Defensive and offensive war

351. Declarations. a. War is a fight of multitude with an external multitude, undertaken on account of the common good by public authority.

b. War is distinguished as offensive, which is instituted either for avenging an injury or for recovering possession, and defensive, which is instituted for repelling by force the force brought by another republic.

War differs from a brawl, which is done in a private name and is of few or single persons against few or single persons; it differs from sedition, which is a fight of multitude against multitude in the same republic or city; it differs from a duel, which is a single combat, not of a multitude, and is instituted by agreement.

¹ Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4, II, p. 611 ff.; Meyer, Institutiones iuris nat., II, n. 732 ss.; Kirchenlexikon^2, Krieg.

352. On the lawfulness of war. 1. War, both defensive and offensive, is licit if the due conditions concur. Defensive: for if it is licit for a private man to repel force by force, the same will also be licit for the republic. Offensive: for the law of nature gives to each one the power of prosecuting his right or avenging an injury inflicted by public authority; therefore the same power of prosecuting right or avenging an injury belongs also to a prince if his right has been injured by another prince. But since princes do not have a higher authority, they cannot prosecute their right or avenge an injury inflicted on them except through offensive war.¹

2. In a just war all things are licit which are necessary or apt for obtaining the end, provided they are permitted by the law of nature and by the law of nations. For he who has a right to the end also has a right to the necessary or useful means. Therefore those things which are neither necessary nor useful to the end of war, or which are interdicted by the law of nature or by the law of nations, cannot be inflicted on enemies without injustice, and therefore damage inflicted in this way must be repaired.

Therefore it is licit to prepare ambushes and to employ stratagems, for example, to feign flight; but it is not licit to employ frauds which can be guarded against by no prudence. - It is licit to besiege cities and deprive them of water, to discharge artillery against them, to destroy monasteries and churches if enemies use them to defend themselves; but it is not licit to infect wells or fountains with poison. - It is licit to kill all those fighting against one or existing in arms, of whatever condition, state, or sex, until perfect victory has been obtained; but it is not licit directly to kill the innocent, nor ambassadors, who by the law of nations are inviolable, nor is it licit to suborn assassins who may secretly kill the commander. The innocent, whom it is not licit directly to kill, are children, women, old men, pilgrims, rustics, merchants, etc., who are not found in arms. Captured enemies cannot be killed by today's law of war; for they can be killed insofar as soldiers fighting in an unjust war are guilty of a grave crime, on account of which the penalty of death may be inflicted on them. But in our times fighting soldiers, as compelled men, cannot be considered guilty of a grave crime. - Private goods of enemies by the strict right of war can be given to soldiers as spoil; for citizens of a hostile region are considered participants in the injustice on account of which war is brought. Yet by today's custom it is not licit to give the private goods of enemies as spoil unless a special reason exists, as if some private person or some village had exercised a special hostility.

3. After the owed thing has been recovered, or after the injury has been sufficiently avenged, the victor is bound to accept peace offered on just conditions: for when the just cause ceases, the war becomes unjust. Accidentally, even the conquered is sometimes bound to accept peace, lest he expose himself and his subjects to greater damages.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1.

353. Required conditions. The just conditions under which it is licit to bring war are three:

a. Supreme authority: for if a greater authority is present, this ought to settle the controversy and avenge the injury inflicted.

Yet if the supreme authority either did not wish or were unable to avenge the injury inflicted on a subordinate society, necessity itself seems also to give to the subordinate republic the right of bringing war upon enemies.¹

b. A just and grave cause. The sole just cause of offensive war is an inflicted injury which the enemy refuses to repair. Hence, that war can justly be begun, it is required that satisfaction be demanded from the opposing party; and if it is offered, it must be accepted from justice. A grave cause is one which would outweigh so many evils coming from war both to body and to soul.

Causes of this kind, on account of which it is licit to bring war, are these: a province usurped by an adversary to be recovered; a grave injury inflicted on the republic to be driven away; religion to be protected against aggressors, even against unbelieving peoples who impede the preaching of the faith by expelling or killing missionaries;² a people unjustly oppressed to be defended. For the proposition (62) of the Syllabus is condemned: "The principle which they call non-intervention is to be proclaimed and observed," etc. But just causes are not: enlargement of the kingdom, glory of name, the power of a neighboring prince to be diminished, etc.

c. A morally certain right, if the war is offensive, or at least probable, if the war is defensive. The reason for the first is that the damages coming from war are so many and so great that it is not licit to declare it unless the right to be vindicated is certain; besides, no one can be despoiled or punished unless the unjust possession or delict is certain. The reason for the second is that, for force brought to be justly repelled, it suffices that it be probable that the force is unjustly brought.

