The minister's intention

Intention is an act of the will directing an action to a certain end. Divines distinguish between an actual, a virtual, an habitual, and an interpretative intention, wishes here and now to administer When a minister a sacrament, he has an actual intention to perform the rite. If he had such a wish and in consequence set about his task, but became distracted while administering the sacrament, he has a virtual intention. An habitual intention is a wish to do something, which wish has not been retracted but which does not issue in action. An interpretative intention is a wish which would be conceived if one thought of it, but for want of thinking of it is not elicited.

An intention of some sort in the minister is necessary for the validity of a sacrament; the Council of Trent anathematized anyone who should say that there is not required in ministers while they make and confer the sacraments at least an intention to do what the Church does.¹ Now the Church by her ministers and through the sacraments baptizes, confirms, absolves from sin, and so forth; so that the minister while making a sacrament must intend to baptize, confirm, absolve. However, it is not necessary to have an actual intention of doing this; distractions cannot always be avoided, and always to have an actual intention while engaged in conferring the sacraments would be an impossible requirement. Nor would an habitual intention suffice, for it does not exist while the action is put, nor has it any effect upon the action. Much less would an interpretative intention be sufficient. It remains, then, that a virtual intention is necessary and sufficient in the minister while he makes a sacrament.

¹ Sess. vii, c. 11.

Ambrosius Catharinus, Salmeron, Contenson, and other theologians thought that an intention to perform the external rite of a sacrament, even if the minister internally expressly withheld his intention to do what the Church does, would be sufficient for the validity of a sacrament. Such an intention to perform the merely external rite while internally withholding the intention to baptize, absolve, and so forth, is called an external intention, ‘The common opinion is that such a merely external intention is not sufficient, but that an internal intention or a positive wish to baptize, absolve, and so forth, is necessary for the validity of the sacrament. On December 7, 1690, Alexander VIII condemned the proposition that Baptism is valid when it is conferred by a minister who observes all the external rite and form of Baptism but inwardly in his heart makes this resolution, ‘‘ I do not intend to do what the Church does.” This decree would seem to settle the matter, for it seems to have been directed against Fr. Farvacques, O.S.A., who, in a little book published ten years earlier, had defended the opinion of Catharinus and Salmeron. A few theologians even subsequently to the decree of Alexander VIII have defended the same view, on the ground that the decree was aimed at the Lutheran error which asserted the validity of the sacraments even when administered in joke. No Catholic, however, defended the Lutheran doctrine at the time, and it had already been condemned by the Council of Trent. We must, then, at least say with Benedict XIV that the condemnation of the above proposition inflicted a serious blow on the opinion of Catharinus, and no theologian of note now defends it. The Church does not merely apply the matter and form when ministering the sacraments, but by means of those external rites she intends to do what Christ instituted the sacraments to effect—that is, to baptize, to absolve, and so forth. An intention, then, to do this—to baptize, to absolve, or an internal intention—is necessary for the validity of a sacrament.

It is not sufficient for the minister while making a sacrament to have a vague intention of conferring it on somebody or other, or of taking and applying some matter in general for the making of the sacrament. The intention must be definite in its scope and object, otherwise there is no reason why this matter should be taken rather than that, or why one person should be benefited rather than another. An intention, therefore, to absolve anyone in a crowd who may need it, or to consecrate five hosts out of a larger number on the altar would not be effective.

Neither ignorance nor mistake on the part of the minister about the nature or effect of a sacrament makes it invalid. Baptism conferred by one who knows nothing of its nature, or by one who denies baptismal regeneration, is valid, provided that the three essential elements of the sacrament are not wanting.

Difficulties may arise from the fact that a minister while making a sacrament had mutually contradictory intentions. Thus an heretical priest while saying Mass may have the intention to do what Christ instituted but not to offer sacrifice, as he denies that Mass is a sacrifice. In this and in similar cases divines give the following rules for discovering whether the sacrament is effected or not. When the contradictory intentions are present in the mind at the time of making the sacrament, that will prevail which is the stronger, and that is the stronger which would be chosen by the minister if he realized the contradiction. So that, in the example given, the heretical minister will actually say Mass if the intention to do what Christ instituted be the prevailing and stronger one; he will not say Mass if his intention not to offer sacrifice is the stronger. When the contradictory intentions follow one another, the last will ordinarily prevail, unless the former revoked all subsequent intentions.

