Gratitude

The Virtue of Gratitude.—Religion, piety, reverence and obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to repay with gladness the favors one has received.”

(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus, gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony) or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed), though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives, even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

Two Kinds of Gratitude.—(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense, gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and follows in order after reverence.

Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, per se and other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

Circumstances of Gratitude.—(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.—Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible (e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.—Every person who is favored should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his benefactors.

(c) The Time for Gratitude.—Internal gratitude should be immediate, and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received; but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.—If the favor was bestowed by reason of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.—It is suitable that one repay benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.

The Sins against Gratitude.—(a) Since gratitude is a moral virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal. Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor without contempt for him or his favor.

(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem., xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

The Moral Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Material ingratitude is not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

The Theological Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Formal ingratitude from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity, which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter. Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?—(a) If the favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.