There are not lacking authors who say that it suffices that the right of the prince bringing war be probable (Sporer, Azor) or more probable (Suarez, Victoria, St. Alphonsus). Others reject both (Elbel, Holzmann, Laymann, Tamburini). Genicot joins himself to these; citing Waffelaert, he has these things worthy of note (I, n. 383): "If doubt remains about the right, recourse must be had to the arbitration of other princes and especially of the Roman Pontiff: but if the other party wholly rejects this recourse, or refuses to obey the sentence given by the arbiter, then there will already be a certain injury, on account of which it will be licit to declare war."

¹ Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 12, n. 4.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.

354. On soldiers. a. In a certainly unjust war it is not licit to serve as a soldier, and in the conflict itself it is not licit for soldiers to kill enemies, not even for the sake of defense: for they themselves are unjust aggressors. Therefore, if they cannot flee, they ought to see to it that by their blows they strike no one except the air.

b. In doubt concerning the justice of the war, a soldier who is a subject or hired before the war is bound to obey, both because a subject ought to obey unless the sin is certain, and because he ought to presume that the war is just unless the contrary is established.

c. But a soldier who is not a subject, or who is hired after the war has been declared, cannot serve as a soldier unless he is certain of the justice of the war: for since the matter concerns a very grave damage to be inflicted on another, it is not licit to inflict it unless it is established that the war is just. Yet if the war is defensive, a probable judgment concerning the justice of the war also suffices.

d. It is not licit for soldiers fighting in a just war to take away anything from the goods of enemies, except those things which are necessary for sustenance, unless the commander of the war has permitted it. Wherefore those things which have been taken away against the commander's will must of themselves be restored, provided he is unwilling with respect to the taking itself, not only with respect to the violated military discipline.

Although a war cannot be just on both sides, nevertheless it can happen that the soldiers of each side wage war with a safe conscience. For on the one hand grave authors deny that the right of the prince bringing war must be certain; and on the other hand soldiers usually do not know the more hidden causes of the war declared. But the causes which are spread abroad among the common people can seem just to them. Nor are they bound to inquire into the more hidden causes of war unless there is grave suspicion of injustice and at the same time hope of knowing the truth.

Theologians of an earlier time, having made a distinction between just and unjust war, absolutely forbid the plundering of fellow soldiers, and in a just war also of enemies; but they permit the plundering of enemies in an unjust war. In our time, by force of the law of nations or of international conventions, the plundering of the slain is absolutely interdicted; their goods, which can be recognized, pertain to their heirs.

War, or an armed struggle between sovereign states, is defensive when it is undertaken to resist attack; otherwise it is offensive when undertaken to avenge an injury, or in vindication of a right.

When a quarrel has arisen between two sovereign states, if it is clear that one of the parties is in the wrong, it is bound to make reparation to the offended party. In national quarrels, however, this is seldom the case; as a rule, international disputes are matters of great complexity, and it is very difficult to say on which side right and justice lie. In ordinary cases, then, defensive war is always lawful, for if individuals have the right of self-defence the same right must a fortiori be conceded to a sovereign state. Even offensive war is lawful, provided that certain conditions be fulfilled. This is the certain teaching of Catholic theology, although the Church constantly prays to be delivered from all wars and from the terrible evils to which they give rise. Although war is a great evil, yet it is sometimes a hard necessity if still greater evils are to be avoided. For there is no higher tribunal to which sovereign states can have recourse to settle their disputed rights, and nothing is left but the final arbitrament of the sword. In modern times arbitration courts have been established, and they have done useful work, but cases arise in which their aid cannot be invoked with effect.

War.—War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war, rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations, etc.

There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation); (b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the enslavement of a nation).

Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right (e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of one’s country).

Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it declared war.

War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34). Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).

Certain sayings of our Lord—for example, that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)—are not an endorsement of extreme pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor. Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals. The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace, but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would be set on iniquity.

Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

What public authority has the right to declare war? (a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power—that is, the person or body in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the nation—can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause for war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. “A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right, charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of war.

Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.

Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are tyrannized over by their government.

Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?

(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or polygamous.

(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades, which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a casus belli; for in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however, hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the controversy.

It is possible that there should be objective justice and injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory, but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if causes are traced farther back.

What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.—It is clear that those charged with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many—not merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.—It is also clear that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.—Prudence demands that, even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.—Even if the cause is just and the war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means. Hence, pacific means—such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.—should be tried in the first place.

The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.—(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake (such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense. (b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of national policy, indicates progress for this view.

What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral. (b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international law.

It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war, massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.

The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

Acts of War and Sacred Times.—(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at those times.

Acts of War and Sacred Places.—(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

Acts of War and Sacred Persons.—(a) It is lawful for clerics to cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.—(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without hastening the decision.