I. Notion. Intention is here understood as the deliberate will of confecting a sacrament.

II. Division. Intention is distinguished:

1. By reason of itself into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. Actual intention is had when the minister, at the time at which he confects the sacrament, actually wills to confect it. It is reflex, or rather in actu signato, if there is had an express and formal volition of confecting the sacrament; it is in actu exercito if someone actually wills indeed, but nevertheless less expressly and formally, to confect the sacrament, as if someone, recognizing a rite as a sacrament, administers it under this recognition. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament, and that will, though not actually, nevertheless perseveres virtually, so that he operates by force of the will once had, as if someone, from the intention of celebrating Mass, puts on the vestments and performs the other things, even if perhaps at the time of the ministry he is wholly distracted. Habitual intention exists if someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament and that will has not indeed been retracted, but nevertheless does not persevere virtually. Interpretative intention is had when someone neither actually and explicitly wills nor actually and explicitly has willed to confect a sacrament, but is presumed to be going to will it if thought about it should occur.¹ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15.)

2. By reason of the object into merely external and internal. Merely external intention is had when someone wills and outwardly seriously performs only the external rite, but lacks the mind of confecting a sacrament, or even intends the contrary. It is called merely external because, although in itself it is internal, nevertheless its whole object is external, namely only the placing of the external rite. Internal intention is had when someone wills the external rite insofar as it is sacred, or at least insofar as it is held as such by the Church.

By reason of the object, intention is further distinguished into determinate and indeterminate, according as the thing intended is certain and defined; or is uncertain, as if someone intends to consecrate only ten hosts out of a multitude of hosts.

3. By reason of mode into explicit and implicit, according as someone expressly wills such a sacrament known and thought of, or by a more general will wills such a sacrament, whether not known, or known but not thought of.

By reason of mode it is also distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone intends to confect a sacrament independently of, or dependently upon, some circumstance or event; as if someone absolves another under the condition: if you are attrite; or: if you make restitution.

¹ Some call interpretative the intention which others call implicit habitual intention.

III. The intention required. It is of faith that intention is required, and indeed intention "at least of doing what the Church does."¹ In order that these things may be unfolded and completed, observe the following:

1. In itself, actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices; habitual intention does not suffice, much less interpretative intention; fear, however, does not hinder intention. I said:

a) Actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices. For it must be judged that the intention suffices which truly flows into the act or sacramental rite, and therefore can be called its cause. Such is not only actual intention, but also virtual intention. There is added the fact that actual intention is not always within man's power, and its necessity would give occasion for anxieties about the validity of the sacraments (St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 3;² St. Alphonsus, VI, 17, 18).

Corollary. A priest validly acts who, in the customary way, betakes himself to the baptistery, confessional, or altar and there baptizes, absolves, or consecrates; for there is had at least virtual intention; indeed practically everywhere actual intention is present, even if remiss. Likewise, a priest validly consecrates who has placed on the corporal the hosts to be consecrated, even if at the time of consecration he does not think of them. Indeed, in general it must be said that one imprudently doubts the value of the act who has placed the required rite, unless he has expressly excluded the due intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 18).

b) Habitual intention does not suffice; since it cannot be admitted that an intention suffices which in no way flows into the action of the minister; such is habitual intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16). Much less, as is clear, does interpretative intention suffice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

c) Fear does not hinder, because, as we posit, it does not take away the voluntary (St. Alphonsus, VI, 19). Except, however, Matrimony, as will be said in its place.

2. As regards the object, there is required the intention or will of confecting a sacrament. This is established against those who judge that external intention suffices; in other words, that it suffices for someone outwardly and seriously to place the external rite, even if inwardly he does not will to confect the sacrament. This doctrine, first defended by Roland Bandinelli, and afterwards revived by Ambrosius Catharinus (1553), is today almost commonly abandoned and rightly seems to be rejected. For: 1. as we have said, it is of faith that intention is required in the minister, "at least of doing what the Church does." But these words seem to have to be understood according to the sense which they had in the schools, in other words, of the intention of doing what the Church intends to effect through the rite. 2. Proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, even though inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does."³ Here it seems entirely that there is discussion of one who outwardly and seriously places the external rite. Therefore this does not suffice. 3. The Roman Missal has these words: "If someone has before him eleven hosts and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, ... he does not consecrate, because intention is required,"⁴ namely, as the Missal, according to the obvious sense, supposes, the intention of consecrating, and that a determinate one (St. Alphonsus, VI, 23).

