benefactor: this is not a special sin, but ingratitude toward God is a general circumstance of every sin; ingratitude toward man is a circumstance of the sin which is committed against him;

2. formal, when the benefit or the mind of the benefactor is contemned, so that you do not seem bound or a debtor to him by reason of the benefit: this is a special sin, directly opposed to the virtue of gratitude, of itself and ordinarily mortal, as was said concerning formal inobedience (n. 844).

Ingratitude is made in a twofold way: a) by omission, by omitting the office which gratitude requires. This is a sin (II Tim. III, 2), because it proceeds from negligence or from another indisposition to virtue; of itself only venial, because the obligation of gratitude does not arise from strict right or debt but from a debt of honesty; accidentally mortal from contempt of the benefactor or of a notable benefit, or if the benefactor is in grave necessity, or even from the omission is to be gravely offended: for then a mortal species against gratitude is added;

b) by commission, by doing something contrary to gratitude. This is a mortal or venial sin according to the condition of the work which is done against the benefactor.

879. There is a threefold grade of gratitude: the first is in the soul, namely, acknowledgment and grateful memory of the benefit; the second is in words, by praising and giving thanks; the third is in deeds, by repaying another benefit according to time and place and according to ability. From this it is clear that the poor can also be grateful, at least in the first and second way, also in the third according to affection.

Similarly there is a threefold grade of ingratitude, yet in inverse order, because what is last in generation is first in dissolution; hence the first is that a man not repay benefits; the second, that he dissimulate, not giving thanks nor showing that he has received benefits; the third and gravest is that he not acknowledge it, whether by voluntary forgetfulness or in another way. And because negation is understood in the opposite affirmation, therefore there are three grades of contrary ingratitude: the first, that someone repay evils for goods; the second, that he disparage benefits; the third, that he reckon a benefit as though it were a wrong.

880. Remark. - St. Thomas notes, q. 106, a. 2, that the innocent man is more bound to give thanks to God if the greatness of the grace conferred is considered according to itself, because, other things being equal, a greater gift is given to him by God, and more continuously; on the contrary, the penitent is more bound if the greatness of grace is considered comparatively to himself, because it is given to him more gratuitously, for when he was worthy of punishment, grace is given to him. Just as also a small gift given to a poor man is greater to him than a great one to a rich man. "And because acts concern singulars, in those things which are to be done that which is such here and now is considered more than that which is such simply"; hence the latter consideration preponderates.