The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.—(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect (see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford, S.J. (Theological Studies, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.

The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.—(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel or break faith.

Imprisonment and Restraint.—(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.—(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery? (a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In modern times and according to present international law, looting is strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

What is war? War is a fight of a multitude against an external multitude, undertaken by the legitimate authority of Princes, for defending the good of the commonwealth or for vindicating an injury inflicted upon it. War differs from a brawl because a brawl is a fight between private persons, of a few or of individuals against a few or individuals. It differs from sedition, because sedition is the attack of a multitude against a multitude in the same commonwealth or society. A brawl proceeds from an inordinate will. And therefore a brawl always imports sin. And in him indeed who unjustly attacks another, it is per se mortal sin; for to inflict harm on a neighbor, even by natural work, is not without mortal sin. But because sedition has a special good to which it is opposed, namely the unity and peace of the multitude, it is a special sin. It is opposed to justice and to the common good, insofar as it inflicts harm on the commonwealth and its citizens. "And therefore from its genus it is mortal sin, and so much the more grave as the common good which is attacked through sedition is greater than private good.... But those who defend the common good by resisting them are not to be called seditious, just as neither are those who defend themselves called brawlers." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1.

How many kinds of war are there? One war is defensive, another offensive. Offensive war pertains to vindicative justice, and cannot be instituted except by the authority of the supreme Prince. But defensive war looks only to this, that force brought by another commonwealth be repelled by force. "Moreover, since all laws permit force unjustly brought to be repelled by force, hence defensive war can be undertaken not only by public authority, but also by private authority of those invaded by the enemy, as is found in L. 3 ff. de Iust. et iur. Meanwhile, however, between war undertaken by private and public authority there is this distinction: that those fighting in defensive war by private authority are bound to the moderation of blameless defense, stopping in only necessary and sufficient defense; on the contrary, those fighting in defensive war undertaken by public authority can justly proceed further offensively to vengeance for the injury inflicted." Struggl 40; L. 402; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1.

407. • War is a fight of a multitude against a multitude foreign to the Republic, for the cause of defending or vindicating the Republic.

Hence it differs: 1. from a brawl, which is the fight of a few against a few; 2. from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against the political society to which it pertains.

War is distinguished as: 1. offensive, if it is done for vindicating an injury; 2. defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

Principles. - I. War per se is lawful, whether for repelling an injury, or for vindicating one's own right. The reason is that any society independent from another society must have a means of protecting itself against injury and vindicating its own right; but sometimes no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. Indeed, since higher tribunals are lacking to which Nations or Princes can have recourse, it remains only that they use war for obtaining satisfaction from another society. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 40, art. 1, and others.

II. For a just and lawful war, the following are necessarily required:

1. Legitimate authority, that is, supreme, acknowledging no other Superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this must judge concerning the dispute.

2. A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences going to follow from the war; for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury to the Republic to be driven away, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, etc.

3. The due manner of waging war, namely that before war fitting satisfaction be demanded from the adverse party; if this is offered, it must be accepted from justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - St. Thomas, ibid. - Billuart, etc.

1. LAWFULNESS OF WAR.—What self-defense is for the individual, that war (bellum) is for society or the State, namely, the act of warding off unjust attacks or of asserting important rights by force of arms.¹

¹ J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 418: “War is the struggle of a multitude against an external multitude for the purpose of defending or vindicating the commonwealth. Hence it differs: 1. From a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2. From sedition, which is a disturbance or conflict of a multitude against political society.”

The purpose of war, therefore, is to protect the material, moral, and spiritual possessions of a nation, such as religion, liberty, independence, honor, good name, its right and power to conclude treaties, etc. When war is waged within the limits of a just self-defense, that is, after all other means to preserve the peace² (such as diplo- matic negotiations, arbitration, reprisals, blockade, etc.) have proved ineffective, and the sword has become the final and inevitable arbiter, and if the moderamen inculpatae tutelae is duly observed, war is not only morally lawful, but may be a social duty, and participation therein may become a highly meritorious act.³

² Cfr. Deut. XX, 10.—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 419: “For a just and lawful war the following are required: 1. Public authority, that is, supreme authority acknowledging no other superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a higher authority exists, it must judge the dispute; 2. A just and grave cause which outweighs the disadvantages that will follow from the war, e. g., a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury done to the commonwealth to be repelled, or a rebellion of subjects to be suppressed, etc.; 3. The proper manner of waging war, namely, that before war adequate satisfaction be demanded from the opposing party, and if it is offered, it must be accepted as a matter of justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just.” N. 424: “A prince, once the justice of a war has been recognized, must present it to the opposing party and cannot begin the war, if adequate satisfaction is offered to him; indeed, even a war already begun he is bound to abandon when adequate satisfaction is offered, if not from the rigor of justice, at least generally from charity, provided the other party is willing to compensate all expenses already incurred and it is not necessary for the public good that it be repelled.”