It suffices, however, that the minister implicitly will to confect the sacrament, for example, that he will the rite as sacred, that he will to do what Christ instituted, what the Church does, what is asked by a Christian, etc.

Corollary I. A sacrament is not valid: 1. if someone places the external rite without any intention; this, for example, will have place if someone does not place a human act, as if he baptizes someone in sleep or drunkenness; 2. if someone performs the external rite for the sake of jest, mockery, or mere exercise.

Corollary II. A sacrament can be valid, even if someone does not regard the rite placed by himself as sacramental, provided he truly wills, for example, what Christ instituted, what he who admits the sacrament asks, etc. Hence heresy or infidelity of itself is not a reason for doubting the required intention;⁵ otherwise if there is added hatred of the Christian name, which, for example, we can easily suspect in a Jew.

3. As regards the term, intention must be borne toward a determinate person or matter; yet it suffices that the intention be directed to the person or to the whole matter present, without being directed to the parts individually. But he consecrates invalidly who would will to consecrate ten hosts out of eleven and would not determine those ten.

4. As regards the mode, especially as regards a sacrament to be confected under a condition, several things must be noted:

a) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the present or the past generally is valid or not valid at once, according as the condition is verified or not verified. I said "generally," because it is disputed whether a sacrament conferred under a condition naturally unknowable is valid; as if someone were to absolve another if he were predestined. Further, it seems this must be denied, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human knowledge" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 26).

b) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the future, for example: I absolve you, if you will make restitution, that is, as soon as you shall have made restitution, generally is not valid, neither before nor after the condition has been fulfilled. Not before the condition is fulfilled, because there is not had the intention of confecting the sacrament before the fulfilled condition; not after the condition is fulfilled, because then the matter and form no longer exist (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I said generally, because Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract. But a contract entered into under a condition is perfected when the condition has been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, Session 7, On the Sacraments, canon 11.

² St. Thomas in the cited place indeed says: "Although he who is thinking of something else does not have actual intention, nevertheless he has ... habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament." But St. Alphonsus responds: "By habitual intention here the holy Doctor without doubt understands virtual intention; for immediately after he adds thus: Suppose that when a priest approaches to baptize, he intends to do with respect to the one to be baptized what the Church does; hence if afterwards in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried off to other things, the sacrament is perfected from the force, note well, of the first intention" (VI, 18).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1318.

⁴ De Defectibus, title 7, n. 1.

⁵ Holy Office, 18 December 1872 (Collectanea, n. 1392).

1. Titius, a priest, determines to celebrate Mass on the following day for Sempronius, who asked that it be celebrated according to his intention, an alms having been given, but with no determined time. But on the following day Titius is asked in the sacristy by Caius that he be willing soon to celebrate Mass, and to sing it for his father, who died that very night. Forgetful of the prior intention, Titius celebrates and sings the Mass for Caius's father. Still forgetful of the Mass to be celebrated for Sempronius, he celebrates on the third day for himself, since he thinks he has no other obligation which he must satisfy. But behold, after some days the same Sempronius asked several other Masses from Titius, and then Titius remembered that prior Mass to be celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius.

Q. 1. What is intention; and can several things be intended? 2. Which intention of Titius prevailed in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17-19. To the second: the Mass which Titius celebrated and sang on the following day was celebrated for Caius's deceased father. For this was the predominant intention, which prevails over the other, which was incompatible with it. This can be confirmed even from that circumstance, that he sang the Mass.

The Mass which Titius celebrated on the third day was celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius. For this intention, although habitual, was evidently predominant over the intention of celebrating for himself, although this latter was actual. For the predominant intention is that which would actually be chosen, once its incompatibility with the other were known. But, once each intention was known, the intention which would have been chosen by Titius would have been the intention of celebrating for Sempronius, because he celebrated for himself only insofar as he was persuaded that he had no obligation which he had to satisfy. Therefore. And this must be asserted a fortiori if Titius had had no intention specially on that day. "If it is applied to no one, or to one incapable, the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church, or yields to the priest himself, or to those for whom he is specially held to offer, since he is thus judged implicitly to have intended." St. Alph. l. 6, n. 336. Cf. n. 335, q. 1. Moreover, in practice, when a doubt stands, it would be safer to celebrate the Mass another time for the one for whom the application did not avail. - G. 5, 6; v. 2, 335; Elbel 403.

