§ I. On the Voluntary in General

4. • DEFINITION. The voluntary, or a voluntary act, is called that which proceeds from the will with intellectual cognition of the end. The reason of this definition is clear from what has just been said, or from the necessity of previous cognition, so that the will can determine itself to an act.

Hence it differs 1. from the willed ¹, which can be the object of the will even when inefficacious, and therefore without being the effect of the same will; thus rain poured upon dry land, as regards the farmer, will be called willed, but not voluntary; 2. from the spontaneous, which is done with merely sensitive and material cognition, and therefore imperfect, and is commonly also attributed to brutes.

¹ The willed, namely, is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends; and this can happen, although the object does not depend on the will as an effect on its cause. I said, can happen; for what we call willed can also proceed from and depend on the will, so that it is both willed and voluntary. Thus, for example, while you move foot or hand, this motion will be called both willed and voluntary to you. Wherefore it hardly appears why the editor of the most recent French edition (Anicii 1873) requires for the notion of the willed that it not proceed from or depend on the will, since nothing is more contrary to the very frequent usage of Theologians.

5. • DIVISION. The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1. Perfect, or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full cognition and full consent of the will. But the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure cognition or imperfect consent ².

² Understand: where full deliberation is not present; in which matter there can be many degrees.

2. Voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. The former is that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will. But the latter is that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors employ this partition only with those acts in which there is something of the voluntary and at the same time of the involuntary; namely, when the affection of the will tends to two things which it cannot have at the same time, and therefore, concerning one, rises efficaciously and embraces it; toward the other, inefficaciously, and therefore leaves this. Concerning one there is will, concerning the other velleity; toward one the will is borne absolutely, but toward the other conditionally, namely if the former is not to be lost; and thence comes the appellation of absolute or simple will, and of will in a certain respect, namely according to some regard or inefficacious complacency.

3. Direct, or indirect ⁴. The former is that which is intended in itself, or per se, that is, that which is the immediate object of the will ⁵, as theft perpetrated by a thief, or killing intended by a malevolent murderer. The latter is called that which is not willed in itself, but in another directly willed, either as effect in cause, or as something connected with it, for example drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone.

⁴ Others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 3), understand by the name of direct and indirect voluntary that which the Author soon designates by the expressions positive and negative voluntary. But the things handed down here express another partition of the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause.

⁵ The immediate object of the will can also be an effect very remote, provided that it too is intended in itself. But you will call voluntary in cause that which is not indeed intended in itself, yet is foreseen to follow.

4. Positive, or negative. The former is said to be that which is from the will itself really acting, or that which requires a positive action, for instance reading. The latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will. Such is the omission of Mass in him who, adverting to the instant celebration of it, nevertheless continues to devote himself to study at home ⁶.

⁶ More briefly and clearly you will say that it is called positive when the will elicits an act; negative, when the will elicits no act, but remains suspended. This distinction is employed when it is asked whether omission can be given without any act of the will. See Suarez on I-II, Treatise V, Disputation 3, Section 2.

5. Express, or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if it is known to be present from some fact or even omission. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he does not oppose them, when otherwise he can and ought to do it ⁷. Hence rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent ⁸.

⁷ In that example you have 1. tacit voluntary, as is clear; 2. voluntary in cause (the Author calls it indirect), insofar as the sins are judged effects of correction omitted by the Superior; and 3. negative voluntary (others with St. Thomas call it indirect), insofar as the effect comes from omission.

⁸ For rightly understanding the axiom, He who is silent seems to consent, these rules can help. I. Someone is judged to consent in favorable matters. II. Likewise one silent where otherwise there intervenes some obligation or necessity of contradicting, and an available faculty for doing it; to this also pertains that saying: Knowledge and patience in those things which are of slight prejudice works consent. III. One silent, if anything is decreed unjustly or less rightly, where deliberation is made by common counsel and vote. IV. Likewise, one asked several things, who is silent concerning one thing while he refuses the rest. V. Add cases from the disposition of law, for example of a son silent in betrothals contracted for him by a parent.

6. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. It is called actual if it proceeds from the will actually influencing, as for example contrition in him who here and now elicits an act of penance. It is virtual if it comes by force of an act previously posited and continuing morally to influence the agent, as absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. It is called habitual if indeed it was once had, and not retracted, but now neither directly nor reflexively influences the will or the act. It is named interpretative if it has been had neither physically nor morally, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived in a Christian manner, is judged to wish to receive extreme Unction ⁹.

⁹ The interpretative voluntary differs from the tacit because in the former there is no consent, in the latter true consent is present. But each is customarily called presumed voluntary, because it is presumed to be present in its own manner.

6. You Will Resolve. - 1. In the same act there can be direct voluntary, or voluntary in itself, indirect voluntary, or voluntary in cause, and involuntary ¹⁰. Example: Titius, seeking Caius his enemy unto death, attacks him, with danger also of injuring his companion, whom he sees associated with him; but with the bullet, besides both, he also strikes Sempronius, whom he neither saw nor could have suspected to be present there. Caius is struck from the direct voluntary of Titius; the companion from the voluntary in cause; and Sempronius apart from every voluntary.

¹⁰ It is clear from the context that involuntary is not here said of what is against the will. Others call it not voluntary rather than involuntary. Otherwise this would have to be said not apart from, but against, the will.

2. Where there is no advertence to a precept, there is no voluntary in relation to it, and therefore no voluntary transgression of the precept, and therefore no sin. - St. Lig., no. 8.

3. Where there is half-full advertence of the mind, you have an act only half-voluntary, which even in violation of a grave precept does not exceed venial sin; thus it happens in those half-asleep, or distracted to other things. Hold the same concerning imperfect consent of the will. - St. Lig., ibid.

4. Some act can be voluntary under one respect, not however under another, according as it is known in one way or another: thus he who kills someone, being ignorant that he is a Priest, commits homicide, but not sacrilege. - St. Lig., ibid.

5. He who violates a grave precept, induced by human fear or threats of companions, posits an act simply voluntary, and indeed gravely sinful in grave matter ¹¹, because he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts unwillingly, and would more gladly not have done this; nevertheless an act of this kind is also involuntary in a certain respect, and therefore becomes less culpable. - St. Lig., no. 21.

¹¹ Too hastily is this resolution placed here, which supposes that known point which will have to be discussed below concerning fear. Therefore, so that the resolution may be true, it must be supposed that the fear 1. did not greatly disturb the use of reason, and 2. does not excuse from observing the precept. For, as will be said below, fear of grave evil not only excuses from an ecclesiastical precept, for example of hearing Mass, but also from a positive divine precept, for example of confessing integrally, indeed even from natural divine law, for example of preserving a secret.

6. Not only actual voluntary, but also merely virtual voluntary influences the morality or validity of an act sufficiently in such a way that it is good or evil, valid or invalid; but otherwise one must speak concerning the habitual and interpretative, as becomes manifest from their definition.

7. Omission can be voluntary ¹², just as a positive act of the will; nevertheless, unless a precept is included, it cannot be imputable unto fault. Thus one omitting Mass on a weekday does not sin. St. Lig., no. 11.

¹² Indeed, even the omission itself, if it is truly voluntary, that is, free, according to the truer doctrine cannot be understood without some act of the will. For it is necessary that the will determine itself to it, and choose it before the opposite. But a determination or election of this kind says a positive act of the will. And the equivocation on which the opposite opinion rests, namely that it admits that free omission happens without any act of the will, you will easily detect from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 71, art. 5).