³ Cfr. Judg. XI, 27.—Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 419: “War is of itself permissible either to repel an injury or to vindicate one's right. The reason is that every society independent of another society must have a means of protecting itself against injury and vindicating its right. Sometimes, however, no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. For since higher authorities to whom nations or princes might have recourse are lacking, they may wage war to obtain satisfaction from another society.”

God repeatedly commanded His Chosen People to wage war against their enemies and lent them His special assistance and co-operation.⁴ St. John baptized soldiers, but neither he nor Christ Himself required of them that they renounce their profession;⁵ all they asked of them was, to “do violence to no man,” i. e. abstain from injustice.⁶ St. Paul says that the civil authority, as the representative of God, has the right of wielding the sword in order to protect law and order against domestic evil-doers and foreign enemies.⁷

⁴ Ex. XIV, 13 sq.; Deut. I, 29 sq.; III, 21 sqq.—Cfr. F. Schwally, Semitische Kriegsaltertümer, Leipzig 1901, 1. Heft, pp. 3 sqq.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “Otherwise John, when soldiers came to him to be baptized, saying, ‘And what shall we do?’ would have answered them: ‘Cast away your arms, abandon this military service, strike no one, wound no one, lay no one low.’ But because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not murderers but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries but defenders of the public safety, he answered them: ‘Do violence to no one,’” etc. (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447.) IDEM, Epist. 189 (al. 205), n. 4: “Do not think that no one who serves under arms in war can please God. Holy David was among them, to whom the Lord bore such great testimony; among them also were very many righteous men of that time. . . . John certainly did not forbid those soldiers to serve under arms whom he instructed that their own pay ought to suffice.” (P. L., XXXIII, 855).

⁶ Luke III, 14; Acts X, 1 sqq.

⁷ Rom. XIII, 1–5; cfr. John XIX, 10 sqq.

If some of the Church Fathers objected to Christians serving as soldiers, they did so for the reason that the life of a soldier in their days was full of danger to faith and morals, and that the ancient State, with its emperor-worship, was essentially pagan. There is sufficient evidence to show that the early Christians acknowledged legitimate warfare as morally licit.⁸ The canonical law exempting clerics from military service was based upon the supernatural and pacific character of their office.⁹ The Church not only admits that war may be just, but she admonishes her children to fight for their highest and most sacred possessions.¹⁰

⁸ Cfr. Ch. Lupus, De Antiqua Disciplina Christianae Militiae, XI (Opera Omnia, Venice ed., 1729), pp. 94 sqq.—Hefele, Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 20 sqq.—K. Künstle, Zwei Dokumente zur altchristlichen Militärseelsorge, Mayence 1900, pp. 3 sqq.—A. Bigelmair, Die Beteiligung der Christen am öffentlichen Leben, Munich, 1902.—A. Harnack, Militia Christi, Tübingen 1905, pp. 46 sqq.

⁹ Syllabus Errorum, n. 32 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1732).—C. Richert, Die Anfänge der Irregularitäten, Freiburg 1901, pp. 114 sqq.

¹⁰ Errores M. Lutheri damn. a Leone X, n. 34 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 774).

2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES.—a) Every just war is by its very definition defensive (bellum defensivum), because war is permitted only as an extreme means of self-help or to protect a na- tion's legitimate rights or interests. It does not, however, follow that when a State is unjustly menaced in its vital interests,—be they material, moral, or spiritual,—it is not permitted to make use of its right per modum praeventionis, i. e., to forestall a threatening attack, for instance, by occupying foreign territory, compelling enemy troops to lay down their arms, cutting off their supplies, destroying fortifications, and so forth. Such a war, though seemingly offensive, would in reality be defensive, for the justice of a war depends not upon its physical, but upon its moral authorship. It is also licit and therefore just, nay, it may even be a duty for a nation to assist another, especially an allied nation, in warding off an unjust attack.

The socalled principle of non-intervention, that is, non-interference of a State in hostilities between other States, unless its own territory or rights are attacked, may be justifiable from a purely political point of view, but not morally,¹¹ because if a nation unjustly attacks another, all others are threatened in their very existence, and under the law of nations every State is in duty bound to protect right and justice. Intervention, if exercised in accordance with the principles of morality, constitutes an effective support of international law and order. For the rest, its exercise in most cases will not entail war, but merely lead to diplomatic negotiations.