2. Franciscus, administering the sacrament of baptism, is distracted by a sudden noise made in the church, and pronounces the form of baptism without attending to it in any way. A little later, he hears confession, and, finding the penitent little disposed, resolves not to absolve him. But again he is distracted, thinking of the cause of that noise, and, distracted, pronounces the form of absolution.

Q. 1. What is actual and virtual intention? 2. Do baptism and absolution avail in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17, 18, 41, 42. To the second: Franciscus administers baptism validly and licitly. Validly, because, although there is no actual intention and voluntary; nevertheless there is virtual intention and voluntary, which suffices in the administration of the sacraments. Licitly, because that distraction, since it was voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, can be attributed to Franciscus as no fault. S. Th. 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, ad 3.

The absolution given by Franciscus was invalid, nor in giving it did Franciscus sin in any way. It was invalid because, of two intentions simultaneously incompatible, the predominant intention always prevails, and this in the case is the intention of not absolving. Indeed, it was the only one, since he absolved while distracted. But Franciscus sinned in no way, because that wandering of mind was altogether natural and involuntary. - G. 5.

203. • DEFINITION. Intention is an act of the will tending toward some end, or an act of the will by which someone intends to do or omit something.

DIVISION. It is manifold, namely: 1º actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; 2º internal or true, or external, which regards only the external act; 3º determinate, or indeterminate or in the confused; 4º absolute, or conditioned. Recall the definitions given throughout, for example in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary action is treated, tom. 1, n. 5.

Principles. - I. For the validity of a Sacrament there is required in the Minister some true and serious will at least of doing that which the Church does. - This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, Can. 11.

II. Nevertheless an actual intention is not required, but a virtual one suffices. The reason is that actual intention, although best and to be desired, is sometimes morally impossible; but virtual intention sufficiently flows into the action of the Minister, so that this action can be called truly human and deliberate. - Thus all.

III. A habitual intention does not suffice, nor an interpretative one. The reason is that for a human act some will is required, by force of which the act is placed. But neither habitual nor interpretative intention is of this kind: not the first, because it is neither actually elicited by the will, nor, although it was once elicited, does it endure in some effect or in a series of actions; not the second, because it is neither actually elicited, nor was it ever actually elicited, but would only be elicited if the mind were thinking about the thing to be done. - St. Ligorius, n. 16.

“29. Urgent fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the Sacraments.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

63. By reason of the subject, intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative.

1. Actual is said of that intention which is elicited here and now. It can be subdivided into reflex and simply direct. A reflex actual intention is present when a man not only actually wills something, but also knows that he here and now wills it. But if this reflex knowledge is lacking, there is a simply direct actual intention. For example, he who baptizes and attends to the baptism has a simply direct actual intention; but he who in addition reflects that he now wills to baptize has a reflex actual intention.

2. Virtual is said of that intention which was formerly possessed as actual, then was never retracted, and now, although not elicited anew and indeed not even perceived, nevertheless still influences the work to be performed. For example, a priest who goes to hear confessions with the intention of absolving all penitents rightly disposed has a virtual intention of absolving if afterward he no longer attends to that intention and pronounces the words of absolution amid distractions. To avoid ambiguities, it can never be kept too firmly before one's eyes that the older authors not infrequently take habitual and virtual intention interchangeably. Thus, for example, St. Thomas²⁵⁰ says: "Although he who thinks of something else does not have an actual intention, nevertheless he has a habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament; for example, when a priest approaching to baptize intends to do concerning the one to be baptized what the Church does; whence, if afterward in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried away to other things, the sacrament is perfected by virtue of the first intention." In the example adduced by the Angelic Doctor there is manifestly a virtual and not a habitual intention²⁵¹ in the sense of modern authors.

