Chapter I. On Intention

I. Notion. Intention is here understood as the deliberate will of confecting a sacrament.

II. Division. Intention is distinguished:

1. By reason of itself into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. Actual intention is had when the minister, at the time at which he confects the sacrament, actually wills to confect it. It is reflex, or rather in actu signato, if there is had an express and formal volition of confecting the sacrament; it is in actu exercito if someone actually wills indeed, but nevertheless less expressly and formally, to confect the sacrament, as if someone, recognizing a rite as a sacrament, administers it under this recognition. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament, and that will, though not actually, nevertheless perseveres virtually, so that he operates by force of the will once had, as if someone, from the intention of celebrating Mass, puts on the vestments and performs the other things, even if perhaps at the time of the ministry he is wholly distracted. Habitual intention exists if someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament and that will has not indeed been retracted, but nevertheless does not persevere virtually. Interpretative intention is had when someone neither actually and explicitly wills nor actually and explicitly has willed to confect a sacrament, but is presumed to be going to will it if thought about it should occur.¹ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15.)

2. By reason of the object into merely external and internal. Merely external intention is had when someone wills and outwardly seriously performs only the external rite, but lacks the mind of confecting a sacrament, or even intends the contrary. It is called merely external because, although in itself it is internal, nevertheless its whole object is external, namely only the placing of the external rite. Internal intention is had when someone wills the external rite insofar as it is sacred, or at least insofar as it is held as such by the Church.

By reason of the object, intention is further distinguished into determinate and indeterminate, according as the thing intended is certain and defined; or is uncertain, as if someone intends to consecrate only ten hosts out of a multitude of hosts.

3. By reason of mode into explicit and implicit, according as someone expressly wills such a sacrament known and thought of, or by a more general will wills such a sacrament, whether not known, or known but not thought of.

By reason of mode it is also distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone intends to confect a sacrament independently of, or dependently upon, some circumstance or event; as if someone absolves another under the condition: if you are attrite; or: if you make restitution.

¹ Some call interpretative the intention which others call implicit habitual intention.

III. The intention required. It is of faith that intention is required, and indeed intention "at least of doing what the Church does."¹ In order that these things may be unfolded and completed, observe the following:

1. In itself, actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices; habitual intention does not suffice, much less interpretative intention; fear, however, does not hinder intention. I said:

a) Actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices. For it must be judged that the intention suffices which truly flows into the act or sacramental rite, and therefore can be called its cause. Such is not only actual intention, but also virtual intention. There is added the fact that actual intention is not always within man's power, and its necessity would give occasion for anxieties about the validity of the sacraments (St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 3;² St. Alphonsus, VI, 17, 18).

Corollary. A priest validly acts who, in the customary way, betakes himself to the baptistery, confessional, or altar and there baptizes, absolves, or consecrates; for there is had at least virtual intention; indeed practically everywhere actual intention is present, even if remiss. Likewise, a priest validly consecrates who has placed on the corporal the hosts to be consecrated, even if at the time of consecration he does not think of them. Indeed, in general it must be said that one imprudently doubts the value of the act who has placed the required rite, unless he has expressly excluded the due intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 18).

b) Habitual intention does not suffice; since it cannot be admitted that an intention suffices which in no way flows into the action of the minister; such is habitual intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16). Much less, as is clear, does interpretative intention suffice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

c) Fear does not hinder, because, as we posit, it does not take away the voluntary (St. Alphonsus, VI, 19). Except, however, Matrimony, as will be said in its place.

2. As regards the object, there is required the intention or will of confecting a sacrament. This is established against those who judge that external intention suffices; in other words, that it suffices for someone outwardly and seriously to place the external rite, even if inwardly he does not will to confect the sacrament. This doctrine, first defended by Roland Bandinelli, and afterwards revived by Ambrosius Catharinus (1553), is today almost commonly abandoned and rightly seems to be rejected. For: 1. as we have said, it is of faith that intention is required in the minister, "at least of doing what the Church does." But these words seem to have to be understood according to the sense which they had in the schools, in other words, of the intention of doing what the Church intends to effect through the rite. 2. Proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, even though inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does."³ Here it seems entirely that there is discussion of one who outwardly and seriously places the external rite. Therefore this does not suffice. 3. The Roman Missal has these words: "If someone has before him eleven hosts and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, ... he does not consecrate, because intention is required,"⁴ namely, as the Missal, according to the obvious sense, supposes, the intention of consecrating, and that a determinate one (St. Alphonsus, VI, 23).

It suffices, however, that the minister implicitly will to confect the sacrament, for example, that he will the rite as sacred, that he will to do what Christ instituted, what the Church does, what is asked by a Christian, etc.

Corollary I. A sacrament is not valid: 1. if someone places the external rite without any intention; this, for example, will have place if someone does not place a human act, as if he baptizes someone in sleep or drunkenness; 2. if someone performs the external rite for the sake of jest, mockery, or mere exercise.

Corollary II. A sacrament can be valid, even if someone does not regard the rite placed by himself as sacramental, provided he truly wills, for example, what Christ instituted, what he who admits the sacrament asks, etc. Hence heresy or infidelity of itself is not a reason for doubting the required intention;⁵ otherwise if there is added hatred of the Christian name, which, for example, we can easily suspect in a Jew.

3. As regards the term, intention must be borne toward a determinate person or matter; yet it suffices that the intention be directed to the person or to the whole matter present, without being directed to the parts individually. But he consecrates invalidly who would will to consecrate ten hosts out of eleven and would not determine those ten.

4. As regards the mode, especially as regards a sacrament to be confected under a condition, several things must be noted:

a) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the present or the past generally is valid or not valid at once, according as the condition is verified or not verified. I said "generally," because it is disputed whether a sacrament conferred under a condition naturally unknowable is valid; as if someone were to absolve another if he were predestined. Further, it seems this must be denied, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human knowledge" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 26).

b) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the future, for example: I absolve you, if you will make restitution, that is, as soon as you shall have made restitution, generally is not valid, neither before nor after the condition has been fulfilled. Not before the condition is fulfilled, because there is not had the intention of confecting the sacrament before the fulfilled condition; not after the condition is fulfilled, because then the matter and form no longer exist (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I said generally, because Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract. But a contract entered into under a condition is perfected when the condition has been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, Session 7, On the Sacraments, canon 11.

² St. Thomas in the cited place indeed says: "Although he who is thinking of something else does not have actual intention, nevertheless he has ... habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament." But St. Alphonsus responds: "By habitual intention here the holy Doctor without doubt understands virtual intention; for immediately after he adds thus: Suppose that when a priest approaches to baptize, he intends to do with respect to the one to be baptized what the Church does; hence if afterwards in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried off to other things, the sacrament is perfected from the force, note well, of the first intention" (VI, 18).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1318.

⁴ De Defectibus, title 7, n. 1.

⁵ Holy Office, 18 December 1872 (Collectanea, n. 1392).