¹¹ Syllabus Errorum, n. 62: “The principle which they call that of non-intervention must be proclaimed and observed.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1762).—Cfr. M. Pachtler, S. J., “Das Prinzip der Nichtintervention,” in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. I (1871), pp. 107 sqq., 196 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. II, pp. 353 sqq.; Vol. III, pp. 22 sqq.

b) The moderamen inculpatae tutelae must be kept inviolate even in a just war. Consequently, war may not be continued longer than is necessary to accomplish its object, that is, until full satisfaction or reparation has been obtained and peace secured. Disregard of this principle would be a violation of the moral law of nature and involve the duty of restitution. To undertake or continue a war solely for the acquisition of territory or as a preventive of internal dissensions would be positively criminal.¹²

¹² Osee V, 13.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. IV, c. 6: “To bring wars upon neighboring peoples and thence proceed against others, and from mere lust for dominion to crush and subjugate peoples who do not trouble one—what else should this be called but grand robbery?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 116 sq.).—Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “What is blamed in war? Is it that those who will die sometime die, so that those who will live in peace may be subdued? To censure this belongs to the timid, not to the religious. The desire to harm, the cruelty of vengeance, an unpacified and implacable spirit, the savagery of rebellion, the lust for domination, and anything similar—these are the things rightly blamed in wars.” (P. L., XLII, 447).

Secondly, not all is fair in war. Absolutely damnable and illicit means of warfare are: lying, perjury, the intentional dissemination of false reports, e. g., of faked victories. Among the licit means are: espionage, stratagems, ambuscades, etc.; these are allowed because they are not based on lies pure and simple, but merely furnish the enemy an occasion for drawing false conclusions.

Third, the means employed in warfare must not be more cruel than is necessary for the successful termination of the bloody struggle.

It goes without saying that the direct slaying of innocent and unarmed persons, such as women, children, and old men, or the dishonoring of women can never be justified under any pretext.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40, art. 3: “It is permissible in war to prepare ambushes and employ stratagems, so that enemies may be deceived by ruses and cast into various dangers. For these things are not reckoned lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since such means are customarily employed in war; thus it is permissible to feign flight, to use the enemy's standards, etc. But those deceptions are illicit which cannot be guarded against by any prudence, e. g., to poison wells and springs, etc. For these things, in common judgment, conflict with the laws of war.”

Fourth, the right to kill the enemy or damage his property belongs to individual soldiers or single divisions of an army only in so far as they have been authorized to proceed by legitimate authority. Therefore, if an army, or any single division thereof, marches through enemy territory plundering and robbing the populace, without the express or at least implicit authorization of its commander, it is no better than a band of marauders and its members are bound to restitution. Officers bearing a flag of truce are inviolable.

c) In addition to these general principles, derived from the moral law of nature, the so-called international law has laid down others which deserve mention. One of these is that the laws of war apply only to active combatants, i. e., persons actually wielding or entitled to wield arms. Hence it is not allowed to kill a disarmed or captured soldier. Non-combatants engaged in the service of an army, such as chaplains, physicians, nurses, etc., may not be killed, but they may be made captives. Prisoners of war should be treated humanely, but not better than the soldiers of one's own army, lest cowardly members of the latter be tempted to surrender. Weapons which render war more cruel without hastening the decision are forbidden. To this class belong explosive hand guns, poisoned arrows, poison substances, the poisoning of wells, etc. Those living peaceably in enemy territory should not be treated harshly and their property should be spared unless it is needed to enable the invading army to live. The retention of hostages, the devastation of the country, the destruction of crops, the burning of dwelling houses and other necessities of life are permissible only in exceptional cases, when necessary for the carrying out of an important operation or to overcome the hostile attitude of the populace. Wounded soldiers who are no longer able to fight should be protected against attacks upon their person.¹⁴

¹⁴ Of the barbarities of war Fr. Ross justly says: “Once the dogs of war are let loose, it is difficult to keep them within the bounds of civilized Christian custom. The records of Sherman's march to the sea, of English conduct in the Sepoy rebellion, of our water cure and other tortures in the Philippines, of the international intervention in China during the Boxer rebellion, do not make us very proud of humanity. There is an old saying, ‘Scratch an Englishman and you find a barbarian,’ and this is equally true of the Germans, French, Italians, and Americans.” (Christian Ethics, pp. 426 sq.).