3. Habitual, properly speaking, is that intention which indeed was once possessed and was never retracted, but now in no way positively influences the work. For example, a just person possessing the habit of praying prays in sleep from a habitual intention; or a just person sinning venially habitually orders this act to God, because the habit of charity existing in the just person refers all things to God. Nevertheless, it is absurd to say that the habit of charity actually or virtually influences the venial sin and thus refers it to God.

4. Interpretative is the name given to that intention which neither now exists nor formerly existed, but which, as is presumed from clear indications, would be present if the man here and now attended or were able to attend.²⁵² For example, a dying Protestant deprived of his senses, who lived uprightly and was in good faith, is judged to have the interpretative intention of receiving sacramental absolution, and therefore with a safe conscience a confessor can absolve him, at least conditionally. As will be explained more broadly afterward: for receiving sacraments, at least in a case of necessity, any of these four intentions suffices; but for administering sacraments neither an interpretative nor a habitual intention suffices, but an actual or at least virtual intention is required. The reason is that for receiving or undergoing something, so great an act of the will is not customarily required as for doing and positively producing something. But in the reception of the sacraments man is rather one who receives and undergoes; in their administration, however, he is rather one who causes and instrumentally produces grace.

The difference among the four enumerated intentions can be stated briefly in this manner:

Actual intention is present and influences the work with advertence on the part of the agent.

Virtual intention is present and influences the work without advertence on the part of the agent.

Habitual intention was present, but now exercises no influence upon the work insofar as it is a human act.

Interpretative intention neither was present, nor is present, nor influences the work.

²⁵⁰ S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

²⁵¹ Cf. Billuart, De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 3, and Cajetan, Comm. in h.l.

²⁵² Certain theologians, such as Suarez (In III, disp. 13, s. 3, n. 2), Sylvius (In III, q. 64, a. 8, concl. 5), and Lugo (De sacr. in genere, disp. 8, n. 73), equate interpretative intention with the indirect voluntary.

St. Thomas III, q. 64, a. 8 and 10.

80. Principle I. For the validity of a sacrament, in the minister, besides power, there is required the intention or deliberate will of confecting a sacrament. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11, and can. 4 on Baptism, defined against the Protestants.

It is proved:

1. From Tradition, whose witnesses are Innocent III, the profession of faith for the Waldensians; the Council of Constance, last session, constitution against Wicleff, a. 22; Florence, decree for the Armenians; and Trent already cited.

2. From the Scriptures, in which it is implicitly asserted, I Cor. IV, 1: A priest, in the ministration of the sacraments, is a minister of Christ; but in order that a man be a minister of Christ, he must will to act in the name of Christ and intend what Christ instituted; therefore. The minor is proved:

a) A minister differs from a blind instrument in this, that he is a voluntary agent; whence he must will to use his ministerial power, and thus through his will subject himself to the principal agent: for a human act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent.

b) Similarly, there was given to ministers not a mere deputation but a power (Mt. XXVIII, 18-19; John XX, 21; Luke XXII, 19); but one who has a power can use it or not use it; and therefore there is required in ministers an intention of using their power or of acting in the name of Christ.

Therefore intention is required on the part of the minister.

3. By reason: The placing of matter and form is an indifferent action which can signify various things and be done for various ends: washing, for example, for bodily cleanliness, for health, for play, for mere exercise, for representation alone; therefore it must be determined to one sacramental signification, which will not be done except by the intention of the minister. Therefore intention is also required on the part of the work.

Nor should you say: the external rite is determined by the words of the form; therefore intention is superfluous. - Reply: supposing that the words are pronounced in the name of Christ, in the person of Christ; otherwise they would not have their sacramental signification.

81. Principle II. The required intention is the will, at least virtual and implicit, absolute or equivalent to this, determined to a certain matter and person, of performing the sacramental rite. - It is said:

1. Will; hence one deprived of reason, perfectly drunk, or dreaming, does not confect a sacrament, even if he previously intended this, because he does not act in a human mode, from intention.

2. On the part of the subject: at least virtual and implicit: for an interpretative intention does not suffice, which someone would have had if he had adverted to this or that; nor a merely habitual intention, i.e., one once had and not retracted, for these do not make a human act (I, n. 55) nor influence the constitution of a sacrament. Nor is an actual intention required, which someone here and now has, because this is not always in man's moral power; but a virtual intention is required, by which someone, from the force or influx of a past actual intention, places or continues to place the sacrament.¹ Likewise an explicit intention is not required, by which someone says: I intend to make a sacrament; but an implicit one suffices, contained in another act, as if someone, having been called, goes to the church and, distracted, performs all things required for Baptism.

