Question I: On gratitude

I ASSERT first, that Gratitude is a special virtue, whereby graces are acknowledged and referred to the benefactor. So D. Thom. here, D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. and the opusc. declaratio terminorum Theologiae, which defines it in other words thus: Gratia was instituted to keep the memory of benefits ever in mind, and to repay them where possible. It is gathered from Tullius lib. 2. de Inventione.

THE REASON is, because in it is seen a special debt, not legal, but of honesty, and indeed a peculiar one.

THE VARIOUS DEGREES of gratitude D. Bonav. reviews in de gradibus virtutum, cap. 20. where, according to the dignity of benefits, he assigns an even higher degree of Gratitude, as for gratuitous benefits more than for natural ones, etc. Where note that he there assigns gratitude also in order to God, insofar as He is the author of benefits. But D. Thom. quaest. 106. ad 1. seems here deliberately to omit gratitude toward God, reducing it to Religion. Yet Religion is not formally gratitude, although it commands the acts of this virtue; these however are elicited by the proper virtue of Gratitude, as Tannerus also warns, d. 6. quaest. 1. dub. 3.

S. Thom. ADDS, art. 2. that the innocent is more bound to God than the penitent. But of this it will be said in the Tract. de Poenitentia, disput. 1.

I ASSERT second, that thanks are owed to any benefactor whatever, and at least the affection of recompense, where the means are lacking. So D. Thom. art. 3. Because the formal aspect of this debt is any benefit whatever accepted; even if one benefit be greater than another, not only from the magnitude of the thing given, but also from the affection, and the inconvenience. Of which see Seneca lib. 2. de benef. cap. 6. and 12. where nonetheless he adds a golden saying, truly spoken: It is the height of wickedness not to call a benefit anything but what affects the giver with some inconvenience.

I ASSERT third, that the affection of gratitude must be shown at once, but compensation at an opportune time. So D. Thom. art. 4. from Seneca lib. 4. de benef. where he says: He who desires to repay too quickly, repays unwillingly; he who repays unwillingly, is ungrateful. The reason is, because as the benefit, so also the compensation of the benefit ought to be opportune for the receiver.

I ASSERT fourth, that recompense ought to regard the affection rather than the effect. So D. Thom. art. 5. after Seneca lib. 1. de benef. cap. 7. The reason is, because gratitude regards the benefit insofar as it is bestowed gratuitously, which indeed pertains to the affection.

I ASSERT fifth, that the aspect of honesty, and the debt, require that the compensation not only equal but even surpass the benefit accepted. So D. Thom. art. 6. according to Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 5.

THE REASON is, because in the benefactor this is especially commendable, that, grateful, and anticipated by no benefit, he bestowed the benefit: Therefore it is fitting that the good conferred be surpassed by the one repaying, because as long as he recompenses, giving less, or equal, he does not seem to act gratuitously, but to render back what he received.

JUST as, however, in justice the equality of things is regarded, so in gratitude chiefly the equality of wills is regarded. See D. Thomam on the arguments.