Under the Geneva Convention, of August 22, 1864, all military hospitals and ambulances with their attendants, physicians and nurses, when carrying the Red Cross, as well as all buildings containing wounded soldiers who display the Red Cross flag, are neutral and must not be attacked or molested. Citizens who receive wounded war victims into their houses shall be excused from quartering troops and also, partially, from paying war contributions.¹⁵

¹⁵ H. Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino, Geneva 1862; 2nd ed., Paris 1871; C. Lueder, Die Genfer Konvention, Erlangen 1876; H. Lammasch, Die Fortbildung des Völkerrechts durch die Haager Konferenz, Stuttgart and Vienna 1900; A. Zorn, Das Kriegsrecht zu Lande in seiner neuesten Gestaltung, Berlin 1906; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 430 sq.; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, Boston 1909.

The use of savages or convicted criminals is morally objectionable, because they are apt to disregard the laws of war. Attempts to induce enemy soldiers to break their oath of loyalty or to rebel against their superiors are likewise inadmissible.

d) Voluntary participation in a war which one regards as unjust is sinful. Since, however, the individual citizen is rarely in a position to form a reliable judgment concerning the justice or injustice of a war, and since, moreover, a soldier employed or drafted by the government (miles subditus) has not the right to question the justice of an international quarrel, he must obey his supe- rior officers even though he doubts the justice of the cause. But he is never permitted to co-operate in manifest injustice or criminal acts of violence, e. g., the maltreatment of peaceful non-combatants or the killing of soldiers who have unconditionally surrendered. Mercenaries (milites conducti), who have been hired before the outbreak of a war, may take part therein even if they doubt its justice. The case is different with those who volunteer their services after the war has started (milites nondum conducti); if they are in doubt as to the justice of the cause in which they intend to enlist, they are in duty bound to obtain certainty, for no man is permitted to co-operate in an unjust cause.¹⁶

¹⁶ Rom. XIII, 1 sqq.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “And for this purpose taxes are paid (Mt. 22, 21), so that, because of wars, pay may necessarily be furnished to the soldier.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447).—IDEM, ibid., c. 75: “When a just man happens to serve as a soldier under a king who is even a sacrilegious man, he can rightly wage war at that king's command while preserving the order of civic peace: either it is certain that what is commanded of him is not contrary to God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is; so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, while the order of serving shows the soldier innocent.” (P. L., XLII, 448).—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 421: “It is asked whether soldiers may wage war while in doubt about the justice of the war. The answer is: 1. If the question concerns a subject soldier, he is bound to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not belong to him to examine the reasons of his superiors. 2. If the question concerns a soldier hired before war was declared, he may obey; for he is hired for this, and therefore must conduct himself almost as if he were a subject. 3. If the question concerns a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire into the justice of the war and cannot place himself in doubt about its justice. The reason is that no one can co-operate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses unless he is certain that it is possessed by him unjustly.”

The causes of war are as a rule hidden to the ordinary citizen, nay ofttimes even to the better informed and more sensitive organs of public opinion. Ordinarily, the private citizen may and should presume that his country is right. The question how far his duty of obedience goes, and for what acts of violence he may allow himself to be used, are answered by the ius belli, but its provisions are of little practical importance, because in case of doubt every citizen will naturally submit his subjective opinion to the supposedly more enlightened judgment of the authorities.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 469 sqq.; Ross, Christian Ethics, p. 440.

3. MORAL ESTIMATE OF WAR.—a) Just war is not only permissible as an act of self-defense, but it may be useful for the punishment of injustice, the restoration of law and order, and as an instrument of correction in the hands of God.¹⁸

¹⁸ Judg. II, 20 sqq.; III, 1 sqq.; Is. X, 5 sqq.; 2 Macch. V, 17 sq.

Nor can it be denied that a number of noble virtues, e. g., loyalty, courage, self-sacrifice, fidelity to duty, are developed by and in war, and that bloody conflicts with other nations often strengthen the moral and religious fibre of a nation and promote patriotism. A war waged against savage tribes, may, moreover, serve the purpose of genuine culture and the legitimate needs of colonization.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cfr. Horace, Epist., l. II, 1, 156 sq.: “Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio.”

b) On the other hand, though a just war may prove a moral blessing for a nation or for humanity at large, even the justest war is in- variably accompanied by so many horrors and barbarities, and entails so much material and moral destruction that it must be regarded as an evil and a terrible scourge. Though the Bible acknowledges the legitimacy of war and of the military profession, there are many passages in both Testaments which point to lasting peace as the final goal for the human race to strive after.²⁰ War does not fit into the ideal picture of international intercourse. Its existence and relative necessity is merely a sad proof how little even Christian nations are actuated by the spirit of charity, peace, and justice. The highest good of the State, the ideal political condition of a people, is that “rest from all enemies round about” described in Deuteronomy,²¹ and permanent peace must be the first and foremost aim of every real statesman. Kant's idea of a universal peace²² has no prospect of realization because it is based for the most part upon purely worldly interests or upon so-called humanitarian or philanthropic considerations and motives, which are at bottom utopian, instead of seeking the peace of Christ which the world cannot give.²³ Nevertheless every attempt to settle international difficulties and quarrels by means of arbitration should be hailed with joy. An international tribunal of arbitration might not prevent war entirely, but it would postpone the outbreak of hostilities and thus give reason instead of passion an opportunity to speak the last word. Even though war were abolished, it would still be “sweet and meet to die for one's fatherland,”²⁴ and every citizen would have sufficient opportunities to prove his patriotism by faithfully performing his duties towards God and the legitimate civil authorities.