¹ Among the older authors, virtual intention is sometimes called habitual, as in St. Thomas, a. 8, ad 3; but he understands virtual, for he adds: "from the power of the first intention the sacrament is perfected." Yet to avoid equivocations, the terminology received today must be preserved.

In practice, one who places the actions according to custom and does not exclude intention has an implicit intention; a fortiori one who fears whether he has sufficient intention, by this very fact has more than sufficient intention.

3. On the part of the mode by which the will is borne toward the object:

a) Absolute or equivalent to this, i.e., conditioned concerning the past or present: for if, at the moment at which the sacrament is made, this condition is verified, the intention passes into an absolute one and the sacrament is valid; otherwise it is not perfected from defect of intention. But a condition concerning a future contingent thing (for example, if you restore), and also concerning a necessary future thing (for example, if the sun rises), with the mind of suspending the sacrament, renders it invalid: for it impedes the union between the intention of the minister and the application of matter and form, since it suspends the present intention and makes it so that the minister does not have the will of confecting the sacrament in the present; moreover, when the condition has been verified, there also is not then a sacrament, because then matter and form no longer exist.

Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract; whence, when the condition has been verified, if consent has persevered, the matter and form of matrimony are present, for they coincide with the persevering intention.

b) Determined to a certain matter, because otherwise it would be indifferent, for example, if someone, knowing there are eleven hosts, wished to consecrate ten without indicating which ones; and to a certain person, because otherwise no application would be made, for example, if someone said: I absolve thee, to two persons.

But it suffices that it be determined to the present person, whoever that person may be; whence a man who is thought to be a woman is validly absolved, and Peter who seems to be Paul. Error concerning the person does not invalidate, unless the minister were to bind his intention to a determinate person; in matrimony, however, error of person is substantial, because the person is the very object of the contract.

4. On the part of the object: of performing the sacramental rite. For the rite of itself is indifferent and can be posited for a diverse end: as sacred or as profane, indeed by playing, or by pretending, without, namely, the will of confecting a sacrament; therefore in order that it be a sacrament it must be determined by the intention of doing the rite as sacramental, or of doing what the Church does,² as the Councils say, or what is done in the Church. This must be explained further.

² The first who used the formula was William of Auxerre, on IV Sentences, On Baptism.

82. Principle III. For the validity of a sacrament, external intention does not suffice, i.e., the intention only of doing the external act; but there is required, at least implicitly, an internal intention of doing what Christ instituted, or at least what the Church does. - Therefore the intention of positing the external act, even seriously and in the habit of a minister, but merely materially (although inwardly someone wills to simulate), does not suffice; this intention they call external, namely from the part of the object, and some have said that it suffices;³ for:

³ It is attributed to Alan of Lille; it was formally proposed by Catharinus, Salmeron, Contenson, Juenin, Natalis Alexander, Serry, Drouin, and others.

a) One who has only external intention, but internally does not have the intention of doing what the Church does, implicitly intends to simulate a sacrament, although not openly; but one who simulates a sacrament, whether openly or secretly, cannot be said to act in the name of Christ.

b) The external act, even one posited in a sacred place by a minister clothed in sacred vestments, can be done for a diverse end: it can be a serious or simulated action, done in the name of Christ or in one's own name, a profane representation or exercise, or a sacred action. Therefore it will not be determined to the being of a sacrament except through an internal intention, consonant with the external act, namely of doing the act formally as sacred, as instituted by Christ and intended by the Church.

This opinion in practice must be altogether held, because the sacraments are to be ministered in the safer way (n. 23); indeed the contrary seems not safe even speculatively, because proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, while inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does." For although the one who only negatively does not say: I intend what the Church does, but positively does not add: I do not intend what the Church does, has not been explicitly condemned; nevertheless, because he implicitly says this, therefore with Benedict XIV⁴ it is rightly judged that, from the condemnation of the proposition, a grave wound has been inflicted on the opinion which asserts that this suffices.

⁴ On the Diocesan Synod, book VII, 4, 8.

83. Corollaries. - Since implicit intention suffices, hence:

1. There is not required an explicit intention of that which the Church intends, namely, of confecting something sacred, or a sacrament, or of producing its effect.