²⁰ Ps. 67, 31; Is. II, 4; Mich. IV, 1 sqq.; Matt. XXIV, 6; Mark XIII, 7; Luke XXI, 9 sq.

²¹ Deut. XII, 9 sq.; XXV, 19. St. Augustine, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “The will ought to have peace, necessity war, so that God may free us from necessity and preserve us in peace. For peace is not sought so that war may be stirred up, but war is waged so that peace may be acquired.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 856).—IDEM, Epist., 229 (al. 262), n. 2: “Great indeed are not only the bravest warriors, and they have their own glory, but also—and this is a truer kind of praise—the most faithful warriors, by whose labors and dangers, with the aid of God who protects and helps, the untamed enemy is conquered and tranquility is procured for the commonwealth and the pacified provinces. But it is of greater glory to kill wars themselves with a word than men with the sword, and to acquire or obtain peace by peace, not by war. For even those who fight, if they are good, undoubtedly seek peace, but nevertheless through blood.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1020).

²² I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg 1795 (edited by K. Kehrbach, Leipsic 1881).—Cfr. F. von Holtzendorff, Die Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens, Berlin 1882.—L. Stein, Das Ideal des ewigen Friedens, Berlin 1896.—Ch. Richet, Les Guerres et la Paix, Paris 1901. K. F. Küster, De Treuga et Pace Dei, Cologne, 1902.—P. Meyer, Die Idee des ewigen Friedens bei Kants Zeitgenossen, Berlin 1903.—K. Geissler, Der Krieg und die sozialen Sünden, Jena 1905.

²³ John XIV, 27; cfr. Judith XVI, 3: “The Lord putteth an end to wars.”—St. Leo the Great, Serm., 82 (al. 80), c. 1: “Although [the city of Rome], enlarged by many victories, extended the jurisdiction of your empire by land and sea, nevertheless what military toil subjected to you is less than what Christian peace subjected to you.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 423).

²⁴ Horace, Carm., III, 2, 18: “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”—Cfr. Homer, Ilias, XII, 243.

In striving for international peace it is well for us to realize that there are many strong “interests” that must be vigorously opposed. First of all come the war traders. “Those who en- gage in the sale of materials of war know that it is to their advantage to foster the military spirit. The more one nation spends on preparation, the more the others are forced to spend. It is an endless chain. A few individuals are enriched, but the vast majority suffer from such enormous expenditure in unproductive ways. Perhaps the problem could be partly solved by the various governments taking over the munition factories. But the solution is problematical and at best would be merely partial. For only a completely socialized State could take over all the industries directly and indirectly depending upon war. A hardly less important expression of commercialism versus peace is found in yellow journalism. Newspapers recognize that in order to sell large editions they must exaggerate. As a consequence they are absolutely conscienceless in dressing up reports of differences between nations. Again, there arises in the popular mind induced by this irresponsible journalism a certain spread-eagleism, an attitude that sees no fault in one's own nation, but faults innumerable in others—a loud-mouthed patriotism [rectius: jingoism] that is ready to call every man a traitor who happens to advocate peaceful methods. . . . This evil of yellow journalism tends to grow worse and worse. New forms of exaggeration, new appeals to this false patri- otism must be constantly devised; for as one form grows stale, it becomes useless from a journalistic standpoint. And so one fosters the other. The public, weary of the drab dullness of everyday life, demands of the newspapers a certain amount of sensationalism and grows more rampant the more it gets.”²⁵

²⁵ J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 436 sqq.

READINGS.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74–78.—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 4 to 6.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, I, 407 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 402–411 (ed. Gaudé, I, 659 sqq.).—H. Grotius, De Iure Belli et Pacis, Amsterdam 1712.—J. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, pp. 462 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. III, pp. 417 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 468 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 741 sqq.—F. Kattenbusch, Das sittliche Recht des Krieges, Giessen 1906.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 663 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 191 sqq.—Chs. Macksey, S.J., art. “War” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, pp. 546–550.

S. Th. II-II, q. 40.

272. War is a means of defending the common good of the political community against foreign enemies: namely, the public taking up of arms for the sake of protecting or vindicating the commonwealth. It can be defined: a conflict by force and arms between two or more nations; or the fight of a multitude or commonwealth with a foreign multitude or commonwealth, undertaken by public authority for the common good.

It differs: a) from a brawl, which is undertaken in a private capacity and is of one or a few against one or a few, and not always with arms;

b) from a duel, which is a contest with arms, but singular, not of a multitude, and is instituted by agreement;

c) from sedition, which is an uprising or conflict of a multitude against the prince, or against the political society to which it belongs, or the fight of a multitude against a multitude in the same community; whence it is, as it were, civil war.

Hence St. Thomas, q. 42, a. 1: "War properly is against foreign enemies, as of a multitude against a multitude; but a brawl is of one against one, or of few against few; sedition, however, is properly among the parts of one multitude disagreeing among themselves, for instance, when one part of the political community is stirred up in tumult against another."

War is either offensive, when it is undertaken to avenge or obtain reparation for an injury inflicted by another nation; or defensive, when it is sustained for repelling unjust force by force, namely, an aggression made by another prince or kingdom, or for warding off an injury which is being inflicted here and now.

Ordinarily offensive war is waged by him who first begins hostilities; not always, however, because sometimes an apparent aggression is nothing other than necessary defense.

War can be defined : «A clash by force and arms between two hostile armies.» By which it differs from a duel, which is a clash of one against one.

War is twofold : offensive, which is for obtaining satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and defensive, which is for repelling an injury being inflicted.

strike no one, wound no one; but because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not homicides, but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries, but defenders of the public safety: he answered them: shake no one down, etc.; but be content with your wages.

John the Baptist was certainly speaking on behalf of men even of the New Testament; for he was the precursor of Christ.

IT IS PROVED secondly from the Heroes, praised in Scripture as saints, who waged wars: thus Abraham, Moses, Josue, Gedeon, Sampson, David, Josias, the Machabees, and others.

IT IS PROVED thirdly from holy Pontiffs, who praised wars waged by Christians, or urged that they be waged: Damasus, in Theodorus book 5, chapter 10; Gregory book 1, epistle 72; Chrysostom on Psalm 45; Nazianzen oration 3, on peace; Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapters 40 and 41; Jerome on Micheas 4; see the Holy Doctor in the sermons of the Hexaemeron.

IT IS PROVED by reason, D. Bonaventure at the place cited, drawing on Aristotle 7 Politics, chapter 14, and D. Augustine epistle 207: because peace is necessary to the human commonwealth, that we and ours may have the means of living; but this is often impeded by acts of violence, which cannot otherwise be repelled than by war; and it is a law of nature that we repel violence, whence the opposing arguments collapse.

The Holy Doctor confirms all this on Luke 6, in these words: and he who strikes you on the cheek, etc., from D. Augustine book 1 of the City of God, chapter 21, where he says, expounding that precept: Thou shalt not kill: Against this precept they did not act who, by God's authority, waged wars, or who, bearing the person of public power, and according to its laws — that is, by the most just command of reason — punished criminals with death.

It is confirmed from the chapter Fortitudo 23, question 3, which is by D. Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapter 27: Fortitude, which either defends the fatherland from barbarians in war, or at home defends the weak, or one's companions from robbers, is full of justice.

YOU WILL OBJECT first. It was said in Isaias 2 and Micheas 4 that wars are to be put away in the time of grace.

IT IS ANSWERED with D. Ambrose on Psalm 45 and D. Jerome on chapter 4 of Micheas, that what was foretold was the peace to come in the whole world at the time of Christ's advent, so that it might be prepared to receive the Gospel.

YOU OBJECT secondly that in the Gospel it is commanded: Matth. 5. Whoever strikes you on one cheek, offer him the other also. Matth. 26. Whoever takes up the sword shall perish by the sword. Rom. 12. Rendering to no one evil for evil.

IT IS ANSWERED from D. Augustine epistle 5 to Marcellinus, that this is forbidden lest it be done by private authority.

TAKE NOTE that in the Council of Nicaea, canon 11, those are condemned who, after first laying down the military belt lest they sacrifice to idols, returned again as a dog to its vomit, serving Pagan Emperors, Diocletian, Licinius, and others, who all dishonored the military belt of Christians unless they sacrificed to idols.

Some Fathers indeed condemn only unjust wars, or those which are occasions of sinning proximately, or dissuade men in religious orders, or urge them to enter religion, etc.

From these you have that wars even against the Turks are lawful; for if God uses the Turks for our exercise, he also uses pestilence and famine, and yet we are bound to defend ourselves, lest they overwhelm the Christian world with superstitious clouds. See Valentia at the place cited and Bellarmine, chapter 16. For the Turks are unjust possessors of Christian kingdoms.