2. Nor is faith in Christ, the Church, or the sacrament required; but whatever the minister's opinion may be concerning Christ, concerning the sacrament and its efficacy, he ministers validly provided that he wills to perform the rite which the Church performs, and which by her is held as sacred, even if he himself thinks it to be nothing: "for because the Church does something, therefore consequently and implicitly he intends to do something, although not explicitly," says St. Thomas, on IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 1.

3. Nor is an explicit intention required of doing what the Roman Church does, but a general intention of doing what the true Church does, whatever the minister may think of that Church; whence a heretic, by willing what his own Church does, which he falsely thinks to be true, implicitly wills what the Church of Christ and the Roman Church does.

4. Nor is an express thought about the Church required, but the intention of doing something which identically the Church does suffices, for example, what is commanded in the Gospel, what Christians do, what is asked by the one requesting: thus baptized persons minister the sacrament of matrimony which they are ignorant to be a sacrament of the Church.

5. Indeed even if the minister has two contrary intentions, for example, of doing what Christ instituted but not what the Church does, what the Church does but not what the Roman Church does, of celebrating matrimony but dissoluble or not a sacrament, of making a sacrament but not of giving grace; the sacrament is valid, provided that the general intention of doing what the Church in fact does is predominant and prevails over the intention proceeding from error, i.e., provided that this is the intention which, according to his actual disposition, the minister would choose if he knew that both could not stand together at the same time.

But if each were equal, nothing would be operated, for one would destroy the other; but if there were doubt about this, the sacrament would be doubtful.

84. He sins gravely from defect of due intention:

1. Who ministers a sacrament without intention, or under a future condition suspending the intention, because it is not a valid sacrament, but a simulation and mockery of it.

2. Who ministers under a hidden condition extrinsic to the sacrament, whether it is unknowable in a human way, for example, if you are predestined, if God sees that you will die this year; or whether it is knowable, for example, if you are fasting, if you have recited the Rosary; because from the very placing of the condition there arises doubt concerning the validity of the sacrament, and hence he exposes himself to the danger of doing nothing and of frustrating his neighbor of the sacramental effect; and on the other hand there can be no reason for such ministration. Indeed to some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book VI, n. 28, it seems more probable that a sacrament confected under a hidden condition unknowable in a human way is invalid, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the cognition and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human cognition."

3. Who without grave cause ministers under a hidden condition concerning the present or the past and intrinsic to the sacrament, or from its nature required for its value, so that doubt concerning the value does not arise from the very placing of the condition: for he plays in a most grave and most holy matter, because he incurs the danger of making the sacrament null, and thus inflicts irreverence upon Christ and exposes his neighbor to great harm.

On the contrary:

A. It is licit if a sufficient cause is present, such as is generally had when the sacrament here and now is necessary or very useful and cannot be had as certainly valid:

a) if a serious doubt arises whether a sacrament which cannot be repeated was conferred or validly conferred, or whether the confessor absolved the penitent; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are not yet baptized, absolved, etc.;

b) if there is doubt whether a capable subject is had, for example, whether a child confessing matter of mortal sin is possessed of reason, whether one deprived of the senses wishes to receive the sacrament or is still alive, whether the one to be absolved repents, whether the fetus is a man; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are capable;

c) if there is doubt concerning the validity of the matter or form, for example, whether this is water, or concerning the power of the minister: for doubt concerning the power of the minister, or concerning his jurisdiction for the sacrament of Penance, renders the matters and forms doubtful; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if I can.

Question 2. Is it licit to simulate, or at least to dissimulate, a sacrament, lest it be conferred upon the unworthy?

Before an answer is given, it must be noted beforehand what the simulation of a sacrament is and in what it differs from its dissimulation. Now since simulation in general is, as St. Thomas says, "a lie of deed," or the placing of some sign expressing something contrary to that which is had in the mind, it follows that simulation of a sacrament is nothing other than a fictitious placing of a sacramental action, so that outwardly there does not appear the defect on account of which no sacrament is rendered. But it is called a fictitious placing of a sacramental action when matter and form are placed with the intention of not confecting the sacrament. But if the Minister, in acting thus, directly intends to deceive, then the simulation of the sacrament is called formal; if, however, he is induced to simulate from another motive, for example from grave fear, then it will be only material. But to dissimulate a sacrament is to omit some essential part of it, namely matter or form, whether another thing is substituted in its place or nothing is substituted; yet in such a way that this omission or substitution can be known outwardly, and this alone is sought, namely to hide the truth. These things having been noted, now to the question:

Resp. Certainly it is never licit to simulate a sacrament, whether there is question of formal simulation or only of material simulation. The reason is both because to simulate a sacrament is properly to lie, and because to act thus is to abuse sacred things and to mock God Himself; and since an abuse of this kind contains grave irreverence toward the sacrament, he who simulates some sacrament can never be excused from mortal sin. Besides, it is clear from proposition 29 condemned by Innocent XI, which is thus stated: "Urgent grave fear is a cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments." But in this condemnation even material simulation is reproved, since it is treated specially in the proposition. - Nevertheless, contempt being set aside and a just cause being added, it is licit to dissimulate a sacrament. The reason is that in dissimulation no injury is done to the sacrament, because no sacramental action is placed, nor is a lie committed, but only the truth is hidden. - Cf. Viva, on the cited proposition. - Scavini, lib. 3, n. 31. - Ballerini, note (a) p. 145. - Haine, vol. 2, p. 331.

IX. QUESTION V. Whether an actual intention is necessary, or a virtual one suffices? ANSWER. It has been said above that a habitual intention does not suffice, nor is an actual one required, but a virtual one suffices and is necessary. How this virtual intention perseveres, and how long it lasts unretracted, can scarcely be explained; but it can be gathered from circumstances at the judgment of prudent men. He who, seized by sleep, drunkenness, or madness, baptizes or consecrates, and so forth, although before he fell into drunkenness he deliberately determined to baptize, does not baptize, does not consecrate: because a sacramental action must necessarily be human; but the action of a drunken or demented man is the action of a man, but not human, as the common and true opinion teaches.

Agnes, because of grave fear instilled by a rather severe father, had promised to enter marriage with Albert, a marriage to which she was greatly opposed. On the very morning of the marriage she seeks Caius, the parish priest, with the intention of declaring that she was compelled by fear. Nevertheless, in the confessional itself she changes her plan, discloses some faults, and asks for absolution. Since Caius cannot obtain certain matter for absolution, he dismisses her with a simple blessing, without, however, warning her at all that absolution was not given. Afterwards Agnes goes through the form of marriage; when it is later lawfully proved that the marriage was entered through grave fear, it is declared null and void by ecclesiastical authority. When Agnes comes to confession the next time and says nothing about the simulated marriage, Caius remains in doubt whether or not he ought to question her. Hence it is asked:

1. What is it to simulate a sacrament?

2. Is it ever lawful to simulate a sacrament?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is simulating a sacrament?

The 29th proposition condemned by Innocent XI asserted: “ Urgent and grave fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments.” This false proposition was applied by its defenders to such cases as the following: To avoid death a priest might utter the words of consecration over all the bread in a baker’s shop without the intention of consecrating it; or the words of absolution over an indisposed penitent without intending to absolve him; or might give a non-consecrated Host to one who was unworthy to communicate. Hence simulating the administration of a sacrament acquired a technical meaning and signified the use of the matter or of the form of a sacrament without the intention of completing and making the sacrament.¹

1 Viva, Damnatae theses.

2. Is it ever lawful to simulate a sacrament?

The absolute condemnation of the above proposition by the Holy See shows that it is never lawful to simulate a sacrament either formally, when deception is intended, or materially, when deception is not intended but only permitted. The chief reason is because by such simulation a portion of a sacred rite instituted by Christ for the making of a sacrament and the conferring of grace on the souls of men, is used without the intention of completing the sacrament. Such an illusory use of a sacred sign is greatly injurious to God, and can not be rendered lawful even by the pressure of grave fear.

3. The case. Agnes should have kept to her resolution of telling the parish priest the truth about her case. Still she was not guilty of simulating the sacrament of marriage, for both the matter and form of this sacrament lie in the consent of the parties, and as Agnes did not consent, she did not simulate marriage in the technical sense. A fortiori Caius did not simulate the sacrament of Penance, for he dismissed her with a blessing. Caius, therefore, was under no obligation of questioning Agnes about the simulation of marriage.